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US–India–China Relations in the Indian Ocean: A Chinese Perspective

The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is becoming increasingly significant in the world arena, with the United States, India and China—the most important stakeholders in the region—playing substantial roles. Judging from the three countries' strategic thought, concerns, interests and power balances, it is the US–India potential competition for maritime dominance in the IOR that demands the most attention. However, competition does not mean confrontation.

The US–India Nuclear Agreement: Revisiting the Debate

The 2005 US—India nuclear pact created ripples of controversy and debates within in a short period of time. In the US, the nuclear agreement was weighed vis-à-vis the non-proliferation regime—does it strengthen or weaken the regime? On the contrary, in India concerns were raised regarding the implications for India's strategic as well as civilian nuclear programmes. This article highlights the disjuncture in the concerns raised in the US and India.

The Diamer Bhasha Dam in Gilgit Baltistan: India’s Concerns

This article is an attempt to understand India's concerns over the Diamer Bhasha dam project within the overall ambit of India's approach towards Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). It makes a holistic assessment of the feasibility of the project, the political and technical issues involved in it, the long-term strategy of Pakistan and China in the region, and the local reactions, which must inform India's future policy preferences regarding PoK. The article is divided into three parts.

Evaluating the Political and Economic Role of the IRGC

The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) is Iran's most powerful security and military organisation, responsible for the protection and survival of the regime. Over time, the IRGC has attained a position of dominance vis-à-vis the regular army (Artesh). In due course, the Guards have also been transformed into a leading political and economic actor. The major political role of the IRGC started with the election of the reformist presidency. However, the Guards' involvement in the Iranian economy began during Rafsanjani's presidency.

India’s Afghan Policy: Beyond Bilateralism

The India–Afghanistan relationship is not a simple bilateral engagement. India's Afghan policy is driven by, and is dependent on, many extraneous factors such as India's troubled relationship with Pakistan, its search for a land transit to Central Asia through Iran and Afghanistan and its concerns regarding use of Afghan territory by Pakistan to the detriment of Indian interests. Given the geographical constraints, India has relied on Iran for land access to Afghanistan. This has been complicated by Iran–US relations —the two countries with whom India shares common interests.

Securing Central Asian Frontiers: Institutionalisation of Borders and Inter-state Relations

This article develops the message that the artificially introduced administrative borders during the Soviet era, which were subject to the processes of re-delimitation after 1991, whether for reasons of security, administration, mutual distrust or the population's ethnic attachment, have become results and means of political manipulation and pressurisation. This has resulted in further pushing regional states to follow mutually exclusive policies.

Re-examining India’s Counterterrorism Approach: Adopting a Long View

This article looks at the status quo of Indian counterterrorism policy—which largely favours ‘physical’ or ‘hard’ measures—and proposes that the government adopt a more holistic strategy. Termed ‘Countering Violent Extremism’, this would involve measures geared towards long-term prevention, with greater attention paid to the reasons for which people commit terrorism and to the impact of counterterrorism on communities.

Political Decision-Making and Nuclear Retaliation

Currently, India's nuclear doctrine is one of inflicting ‘unacceptable damage’ in case of nuclear first use against it or its forces anywhere. The problem with this is that at current levels of vertical proliferation it is liable to face a counter strike of equal proportions. This may not be in India's interests when viewed in relation to the inevitable setback to its trajectory of progress. Therefore, there is a case for terminating nuclear exchanges at the lowest possible level in case of nuclear first use of low opprobrium quotient or violence.