BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//MP-IDSA - ECPv6.15.12.2//NONSGML v1.0//EN CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH X-WR-CALNAME:MP-IDSA X-ORIGINAL-URL:https://idsa.in X-WR-CALDESC:Events for MP-IDSA REFRESH-INTERVAL;VALUE=DURATION:PT1H X-Robots-Tag:noindex X-PUBLISHED-TTL:PT1H BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:Asia/Kolkata BEGIN:STANDARD TZOFFSETFROM:+0530 TZOFFSETTO:+0530 TZNAME:IST DTSTART:20180101T000000 END:STANDARD END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20190716T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20190716T053000 DTSTAMP:20261103T061148 CREATED:20231224T110856Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130737Z UID:64439-1563255000-1563255000@idsa.in SUMMARY:Round Table Discussion on ‘China’s Policy Towards South Asia: Implications for India’ DESCRIPTION:Chair: Amb. Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General\, IDSA \nVenue: Room No. 005\, Ground Floor \nConcept Note\nThe South Asian region has been central to India’s security and foreign policy. Since independence\, India’s natural pre-eminence has been subjected to contestation because of growing presence of extra-regional powers\, including China\, in the region. China’s presence in Tibet\, bordering India\, has made China an important part of India’s strategic calculus; more so\, because China shares borders with many of India’s neighbours. Though India recognised China’s sovereignty over Tibet and tried to engage and befriend China\, the 1962 war not only altered the India-China equation but substantially reshaped the perception of India’s neighbours towards both China and India. To some countries in the region\, China gradually emerged as a reliable security partner\, while India was perceived as a ‘hegemon’. \nOver the years\, China’s approach towards South Asia has been a work in progress. At the moment\, a pragmatic mode of engagement is evident between China and South Asia which throws up a challenge for India’s neighbourhood policy wherein each of India’s neighbours is eager to play the China card against India. In the past\, China not only supported insurgent groups fighting against the Indian State\, but also supported anti-India policies of various undemocratic regimes in neighbourhood\, who faced popular opposition from constituencies seeking to bring about representative governance in these countries influenced by the successful democratic experiment in India. While following the 1988 Sino-Indian rapprochement\, China advised India’s neighbours to resolve their disputes with India bilaterally\, it continued to balance India and stay relevant in the region by extending military and strategic cooperation to Pakistan. China has also made multiple inroads into South Asia\, often cultivating political parties\, highlighting cultural affinity with South Asia\, diligently spreading its soft power through Confucius Institutes and building close ties with militaries in different countries by providing defence equipment at cheaper rates. It has forged close relationships with political parties\, often inviting delegations belonging to different political parties to visit China and engage the Communist Party of China. It shares close relations with the Nepal Communist Party\, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party\, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party and the Progressive Party of Maldives headed by former President Yameen. In Pakistan\, China’s greatest support base has been the Pakistan Army\, which wields real power in Pakistan. Apart from these parties which may favour China\, through grants\, loans and aid\, it has made the ruling regimes stakeholders in its strategic calculus\, while pursuing its interests in South Asia. It provides generous fellowships to students in the South Asian region to learn the language or pursue higher degrees in leading Chinese universities. It is the largest supplier of weapons to Pakistan\, followed by Bangladesh. It has strategic defence and nuclear collaboration with Pakistan; it has signed a Defence Cooperation Agreement with Bangladesh and has recently supplied submarines to the Bangladesh Navy. Its supply of arms during Sri Lanka’s fight against the LTTE is often cited as being critical to its success by the Sri Lankan Army. \nChina’s ability to provide loans on attractive terms as part of its flagship Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) announced in 