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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20111202T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20111202T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T192812
CREATED:20231223T134607Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130741Z
UID:63190-1322803800-1322803800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:The Wars of 21st Century So Far: Operational Lessons
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Dr S KalyanaramanDiscussants: Professor Srinath Raghavan\, Sq Ldr RTS Chhina and Wg Cdr Gregory Hammond\, RAF \nExamining the wars of the 21st century – Afghanistan\, Iraq\, Lebanon\, Georgia and Libya\, as well as the new trend of Cyber War – the paper argued the use force will continue to be a factor in international relations. Col. Gautam noted that the lessons to be learnt from the Afghanistan and Iraq war are in terms of the importance of close contact battles\, the role of air power including close air support\, UAVs\, Special Forces\, academics in policy making\, human terrain mapping\, and inadequacies of the Revolution in Military Affairs for land battle. \nThe Lebanon War has taught several lessons to Israel like the core competence involved in combined versus jointmanship\, plasma effect\, and superficial intellectualization. The Russo-Georgia War has imparted lessons at the tactical level\, close air support by the air force and basic training including SEAD and electronic warfare operations. Further\, the implementation of Tactical Command\, Control\, Communications and Information (TC3I) has faced excruciating delays given stiff resistance from certain quarters due to narrow vested interests of intra-army regiments and corps. Military reforms in Russia have led to a change in civil-military relations. \nIn the section on Cyber War\, the paper emphasised that the internet is becoming important just as air\, water and food\, and is also leading to the increasing vulnerability associated with a “risk society”. Stuxnet 2010 is a recent example of Cyber War. In Libya\, the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 authorised the protection of civilians\, but specifically ruled out the use of ground forces. As a result\, the alliance in effect became the insurgent’s air arm. \nSome of the consolidated lessons learnt from these wars were: \n\nIntelligence has crept in as the 11th Principal of War.\nThe importance of a central Organization to overseas RMA\, Transformation and Network Centric Warfare.\nThe importance of the use of minimum force \nThe need to decrease procurement.\n\nMajor Points Raised During the Discussion \n\nAlthough the study is very important particularly for the Indian Army\, its ambit is too vast for a single paper. Further\, an inter-disciplinary understanding of the issues involved is necessary. \nIt was suggested that the structural discrepancies need to be looked at to make the paper more comprehensive. Lessons can be presented in a consolidated format. \nThe paper is more in the nature of a study of the principles of war rather than an empirical study of the wars of the 21st century.\nThere is a lack of understanding of the character of war.\nIt is important to focus on the political context of war and the important role that political leaders played with respect to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.\nModern Warfare is also a battle of narratives. Strategic communications is important for shaping popular opinion and this aspect played a key role in Afghanistan and Iraq. \nCyber Warfare is being discussed using the vocabulary of traditional warfare. \nLessons for India are important; however the paper’s contextualisation of these lessons is limited. \nCyber Warfare is likely to play a key role in future conventional war. The Russian experience in Cyber Warfare suggests that the targets of attack should be clear. Given changing methods in wars\, the principle of proportionality is also being used in cyber warfare. \nCyber Warfare is likely to bring down the operational cost of war. \nThe aspect of winning the peace is extremely important and needs to be factored in. \nIt is also important to bring out the lessons in terms of fighting in a populated environment and how far lethal weapons can be employed in such contexts.\nThe paper can be divided into two sections\, one focusing on the analysis of the wars and the second about applying these lessons in the Indian context. Further\, the case studies should be concise and more emphasis should be placed on learning from our own internal conflicts. \n\nReport prepared by Soumya Tiwari\, Research Intern\, IDSA
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-wars-of-21st-century-so-far-operational-lessons
