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Conventional War in the Presence of Nuclear Weapons

Nuclear weapons cannot obviate wars, but can change its complexion and influence the manner of its conduct. In order to keep nuclear weapons from entering into real warfare, it is important to intelligently judge an adversary's nuclear thresholds and to calibrate one's own conventional strikes. For India, the exploration of this space is particularly important in order to deny Pakistan a free hand to indulge in sub-conventional conflict even as it holds the threat of an all-out nuclear war against an Indian conventional response.

India–Pakistan Relations After the Mumbai Terror Attacks: What Should India Do?

Arvind Gupta , S. Kalyanaraman , Ashok K. Behuria
May 2009
Strategic Analysis

A Cold Start: India’s Response to Pakistan-Aided Low-Intensity Conflict

A decade after the Kargil conflict and over seven years after the major Indian military mobilization along the Line of Control (LoC) with Pakistan, both countries were yet again on the verge of a military confrontation following the revelation of Pakistan's complicity in the Mumbai terror attacks of November 2008. Islamabad's recalcitrance in taking action against groups responsible for this attack forced New Delhi to plan punitive responses against terror camps within Pakistan, prompting the latter to mobilize troops and project a capability to repulse an Indian attack.

Nuclear Weapons and War

The November 2008 Mumbai terror attacks that shook the world again had tangible links to the security and intelligence establishment of Pakistan. The emergent situation is forcing the policy-making community to take appropriate action so that the culprits are brought to justice and the elements sponsoring the terror attacks in India are adequately deterred. Several options were being exercised and explored for the purpose. As the Pakistani Government is undertaking only cosmetic and deceptive steps to ward off international pressure, the world and India appear far from convinced.

Jihad Beyond Jammu & Kashmir

Despite the instant denial issued by the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) of its involvement in the November 26 Mumbai terrorist attacks, it is clear that the attacks were the latest manifestation of the terrorist grouping's engorged war – the extension of Jihad much beyond its traditional hunting ground of Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) to the Indian heartland. Abdullah Ghaznavi, speaking on behalf of the Lashkar, told TV channels in the early hours of November 27: ‘LeT condemns such acts and we have no link with those responsible for such acts’.

Militant Training Camps in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir: An Existential Threat

Investigations into Mumbai's 26/11 attack made startling revelations about the militant training camps in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). The Mumbai perpetrators started from Baitul-Mujahideen in Muzaffarabad, the capital of the so-called ‘Azad Kashmir’, and headed for Mumbai via Karachi. They underwent specialized training in PoK for an extended period before the attack.

Nuclear Weapons and India–Pakistan Relations

India-Pakistan relations are best understood as an example of nuclear rivalry, in which nuclear weapons both exacerbate and limit hostility. In all such relationships, the minimal possession of nuclear weapons suffices to deter. Both India and Pakistan have adopted a minimalist posture, yet their strategic thinking tends to be inconsistent, which makes them vulnerable to needless expansion. This essay points to the conceptual basis for an optimal doctrine.

Nuclear Weapons and India-Pakistan Relations: A Complementary Comment

Nuclear weapons deter by the possibility of their use, and in no other way. Although US and Soviet arsenals became grotesquely excessive in both numbers and diversity in the late 1960s, by the later 1908s there had been very extensive reductions in both numbers and types. NATO's collective doctrine had accepted that the only sen-sible role for its nuclear weapons was for war-termination. Western governments had increasingly accepted the idea of sufficiency, recognizing that notions of nuclear supe-riority were vacuous.

Response to Dr. Quinlan’s Critique

Dr. Quinlan and I are in fundamental agreement on the validity of nuclear deterrence as a national security strategy because the possibility of nuclear use cannot be ruled out. Where we disagree is on the conceptual basis for formulating such a strategy. Dr. Quinlan finds my minimalist approach to deterrence unsatisfactory because it rests on a very small number of historical cases in which states with large arsenals were deterred by states with far smaller ones.

Kargil War: Reflections on the Tenth Anniversary

Ten years later, the Kargil War still arouses deep emotions turning around Pakistan's gross perfidy, an intelligence failure, great heroism, military improvisation and innovation, a national upsurge, a most open inquiry leading to a comprehensive review of vital issues long closed to scrutiny and reform. Its report, prepared in record time, was uniquely presented to the nation as a commercial publication. (From Surprise to Reckoning: The Kargil Review Committee Report, Sage, New Delhi, December 1999.)