2013\, has been seen as a success by many countries in the region\, especially for the regimes that wish to showcase economic development for their continuation in power and are unwilling to adhere to the terms and conditions of The World Bank and the IMF. Not withstanding the fear of debts\, China is able to provide an alternative politically and economically and a choice that these countries can exercise. As a result\, China’s strategic entrenchment in the region has been facilitated by its involvement in building ports and infrastructure in South Asia. The deep sea port at Kyaukpyu in Myanmar\, the Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka and the Gwadar Port in Pakistan certainly enhance its presence in the Indian Ocean. It is continuing to eye the Sonadia Port in Bangladesh\, work on which is currently shelved. \nThe strategic underpinnings of China’s involvement in these deep sea ports are apparent. It helps China to expand its presence into the Indian Ocean ostensibly to protect its Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC)\, and there are several implications for India. It already controls the Hambantota Port on a 99-year lease; 91 per cent of the revenue generated by the Gwadar Port goes to the China Overseas Ports Holding Company while only 9 per cent is earned by the Gwadar Port Authority. Many in Pakistan often refer to their country as China’s colony. Its presence in Gilgit-Baltistan in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK) through the CPEC project and its unrelenting effort to bring Bhutan to its side by offering to swap territory and settle the border dispute with Thimpu\, are some examples of China’s attempts to make further strategic inroads into the region. This also reflects China’s strategy to control ports and to have a strategic presence around India through BRI\, in the name of bringing growth and prosperity to the host country. Connectivity has emerged as an important yardstick to measure ‘influence’. \nChina has substantial defence cooperation with the countries in the South Asia region. It has signed a defence cooperation agreement with Bangladesh in 2001 and the two countries are now strategic partners. According to a media report published in 2018\, around 35 per cent of China’s arms supplies went to Pakistan between 2013 and 2017\, followed by 19 per cent to Bangladesh. Dhaka procured 71 per cent of its arms from China over the five-year period\, and Myanmar sourced 68 per cent of its arms during the same period. Due to India’s inability to assist in supplying arms to Nepal in 2005 because of the takeover of power by the Monarchy\, and its difficulties in supplying weapons to Sri Lanka during its war with the LTTE due to opposition from Tamil Nadu\, China filled the gap and supplied arms and provided military aid to Nepal and Sri Lanka. This substantially undermined India’s position in the conflicts in these two countries. Later\, China provided $32.3mn as grant to the Nepal Army and built an armed police force training academy at the cost of US $350 million. Following the suicide bombings on April 21\, 2019 in Colombo on Easter\, China has offered Sri Lanka counter-insurgency weapons worth US$14 million. \nAs regards Beijing’s trade with South Asia\, it is heavily skewed in favour of China. Beijing enjoys a surplus in trade with all South Asian countries. However\, the pattern of China’s trade does not represent a similar trend for all of South Asia. For instance\, while China’s trade with countries like India and Bangladesh shows an average increase in both exports and imports (with exports significantly outweighing imports\, as with all other South Asian countries)\, in the case of Pakistan and Afghanistan\, China’s imports have declined drastically; while exports continued to rise: Chinese imports from Pakistan fell from roughly US$ 2.7 billion in 2014 to US$ 1.8 billion in 2017\, while imports from Afghanistan reduced from US$ 17 million in 2014 to US$ 3 million in 2017. At the same time\, Chinese exports to Pakistan and Afghanistan increased from\nUS$ 13 billion and US$ 393 million respectively in 2014 to US$ 18 billion and US$ 541 million respectively in 2017. Another noticeable trend in China’s trade with the South Asian region pertains to its economic relations with Nepal and Bhutan. Since 2014\, China’s exports to the two landlocked states have declined significantly. While occasionally year-on-year exports have increased – for instance\, in 2016 