Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses
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International Law Matters: Implications of the ICJ Reparations Judgment in the DRC v. Uganda Case

Rajeesh Kumar
Rajeesh Kumar is an Associate Fellow at the Institute, currently working on a project titled “Emerging Powers and the Future of Global Governance: India and International Institutions.” He has PhD… Continue reading International Law Matters: Implications of the ICJ Reparations Judgment in the DRC v. Uganda Case read more
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In February 2022, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ordered Uganda to pay $325 million in reparations to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) for its occupation and plundering of the Ituri region in DRC between 1998 and 2003. The court observed that Uganda had violated international norms and was responsible for the deaths of nearly 15,000 Congolese people. Uganda has to pay the sum in five yearly instalments of US$ 65 million. The ruling is considered the most detailed decision of the United Nations’ top court in war compensation and signifies the occupying powers’ reparation duties for damages resulting from its direct and indirect actions that violate international law. The verdict also highlights the efficacy of international law and ICJ in conflicts between States.

Background and the Timeline of the Case

In 1998, the armed forces of Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda started a conflict in the north-eastern region of the DRC. The conflict soon became the biggest interstate war in modern African history. At one point in time, the war involved the armed forces of nine African countries and nearly 20 armed groups, later known as “Africa’s World War”.1 An estimated 3.8 million people died and millions more were displaced or sought asylum in neighbouring nations. The conflict ended with multiple peace deals signed between the conflicting parties in 2002 and the formation of a transitionary government in 2003.

In June 1999, DRC filed its submission to the ICJ, alleging that armed aggression by Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda constituted a blatant violation of international law. The petition said that their actions had violated the fundamental principles of the UN Charter and of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity. Moreover, the DRC claimed they violated human rights law by committing acts of oppression, including killing, injuring, and abducting DRC nationals. The DRC sought compensation for acts of intentional destruction and plundering and the restitution of national property and resources.2 The Court dismissed the charges against Burundi and Rwanda as neither country recognized its compulsory jurisdiction. The Court also found that the international instruments invoked by the DRC, such as the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, are not applicable since Rwanda and Burundi were not a party to them or had made reservations to them. As a result, the DRC decided to discontinue the proceedings against Burundi and Rwanda and resubmitted a separate lawsuit against Uganda in 2002.

Responding to the DRC’s allegation, Uganda subsequently filed a Counter-Memorial in the Court. Uganda contended that its actions were justified by self-defence: “first, the combined forces of the DRC, Sudan, and anti-Ugandan rebels threatened Uganda’s territorial integrity; second, the DRC had directly commanded and supported the armed groups’ attacks on Uganda; and third, the DRC had tolerated the use of its territory by the armed groups as a base for attacks on Uganda.”3

After considering the submissions and counter-memorials of the parties, in December 2005, the ICJ ruled that Uganda violated the international legal principles of non-use of force and of non-intervention. Moreover, the Court also noted that Uganda had violated its obligations under international humanitarian law.4 In its ruling, the Court stated that Uganda had invaded the DRC, financing and training rebel activities and that it was responsible for all human rights violations committed by its army and the rebels in the DRC territory. The Court also held Uganda accountable for looting the Congo’s natural resources, calling it a crime against international law.5 The ICJ also reserved the right to intervene in future proceedings if the parties could not settle reparations between them.

Though the verdict specified that Uganda was liable for damage to the DRC, the Court requested the parties to decide the nature, form and amount of compensation. As a result, the DRC demanded over US$ 11.3 billion as compensation.6 However, Uganda rejected the claim. After failure of several rounds of negotiations with Uganda, in May 2015, the DRC appealed to the ICJ to determine the amount of reparation owed by Uganda. The Court then resumed the case and appointed independent experts to examine the DRC’s claims of damage, particularly loss of human life, loss of natural resources and property damage.7 Based on expert report, the Court delivered its final Judgment on 9 February 2022, awarding US$ 325 million to the DRC.8

Nonetheless, the ICJ dismissed DRC’s other claims, including compensation for macroeconomic damage and sexual violations, citing a lack of evidence. As a result, the total of the awarded reparations is just around 3 per cent of the amount claimed by DRC, breaks down into US$ 225 million for damages to persons, US$ 40 million for property damage, and another US$ 60 million for damage to the environment and loss of natural resources. The total sum will be paid in annual instalments of US$ 65 million, due on 1 September each year, from 2022 to 2026. The Court also decided that post-judgment interest at a yearly rate of 6 per cent on each instalment on any overdue amount.

Legal Implications of the Judgment

The 9 February 2022 judgment on the DRC v. Uganda case is one of the ICJ’s most significant rulings in recent years. It is also considered the most detailed decision by the ICJ on reparation matters. In addition, the judgment raised many legal questions and revisited some fundamental international legal principles. It includes the legality of the use of force and right of self-defence under international law, the rights and obligations of the occupying power in occupied territories and the dilemma of assessing the damage and liability. Consequently, the judgement underlined the centrality of international law, international humanitarian, and human rights law.

The ICJ found that Uganda’s military actions against the DRC contradicted Article 2(4) requirements of the UN Charter. Article 2(4) prohibits states’ threat or use of force in their international relations. Furthermore, the Court observed that Uganda’s armed aggression did not meet legal and factual circumstances for exercising the right of self-defence stipulated in Article 51 of the UN Charter. ICJ’s observation is significant, particularly in the context of increasing interstate armed conflicts and geopolitical tensions. The judgment shows that the Court has taken the clear view that the prohibition of the use of force in Article 2(4) is a strict one, and it has resisted calls to broaden its view of the scope of self-defence.

Similarly, regarding the question of the belligerent occupation, the judgment underlined the importance of explicit and ascertainable consent of the state where the conflict occurs. The Court also mentioned the roles of non-state armed actors that Uganda supported in the DRC. It is important since the Court has sanctioned a country for how it has worked with rebels.

Another significant development is Court’s invoking the ‘global sum’ doctrine for awarding compensation. The global sum is an approximate sum of damages a court may award by softening the rules of causation to protect a claimant’s rights where the ideal of fairness warrants it.9 It offers a feasible, fair and equitable remedy for claimants that otherwise would not receive compensation for the wrongs committed against them. The global sum approach is undoubtedly a significant development, especially in human rights abuses cases. Here, it is also important to note that the ICJ had taken a different position in the past in similar situations. For instance, in 2007, the Court denied monetary compensation to Bosnia and Herzegovina by saying that the mere declaration of Serbia’s responsibility for not preventing the genocide in Srebrenica was in itself appropriate satisfaction.10 Moreover, since the Court could not rely on any precedent drawn from its case law, it became the sole case in the ICJ’s history in which the Court had to decide the amount of war compensation due.

The judgement also represents a landmark in accountability for resource exploitation in armed conflict. By awarding reparation on the head of damages to natural resources, the Court clarified the rules governing the exploitation of natural resources in armed conflict. On the other, it also exposes the limits of existing international law regulating resource exploitation in armed conflict by dismissing some of the claims by DRC, including deforestation. The substantial gap between DRC’s original claim and the actual awarded sum, the large temporal gap between the ruling on reparations and the judgement on the merits, and ICJ’s dismissal of DRC’s claim for macroeconomic damages are also worthy of attention. Moreover, the ICJ’s lack of enforcement powers in situations of state’s non-compliance with its judgement remains a cause for concern.

Nonetheless, the judgement is undoubtedly historic and destined to act as a precedent for future cases. It once again establishes the fact that international law matters in situations of interstate armed conflicts.

Dr. Rajeesh Kumar is Associate Fellow at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), New Delhi.

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