South Sudan: From Conflict to Peace and Back

A significant characteristic of post-Cold War conflicts in Africa was their intractability. With brutal violence and bloodshed, and roots stretched from territory to ethnicity, clashes in the region turned into a colossal assault on humanity. Though many negotiations, mediations, and treaties were endeavoured to resolve the conflicts, none of them could bring lasting peace to the region. In most of the situations, peace was short-lived and conflict re-escalated very soon. South Sudan is one such case where peace was established with high hopes, but optimism is rapidly fading. After one year of relative peace, violence and bloodshed have come back to the streets and villages of the Central African nation. This was evident in the words of the officials and staff of the United Nations and other humanitarian actors in the field that the country is “on the brink of genocide.”1 Spreading violence across the country, even to the regions that were untouched by violence during the decades-long civil war in the past is tangible proof of a genocide in the making.

Conflicts in Sudan and its South

South Sudan is the world’s newest country. It became independent in 2011, after over six decades of irregular warfare between the government of Sudan and various opposition forces, which made the Horn of Africa as one of the deadliest places in the world. The conflict claimed the lives of around 1.5 million people and more than four million people were displaced. The secession movement began right after the independence from the United Kingdom in 1956. The determined resistance by the southern rebels under the umbrella of South Sudanese Liberation Movement (SSLM) resulted in the creation of an autonomous region in the south in 1972. However, this autonomy was later overturned by the Sudanese government, and the north-south conflict came back to life. The second civil war, which started in 1983 with the formation of Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and ended with the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) in 2005, had witnessed many transformations at various junctures; for instance, change of actors, methods, leaders, causes and interests. Finally, it led to the formation of the independent South Sudanese nation in 2011.

However, the present civil war in South Sudan has nothing much to do with the conflict between the North and South. The ongoing conflict began in 2013 as a result of internal power struggles in Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), the ruling party of South Sudan. In July 2013 President Salva Kiir Mayardiit alleged that Vice-president Reik Machar attempted a coup against his government. As a result, the president immediately sacked the cabinet and expelled Riek Machar and his colleagues from the government. Since Kiir and Machar represent two dominant and rival ethnic groups, Dinka and Nuer, the conflict of interest between these two men soon transformed into a bloody civil war, where two ethnic communities slaughtered each other.2 Consequently, the Sudan’s People Liberation Army (SPLA), the national army of South Sudan formed out of former rebel movements also split into several fractions with two dominant segments, one supporting Kiir and the other backing Machar. Targeted killing of civilians and ethnically motivated violence in the central regions of the country, especially in Malakal and Baliet, Jonglei and Upper Nile has invoked the formation of local militia groups and retaliatory attacks. The violence had claimed tens of thousands of lives and millions of South Sudanese became refugees unto the ceasefire. According to UNHCR, around 1.83 million people were displaced internally and 1.17 million South Sudanese fled to neighbouring countries.3 The UN also said that thousands of young girls had been raped and burned alive during the conflict.

Towards Peace

20 months of conflict ended with a peace agreement-Agreement on Resolution of the Conflicts in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS) – between the two parties on 17 August 2015, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia under the auspices of Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD).4 The parties then signed the agreement in Juba, South Sudan on 26 August and it was ratified by the South Sudan National Legislative Assembly on 10 September 2015. In the peace agreement, both parties pledged to end the fighting and promised to work towards “an inclusive and democratic society founded on the rule of law.”5 The parties also agreed to form a Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU) to monitor the implementation of the pact. TGNU proposed power-sharing among the conflicting parties; Kiir and Machar to be president and vice president respectively. Other positions in the government were also distributed among the parties; 53 per cent for Kiir’s party, 33 per cent for SPLA-IO, 7 per cent for former political detainees and 7 for other political outfits.6 Machar and his colleagues who flew to neighbouring Ethiopia returned to Juba in April 2016 and the unity government also marked its beginning with selection of cabinet ministers from two parties.

Though the fighting between the government forces and armed opposition groups continued during the implementation of the peace agreement and formulation of the transitional government, it is possible to say that the IGAD-led deal brought optimism of peace in South Sudan. Many saw the return of Machar as vice president and the creation of the transitional government based on the power-sharing formula as indicators of sustainable peace. However, some mischievous developments in July 2016 destroyed all these hopes, and South Sudan went onto the trajectory of a bloodier civil war.

Reescalation of Conflict and Impending Genocide

From August 2015 to July 2016 repeated breaches of peace agreement were reported across South Sudan. However, none of them have escalated into large-scale conflicts. On 7 July, this relative peace was broken with a clash between the rival forces in Juba. Within days more than 300 people died, and opposition leader Machar and his forces were compelled to leave the capital. Amidst these troubles, on 11 July, President Kiir unilaterally declared a ceasefire and later opposition forces also agreed to it. However, two weeks after ceasefire, on 23 July, Kiir appointed Taban Deng Gai, another prominent leader of SPLM-IO, as the First Vice President to replace Machar. President Kiir also accused Machar of orchestrating a coup. As a result Machar again fled the country to Congo border and later went to Sudan. These developments not only resulted in escalating conflict between government and opposition but initiated new conflict within the SPLM -IO, between Deng Gai and Machar supporters.

