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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120210T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120210T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T191741
CREATED:20231224T111307Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130741Z
UID:64488-1328851800-1328851800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:War on Terror in the Post-Osama Phase
DESCRIPTION:Jointly organised by MAKAIAS & IDSAVenue: Room # 005\, Ground Floor\, IDSA  \nProgramme\n10:30 – 11:00 A.M Arrival of Guests\nTea/Coffee \n11:00 – 11:05 A.M.\nWelcome Address by Dr. Arvind Gupta\, Director – General\, IDSA\, New Delhi \n11:05 – 11:10 A.M.\nWelcome Address by Dr. Sreeradha Datta\, Director\, MAKAIAS\, Kolkata \n11:10 A.M – 12:40 P.M. SessionChairperson: Ambassador Satish Chandra (retd.)\n(Former Deputy National Security Advisor) \nKey Speakers:\n\nMr. Shamlal Bathija\, AFGHANISTAN\nSenior Advisor for Economic Affairs to the President of the Islamic Republic\nof Afghanistan\, Kabul\nMr. B. Raman\, INDIA\nDirector\, Institute for Topical Studies\, Chennai\nDr. Maqsudul Hasan Nuri\, PAKISTAN\nActing President & Senior Research Fellow\, Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI)\, Islamabad\nMr. R. Banerji\, INDIA\nSenior Political Analyst\nProf. Bahram Amirahmadian\, IRAN\nFaculty of World Studies\, Tehran University\, Tehran\nDr. Zubair Popalzai\, AFGHAN\nBBC Monitoring\, London\, United Kingdom\nProf. Vladimir Boyko\, RUSSIA\nAltai State Pedagogical Academy\, Barnaul\nMr. Vishal Chandra\, INDIA\nAssociate Fellow\, IDSA\, New Delhi\n\n12:40 – 01:20 P.M. Discussions \n01:20 – 01:30 P.M. Chairperson’s concluding remarks \n01.30 – 02:30 P.M. Lunch \nConcept Note\nWith the killing of Osama Bin Laden by the US Navy Seals on May 2\, 2011 in Pakistani Garrison city of Abbottabad\, the war on Terror has entered into a new phase. Contrary to the imagination\, instead of decreasing\, incidents of Jihadi terrorism are on the rise indicating spread of terror network. Numerous lesser known outfits have gained in strength and are zealously engaged in furthering the terror agenda. While the US is struggling to make Afghanistan out of bounds for al-Qaeda and its associates\, the Pakistani state sees her national interest being served by these very terror outfits and thus willingly impedes the US efforts. It is about time to realise that selective approach to deal with the issue of terrorism is bound to fail as groups with terror agenda are complementing each other much better than states launching a campaign against them. It is often argued that the role of states like Pakistan under the pressure of domestic contradictions is proving to be the main stumbling block in winning the war on terror. Under these circumstances\, ‘war on terror’ cannot be treated as a specific war against al-Qaeda and its associates like the Taliban.  \nThe understanding of the issue of terror needs to be broadened to discover the linkages that exist among all the terror outfits with various agenda. The first step towards victory against terror can be taken by making the divide between States and non-state actors with terror agenda clear. Most states allied with the US in the war on terror realises that unless the international community takes a united and tough stand against terrorism in all its aspects\, the ‘War on Terror’ will\, sooner than later\, turn into a full-scale war between State and Non-state actors. But given the ground realities of the situation and the challenges facing the international community in dealing with these realities\, the right course of action is always debatable. \nThe Symposium proposes to address certain specific issues: \n\nIs the War on Terror being fought in the proper way by the international community?\nIs reconciliation with Taliban unifying or dividing the Afghan nation?\nWhat is the impact of the civil-military divide in Pakistan?\nHow will the US- Pak relations affect the war?\nWhat can be the likely scenarios in the post-2014 period?\nWhat are the perceptions of the countries in the region on the issue of the war on terror?
