The Union Government took notice of the current phase of the Naxalite challenge with concern, for the first time, in 1998. Since then, it has been playing a coordinating role among the various affected states to address the challenge. It has also been advising the affected states on ways to deal with the challenge. By 2003, the Union Government had put in place a two-pronged approach to address the Maoist challenge - that of a development response and a security response. However, all along, the Union Government's response has largely been security-centric.

• P. V. Ramana |
• September 2009 |
• Strategic Analysis

Based on interviews with a cross-section of people from the Kashmir Valley including aspirants of self-determination, academics, media persons, members of the civil society, and security forces this article argues that perceptions about identity are central to the conflict in Kashmir Valley. Having successfully stemmed the tide of armed conflict militarily, it is now crucial for the government to take cognizance of and address these issues in an appropriate manner as management of these perceptions will be critical to bringing enduring peace to the Kashmir Valley.

• Arpita Anant |
• September 2009 |
• Strategic Analysis

• Satish Chandra |
• September 2009 |
• Strategic Analysis

• Ali Ahmed |
• September 2009 |
• Strategic Analysis

• Arvind Gupta |
• September 2009 |
• Strategic Analysis

• Ali Ahmed |
• September 2009 |
• Strategic Analysis

• Arvind Gupta |
• September 2009 |
• Strategic Analysis

• Reshmi Kazi |
• September 2009 |
• Strategic Analysis

So far the Chinese have carried out ten nuclear tests which include one underground test, one test of a nuclear-tipped missile and three thermo-nuclear tests. In other words, the Chinese are on a comprehensive weapons programme, which will give them thermo-nuclear warheads from the megaton range down to small yield nuclear weapons of a few kiloton range and even fractional kiloton range. They are now engaged in improving the compactness of their warheads.

• K. Subrahmanyam |
• September 2009 |
• Strategic Analysis

On February 6, 2009, the Pakistani judiciary acquitted Abdul Qadeer (AQ) Khan, the symbol of Pakistani involvement in clandestine nuclear commerce. Since 2004, he had been under house arrest after the proliferation network, linking several countries, including Pakistan, was uncovered. Though he has been put under ‘unspecified security measures’, yet the release of AQ Khan – dubbed by the United States State Department spokesman Gordon Duguid as a ‘serious proliferation risk’ – is considered to be a disturbing development for the non-proliferation regime.

• Rajiv Nayan |
• July 2009 |
• Strategic Analysis