Publication Filter

The Creation of Indian Integrated Commands: Organisational Learning and the Andaman and Nicobar Command

India took an unprecedented step 10 years ago by setting up a joint theatre operational command for the Andaman and Nicobar Islands (ANC). This article seeks to examine the following questions: why did India decide to establish its first joint operational command? Why has the creation of this and other unified commands been so incremental in the Indian context? What are the arguments for and against jointness, integration and joint operational commands in the Indian context?

India’s Maritime Core Interests

While the maritime doctrine was published by the Indian navy in 2004 and improved upon in 2007, the core interests identified were as seen through the prism of the navy. The national maritime interests of India are distinctly different from the ones identified by the Indian navy and need to be analysed to understand the nuances and the dimensions of such interests so as to promote India's maritime power potential.

Charting a Maritime Security Cooperation Mechanism in the Indian Ocean: Sharing Responsibilities among Littoral States and User States

The main objective of this article is to highlight the challenge of maritime security in the region geographically bounded by the Indian Ocean. It studies the current status of maritime security in the region from both the traditional and non-traditional points of view. From the traditional security perspective, it examines the strategic interests of the major Indian Ocean players—the China–India competition and India–US relations in particular—in addition to the existing maritime disputes among the littoral states.

A Neo-Nixon Doctrine for the Indian Ocean: Helping States Help Themselves

In recent years the Indian Ocean has received significant attention from the defence-intellectual community in the United States. However, the actual strategic importance of the region to US interests is less clear. In an environment of fiscal austerity, if commitments abroad are not firmly linked to interests, any significant involvement in a region of secondary concern could contribute to ‘imperial overstretch’.

China Shakes Up the Maritime Balance in the Indian Ocean

The Indian Ocean has long been a hub of great power rivalry and the struggle for its domination has been a perennial feature of global politics. It is the third largest of the world's five oceans and touches Asia in the north, Africa in the west, Indo-China in the east, and Antarctica in the south. Home to four critical access waterways—the Suez Canal, Bab-el Mandeb, the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca—the Indian Ocean connects the Middle East, Africa and East Asia with Europe and the Americas.

Inside, Outside: India’s ‘Exterior Lines’ in the South China Sea

New Delhi has long countenanced the idea of extra-regional operations. The Maritime Military Strategy published in 2007, for instance, lists the South China Sea and the Pacific Ocean among ‘secondary areas’ of endeavour for the Indian sea services. ‘Areas of secondary interest will come in where there is a direct connection with areas of primary interest, or where they impinge on the deployment of future maritime forces.’ 1 The South China Sea abuts the Indian Ocean, the most compelling zone of primary interest for New Delhi, through the Malacca Strait.