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IDSA-CCC Bilateral Seminar on Indo-US Strategic Partnership

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  • April 25, 2007 to April 26, 2007
    Conference
    Only by Invitation

    The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses along with the Center for Contemporary Conflict, Monterey, organised a two day seminar on the Indo-US strategic partnership in New Delhi on 25-26 April 2007. Bringing together academics, practitioners and policy-makers, the aim of the conference was to examine and identify opportunities and challenges in the strategic partnership between United States of America and India. The seminar was structured into separate working sessions focusing on General Trends in Strategic Cooperation, Commercial Cooperation, Weapons of Mass Destruction/ Non-Proliferation, Developments in Central Asia/Middle East, Developments in South Asia and Defence Cooperation.

    1. Inaugural Address

    A former Indian diplomat inaugurated the two-day workshop with a discussion of the history of the US-India relationship and some of the positive trends he currently sees. India has a long history of partnership with the United States, going back to 1952. While the relationship was initially close, with India’s founding fathers having a great deal of admiration for the United States, the two countries drifted apart following the US decision in 1953 to provide arms to Pakistan to help contain the Soviet Union. The United States and India did not see eye-to-eye on many issues, including Kashmir and arms assistance, but the big separator was India’s insistence on its nonaligned stance. Sanctions have also been a major feature of the relationship, with the United States imposing sanctions on India in 1965, 1974, and 1998. However, the relationship completely changed in 2004 with the United States-India Joint Statement on Next Steps the Strategic Partnership document, featuring a quartet of issues: nuclear energy, civilian space programs, high technology trade, and missile defence. He noted that the United States had transferred greater technology to India than any of its non-NATO allies. The speaker observed that the workshop on the US-India strategic partnership was particularly pertinent and described United States of America as an Asian power, since it had become embedded in Asia because of its economic might, military presence and long-standing association with the region. He stated that one major issue discussed at the official level was the US-India civilian nuclear deal which hinged on India’s freedom to conduct nuclear tests whenever necessary. He stated that having declared itself a nuclear power with the 1974 and 1998 nuclear tests, India eventually must revert back to the position of no further nuclear tests, as was first enunciated by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. He also noted that the Americans had not showed sufficient understanding to India’s right to treat and maintain spent fuel. Pointing out that Europe would be embroiled in internal socio-economicpolitical issues; he argued that in the coming years the core group of countries affecting the region would be the US, China, Russia and India. Commenting on the dynamics of Indo-US partnership he asserted that irrespective of the success or failure of the nuclear deal, the relationship between India and the US would remain stable.

    II. General Trends in Indo-US Relations

    The working session was chaired by a former Indian diplomat who in his initial remarks stated that one needed to go beyond the chronological time frame in order to take the Indo-US bilateral relationship further. He observed that the US-India relationship was like the Bombay Stock Exchange, which had its ups and downs in the short run, but overall trends pointed upwards. He noted that instead of zeroing on the Indo-US nuclear deal, as the main bench mark for judging the bilateral relations between the two countries, a broader spectrum ranging from economic cooperation to issues relating to health and education needed to be addressed.

    The first Indian presenter began by discussing systemic compulsions in US India relations, arguing that that the "systemic" factor played a central role in shaping the contours of the bilateral relationship from the early 1950s through to the end of the Cold War in 1991. It is the changed post-Cold War global systemic scene that has enabled the two states to review their relationship and make bold overtures to rearrange it in a radical and innovative manner. A post-May 1998 Realpolitik assessment by President Clinton led to a radical departure from the pre-1999 India policy, resulting in improved relations and a stronger global strategic environment. As far as the United States is concerned, its interests would be best served by developing closer relations with India. As for India, with 21st century being the knowledge economy, its human resource base is an advantage and therefore a desirable tool for taking this relationship to new heights.

    The presenter agreed with the keynote speaker that the power polarity in international relations was hexagonal, with three nodes Russia, China and India on one side and the United States, Japan and the European Union forming the other three nodal points. He predicted greater accommodation of interest and better management of the contradictions between these various nodes in the future. He further stressed that the constraints in the relationship arose out of differing styles of discourse and strategic culture. In this context, he elaborated on the anxieties and suspicions of the other that are buttressed by certain constituencies in both the countries, including the nonproliferation lobby in the United States and the legacy of the non-aligned movement in India. He pointed out that because the United States was military-security-led state, while India was a tentative and reticent military power, this led to different perspectives on many issues. Therefore, the dissonance of strategic culture is something that needs to be addressed.

