Sects Within Sect: The Case of Deobandi-Barelvi Encounter in Pakistan
The Sunni Muslims of South Asia are divided into two major sub-sects, i.e. Deobandi and Barelvi, named after their places of origin in India in the 19th century. Because of abiding differences between them, these two sub-sects have built up walls of hatred and mistrust between them over time. The faultline between them has erupted violently in Pakistan since the late 1970s. While there are some pioneering works available on their separate worldviews, no study has yet been attempted to critically analyse the nature of their interaction at the political level.
Gilgit-Baltistan: The Roots of Political Alienation
Gilgit-Baltistan in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir has witnessed a series of political disturbances and violence over the past years. Though many analysts have viewed the often-violent assertions by otherwise peaceful residents of this remote and mountainous region as occasional eruptions of the Shia-Sunni sectarian divide, a careful examination will indicate the deeper roots of alienation of the population in this long-neglected region.
Bangladesh Factor in the Indo-Myanmarese Gas Deal
With the discovery of substantial gas in Myanmar's Sittwe region in the Rakhine state, India was keen to acquire gas from some of the new finds in the Shwe gas field, divided in several blocks, of which A-1 and A-2 blocks were closer to India and also estimated to have the best recoverable reserves. Given the geographical location, overland pipelines transiting through Bangladesh are the most cost-effective way of getting gas from Myanmar to India. Despite its initial enthusiasm, Bangladesh backtracked from its earlier willingness to be a partner to the tripartite pipeline.
Japan’s Energy Angst: Asia’s Changing Energy Prospects and the View from Tokyo
Tokyo looks at energy security differently than does Washington, or other major global capitals. This persistent and deepening reality—so incongruously at odds with the continual affirmations of solidarity and alliance in the US–Japan bilateral relationship—has substantial grounding in economics. Yet, the contrast in mindset between Japan and the broader world is sharply amplified by differences in domestic institutions and politics. This perceptual gap has major implications for East Asia's energy future and for global geopolitics as well.
The Irrepressible Taliban!
The Taliban are proving to be increasingly irrepressible. They seem to be adapting, faster than expected, to the challenges confronting them. Although in terms of weaponry they cannot match the vastly superior Western forces, in terms of propaganda, psyops and operational reach they are proving to be a force to reckon with. In retrospect one can say that the Taliban made good use of the time made available to them by the United States when it shifted its focus towards Iraq in late 2002.
Generally speaking…
General Asfaq Pervez Kayani’s elevation as the 14th Pakistan Army Chief of Staff in November has been treated in the Indian media as a relatively low key affair. The General has been projected as a Musharraf ‘loyalist’ positioned primarily to retain Musharraf’s influence and hold on the Army. But transitions, particularly in Pakistan’s military etablishment, have rarely followed any given pattern and it can be expected of Gen Kiyani to initiate some new policy direction.
The Politics of Disaster Relief
Muslim countries and Islamic relief organisations along with the rest of the world have shown unprecedented solidarity with the people of Bangladesh after the devastating impact of cyclone Sidr in mid-November. Ironically, many of these Islamic charitable organizations have been involved in fuelling fundamentalism in Bangladesh. The extremist forces, and not surprisingly, are once again trying to capitalize on the miseries of the people and the inadequacies of the state machinery.
US Estimate on Iran: Of New Intelligence and New-found Confidence
The latest US National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran’s nuclear programme, “Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities” of November 2007 (released on 3 December 2007) notes with “high confidence” that Tehran halted its nuclear weapons programme in the fall of 2003 and with “moderate confidence” that Iran had not restarted its nuclear weapons program as of mid-2007.