and 2017 with Nepal and in 2017 with Bhutan – it has however\, not been able to reach the level of 2014. The trade patterns indicate that the overall nature of China-South Asia trade is unfavourable and unsustainable for the South Asian region. \nThe question is\, what will all this mean for India? To what extent would it affect India’s regional primacy and its vital security interests in times to come\, as India would not be able to match China’s capacity to invest? This Roundtable will broadly examine four aspects: \n\nContours of China’s policies towards South Asia since its presence in Tibet;\nThe strategic and economic component of its foreign policy and response of countries in the region to China’s strategic overtures;\nThe BRI and its implications for the South Asian region;\nIndia’s policy response to China’s strategy in the South Asian neighbourhood.\n\n(Concept Note is prepared by South Asia Centre. Inputs provided by East Asia Centre) \nProgramme\n\n\n\n10AM-10.15AM:                                           Inaugural Remarks by Amb. Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General\, IDSA \n\n\n\n\n[15 Mnts. Each Speaker) \n\n\n\n\n10.15AM-1.15PM:                                        Chair: Amb. Sujan R. Chinoy \n\n\n\n\nChina in South Asia: A Geo-Economic Perspective | Dr. Sanjaya Baru\, Distinguished Fellow\, IDSA \n\n\n\n\nChina’s Political Outreach in South Asia | Amb. T.C.A. Rangachari\, Distinguished Fellow\, VIF \n\n\n\n\nIndia\, SAARC and China’s Growing Footprint  in South Asia | Prof. S.D. Muni\, Member\, Executive Council\, IDSA \n\n\n\n\nChina and South Asia: The Growing Security Linkages | Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli\, Chinese Studies\, SIS\, JNU \n\n\n\n\nXi Jinping and China’s South Asia              Policy | Dr. Jagannath Panda\, Fellow\, IDSA \n\n\n\n\nChina in Pakistan and Afghanistan’s Foreign Policy | Dr. Ashok Kumar Behuria\, Senior Fellow\, IDSA \n\n\n\n\nChina in the Strategic Outlook of Sri Lanka\, Maldives and Bangladesh | Dr. Smruti S. Pattanaik\, Fellow\, IDSA \n\n\n\n\nNepal’s Policy Outlook on China | Dr. Nihar R. Nayak\, Fellow\, IDSA \n\n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n\nDiscussion URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/round-table-discussion-on-chinas-policy-towards-south-asia-implications-for-india CATEGORIES:ROUND TABLES / WORKSHOPS ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20190717T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20190717T053000 DTSTAMP:20261103T061148 CREATED:20231223T132906Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130737Z UID:63057-1563341400-1563341400@idsa.in SUMMARY:Round Table Discussion on "A Study of the Kural: Concepts and Themes" DESCRIPTION:Venue: Room No. 005\, IDSA \n Date: July 17\, 2019 \nThe discussion was initiated by Director General\, IDSA\, Amb. Sujan R. Chinoy. In his welcome remarks\, he observed that the Indian strategic thought in the last five years has been more anchored in India’s own strategic ethos than ever before. He highlighted the growing relevance of vernacular languages to foster out-of-box thinking which has enabled people with linguistic skills to gain meaningful employment in both public and private sectors. \n Amb. Chinoy raised a few questions\, based on the history of invasions into India\, for the lead discussant\, Col. P.K. Gautam (Retd.)\, to incorporate in his presentation. These include: \n\nHas the Indian strategic thought ever been linear in terms of shaping the decision making of the dynasties that ruled India? \nGiven the history of Mughal and British rule in India\, did the local rulers and the people inculcate the traditional Indian ethos in their strategic thinking?\nWhat happened to the Indian strategic culture during these ‘long centuries’? \nHas any historical study been conducted ever before to examine these issues or are they only now gaining traction\, given the fact that today India is in-charge of its destiny?