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/war-on-terror-in-the-post-osama-phase
CATEGORIES:ROUND TABLES / WORKSHOPS
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120222T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120222T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T191741
CREATED:20231223T134506Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130741Z
UID:63178-1329888600-1329888600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Current Situation in West Asia and India’s Dilemma
DESCRIPTION:DG Dr. Arvind Gupta\nThe changes and challenges faced by the world today are enormous and daunting\, and there is a need to deal with these in an interconnected way. The dramatic unfolding of the situation in West Asia over the past year poses a challenge to India in terms of a political response. It calls for a quick rethinking of our foreign policy not just from a long term perspective but also to address the challenges in a tactical manner. The challenges did not appear on the scene without warnings. We have been dealing with nuclear issues for about a decade. Apart from this\, the post-9/11 scenario brought forth other issues that added to the dilemma and changed the situation in West Asia—the rise of Shia influence\, the Iranian nuclear issue\, tensions between Iranians and their Arab neighbours\, tensions between Iranians and Israelis\, and the Arab Spring.  \nIndia’s interests are interspersed with all these developments. These have entangled India’s policy so much so that responding and dealing with them within set parameters has become difficult. The interconnectedness of these issues makes it difficult for India to accept any side or position. Moreover\, the recent bomb blast in New Delhi targeting Israeli embassy personnel has added further to the existing dilemma as to how India should articulate its stance on the West Asia imbroglio.  \nWith this background\, the participants of the roundtable sought to answer the following research questions: \n\nWhat are the dilemmas facing India in dealing with the present crisis in West Asia?\nHow should India mitigate these dilemmas?\nDid India make the right move when it abstained on the Libyan resolution and supported the West on the Syrian resolution?\nHow should India balance its foreign policy towards Iran vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia; Iran vis-à-vis Israel; and Iran vis-à-vis the US?\n\nAmbassador S.K. Bhutani\nOur foreign policy decision in terms of East Asia\, the West\, etc.\, is set\, which is not the case when compared to the West Asian region. Amongst the three revolutions that have been witnessed within the region\, the third revolution triggered by the self-immolation of the fruit seller in Tunisia sent out a new message. It was a revolution showcasing the rising expectations and demand for participatory democracy.  However\, our response to the crisis in the region is confused.  \nIn the case of the Gulf\, a military solution to stop Iran from becoming a nuclear power is not a feasible one. This is the same case with the Western solution of strangling the Iranian economy. Within Iran\, there is a fragmentation of the elite. The leadership is divided\, wherein the Ayatollah [Khamenei] and President Ahmedinejad are at loggerheads. The West’s aim is to use the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the P5+1 in order to pass a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution against Iran. India should not get involved in this debate because the Iranian interest will be taken care of by China and Russia. It is not the principles\, but our interests that should matter.  \nTherefore\, the question arises: What are India’s interests? Iran is beneficial to us for three important reasons: oil and gas\, access to Afghanistan\, and access to the Caspian Sea. The Afghanistan advantage fits into the large perspective for India\, that is\, in order to break the two fronts that we face in terms of conflict—Pakistan and China. India should not be a partner to other powers in containing Iran; rather our role should be to double our relationship with the latter. We should develop a constructive relationship with Iran and protect our country’s strategic interests. We should also work harder to develop relations with the Gulf States\, especially those states that are not in favour of India developing relations with Iran by citing our purpose as being to maintain relations with both sides.  However\, its internal developments and politics makes it difficult to predict the direction Iran might take.  \nWhat do we do with the non-Gulf Arab states? Syria is a difficult case in point. Here\, India should take a constructive humanitarian view and offer to send a non-official medical mission to both sides\, or\, at least\, make such announcements. This will take the immediate pressure off from the Indian government and give them time to think up a response. In Egypt\, the signs are positive and there are fewer contradictions to be resolved. The statement from the Muslim Brotherhood of 21 February\, assuring the US that the peace treaty with Israel will be maintained if aid continues\, and positive feedback from the US Senators’ visit to Egypt\, all point in this direction. Egypt faces a lot of internal strife between the Salafists and the Muslim Brotherhood along with unemployment\, dip in tourism\, and capital flight\, etc. This\, therefore\, presents India with an opportunity to go in. During the protests at Tahrir Square\, one of the demonstrators’ demands called for Egypt to adopt the Indian model. Hence\, we need a non-official level study to probe this further\, which should include the intelligentsia—academic institutions and/or the press. Moreover\, we should not choose sides but try to live with all of them.  \nAmbassador Ishrat Azziz\nAll the problems that India is facing in the region are not bilateral in nature—be they with Israel\, Iran\, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)\, etc. The root of the problem lies between the actors within the Gulf region\, and in this they want to drag India into taking sides.  The positive aspect is that India does not have a colonial relation or “cornering and controlling” relation with this region. All the countries in the West Asian region have strategic problems with each other—the Shia-Sunni divide (led to strategic gains to outside powers)\, Iran-Israel tensions\, and Shia Iran’s problem with Sunni-Saudi Arabia\, etc. However\, India has to give this region its due importance due to meeting its energy needs. Thus\, the economic factor becomes the most important factor in not hindering our relations with this region. We must note that though effective military power is regional\, economic power is global. The other aspect of great importance is the 6 million Indians that work in this region and form an area of immediate concern to India.  \nMoreover\, the GCC\, led by Saudi Arabia\, have expressed desire to develop strategic relations with India. The problem\, however\, is that developing strategic relations with the GCC will put us in a bind vis-à-vis dealing with Iran. The tension between GCC and Iran will affect Indian relations with either of them. For India\, two countries that matter above others—amongst those who possess nuclear arsenals\, share common border with it\, and are beset with internal problems—are Pakistan and China. Hence\, Iran possessing nuclear weapons does not affect us directly\, as it is our neighbour’s neighbour.  Rather\, our immediate concern should be regarding our policy and stand on the issue\, and what we should do to substantially prevent Iran’s nuclear programme. Moreover\, we have to formulate policy for both the long-  and the short term\, especially for the latter\, as it is difficult to meet contingencies that India faces now with regard to this region. Voting in the UNSC should be avoided as much as possible. However\, neutrality in certain situations is not an option as our image as an emerging power demands that take a strong\, positive stand. And this is our dilemma. \nThere will\, eventually\, be pressure on India. But we should not be seen to be taking sides because of\, for instance\, the influence/interest of the USA\, Israel\, and the West. We can justify the Syrian vote because the Arab League is the conscience keeper of the Arab world. However\, regarding Iran\, we should stand firm in stating that the IAEA should be the agency that should deal with such matters. If an anti-Iran resolution or a resolution perceived by Iran as against it comes up for vote in the UNSC\, India must abstain and avoid taking sides. If it is proved that Iran has enriched to higher percentages other than for peaceful purposes\, then India might have to take a stance.  \nDiscussion from participants \nOne of the discussants\, Dr G. Balachandran\, said that\, firstly\, the military option against Iran is not ruled out yet. Secondly\, there is going to be no diplomatic solution to this issue at all. The only solution during the negotiations is\, one\, suspension of enrichment and\, two\, to assure IAEA that there are no hidden facilities in Iran. The question is: if Iran possesses a nuclear bomb\, will it do to Israel what Pakistan is doing to India\, that is\, use the possession of a nuclear bomb for doing anything in a non-nuclear way. In this case\, Israel has to weigh the option of military solution or not. The belief that is going around is that in case the Iranian government does not change its position\, then Israel will choose a military solution. Then India\, as a bystander\, has to make arrangements to procure oil and gas from other sources if the Gulf region goes for war\, apart from evacuation arrangements for its nationals working in the region.  \nCdr. S.S. Parmar said that the Shia-Sunni divide is a factor and a strategic problem in this region that India has to take into consideration. Ms Ruchita Beri emphasised that we cannot ignore that Iran is an emerging regional leader in the light of the decline of US power in the region.  \nDr. Meena S. Roy said that Iran is a burning issue wherein the world is divided as to how to deal with it—it is also a ‘catch-22’ situation for India. India cannot afford to distance itself from Iran because of Afghanistan\, though the argument points to the fact that the USA is more important than Iran. If we are looking at a symptomatic treatment of the problem\, then the US position becomes important. However\, as part of this region\, we cannot afford to distance ourselves from Iran.  How India deals with Iran is a real question for the fact that India tries to balance its relations with Israel\, USA\, and the other regional actors\, particularly China and Russia\, who are clear about their positions. Russia and China support Iran by seeking non-intervention. In terms of military intervention in Iran\, within the USA there are divided opinions. A long-term study\, as pointed out by Ambassador Bhutani\, on the Caspian region should also be pursued as it is China’s next target. For India\, it is possible to get into this sector. At the same time\, we should explore options of cooperating with China in this region\, and not just competing with it.  \nDr. Roy also stressed that work needs to be done on internal dynamics within Iran. However\, she said that change within Iran is not likely to come soon under current the circumstances when there is increasing pressure from external forces to isolate Iran. People within Iran will resist any kind of pressure and thus such a situation is likely to strengthen the current regime.   \nMr. Samuel Rajiv  felt that there is space for a constructive role for India in the resolution of the Iranian issue\, along with other regional groupings like GCC and countries like Turkey. Currently\, powers that are intervening in the Iranian nuclear debate are the Western ones. Gp. Capt. Krishnappa suggested that India should weigh the option or assess the cost of voting for or against\, or abstaining when the UNSC vote comes on Iran. Dr. Kalyanaraman inquired about the advantages we can derive from India leaning towards the GCC and Saudi Arabia with particular reference to Afghanistan and its transition.  \nMs. Shebonti Ray Dadwal asked if there was much pressure from Saudi Arabia or from any of the GCC countries vis-à-vis India to cut-off relations with Iran. Also\, what is the need for adopting an ‘either-or’ policy? India’s relations with Iran are strategic\, apart from being related to oil\, and with the GCC the relations are largely economic in nature. So\, she suggested\, India should deal with them from these perspectives. In terms of our energy needs\, we need not depend on Iran for energy per se. Yet\, going by past experience\, Ms Dadwal cautioned that India should learn its lessons from the 2005 resolution wherein relations between Iran and India soured. The implications need to be studied. As for the spare capacity of Saudi oil\, one needs to bear in mind that its spare capacity is only 2 million barrels a day if oil from Iran is cut off. Moreover\, till the present global economic crisis comes to an end\, a military solution to Iran is not a likely option. \nThe common agreement amongst the participants at the roundtable was that relations with Iran must not be abandoned by taking sides. India’s stand should\, instead\, be guided by its national interests. Moreover\, as Ambassador Bhutani cautioned\, India’s response to the current situation cannot be merely guided by the past. According to him\, we have to clearly understand motives behind certain occurrences\, especially in terms of the recent bombings in New Delhi; it can be a person(s) or group(s) whose motive is to disrupt India’s relations not just with Israel but also with Iran. Ambassador Bhutani pointed out that India should pursue a constructive role wherever possible; where not\, it should step aside. Ambassador Azziz said that if ever  clear evidence of the compliance of any country’s/party’s involvement in the recent bombings in India is brought forth\, then India should follow the due course of law. Moreover\, he said that if India takes an anti-Iran stance at the UNSC without adequate justification\, then it can spell trouble. The discussants emphasised that thorough research on Iran should be carried to get adequate information and data so as to form an informed picture of the evolving situation.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/current-situation-in-west-asia-and-indias-dilemma
CATEGORIES:ROUND TABLES / WORKSHOPS,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120228T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120228T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T191741
CREATED:20231224T111307Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130741Z
UID:64487-1330407000-1330407000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Private Sector Participation in Defence Production: Issues of Industrial Licensing and FDI
DESCRIPTION:Venue: Room No 005\, IDSA \n \nConcept Note\nIt is more than decade now since the Government of India in a major policy initiative liberalised the defence industry in 2001\, by allowing 100 per cent participation by the private sector with foreign direct investment (FDI) permissible up to 26 per cent\, both subject to licensing and security clearance. The initiative was taken to harness the expertise of the private sector\, and facilitate its participation through infusion of foreign capital and technology for enhancing self-reliance in India’s defence production. By October 2011\, the DIPP has given 200 Letters of Intent/Industrial Licenses (LoI/IL) to various private entities\, with proposed investment totaling Rs. 11\,773 crore and employment opportunities for 38\,579 people. And by November 2011\, a cumulative FDI of Rs 17.68 crore ($3.72 million) has flown into Indian defence industry. \nThe above developments notwithstanding\, there are certain grey areas in both industrial licensing and FDI policy\, which need further improvement to facilitate private sector’s participation in defence industry in a more meaningful manner. As regards industrial license\, the first major issue that intrigues the domestic private industry is the definition of defence items. Unlike some other countries and international arms control organisations\, which define defence item through a comprehensive list (e.g.\, the Munitions List of the Wassenaar Arrangement)\, in India there is no such list to give clarity of what constitute a defence product. The lack of clarity becomes an issue when industry is required to provide the ‘item code’ and ‘item description’ while filling up the application form for industrial license. As per the current practice\, the industry is required to provide the ‘item code’ from the National Industrial Classification (NIC) Code list of 1987\, which has only one code ( 359.4: ‘manufacture of arms and armaments’) for entire defence manufacturing. The NIC code does not tell about what constitutes arms and armaments and if dual-use items are also covered by it. It also does not tell about if parts and components that go into arms and ammunition but may or may not have dual-use application\, fall under this head. \nThe issue with ‘item description’ is more nuanced. There is not a single dedicated list on which the Industry can rely on to describe the defence nature of its production. Rather\, they have to depend on at least three different lists\, depending on which list best describes their production. Apart from NIC list (which is most generic among the three)\, two others are Indian Trade Classification (Harmonised System) ITC (HS) Code\, as maintained by the Director General of Foreign Trade (DGFT) of Ministry of Commerce for the purpose of India’s external trade; and the ‘Product List’ as articulated in the Ministry of Defence’s (MoD’s) Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP)\, for discharge of offset obligations by the foreign vendors. The DGFT list\, gives some broad sub-details of the items which can be covered under the defence industry. For instance\, under the broad HS Code 93 (arms and ammunition; parts and accessories thereof)\, there are 16 sub-categories. The MoD list similarly provides some broad details of items in 27 categories under three broad headings: Defence Products\, Products for Internal Security\, and Civil Aerospace Products.  \nAlthough more elaborate in comparison to NIC list\, the lists of DGFT and MoD are still not defence specific. They cater to items of defence\, dual-use and even commercially off-the-shelf in nature. For instance\, under HS Code 88 (aircraft\, spacecraft\, and parts thereof) there are sub-categories such as ‘gliders’\, ‘balloons’\, and ‘under carriages and parts thereof’\, which are commercially available products or at best dual-use items. But a company producing any of the above items is at freedom to apply for a defence license and once it gets becomes a part of the defence industry\, even though the item in question may not be defence in nature. \nGiven the above lack of clarity\, the Indian defence industry in the private sector comprises of companies having a defence industrial license. Even this loosely defined industry is not free from other issues. It is noteworthy that as per the guidelines of the DIPP\, defence falls under the ‘Manufacturing’ sector. So the companies in manufacturing business can apply for license and get it (subject to approval) and be formally part of the defence industry. However this is not the case for companies in the services sector (such as engineering\, design and software\, etc) which do not come under the purview of ‘Manufacturing’\, and hence do not require a license for their services. Consequently they are not formally part of the defence industry\, even though their services have direct application in defence products. \nThe only way companies in the services sector become\, in a way\, part of the defence industry is by becoming Indian Offset Partner (IOP) – an Indian company partnering with a foreign company for discharge of latter’s offset obligation.  However the path toward becoming IOP is not very clear in the existing policy framework. It is because the term ‘Indian’ in IOP in the context of a company in the services sector is interpreted differently from the one in the manufacturing sector. The difference is because of the foreign equity that is allowed in these two sectors. For defence manufacturing\, FDI is allowed upto 26 per cent where as it is upto 100 per cent in case of services sector. In other words\, in defence manufacturing sector a company will be called an Indian company only when it owns minimum 74 per cent of total equity share of that company. For the services sector\, the equivalent minimum equity share (with the Indian shareholder) is 51 per cent to be called an Indian company.  However it is believed that the Defence Offset Facilitation Agency (DOFA) – the single window agency under the Department of Defence Production of MoD responsible for facilitating offsets in defence contracts – does not buy this argument and insists that companies in the services sector must have minimum 74 per cent domestic equity share so as to participate as an IOP. \nApart from the above ambiguity caused by the FDI policy\, the way foreign investment in a company in India is calculated also creates confusion in the industry. As per the current guidelines issued by the DIPP\, foreign investment in an Indian company is calculated by taking into account both the direct and indirect investments (the direct investment is the one that comes directly from a foreign source where as the indirect investment is one that comes through another company in India having a foreign equity). The tricky part is that technically and as per DIPP rules\, if an indirect investment comes from a company in Indian in which the foreign partner has a minority share\, the said investment is not considered as foreign investment. As an illustration\, if a company X in India with a foreign equity holding of 49 per cent invests 70 per cent in the equity of another company Y (which is ‘owned and controlled’ by resident Indians)\, the resultant foreign equity share in Y (49%*70=34.3)  is not technically considered foreign investment. The said rules notwithstanding\, the MoD has a different view\, which is based on actual equity owned by the foreign partner. In the above illustration\, the MoD views 34.3 per cent equity share in Y as foreign investment. At least on one case\, the MoD has prevailed over the DIPP’ stipulated technical rules\, giving a message that when it comes to defence industry\, it is the actual foreign holding that matters rather than the technical calculation as suggested by the DIPP. However given the different approach adopted by two ministries of the government\, it is ideal to clarify once and for all which approach is correct. \nKeeping the above in view\, the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) is organising a round table discussion. Senior officials from the MoD\, DIPP\, armed forces\, industry representatives\, and consultancy firms are invited to discuss and debate the following issues. \nDoing away with the mandatory requirement of industrial licensing: Merits & demerits \nIssues of industrial licensing\n\nTimeframe\nEligibility/definition of  product\n\n\nIssues of FDI – Existing ceiling & need for revision\nInstitutional and procedural Issues of defence exports\n\nDownload Concept Note
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/private-sector-participation-in-defence-production-issues-of-industrial-licensing-and-fdi
CATEGORIES:ROUND TABLES / WORKSHOPS
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