Battle of Haji Pir: The Army’s Glory in 1965 In 1965, Pakistan attempted infiltration into Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), with Operation Gibralter, followed by a planned capture of Akhnoor Bridge under Operation Grand Slam. While Operation Gibraltar was bold from the point of view of multi-directional infiltration, it was largely based on the utopian dream of President Ayub Khan and Foreign Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, ignoring the ground realities that J&K’s population would not support it. P.C. Katoch July 2015 Journal of Defence Studies
Recounting 1965: War, Diplomacy and Great Games in the Subcontinent ‘Stalemate’, ‘futile’, ‘forgotten’—the descriptions of the 1965 War between India and Pakistan often do injustice to its profound Impact on the history of the Indian subcontinent. It was a war that altered the fates of India and Pakistan both politically and militarily, and officially began the new great game for Asia. For India, it was a test of leadership post Nehru and banishing the demons of 1962. For Pakistan, it was about Kashmir and testing India, playing roulette with the superpowers, and sealing its friendship with China. Shruti Pandalai July 2015 Journal of Defence Studies
Deployment of Central Forces in the North East: Need for a Realistic Security Audit The security audit should be done in a realistic frame and may include some interlocutors and officers of the C&AG`s department given their understanding of the functioning of the state government machinery at various tiers as well as their independence of approach. Gautam Sen July 15, 2015 IDSA Comments
INDIA, AFRICA and UN Security Council Reform At the very least, the decision on text-based negotiations has brought some more legitimacy to the process of reform. However, there is no guarantee yet that Security Council reform is any closer or any less complicated. Arpita Anant July-September 2015 Africa Trends
Indian Army in the East African Campaign in World War I During the Great War, seven Indian Expeditionary Forces (IEF) from 'A' to 'G' were employed of which IEF 'B' and IEF 'C' are of interest. In the four year period from 1914 to 1918 nearly 50,000 Indian troops passed through East Africa. At any one time in-theatre there were about 15,000 troops. P. K. Gautam July-September 2015 Africa Trends
UN-AU Cooperation in Peace and Security: Convergence and Divergence The emergence of the AU as a player in maintenance of peace and security should not mean prioritising regionalism over the true spirit of internationalism that the UN ought to represent. This may need a reform or two on both sides. Saurabh Mishra July-September 2015 Africa Trends
China’s New Security Law: Some Preliminary Observations By extending the notion of national security to the domains of space and the earth’s poles, the Chinese government has expressed its determination to undertake every measure to safeguard interests even in areas beyond the national border. Gunjan Singh July 14, 2015 IDSA Comments
China’s Preference for Border Peace and Control over Early Resolution Even if China has not stated that it cannot settle the border question with India in the immediate future, its actions certainly hint at its preference for border peace and control over an early resolution. M.S. Prathibha July 14, 2015 IDSA Comments
The 1965 Indo-Pak War: Through Today’s Lens This article seeks to analyse the lessons of the 1965 Indo-Pak war that are applicable today. It finds that the current army doctrine, Cold Start, has some similarities to the opening round of the 1965 war. It argues that even the attritionist strategy adopted in 1965 may have more to give today than the manoeuvre war approach of its more famous successor, the 1971 war. In particular, the article appraises Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri’s firm political control during the war and finds that it was ably reinforced by the prime ministers who were at the helm in India’s later wars. Ali Ahmed July 2015 Journal of Defence Studies
Operation Gibraltar: An Uprising that Never Was Launched in early-August 1965, Operation Gibraltar was designed to infiltrate several columns of trained and well-armed Mujahids and Razakars, led by Pakistan Army Majors into Jammu and Kashmir. Under the cover of fire provided by the Pakistan Army deployed on the Cease Fire Line (CFL), the columns managed to infiltrate, but failed to create large-scale disturbances and did not receive support from the people. In fact, locals often provided information about the columns to the Indian Army, which led to their being captured or neutralised. P. K. Chakravarty , Gurmeet Kanwal July 2015 Journal of Defence Studies