\n\nThe Chair of the discussion\, Amb. R. Rajagopalan\, highlighted the ongoing debate about India’s existing strategic culture. He argued that India’s strategic culture is often used impulsively rather than being based on an objective definition. While stressing the presence of a strong strategic culture in India\, he lamented the fact that the majority of the country’s scholarly literature is focussed on Kautilya. He highlighted 10 other schools of thought which are yet to be explored. He also dwelt on the lack of enthusiasm as well as platforms for Indian scholars vis-à-vis their international peers to study India’s strategic culture. He observed that one of the best translations of Thirukural is by a British national. \nAmb. Rajagopalan further stated that India’s strategic culture is not monolithic but is rather mosaic. However\, as a composite\, it is more coherent than in most contemporary nation-states\, including the United States. \nHe argued that Thirukural (Kural in short) is not a sacred text. He observed that Thirukural is a combination of the words Thiru and Kural. The word Thiru denotes sanctity (sacredness) of Kurals\, and Kural signifies short verses (couplets). Thirukural\, meaning ‘sacred couplets’\, is considered equivalent to the Vedas\, and is one of the most important works in the Tamil language. It is also called the masterpiece of Tamil literature. However\, it is not a religious text since it highlights a commoner’s way of life and offers perspective on various things. Also\, the followers had bestowed the honour of Thiru on its author Valluvar\, and therefore the name – Thiruvalluvar. \nHighlighting the differences and similarities between Kautilya’s Arthashastra and Thiruvalluvar’s Thirukural\, Amb. Rajagopalan pointed out that Kautilya was a man in the king’s court responsible for advising the king\, whereas Thiruvalluvar was a common weaver who spoke about everything in his text\, including statecraft. \nThe lead discussant of the session\, Col. Gautam\, began his presentation by pointing out that Thirukural is a 2\,000-year-old Tamil book that compresses 133 different topics into poetry. These topics range from war (like Sun Tzu) to economics (like Kautilya)\, and good governance to social reforms. The text is also cognisant of the institutions of war and national interest\, and the instruments of exercising state power. It has pragmatic advice for the ruler\, and is\, therefore\, among the most complete philosophical works. \nElaborating further on Thirukural\, Col. Gautam informed that it consists of 1\,330 Kurals divided into 133 chapters called Adhikaram. The entire work is divided into three sections – Aram\, Porul and Inbam\, meaning dharma/virtue\, wealth/goods and pleasure/love respectively. Out of the four aspects of Purushartha – Aram\, Porul\, Inbam and Veedu (Moksha) – Thirukural addresses only the first three and advocates the path to Veedu through the others\, as a result of which it is called Muppal (three elements) and Muppalil Narporul (four aspects in three elements). Its uniqueness lies in its method to attain Moksha (Veedu) through the other three elements and by following a married life based on dharma. \nCol. Gautam illustrated this in the following structure: \n\n38 Adhikarams (380 Kurals) in Aram section. \n70 Adhikarams(700 Kurals) in Porul section. \n25 Adhikarams (250 Kurals) in Inbam section. \n\n According to Col. Gautam\, “Kural is not a moral utopian sermon. It recognises political realism in a world where till date there is no world society or world government. This calls for building alliances (friends)\, armed forces supported by treasury\, secured urban centres led by an able king who is advised by competent ministers\, productive countryside and upright people. If all the above conditions blend-in with political virtue and legitimacy\, a state can emerge prosperous and ensure good life for its subjects.” \nCol. Gautam also highlighted the Thirukural’s political and economic relevance that can be applied in modern times. These include: \n\nKing’s Qualities and Duties (Chapters 39-46): This section is a lesson on good governance. There are three sources of income for the king – unclaimed wealth\, taxes\, and customs collection from the foreigners. In Valluvar’s world\, there were three channels of equitable distribution of wealth – defence\, public works and social service. The kurals were primarily addressed to the King\, but many of them applied to people in equal measure. Today\, democracies have replaced kingdoms while political parties and ministers have replaced kings. The qualities that Thiruvalluvar attributes to kings are naturally expected to be found in our leaders. \nEconomic Planning (Chapters 47-50): This section is a lesson on economic governance. According to Valluvar\, “the energy and effort spent on action without adequate prior planning will not produce the desired result.” Today\, this is referred to as the cost-benefit analysis. Similarly\, Verse 