    The presentation by the second panellist from USA, focused peripherally on the Indo-US relations. His presentation was based on a report titled ‘Mapping the Global Future’ by the National Intelligence Council. The four major themes covered by his presentation were: Contradictions of Globalization, Rising Powers, New Challenges to Governance, and Pervasive Insecurity- with four scenarios-Davos World, Pax Americana, A New Caliphate and Cycle of Fear. Mapping the development which would take shape by year 2020, he argued that globalization seemed to an emerging trend and that China and India would be the two emerging powers which would change the global landscape by 2020.

    The third panellist, a security analyst from India, considered mapping the global future, a problematic concept. He asserted that historical facts had played an important role in shaping the perception of South Asian countries. He based his arguments on the proposition that changes in the distribution of power constituted the principal driver of international politics and therefore the nuanced warmth in Indo-US relations was contingent on the unfolding structural change in the existing great power hierarchy. In this context, he noted that the rise of India and China was inevitable. He argued that there was an urgent need to intellectually conceptualise India’s interest in the systemic and structural framework, so that India could start working on harmonizing its interests specifically in areas where Indo- US cooperation was possible.

    The ensuing discussion began with the question as to whether strategic culture and discourse were more important than interests. It was observed that real policy was interest oriented rather than culture-fixated. Strategic culture was an evolutionary process and both Indian and US strategic cultures needed to change in order to accommodate the structural changes

    III. Luncheon Address

    A senior Indian bureaucrat argued that the most important issue about Indo-US relations was not their present standing, but the potential, to take the strategic relationship further. He noted that the Indo-US defence relations started in earnest in 2005 with the “Framework Agreement”. He observed in that in the Cold War era on the occasions when India approached United States to procure certain military equipments, it was invariably denied. He asserted that the defence dialogue required a continuous exchange of information to facilitate further cooperation and expressed satisfaction that India and US were working closely on many issues including energy security, security of sea lanes, maritime activities etc. He argued that engagement with US was important since American actions impacted India in every sphere and in this sense he felt that the present engagement would prove very useful.

    IV. Growing Indo-US Commercial Linkages

    The panel was chaired by an Indian official from one of the apex national chambers of commerce and industry. He argued for inter- industry dialogue between United Stated and India and emphasised the need for more active participation by Indian industries in the ongoing bilateral negotiations taking place between the two countries. He emphasised that the United States should understand the potential which corporate India would have in the twenty-first century and stated that civil-nuclear cooperation could benefit the defence industries on both sides. He also drew attention to the existing linkages between climate change and the process of Indian industralisation and stated that Indian industries needed more technology from the West to grow in a responsible manner.

    The first panellist, who was an Indian academician, stated at the outset that political and trade relations between the two countries should not be mixed as both stand independent of each other. Comparing the nature of Indo-US trade relations with Indo- China relations, he argued that the nature of trade which India had with both countries was vastly different and that India gained far more by fostering economic relations with the United States than with China. He stated that India, like the United States, has a surplus of services trade and a deficit of goods trade, and noted that the growing link between the information technology (IT) business has very little to do with either government, other than the removal of the foreign exchange constraint in 1993.

    The second panellist, a bureaucrat from the United States, highlighted the growing influence of Indian Americans in the US industry, which, he considered as the primary factor in fostering the Indo-US bilateral commercial ties. He highlighted the power of Indian Diaspora in American business circles for influencing it to choose India as an investment destination. He described Indo-US commercial ties as people-driven, not politics-driven or directed by a governmental plan.

    The third panellist, an executive from the United States, highlighted the comparative advantages, which India possessed vis à vis other countries, especially in the technological, industrial and business sectors. Although defence trade is only a small portion of the overall Indo-US trade, valued at around $400 million a year, that number has risen more than ten-fold in just a few years. He explained some of the expectations about the relationship from the US industry standpoint, describing the industry’s excitement at the strength of Indian aerospace engineering and culture adapted to serving overseas customers. He noted that lack of familiarity with the US products was one area which merited attention. He suggested that a constructive dialogue with the US as a military supplier also needed to be addressed but also stressed that that US companies must have a ground presence and get away from their “suitcase mentality”. He concluded by stating that procurement systems and policies of the two nations needed to be made transparent in order to facilitate further growth of commercial ties between the two countries.

