Journal of Defence Studies

China’s ‘Anti-ship Ballistic Missile’ based Anti-access Concept: Implications of a Southward Re-orientation

The Chinese efforts towards actualization of the ‘offshore defense’ concept which entails the conduct of campaigns in distant waters, strategic deterrence and counterattacks, has an inherent risk of bringing its naval forces on a confrontational course vis-à-vis other maritime forces, particularly the US. To defend itself against overarching US maritime superiority in such a scenario, China has developed its Anti-access and Area Denial (A2AD) concept, predicated mainly around the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile.

Instability in Pakistan

What is happening in Pakistan today is no secret. It is a country ruled by a shaky coalition of political parties led by the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP). The government and judiciary are on a collision course with one Prime Minister (Yousuf Raza Gillani) having had to resign. The Army, the force behind every major decision in Pakistan, is zealously guarding its turf and dominant position in the polity, irrespective of who heads the government and unmindful of the ultimate consequences.

Tibet as a Factor in Sino-Indian Relations Past and Present

Tibet has always been the core issue in Sino-Indian relations. Even during the 1962 conflict, Chinese leaders, including Mao, acknowledged that the conflict was not about the boundary or territory but about Tibet. The revolt in Tibet leading to the flight of the Dalai Lama to India in 1959 came as a rude shock to the Indian leadership. After the 1962 conflict, the issue of Tibet went on the back burner. The revival of negotiations in 1981 brought the issue back into focus.

‘We Over-imagined the Threat from China in 1962’ : Interview with Marshal of the Indian Air Force

Fifty years since the 1962 war, reams have been written and multiple perspectives have come to the fore. Yet, the oral history of the time, the leaders and the politics, passed down to us by the generation of officers who saw these events unfold, has never been more valuable. Shruti Pandalai had the privilege of interviewing the highly decorated veteran officer and Marshall of the Indian Air Force (IAF), Arjan Singh, on his recollections of the war.

Remembering 1962 Sino-Indian Border War: Politics of Memory

How does India remember the 1962 border war with China? The article argues that there are two ways in which the war is recalled in the country and both of them are betrayal narratives, one blaming the Chinese alone and the second blaming the Chinese expansionism as well as the naive leadership of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. The main focus of the article will be on a critical analysis of the three primary assumptions made by the betrayal narratives: the legitimacy of Indian claims; the unexpected Chinese aggression; and the singular failure of Indian political leadership.

The Tibetan Uprising and Indian Opinion of the Chinese

China’s cruel repression of the revolt which broke out on 10 March 1959 in Lhasa provoked sharp reactions in India. The mood of agitation that captured the country found expression in the form of a flood of articles, editorials and vivid political caricatures in national newspapers, noted for creating a powerful case in support of the Tibetans and forcefully condemning the Chinese for their imperialistic adventures in Tibet.

The Stormy Parliamentary Debates of 1962

Excepting in a war-like situation when there is threat to national security, unity and integrity, parliamentarians neither have the time nor the inclination to discuss issues that do not have a direct bearing on their constituency or on electoral politics. Besides considering the sensitive and professional nature of the subject, parliamentarians tend to leave the foreign policy issues to the professional diplomats and the foreign policy establishment. But there have been exceptions to the rule in most democratic countries, including India.

Sino-Indian War, 1962 and the Role of Great Powers

The easy availability of Indian Government documents allowed early commentators to focus on the policies pursued by India to counter the relentless advance by China in the Western border region, and the prospect of a similar thrust in the Eastern region in 1962. The spotlight settled on the inadequacy of the ‘Forward Policy’, which was a response to Chinese military pressure on the ground.

The Great Divide: Chinese and Indian Views on Negotiations, 1959-62

When will states bargain while fighting and when will they evade intrawar negotiations? This article addresses this question with respect to the 1962 Sino-Indian War and provides insight into the question of why talks did not occur for the duration of the war. To do so, I analyse Chinese and Indian strategic thinking regarding the prospects of talks in the lead up and throughout the short war, with information gathered through archival work at the Chinese Foreign Ministry Archives, interviews with former Indian political and military leaders as well as scholars and secondary sources.

A Game of Chess and a Battle of Wits: India’s Forward Policy Decision in Late 1961

In spring 1962, small numbers of lightly armed Indian troops proactively established presence in the disputed border areas between Chinese Tibet and India, despite intense sabre-rattling in Beijing. What was originally intended as a ‘game of chess and a battle of wits’ in late 1961, eventually ended in war in October 1962. This article discusses the long-term and short-term factors that can help explain why the Government of India opted for the ‘Forward Policy’ in late 1961.