As China has emerged as a great power, it has sought to augment its overseas presence in the international arena through measures like the establishment of Confucius Institutes and military bases and access points worldwide.1 The setting up of overseas police stations is a recent development that has invited international scrutiny, sparking serious concerns regarding the breach of international norms and the erosion of host countries’ sovereignty.2
On the surface, the Chinese government has presented these Overseas Police Stations as entities created to assist Chinese citizens abroad, especially in light of the challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic.3 According to Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin, these stations serve as overseas Chinese service centers, catering to the needs of the Chinese diaspora and tourists.4 Supposedly, their primary objective is to provide assistance to Chinese nationals in foreign lands, including support with lost passports, legal issues and various emergencies.
However, the reality behind their operations paints a far more troubling picture. What make these stations particularly concerning are their covert nature and the methods employed by Chinese officials operating within them. The gravity of this issue became even more apparent with the disclosure of startling statistics by China’s Ministry of Public Security. On 14 April 2022, the Vice Minister of the Ministry of Public Security revealed that 210,000 individuals were persuaded to return to China in the previous year.5 This number surged further, with Chinese authorities claiming on 17 August 2022 that between April and July of the same year, they had persuaded more than 230,000 Chinese nationals to return from abroad to face criminal proceedings in China.6
These revelations not only highlight the scale of China’s overseas operations but also underline the urgency of addressing this issue which may be a prelude to a crisis. According to a comprehensive investigation conducted by the European Union registered human rights organisation Safeguard Defenders, which primarily monitors human rights situation in China and Vietnam, these stations have been set up in various countries. They are reportedly functioning in Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, South Africa, Tanzania, the United Kingdom, and the United States.7
It is believed that these Overseas Police Stations are being utilised as tools for coercive measures, employing three distinct methods categorised as Type 1, Type 2 and Type 3.8 In Type 1, Chinese officials from the Ministry of Public Security track down the family members and relatives of individuals living abroad, exerting pressure through intimidation, harassment, detention or even imprisonment. The objective is to persuade these individuals voluntarily to return to China. Type 2 involves direct approaches through online means or undercover agents from the Ministry of State Security within the host country. The last and most alarming method, Type 3, entails the alleged physical abduction of individuals on foreign soil, taking them back to China, where further legal proceedings await.9
These stations, under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Public Security, are therefore being utilised as tools for long-arm policing and transnational repression by the Communist Party of China.10 The methods employed are disconcerting, and are believed to involve coercion, intimidation, harassment and even abduction of Chinese nationals living abroad. These activities are not only a violation of international norms but may also pose a significant threat to the human rights of Chinese citizens residing outside their homeland and rule of law in the host country.
Such mass repatriations challenge the territorial integrity and judicial sovereignty of host nations, undermining their legal autonomy and casting doubt on the adherence to due process and human rights. The unilateral actions by Chinese authorities may strain diplomatic relations, potentially disrupting international cooperation on law enforcement, counter-terrorism and extradition agreements. The lack of transparency in legal processes and the potential for coercion in persuading individuals to return suggest a disregard for established international norms. From a security standpoint, the forcible repatriation poses the risk of transferring sensitive information to Chinese authorities, compromising the security interests of the countries where these individuals have resided.
This alarming trend has not gone unnoticed by the international community. Christopher Wray, Director of the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), expressed his concerns about these police stations while testifying before a U.S. Senate committee in November 2022 when he stated that he was “very concerned about these police stations. We are aware of the existence of these stations.” He emphasised that these stations are unauthorised. Republican U.S. Representative, Mike Gallagher, has called for the shutdown of these stations.11
In the United Kingdom, Yvette Cooper, the then Shadow Secretary of State urged the Home Secretary to make a statement regarding the secret police stations operated by the Chinese Communist Party in the UK. In response, Chris Philp, the Minister for Crime, Policing, and Fire, acknowledged the gravity of the situation. He stated that
these overseas police stations are, of course, of great concern, and our police forces and intelligence agencies are working diligently on this issue. We take a proactive approach to protecting individuals and communities from threats, deploying security measures and guidance where necessary.12
Canada took a strong measure by issuing a ‘cease and desist’ warning in November 2022. It summoned the Chinese ambassador, Cong Peiwu, and conveyed its concerns. Additionally, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police announced investigations into two police stations in Quebec.13
Rita Schwarzeluhr Sutter, the Parliamentary State Secretary for Interior and Community of Germany, highlighted that two police stations of ‘Overseas 110’ remain operational in Germany, violating the country’s sovereignty. ‘Overseas 110’ refers to various extralegal stations established by the Chinese government. She pointed out that these stations are run by individuals with strong connections to the diplomatic missions of the People’s Republic of China who enjoy the trust of the Chinese security authorities. Furthermore, they are involved in Chinese United Front organisations, raising concerns about their activities and influence within Germany.14
Conclusion
The proliferation of China’s Overseas Police Stations underscores the urgent need for international scrutiny and diplomatic actions. The coercive methods employed by these stations are not only a violation of human rights and international law but also a challenge to international security. There is a legitimate fear that these stations may be exploited by the intelligence agents of the Ministry of State Security, further escalating the risks posed by their operations.