    The ensuing discussion focused on the bottlenecks in bilateral commercial relations. The panellists as well as the participants agreed that lack of sufficient infrastructure facilities in India was a major impediment in promoting FDI from overseas countries.

    V. Nuclear World Order & WMD Non-Proliferation

    The panel was chaired by an Indian security analyst. He noted that US effort at technology denial was primarily aimed at countries like China and the erstwhile Soviet Union but the ‘technology denial regime’ was also badly hurting India’s interests. It was imperative that India found a way out of this technology apartheid. He proposed that the possibility of a conference by nations possessing nuclear weapons should be considered in order to consider the nature of future nuclear world order.

    The first panellist, who was a former India military official, stated at the outset that ever since India’s attention shifted to the Nuclear Deal, the discourse in New Delhi on the NPT and its iniquitous nature had been muted. Though there were no specific attempts made by non –state actors on employing weapons of mass destruction, challenges had been posed by states like Iran. He stated that the international response was to enhance non-proliferation and to combat WMD via a cohesive strategy through related Security Council Resolutions. He cautioned however that unless the Indo-US nuclear deal was cleared, India was not going to get past the dual-use exports deal. He considered Missile Defence and Outer Space as two areas of concern for India.

    The second panellist, an American nuclear expert, focused his presentation on benefits which would accrue to both countries through the signing of the Indo-US nuclear deal. He argued that Indo-US cooperation would make the world safer and one of the primary challenges in front of the two countries was to prevent proliferation in North East and Central Asia. Supporting his arguments, he asserted that that it was imperative to further strengthen the legitimacy of non-proliferation institutions. Proposing that India-US cooperation could take many forms like concerted joint initiatives, parallel unilateral actions and monitoring of WMDs in order to prevent their accessibility to non-state actors, he cited technical aspects as the main challenge for India-US cooperation. A global peaceful nuclear order, he argued, should be the main goal of the bilateral relationship between the two countries.

    The discussion which followed questioned the authenticity of the reports appearing in both the US and the Indian media regarding Indo-US nuclear deal. Future scenario for potential for nuclear weapons use by countries and the possibilities of deterrence through nuclear weapons was questioned. It was argued that a cooperative security management mechanism should be created to manage adversarial relations and turn them towards positive direction.

    VI. Developments in the Middle East and Central Asia

    The panel chair was a former Indian diplomat, who underlined the need to understand West Asia in a broader perspective. He stated that India at present had a multitude of policies but greater coherence was required towards the Middle East, for which a better understanding of the region was imperative. He stated that the whole exercise of reconciling interest was a continuous one and there were no definite answers to the politically volatile regions of Central Asia and Middle East. However he noted that the only way to approach these problems was by employing tools of international diplomacy.

    The first panellist, an Indian academician, argued that Middle East would be the litmus test for both India and the United States to balance their ability to cooperate on international issues. Elaborating further he stated that India had been at odds with the US on a number of issues related to the region, primarily because of economic interests. Growing energy needs as well as strong domestic political compulsions had determined New Delhi’s Middle East policy. Though developing stronger ties with the US made political and economic sense, India had been unable to come up with a strategy that could minimize the areas of friction. He cited domestic compulsions as the main contributing factor for this. He also described the Iran issue as constituting another tension point in the Indo-US relations. The speaker pointed out that though India needed energy from the Middle East countries to propel its economic growth, these countries including Iran also needed to find markets for their abundant energy resources. He concluded by noting that India’s challenge was two-fold: convincing the US of its Middle East compulsions and explaining to the Middle East how its close ties with the US formed part of its global strategy. At present, India’s record on both fronts was unsatisfactory. Unless this was remedied quickly, he argued doubts would be cast over whether India would a “reliable” friend of the US.

    The second panellist, an American diplomat and academic, noted that the US had important interests in Central Asia. Central Asia was a region blessed with great energy potential and therefore was strategically important. He argued that the region played an important part in US global strategy in view of its proximity to Russia, China, India, Pakistan and Iran. The main issues were security, energy and the need to democratize the region. While highlighting America’s global interests in combating terrorism and WMD proliferation; he stated that Washington was concerned about the growing Islamic terrorism in Central Asia. The United States, he opined, was interested in undertaking economic reforms and in ensuring stability in the region. He stated that India considered Central Asia as its extended neighbourhood of considerable strategic importance in view of its geo political and geo-economic interest. In this context he referred to rich oil and gas resources of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. He added that India’s security interests in Central Asia primarily emanates from Pakistan’s and China’s role in the region and also since it formed a critical component in India’s security calculus both for establishing peace and stability in Afghanistan.