CATEGORIES:ROUND TABLES / WORKSHOPS,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20111208T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20111208T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T192812
CREATED:20231223T134606Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130741Z
UID:63188-1323322200-1323322200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:The ‘Arab Spring’: An Israeli Perspective
DESCRIPTION:Speakers:  Dr. Efraim Inbar\, Dr. Eytan Gilboa and Dr. Mordechai Kedar\, The BESA Centre\, Israel \nChairperson: Dr. Arvind Gupta\, LBSC\, IDSA \nA panel Discussion on “The ‘Arab Spring’: An Israeli Perspective” was held on December 8\, 2011 at the IDSA. Three speakers from BESA Center\, Israel- Dr. Efraim Inbar\, Dr. Eytan Gilboa and Dr. Mordechai Kedar expressed their views on the ‘Arab Spring’. The panel discussion was chaired by Dr. Arvind Gupta\, LBSC\, IDSA.  \nDr. Moredechai Kedar: Israeli Perspective on the ‘Arab Spring’\nTracing the origin of the ‘Arab Spring’ to the developments in Iraq of 2003\, Dr. Kedar alleged that it was the wrong propaganda by media like Al Jazeera that connected the spring to the trends in Tunisia. It was noted that the uprisings showed inherent weakness of the Arab world. At the same time\, it is very difficult to predict the end of the revolution. Many reasons were cited for the same— lack of democracy in Middle East\, failure of secularism\, authoritarian rule and ethnic and sectarian divide in the countries. Dr. Kedar said that the democratic process in Middle East was in shackles as politics does not reflect the popular aspirations and lack of secularism in these countries has further complicated the situation which in turn has resulted in the emergence of radical and extremist Islam in the region. The speaker highlighted two major trends in the spring; \n\nProgress towards Islamism (religious tradition) as seen in Egypt\, Tunisia and Gaza;\nStates being divided on tribal and ethnic lines like Yemen\, Iraq and Libya. \n\nThe Arab Spring is also about the colonial past of the region and not a sudden phenomenon. Drawing of boundaries without taking into account the tribal/ethnic factor has been cause of unrest in the region. Citing the example of Iraq\, it was noted that so long as Sadnam Husain was in power\, he could control the sectarian problem of the country but after him the country is still struggling with sectarian violence and conflicts. It was further pointed out that especially in Libya\, there are troubles among different tribes on final outcome of the revolution. If different groups are unable to reach an amicable solution then the results could be somewhat dangerous. Such a situation might result in division of the nation on tribal lines. At the same time\, the State had failed in replacing loyalty of people\, which is another tragedy of Arab spring. \nWhile one sees unrest and uprising in many states\, there are a few countries that have been able to control the unrest. These states have survived not because of their huge oil resources but because of homogeneity of society. State is legitimate in these countries and leadership is traditional. However in other cases the regimes have tried to maintain state by dictatorial means and have also been influenced by colonial powers. Finally the speaker warned of possible collapse of regime in Syria and the uprising spreading to Algeria. \nDr. Eytan Gilboa: External (Western) perspective on ‘Arab spring’\nDr Gilboa commented that the external intervention or lack of it has affected events in the Middle East region. It is generally presumed that a country protesting against the authoritarian regime would automatically move towards democracy. However\, in case of Middle East there has not been any transition to liberal democracy despite this widespread uprising against autocratic rulers. In fact\, what people have not realised is that there has been a move from autocracy to mobocracy or more autocratic rule. It was noted that in the West there was huge enthusiasm about Arab spring and the Western rhetoric about uprisings in Middle East has been almost identical— to condemn brutal suppression of demonstrations\, call on leaders to respect peoples’ voices and aspirations\, and in certain cases recourse to sanctions. Nevertheless\, actions in each case have been varied (be it Egypt\, Libya or Syria) even though situations on ground were very similar in almost every country. The speaker opined that realpolitik was responsible for these variations in responses. These have been mainly:   \n\nrelations and interests of different countries to the US; \nevaluation and assessment as to how far the present regime has the chances of survival\, if not\, is there a viable pro-West alternative; and \nAttitudes of other major powers like Russia and China. \n\nTo cite an example\, in Egypt regime was not strong enough to survive\, there were chances for plural democracy to emerge\, and the rebels were happy to be associated with the US\, which led to the West supporting the rebels in Egypt. In case of Syria\, though the regime atrocities were the worst\, there was no condemnation of the same in the UNSC resolutions mainly because of China and Russia. This behaviour is understandable given the fact that there were better chances of al-Assad surviving the rebellion. As the army did not break ranks\, there was no alternative\, and no fear of regional war because of close alliance between Syria and Iran. It was noted that the most decisive factor in Syria has been the fear of regional war. Therefore\, West has adopted a very passive attitude towards Syria.  \n It was noted by the speaker that the West had failed to learn lessons from history and in this context he cited the example of Iran in 1979 when attempts were made to establish democracy. Instead\, it resulted in more Islamic control and suppression. The speaker opined that what happened in Iran then is likely to happen in rest of the region. It was noted that elections should be taken as only one component of democratisation\, because even autocracies have elections. He also pointed out that in case of Iran\, Gaza\, and Lebanon\, one saw autocratic rule being replaced by Islamist rule. And same is likely to happen in Middle East in future as a result of this ‘Arab Spring’. He concluded by saying that Middle East can expect a long ‘Arab winter’ before the actual ‘Arab Spring’ sets. \nDr. Efraim Inbar: Strategic Implications of Arab Spring on Israel\nDr. Inbar said that there was continuous weakening of Arab states as a result of the uprising. The important features of these weakening states include increasing divisions\, domestic turbulences and law and order problems. To some extent\, this is good for Israel since it diminishes the possibility of a large scale war for Israel and makes it secure to some extent. However\, this is not to deny the fact that Israel is confronted with new set of challenges. The uprising has led to the emergence of new elites/rulers who are not sufficiently experienced\, are ideologically motivated and less cautious\, which is a dangerous trend for Israel’s security. It was pointed out that if there is militarisation of Sanai then it will have serious implications for Israel. He said that already there is enhanced influence of radical Islamic groups; loss of effective control of the State over its constituent territories leading to sub-nationalism and terrorism\, erosion in deterrence because of perceived decline of the US in Middle East. There is greater isolation of Israel in the region now after the loss of Turkey and the country is in midst of anti-Israeli\, Islamic regimes resulting in posing serious threats to peace treaties. \n It was also noted that the Middle East peace process has come to an end. On the decreased US role in peace making\, the speaker pointed that the US was not central to peace and the domestic dynamics pushed the peace process. Articulating the on challenges and threats\, it was noted that there are threats in the Mediterranean\, especially its eastern portion becoming an Islamic lake. In addition\, there is also the issue of Suez Canal being ruled by Islamists. Under these circumstances\, there is a debate in Israel whether it should move with covert operation or military action. Further articulating his views on what Israel should do to ensure its security\, it was pointed out that Israel should prepare for the worst (surprises); invest much in security\, secure borders\, build large force; deal with Iran; and invest in securing new alliances with Greece and Cyprus. In other words\, it is the time for announcing the Israel’s periphery doctrine.  \nDuring the discussion some very pertinent issues were raised. These included;  \n\nIsraeli views on Pakistan (Sunni) and the possibility of an alliance against Iran (Shia)\,\nRole of religion in Israeli society\,\nThreat perceptions of a state in the context of fragmentation\,\nPossibility of dialogue with new Arab regimes\,\nPossibility of 1969/73 kind of war since the US is perceived to be leaving the Middle East\,\nIsrael-India energy cooperation in fossil fuels\,\nQuality of democracy\,\nEngaging Iran\, especially on nuclear issue\,\nIran’s hegemonic ideology\,\nThe Middle East peace process as perceived by Israeli Left.\n\nIt was noted by the panelists that it will not be possible to engage Iran if the US has failed to do so. Nuclear Iran will be a major source of distabilisation in the region. It was argued that the Palestinians don’t want resolution of the problem rather they want to end the conflict. Moreover\, the problem is who do you negotiate with? Therefore in the current situation Israel has to wait and watch. The discussion concluded with remarks by the Chair\, Dr. Arvind Gupta\, who empahsised upon the role of energy and how this may change the complete scenario in the region. He pointed out that the issue of water\, human security\, agriculture and food\, role of Russia and China in Middle East\, nuclearisation of the region and its implications demand more discussion in future. \nReport prepared by Meena Singh Roy and Babajee Pothuraju\, IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-arab-spring-an-israeli-perspective