The affected countries must hold China accountable. Diplomatic efforts, coupled with legal measures, must be collectively pursued to curb unlawful Chinese actions. Moreover, raising awareness among Chinese nationals about their rights in the host country and establishing support networks are crucial steps in mitigating the impact of any such actions. The presence of China’s Overseas Police Stations is a call to action for all nations to prioritise the protection of persons within their territorial jurisdictions.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
As China has emerged as a great power, it has sought to augment its overseas presence in the international arena through measures like the establishment of Confucius Institutes and military bases and access points worldwide.1 The setting up of overseas police stations is a recent development that has invited international scrutiny, sparking serious concerns regarding the breach of international norms and the erosion of host countries’ sovereignty.2
On the surface, the Chinese government has presented these Overseas Police Stations as entities created to assist Chinese citizens abroad, especially in light of the challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic.3 According to Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin, these stations serve as overseas Chinese service centers, catering to the needs of the Chinese diaspora and tourists.4 Supposedly, their primary objective is to provide assistance to Chinese nationals in foreign lands, including support with lost passports, legal issues and various emergencies.
However, the reality behind their operations paints a far more troubling picture. What make these stations particularly concerning are their covert nature and the methods employed by Chinese officials operating within them. The gravity of this issue became even more apparent with the disclosure of startling statistics by China’s Ministry of Public Security. On 14 April 2022, the Vice Minister of the Ministry of Public Security revealed that 210,000 individuals were persuaded to return to China in the previous year.5 This number surged further, with Chinese authorities claiming on 17 August 2022 that between April and July of the same year, they had persuaded more than 230,000 Chinese nationals to return from abroad to face criminal proceedings in China.6
These revelations not only highlight the scale of China’s overseas operations but also underline the urgency of addressing this issue which may be a prelude to a crisis. According to a comprehensive investigation conducted by the European Union registered human rights organisation Safeguard Defenders, which primarily monitors human rights situation in China and Vietnam, these stations have been set up in various countries. They are reportedly functioning in Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, South Africa, Tanzania, the United Kingdom, and the United States.7
It is believed that these Overseas Police Stations are being utilised as tools for coercive measures, employing three distinct methods categorised as Type 1, Type 2 and Type 3.8 In Type 1, Chinese officials from the Ministry of Public Security track down the family members and relatives of individuals living abroad, exerting pressure through intimidation, harassment, detention or even imprisonment. The objective is to persuade these individuals voluntarily to return to China. Type 2 involves direct approaches through online means or undercover agents from the Ministry of State Security within the host country. The last and most alarming method, Type 3, entails the alleged physical abduction of individuals on foreign soil, taking them back to China, where further legal proceedings await.9
These stations, under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Public Security, are therefore being utilised as tools for long-arm policing and transnational repression by the Communist Party of China.10 The methods employed are disconcerting, and are believed to involve coercion, intimidation, harassment and even abduction of Chinese nationals living abroad. These activities are not only a violation of international norms but may also pose a significant threat to the human rights of Chinese citizens residing outside their homeland and rule of law in the host country.
Such mass repatriations challenge the territorial integrity and judicial sovereignty of host nations, undermining their legal autonomy and casting doubt on the adherence to due process and human rights. The unilateral actions by Chinese authorities may strain diplomatic relations, potentially disrupting international cooperation on law enforcement, counter-terrorism and extradition agreements. The lack of transparency in legal processes and the potential for coercion in persuading individuals to return suggest a disregard for established international norms. From a security standpoint, the forcible repatriation poses the risk of transferring sensitive information to Chinese authorities, compromising the security interests of the countries where these individuals have resided.
This alarming trend has not gone unnoticed by the international community. Christopher Wray, Director of the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), expressed his concerns about these police stations while testifying before a U.S. Senate committee in November 2022 when he stated that he was “very concerned about these police stations. We are aware of the existence of these stations.” He emphasised that these stations are unauthorised. Republican U.S. Representative, Mike Gallagher, has called for the shutdown of these stations.11
In the United Kingdom, Yvette Cooper, the then Shadow Secretary of State urged the Home Secretary to make a statement regarding the secret police stations operated by the Chinese Communist Party in the UK. In response, Chris Philp, the Minister for Crime, Policing, and Fire, acknowledged the gravity of the situation. He stated that
Canada took a strong measure by issuing a ‘cease and desist’ warning in November 2022. It summoned the Chinese ambassador, Cong Peiwu, and conveyed its concerns. Additionally, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police announced investigations into two police stations in Quebec.13
Rita Schwarzeluhr Sutter, the Parliamentary State Secretary for Interior and Community of Germany, highlighted that two police stations of ‘Overseas 110’ remain operational in Germany, violating the country’s sovereignty. ‘Overseas 110’ refers to various extralegal stations established by the Chinese government. She pointed out that these stations are run by individuals with strong connections to the diplomatic missions of the People’s Republic of China who enjoy the trust of the Chinese security authorities. Furthermore, they are involved in Chinese United Front organisations, raising concerns about their activities and influence within Germany.14
Conclusion
The proliferation of China’s Overseas Police Stations underscores the urgent need for international scrutiny and diplomatic actions. The coercive methods employed by these stations are not only a violation of human rights and international law but also a challenge to international security. There is a legitimate fear that these stations may be exploited by the intelligence agents of the Ministry of State Security, further escalating the risks posed by their operations.
The affected countries must hold China accountable. Diplomatic efforts, coupled with legal measures, must be collectively pursued to curb unlawful Chinese actions. Moreover, raising awareness among Chinese nationals about their rights in the host country and establishing support networks are crucial steps in mitigating the impact of any such actions. The presence of China’s Overseas Police Stations is a call to action for all nations to prioritise the protection of persons within their territorial jurisdictions.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.