    The discussion which followed revolved around the formulation of India’s foreign policy towards the Middle East. It was suggested that India’s policies should be realistic and that there was a need on the American side to engage in dialogue rather than employ military means.

    VII Developments in South Asia

    The panel chair was a well known Indian journalist. He pointed out that discussion on South Asia had always been lively as it was never free from controversies and unexpected developments. The first panellist who was an Indian academician who spoke on the internal developments in Pakistan and Afghanistan. He threw light on the composite dialogue between India and Pakistan, which had been active in recent
    months. However he pointed out that Siachen and Kashmir still remain the bone of contention. As far as the proposed four point programme was concerned his view was that despite being very close to an agreed solution, its weakness was that it had put the onus of responsibility on India. Pointing out prescriptive issues for India in the four point programme, like demilitarization, self governance (which Jammu and Kashmir had been experiencing since last sixty years) and common governance, he stated that these issues, particularly the one on common governance were extremely complex. He pointed out some of negative developments in Pakistan including militant activities by radical organizations making use of the political turmoil
    arising out of the ousting of the chief justice. The resurgence of seminaries, which were advocating the Talibanisation of the country, was also a development of grave concern. Regarding Afghanistan, he stated that the problem was that Karzai, did not possess a popular base, especially within the Pashtoon community. Also the Afghan army had not been trained as yet with capabilities to counter the Taliban, which had chances of re-emerging by 2009.

    The second panellist, an Indian diplomat in his presentation ‘South Asia: The Road Ahead’, argued that despite shared cultural values and people to people contacts, cooperation between countries in South Asia had not reached desirable levels. He was hopeful that things could be changing for the better. He focused on the positive trends and stated that globalization was facilitating better appreciation of the ascendancy of economic factors. He argued that the phenomenon of sustained high rates of economic growth in most countries in South Asia had unleashed an altogether new but positive dynamics and stated that the governments could not remain unmindful of these developing pressures. The global power structure was undergoing a change, which he opined as being more inclusive, and not based on rigid divisions or exclusive zones of influence. The entry of China, USA, EU, Japan and Korea as observers in the SAARC summit, in New Delhi, he noted augured well for the region, since it signified a new found confidence amongst the countries in South Asia in keeping with the changing time to engage with outsiders for the growth and development of the region. He pointed out that the issue of ‘asymmetry’ could be solved by India taking the lead in SAARC and providing unilateral trade concessions to address the concerns of smaller neighbours. He also referred to Pakistan’s obsession in competing for ‘elusive parity’ with India as constituting a big problem in fostering regional cooperation.

    The third panellist, a US bureaucrat made a sweeping overview of the many problems affecting the South Asian countries. Regarding Pakistan, he stated there was Taliban resurgence which had serious implications for the region. Aggressive military action in tribal areas of Pakistan had proved to be costly and the elections scheduled for late 2007 was providing an opportunity for Taliban propaganda. As for Nepal, he asserted that the Maoist entry into the government would generate more political activity and there was always a potential threat of the Maoists reverting to their militant ways. The response of the international community and India therefore was critically important in this respect. His comments on Bangladesh, revolved around the interim government which he stated were sidelining important leaders and that could give rise to heightened negative reaction among the general public. He pointed out there was a need to go beyond personality conflicts as prospects for religious extremism in Bangladesh were great. In Sri Lanka, he stated the LTTE was seriously weakened. The decreasing foreign aid due to the failure of ceasefire was another problem and should be addressed. He also pointed out that India’s support for global war on terrorism was important; however the focus of India should be on engaging itself primarily with its neighbours. The discussion expressed concern over the resurgence of Talibanisation in Pakistan. It was also pointed out that India should be willing to give unilateral trade concession without reciprocity and the main challenge in front of India and Pakistan was to find ways and means to harmonise and balance their interest.

    VIII. Luncheon Address

    A former Indian military official argued that last two-three years had particularly been eventful for Indo-US relations. However, having said this, he cautioned that Indo-US relations were likely to remain fluid as history was a witness to the nature of these unpredictable relations. He asserted that Indo-US relations could be better described as an “Evolving Entente” and argued that given its size, location and ambitions, India would always march “to the beat of its own drummer”. He pointed out that ability to generate hard power, and the will and ability to make use of the same was not India’s strong point. He stated that defence in India was quite rightly a low priority area because of the constraints imposed by the demands of the socio-economic development of the country. Defence issues in India gained importance only in times of crisis and in such situations Indian leadership had always adopted restrained and consensual approach. -- both at domestic as well as international level. He stated that India’s primary effort invariably was to shape the security environment through cooperative peace rather than plan on the basis of inevitability of the armed conflict. As foreign policy was the primary instrument of strategy, the Indian military was often left out from the decision-making loop. This situation, however, he pointed out, seemed to be improving.

    To take the strategic relationship further, he argued that Indo-US relations required a lot of confidence building measures. Though there were areas where strategic interests did not overlap such as Iran and Iraq he argued that by and large the India -US military relations remained positive .He stated that Indian military needed training in hi-tech technology, while US military could gain experience in operations in varied kinds of terrains, sub-conventional warfare, operations in ethnic conflict etc. He also pointed out there was also scope for co-operation in rescue operations and ‘Ballistic Missile Defence’. He suggested that exchange of instructors of the two militaries would go a long way in fostering relations and enhancing the knowledge about each other. He emphasized greater interaction between the MOD and the Pentagon and stated that reforms in Indian defence industry clearly reflected that India was looking for capacity building. He argued that therefore it was a great opportunity for the US to establish strong and long-term foothold in the defence industry in India. He pointed out that in defence co-operation dual use technology would be the litmus test for bilateral cooperation. Both the countries should remove the restrictions on hi-technology co-operation and the passage of the Indo-US nuclear deal would be a big step in confidence building on both sides. However he pointed out that one aspect that remained a sore point in Indo-US relations was that the products of Indo-US R&D co-operation on Indian soil were denied to India. He concluded by stating that the most important issue in defence co-operation was that it was not a zero-sum game. India and the US had the broader strategic understanding and there was a need to work constructively towards it.

    IX. Indo-US Defence Cooperation

    The panel chair was a former Indian bureaucrat. He referred at the outset the agreement signed by Donald Rumsfeld and Pranab Mukherjee on June 2005. He suggested that it would be a value addition if the presenters could focus on the elements of cooperation and commonalities of interests between the two countries and suggest a roadmap for taking the defence cooperation between the United States and India to a platform where both countries could share a strategic partnership.

    The first panellist, a security analyst from India, gave a brief history of India-US interaction in the defence/high-technology field, and referred to the 1982 President Reagan-Mrs. Gandhi S&T Initiative, the Indo-US MoU on High Technology Cooperation of 1984, and the 1986 agreement on LCA Aeronautics. He urged the participants from the US to have a closer look at the Kelkar Committee report on restructuring of the Indian defence industry. According to him, areas of fertile future cooperation included systems engineering and outsourcing.

    The second panellist, a former Indian military officer, stressed that for Indo-US relations to flourish the current political momentum behind the relationship ad to be maintained. As these issues had to deal with sustained patience and optimism, it was also essential that the cooperation be mutually beneficial. Referring to the military exercises undertaken by the two countries he stressed that the important issue was the scope of the exercises. The speaker noted that India sought American expertise in certain technologies which were of essential requirement to its armed forces, including aircrafts, and missiles. According to him, formal and informal mechanisms should be encouraged in the areas of intelligence sharing, counter terrorism activities, among other areas. He also called for greater co-ordination between the Indian Ministry of Defence and the Pentagon to undertake mutually-beneficial cooperative endeavours.

    The third panellist who was an American bureaucrat, brought to attention of the audience the Maritime Basic Framework in the Joint Statement issued during the visit of President George Bush to India during March 2006, which recognized each other’s commitment to “…ensure security in the maritime domain, joint patrolling, and other transnational issues at sea…” This concept envisaged a global network of allied ships complimenting each others’ strengths in tackling the most pressing maritime problems. The speaker pointed out that India had a huge stake in maritime security and should be an integral part of any cooperative framework designed to deal with these issues. The speaker noted that India and the United States shared a lot of similarities that augured well for their relationship. The speaker favoured moving forward with the operational level exercises. While noting that many opportunities existed in the multilateral arena, he felt it was too early to undertake those without building a proper road map delineating each others interests and opportunities. At the bilateral level, the speaker noted that promising areas of cooperation included disaster management and security related exercises. This was on account of the Indian military’s enormous experience in civil operations, operations in varied terrains, and in sub-conventional warfare, which was of great relevance for the United States. He also suggested that India and the US could undertake practical exercises in anti-narcotics operations and in countering piracy.

