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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20221116T053000
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SUMMARY:Report on Roundtable Discussion on Dangers of Tactical Nuclear Weapons
DESCRIPTION:Manohar Parrikar Institute for  Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) and the Indian Pugwash Society (IPS) jointly  organised an in-person roundtable discussion on “Dangers of Tactical Nuclear  Weapons” as part of the Nuclear Roundtable Series on 16 November 2022 at  1500 hrs in Room Number 005. Ambassador  Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General\, MP-IDSA and Convener\, IPS chaired the  session. Air Marshal Rajesh Kumar\,  PVSM\, AVSM\, VM\, ADC\, (Retd.)\, Former Commander-in-Chief\, Strategic Forces  Command; Dr. G. Balachandran\,  Independent Scholar; and Dr. Rajiv Nayan\,  Senior Research Associate and Centre Coordinator\, Nuclear and Arms Control  Centre\, MP-IDSA participated in the discussion as panellists.  \nExecutive Summary\nBrainstorming was done at the roundtable discussion on the implications of the use of Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNW)s in  the Russia-Ukraine war as well as in the various theatres of the world. The speakers  brought out various factors related to TNWs right from its definition\, the  issue of command and control\, nuclear doctrines\, the demonstrative role of TNWs\,  and factors related to radiation among others. Also\, that there was the least  possibility of Russia using TNWs against Ukraine. In the India-Pakistan  context\, Pakistan’s threat to use TNWs was bluff and bluster and India needs to  enforce deterrence through actions such as the Balakot strikes.  \nDetailed Report\nAmbassador Sujan R. Chinoy set  the ball rolling by providing a brief background to the topic. He reminded the  audience about the P-5 Joint Statement at the beginning of 2022\, that abjured  the use of nuclear weapons. But just a few weeks later\, Russia put its nuclear  forces on alert amidst the Ukraine crisis. However\, the United States (US) did  not react with a similar counter-action. Broadening the scope of the topic\, Ambassador  Chinoy spoke about the risks of escalation\, retaliation and miscalculation with  the TNWs being in the action. The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New  START) Treaty was drawing to an end and new negotiations were yet to begin.  China is loathe to get involved in any nuclear arms control treaty. Russia\,  even today\, contains a large number of TNWs. However\, the lack of consensus on  the definition of TNWs adds to the problem of putting TNWs in meaningful arms  control negotiations. With these initial remarks\, the Chair invited Air Marshal  Rajesh Kumar to speak on the topic. \nAir Marshal Rajesh Kumar began by  stating that the TNWs are weapons meant to be used on the battlefield. Their  yield varies from 1 – 50 Kilotons. Tactical weapons should be judged based on  size\, range and doctrine. There were so many TNWs before the advent of the  START treaty but over a period of time\, their numbers have been reduced.  However\, there is no treaty limiting TNWs. The US has drawn down tactical  nuclear weapons because of the advent of precision weapons. However\, the  Russian Doctrine requires TNWs to have escalation control in the event of war as  Russia doesn’t match up to the combined might of the NATO forces. For Russia\,  TNWs can be used to return the aggression\, prevent conflict from expanding\,  pre-empt damaging strikes that pose an existential threat to Russia and  terminate hostility. They have a strategy of escalating to deescalate.  The US had a similar strategy when the Warsaw  Pact was alive. Air Marshal Rajesh Kumar mentioned the Kalibr and Iskander missiles  of Russia and the B61 air-delivered gravity bomb of the US. The US has not  developed TNWs because their doctrine says that the use of TNWs will escalate  the war in the nuclear ladder and there will be Mutually Assured Destruction  (MAD). In the case of MAD\, the US doctrine mandates to respond with strategic  weapons. Russian assertion on 2 November 2022 that the nuclear war should not  be fought has come out of a realisation that the nuclear war cannot be stopped  after firing a single tactical nuclear weapon. The war would inevitably  escalate. \nAccording to Air Marshal Rajesh  Kumar\, TNWs had limited utility when it came to achieving specific objectives  such as stopping the war or stopping the enemy’s advances. A study suggested  that Pakistan would require 35 TNWs of 1-2 Kilotons each to stop the advancing Indian  Armoured Division in its tracts by destroying at least fifty per cent of the  tanks in a hypothetical situation. Targeting is a big problem with TNWs which  is not the case with precision weapons. With the use of precision weapons\, the  objectives of TNWs can be achieved with conventional weapons. Later\, the speaker  highlighted the issue of command and control vis-à-vis TNWs. In the case of TNWs\,  command and control is delegated to the person on the ground unlike the case of  strategic weapons where Command and Control is in safe hands. Therefore\, there  is a big risk of miscalculation in the case of TNWs. After dwelling on the  theoretical issues related to tactical weapons\, the speaker put forth his  thoughts on the Russia-Ukraine war. Moscow’s action of putting nuclear forces  on alert was a warning to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) to not  get involved. Surfacing of the Ohio-class Sub-surface Ballistic Nuclear Submarine  (SSBN) in the Arabian Sea and the port visit of another Ohio-class SSBN to  Gibraltar was a signal from the US to Russia. The US signalled that they would  respond to TNWs with strategic nuclear weapons. The speaker\, further\, contended  that the supporters of disarmament as well as those of deterrence were making  strong arguments according to their respective positions with TNWs in the news. \nAir Marshal Rajesh Kumar dwelled  on TNWs in various theatres across the world. He called out Pakistan’s threat to  use TNWs and asserted that it was just bluff and bluster. Pakistan knows that  if they use TNWs\, the war will certainly be escalated to a full-fledged nuclear  war. Additionally\, they have inadequate fissile material for the consequential  use of TNWs to meet their objectives. Therefore\, India should make its doctrine  of massive nuclear retaliation credible. According to the speaker\, TNWs will be  ineffective in the case of the Korean Peninsula. In the India-China context\,  both are No-First-Use states\, so the question of TNWs does not arise. In  conclusion\, Air Marshal Kumar said that TNWs do not work. There is an issue of  command and control. Any use of TNWs will lead to a full-fledged nuclear war. Therefore\,  any talk of normalisation of the use of nuclear weapons should be discouraged.  \nDr. G. Balachandran endorsed the  arguments of Air Marshal Rajesh Kumar. He said that a dispersed delegation of  command and control in the case of TNWs involves multiple actors. The more  actors involved\, the more the anarchy. He contended that distance became an  important factor in distinguishing between strategic and TNWs because of the  US-Russia dynamic. He defined strategic weapons as weapons that take out an opponent’s  retaliatory weapons. If there is a first strike then strategic weapons take out  the opponent’s strategic weapons. Whereas TNWs are used for tactical purposes.  Thus\, on average\, strategic nuclear weapons have a higher yield than TNWs. \nFurther\, the speaker stated that  if a nuclear weapon state uses TNWs against a non-nuclear weapon state\, then a non-nuclear  weapon state has to depend upon a nuclear-weapon state for retaliation. In the case  of the Russia-Ukraine conflict\, if Russia uses TNWs\, the command and control  would be vested only with the president rather than delegated to the local  commander. TNWs can either be used against a large enemy formation or to create  a radioactive barrier to slow down the advances of the enemy. Referring to  JASON advisory group’s report regarding the use of TNWs in the Vietnam War\, Dr.  Balachandran asserted that the study concluded that the use of TNWs would not  have been effective as conventional weapons could have achieved the same  objectives. Additionally\, the use of TNWs would have turned international and  domestic opinion against the state that was using it. The same logic could be  applied in the case of Russia today which is a rational state\, therefore it would  not use TNWs. However\, if TNWs are used\, it will be to send a strategic message  to the opponent. Coming back to the use of TNWs\, the speaker asserted that TNWs  used in massive quantities could be effective. Moreover\, they are effective in  erecting radioactive barriers for advancing opponent forces. But even then\, TNWs  of a specified yield have to be continuously used as the radiation level drops  after some time.  \nDr. Rajiv Nayan in his opening remarks stated that there was no universally accepted definition of TNWs. Broadly\,  missiles below a range of 550 km are considered tactical weapons. However\,  there was no limit to the yield of the weapon. Therefore\, even weapons with a yield  of 200 Kilotons could be termed as TNWs. In 2010\, the Treaty on the  Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) tried to reach a consensus regarding  the definition of TNWs but failed.  \nTalking about the Russia-Ukraine  conflict\, Dr. Nayan asserted that western media\, western think tanks\, research  institutes\, and western leadership had created hype about Russian TNWs. One-third  of Russian nuclear weapons are always on alert. So\, there is nothing unusual.  Rather Russian actions vis-à-vis nuclear weapons are according to their  doctrine. In the Ukraine crisis\, TNWs are not in the picture except maybe for  signalling. Russia has always denied the use of TNWs but the western strategic  community has projected the Russian threat of TNWs against Ukrainian  infrastructure and NATO forces.  \nDr. Nayan\, further\, spoke about the  implications of the use of TNWs after the Ukraine conflict. He foresaw a demand  for the deployment of TNWs in Europe. Although some European countries were not  in favour of the same\, the changed equations may lead to the redeployment of  the weapons. Then there is a possibility that nations will try to modernise their  respective TNWs. The Russian threat projection can be used for securing modernisation  funding by the US. Further\, the concept of graduated deterrence might come into  vogue. The speaker predicted that there could be a verification problem in  coming times. The world will have to grapple with how to deal with stored nuclear  weapons as they are likely to come into play. Unless there is overall  disarmament\, TNWs are unlikely to fade away. Nations are likely to take a fresh  look at the doctrines to make necessary changes. \nIn the ensuing discussion  including the question and answer session\, Ambassador Chinoy argued  compellingly that tactical and strategic nuclear weapons were conjoined. The use  of one would involve the other. There was no doctrine for TNWs. Taking over  from him\, Dr. Balachandran argued that if Russia were to use TNWs\, it won’t  face any counter-action from NATO. However\, the use of nuclear weapons would  certainly lead to the collapse of the international non-proliferation regime. Responding  to questions and comments\, Air Marshal Rajesh Kumar opined that India’s nuclear  doctrine is very well crafted. However\, it is not studied well by practitioners  and academicians. There is an air of secrecy about our strategic weapons.  Sometimes political and military leadership work in silos\, as a result\, they  speak differently as there is a difference in understanding of strategy and  doctrine by the two. Our programme does not appear to be credible because many  stakeholders speak at cross-purposes. We should set our narrative right so that  the world interprets it as we want. Further\, the cold-start doctrine is no  longer required. Rather Generals are worried about so many soldiers being  deployed on the border as there is a possibility of tiredness at the beginning  of the war. Bringing back the debate on the Russia-Ukraine crisis\, Dr. Nayan  drew the attention of the audience to the fact that Uranium can be accessed by  countries in indirect ways and Russians were not pondering using TNWs. In the  India-Pakistan context\, Dr. Nayan contended that India needs to take action  like at Balakot to achieve deterrence. If actions is not taken\, Pakistan will  get emboldened. In the end\, Ambassador Chinoy complimented the panel and the audience  for intense brainstorming. \nThe  report was prepared by Mr. Niranjan Chandrashekhar Oak\, Research Analyst\,  MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/report-on-roundtable-discussion-on-dangers-of-tactical-nuclear-weapons
CATEGORIES:ROUND TABLES / WORKSHOPS,EVENT REPORT
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