The re-escalation of the conflict in July resulted in a humanitarian catastrophe with one million people fleeing to neighbouring countries and three million IDPs. As per a report of Yasmin Sooka to the special session of UNHRC, 4.8 million people in South Sudan need humanitarian assistance for their next meal and survival. In the past three years, 70 per cent of women in the protection camps had been sexually violated, Sooka informed the Council. Moreover, South Sudan’s economy also collapsed with 837 per cent inflation as reported in October 2016.7 The most alarming statement from Yasmin Sooka was “genocide is looming in South Sudan” and an ethnic cleansing is underway.

When we compare the recent conflict that began in July 2016 with the previous conflicts, Sooka is right in her observation. The present conflict is more intensive and massive and also spread to entire South Sudan. During the twenty months of civil war (December 2013-August 2015) the conflicts were concentrated primarily in two states; Unity and Jonglei. Now violent clashes are spreading to Juba, Equatoria, and Lake Region, which were more or less untouched by the past conflicts. Moreover, from a conflict between Nuer and Dinka, the July clashes witnessed the entry of more ethnic groups such as Equatorians, Murle, and Shilluk into the conflict. The magnitude of the violence is also very high in the ongoing conflict, for instance, in Equatoria, 1900 houses were destroyed within one week of the violence broke out. The pattern of atrocities perpetrated against civilians in places such as Akobo, Bor, Bentiu, Juba, and Malakal point toward an ethnically targeted mass carnage never seen before in the history of South Sudan.8 This intensity and magnitude of the violence after re-escalation of civil war in July, and the warnings from humanitarian organisations in the field signal toward an impending genocide in South Sudan.

Why Peace Fails

One of the primary reason for recurrence of violence is the failure of peace agreements to address the real issues of conflict. The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) and Addis Ababa Agreement of August 2015 have many fault lines which potentially contribute to protracted conflict. The problems within the South Sudan Army, which is the predominant reason behind the recurrence of conflict, was, in fact, a fault line in the provisions for Security Sector Reforms (SSR), especially Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration in the CPA and its repetition in Addis Ababa Agreement. South Sudan army includes the group fought against Khartoum, those who fought against SPLA and many other groups as well. As per the CPA provision, the opposing armed groups were forced to join either the Sudanese or South Sudan army. However, the CPA did not suggest any mechanism to integrate these groups into a national army. As a result, these armed groups are still under the command of their leaders. Besides, 60 percent of South Sudan military personnel are from one ethnic group, Nuer. This ethnic dimension, domination of one group, was also not addressed in these peace agreements. Moreover, the disarmament provisions in the accords also backfired and led to re-escalation of the violence across the country. For instance, in many places, the community that was disarmed today was slaughtered by the one that was to disarm next day. Without fixing these fault lines it would be difficult to prevent the impending genocide in South Sudan.

Dr. Rajeesh Kumar is Associate Fellow, ALACUN Centre, IDSA.

• 1. Statement by Yasmin Sooka, Chair of the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan at the 26th Special Session of the UN Human Rights Council, December 14, 2016, at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21028&LangID#sthash.XQocrzxn.dpuf.
• 2. Carlo Koos and Thea Gutschke, “South Sudan’s Newest War: When Two Old Men Divide a Nation,” GIGA Focus, No. 2, 2014, at https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/180522/gf_international_1402.pdf.
• 3. OCHA South Sudan Humanitarian Bulletin, 21 December 2016, http://www.unocha.org/south-sudan/; Also see “UNHCR Operational Update 23/2016,” at http://data.unhcr.org/SouthSudan/documents.php?page=1&view =grid&Country% 5B%5D=251.
• 4. Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is a regional forum created in 1996 with eight countries in the Horn of Africa as members. It focuses on peace, prosperity, and integration of the region.
• 5. “Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan,” Addis Ababa Ethiopia 17 August 2015, at https://unmiss.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/final_proposed_compromise_agreement_for_south_ sudan_conflict.pdf.
• 6. Lauren P. Blanchard, “Conflict in South Sudan and the Challenges Ahead”, CRS Report, September 22, 2016, at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43344.pdf.
• 7. Statement by Yasmin Sooka, n. 1.
• 8. See “UNHCR Operational Update 19/2016,” for a detailed account on the scale of violence in these places, at https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/UNHCR%20SSD%20Operational%20Update%20No%2019%20-%201-15%20October%202016.pdf.