    The discussion focused on the debate in India concerning 1,000-ship navy concept and it was argued that the contours of the new concept was more amorphous than visible. It was also argued that India was no longer looking at a buyer-seller relationship in the defence field. In fact, for the US-India relationship to grow, both the countries should necessarily look at joint development of major platforms and weapons systems. It was also stated that India had bought very little equipment from the United States over the last 40 years partially because questions still remain over the reliability of supply; bureaucratic impediments and delays in decision making for actual acquisition in India were also considered to be major challenges. Patience as a diplomatic element was emphasized for sustaining the Indo-US partnership.

    X. Remarks at Closing Session


    The Indian host highlighted the resounding success of the workshop on account of the rich exchange of ideas and high quality presentations. He stated that the presence of prominent personalities like K Subrahmanyam, M K Rasgotra, Shekhar Dutt and Shivshankar Menon had added to the authenticity of deliberations. He concluded by stating that, the six sessions had covered the whole gamut of issues related to Indo-US strategic partnership and threw light on the possibilities of cooperation which could be achieved by the two countries particularly in field of defence technology. A US speaker stated that the two-day exercise identified some of the future challenges and opportunities for long-term cooperation. The plan of action would be to get the Indian and American participants to communicate with their respective government decision-makers on exploring ways to take the relationship forward. In any bilateral cooperation he noted symmetry of interests, responsibilities, and expectations were the most important ingredients. The track-two process should be used to influence policymaking by frankly exchanging ideas and voicing concerns in a collegial manner.

    XI. Valedictory Address


    A senior Indian official, in his valedictory address, noted that there had been a successful transformation of the Indo-US relationship in the past few years. He stated that at present it was poised as a partnership with strategic significance; US was India’s largest trading and technology partner. He pointed that there were nearly two million people of Indian origin resident in the US and politically there was an increasing level of convergence, with a shared background in democratic governance, values and pluralistic societies. Therefore, the challenge lay in taking the relationship forward. The US could provide critical inputs to India’s developmental process.

    With the end of the Cold War and the transformation of the world order, a new cluster of global threats, including those posed by non-state actors and weapons of mass destruction, require global responses and transformation, resulting in something other than a simple zero-sum equation between major powers. The speaker stated that the July 18th 2005 agreement set forth an open-ended structure and mechanism for cooperation, which was enhanced by the March 2006 Vision Statement signed during President Bush’s visit to India. However, he argued that despite these common interests, there were prominent differences in approach, for instance, on the Iran issue, but on the whole these should not affect the broader thrust of the bilateral relationship. Referring to the 123 agreement, he noted that the democratic decision making in both countries had made the negotiated agreement a slightly long drawn process. He was confident that the future of this strategic partnership appeared bright and set on a progressive trajectory. He identified civil nuclear energy, space technology, science and technology, education, agriculture, environmental concerns, pandemics and health care health sector as promising areas of cooperation in future where greater synergies could be developed.

    During the question and discussion period, the Indian official stated that the democratic decision-making processes in both countries have made arriving at a negotiated agreement a long and drawn-out process. He mentioned the need to imbibe greater transparency to bilateral dealings at the governmental level by informing public opinion. He stated that research efforts can be made more relevant to policymakers in the United States and India by highlighting areas that are untouched or outside current scope of bilateral cooperation. He stated that both governments need to foster greater transparency in their bilateral negotiations, starting with the civilian nuclear deal, by informing public opinion and building momentum from the public at large. To that end, he encouraged the findings of this conference to be promulgated as widely as possible. In conclusion, he stated that how the Indio-US partnership will evolve will be a key factor in influencing global norms. India in the 21st century has leverage to help shape global norms as well. Global institutional structures such as, the Bretton Woods economic arrangements are outdated; there is need for cooperation in many emerging areas, including nonproliferation and climate change. The present system has failed to deliver substantively apart from ad hoc solutions in each case, leading to the formation of coalitions of the willing. Hence the current global institutional structures urgently need to be revamped, a task requiring future strengthening of the Indo-US partnership.

    (Report prepared by Medha Bisht, Research Assistant)

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