478 is an excellent principle of public finance and financial administration – “If the revenue of the State is limited\, the king should keep the expenditure within bounds.” Our failure in economic development reflects our inefficient planning and implementation. \nQualities of Ministers (Chapters 64-68): These chapters consist of dissertations on ministers – their qualifications\, characteristics and activities. This is an important section on statecraft. “A Minister is one who makes excellent consideration of time\, means\, place\, manner and the difficulties. He excels in firmness\, knowledge\, preference and protection of subjects. He gives sound advice to the king and people. A Minister must possess – power of speech (because wealth and evil result from his speech)\, firm in action and proper consultation. Far better are the seventy crores of enemies for a king than an unfaithful minister at his side.”\nThere is also a chapter on management techniques and decision-making processes. “A minister is conversant with the best methods of performance; he should avoid actions that yield no benefit or bring grief to the king. Even though he may see his mother starve\, he should not act hastily.” After considerable thought\, planning and analysis\, one arrives at a decision. One should not back out once a decision has been made. \n\nEnvoy/Ambassador (Chapter 69) and King’s Advisers (Chapter 70): Chapter 69 is on diplomacy. “Envoy should have: love for the king\, knowledge of his affairs\, pleasing attributes; power of speech and ability to bring glory to his country. The ambassador should fearlessly seek his country’s good even though it might cost him his life.” In Chapter 70\, Valluvar says that an adviser to the ruler “should give firm advice to rectify errors”. In comparison\, today’s advisers (secretaries to ministers) often hesitate in giving credible advice. \nGood Army and Soldiers (Chapters 77-78): In this section\, Valluvar talks about valour and honour. He says\, “the army that conquers without fear is the chief wealth of the king.” A good army is one that stands firm. It must be capable of resisting unitedly. An army cannot last long without brave generals. “What if a host of rats roar like the sea? They will perish at the mere breath of the cobra.” Valluvar also says that it is the affection of the people that maintains the morale and efficiency of the army. If people hate the army\, it will dwindle. The army in garrison has to be constantly engaged\, otherwise\, it will lose its efficiency. “A soldier’s achievement is in his valour; on the days he has not received wounds in action are days lost to him.” \n\nCol. Gautam observed that Thirukural also reflects Valluvar’s outlook on social reforms. For example\, kurals33 and 93 on Kollamai (non-violence) and Kallunnamai (abstinence from alcohol)\, respectively\, highlight the anomalies found in the society during the period\, which was also known as the Golden Era of Tamil Sangam\, and measures to bring about changes. \n Col. Gautam concluded by arguing that the need of the hour is to be inspired by Kural’s normative and didactic philosophy. The values of aram or dharmais supreme. It is aram which regulates both porul and imbam. Col. Gautam noted that even Mahatma Gandhi had taken a similar line in his Hind Swaraj. The Kural in Tamil\, therefore\, adds value to the Indian heritage\, and many of its ideas and concepts are relevant not only for contemporary times but also the future. \nFollowing points were raised during the ensuing discussion: \n\nThirukural is not an ethical or moral literature. It is an encyclopaedia of mankind\, and is\, therefore\, a universal script.\nThere is a lack of understanding of the Tamil literature. For instance\, a majority of people fail to understand the existence of male and female perspectives in the Sangam literature.\nThere is a need to explore ways in which Kural can be further interpreted in the fields of political science\, defence\, engineering\, etc.\nShould texts like Kural not be made mandatory in education and government services curriculum?\nThe debate revolving around Kural is ‘underrated’.\nIs Kural and moral realism inter-linked? \n\n Report prepared by Ms. Nagapushpa Devendra\, Research Analyst\, IDSA. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/round-table-discussion-on-a-study-of-the-kural-concepts-and-themes CATEGORIES:ROUND TABLES / WORKSHOPS,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR