Exit of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)

UNAMID’s exit did not emerge from a context of peace or progress towards conflict resolution in Darfur. Instead, the exit decision was essentially the outcome of the reflection that keeping the mission on the ground would not change the situation. Initially, the hybrid peacekeeping model was seen as a paradigm shift in peacekeeping operations, and many hailed it as the future of UN peace operations. However, the UNAMID has proven that cooperation between the UN and regional bodies is a complex issue. If the UN takes the lessons learned in Darfur seriously, UNAMID would probably be the first and last hybrid peacekeeping mission.

On 22 December 2020, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) decided to end its 13-year old peacekeeping mission in Darfur. Resolution 2559, unanimously adopted by the Council, terminated the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) mandate on 31 December 2020.1 The resolution also authorized six months for the Mission to complete the withdrawal of personnel and proposed establishing the United Nations Country Team as part of the transition and drawdown process.   

UNAMID’s exit decision came after the landmark peace deal signed in October 2020 between the Sudanese transitional government and key rebel factions. The peace deal was a sequel to President Omar al-Bashir’s ousting by a pro-democracy revolution in April 2019 and forming a transitionary government four months later. However, while UNAMID leaves Darfur, neither violence has ended nor has the human rights situation improved. It is a significant setback for the UN that the hybrid mission, which was regarded as a paradigm shift and the future of UN peacekeeping, is leaving Darfur without achieving its mandates. 

Darfur Conflict and the AU-UN Peacekeeping Mission

The conflict in Darfur between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) started in 2003. However, its roots and causes can be traced back for decades. Since 2003, the region has witnessed horrific civil war, violence, death, and displacement. According to the UN, from 2033-2020, nearly 300,000 people had lost their lives in Darfur, and about 2.7 million people had fled their homes.2

This massive humanitarian catastrophe has brought international attention to Darfur. African Union (AU) was the lead regional player in mediating the conflict. Demonstrating its strong commitment, the AU took the initiative to establish political negotiations and brokered N’djamena Ceasefire Agreement between the initial two rebel groups and the government of Sudan. In July 2004, AU deployed a peacekeeping force, African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to monitor the ceasefire agreement.

On 5 May 2006, the continuous efforts of the AU with the support of the UN resulted in the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). However, it did not result in the normalisation of the security and political situation in Darfur. Often, challenges and expectations beyond its capabilities confronted AMIS. Its efforts have fallen far short of ending the violence and human rights violations in Darfur. As a result, on 31 July 2007, the UNSC adopted resolution 1769 authorizing a hybrid peacekeeping force in Darfur.3

UNAMID

The African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) was the world’s largest peacekeeping mission for a long period, with its authorized force of 26,000 and nearly 23,500 troops at its peak deployment in 2011. It is also the only peacekeeping operation led jointly by the AU and UN. UNAMID has the mandates under chapter VII to support the effective implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, prevent armed attacks and protect civilians.4 It was also tasked with contributing to security for humanitarian assistance, monitoring and verifying the implementation of agreements, assisting an inclusive political process, and promoting human rights and the rule of law.

The deployment of UNAMID in Darfur has played a positive role in creating relatively improved life conditions in areas of their presence. During its 13-year operation, UNAMID involved more than 100,000 military and police personnel from dozens of countries. According to the UN, the UNAMID helped reduce the number of armed clashes in the region, improve access to previously denied areas, and participated in and enabled several peace talks between the Government of Sudan and armed groups.5 The mission also worked to empower women, address sexual and gender-based violence, and help the locals fight against the COVID-19 pandemic. It also contributed immensely to bringing voices from Darfur, including those of women and civil society representatives, to political discussions.

However, UNAMID has encountered several intense challenges as well. First, the Sudanese government blocked and prevented UNAMID from accessing towns where attacks against civilians occurred. Second, its soldiers have been subject to frequent attacks and brutal killings since the beginning of their mission. UNAMID accounts for the second-highest fatalities in the history of UN peacekeeping, with 295 peacekeepers sacrificing their lives.6 Though it has been there for more than a decade, UNAMID has failed to achieve its benchmark targets such as comprehensive and inclusive peace, enhanced rule of law and improved humanitarian situation.

UNAMID has also shown that cooperation between the UN and regional organisations is a complex issue. During the mission, the UN and the AU often sought to redefine their relationship, particularly the hierarchy of their relations. The two organizations also increasingly claimed different and competing bases of legitimacy. The mission also faced interoperability problems such as incompatible procedures between the UN and the AU.7

Transition and Exit

UNAMID’s transition and exit started as a “process to close the mission in the face of waning international support and overwhelming pressure from an autocratic regime that wanted it gone.”8 On several occasions, the government of Sudan undertook public campaigns demanding the exit of UNAMID. The then President of Sudan, Omar Bashir, often stated that the UNAMID forces could not defend themselves and had become a security burden for his government. He also accused that the troops came to protect the rebellion and not the citizen and demanded its early exit.9 These developments undermined the UNAMID’s effectiveness and relevance.

