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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20161019T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20161019T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T143450
CREATED:20231223T133006Z
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SUMMARY:Compressing politics on COIN: Implications for counterinsurgency theory with reference to India’s Northeast
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Prof. Rajesh  Rajagopalan \n  Discussants:  Brig. Narender Kumar\, Col. Pradeep Singh Chhonkar\, Col. Vikrant S. Deshpande  \nMr. Walterman elaborated on his paper about the  theoretical debates of Counterinsurgency (COIN) and the growing complex  challenges that have confronted the traditional theorization of COIN. The paper  deals with the relationship between COIN and the complex aspects of latest insurgencies.  Mr. Alex argued that the old theorization of COIN\, which was conditioned by Cold  War understanding and the traditional division of “duties into 80% political  action and 20% military”\, has almost become stagnant. He argued even the 21st  century democracies have been adopting this mechanism for dealing with  insurgencies. Mr Waterman noted there is a need to overcome this “conceptual  inertia” in order to address the complexity of changed insurgencies and this  paper is an attempt in that direction.  \nWaterman argued that the continued theorisation and  division of COIN into political and military are inadequate for dealing with insurgencies  as these have evolved\, grown complex and are sometimes thriving upon  alternative political models. Defeating the political in the insurgencies remains challenge for any COIN rather than merely crushing  its guerrilla tactics. That means in many ways that COIN has become 100%  political.  \nWith regard to India\, Waterman argued that in India  the rebel groups were recognised from the beginning as “misguided citizens” by  then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and the approach to deal with them has  been overwhelmingly political with less use of military tactics. However\, this approach  has not paid off in the way the state would have liked it to. According to Waterman\,  the current notion of political embedded in COIN understanding fails to take  into account the complexity of the political environment at the two levels: One  is that counterinsurgents and insurgents are not the only actors that can have  an overall political impact. There are other influential actors as well; strong  local  politicians\, civil society or foreign  intelligence agencies. Second is that the interactions within this environment  may not reflect the traditional and complex political competition. Some elements  of an insurgency may be seeking to carve out an ethnic exclusionary base to  consolidate power while others may be seeking to control drug trafficking or  likewise. Such vested interests are not uncommon in the latest insurgencies.  \nWaterman argued that the Indian approach of a  combination of political engagement and military coercion\, has been successful  in co-opting those groups who are willing to be part of the mainstream and  empowering political actors to bring them to negotiations. Though this has been  successful\, for example\, in Mizoram with the Mizo National Front (MNF)\, it\,  however\, remains an exception. In other Northeast states like Nagaland\, issues  remains unsettled. In Bodoland\, the Peace Accords of 1993 and 2003 created a  new kind of identity politics within the Bodo society\, fragmenting it\, and creating  new forms of violence that led to the emergence of “other armed groups” who are  creating their own space. Insurgent groups tend to exploit vulnerable sections of  a society and grey area to their interest. Many a times\, insurgent groups react  to a particular COIN approach differently based upon their political and social  conditions. These different signals from different groups “produce  complications” which the current political primacy in COIN fails to cover  appropriately. Similarly\, apart from the political\, the force used in the COIN  is meant to weaken the insurgent groups and bring them on the negotiating table.  This\, however\, changes the political/power dynamics: apparently empowering one  group and sidelining the others.  \nTherefore\,  though the political primacy on COIN is rightly the main feature\, but it is  unable to capture increased complexity present in the latest insurgencies. For  that we need to re-visit the old theory of COIN and attempt a new theorization  for capturing the latest dynamics and actors involved. We need to revise the theory  in order to successfully draw generalisations to cover diverse cases.  \nBrig. Narender Kumar\n  Brig. Kumar in his comments argued that there are indeed  complications in the process of COIN\, as the paper argues. But these arise also  from the geography\, demography and relationship between ethnic groups as well\,  whose understanding may differ from the mainstream. As a case in point\, in the Northeast\,  there was no concept of state as it is understood now. The effort from the  centre to compress the local structures and traditions has created problems. For  example\, Assam was one of the most developed regions in India. Attempted reform  of its structure without taking into account the local traditions led to the  problems it is faced with today. In other places like Manipur\, conflicts exist  between the ethnic groups themselves rather than with the centre or state.  Overall\, Brig. Kumar argued\, given the complexity\, where is the space for the  political? The situation demands closer to an 80% military and 20% political  approach. Therefore\, at best\, it was more likely that the political and  military will go hand in hand.  \n  In  Nagaland\, insurgency is an industry which provides jobs to the unemployed  youth. This is because there are no economic opportunities for them. It’s  fortunate that the people are forcing the insurgent groups to maintain the  cease fire. There is a requirement for the northeast to be first integrated  with itself\, then with the main land.   \nCol. Pradeep Singh Chhonkar\n  Col. Chhonkar argued that the paper presented aptly  analyzes the concept of political in COIN and dynamics involved in  insurgencies. This complexity has grown mainly because of the vast number of actors  involved in these insurgencies. These actors control economic\, social and  political power and use them to pursue their interests. Many Northeast  insurgencies are complex because these are not insurgencies of traditional understanding  and features but are used for controlling the drug market\, fake currency and  for extortions. He suggested that Nagaland could also be included as a case  study for a situation in which\, when one group is talked to\, the others feel  being sidelined.     \n Col. Vikrant S. Deshpande\n Col. Deshpande opined that the paper highlights two  elements of COIN: political approach and utility of force. It argues that the  existing theory doesn’t entail the complexity involved in insurgencies and for  analyzing this Northeast is taken as case study. COIN practice precedes the  theory and it is not that the practioners are not aware about the  complications. The measures taken in Northeast were ineffective not because the  design or intention were missing but because of the wrong execution. \nCol.  Deshpande was of the opinion that the idea of utility of force in the paper can  be further developed. Force is used to achieve tactical ends. It needs to be elaborated  why the use of force should stop at getting a fighting group to the negotiating  table.  \nProf. Rajesh Rajagopalan\n   Commenting on the paper\, Prof. Rajagopalan argued that  three points need to be taken into consideration: i)academic theorizing has practice behind it; \, i.e.\, a theory’s premise  is empirical data or/experience which informs the theorist’s understanding of  an issue which he/she then tries to give a theoretical explanation.  ii)\, the binary division of the COIN theory debate into the political and  military doesn’t cover all the dimensions involved. Besides\, the perspective of  a theorist or practioner has a significant impact on this; and iii) As a corollary to  the second point\, therefore\, for better or worse\, there is politics involved in  this division of the COIN into the political and military itself\,. An  academician or a practioner after all has his subjectivity involved in this  process which influences his/her understanding of the COIN.  \n          Prof.  Rajagopalan further argued that the concept of political in COIN is not  applicable at the global level. India is fighting insurgencies internally and the issues of human rights\, citizenship rights\, democratic values  and excessive use of force are factors in play while taking on the insurgent  groups\,; unlike in international  counterinsurgency enterprises\, of the type found in Afghanistan and Iraq. In an  attempt of theorization\, we also need to open the black box from the both  sides\, i.e.\, from the state and from the insurgent side as well. Prof.  Rajagopalan noted that a major challenge for the paper would be to draw generalizations  from the application of the (reformed) COIN theory in cases where there are  complexities involved\, like in the Northeast region of India.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/compressing-politics-on-coin-implications-for-counterinsurgency-theory-with-reference-to-indias-northeast
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