China’s Strategic Assessment of Japan
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Mayuri Banerjee
Mayuri Banerjee is a Research Analyst with the East Asia Centre at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), New Delhi. Her research focus is on India-China… Continue reading China’s Strategic Assessment of Japan read more
Introduction
The resignation of Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida triggered widespread discussions within the Chinese strategic community over the impending leadership transition in Japan. While China’s Foreign Ministry’s offered a muted response keeping in line with diplomatic protocols,1 active debate has been underway among foreign policy and strategic observers regarding the cause of the change of leadership, possible foreign policy orientation of a new Japanese government and the likely implication on China–Japan ties.
As expressed by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, during a meeting with his Japanese counterpart Yoko Kamikawa in July 2024, Beijing believes that China–Japan ties are at a critical phase.2 Escalating tensions over Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, South China Sea, Taiwan Straits, high-tech export controls, Japan’s discharge of nuclear water from Fukushima plant and China’s ban on import of seafood from Japan are disrupting efforts to maintain a mutually beneficial partnership.3
On account of unresolved territorial issues and geo-economic competition, the friction between the two countries is likely to continue as has been the case over the past decade. China’s response will be shaped largely by Beijing’s assessment of the new Japanese government’s position on three significant issues—Sino-US rivalry; Japan’s military modernisation; and Taiwan Straits.
Japan and Sino-US Rivalry
Chinese strategists see Japan as a key player in Sino-US rivalry. The prevalent opinion among Chinese foreign policy observers is that Japan not only wields considerable diplomatic influence in East and Southeast Asia through its Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) and various other technological and civil assistance programmes but that Tokyo occupies a pivotal role in Washington’s strategy to contain China’s rise in the Indo-Pacific.4 The Japanese Self Defense Force (JSDF) has become central to the US’ strategy to deal with military challenge from China, thus making Japan a frontline state.5
In view of Japan’s geographical location in East Asia, its integration in the US-led post Second World War security architecture, the intensity of economic, technological and strategic cooperation between the two countries, Chinese policy elites have long recognised Japan’s role in the US strategic calculus vis-à-vis China. However, assessing the down turn in Sino-Japanese relations in the recent years, they perceive that Japan has shifted its previous strategic orientation of maintaining a distance from Sino-US rivalry to closely following US strategic guidance regarding China.
Referring to Japan’s criticism of China on human rights, trade policies, military modernisation and instituting US-like technological controls, Chinese observers contend that Japan is increasingly being driven by the China threat theory and like the US, believes China to be a disruptive power.6 In that context, it is surmised that Tokyo probably considers US hegemonic presence in the Indo-Pacific as the ultimate security guarantee against China and therefore will cooperate closely with the US to jointly suppress China. Moreover, besides strengthening anti-China alliance with the US, Japan using the issues of East and South China Sea and the Taiwan Straits could induce the US to get more involved and intervene deeply in East and Southeast Asia, thus deepening Sino-US rivalry.7
Japanese Military Modernisation
Beijing has traditionally been critical of any move by Japanese leaders to amend Article 9 of the Japanese constitution8 or increase the defence budget. Any proposal to dilute the provisions of the peace constitution or to give the SDF more power is claimed by China as Japan’s return to militarism and violation of its post-war commitment to peaceful development. The publication of the National Security Documents in 2022 which declared Tokyo’s intent to increase defence budget and acquire counter-strike capabilities for SDF, citing increasing strategic challenge from China, prompted strong reactions from Beijing.9
The Chinese Embassy in Japan, evoking memory of Japanese aggression during the Second World War, observed that the documents indicated revival of Japanese militarism and departure from post-war peaceful development.10 Similarly, Japan’s 2024 Defense White Paper drew sharp criticism from China. Taking note of the cover which featured swords, Chinese commentators interpreted that Japan departing from the principle of ‘exclusive defense’ is now developing ‘out-of-area defense capabilities’. 11
The trend in Japanese military modernisation has emerged as a point of concern for Chinese analysts and commentators. Seeing this in tandem with Japan’s deepening convergence with the US, they perceive that Japan is engaged in classic hard-balancing tactic through developing both internal and external checks and balances.12 While strengthening its external strategic and military cooperation with the US and other Western countries, Tokyo is simultaneously enhancing its own military power to reduce dependence on the US military power in the long run. As Japan continues to build offensive and pre-emptive attack capabilities, some observers note that rather than being a shield to the US spear, Japan is now aspiring to become a spear itself against Chinese military.13
Taiwan Straits
Fumio Kishida’s statement in 2022, warning that the invasion of Ukraine would be replicated in Taiwan Straits if major powers failed to act together, alarmed Beijing. It was seen as advancing Shinzo Abe’s position that if something happens to Taiwan, it means something happens to Japan and the Japan–US alliance, and that the United States should abandon its “ambiguous strategy” and clarify its position of “protecting Taiwan with force”.14 Chinese strategists argue that Japan’s defence and security policies have undergone major changes, under the Abe government which was continued by the Kishida administration. They note that Japan is constructing a threat scenario of Chinese military invasion of Taiwan in order to mobilise public support at home for military modernisation.15
As the Japanese public opposes departure from the peace constitution and increase in defence budget amidst economic downturn, the Japanese government considers promotion of China threat theory as a means to build public legitimacy for these decisions.16 Further, Japanese strategy is also to make the US commit more strongly to Sino-Japan alliance. Chinese observers believe that Japan is wary of US future intentions to manage Indo-Pacific affairs and rapprochement between Washington and Beijing could lead to failure of US–Japan alliance. Therefore, the prospect of Chinese military invasion could be a binding factor between the two countries.17
While Chinese strategic community agree that Japan intends to use Taiwan as a ‘strategic chess piece’, they are divided over the prospect of Japanese intervention in Taiwan Straits. While some argue that Japan is unlikely to intervene directly in a military conflict in Taiwan straits owing to domestic public opposition, lack of strategic depth and military power,18 certain sections warn that Japan’s increasing military cooperation with US and Tokyo’s military deployments and infrastructure building in the south-west part of the country facing the first island chain indicates Japan’s intent to militarily intervene.19
Conclusion: Key Takeaways
In view of Tokyo’s close alignment with the US, its rapid military modernisation and tough stand on Taiwan, Chinese policy observers’ strategic assessment of Japan is negative. Also, they perceive that there is very less hope of improvement of bilateral ties in the foreseeable future. Although Japan cannot completely decouple from China and continues to be economically dependent, commentators note that Japan has initiated de-risking to allow it more strategic flexibility.
Chinese policy experts also fear that Japan and the US are likely to follow a containment policy against China more vigorously. Further, besides cooperating with the US, Japan is also trying hard to get closer to the EU and NATO, attempting to shrink China’s strategic space. Moreover, Tokyo’s military normalisation could trigger provocative behaviour on behalf of SDF with regard to Taiwan and in the waters of East and South China Sea.
Finally, Chinese commentators warn that in the short-term, Sino-Japanese ties are full of uncertainty and even high-level dialogue could be a delaying tactic to gain more time and space to strengthen military alliances against China.
As Japan is at the cusp of leadership change, these perceptions are likely to increase Chinese policymakers’ distrust of Japan and deepen the political chasm between the two countries. There are apprehensions about a right-wing leadership coming to power resulting in complete departure from the post-Second World War arrangements. In this context, Japan could be the target of further coercive diplomacy and military pressure as Beijing’s security concerns deepen. China is also likely to enhance strategic, economic and technological cooperation with Russia as a counter to Japan–US alliance.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.