Journal of Defence Studies

Naval Operations Analysis in the Indian Ocean Region A Review

The end of the Cold War resulted in a fundamental swing from a navy designed to engage a blue water battle fleet to one focused on forward operations in littoral waters. The Cold War era had fuelled massive research and development (R&D) in design of sonars that was able to substantially minimize the uncertainties of the underwater environment. The shift of the naval theatre to the littoral waters led to a paradigm change in terms of technology requirements to retain the effectiveness of these sonars.

Challenges for Indian Air Force: 2032

This is the first in a four-article series on the theme ‘IAF Deep Multidimensional Change 2032: Imperatives and a Roadmap’. It examines the challenges that the Indian Air Force (IAF) is likely to face when it completes a century in 2032. The main external challenges facing the IAF are the Chinese, Pakistani and Sino-Pak threat, and the need to build and maintain capability for Out of Area Contingency Operations.

China’s ‘Anti-ship Ballistic Missile’ based Anti-access Concept: Implications of a Southward Re-orientation

The Chinese efforts towards actualization of the ‘offshore defense’ concept which entails the conduct of campaigns in distant waters, strategic deterrence and counterattacks, has an inherent risk of bringing its naval forces on a confrontational course vis-à-vis other maritime forces, particularly the US. To defend itself against overarching US maritime superiority in such a scenario, China has developed its Anti-access and Area Denial (A2AD) concept, predicated mainly around the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile.

Transformation of Indian Naval Aviation Post New Inductions

The need for credible surveillance over the high seas forms the bedrock and foundation of infallible maritime security, and Maritime Reconnaissance (MR) is the basic input for any successful maritime operation. For the last two decades, Indian naval aviation assets have been dependant on the Ilyushin (IL), the Tuplov (TU) aircraft, the Kamov (KM) 31 and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). The Fleet Air Defence has also received a fillip by the induction of the MIG 29Ks.

Instability in Pakistan

What is happening in Pakistan today is no secret. It is a country ruled by a shaky coalition of political parties led by the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP). The government and judiciary are on a collision course with one Prime Minister (Yousuf Raza Gillani) having had to resign. The Army, the force behind every major decision in Pakistan, is zealously guarding its turf and dominant position in the polity, irrespective of who heads the government and unmindful of the ultimate consequences.

Tibet as a Factor in Sino-Indian Relations Past and Present

Tibet has always been the core issue in Sino-Indian relations. Even during the 1962 conflict, Chinese leaders, including Mao, acknowledged that the conflict was not about the boundary or territory but about Tibet. The revolt in Tibet leading to the flight of the Dalai Lama to India in 1959 came as a rude shock to the Indian leadership. After the 1962 conflict, the issue of Tibet went on the back burner. The revival of negotiations in 1981 brought the issue back into focus.

The Stormy Parliamentary Debates of 1962

Excepting in a war-like situation when there is threat to national security, unity and integrity, parliamentarians neither have the time nor the inclination to discuss issues that do not have a direct bearing on their constituency or on electoral politics. Besides considering the sensitive and professional nature of the subject, parliamentarians tend to leave the foreign policy issues to the professional diplomats and the foreign policy establishment. But there have been exceptions to the rule in most democratic countries, including India.

Remembering 1962 Sino-Indian Border War: Politics of Memory

How does India remember the 1962 border war with China? The article argues that there are two ways in which the war is recalled in the country and both of them are betrayal narratives, one blaming the Chinese alone and the second blaming the Chinese expansionism as well as the naive leadership of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. The main focus of the article will be on a critical analysis of the three primary assumptions made by the betrayal narratives: the legitimacy of Indian claims; the unexpected Chinese aggression; and the singular failure of Indian political leadership.

The Tibetan Uprising and Indian Opinion of the Chinese

China’s cruel repression of the revolt which broke out on 10 March 1959 in Lhasa provoked sharp reactions in India. The mood of agitation that captured the country found expression in the form of a flood of articles, editorials and vivid political caricatures in national newspapers, noted for creating a powerful case in support of the Tibetans and forcefully condemning the Chinese for their imperialistic adventures in Tibet.

A Game of Chess and a Battle of Wits: India’s Forward Policy Decision in Late 1961

In spring 1962, small numbers of lightly armed Indian troops proactively established presence in the disputed border areas between Chinese Tibet and India, despite intense sabre-rattling in Beijing. What was originally intended as a ‘game of chess and a battle of wits’ in late 1961, eventually ended in war in October 1962. This article discusses the long-term and short-term factors that can help explain why the Government of India opted for the ‘Forward Policy’ in late 1961.