Strategic Analysis

So far the Chinese have carried out ten nuclear tests which include one underground test, one test of a nuclear-tipped missile and three thermo-nuclear tests. In other words, the Chinese are on a comprehensive weapons programme, which will give them thermo-nuclear warheads from the megaton range down to small yield nuclear weapons of a few kiloton range and even fractional kiloton range. They are now engaged in improving the compactness of their warheads.

• K. Subrahmanyam
• September 2009 |
• Strategic Analysis
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After eight years of governance by a Republican Administration, the United States elected a Democrat as its president. The Democrat President, Barack Hussein Obama, assumed presidency and appointed several key officials to implement his agenda. Though some believe that democracy forces political parties to evolve a common agenda and towards consensus on several key issues, there are others who see differences between the Republican agenda and those of Democrats.

• Rajiv Nayan
• September 2009 |
• Strategic Analysis
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This article highlights the changing dynamics of relations between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the People's Liberation Army under the current leadership. While the military in China still remains politically loyal to the Communist Party, specification of the role of the military in the Chinese Constitution, generational changes in the CCP, factional politics, and relative depoliticization of the military are some of the factors suggesting a 'bifurcation' between the party and the military.

• Jagannath P. Panda
• September 2009 |
• Strategic Analysis
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In his April 5 speech in Prague, President Barack Obama made a renewed pledge to push the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) as a practical and immediate step to ‘seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons’. However, global efforts to attain Global Zero as spearheaded by Obama have been interrupted by the refusal of the United States and China to ratify the treaty. The CTBT is also contingent on the approval of the threshold nuclear weapons states – India, Pakistan, and Israel – who have refused to sign and ratify the treaty.

• Reshmi Kazi
• September 2009 |
• Strategic Analysis
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Integration of Maoist combatants into the Nepal Army (NA) has become a contentious issue. Although the stakeholders have agreed on the integration process, they are yet to arrive at a consensus on how to attempt it. They have changed their positions frequently over the issue, which has complicated matters further. The NA holds the view that the lack of conventional training of Maoist combatants, as well as their ideological orientation, would have a serious effect on its professional standards.

• Nihar R. Nayak
• September 2009 |
• Strategic Analysis
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The Road to Copenhagen in December 2009 has two visible signposts. One that reads, ‘The time for climate change action is now’, the other that warns, ‘The road is bumpy’. The first signpost expresses the apocalyptic language that the earth's rising temperatures are poised to set off irreversible consequences if concrete steps are not taken quickly. It suggests that the climate is nearing tipping point. The second signpost forewarns that arriving at a bold, equitable, and binding treaty will not be easy and that the politics of climate change will undermine the science of climate change.

• Uttam Kumar Sinha
• September 2009 |
• Strategic Analysis
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The Union Government took notice of the current phase of the Naxalite challenge with concern, for the first time, in 1998. Since then, it has been playing a coordinating role among the various affected states to address the challenge. It has also been advising the affected states on ways to deal with the challenge. By 2003, the Union Government had put in place a two-pronged approach to address the Maoist challenge - that of a development response and a security response. However, all along, the Union Government's response has largely been security-centric.

• P. V. Ramana
• September 2009 |
• Strategic Analysis
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Linked to the terrorist goal of intimidation of a targeted population, there is an inherent objective to spread fear and undermine the declared values of the targeted political system by pushing a frightened society and government into overreaction. On the other hand, the counter-insurgent state wishes to downplay the impact of the terrorist attack and works towards keeping the morale of the population as well as the security forces intact. In this battle, the media plays an important and influential role.

• Shanthie Mariet D’Souza
• September 2009 |
• Strategic Analysis
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Based on interviews with a cross-section of people from the Kashmir Valley including aspirants of self-determination, academics, media persons, members of the civil society, and security forces this article argues that perceptions about identity are central to the conflict in Kashmir Valley. Having successfully stemmed the tide of armed conflict militarily, it is now crucial for the government to take cognizance of and address these issues in an appropriate manner as management of these perceptions will be critical to bringing enduring peace to the Kashmir Valley.

• Arpita Anant
• September 2009 |
• Strategic Analysis
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The case of Mizoram in India provides informative lessons for conflict resolution. Factors such as addressing the root causes of the conflict, de-escalation in violence, empathizing with the conflicting actor, surrender policy for insurgents, indigenous mediators, absence of peace-spoilers, strengthening of local institutions, formation of a pan-Mizo identity and limited 'use of force' policy all played a role in establishing peace in Mizoram.

• Namrata Goswami
• July 2009 |
• Strategic Analysis
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