The responses to the arguments that I forwarded in my initial essay, ‘China in SAARC? To What Effect?’, have introduced interesting dimensions to this debate. While most of the respondents have agreed with my proposition that it is premature to think about China's entry into the South Asian regionalist project and that it would introduce complex challenges that would be difficult to manage, they disagree with some of the reasons that I have cited.
Is democracy a criterion for the membership of SAARC? It is not. One should not forget that it was General Zia ur Rahman, president of Bangladesh, who had initiated regional cooperation as a part of his strategy to diversify Bangladesh's Indo-centric foreign policy after Sheikh Mujib's assassination. The grouping in the beginning had two monarchs from Nepal and Bhutan, two military dictators from Pakistan and Bangladesh, and one authoritarian ruler from the Maldives, apart from India and Sri Lanka which were democracies as member countries.
‘China in SAARC: To What Effect?’ is a detailed article and the author has elaborated the modest achievements of SAARC despite its 25 years of existence. One of the foremost problems in the regional grouping has been a restricted charter which desperately needs a revision.
Sujit Dutta's article, ‘China in SAARC? To What Effect?’ is a thought-provoking essay. It raises an appropriate and timely debate on a theme that is of vital significance for the peace and prosperity of South Asia. Sujit has given a sound conceptual background on regionalism and has strongly argued against supporting China's membership in SAARC.
A recognised China specialist like Sujit sees the writing on the wall in view of the proposal of some of India's neighbours to include China in SAARC.
The debate on giving the People's Republic of China full membership of the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) is primarily seen in the context of positive and negative thinking. While China has an observer status in SAARC along with Australia, the EU, Japan, Iran, Mauritius, Myanmar, South Korea and the United States, its case for full membership is primarily advocated by Nepal and Pakistan but not supported by India.
There is a common tendency among analysts and policy makers to compare SAARC with the EU and the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN). This is not fair. There are significant differences among these three regional groupings. Geo-strategically India looms too large in SAARC in a manner incomparable with Indonesia in ASEAN or Germany and France in the EU. Economically, SAARC started with a poor economic base and there were no large investments from outsiders like in ASEAN and the EU to boost economic cooperation.
Professor Sujit Dutta's article, ‘China in SAARC? To What Effect?’ has made an excellent case for the desirability of regionalism as it offers public commons to members of such institutions. Indeed the EU and ASEAN are prime examples of such cooperation as they generate political, economic and security benefits for their members, though to different degrees.
Over the past few years there has been a move by some of the member states of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) to induct China into the regional organisation. China, in turn, has indicated its desire to join. Since other extra-regional states were also keen to be involved, SAARC has opened its doors since 2007 for out-of region states through a new arrangement.
The strategic outlook of the political, bureaucratic and military elites in Pakistan was shaped by historical exigencies, geopolitical location, Pakistan's self-perception, and its Islamic credentials. Pakistan's military-dominated leadership formulated strategies towards regional and extra-regional powers based on its threat perceptions. The strategies adopted have not necessarily resulted in fully achieving the objectives for which they were formulated.
