Seth G. Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires: America's War in Afghanistan, W.W. Norton & Company, New York, 2010, pp. 430, ISBN 978-0-393-33851-5 (paperback
Forrest E. Morgan, C. Christine Fair, Keith Crane, Christopher S. Chivvis, Samir Puri, and Michael Spirtas, Can United States Secure an Insecure State , RAND Corporation, US, 2010, pp. 232, ISBN 978-0-8330-4807-3 (paperback)
There is no cause for dismay over a growing sense of marginalisation of India in regional and international forums on the Afghan issue. Similarly, the resurgence of the Taliban and increasing Pakistani influence in Afghanistan should be seen as a temporary phenomenon. Sushant Sareen is right in arguing that the ‘turn of events’ in the ‘not so distant future’ could open up possibilities of India playing a larger role in Afghanistan.
There is really never any endgame in Afghanistan and what might appear to be one today will, in all likelihood, be nothing more than the closing of one chapter and the opening of another. Therefore Chandra's contention that the war in Afghanistan has a long way to go is incontestable, and it is in this context that India's options will always remain alive.
Responding to Dr. Vishal Chandra's article ‘India in the Afghan Maze: Search for Options’ allows me the opportunity to update and improve upon the suggestions I had made in my commentary ‘Af-Pak and India's Options in Afghanistan’ (Strategic Analysis, 34(5), 2010, pp. 683–689).
Although General David Petraeus emphatically stated that the United States of America is not in Afghanistan to lose the war, the fact remains that the decade-long war on terror against the Taliban and shadow boxing the al Qaida has lost its aim and purpose, reaching levels of absurdity at a cost of over a trillion dollars and yet the US will not win the war! Every effort of General Petraeus to win will only escalate the conflict and that is not in the best interests of Afghanistan and the US.
As the United States seeks to draw down its security forces in Afghanistan, India faces a serious policy conundrum. It has made, as Vishal Chandra argues, significant developmental and infrastructural investments in the country. If the US military withdrawal is significant, even if not precipitate, it may leave the field open to a reconstitution of the Taliban within the country. Such an outcome will dramatically enhance Pakistani influence in the country and thereby place India's very substantial commitments to date at risk.
The prognoses that it will be long before Afghanistan will be at peace with itself; that the Taliban have raised the cost of the Afghan war for the West; that the growing differences between the West and Kabul have aggravated the prevailing uncertainty over the future of the war; and that the US-led Afghan mission appears unwinnable are all unexceptionable.
The Afghan war has a long way to go. The situation has come to a point where with every passing month one wonders where the war is headed. There can be no doubt that it will be long before Afghanistan will be at peace with itself. At this moment, there does not seem to be any solution to the Afghan crisis. The Taliban and their allies, both Afghan and foreign, have notably succeeded in transforming the war to their advantage.
Migration, a worldwide phenomenon, has often been seen as beneficial for both the sending and receiving countries. However, post-9/11, the phenomenon is seen as a mixed blessing. It is also being realised that it is impossible to check illegal migration unless the sending country cooperates. In South Asia, India has been at the receiving end of the problem of illegal immigration from Bangladesh. This paper argues that such illegal migration is posing a threat to internal security because the issue has not been properly securitised.