CATEGORIES:ROUND TABLES / WORKSHOPS,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20111222T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20111222T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T192812
CREATED:20231224T111312Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130741Z
UID:64493-1324531800-1324531800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Future Direction of India’s Deterrent
DESCRIPTION:Topic: “Future Direction of India’s Deterrent” \nChair: Prof. Rajesh Rajagopalan (JNU) \nSpeaker: Dr. Vipin Narang (MIT) & Ali Ahmed (IDSA)  \nDiscussant: Dr. Manpreet Sethi(CAPS) \nThe IDSA Centre for Military Affairs conducted a Round Table on 22 December 2011 on “Future Direction of India’s Deterrent”. The event was chaired by Prof. Rajesh Rajagopalan (JNU). The speakers were Dr. Vipin Narang (MIT) and Ali Ahmed\, Research Fellow\, IDSA. The discussant was Dr. Manpreet Sethi\, Senior Research Fellow\, CAPS. \nDr. Vipin Narang brought out the nature of India’s deterrent as Assured Retaliation. He suggested that the manner of the nuclear retaliation need not be specified\, enabling flexibility in nuclear employment strategy. The inevitability of the retaliation would make for credibility of the deterrent. He therefore advocated moving away from India’s declaratory nuclear doctrine of ‘massive’ punitive retaliation. The other measures that need to be continued with include the second strike capability\, delivery systems of requisite range against China and ensuring that the missile capability is qualitatively upgraded. \nAli Ahmed dwelt on the relationship between nuclear deterrence and national security. He opined that an over-emphasis on deterrence could lead to mistaking its management with national security\, as occurred between the two super powers during the Cold War. He too favoured a reformulation of India’s nuclear deterrence doctrine to flexible punitive retaliation. He also suggested that non-retaliation as an option against a lower order nuclear strike need not be reflexively ruled out. He averred that the Sundarji doctrine of ending nuclear exchanges at the lowest level possible is a suitable doctrine for India. Towards this end\, he proposed enhancing the confidence building measures to the extent of establishment of an NRRC with Pakistan. \nDr. Manpreet Sethi\, in agreeing with Dr. Narang\, opined that India’s nuclear direction was appropriate. She also seconded the idea that India could shed the formulation ‘massive’ in its declaratory nuclear doctrine in favour of sufficient punitive retaliation to inflict unacceptable damage. This would be enough to serve deterrence since unacceptable damage does not require ‘massive’ levels of nuclear weapons. This would enable keeping both ‘credible’ and ‘minimum’ at the forefront in the doctrine. \nThe Chairperson\, Dr. Rajagopalan\, emphasised that irrationality cannot be lost sight of in discussions on deterrence that usually take states as rational actors. Among other issues\, he brought out that creation of the sea based second strike force would require careful consideration from command and control\, communication and survivability point of view.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/future-direction-of-indias-deterrent
CATEGORIES:ROUND TABLES / WORKSHOPS
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20111222T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20111222T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T192812
CREATED:20231224T111412Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130741Z
UID:64499-1324531800-1324531800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:The Future of India's Deterrent
DESCRIPTION:Opening remarks of Chair Prof. Rajesh Rajagopalan\, SIS\, JNU \nTalk by Dr. Vipin Narang\, MIT\, ‘Sufficiency of Assured Retaliation’  \nIntervention by Ali Ahmed\, IDSA – ‘Future Directions – Issues’  \nDiscussant – Dr Manpreet Sethi\, CAPS  \nGeneral Discussion and Q&A  \nLunch
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-future-of-indias-deterrent
CATEGORIES:ROUND TABLES / WORKSHOPS
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
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