In his April 5 speech in Prague, President Barack Obama made a renewed pledge to push the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) as a practical and immediate step to ‘seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons’. However, global efforts to attain Global Zero as spearheaded by Obama have been interrupted by the refusal of the United States and China to ratify the treaty. The CTBT is also contingent on the approval of the threshold nuclear weapons states – India, Pakistan, and Israel – who have refused to sign and ratify the treaty.
The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is emerging as a key anti-proliferation platform with a global reach. However, being a US-promoted initiative with a military dimension, the PSI is yet to gain a multilateral character and raises concerns among nations. While backing the further expansion of this initiative, President Barack Obama seeks its institutionalization and cooperative enhancement. India is exhorted to join this initiative as part of the strategic cooperation with the United States. However, India is yet to decide its approach towards the PSI owing to various concerns.
On February 6, 2009, the Pakistani judiciary acquitted Abdul Qadeer (AQ) Khan, the symbol of Pakistani involvement in clandestine nuclear commerce. Since 2004, he had been under house arrest after the proliferation network, linking several countries, including Pakistan, was uncovered. Though he has been put under ‘unspecified security measures’, yet the release of AQ Khan – dubbed by the United States State Department spokesman Gordon Duguid as a ‘serious proliferation risk’ – is considered to be a disturbing development for the non-proliferation regime.
The concept of nuclear terrorism is possibly the least understood of all dangers emanating from nuclear weapons. However, certain drivers like the nuclear black market (the AQ Khan Network), proliferation of nuclear technology, and the increasing demand for nuclear energy can make it easier for terrorist organizations like Al Qaida to acquire fissile material. The threat of nuclear terrorism cannot be ignored any longer. Nuclear terrorism is a plausible phenomenon that deserves adequate consideration, substantial countermeasures, expertise, and competence to combat it.
Nuclear weapons cannot obviate wars, but can change its complexion and influence the manner of its conduct. In order to keep nuclear weapons from entering into real warfare, it is important to intelligently judge an adversary's nuclear thresholds and to calibrate one's own conventional strikes. For India, the exploration of this space is particularly important in order to deny Pakistan a free hand to indulge in sub-conventional conflict even as it holds the threat of an all-out nuclear war against an Indian conventional response.
The November 2008 Mumbai terror attacks that shook the world again had tangible links to the security and intelligence establishment of Pakistan. The emergent situation is forcing the policy-making community to take appropriate action so that the culprits are brought to justice and the elements sponsoring the terror attacks in India are adequately deterred. Several options were being exercised and explored for the purpose. As the Pakistani Government is undertaking only cosmetic and deceptive steps to ward off international pressure, the world and India appear far from convinced.
India-Pakistan relations are best understood as an example of nuclear rivalry, in which nuclear weapons both exacerbate and limit hostility. In all such relationships, the minimal possession of nuclear weapons suffices to deter. Both India and Pakistan have adopted a minimalist posture, yet their strategic thinking tends to be inconsistent, which makes them vulnerable to needless expansion. This essay points to the conceptual basis for an optimal doctrine.
Nuclear weapons deter by the possibility of their use, and in no other way. Although US and Soviet arsenals became grotesquely excessive in both numbers and diversity in the late 1960s, by the later 1908s there had been very extensive reductions in both numbers and types. NATO's collective doctrine had accepted that the only sen-sible role for its nuclear weapons was for war-termination. Western governments had increasingly accepted the idea of sufficiency, recognizing that notions of nuclear supe-riority were vacuous.
Contrary to the arguments of proliferation pessimists, this article contends that the overt nuclearization of South Asia has contributed to stability in the region. To that end this article carefully examines two recent crises in Indo-Pakistani relations and concludes that in the absence of nuclear weapons they would have culminated in full-scale war. Accordingly, while Indo-Pakistani relations may remain fraught with tension, the likelihood of major war in the region has dramatically diminished.
