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US–Soviet/Russian Dialogue on the Nuclear Weapons Programme of India

The history of the US–Soviet and US–Russian dialogues on the nuclear weapons programme of India can be divided into two major periods: First, from Pokhran I up to the end of the 1990s, when Moscow and Washington shared concerns regarding India’s nuclear programme, and even their bilateral disagreements in international affairs did not stop them from reaching a consensus on how to react to the 1974 nuclear test.

Nuclear Armed for Uncertain Times

India can look back with more than a fair measure of satisfaction on the past two decades since its nuclear weapon tests of May 1998. Those tests signalled a strategic shift. This article therefore looks at the international situation and tendencies that prevailed in the run up to these tests. It then presents an assessment of the international reaction as a consequence of that bold and courageous action

Nuclear India and the Global Nuclear Order

The 1998 nuclear tests conducted by India heralded yet another nuclear age. The instant response of a section of the international community was highly pessimistic. It foresaw regional instability, collapse of the global nuclear order and serious crisis in the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. As a result, overlooking India’s security imperatives, a number of countries reacted with hostility against the Indian nuclear tests. Even international organisations were mobilised against India.

Post-Pokhran II: Emerging Global Nuclear Order and India’s Nuclear Challenge

Post-Pokhran II the global nuclear environment has changed both in terms of developing niche technologies as also the nuclear strategies. Apart from the traditional challenges, there are new threats emerging in the form of cyber, space, hypersonic glide vehicles, nuclear terrorism, etc. The development of multiple nuclear dyads and triads further makes the security environment increasingly complex, as nations now have to deal with multiple nuclear problems and adversaries.

Military Dimensions of a Multipolar World: Implications for Global Governance

For a decade after the Cold War it seemed that multilateral governance might take root under US leadership, including a reinvigorated United Nations and a strengthened international legal framework. The nuclear explosive devices tested by India in 1998 took place in a pivotal period when the so-called ‘unipolar moment’ of the US began to be challenged by states that were not satisfied such an arrangement could advance their national interests.

Pokhran 20 Years After: Did the World Change?

Was the 1998 Pokhran test a historical watershed as many contemporary observers believed? This article looks at its impact on the nuclear non-proliferation regime, regional security, India’s position in global institutions, and the ongoing global power shift: the non-proliferation regime continued along the old dispute lines; regional conflict behaviour did not change at all; India grew into global institutions not because of nuclear tests but because of her remarkable economic development; the re-arrangement of global power follows more basic trends as well.

Walking Back Delusional Nuclear Policies

India’s ‘dual use’ nuclear policy has been strung out from the beginning between the peaceful atom and military atom as illustrated in Jawaharlal Nehru’s use of the phrase for the country’s nuclear energy programme—‘Janus-faced’. However, the Indian Government has been too influenced by its own rhetoric of peaceful use to equally emphasise the security aspects that the phrase implied.

Implications of CAATSA for India’s Defence Relations with Russia and America

While the provisions of the Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) are unlikely to be imposed on India anytime soon, it is nonetheless likely to prove a dampener on an otherwise booming defence relationship between India and the United States.

Defence Investor Cell Needs Fleshing Out

The Cell will remain hamstrung if its powers are not clearly defined, especially in regard to securing budgetary support which is to be provided by the Director General of Quality Assurance.

Amit Cowshish
April 24, 2018
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Maoist Finances

This article shows that the Maoists have been collecting not less than Rs 140 crore annually from a variety of sources: businesses—big and small—industry; contractors engaged in various trades; corrupt government officials; and political leaders. The largest and principal sources of income for the Maoists are the mining industry, PWD works, and collection of tendu leaves. They have been able to put in place a well-organised mechanism to extort money on a regular basis. Besides, they have conceived ingenious ways to store money and ensure its safety.