Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses
मनोहर पर्रिकर रक्षा अध्ययन एवं विश्लेषण संस्थान

From Discord to Dialogue: The Ethiopia–Somalia Peace Agreement

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Introduction

On 11 December 2024, Turkey achieved a significant diplomatic milestone by mediating a landmark reconciliation agreement between Ethiopia and Somalia1. This breakthrough, forged during high-level discussions in Ankara, underscores Turkey’s growing influence in the region. It provides Ethiopia and Somalia with a platform to foster renewed cooperation and mutual progress after nearly a year of escalating tensions. The declaration also has received international support from the UN,2 the US3 and the African Union.4

The roots of the Ethiopia–Somalia discord trace back to January 2024, when Ethiopia signed a contentious Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Somaliland, a self-declared autonomous region within Somalia. The agreement granted Ethiopia a 20-kilometre stretch of Somaliland’s Red Sea coastline to establish a naval base.5 This raised concerns that Ethiopia might formally recognise Somaliland’s independence, a prospect vehemently opposed by Somalia, which saw it as a threat to its territorial integrity. The fallout from the MoU led to the collapse of bilateral relations between the two nations.

The diplomatic crisis polarised the region, drawing sharp lines of alignment. Somalia gained significant backing from Egypt, which promised military assistance, alongside support from Eritrea6 and Djibouti7. Ethiopia, in contrast, secured support from Uganda and Kenya, exacerbating geopolitical tensions in the Horn of Africa.8 Somalia further demanded the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops from its territory by the end of 2024, coinciding with the expiration of the African Union Transition Mission mandate.9 This fraught situation set the stage for external mediation.

Türkiye’s Role as Mediator

In this volatile environment, Türkiye positioned itself as a peacemaker in the Horn of Africa through the ‘Ankara Process’, which sought to address rising tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia. Initiated on 1 July 2024, the process began with high-level discussions involving Ethiopian and Somali officials.10 Further talks took place in August,11 followed by diplomatic engagements on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in September in New York.12 These efforts culminated on 11 December 2024.

According to the Ankara Declaration,13 both Somalia and Ethiopia reaffirmed their commitment to sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity. They agreed to set aside differences and work towards shared prosperity. Somalia recognised Ethiopia’s sacrifices in African Union missions and agreed to provide Ethiopia with assured access to the sea, respecting Somalia’s territorial integrity. Both sides will finalise commercial arrangements through bilateral agreements, with technical negotiations starting by February 2025 and concluding within four months, facilitated by Türkiye.

Assessment

The Ankara Declaration marks a significant step in Ethiopia’s push for Red Sea access, fostering cooperation with Somalia while easing regional tensions. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s diplomatic approach reflects a calculated effort to prioritise Ethiopia’s economic recovery and geopolitical objectives without escalating conflicts. Two years after the devastating Tigray war, which left lasting humanitarian and social challenges, Ethiopia continues to grapple with unrest in Amhara and Oromia and severe economic difficulties. The US$ 3.4 billion IMF deal offers a vital opportunity for stabilisation,14 and the Ankara Declaration creates the policy space needed for Ethiopia to focus on rebuilding its economy rather than intensifying regional conflicts.

For Somalia, the agreement provides a dual advantage—an opportunity to stabilise its precarious security landscape in the face of significant threats from Al Shabaab, and a means to reaffirm its commitment to peaceful conflict resolution. Nevertheless, domestically, the accord may face resistance, with nationalist factions potentially accusing the government of compromising national sovereignty. Moreover, Al Shabaab is likely to exploit the anti-Ethiopian sentiment, a narrative cultivated by both the government and Al Shabaab as part of a broader contest to gain legitimacy. To address these challenges, Somalia’s leadership must adeptly manage domestic dissent and foster consensus around the prospective benefits of the agreement.

Adding to the complexity, Somaliland’s pursuit of international recognition introduces significant challenges to the reconciliation process. Newly elected Somaliland President Abdirahman has strengthened efforts to deepen ties with Ethiopia, while potential US recognition of Somaliland as an independent state under a second Trump administration further complicates Somalia’s position. Conservative policy circles, such as the Project 2025 manifesto,15 have advocated for this recognition, envisioning Somaliland as a strategic site for US intelligence and military operations to counter Chinese influence in the region. Moreover, Somaliland has proposed hosting a US military base near Berbera to secure Red Sea shipping lanes against Houthi threats, a move aligned with its decades-long quest for recognition.16

While the Ankara Declaration remains unclear about Ethiopia’s naval ambitions, President Emmanuel Macron’s visit signals France’s interest in playing a constructive role in Ethiopia’s maritime aspirations. In 2019, Ethiopia entered an agreement with France to develop its naval capacity, signalling its determination to enhance maritime capabilities. However, this collaboration was shortlived, as France withdrew in 2021, citing human rights concerns amid the Tigray civil war.17 Despite this setback, Macron’s recent visit to Ethiopia underscored a willingness to revive ties. Macron’s support reflects an acknowledgment of Ethiopia’s strategic need to access the Red Sea and its commitment to pursuing this goal through peaceful negotiations. Abiy emphasised that discussions with Macron focused on achieving access in a manner respectful of international norms and neighbouring countries’ sovereignty.

Beyond maritime discussions, Macron’s visit also highlighted France’s broader interest in strengthening its influence in Ethiopia. France has provided significant cultural and developmental support, such as funding for the restoration of Ethiopia’s National Palace and UNESCO World Heritage sites like the Rock-Hewn Churches at Lalibela.18 These projects showcase France’s intent to deepen bilateral ties through cultural and technical collaboration. However, this renewed engagement comes at a time when France faces declining influence in Francophone Africa. Countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Senegal and Chad have increasingly rejected French military and political presence, forcing Paris to seek partnerships beyond its traditional strongholds.19 Macron’s overtures to Ethiopia can thus be seen as part of a broader strategy to rebuild France’s image and relevance on the African continent.

Finally, Turkey’s mediation underscores its expanding role as a diplomatic force in Africa. By facilitating this agreement, it has strengthened its reputation as a reliable partner and expressed interest in mediating the Sudan conflict.20 However, the accord’s success is contingent on sustained commitment from all stakeholders, especially amid allegations of violations of the declaration.21 Ethiopia must navigate its relations with Somalia cautiously to prevent renewed tensions, while Somalia’s government must engage nationalist factions and foster domestic consensus by highlighting the agreement’s benefits. Turkey’s continued engagement and international backing will be crucial for its successful implementation.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

Keywords: Ethiopia, Turkey, Somalia
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