While some experts claim that the October 7 attacks were worse for Israel than 9/11 was for the US,1 few aver that the Hamas strikes could have more devastating long-term impact for global peace and security than 9/11. There is no denying that 9/11 attacks severely impacted global geopolitics, but the 7/10 Hamas strikes might have serious long-term implications for the world’s security architecture, the Western rules-based order and may engender a Cold War redux leading to a wider conflagration.
Undoubtedly, the horrific terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 shocked millions of people around the world, who viewed the devastation unfold on their television screens in real time. In response, the US achieved initial victories in its global war on terror (GWOT), which marked the acme of its global hegemonic might and influence. However, its protracted wars in Afghanistan and Iraq led to greater instability across West Asia with the onset of Arab Spring in 2011 and the rise of ISIS in 2013.
Taking advantage of the US entanglement in West Asia, China and Russia started to rebuild their economic and military might after the virtual collapse of communism and gradually re-emerged as challengers to the Western liberal order, particularly after the 2008 economic meltdown. As the US reluctantly began to withdraw its forces from wars across the ‘larger Middle East’, it ended up ceding power to violent Islamists—Iran-backed Shia parties and militias in Iraq and a resurgent Taliban in Afghanistan.
Thus, the chain of events in the decades following 9/11 showed the gradual erosion of US status and influence as the sole superpower of the world, both in economic and political terms, which is now evident in its ambivalent response to the 7 October attacks.2
In fact, the 7/10 attacks have shaken global geopolitics in more fundamental ways than 9/11. Terrorist forces seem to have shed off their tag of being violent and irrational non-state actors and have risen to the level of proto-state regimes that insidiously work as proxies for emerging powers out to build an anti-West axis.
Unlike the divisive Salafi jihadists, pan-Islamist Shia Iran has started forging alliances not only with Sunni states (the anti-Shia Wahhabis in Saudi Arabia and Qatar) and so-called resistance groups (the Hanafi Hamas and the Zaidi Houthis),3 but also with non-Muslim powers, Russia and China. This has allowed the ‘West vs. Islam’ extremist narrative of the post-9/11 world into becoming a ‘West versus the Rest’ rhetoric, which has the potential of upending the entire global security applecart.
Under the banner of a united ‘Global South’, Russia and China are steadily constructing an anti-West geopolitical bloc, thus setting up former colonised states in Asia and Africa against their erstwhile imperialist masters. By keeping the West mired in West Asia and Africa, the emerging challengers are also staving off global attention from their own wars and conflicts in Ukraine and the South China Sea.
Thus, West Asia has turned into an arena for emerging powers to displace the existing superpower as the regional or international hegemon. In fact, China chose the region for the formal launch of its Global Security Initiative (GSI) last year,4 and has since sought to create a wedge in the US-brokered Abraham Accords of 2020. First, it became the mediator for restoring diplomatic relations between its long-time ally Iran and the new BRICS aspirant, Saudi Arabia. Then, Russia reportedly played its part in bringing the much-reviled Bashar Al-Assad regime back into the fold of the Arab League.5 Finally, China brokered this year a unity deal between all Palestinian factions, including Hamas and Fatah in Beijing, in which the factions agreed to form ‘an interim national unity government’.6
Thus unlike 9/11, which was conducted by largely independent non-state actors like Al-Qaeda, Iran and its proxies (held responsible for the 7/10 attacks) have received both overt and covert support from left-wing groups in the West and new global powers. These strategic alignments might engender more flashpoints for conflict in the rapidly changing Cold War-like global scenario, as exemplified in the recent toppling of Bashar Al-Assad’s regime in Syria.7
Add to this the tactics of lawfare, which has divided the Western bloc and riddled it with several internal contradictions. When the US had launched its Global War on Terrorism in 2001 by toppling the then Taliban regime (that had provided a safe haven to Al-Qaeda), much of the world stood united in its condemnation of the terror attacks and a large majority formally supported US-led invasions of both Afghanistan and Iraq.
But this time, international organisations have appeared to ignore the terrorist atrocities of 7 October attacks, and seem more focused on Israel’s response in Gaza and Lebanon. In fact, the International Criminal Court has issued arrest warrants against Israeli prime minister and former defence minister and surprisingly, many European countries like Belgium, The Netherlands, Ireland, Lithuania, Slovenia and Spain appear ready to comply with this ruling, while France, Germany and Italy have not rejected it outright.
As chinks in the Western bloc continue to widen, the emphasis has shifted from a West-centred ‘rules-based order’ to a supposedly ‘international law-based order’,8 which is merely a ruse as few states comply when the ruling goes against them or their allies.
Thus, in February 2024, China told the International Court of Justice, that the Palestinians’ use of armed struggle to gain independence from foreign and colonial rule was “legitimate” and “well founded” in international law, thus implicitly legitimising Hamas’ terrorism. In his address to the International Court of Justice in The Hague, Chinese representative Ma Xinmin stated:
In pursuit of the right to self-determination, Palestinian people’s use of force to resist foreign oppression and complete the establishment of an independent state is (an) inalienable right well founded in international law.9
Citing resolutions by the UN General Assembly, Beijing’s envoy even asserted that people struggling for self-determination could use “all available means, including armed struggle”.10
Perhaps, the Chinese diplomat failed to recall at that time the plight of the tortured people in Xinjiang (the mainly Muslim Uyghurs) or the harassed Buddhist Tibetans in his own country, who are also struggling against state oppression. China also apparently used South Africa to file a case of genocide against Israel in the International Criminal Court, banking on that country’s credentials as a former victim of apartheid, as opposed to any Muslim state with a dubious human rights record.
It is indeed strange, however, that ANC-led South Africa has denied visit visa to the Dalai Lama thrice in recent years, once stopping him from attending a summit of Nobel laureates in 2014.11 Curiously, the ruling ANC government in South Africa not only has healthy economic ties with China, but even sends its politicians to Beijing for learning non-democratic one party rule.12 This raises questions about South Africa’s own avowed commitment to combat genocide and ethnic cleansing as well as towards its liberal political values.
When the US launched its campaign against Afghanistan and Iraq in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the technological asymmetry between the opposing sides was enormous. However, conflicts following 7/10 attacks show a growing parity even on this front, with Houthi militias shooting down advanced US Reaper drones, and Iran launching Russia-developed hypersonic missiles to penetrate Israel’s air defence systems.
In the uncertain times ahead, India would have to keep a close watch on the unravelling geopolitical order, particularly the dangerous quartet of growing Chinese cooperation with a theocratic Iran (whose top leadership frequently spews out statements against Kashmir),13 jihadist Taliban in Afghanistan and an increasingly radicalised and restive Pakistan. On India’s eastern front, events unfolding in Bangladesh and lingering extremism in some Southeast Asian states constitute a cause for concern. In these circumstances, the support from India’s minority communities and the empowerment of liberal parties and governments in the neighbourhood could help secure our national goals and larger geopolitical interests.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.