UN’s decision to cut its peacekeeping budget after the US decided to slash its contributions disproportionately also affected UNAMID, significantly. In 2017, UNAMID was one of the most expensive missions, with an annual approved budget of nearly one billion US dollars. However, in 2018, the UN slashed the UNAMID budget by 58 per cent, from $ 911,000,000 to $525,300,000.10

In July 2013, against the backdrop of lack of progress on the peace process, continuous attacks on UNAMID peacekeepers, and incessant resistance from the local authorities, the Security Council called for a joint AU-UN strategic review of UNAMID.11 The strategic review held in March 2014, for the first time, discussed the idea of UNAMID’s transition. Next year, a tripartite working group of the Sudanese government, AU and UN was set up to develop an exit strategy. In 2017, the UN voted to reduce the number of UNAMID troops by 44 per cent and the number of police by about 27 per cent.12 In 2018, the Security Council resolution 2429 directed UNAMID to draw down its operations in Darfur and reduce its troop ceiling by 54 per cent.13 The resolution also discussed potential exit of the UNAMID in June 2020. Since then, UNAMID has been working with United Nations Country Team (UNCT) in Sudan to prepare for its eventual drawdown and exit.

However, while the UNAMID was preparing to exit Darfur, on the other side, a popular protest began against President al-Bashir, and he declared a state of emergency. In April 2019, al-Bashir was ousted by the military, and a Transitional Military Council (TMC) took over the power. In June 2020, the Security Council extended the mandate of UNAMID till 31 December 2020.14 Moreover, the UN also authorized a new mission, the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS), to assist the political transition in Sudan.15

Conclusion

UNAMID’s exit did not emerge from a context of peace or progress towards conflict resolution in Darfur. Instead, the exit decision was essentially the outcome of the reflection that keeping the mission on the ground would not change the situation. Whereas many past peacekeeping missions were able to exit with a marker of political stability, UNAMID left before the conclusion of an inclusive political settlement. Active fighting continued in the mission’s zone of operations when the drawdown process started, and over 2 million people remained displaced.

Moreover, from the perspective of the UN and AU also, the UNAMID was disappointing. Initially, the hybrid peacekeeping model was seen as a paradigm shift in peacekeeping operations, and many hailed it as the future of UN peace operations. However, the UNAMID has proven that cooperation between the UN and regional bodies is a complex issue. The mission also highlighted the importance of the principle of host-state consent and cooperation in UN peacekeeping operations. If the UN takes the lessons learned in Darfur seriously, UNAMID would probably be the first and last hybrid peacekeeping mission.

*Dr. Rajeesh Kumar is Associate Fellow at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (            MP-IDSA), New Delhi.

• 1. Security Council resolution 2559 (2020) on termination of the mandate of the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) as of 31 Dec. 2020.
• 2. ‘Sudan: Intercommunal clashes displace tens of thousands in volatile Darfur region’, UN News, January 7, 2020, at https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/01/1054911 (Accessed April 15, 2022)
• 3. Security Council resolution 1769 (2007) on establishment of AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID).
• 4. Ibid.
• 5. ‘UNAMID infographic’, United Nations Peacekeeping, at  https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/unamid-infographic (Accessed April 22, 2022)
• 6. ‘Fatalities’, United Nations Peacekeeping, at  https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/fatalities (Accessed August 9, 2022)
• 7. Security Council Report, ‘Working together for Peace and Security in Africa: The Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council,’ Special Research Report No. 2, May 10 2011.
• 8. Daniel Forti, ‘Walking a Tightrope: The Transition from UNAMID to UNITAMS in Sudan’, International Peace Institute, February 2021, at https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Walking_a_Tightrope_Sudan.pdf (Accessed April 15, 2022)
• 9. ‘Sudan’s Bashir slams U.N. peacekeepers, demands they leave’, Reuters, at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sudan-darfur-unamid-idUSKCN0JE0BB20141130 (Accessed March 31, 2022)
• 10. ‘Peacekeeping Budget Approval and Cuts Leave Fundamental Questions Unaddressed’, IPI Global Observatory, at https://theglobalobservatory.org/2018/09/peacekeeping-budget-approval-cuts-questions-unaddressed/ (Accessed August 10, 2022)
• 11. Security Council resolution 2113 (2013) on extension of the mandate of AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) until 31 Aug. 2014.
• 12. Security Council resolution 2363 (2017) on extension of the mandate of the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) until 30 June 2018.
• 13. Security Council resolution 2429 (2018) on extension of the mandate of the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) until 30 June 2019.
• 14. Security Council resolution 2525 (2020) on extension of the mandate of the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) until 31 December 2020.
• 15. Security Council resolution 2524 (2020) on establishment of the Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS).