BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//MP-IDSA - ECPv6.15.12.2//NONSGML v1.0//EN CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH X-WR-CALNAME:MP-IDSA X-ORIGINAL-URL:https://idsa.in X-WR-CALDESC:Events for MP-IDSA REFRESH-INTERVAL;VALUE=DURATION:PT1H X-Robots-Tag:noindex X-PUBLISHED-TTL:PT1H BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:Asia/Kolkata BEGIN:STANDARD TZOFFSETFROM:+0530 TZOFFSETTO:+0530 TZNAME:IST DTSTART:20100101T000000 END:STANDARD END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20250417T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20250417T053000 DTSTAMP:20261101T020754 CREATED:20250731T035528Z LAST-MODIFIED:20260707T061905Z UID:93166-1744867800-1744867800@idsa.in SUMMARY:Eminent Persons Lecture by His Excellency Ambassador (Dr.) Shankar P. Sharma\, Ambassador of Nepal to India\, on “Strengthening India-Nepal Relations.” DESCRIPTION:The Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) organised a lecture by H.E. Ambassador (Dr.) Shankar P. Sharma\, Ambassador of Nepal to India\, under the Eminent Persons Lecture Series on 17 April 2025. The theme of the lecture was “Strengthening India-Nepal Relations.” Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General\, MP-IDSA\, chaired the event. The Institute’s scholars were in attendance. \nExecutive Summary\nIndia-Nepal relations have deepened through enhanced cooperation in energy\, infrastructure\, trade\, and digital connectivity. Hydropower agreements\, cross-border petroleum pipelines\, and railway projects have strengthened economic ties\, while integrated check posts are streamlining trade flows. Digital payment systems are expanding\, though regulatory issues persist. Progress in education\, agriculture\, and environmental cooperation is evident\, yet challenges remain in areas like certification standards and seasonal power shortages. Migration and youth mobility continue to shape bilateral dynamics. Despite political fluctuations and administrative delays\, both countries are moving toward a more structured\, investment-driven partnership grounded in shared geography and cultural proximity. \nDetailed Report\nAmbassador Sujan R. Chinoy introduced the speaker by outlining his distinguished career as a diplomat\, academic\, and policymaker. He highlighted the strong civilisational and cultural ties between India and Nepal\, emphasising their open border\, shared traditions\, and growing economic connectivity. He underscored recent developments in physical infrastructure\, such as new railway links and pipelines\, that are bringing the two countries closer together and making them active partners in each other’s economic progress. He noted that the enormous movement of people across the border\, with many Indians working in Nepal and vice versa\, reflects this deepening integration. \nAmbassador (Dr.) Shankar P. Sharma began by focusing on recent developments\, particularly over the last three years\, in key sectors such as hydropower\, digital payment systems\, infrastructure\, education\, and others. In the hydropower sector\, he highlighted a landmark agreement signed in 2022 between the Prime Ministers of India and Nepal. This long-term strategic document envisions electricity generation in Nepal and its subsequent transmission and trade with India. He highlighted that the agreement\, which initially commenced with a capacity of 39 megawatts (MW) in October 2021\, has evolved to allow Nepal to export up to 1\,000 MW of electricity to India. He noted that under this framework\, India has committed to importing 10\,000 MW over the next ten years. This advancement is anticipated to contribute substantially to Nepal’s revenue generation and aid in narrowing its significant trade deficit. However\, he pointed out Nepal’s seasonal limitation: hydropower generation drops to around 1\,000 MW during winter due to river conditions. During these lean months\, Nepal imports electricity from India\, a mechanism in place for years. \nDiscussing the Indian Pubic Sector Undertakings (PSUs) and companies like National Hydroelectric Power Corporation (NHPC) Limited and Satluj Jal Vidyut Nigam (SJVN) Limited\, Ambassador (Dr.) Sharma noted that they are engaged in several hydropower projects in Nepal. The investment so far has been government-to-government (G2G)\, he emphasised the need to attract private sector participation. A key issue has been the expected 21.9 per cent free energy provision by Nepal. Some projects cannot offer this due to financial non-viability—especially in western Nepal. This makes commercial negotiation models critical. He underlined the need to liberalise electricity trade so that private companies from both sides could participate. Although currently regulated\, he suggested opening up the power trade to the private sector in both countries.  Given India’s growing energy demand\, this would be a significant opportunity. \nAmbassador (Dr.) Sharma also informed the audience that Nepal has set an ambitious target to develop 28\,500 MW of hydropower by 2035 for three main reasons: to meet domestic demand year-round\, especially during winter; to cater to increasing domestic consumption; and to export to third countries\, including Bangladesh. He noted that a tripartite agreement involving Nepal\, India\, and Bangladesh aims to enable 500 MW of power exports to Bangladesh. The estimated investment needed for this development is USD 46 billion\, equivalent to ₹4 trillion. He acknowledged that attracting foreign investment will be essential and that India would play a central role. He said that the efforts are ongoing to bring more investors on board to realise this 10-year development vision in Nepal. \nAmbassador (Dr.) Sharma then discussed the growing success of digital payment systems between the two countries\, citing that Indians transfer around ₹66 million using QR codes in a single day—a reflection of the increasing convenience for tourists visiting from India. He also underlined ongoing issues\, such as limits on how much cash can be officially carried across the border. He also emphasised that expanding digital infrastructure and addressing regulatory hurdles will be crucial to further unlocking the potential of this technology for both economies. \nFurther discussing infrastructure cooperation\, particularly the petroleum pipeline projects\, Ambassador (Dr.) Sharma explained that one such project—the Motihari-Amlekhgunj pipeline—was completed two years ago\, marking a milestone as South Asia’s first transnational petroleum pipeline. Two additional extensions are currently under construction with Indian support\, including the development of storage terminals and distribution infrastructure. He assessed that these pipelines are expected to save Nepal millions of dollars annually by reducing dependence on expensive\, leak-prone\, and inefficient tanker truck transport. In addition to economic benefits\, the speaker noted that the shift to pipeline-based supply contributes to environmental gains by lowering emissions and easing congestion along key road corridors and border points. \nTurning to transport infrastructure\, Ambassador (Dr.) Sharma highlighted progress in railway connectivity. A Detailed Project Report (DPR) for one of the proposed cross-border rail corridors has been completed and is currently under inter-ministerial review. This railway line is expected to play a significant role in facilitating trade and reducing overland transport costs. The speaker also mentioned that three out of five planned Integrated Check Posts (ICPs) have been completed—at Raxaul-Birgunj\, Jogbani-Biratnagar\, and Sunauli-Bhairahawa. Construction of the remaining ICPs is underway\, and once completed\, these facilities will form the backbone of a corridor-based connectivity strategy aimed at integrating Nepal more effectively into regional economic and trade networks. \nOn education\, Ambassador (Dr.) Sharma cited the MoU between IIT Madras and Kathmandu University\, alongside scholarship contributions by the Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR). He also pointed to multiple joint initiatives in sustainable development\, agriculture\, sanitation\, environment\, and biodiversity.  In agriculture\, he mentioned that the Kathmandu lab has been accredited by India\, allowing the export of nine agricultural products without additional testing. Ongoing negotiations aim to expand this list. \nAmbassador (Dr.) Sharma also addressed the occasional politicisation of trade issues\, such as palm oil exports\, which are benefiting from Nepal’s zero per cent tariff regime. Although exports have grown rapidly\, he argued they remain a small fraction of India’s total consumption. However\, he flagged concerns about India’s Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) certification requirement for Nepalese industrial exports. With around 70 small manufacturers needing certification\, it places a disproportionate burden on both Nepali exporters and Indian regulators. He proposed mutual recognition of certificates or expedited inspection processes\, noting that as of now\, 30 companies have been certified. \n Q& A Session\nThe Q&A session opened with inquiries into Nepal’s evolving political landscape and its implications for bilateral ties with India. Responding to a question on the frequent governmental changes in Kathmandu\, Ambassador (Dr.) Sharma noted that while coalition politics remains the norm\, this has led to policy paralysis on key strategic issues\, especially those requiring long-term planning. \nParticipants then turned their attention to the open border arrangement\, questioning its future in light of emerging security challenges. Ambassador (Dr.) Sharma supported the arrangement as a model of regional integration but acknowledged vulnerabilities due to inadequate documentation and weak border surveillance. He added that misuse of the open border by third-country nationals has remained a point of concern\, particularly as transnational crime networks and trafficking rings become more active across South Asia. \nThe conversation shifted to energy cooperation\, where participants challenged the slow pace of hydropower exports despite repeated political assurances. Ambassador (Dr.) Sharma agreed that the figures often quoted in public discourse—like Nepal’s theoretical 80\,000 MW capacity—rarely translate into actual exports. He attributed this to delayed project clearances\, lack of transmission infrastructure\, and inconsistent political support within Nepal. Nonetheless\, he highlighted the recent entry of Indian private sector players into Nepal’s energy space as a positive development\, signalling a shift towards commercially driven partnerships\, less reliant on G2G frameworks. \nOn the economic front\, questions arose regarding Nepal’s agricultural stagnation and the role cross-border trade could play in reviving rural livelihoods. Ambassador (Dr.) Sharma observed that Indian subsidies and support mechanisms have unintentionally distorted incentives for Nepali farmers\, making it difficult for them to compete. He proposed more targeted bilateral agreements in food processing\, access to regional value chains\, and institutional support for smallholders. One suggestion was to capitalise on emerging corridors like the one linking Eastern Nepal to Siliguri\, which could offer seamless access to Indian and Bangladeshi markets. \nFinally\, participants raised questions on youth migration\, particularly the long-term impact of Nepali students studying abroad. Ambassador (Dr.) Sharma underscored that while migration offers economic relief through remittances\, it also fuels a brain drain when students relocate to Western countries and do not return. He recommended expanding scholarships in Indian institutions as a way to retain talent within the region\, arguing that students trained in India tend to maintain cultural and professional links with Nepal. In his closing remarks\, he urged both governments to move beyond symbolic gestures and implement structural changes—especially in education\, infrastructure\, and institutional coordination—to convert goodwill into durable partnerships. \nAfter the Q&A session\, Ambassador Chinoy made his closing remarks and brought the discussion to a close. He thanked the speakers and audience for their engagement and emphasised the importance of continued dialogue on India-Nepal relations. \nReport prepared by Ms. Sneha M\, Research Analyst\, South Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/eminent-persons-lecture-by-his-excellency-ambassador-dr-shankar-p-sharma-ambassador-of-nepal-to-india-on-strengthening-india-nepal-relations CATEGORIES:LECTURES,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20220203T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20220203T053000 DTSTAMP:20261101T020754 CREATED:20231223T132407Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T131009Z UID:63026-1643866200-1643866200@idsa.in SUMMARY:The K. Subrahmanyam Memorial Lecture By Dr. Edward N. Luttwak on "Applying the Krishnaswamy Subrahmanyam Method Today" DESCRIPTION:The Second Annual K. Subrahmanyam Memorial Lecture was hosted by the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA)\, India on 03 February 2022 at 1100hrs (IST) in a virtual format. The keynote speaker Dr.  Edward N. Luttwak\, Contractual Advisor US Government and a Treaty ally\, spoke about ‘Applying the Krishnaswamy Subrahmanyam Method Today’\, in the presence of the Hon’ble Minister of External Affairs of India Dr. S. Jaishankar and Shri Dhruva Jaishankar. Both joined the virtual discussion in their capacity as family members of Late K. Subrahmanyam. Director General (DG)\, MP-IDSA\, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, chaired the session and delivered the welcome addreess. \nExecutive Summary\nReminiscing about the memory of Late K. Subrahmanyam\, Dr. Luttwak said that he foresaw the economic rise of China in the late 1970s. He anticipated that China would economically outmatch the US and argued for the India-US partnership. Dr. Luttwak opined that in the changed circumstances\, the US needed allies. He maintained that Chinese belligerent behaviour had compelled the regional states to come together and form an organic coalition which was supplemented by the overlapping bilateral arrangements between the constituent states. \nDr. Luttwak suggested that China was comparatively focusing less on its land borders. Thus\, it was an opportunity for the alliance to make its presence felt on the Chinese borders. Comparing China’s current political environment with Mussolini’s Italy\, Dr. Luttwak contended that China under President Xi Jinping was in the Mussolini phase. He argued for an agile and downsized Indian army ready to take on future challenges. Concluding his address\, Dr. Luttwak strongly proclaimed that blockade in the oceanic space remained the best way to deal with China during adverse times. \nDetailed Report\nAmbassador Sujan R. Chinoy began his introduction by remembering Late K. Subrahmanyam on his 11th death anniversary. He said that the world had changed since the 2008 economic crisis and even more so\, after the COVID-19 pandemic. He referred to China’s economic rise accompanied by its coercive military tactics to state that China’s actions might prove counter to its long-term interests. However\, he observed that the United States (US) was late in recognising China’s hegemonic behaviour in the region. Ambassador Chinoy pointed to the contrast in US’s relations with Europe. On the one hand\, President Biden’s recommitment to the transatlantic alliance helped evolve a consensus on China; on the other hand\, the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the crisis over Ukraine exposed fissures between the US and its European allies. Highlighting the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) expansion against Russian sensitivities and Russian deployment of the troops to Kazakhstan under the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) framework\, Ambassador Chinoy argued that the world was neither unipolar nor bipolar nor was it multipolar. He expressed concern that these events might take the US attention away from China which was the systemic challenger in the Indo-Pacific. \nReferring to the 1990 essay of Dr. Luttwak titled “From Geopolitics to Geoeconomics: Logic of Conflict\, Grammar of Commerce”\, Ambassador Chinoy affirmed that there was a growing intersection between the political\, military and economic factors\, particularly their impact on peace and security.  The state and non-state actors had acquired asymmetrical means to bridge absolute gaps in economic and military heft. He argued that geoeconomics mattered but did not outweigh in importance the harsh reality of geopolitics. This was evident in US-China relations where mutual economic interdependence did not prevent aggravation of geostrategic contestation. Ambassador Chinoy underlined that the great irony was that China’s rise was facilitated in no small measure by the US. Further\, he pointed to China’s debt-trap diplomacy\, stranglehold over critical supply chains\, unilateralism and military aggression over territorial differences to argue that there was consensus on ensuring rules-based order and a free and open maritime space in the Indo-Pacific. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) and the AUKUS were manifestations of new concerns. Furthermore\, the Afghan situation remained fluid and there persisted a fear that Afghanistan might emerge as a hotbed of terrorism. He said that India would pursue strategic autonomy and issue-based alignment. Further\, he emphasised that Kautilyan precepts had found a definite place in India’s strategic outlook whether it was India’s “Neighbourhood First” policy or its Indo-Pacific vision. \nAmbassador Chinoy observed that nationalism\, pragmatism and idealism permeated K. Subrahmanyam’s writings and pronouncements. His ability to synthesise political\, economic and military issues was legendary. Even today\, his imprimatur runs deep – from India’s nuclear posture to the country’s higher defence management. With this broad outline\, Ambassador Chinoy handed over the floor to Dr. Luttwak to interpret the application of the K. Subrahmanyam method in today’s context. \nDr. Luttwak began his address by reminiscing about his interactions with Late K. Subrahmanyam\, and described his voice as a “voice of inexorable logic”. He recalled how Late Subrahmanyam tried to explain the logic of nuclear India with a strict no-first-use policy. With nuclearisation\, the aim was to create a nuclear threshold. His logic was irrefutable and his prediction about the future came out correct. \nLate K. Subrahmanyam also foresaw the economic rise of China in the late 1970s. He anticipated that China would economically outmatch the US and argued a closer Indo-US relationship. Thus\, he had recognised the necessity of an alliance not in a realm of strategy or war but in the realm of geoeconomics. Talking about China\, Dr. Luttwak stated that today the world was dealing with the “New China”. Since the 2008 financial crisis\, there was a feeling in China that “the East was up and the West was down”. The financial crisis was interpreted in China as the beginning of the general crisis of capitalism. During the same time\, the US also weakened greatly. The social and cultural changes in the US and the accidental presidency of Mr. Trump contributed to this phenomenon. Dr. Luttwak argued that the US needed allies in the current circumstances as it was no more a unipolar moment of the 1990s. \nCommenting on the regional scenario\, the speaker observed that although neutrality between the US and China was the flavour of the season for regional states\, the “logic of strategy” forced them to come together to contain China due to Chinese actions. Dr. Luttwak maintained that Chinese belligerent behaviour compelled the regional states to come together and form an organic coalition\, unlike NATO. The organic coalition was supplemented by the overlapping bilateral arrangements between the constituent states. The Indo-Pacific command of the US was also the manifestation of the present-day reality. Although the Southeast Asian states did not take sides\, their actions conveyed that the “logic of strategy” was working itself out\, resulting in organic alliances. \nSpeaking further about the borders of China\, Dr. Luttwak contended that China was acting like an island power. It was putting more efforts into building maritime\, air and strategic forces and had an army of less than a million. He suggested that China was comparatively focusing less on its land borders. Thus\, it was an opportunity for the alliance to make their presence felt on the borders. He asserted that when maritime powers are confronted by land powers\, the former act on borders of the latter to remind them that they are a land power. India\, being a maritime power\, could take a leaf out of this strategy. \nReflecting on the internal dynamics of China\, Dr. Luttwak argued that the world was dealing with only one person – President Xi Jinping – and not with China as a whole. Comparing China’s current political environment with Mussolini’s Italy\, Dr. Luttwak contended that China under President Xi was in the Mussolini phase. Advising India about how it should deal with the challenge\, he claimed that when a country faces a challenge\, it is an opportunity to make drastic reforms. India needed an agile and downsized army ready to take on future challenges. He advocated against India having an aircraft carrier. Concluding his address\, Dr. Luttwak strongly proclaimed that blockade in the oceanic space remained the best way to deal with China during adverse times. \nAmbassador Chinoy steered the discussion through a question-and-answer session with a comment that Dr. Luttwak’s address brought together Mahan and Mackinder in suggesting response levels. While answering questions by the audience\, Dr. Luttwak maintained that although President Biden changed his predecessor’s many policies\, he continued with President Trump’s China policy. The Ukraine crisis had not diverted the US’s attention away from China. He maintained that US resources were mainly focused on the Indo-Pacific\, although the Ukraine crisis was getting much more media traction. Commenting on the Russia-China relationship\, the speaker drew the attention of the audience to the fact that despite close partnership\, Russia was supplying arms to countries that were not friendly with China including Vietnam and India. Answering a question about the US-Pakistan equation\, Dr. Luttwak said that the relationship had gone through many evolutions but there was a strong view that Pakistan was hostile to the US. So\, he believed that the US-Pakistan relations should be conducted in the context of the de-facto Indo-US alliance. About Myanmar\, he argued that allies should work closely and defer to the country within the alliance that had vantage position vis-à-vis Myanmar. On the Ukraine and Taiwan issue\, Dr. Luttwak claimed that Russia cannot contribute anything out of Vladivostok to support Chinese action over Taiwan. Neither would China do anything in the Baltic. So\, there won’t be a scenario where Russians and Chinese will cooperate. Russia and China were tactical allies as against strategic allies. \nJoining the interaction\, India’s Minister of External Affairs Dr. S Jaishankar gave insights about his father. Dr. Jaishankar said that Late K. Subrahmanyam’s thinking was profoundly shaped by the conflicts of 1962\, 1965\, 1971 and 1999. His advocacy of policies was a product of a tough strategic environment where the US\, China and Pakistan had come together. So\, in the 1970s he championed India’s close relations with the Soviet Union. And then a decade later\, in view of the US-China contradictions\, he became a strong advocate of Indo-US partnership. The logic of both relationships was the same. Dr. S. Jaishankar believed that his father was an “insider-outsider”. He served in the government as well as in a think tank like IDSA. At times he held contrary views vis-à-vis the government positions. But he expressed his views very responsibly without making grand sweeping submissions. Late K. Subrahmanyam considered himself a grand strategist. His writings had geoeconomic underpinning. He focussed on non-traditional security issues such as connectivity\, technology\, and financing among others and explained as to how these could be leveraged to shape international relations. Thus\, he was far ahead of his time. \nShri Dhruva Jaishankar delivered a vote of thanks. He remembered Late K. Subrahmanyam’s role in building IDSA\, right from the 1960s as a note-taker in the defence ministry until the establishment of the institute. He also thanked Dr. Luttwak for his address on the occasion and described how Dr. Luttwak’s worldviews were shaped by his personal journey. \nReport prepared by Mr. Niranjan Chandrashekhar Oak\, Research Analyst\, MP-IDSA \n\nWatch Full Video at : URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-k-subrahmanyam-memorial-lecture-by-dr-edward-n-luttwak-on-applying-the-krishnaswamy-subrahmanyam-method-today CATEGORIES:LECTURES,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20211208T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20211208T053000 DTSTAMP:20261101T020754 CREATED:20231223T132606Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T131009Z UID:63041-1638941400-1638941400@idsa.in SUMMARY:Talk by Professor Dr. Bharat H. Desai on “Taking International Law Seriously" DESCRIPTION:Report \nTalk by Prof. Dr. Bharat Desai on “Taking International Law Seriously” \n08 December 2021 \nEvent Report \n The Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) organised a talk on “Taking International Law Seriously” by Prof. Dr. Bharat H. Desai\, Professor of International Law\, Jawaharlal Nehru Chair in International Environmental Law\, Chairman\, Centre for International Legal Studies\, School of International Studies\, Jawaharlal Nehru University\, on 08 December 2021\, at 11am in Seminar Hall I. Maj. Gen. (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi\, AVSM\, VSM\, (Retd.)\, Deputy Director General\, MP-IDSA\, chaired the session. The talk was attended by all scholars at MP-IDSA. \nExecutive Summary \nThe talk drew attention to the negligence of International Law by countries and the challenges in ensuring that it is taken seriously by all players in the international arena. Prof. Desai reflected on the general apathy towards International Law from all spheres – academic\, scholarly as well as the government. Stating that the basis of conduct for International Relations is International Law\, he argued that the concept can be traced to ancient Indian history and indigenous texts. The speaker shed light on the gradual shift seen in India’s growing emphasis on international law in its bilateral and multilateral engagement. Underscoring the consequences of neglecting International Law in dealing with international issues; Prof. Desai emphasised on the diversity and applicability of International Law on a variety of issues. He asserted that scholarship and domain knowledge would add legitimacy and prestige to government officials representing India on international forums \nDetailed Report \n The chair\, Maj. Gen. (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi (Retd.)\, Deputy Director General\, MP-IDSA\, began the session by welcoming the speaker and introduced the topic to the attendees. He drew attention to the importance and relevance of International Law in providing a stable just political order. Referring to the topical issue on border tensions between Russia and Ukraine\, he highlighted the concerns surrounding violation of international norms. The chair underlined that nation-states cannot face challenges with outdated structures\, a message given by Prime Minister Narendra Modi during his address at the United Nations. Maj. Gen. (Dr.) Bakshi reflected on the effectiveness of International Law owing to the fact that its validity depends on the will of the State. He shed light on countries in the international community transitioning from rule takers to rule shapers\, including India. The chair invited the speaker to further discuss these issues and share insights on the theme. \n The speaker\, Prof. Dr. Bharat Desai\, began his talk by expressing his gratitude for the opportunity to present at MP-IDSA. Remarking on the historical trajectory of International Law architecture; he underscored the negligence of International Law and the challenges faced in ensuring it is taken seriously. Presenting an overview of the origins of the School of International Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University; he shared personal anecdotes of his efforts to introduce International Law as a field of study in academic syllabus. Stating the difficult working conditions to ensure recognition of International Law as a serious field of study; he reflected on the general apathy towards International Law from all spheres – academic\, scholarly as well as government. \n Prof. Desai emphasised that the basis of conduct for International Relations is International Law\, which is often taken for granted and neglected by nation-states. Mentioning that the modern understanding of International Law is a product of European civilization; he stated the concept itself is rooted in ancient Indian history. He drew an outline of the rudimentary forms of International Law and territorial sovereignty as was seen in ancient Indian states like the Ganarajyas. He drew parallels between ancient norms like “a Shanthidoot (enemy’s envoy) cannot be punished” prevalent in Mahabharatha and Ramayana texts and; the current practices established in the Geneva Convention. He underscored that the ‘Law of Dharma’ is similar to ‘international norms and laws’ and pre-dates to texts like the Arthashastra and Nitishastra. He remarked that these indigenous scriptures of India also make references to the treatment of ‘Prisoners of War’. \n The speaker explained the trajectory of India’s participation in the formation of International Laws even during the colonial times. He stated that the Maharaja of Bikaner had signed the Treaty of Versailles on behalf of India\, which implies the value Britishers attached to their colonies. The speaker opined that British rulers did not obliterate the identities of their colonies and instead ensured their fair representation by encouraging them to sign international treaties. Prof. Desai underscored that International Law refers to the law governing official relations. He remarked on the initial efforts in developing a law on the seas which eventually took the form of ‘United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)’. The speaker shed light on the provisions in the Indian Constitution which accord importance to International Law and empower the Indian parliament to give effect to international agreements. \n Giving examples of some countries\, Prof. Desai remarked on the dichotomy of statements by Heads of State arguing for adherence to International Law and their actions which often violate established international norms. The speaker also reflected on the changing dimension of use of force in the world. Opining that countries often use International Law as a ‘trump card’; he stated that International Law as a practice has been applied on various international issues. He explained the same by providing examples of Operation Neptune Spear\, treaties like International Solar Alliance\, security issues like border cross-firing and surgical strikes; and post-conflict mechanisms as in the case of Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan. \n Reflecting on the rapidly changing world\, the speaker stressed that India needs to be equipped effectively to understand and grasp the simmering ideas of International Law. He stated that it is essential for India to prioritise International Law in order to solidify her right to self-defense\, especially in issues pertaining to the belligerent occupation of Jammu and Kashmir by Pakistan. Remarking on the idea of gaining consensus for permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)\, Prof. Desai opined that India must instead focus on earning the right. This could be accomplished by building efficient knowledge centres and ensuring that government officials representing India are aided by a strong team of expert scholars. \n Stating the example of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s speech at the recent ASEAN Summit which underlined the importance of International Law; the speaker shed light on the gradual shift seen in India’s growing emphasis on international law in its bilateral and multilateral engagement. Prof. Desai underlined and strongly stressed on the importance of actively pursuing and asserting International Law as a foundation of diplomacy. He stated that countries must gain clarity on the consequences of neglecting International Law in dealing with international issues. Sharing some of his own published works\, the speaker remarked on the diversity and applicability of International Law on a variety of issues. He opined that International Law plays a vital role in the hard core issues of national security and could be tool for policy implementation. The speaker concluded by reiterating the importance of mutual cooperation and dialogue on International Law for international peace and security. \n The talk was followed by a lively Q/A session which brought out inputs on the elections in Libya and role of International Criminal Court (ICC); issue of refugees in India; underlying causes for earlier neglect of International Law by the Government in India and the role of Supreme Court in invoking international law conventions during its judgements on important issues. During his response\, the speaker highlighted the dominance of African-related incidents and undergoing investigations in the ICC; the responsible and humanitarian role played by India in accommodating refugees from neighbor states like Myanmar despite not ratifying the 1951 Refugee Convention; and the dire need for Indian leaders to engage with scholars while dealing with international issues. Prof. Desai underscored that efficient scholarship and domain knowledge would add legitimacy and prestige to officials representing India on international forums. The session concluded with the Chair acknowledging and thanking the Speaker for his passionate and insightful presentation. \nReport prepared by Ms. Sindhu Dinesh\, Research Analyst\, ALACUN Centre\, MP-IDSA. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/talk-by-professor-dr-bharat-h-desai-on-taking-international-law-seriously CATEGORIES:LECTURES,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20180704T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20180704T053000 DTSTAMP:20261101T020754 CREATED:20231223T204324Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T131010Z UID:63226-1530682200-1530682200@idsa.in SUMMARY:Lecture by H.E. Shri Harsh Vardhan Shringla on India-Bangladesh Bilateral Relations: An Indian Perspective DESCRIPTION:Venue: Boardroom # 104\, First Floor \nAbout The Speaker\nHigh Commissioner Harsh Vardhan Shringla is a career diplomat and a member of the Indian Foreign Service. \nIn the course of a diplomatic career spanning 33 years\, High Commissioner Shringla has held a variety of positions in New Delhi and abroad. Before his assignment in Bangladesh\, he served as Ambassador of India to the Kingdom of Thailand. He has also served in France (UNESCO); USA (UN\, New York); Vietnam (Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City); Israel and South Africa (Durban). \nHigh Commissioner Shringla has served in the Ministry of External Affairs\, New Delhi as Joint Secretary (Director General) responsible for Bangladesh\, Sri Lanka\, Myanmar and Maldives. He has also headed the United Nations Political and SAARC Divisions in the Ministry. Earlier\, he served as Director of the Northern Division dealing with Nepal and Bhutan and as Deputy Secretary of the Europe West Division. \nThe High Commissioner has graduated from St. Stephen’s College\, Delhi University and has worked in the Corporate and Public Sectors in India prior to joining the Indian Foreign Service. He has pursued a course in conflict prevention in Columbia University\, New York\, a subject on which he has published an international paper. He has also published Papers on economic diplomacy and the Indian diaspora. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/lecture-by-h-e-shri-harsh-vardhan-shringla-on-india-bangladesh-bilateral-relations-an-indian-perspective CATEGORIES:LECTURES ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20161128T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20161128T053000 DTSTAMP:20261101T020754 CREATED:20231223T204325Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T131010Z UID:63227-1480311000-1480311000@idsa.in SUMMARY:Seventh Y.B. Chavan Memorial Lecture: Decline of Internationalism DESCRIPTION:Programme\n1600-1605: Welcome Address by Shri Jayant Prasad\, DG\, IDSA \n1605-1610: Address by Dr RD Pradhan\, Representative of Yashwantrao Chavan Pratishthan\, Mumbai \n1610-1640: Talk by Shri Shyam Saran \n1640-1645: Remarks by Chair\, Shri Jayant Prasad \n1645-1715: Question and Answer Session \n1715: Vote of Thanks by Col Vivek Chadha (Retd)\, Research Fellow\, IDSA \n1720: Refreshments URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/seventh-y-b-chavan-memorial-lecture-decline-of-internationalism CATEGORIES:LECTURES ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20161117T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20161117T053000 DTSTAMP:20261101T020754 CREATED:20231223T204326Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T131010Z UID:63228-1479360600-1479360600@idsa.in SUMMARY:51st Foundation Day Address by Dr Arvind Panagariya\, Vice Chairman\, Niti Aayog\, on ‘National Security and Development’ DESCRIPTION:The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) is organising 51st Foundation Day Address by Dr Arvind Panagariya\, Vice Chairman\, Niti Aayog\, on ‘National Security and Development’ on Thursday\, November 17\, 2016\, in the IDSA Auditorium (Second Floor) at 1600 hours. \n\n\nProgramme\n1545-1555hrs: Arrival of Guests and Registration \n1556 hrs: Arrival of Dr Arvind Panagariya\, Vice Chairman\, Niti Aayog \n1558 hrs: Arrival of Shri Manohar Parrikar \n1600-1605 hrs: Welcome Remarks by Shri Jayant Prasad\, DG\, IDSA \n1605-1610 hrs: Foundation Day Message by Shri Manohar Parrikar\, Hon’ble Raksha Mantri & President\, IDSA \n1610-1655 hrs: Foundation Day Address by Dr Arvind Panagariya\, Vice Chairman\, Niti Aayog\n(followed by a 15 – minute questions and answers session) \n1655-1700 hrs Vote of Thanks by Maj Gen Alok Deb\, SM\, VSM (Retd)\, DDG\, IDSA \n1700 hrs High Tea \nPress Release [+] URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/51st-foundation-day-address-by-dr-arvind-panagariya-vice-chairman-niti-aayog-on-national-security-and-development CATEGORIES:LECTURES ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20151207T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20151207T053000 DTSTAMP:20261101T020754 CREATED:20231223T204328Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T131010Z UID:63229-1449466200-1449466200@idsa.in SUMMARY:Sixth Y.B. Chavan Memorial Lecture - Make in India: The Way Ahead for Indigenous Defence Production in India DESCRIPTION:Speaker : Shri AK Gupta\, Secretary (Defence Production)\, Ministry of Defence\, Government of India \nTopic : Make in India: The Way Ahead for Indigenous Defence Production in India \nChair : Shri Jayant Prasad \nVenue : IDSA Auditorium \nPress Release [+]\nComplete Text Speech [+]\nProgramme \n\n\n\n1600-1605: Welcome Address by Shri Jayant Prasad\, DG\, IDSA \n1605-1610: Address by Representative of Yashwantrao Chavan Pratishthan\, Mumbai \n1610-1640: Lecture by Shri AK Gupta\, Secretary (Defence Production)\, Ministry of Defence\, Government of India \n1640-1645: Remarks by Chair\, Shri Jayant Prasad \n1645-1715: Question and Answer Session \n1715: Vote of Thanks by Col Vivek Chadha (Retd)\, Research Fellow\, IDSA \n1720: Refreshments URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/sixth-y-b-chavan-memorial-lecture-make-in-india-the-way-ahead-for-indigenous-defence-production-in-india CATEGORIES:LECTURES ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20150731T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20150731T053000 DTSTAMP:20261101T020754 CREATED:20231223T204328Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250222T085346Z UID:63230-1438320600-1438320600@idsa.in SUMMARY:Eminent Persons' Lecture Series - Talk by HE Sher Bahadur Deuba on “Political Situation in Nepal” DESCRIPTION:About the Speaker\nHE Sher Bahadur Deuba is Former Prime Minister of Nepal and Senior Leader of the Nepali Congress. \nExcellencies\, Friends\, Ladies and Gentlemen! \nI would like to begin by offering my heartfelt condolences on the sad and untimely demise of Former President of India\, APJ Abdul Kalam. It is an irreparable loss for all of us. He was a great scientist\, a committed humanist and a source of inspiration to all\, especially youth and children. In his demise\, Nepal has lost a great friend. I have vivid memory of meeting him at Rashtrapati Bhawan while I was Prime Minister. I was struck by his simplicity\, intelligence and saintly personality. I salute his inspirational life as a man of great achievement and brilliance. \nExcellencies and Friends! \nI express my sincere thanks to the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) for giving me this opportunity to share my thoughts on Nepal-India relations in the present context at this gathering of eminent personalities\, intellectuals and friends of Nepal. \nI have come to India at a time when Nepal is engaged in the final stage of promulgating a new democratic\, federal\, and inclusive Constitution through the Constituent Assembly. A series of agreements among the political parties\, the recent 16-series of agreements among the political parties\, have generated crucial understanding to move forward by forging common position on some of the key issues of the new Constitution. \nWe will build on it and take on board all stakeholders in the spirit of inclusiveness since we cannot afford to remain in perennial transition\, which has cost a lot in terms of our political stability\, economic development and social progress. Our efforts are geared towards accommodating the legitimate concerns and aspirations of all segments of the Nepalese society\, including those that have been voiced in the recent public hearing of the draft Constitution. The promulgation of the Constitution will herald a new era of institutionalised peace and stability and strengthened democratic institutions. We also remain committed to Nepal becoming a federal state. \nWe are equally aware that sustainable peace and stability can be achieved only when we ensure economic prosperity to our people. Hence\, while we focus on giving final shape to the political process\, we attach corresponding importance to the social-economic development needs of the country. \nFriends and Excellencies! \nAs you all know\, a devastating earthquake of 7.8 Richter magnitude struck Nepal on 25th April of this year\, which caused massive human loss\, suffering and destruction of infrastructure. This earthquake was followed by four major aftershocks of more than 6 Richter magnitude\, as well as one which was more 7.3 after 17 days that caused even more damage and distress. Our closest neighbour India was the first to lend us support. I fondly recall the prompt action by Prime Minister of India Hon. Shri Narendra Modi ji in sending the rescue and relief teams\, both civil and military\, to Nepal within hours of the first earthquake under “Operation Maitri”. We received spontaneous and generous relief supplies including food\, medicine\, tents and blankets from the Government and people of India\, including non-government\, religious and private sector organisations as well as from the individuals. This proves that our friendship remains firm even during difficult times. \nI equally appreciate the participation from India at the level of Minister for External Affairs in the International Conference on Nepal’s Reconstruction held on 25 June 2015. While assuring continued cooperation in Nepal’s reconstruction\, India pledged one billion US dollars\, one fourth of it as Grant. The pledge at the conference of substantive contribution to the post-earthquake reconstruction of Nepal by India is testimony to the strong bond of friendship and cooperation existing between Nepal and India. \nIn the context of Nepals’ post-earthquake disaster needs and reconstruction plan\, we count on India’s continued support\, both from government and private sector\, in rebuilding the infrastructure destroyed by the earthquake. \nIt may be pertinent to mention here that though the effect of earthquake on tourism infrastructure was not so significant and key areas such as Lumbini\, Chitwan\, the Annapurna trekking route\, etc.\, are unaffected and safe to visit. There has been a significant drop in tourism. I also wish to state that though 14 out of 75 districts of Nepal were severely impacted by the earthquakes\, the international airport\, all domestic airports\, and almost all highways are in operation. There is no health problem reported attributed to the quake. Thus\, it is fully safe to visit Nepal. \nOn a different note\, I am glad to state that Nepal and India enjoy excellent bilateral relations based on cordiality\, goodwill\, mutual respect and cooperation. I also take note with satisfaction that geographical proximity\, extensive economic linkages\, shared historical\, religious\, and socio-cultural affinity as well as wider people-to-people contact have further enriched these relations. \nThe visit to Nepal by Hon. Prime Minister of India Shri Narendra Modiji in August last year\, after a gap of 17 years at the level of Prime Minister\, has created a new momentum in our multi-dimensional relations. His address in Nepal’s Constituent Assembly where he said “Humaare sambandh kagaz ki kashtiyon se aagey nahi badhe hain\, Humaare sambandh dilon ke dasstan kahate hain!” showed his tremendous good will towards Nepal and won the hearts of the Nepali people. Prior to the PM’s visit\, the Joint Commission at the Foreign Minister level was also reactivated. As good friends we are equally committed to bringing our relations to a newer height. \nDevelopment assistance received from India has helped in both infrastructure and human resource development for key projects in much needed sectors. India is Nepal’s largest trade partner\, largest source of foreign investment and of tourist arrivals. The private sectors and business communities of the two countries have played vital role in consolidating and strengthening our relations. However\, I feel that the current level of interactions does not reflect our full potentials. Many areas still remain untapped. We are eager to invite the Indian investors to come and invest in Nepal. \nDespite our long and diverse economic relations\, the ever-growing trade deficit remains a matter of concern for us. Nepal’s trade deficit with India needs to be corrected in the interest of both the economies. As we are eager to increase the volume of trade between our two countries\, we should also ensure that it is sustainable. \nI consider that increased Indian investment\, increase in the number of products being exported from Nepal\, simplification of process related to trade transaction\, relaxation of rules of origin and duty free access of Nepalese products is critical to address Nepal’s trade deficit. \nIt is encouraging to note that with a view to promoting\, facilitating\, expanding and diversifying trade between the two countries and encouraging collaboration in economic development\, Nepal and India have signed BIPPA. To give further momentum to bilateral trade\, Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income has also been signed. There is equality of treatment for foreign and indigenous investors in Nepal. \nThe signing of Power Trade Agreement on 21 October 2014 has enabled cooperation in the power sector\, including developing transmission interconnections\, grid connectivity\, and power exchange and trading through the governmental\, public and private enterprises of the two countries on mutually acceptable terms. I am especially pleased to note the progress that has been made by the establishment of the Joint Executive Committee of the Pancheswar Development Authority. The Pancheswar High Dam Project has been a dram project for me since the signing of the Mahakali Treaty almost two decades ago when I was Prime Minister. People living in both banks and downstream of the Mahakali River stand to benefit a lot from the construction of this high dam as it has the potential to generate 6\,500 MW of hydroelectricity and will also irrigate hundreds of thousands of hectares as well as control floods. This project will herald in a new era for people living of both neighbouring nations. \nThe Project Development Agreements\, that have also been signed\, further demonstrate an upswing in mutually beneficial cooperation. The signing of MoU last year on Tourism Cooperation and the Motor Vehicle Agreement between the two countries has paved the way for promoting tourism. I would also like to reiterate that mutual economic benefits\, especially investment in trade and tourism will be greatly increased by the road connectivity that will be enhanced between our two nations by the construction of the Fast Track Highway that will link Kathmandu to the plain areas. I hope to see the construction of the Nijgadh Airport with the cooperation of the Indian Government in the same spirit and speed. I am happy to note that support to both these projects were especially mentioned by your External Affairs Minister Honourable Shrimati Sushma Swaraj ji during the donor conference in Kathmandu last month. \nI believe that\, in addition to strengthening bilateral mechanisms\, emphasis should be laid on better connectivity – physical\, institutional\, and people to people – which serves as a bridge between the two countries and peoples including economic transactions. No doubt\, Nepal’s location gives it an important role to facilitate wider connectivity in this dynamic region. \nAs the largest and vibrant democracy in the world\, India has consistently nurtured democratic values and norms. I appreciate the achievements made by India in economic\, social\, scientific and other frontiers in the recent years. I admire the policy measures taken by India that have led to consistently high economic growth rate despite multiple global crises. Since India is rising as a major emerging global economic power\, Nepal looks forward to a closer and intensive collaboration with such a vibrant economy so as to ensure a higher degree of prosperity for us. \nIndia’s rise as a technologically highly advanced country of the world and Prime Minister Shri Modiji’s offer of the SAARC satellite as a gift for this region is a much appreciated as great initiative for mutual benefits from applied space science technology. The policy of India to promote cordial ties with countries in the neighbourhood has generated a sense of respect and euphoria in South Asia. Both Regional and Sub-Regional processes are gaining desired momentum in South Asia. Neighbourhood-first policy of India has yielded positive results and I welcome the emerging trends in relationship. \nIn this context\, the business community from both countries can play important role\, through enduring partnership and mutually beneficial activities\, in the years to come. I am confident that the business leaders and industrialists from India will find Nepal an attractive investment destination and the Nepalese entrepreneurs the most reliable business partners. There are immense potentials for the development of hydropower projects\, tourism\, mining\, forestry and agro-based industries as well as the construction sector particularly roads\, transmission lines\, airports and other infrastructure. \nIndia has been supportive to Nepal’s democratic process with tremendous goodwill and solidarity. As Nepalese people strive to achieve a democratic\, inclusive and prosperous society\, I believe India would continue to extend its cooperation and support \nI would like to stop my remarks at thus juncture and thank you all for your patience. Thank you! URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/eminent-persons-lecture-series-talk-by-he-sher-bahadur-deuba-on-political-situation-in-nepal CATEGORIES:LECTURES ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20150716T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20150716T053000 DTSTAMP:20261101T020754 CREATED:20231223T204328Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250222T085452Z UID:63231-1437024600-1437024600@idsa.in SUMMARY:Eminent Persons' Lecture Series - Lecture by HE Mr Evan Garcia on "Issues of South China Sea and Future Prognosis: A Philippine Perspective" DESCRIPTION:About the Speaker\nEvan P. Garcia is Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs\, Department of Foreign Affairs\, Republic of the Philippines \n\nI would like to thank the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses for the kind invitation to be part of today’s discussion. \nI am immensely pleased and honored to join the list of Eminent Persons who have delivered lectures before and interact with the distinguished fellows and associates of this Institute on important and relevant issues. \nDialogue and discussion \nI cannot overemphasize the importance of dialogue and the need to provide a venue for the open discussion of difficult and sensitive subjects. \nThrough dialogue and discussion\, we can hope to gain a fuller understanding and better appreciation of the immense challenges that confront and confound nations and the international community. \nIn the multiplicity of perspectives and in the discussion of diverse ideas\, we can seek and identify points of convergence and common action. \nIndeed\, even opposing views do not necessarily lead parties to a standstill. Neithershould they lead to a standoff. On the contrary\, when properly harnessed and framed\, divergent views – for the willing and for those with an open mind – can create trust\, mutual understanding and the political space for moving forward together. \nThrough genuine dialogue and forthright discussion\, we avoid the needless clash brought about by intransigent positions and – together – harness the power of collective critical thinking. \nCertainly\, the ASEAN-India Centre and the Institute of Defence and Security Analyses play this critical and vital role: In encouraging the open exchange of ideas\, the Centre and Institute serve as thought drivers that help inform both foreign policy makers and the public alike. \nIn this context\, I welcome this opportunity to share with you the Philippine perspective on issues on the West Philippine Sea/South China Sea. \nAsia: New Realities and Evolving Challenges\nAsia has undergone and continues to undergo fundamental changes that have invited the world’s renewed attention and focus. \nDespite the diversity and differences in political and economic systems\, it has transformed itself into a vibrant region thatnow encompasses almost half of the world’s population\, threeof the world’s top 10 economies (China\, Japan and India)\, more than a fifth of the world’s GDP\, a third of the world’s exports and almost half of the world’s maritime tonnage. \nShould Asia sustain the momentum of its growth \, the region is projected to achieve an even greater role as an epicenter of global prosperity by 2050\, producing over half of the world’s GDP and accounting for half of the world’s output\, trade and investment\, by that time according to the Asian Development Bank. \nIndeed\, the objectives of achieving progress and prosperity in Asia are becoming less and less aspirational in nature and the desire to further strengthen economic performance is becoming more and more a defining basis for closer relations between countries in the region. \nBut while Asia’s economic ascent appears on track\, China’s recent stock market problem notwithstanding\, serious challenges remain and the onward advancement can be derailed. \nPolitical insecurity and simmering tensions within the region threaten Asia’s dynamism. The situation in the DPRK remains a continuing concern and disputes over territory and maritime entitlements – including in the South China Sea and the Philippines’ portion of it\, the West Philippine Sea- are becoming red flags for possible flashpoints. \nThat the power relations in the Asian region continue to be in a state of flux complicates attempts to address both traditional and emerging challenges to stability in the region.We are witnessing now the new reality of a regional architecture with an increasing number of players and stakeholders being reconstructed and built along many lines of engagement. \nWe see the rise of China that has stronger economic clout\, greater political influence and developing military might; a United States that has rebalanced itself to Asia and is reinforcing its position as a Pacific power; a resurgent Japan that is reassessing its own self-defense posture; an India that is looking and acting East; a Russia that is increasing its capabilities in the region; and an ASEAN that is on its way to establishing its own Economic Community. \nAgainst this backdrop of relations\, the imperatives for economic interdependence provide the driving incentive for nations to be drawn together\, but the compulsion to assert sovereign interests at the same time also acts as apowerful force keeping certain regional shareholders apart. Nowhere is the interplay of these factors more evident and critical than in the South China Sea. \nEconomic progress alongside geopolitical security tensions\, this is the East Asian dichotomy\, our new reality with which we must all grapple. \nSouth China Sea: Resources and Access \nAsia’s economic success rides heavily on the freedom of navigation and overflight of its waters\, particularly in the South China Sea. \nBoth commercial and naval vessels ply these waters serving as a crucial nautical highway\, the South China Sea is nothing short of being a vital artery in connecting and integrating production bases and markets. \nConsider the following: \n\nAs a semi-enclosed sea\, the SCS provides rich fishing grounds for the nationals of littoral states. Over 500 million people in China\, Hong Kong\, Taiwan\, Viet Nam\, Malaysia\, Singapore\, Indonesia\, Brunei and the Philippines live within 100 miles of the SCS. Many of them depend on the SCS for sustenance and livelihood.\nThe SCS currently accounts for one-tenth of the world’s global fisheries catch and hosts a multi-billion dollar fishing industry. The SCS also has ecological importance. The coral reefs in the SCS provide breeding ground for high-value fisheries and support the sustainability of the waters as fishing grounds. \nThe SCS serves as trade channels and economic lifelines used for global commercial shipping energy transportation and naval fleets.\nIts importance as a Sea Lane of Communication (SLOC) cannot be over-stated: By cargo tonnage\, more than half of the world’s merchant fleet passes through SCS; around 40\,000 ships pass through the SCS every year. Sea traffic is three times that of the Suez Canal and 15 times that of the Panama Canal.\nFor international trade shipping in the SCS\, goods volume of raw material and food takes up more than 90% of total freight volume. \nThe SCS is one of the most important energy trade routes in the world with over a third of crude oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) passing through it annually. Large quantities of coal from Australia and Indonesiaalso pass through the SCS to markets around the world\, especially to China\, Japan and India. These coal shipments include both steam coal used for generating electricity and process heat as well as metallurgical coal that is a key ingredient in primary steel production.\nThe SCS is said to have11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in proved and probable reserves.\n \n\nSouth China Sea: The Stakes Involved \nClearly\, the interests of many nations come to a head in the SCS. Given the resources and the access issues involved\, exercising the ability to explore\, develop and utilize the resources therein – or preventing others from doing so – constitutes a major point of sovereign concern for many nations. \nThe dispute in the South China Sea – rooted in conflicting territorial claims over islands\, rocks and reefs above water at high tide as well as conflicting maritime claims over maritime zones –directly involve Brunei Darussalam\, China\, Malaysia\, the Philippines\, Viet Nam\, and the Chinese province of Taiwan. \nIncreasingly aggressive\, belligerent and expansive behavior by one claimant\, in particular\, namely China\, is provocative and further complicates an already tense milieu. \nBeijing’s recent actions are clearly intended to change the status quo in the South China Sea to its unilateral advantage. \nChina asserts “indisputable sovereignty” over the islands and waters of almost the entire South China Sea as seen in its 9-dashed line claim. \nThese 9-dashes – with no corresponding fixed coordinates – form a U-shaped area of the South China Sea. These encompass and enclose almost 90% of the entire South China Sea. China’s 9-dash line claim seeks to convert the South China Sea into Beijing’s lake. \nAsserting its “indisputable sovereignty” over the 9-dashed line area\, China is preventing other countries from exercising their maritime rights over South China Sea’s waters which otherwise would have been allowed under the United Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). \nAs we all know\, UNCLOS provides for the rights and responsibilities of nations with regard to the world’s waters. UNCLOS was established precisely to give order to the use of the world’s waters and to regulate the behavior of States in the use of these waters. \nWith 166 States Parties\, UNCLOS is considered the constitution of the world’s oceans\, adherence to the principles and provisions of which are key to the sustainable and orderly use of the world’s waterways\, including in the South China Sea. \nUNCLOS prescribes the behavior and provides the rights and entitlements of littoral states and other stakeholders in various zones – from the territorial sea\, to the contiguous zone\, to the 200 nautical mile-exclusive economic zone\, the continental shelf and in the areas beyond national jurisdiction. \nYet with its 9-dash line assertion in the South China Sea\, Chinaeffectively appropriates to itself the enjoyment and exercise of maritime rights in the islands and features and all the waters surrounding them\, to the exclusion and detriment of the littoral states’ and even of states desiring innocent passage or overflight. \nIn plain and simple terms\, the 9-dash lines has this effect on the maritime rights of the littoral states in the South China Sea: The Philippines loses about 80% of its EEZ facing the West Philippine Sea; Malaysia loses also about 80% of its EEZ facing the South China Sea\, as well as most of its active gas and oil fields in the same area; Vietnam on the other hand loses about 50% of its total EEZ; Brunei Darussalam loses about 90% of its total EEZ; and Indonesia loses about 30% of its EEZ facing the South China Sea in Natuna Islands\, whose surrounding waters comprise the largest gas field in Southeast Asia. \nRecently\, China has likewise strongly asserted itself in the South China Sea by accelerating the building of artificial islands through massive reclamation over disputed submerged features. Now\, China’s clear intent to build on these artificial islands and to militarize the area has become apparent. \nThis has resulted in counter-actions from other statesthat do not recognize China’s assertion of sovereignty over these features. \nAn unstable South China Sea does not advance the interest of any claimant state nor of the international community. Instability in the South China Sea is not a permanent condition that the Philippines desires. What the Philippines aspires to is to bring greater stability and more predictable behavior in the South China Sea based on the rule of law. \nIt is with this goal in mind that the Philippines is undertaking a two-pronged approach to the situation in the South China Sea grounded firmly on adherence to the rule of law: firstly\,tension reduction; and secondly\, peaceful settlement of disputes. \nPhilippine diplomacy and tension reduction \nThe Philippines seeks to reduce tension between and among the claimants of the South China Sea and is harnessing its entire diplomatic machinery to meaningfully engage stakeholders in bilateral and multilateral fora. \nAs a founding member of the United Nations and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)\, the Philippines is committed to easing friction between and among states in dispute. \nIn disputes\, conflict should never be considered inevitable. Disputes should be an opportunity to engage concerned parties in dialogue. \nIn the South China Sea issue\, the Philippines placesimportance on the building of a rules-based regional architecture\, given the complexity of the issue and the number of stakeholders involved both within and outside the South China Sea. \nWhile the region continues to evolve\, ASEAN’s central role – and its relations with dialogue partners – will continue to be vital. And indeed\, ASEAN has provided the opportunity for the Philippines to pursue the reduction of tension in the South China Sea. \nThe Declaration on the Code of Conduct (DOC) in the South China Sea brought ASEAN and China together to determine ways of addressing the simmering tension in the area. \nWhile there is room for greater positive and practical results based on the DOC\, the timely conclusion of a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea remains unattainable owing to China’s seeming reluctance to engage in frank and open discussion through multilateral negotiations. \nThe Philippines is nevertheless committed to pursue this track. \nDiplomacyand the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes\nThe Philippines believes firmly that the international legal framework exists to provide better clarity to issues in dispute and that\, equally as important\, this international legal framework exists to encourage States to participate meaningfully and achieve the peaceful settlement of disputes. \nThe Philippines places great faith on the equalizing power of international law. Resort to the rule of law allows small countries\, such as my own\, to stand on an equal footing with wealthier and more powerful States\, confident in the conviction that right prevails over might. \nAs such\, the Philippines is undertaking the legal track\, provided for under UNCLOS\, to seek better clarity of the issues involved in the South China Sea. \nI wish to point out that we resorted to arbitration after our many bilateral exchanges with China to resolve our dispute did not prosper. China has unreasonably insisted that the Philippines must recognize and accept its sovereignty over the entire South China Sea before meaningful discussion of other issues could take place. \nIt has been claimed as well – almost as gospel truth by certain Chinese officials and academicians – that Asians do not go to court against each other. Singapore’s Ambassador at large Tommy Koh pointed out that this is incorrect\, citing that Southeast Asian countries have a positive track record of referring their disputes to the international legal process\, among them: The PreahVihear case between Cambodia and Thailand; The Sipadan and Ligatan case between Indonesia and Malaysia; The PedraBranca/PulauBatuPuteh case between Malaysia and Singapore; and\, the Myanmar Bangladesh case. \nAdditionally\, Ambassador Koh also cited the positive attitude of South Asia towards dispute settlement\, with India leading the way. \nFormer ITLOS President ShunjiYanai shares Ambassador Koh’s observation\, saying that based on the cases submitted to the ICJ and ITLOS\, Asian States have become important and active clients of third-party settlement procedures\, especially in the field of law of the sea\, implying how important the rule of law at sea is for states in Asia. \nThe Philippines too is mindful that under the 1982 Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes\, recourse to judicial settlement of legal disputes\, should not be considered an unfriendly act between States. \nWith these objectives in mind\, the Philippines brought the issue of the South China Sea for arbitration under the UNCLOS. \nSuch an effort deserves support of stakeholders and the international community because the case seeks to clarifyissues on the rights and entitlements of States regarding in the South China Sea. \nThe arbitration case likewise deserves support because the proceedings will serve to strengthen the role of UNCLOS as the constitution of the world’s oceans. Resort to arbitration will also strengthen the international legal regime upon which more and more states have been resorting too. \nAs I indicated earlier\, India\, in particular\, has shown the way for Member States to adhere to the rule of law and to seek the peaceful settlement of international disputes. \nIn bringing the case of the Maritime Boundary in the Bay of Bengal to court\, India has respected fully the decision of the ITLOS. \nApart from this case\, India has\, by its own efforts also sought to settle border disputes peacefully as in the case of the Land Border Agreement between Bangladesh and India which was recently ratified. \nThe South China Sea dispute\, because of its global significance\, has attracted increasing concern from the international community as well. ASEAN\, the EU\, some individual European countries\, the G-7\, the United States\, Japan and India have all expressed such concerns. They have also called for the reduction of tensions\, for the avoidance of destabilizing activities and for the peaceful settlement of disputes. \nThe Philippine Arbitration Case\nIn bringing the case to arbitration\, the Philippines wishes to make it clear that is not seeking a resolution of territorial sovereignty issues. \nThe Philippines understands that the jurisdiction of the tribunal convened under UNCLOS is limited to questions that concern the law of the sea. \nIn bringing the case to arbitration\, the Philippines holds that the China’s 9-dash line claims are illegal\, expansive and arbitrary. \n The Philippines claims are as follows: \n\nChina is not entitled to exercise what it refers to as “historic rights” over the waters\, seabed and subsoil beyond the limits of its entitlements under the Convention\nThe so-called nine dash line has no basis whatsoever under international law insofar as it purports to define the limits of China’s claim to “historic rights”;\nThe various maritime features relied upon by China as a basis upon which to assert its claims in the South China Sea are not islands that generate entitlement to an exclusive economic zone or continental shelf. Rather\, some are “rocks” within the meaning of Article 121\, paragraph 3; others are low-tide elevations; and still others are permanently submerged. As a result\, none are capable of generating entitlements beyond 12NM\, and some generate no entitlements at all. China’s recent massive reclamation activities cannot lawfully change the original nature and character of these features\nChina has breached the Convention by interfering with the Philippines’ exercise of its sovereign rights and jurisdiction; and\,\nChina has irreversibly damaged the regional marine environment\, in breach of UNCLOS\, by its destruction of coral reefs in the South China Sea\, including areas within the Philippines’ EEZ\, by its destructive and hazardous fishing practices\, and by its harvesting and poaching of endangered species.\n\nPhilippine Aspirations \nIn pursuing this arbitration case\, the Philippines believes that a ruling will benefit not only the direct stakeholders but also the entire international community. \nBy ruling on the validity of the 9-dash lines\, the maritime entitlements for the littoral states and those that depend on the South China Sea as an international waterway will be clarified. \nThis is an initiative\, therefore\, that deserves the support of the entire international community. \nIt is important for all concerned friends\, including India\, to do their utmost to promote a regional security architecture built squarely on the rule of law\, and in the case of the South China Sea\, on the UNCLOS. \nThe dialogue-centered approach espoused by India to security cooperation in our region remains relevant\, bearing in mind the diversity and plurality of security systems in the Asia-Pacific. \nThat India has an important role to play in this regard has been recognized. In fact\, India has been urged by ASEAN to assume a greater role in the regional security architecture. \nIndia recognized this cap and launched its Look East Policy over two decades ago. This was followed by the Act East Policy which India announced recently. \nIndia’s efforts to implement its Act East Policy through concrete action is commendable\, particularly one promoting greater connectivity between our regions\, including through the successful implementation of the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity. \nThe day when our people travel more frequently between our countries will be the day when India and ASEAN will cease being relative strangers to one another. \nIndeed\, only when we join together in the endeavors that strengthen the international legal framework and encourage nations to resort to the mechanisms identified can we hope to have a more peaceful and stable world. \nIt is during these times that a country that is known for erecting walls must recognize the importance of building bridges of dialogue. \nThe Philippines’commitment to the rule of law and the peaceful settlement of disputes remains steadfast. \nIndia can count on the Philippines to advance this principled position\, as well. \nThe Philippines is confident of India’s steadfastness in supporting the rule of law and the peaceful settlement of disputes. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/eminent-persons-lecture-series-lecture-by-he-mr-evan-garcia-on-issues-of-south-china-sea-and-future-prognosis-a-philippine-perspective CATEGORIES:LECTURES ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20141203T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20141203T053000 DTSTAMP:20261101T020754 CREATED:20231223T204328Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T131010Z UID:63232-1417584600-1417584600@idsa.in SUMMARY:Fifth Y B Chavan Memorial Lecture: Securing India’s Borders: The Way Ahead DESCRIPTION:Dr Madhav Godbole\, Former Home Secretary\, Government of India would deliver a lecture on ‘Securing India’s Borders: The Way Ahead‘\, on Wednesday\, December 3\, 2014 at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi\, under the series of Y B Chavan Memorial Lecture. \nThe Lecture would be chaired by Shri P C Haldar \nPress Release [+]\nComplete Text Speech [+]\nProgramme\n1500-1505: Welcome Address by Brig Rumel Dahiya (Retd)\, DDG\, IDSA \n1505-1510: Address by Representative of YashwantraoChavanPratishthan\, Mumbai \n1510-1540: Lecture by Dr Madhav Godbole\, Former Home Secretary\, Government of India \n1540-1545: Remarks by Chair Shri P C Haldar \n1545-1615: Question and Answer Session \n1615: Vote of Thanks by Col Vivek Chadha (Retd)\, Research Fellow\, IDSA \n1620: Refreshments URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/fifth-y-b-chavan-memorial-lecture-securing-indias-borders-the-way-ahead CATEGORIES:LECTURES ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140204T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140204T053000 DTSTAMP:20261101T020754 CREATED:20231223T204328Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250310T013520Z UID:63233-1391491800-1391491800@idsa.in SUMMARY:Special Address - K Subrahmanyam Memorial Lecture by Kishore Mahbubani DESCRIPTION:Venue: IDSA Auditorium (2nd Floor) \n \nSpeaker: Mr Kishore Mahbubani\, Dean\, LKY School\, Singapore \nTitle: Can India be Cunning? \nChairperson: Dr Sanjay Baru\, Director IISS \n\n\nPress Release \nDownload Summary of the Lecture URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/special-address-k-subrahmanyam-memorial-lecture-by-kishore-mahbubani CATEGORIES:LECTURES ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20131206T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20131206T053000 DTSTAMP:20261101T020754 CREATED:20231223T204343Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T131010Z UID:63234-1386307800-1386307800@idsa.in SUMMARY:Special Address - Talk by Cho Tae-yong on “The Situation of the Korean Peninsula and the ROK Policy towards North Korea” DESCRIPTION:Speaker: His Excellency Cho Tae-yong\, Special Representative (Vice Minister level)\, for Korean Peninsula Affairs\, Republic of Korea \nSpeaker’s Profile\nMr Cho Tae-yong is the Special Representative (Vice Minister level)\, for Korean Peninsula Peace and Security Affairs for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs\, Republic of Korea since May 2013. \nHe is a career diplomat and started his diplomatic career in the year 1980. During his tenure in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs\, he has worked in various capacities for the ministry and has held important positions for the Republic of Korea in United Nations\, Iraq\, US\, Thailand\, Ireland and Australia. \nMr. Cho Tae-yong is an alumnus of Seoul National University\, Seoul\, Korea and the Oxford University\, UK. \nRSVP\nEmail: cc.idsa@nic.in URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/special-address-talk-by-cho-tae-yong-on-the-situation-of-the-korean-peninsula-and-the-rok-policy-towards-north-korea CATEGORIES:LECTURES ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20131126T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20131126T053000 DTSTAMP:20261101T020754 CREATED:20231223T204343Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250305T065658Z UID:63235-1385443800-1385443800@idsa.in SUMMARY:Fourth YB Chavan Memorial Lecture: Maritime Security of India - Future Challenges DESCRIPTION:Speaker’s Profile\nAdmiral Arun Prakash retired as India’s 20th Naval Chief and Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee in end-2006. Commissioned into the Executive Branch in 1966\, he specialized in aviation and has flown fighters from aircraft-carriers and patrol-aircraft and helicopters from ashore. During a career spanning over 40 years\, he commanded four warships including the aircraft-carrier Viraat\, two naval air squadrons and a naval air station. In staff appointments he served as head of the Aviation and Personnel branches of the navy\, and as Vice Chief of Naval Staff. \nIn flag rank he commanded the Eastern Fleet and the National Defence Academy. He was the first C-in-C of the Andaman & Nicobar Joint Command and subsequently headed the Western Naval Command. During his tenure as Chief\, the Indian Navy saw many initiatives being launched in the fields of doctrine\, strategy\, transformation and foreign maritime cooperation. The 2004 tsunami saw the IN earn plaudits for mounting an effective disaster relief operation\, on India’s eastern seaboard and simultaneously rendering assistance to neighbouring Sri Lanka\, Maldives and Indonesia. \nA graduate of the Indian Air Force Test Pilots School\, the Defence Services Staff College and the US Naval War College\, he was awarded the Vir Chakra during the 1971 war\, while flying with an IAF fighter-bomber squadron in Punjab. \nPost-retirement\, he writes and speaks on strategic and defence related topics. He has published a compendium of speeches and writings titled: From the Crow’s Nest. He has served as chairman of the National Maritime Foundation and was a two-term member of India’s National Security Advisory Board. \nClick here for complete text of lecture URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/fourth-yb-chavan-memorial-lecture-maritime-security-of-india-future-challenges CATEGORIES:LECTURES ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130305T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130305T053000 DTSTAMP:20261101T020754 CREATED:20231223T204343Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T131010Z UID:63236-1362461400-1362461400@idsa.in SUMMARY:Special Address - Admiral D K Joshi on "Role of Indian Navy in Maintaining Peace in Indian Ocean Region" DESCRIPTION:Speaker: Chief of the Naval Staff (CNS)\, Admiral D K Joshi\, PVSM\, AVSM\, YSM\, NM\, VSM\, ADC \nChairperson: Vice Admiral (Retd.) P S Das \nComplete text of lecture URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/special-address-admiral-d-k-joshi-on-role-of-indian-navy-in-maintaining-peace-in-indian-ocean-region CATEGORIES:LECTURES ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130123T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130123T053000 DTSTAMP:20261101T020754 CREATED:20231223T133951Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T131010Z UID:63141-1358919000-1358919000@idsa.in SUMMARY:Eminent Persons' Lecture Series - Lecture by General Bikram Singh on "Challenges for the Indian Army in the 21st Century" DESCRIPTION:On January 23\, 2013\, as part of its ‘Eminent Persons’ Lecture Series\, IDSA organized a lecture by General Bikram Singh\, PVSM\, UYSM\, AVSM\, SM\, VSM\, ADC\, Chief of the Army Staff\, on “Challenges for the Indian Army in the 21st Century”. General Singh delivered his talk on the challenges facing the Indian Army from the perspective of its charter as defined in the Constitution of India and the role assigned to the Army as part of the strategic guidance which it receives from the Raksha Mantri. The talk took into account the existing security environment\, the internal and the external dynamics\, and their impact on the role of the Army. The Chief also made mention of measures which would ensure that the Army continues to be a force for national unity in the 21st century. \nWhile providing a perspective on various countries of Asia\, General Bikram Singh mentioned that China continued on its path of ‘peaceful economic rise’ and has set its sights to become a regional power by 2025 and a global power by 2050. He highlighted China’s increasing infrastructural footprints in the neighbourhood. As regards Pakistan\, the General highlighted the high levels of terrorist and sectarian violence prevalent currently and said it was unlikely that any improvement would manifest in the immediate future. He mentioned that the Pakistani stance is defined in terms of the two extremities of the conflict spectrum viz. low intensity conflict and the threat held out by Pakistan of a nuclear war. He opined that the two main issues of concern at the moment in Pakistan are its unemployed youth who are potential recruits for the terrorist groups and the ‘unconstitutional’ power enjoyed by its Army. Given the trust deficit that exists between India and Pakistan\, General Singh said that there was a requirement of being cautious in our dealings with that country. \nGeneral Singh thereafter made a brief mention of the good relations India shares with its other neighbours and highlighted the contribution of the Army in furthering these relationships. In the extended neighbourhood\, the future of Afghanistan\, according to General Singh\, is a cause of concern. Post US withdrawal in 2014 and given the poor state of security mechanism there\, it is likely that there may be spill over effects of any resultant adversities in India. On the US\, the Chief\, described it as a ‘de facto neighbour of India’\, due to it being a resident power in the region for many decades. The Indo-US relations in the military domain are on the rise and it gives an opportunity for the Indian Army to gain access to high end technology while developing a certain degree of compatibility in operations with the US Army. \nSpeaking on the internal security dimension\, General Singh opined that the situation in Jammu & Kashmir though militarily under control has the potential to flare up given the support it receives from Pakistan. In the North East\, the situation is improving and lies mainly in the realm of law and order. Left Wing Extremism is the problem which is current and requires a multi-pronged approach at the governmental level. In the Chief’s view\, deployment of the Army should not be part of the solution as it militates against training and preparations for the Army’s conventional role. There are agencies within the country\, some of which need to build up their capabilities\, to tackle this menace. \nThe Chief thereafter discussed the Indian Army’s interpretation of the theoretical construct of combat power. He covered the issue in terms of the conceptual\, moral and physical dimensions. He also dwelt briefly on the dimensions of war and our preparations. \nWhile speaking on the challenges facing the Indian Army\, the Chief emphasised on the necessity of versatile military leadership which can brave the complexities of the full spectrum of conflict. Ability to orchestrate and win a war of manoeuvre will test the mettle of the military leaders. The challenge before the Indian Army\, therefore\, is to train its leadership to fight in the full spectrum of conflict\, with special emphasis for its leaders to be proficient in manoeuvre warfare. Speaking on the conceptual dimension of war\, the Chief highlighted that the challenge for the Army would be to define and accomplish political aims in a war which may possibly be of short duration. \nMaintenance of strategic balance against possible adversaries is another challenge described by General Bikram Singh. India has unresolved borders which require to be guarded at all times while concurrently tackling proxy war and terrorism. The endeavour is to counter the ongoing sub-conventional threats while maintaining a posture of strategic balance to tackle other threats. \nIn the moral arena\, the challenge for the Indian Army is recruitment of motivated citizens who are ready to face dangers\, even situations of near certain death\, in the course of their duty. Speaking further on the man-management issues\, he also highlighted the need for proper comprehension of human resource issues by the leadership in view of the socio-economic changes in the country and the rising aspirations of its citizens. \nGeneral Singh spoke about the impact of media in perception management. He was quite categorical in his assertion that the use of social media by parties inimical to the country can have adverse impact on the Army. The Chief assured the audience that the Army is prepared to meet this challenge. \nWhile speaking on the challenge in the field of physical dimension of war\, General Singh made a mention of resource management including equipment. The audience was assured that adequate measures were in place to make certain that the Army remains in fine fettle. \nOn that positive note General Bikram Singh concluded his talk. Thereafter\, he answered all the questions that were raised by the audience. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/eminent-persons-lecture-series-lecture-by-general-bikram-singh-on-challenges-for-the-indian-army-in-the-21st-century CATEGORIES:LECTURES,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130122T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130122T053000 DTSTAMP:20261101T020754 CREATED:20231223T204343Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T131010Z UID:63237-1358832600-1358832600@idsa.in SUMMARY:Eminent Persons' Lecture Series - Lecture by Prof. G. L. Peris on "The Rise of Asia and Sri Lanka’s Role" DESCRIPTION:Venue: IDSA AuditoriumSpeaker: Prof GL Peiris\, Hon’ble Mnister for External Affairs\, Sri Lanka URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/eminent-persons-lecture-series-lecture-by-prof-g-l-peris-on-the-rise-of-asia-and-sri-lankas-role CATEGORIES:LECTURES ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20121130T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20121130T053000 DTSTAMP:20261101T020754 CREATED:20231223T134106Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250305T070630Z UID:63148-1354253400-1354253400@idsa.in SUMMARY:Third YB Chavan Memorial Lecture - India’s Foreign Policy – Future Challenges DESCRIPTION:“India’s Foreign Policy – Future Challenges” — Ambassador Kanwal Sibal\n\nIDSA in collaboration with Yashwantrao Chavan Pratishthan\, Mumbai hosted the third Y B Chavan Memorial Lecture\, the founding President and guiding light for the Institute in its formative years\, on 30 November 2012. Ambassador Kanwal Sibal delivered the lecture on “India’s Foreign Policy – Future Challenges.” The Institute was privileged on the occasion by the presence of Ambassador Leela K Ponappa as chairperson\, Shri RD Pradhan and Shri Ajit Nimbalkar from the Yashwantrao Chavan Pratishthan. \n\nBrief Overview\nShri Y B Chavan was born in the state of Maharashtra on March 12\, 1913. He spent many years in jail as a freedom fighter and played a major role in the Quit India movement in 1942. Following India’s independence\, he was appointed Parliamentary Secretary in 1946 and rose to become Chief Minister of the bi-lingual State of Bombay. In 1960\, he became the first Chief Minister of the newly created state of Maharashtra. He was requested by the then Prime Minister Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru to become the Defence Minister in 1962. Subsequently\, he held the offices of Union Home Minister from 1966 to 1970\, Union Finance Minister from 1970 and Foreign Minister from 1974 to 1977. He was also the Chairman of the 8th Finance Commission. The Yashwantrao Chavan Pratishthan has given a corpus to the IDSA to hold an annual eminent persons’ lecture series In memory of Shri Y B Chavan. \nWelcome Address by Dr. Arvind Gupta\nDr. Arvind Gupta\, Director General\, IDSA\, acknowledged the support of the Yashwantrao Chavan Pratishthan in organising the event. He spoke about late Shri K Subrahmanyam’s admiration for Shri Y B Chavan and about the pivotal role played by the two in establishing and then mentoring IDSA through its formative years. He brought out the role played by Shri Y B Chavan by quoting Shri Subrahmanyam “if IDSA was not nursed at that time by late Shri Y B Chavan\, it would have been killed at the infancy itself.” Dr Gupta also noted that 2012 marks the birth centenary of Y B Chavan and hence it is an important year in the calendar of the IDSA. \nRemarks by Shri Ajit Nimbalkar\nShri Ajit Nimbalkar elaborated on the tremendous contribution of late Shri Y B Chavan to the nation in general and Maharashtra in particular while serving in various capacities both at the centre and in the state. Shri Nimbalkar expressed hope that the annual event organized by the IDSA will draw more attention at the national level and that it would be a fitting tribute to the memory of a towering figure like Y B Chavan. \nThird Y B Chavan Memorial Lecture: Ambassador Kanwal Sibal\n\nAmbassador Sibal said that identification of the problems and challenges will help India in a prescriptive analysis for the future. While giving a comprehensive account of the near and distant future challenges facing the country\, he said that the biggest challenge before India was to maintain coherence and balance in its foreign policy. Shri Sibal said that national interest is a fluid concept and defining it is not easy. However\, a clear and sharp understanding of our national interests is in many ways important to the formulation of a sound foreign policy and addressing various challenges facing the nation at the international level. Foreign policy challenges\, according to him\, largely remain the same over a period of time and India is no exception in this regard. Therefore\, he concluded by saying that the future foreign policy challenges for India will remain the same albeit in a different form; protection of our independence and sovereignty\, friendship with all and enmity with none and a peaceful environment in which we can economically grow and meet our internal challenges. \nClick the link to see the full text of his talk. \nClick link for audio of the talk \nDiscussion Points\nThe talk evinced a lot of interest and the question and answer session generated a host of points. Some salient aspects brought out are as follows: – \n\nIndia’s Neighborhood Challenges: India faces a tough neighborhood. Though\, we wish for a cooperative and trouble free neighborhood\, experience worldwide suggests that none of the big powers\, be it USA or China or erstwhile USSR has had a trouble-free neighborhood; this situation is not unique to India alone. A matter of concern is that India’s smaller neighbours bring in external actors to balance the Indian influence.\nChina: It was argued that a more democratic and globally integrated China will be easier to deal with and a guarantee for peace in the region. The US under Clinton also worked on this thesis\, but to no avail. China is deeply integrated into the global economic system\, but if the unfolding events of the recent past are any indication\, its aggressive foreign policy posturing is not likely to change.\nSino-US bonhomie: Though the US looks at India as a lynchpin and a major power in the region\, it also sees China as an important ally in promoting peace and stability in South Asia. This double view of the US has to be taken into cognition by Indian policy-makers.\nG-2: The prospect of G-2 is questionable; there are many intertwined issues that raise questions about its existence and future possibility. Both Europe and Russia don’t look at it favourably. Its existence would also not be in India’s favour.\nOut of Area Contingency (OOAC): OOAC Operations are going to pose serious questions both within the country and outside. Given the fact that India is a rising power and OOAC is mandated by the RM’s directive\, India is bound to play an important role beyond its defined boundaries. Although the international community is looking towards India to shoulder more global responsibility\, the civilian leadership is yet to take a call on deploying the armed forces in certain out of area contingency operations. Moreover\, there is a lack of synergy between the civilian and military leadership. Unlike the US and other democracies where the military is deeply integrated into the political decision making\, the military component is largely missing from India’s decision making process. This phenomenon puts serious question marks over our ability to undertake missions far from our borders.\nIran: India is trying to maintain an independent position despite US pressures. While maintaining our stated independent position\, we are trying to persuade and convince the US that maintaining closer ties with Iran is critical to India\, given our dependence on that country to meet our vital energy needs.\nTibet: Tawang is important for India as a signal to China that Arunachal Pradesh is an inseparable and integral part of India and is not subject to bargain. India should not compromise on this issue\, as any dilution in its position will compromise its national security.\nMinistry of External Affairs: The fact that the MEA is understaffed and overstretched is not new. However\, if we look at the problem in a holistic fashion the problem does not seem to be as acute as it is commonly portrayed. A host of other ministries viz. the ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs\, the Environment ministry\, Commerce ministry\, the Ministry of Defence deal with our diplomatic efforts in their respective fields. This does in a way reduce the burden of the MEA. However\, since the MEA is the nodal agency in foreign affairs and the complexity of issues faced and emerging are growing an increase in manpower is essential.\n\nObservations by Ambassador Leela Ponappa\nShri Y B Chavan integrated both internal and external agenda\, which is the benchmark of a successful foreign policy. The need of the hour is to rebalance our domestic and foreign policy goals. There is a limit to what a country can achieve internationally on its own and this is true for India also. For example\, India can achieve very little vis-à-vis Central Asian republics as it is limited due to the geographical constraints. So we can aspire only for certain things in a given situation. \nVote of Thanks\nCommander Sarabjeet Parmar thanked Ambassador Kanwal Sibal for his invaluable observations on this important subject. He extended his thanks to Shri Ajit Nimbalkar for being present on the occasion and sharing his experience about Shri Y B Chavan and IDSA. He also thanked RD Pradhan for his support and encouragement for this event. Last but not the least\, he thanked Ambassador Ponappa for sparing some time out of her busy schedule to chair the event and share her incisive remarks. \nReport prepared by Amit Kumar\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA). URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/third-yb-chavan-memorial-lecture-indias-foreign-policy-future-challenges CATEGORIES:LECTURES,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120606T133000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120606T223000 DTSTAMP:20261101T020754 CREATED:20120222T235822Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250305T071731Z UID:85164-1338989400-1339021800@idsa.in SUMMARY:Special Address - US Secretary for Defence\, Mr Leon E. Panetta\, on 'Indo-US Defence Relations' DESCRIPTION:Leon E. Panetta\, US Secretary for Defence \nClick here for complete text of address URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/special-address-us-secretary-for-defence-mr-leon-e-panetta-on-indo-us-defence-relations-2 CATEGORIES:KEY SPEECHES,LECTURES ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120606T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120606T053000 DTSTAMP:20261101T020754 CREATED:20231223T204444Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T131010Z UID:63240-1338960600-1338960600@idsa.in SUMMARY:Special Address - US Secretary for Defence\, Mr Leon E. Panetta\, on 'Indo-US Defence Relations' DESCRIPTION:Leon E. Panetta\, US Secretary for Defence \nClick here for complete text of address URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/special-address-us-secretary-for-defence-mr-leon-e-panetta-on-indo-us-defence-relations CATEGORIES:LECTURES ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120124T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120124T053000 DTSTAMP:20261101T020754 CREATED:20231223T204444Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250305T071525Z UID:63241-1327383000-1327383000@idsa.in SUMMARY:Internal Security Lecture Series - The Jihadist Movement in India: Its Politics\, Practice and Prospects DESCRIPTION: URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/internal-security-lecture-series-the-jihadist-movement-in-india-its-politics-practice-and-prospects CATEGORIES:LECTURES ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120120T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120120T053000 DTSTAMP:20261101T020754 CREATED:20231223T204444Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250307T225734Z UID:63242-1327037400-1327037400@idsa.in SUMMARY:Internal Security Lecture Series - Many Securities DESCRIPTION:About the Speaker\nMr Sainath is the Rural Affairs Editor for The Hindu and received the prestigious Ramon Magsaysay Award in 2007. He received the European Commission’s Natali Prize in 1994 and the Boerma Journalism Prize from the UN FAO in 2001 \, the Amnesty International global award for human rights journalism in 2000\,the PUCL Human Rights Journalism Award\, and the B.D. Goenka award for excellence in journalism in 2000. In June 2006 Sainath won the Judges’ prize (newspaper category) in the 2005 Harry Chapin Media Awards.In 2009 he won the Ramnath Goenka ‘Journalist of the Year’ award from The Indian Express. \nAmartya Sen once called him “one of the world’s great experts on famine and hunger”. \nMr Sainath has also taught at various universities including the University of California\, Berkley. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/internal-security-lecture-series-many-securities CATEGORIES:LECTURES ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20111214T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20111214T053000 DTSTAMP:20261101T020754 CREATED:20231223T134554Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T131010Z UID:63186-1323840600-1323840600@idsa.in SUMMARY:National Strategy Lecture - The Sources of Instability in Asia DESCRIPTION:In his presentation\, Prof. Ganguly discussed why a Sino-Indian conflict is more likely than a Sino-American conflict drawing on the literature on rivalries. He developed his key arguments in four stages: a discussion on theories of power transition; their applicability to the intensifying Sino-Indian rivalry; dealing with potential objections to the predictions of the theory; and suggesting possible policy recommendations. \nAt the outset\, Prof. Ganguly notes the conventional concerns over a US-China rivalry which will increase instability and tension in Asia and may even lead to war. With China’s increasing economic heft\, aggressive growth of sea power and focus on augmenting its naval capabilities\, it is possible that at a point the interests of the two powers may clash. There is a possibility that the US might be drawn into a Sino-Taiwanese conflict or a clash in the South China Sea. While there is already a lot of academic and policy-oriented focus on the possibility of a US-China rivalry\, Prof. Ganguly located a more likely source of instability in Asia: the Sino-Indian rivalry. \nThe extant and growing tensions within this rivalry matter because the two states have long held competing self-images\, they are likely to vie for a dominant role in Asia and because China sees India as the most likely competitor for great power status in Asia. Theories on power transition suggest that there is a high propensity of conflict between aspiring and dominant great powers. The speaker\, citing Rapkin and Thompson (2006)\, highlighted three features pertaining to the context in which great powers have historically emerged; \n\nFirst\, all aspiring powers felt the necessity to take on another powerful state in the global order.\nSecond\, most great powers emerge from greatly troubled neighbourhood; and\nLast\, they start out as being the predominant power within the neighbourhood.\n\nProf. Ganguly extended Rapkin/Thompson analysis of explaining the conditions under which great powers are likely to emerge to examine how an extant rivalry between two rising regional powers can led to a militarized conflict. He argues that a modification of the Rapkin/Thompson argument about the conditions conducive to the emergence of a great power actually leads to a prediction of a potential conflict between the PRC and India. This rivalry\, already accentuated by significant power transition as the PRC steadily outstrips its principal regional rival\, India\, could culminate in a major war. Long before the PRC comes into direct conflict with the US\, it is far more likely to cross swords with India. As India’s economic clout\, military prowess and diplomatic status increase\, the PRC will be tempted to curb its rival’s rise. Given the existence of an extant and seemingly intractable territorial dispute\, the likelihood of such a conflict\, though not imminent\, seems wholly plausible. The speaker backed up his assertions by finding support for Rapkin and Thompson’s three propositions: \n1. The ongoing border dispute\, China’s expansionist tendencies as witnessed in the case of Arunachal Pradesh\, border incursions\, and growing militarization of the region suggest that the process to militarily take on the competitor of the aspiring great power could be underway. \n2. The PRC has penetrated Myanmar and virtually colonized Mandalay. It has transferred nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technology to Pakistan. There is increased competition in the Indian Ocean over sea lanes critical to both India and China. The PRC has also adopted an intransigent stance on the Kashmir issue. There is\, therefore\, ample evidence to prove that the rivalry operates in a tough neighbourhood. \n3. Moreover\, China is easily the predominant power in the neighbourhood\, thus\, confirming the third proposition. \nOn the view that a Sino-Indian conflict is unlikely because of\, firstly\, growing economic interdependence\, and secondly\, presence of nuclear weapons\, Prof. Ganguly noted that: \n\nEconomic interdependence is not a panacea. It is not a guarantee for peace. Moreover\, India-China trade relationship is asymmetrical.\nSino-Indian cooperation in global forums are fleeting moments of convergence of interest and not a strategy.\nMutual possession of nuclear arsenals does not obviate the prospects of limited war. It is possible that Chinese probes and Indian military reactions might precipitate a conflict.\n\nThus\, going by the literature on rivalries\, PRC may well be looking for an opportunity to discipline what it deems to be an upstart power in its neighborhood to demonstrate its clout as a great power. \nGiven the analysis that the intensification of the Sino-Indian rivalry could well prove to be the likely source of a militarized conflict\, in conclusion Prof. Ganguly outlined some policy options/strategies for India to forestall the conflict; \n\nIndia could simply concede ground to PRC and make significant territorial concessions. This option has the potential to prevent immediate conflict but it may embolden the PRC to seek further concessions.\nA second strategy would be to align with the United States. \nThird\, India could embark on a strategy of internal balancing. Indeed\, India has started following this strategy in a rather haphazard fashion.\nA fourth\, and most likely path that India might pursue involves elements of the first three\, involving\, intermittent concessions to China\, growing alignment with Japan\, naval cooperation with the US and steady expansion of its own internal military capabilities.\n\nReport prepared by Bhavna Tripathy\, Research Intern at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/national-strategy-lecture-the-sources-of-instability-in-asia CATEGORIES:LECTURES,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20111213T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20111213T053000 DTSTAMP:20261101T020754 CREATED:20231223T204544Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T131010Z UID:63247-1323754200-1323754200@idsa.in SUMMARY:Internal Security Lecture Series - Security and Human Rights DESCRIPTION: URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/internal-security-lecture-series-security-and-human-rights CATEGORIES:LECTURES ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20111130T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20111130T053000 DTSTAMP:20261101T020754 CREATED:20231223T204643Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T131011Z UID:63250-1322631000-1322631000@idsa.in SUMMARY:Second YB Chavan Memorial Lecture - India and China: Can the Giants of Asia Cooperate? DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: His Excellency\, Shri N N Vohra\, Governor of Jammu & Kashmir \nProgramme\n1630-1635 hrs\nWelcome Address by Dr Arvind Gupta\, Lal Bahadur Shastri Chair\, IDSA \n1635-1640 hrs\nAddress by Representative of Yashwantrao Chavan Pratishthan\, Mumbai \n1640-1725 hrsTalk by Prof Kanti Bajpai on “India and China:Can the Giants of Asia Cooperate?” \n1725-1730 hrs Observations by Shri NN Vohra \n1730-1800 hrs Question and Answer Session \n1800 hrs Vote of Thanks by Cdr Sarabjeet Parmar\, Research Fellow\, IDSA \n1805 hrs Refreshments URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/second-yb-chavan-memorial-lecture-india-and-china-can-the-giants-of-asia-cooperate-2 CATEGORIES:LECTURES ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20111130T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20111130T053000 DTSTAMP:20261101T020754 CREATED:20231223T204543Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T131010Z UID:63245-1322631000-1322631000@idsa.in SUMMARY:Second YB Chavan Memorial Lecture - “India and China: Can the Giants of Asia Cooperate?” DESCRIPTION:Download Event Booklet\nHis Excellency the Governor of Jammu and Kashmir\, Shri N.N. Vohra\, Acting Director General of the Institute\, Shri Arvind Gupta\, and representatives of the Y.B. Chavan Trust\, Shri R.K. Pradhan and Shri Ajit Nimbalkar\, Ladies and Gentlemen: \nMay I begin by thanking the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses and the Y.B. Chavan Trust for inviting me to give the Second Y. B. Chavan Memorial Lecture. It is a great privilege to do so. Shri Y.B. Chavan was an eminent freedom fighter who rose to become a distinguished leader of independent India. In his long career as a politician\, Shri Chavan held various responsibilities. He was the first Chief Minister of the new Maharashtra state\, member of the Union Cabinet responsible for four vital portfolios\, and Deputy Prime Minister in the Charan Singh government. For over forty years\, from his days as President of the Satara District Congress\, to his Chairmanship of the Finance Commission in the 1980s\, Shri Chavan served India with dignity and grace. \nMy subject tonight is India-China relations. It is a subject that would have been close to Shri Chavan’s heart and mind. As Defence Minister after the war with China in 1962\, he set about reorganizing the country’s military preparedness. We know that great changes were made during the three years of his Ministership and that the emergence of a larger\, better-equipped\, and better-led military dates from his time. As Defence Minister\, and subsequently as Minister for Home Affairs and External Affairs\, he would have dealt with issues pertaining to China in terms of the military\, internal security\, and diplomatic implications for India. As Finance Minister\, he would have made budgetary provision for defence\, a large part of which was devoted to protecting the border against China. \nThe title of my talk is “India and China: Can the Giants of Asia Cooperate?” It could also have been titled “The Past\, the Present\, and the Future of India-China Relations”. India and China face two sets of issues\, broadly. The first are the historical ones – the past. These include the border quarrel\, the fear of internal interference by the other side\, and the problem of Pakistan. The second are new areas of competition including an arms race\, the desire for international status\, and the demand for food\, water\, and energy – the future. My argument is that the legacies of the past are with us and cannot be ignored\, but that India and China have learned to manage those legacies. The present is being stabilized by four pillars of cooperative interaction which the two governments have carefully put in place. The future is bringing challenges and requires us to think about a broader\, more institutionalized form of cooperative interaction\, an “Asian G-2”. \nThe Past\nHistorical Legacy —The Border Quarrel \nLet me begin with the historical legacy. \nThis is not the place to settle the issue of exactly why India and China after the initial years of friendliness began to quarrel\, but some engagement with the reasons for their estrangement is necessary in order to understand where we were in the 1950s and early 1960s\, how we got where we are now\, and where we might go in the years to come. \nOne interpretation of India-China estrangement is that the competition for status and influence in Asia if not the world in the 1950s led the two countries into contention\, and that this rather than the border issue itself led to war. \nA second interpretation is that domestic political issues pushed the two leaderships to be more assertive and that a spiral of assertiveness followed\, until Jawaharlal Nehru initiated the “Forward Policy” which proved to be the final trigger. On the Indian side\, the press\, parliament\, and public opinion hardened Nehru’s stand at key junctures and caused him to reject what in retrospect seemed like a fairly good deal from China – Aksai Chin to China and NEFA to India. On the Chinese side\, the disaster of famine\, the Great Leap Forward\, and the departure of the Dalai Lama could well have pushed Mao to “teach India a lesson”. \nBeyond these broader considerations\, there is a third interpretation\, namely\, that war occurred because Nehru and Mao took the issue of territory seriously – that territory was itself the cause of war\, that the war was not the outcome of geopolitical rivalry or domestic politics. Why was territory so important? It is easy to forget now that at the time India and China had just arrived on the world stage as free countries. Their entry was marked\, in addition\, by the trauma of partition. Then\, too\, both had been victims of Western expansionism: India had been colonized\, and China had been humiliated by the Western powers and Japan. They brought with them a deep sense of victimhood\, therefore\, and both saw themselves as the aggrieved party in the border quarrel. \nA fourth interpretation is that by 1962 the three factors described above – the competition for status and influence\, domestic political turbulence\, and the sense of territorial attachment – combined to precipitate war. If big\, consequential social events occur as the climax of several trends or the conjuncture of smaller events\, then the 1962 war and the estrangement of the two giants of Asia could well have arisen from a fatal combination of these factors. \nThat was 1962. Where are we today? \nSome would argue that the confluence of these three factors is with us again: geopolitical rivalry that is centred on notions of status and influence; domestic politics that is often quite volatile; and an attachment to territory and a sense of victimhood that is often quite fierce. They therefore conclude that 1962 may be repeated. Drawing historical parallels is appealing and is a fairly natural activity of the human soul. However\, we should be careful in analogizing from the past. For one thing\, we have no definitive\, conclusive understanding of what caused the war of 1962. For another thing\, it is a different world altogether today\, and it is quite likely that very different factors influence the present course of India-China relations. So\, for example\, the conceptions of status and influence that inspire the two countries and the nature of domestic politics in contemporary India and China are not necessarily the same as in the 1950s and 1960s. There are other differences. In 1962\, India-China trade was almost non-existent. China was not a great trading nation but rather was an isolated and inward looking one. India too was cut off from the dominant world economic system at the time. Then again\, there has been political learning since the war of 1962\, and policies have been put in place to stabilize relations. Finally\, the two countries are members of several regional and global institutions\, which they were not in 1962: they therefore encounter each other more frequently\, and they have accepted norms and practices as members of those institutions that influence their strategic choices. \nTo say that the world India and China inhabit is probably quite different from the world of 1962 is not to say that it is necessarily a better or more stable place. The border conflict is not over\, and we cannot afford to be complacent. There are three things about the border today that we need to take account of – that the negotiations over it have bogged down\, yet some progress has been made; that there are military instabilities along it\, but these may not be of an alarming nature; and that while both sides are increasing their military capabilities\, war in the high Himalayas\, to use General D.K. Palit’s evocative phrase\, is a difficult proposition. \nFirst of all\, it is clear that after fifteen rounds of border talks\, the two countries have not significantly reduced their differences. Crucially\, they have not yet agreed on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and have failed to exchange maps in the crucial western and eastern sectors. On the other hand\, there has been some advance. Specifically\, the 2005 document\, titled “Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question”\, sets out the broad criteria or understandings on the norms that will frame a solution to the border conflict. The agreement made six crucial points: \n\nthe two sides would seek a “political settlement” \nthey would give “due consideration to each other’s strategic and reasonable interests” \nin reaching a settlement\, they would take into account “historical evidence\, national sentiments\, practical difficulties and reasonable concerns and sensitivities of both sides\, and the actual state of the border” \nthe final boundary should be “along well-defined and easily identifiable natural geographical features” \nthey would “safeguard due interests of their settled populations in the border areas” \nthere would be a “delineation and demarcation” by civil and military officials and surveyors. \n\nThis is the most explicit statement regarding the nature of a settlement\, and though it does not represent a breakthrough\, it begins to prepare public opinion for a final agreement. With these six caveats\, it is clear that the two governments have given themselves plenty of room for manoeuver in relation to their publics – virtually any criticism of a future settlement can be fended off by recourse to one or more of the six. \nThe second point about the present state of the border is not so positive\, namely\, that there are signs of military instability along the LAC after two decades of relative quiet. There is some evidence that Chinese incursions across the LAC have dramatically increased in the past two or three years. While the evidence is a little blurred\, something seems to be happening along the LAC. The key question is: are these incursions deliberate or accidental? \nOne view is that they are deliberate and part of Chinese pressure tactics. It is not clear why China should suddenly have chosen to coerce India\, but we could probably conjure up various Chinese motives. Another view is that the intrusions are largely unintended. Chinese units stray across the LAC because the line has never been clearly defined. As General V.K. Singh\, Chief of the Army is quoted to have said: \nI think at times things get unnecessarily blown up. There are no intrusions. There are transgressions. Transgressions are in areas where a certain alignment is disputed between the two countries. You feel that the alignment should be at a particular place and you go up to that place. They feel that the alignment should be at a particular place\, so he comes up to that place….There is nothing very alarming about it. \nA similar but not identical view is that the “transgressions” are not just by China\, that Indian troops also transgress\, and that straying across the LAC is part of a tacit system used by the two militaries to signal their respective claims. The intrusions are probes designed to test the other side’s reconnaissance capabilities\, alacrity of response\, and willpower. They are peacock-strutting exercises\, not the build up to a fire-fight or to war. This does not mean that escalation can be ruled out because there is always a chance that a local commander will misjudge the situation and overreact. It does mean\, though\, that there is no grand plan on either side to attack the other and that violence can be avoided and controlled with careful border management. \nThirdly\, both sides have boosted their forces along the LAC in the eastern sector. China\, with its huge new infrastructure in Tibet\, can apparently move over 30 divisions to the LAC. It has also transferred its CSS-5 missiles to Tibet. In response\, India is modernizing its road infrastructure\, planning to place an additional 90\,000 troops over the next 3-4 years as well as two squadrons of Sukhoi 30s into the eastern sector\, and has reportedly moved its Agni 2 and Prithvi 3 missiles to the border areas. China’s build-up is worrying\, but we should remember that the Chinese need forces to hold down Tibet and that India has responded even if tardily. Also\, as I will suggest in more detail later\, a military assault by China will encounter serious difficulties because it is easier to defend than to attack in this region. \nThe border presents a mixed picture therefore: there has been some progress on the nature of a final settlement\, but there are worrying signs as well. Even if these do not add up to a serious deterioration of relations along the LAC\, the spike in fairly routine incursions/transgressions and the enhancement of military capabilities bears careful watching. It is telling that when Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President Hu Jintao met in Sanya earlier this year\, they agreed to the setting up of a new border monitoring mechanism\, and this is already under discussion. \nHistorical Legacy – Interfering in Domestic Politics and the Problem of Pakistan \nTwo other historical legacies continue to press in on India and China: the fear that the other side might interfere in one’s internal affairs; and China’s friendship with Pakistan. \nAt various points\, India has feared that China would interfere in its internal politics. One fear was that Beijing would support Indian communists against parliamentary democracy. A second fear was that it would help separatists in the northeastern states of India. On the Chinese side\, there has been the persistent worry that\, with the Dalai Lama’s presence in Dharamsala\, New Delhi holds a dagger aimed at China’s southern underbelly. \nIndian fears were in some measure confirmed. China probably helped the original Naxalite movement of the 1960s\, even if this assistance was quite limited. It is worth noting in passing that the Chinese government has not recognized the CPI-Maoist as a community party\, and its news agency\, Xinhua\, continues to refer to the Maoist insurgents as “left wing rebels” – not the most dignified appellation. On the other hand\, Beijing did provide more substantial aid and refuge to some northeastern separatists\, at least until the mid-1970s. As for Chinese fears of the Dalai Lama in India\, the Indian government has acted with great prudence in dealing with him and the Tibetans. In sum\, what is striking about India and China is that whereas the two countries could have interfered a good deal in each other’s affairs\, they have chosen not to do so! \n Is this posture of restraint likely to persist? I think the answer is yes\, on the whole. India has been extremely careful in its handling of the Dalai. New Delhi will not depart from its cautious policy\, even though there are those who want to complicate China’s security. As a democracy and open society\, India is more susceptible to interference. It is\, therefore\, not in its interest to provoke its neighbours by aiding and abetting their internal enemies. China is not a democratic and open society; but Beijing has held off interfering in other countries’ affairs since the mid-1970s\, for at least four reasons – to curb the Maoist radicals within China; to reassure the rest of the world about China’s intentions; to concentrate on economic development; and to discourage others from its domestic vulnerabilities. There is no reason to suppose that China in its “peaceful rise” wants to change its policy of restraint. \n The other great historical burden that India and China carry is the problem of Pakistan. The Pakistan problem grew partly out of the border quarrel. As China’s relations with India worsened in the 1950s\, its appreciation of Pakistan grew apace. Historically\, though\, there were additional reasons for China’s closeness to Pakistan\, which we in India often fail to appreciate. Pakistan stands strategically located at the mouth of the energy-rich Gulf. It is also an important partner for China in the Islamic world. In 1971\, it acted as the intermediary for the US-China rapprochement. At the same time\, China did not want to lose Pakistan to the US. During the latter half of the Cold War\, Islamabad was a key ally against the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. Also\, there is evidence that Pakistan shared its centrifuge technology with China and may have allowed Chinese technicians access to its American military equipment. Pakistan is\, in addition\, a potential threat to China. Islamic extremists operating from Pakistan\, and Uighurs that were trained there during the Afghan war in the 1980s\, are a threat to the stability of Xinjiang. This\, too\, necessitates a close relationship with Pakistan. \nWhatever the reason for China’s closeness to Pakistan\, it is true that Beijing’s quasi-alliance with Pakistan has been a thorn in India’s side\, and there is little doubt that Pakistan has received conventional weapons\, missile technology\, and nuclear knowhow from China. It has also benefited economically from Chinese aid. \nHaving said this\, we in India exaggerate Chinese contributions to Pakistan’s security. Until recently\, China’s conventional arms transfers were modest compared to America’s. As for missile technology and nuclear knowhow\, surely Pakistan would have eventually obtained these through its own efforts. Or it would have acquired them from somewhere other than China. Chinese economic aid to Pakistan has been rather modest\, certainly in comparison to the bilateral and multilateral aid that our neighbour has received from other sources. The US has given Pakistan $33 billion in bilateral economic aid since 1947\, and $73 billion in economic and military aid from 1960-2002. Since 2002\, Pakistan has received about $20 billion from the US\, mostly again in military aid. Chinese aid figures are very difficult to obtain\, but it is clear enough that China cannot match these amounts. Most importantly\, though\, it is worth remembering that China has never actually come to Pakistan’s rescue militarily\, with 1971 being the crucial instance. \n On China-Pakistan\, it is also worth remembering that over the years Beijing has adopted a more equidistant stand on Kashmir. It has more or less stuck to the view that Kashmir is disputed\, that the dispute should be solved peacefully\, and that it is a bilateral matter between India and Pakistan. While it would be wonderful if Beijing did not refer to Kashmir as disputed territory\, we cannot expect that much grace from China! On the other hand\, during the Kargil war in 1999\, Beijing took a rather sharp view of the violation of the Line of Control by Pakistan. Over time\, Beijing has also largely endorsed the idea that the sub-continental dispute should be settled bilaterally\, and it no longer insists on adherence to the original UN resolutions on Kashmir. \n There are Indian concerns about China’s Kashmir policies. Let me mention two. Over the past two years\, we have heard a lot about the issuance of stapled visas for Indian Kashmiris who visit China. This of course is an annoying development for India. However\, there are signs that China is taking steps to undo its rather inept decision: Premier Wen Jiabao promised the Indian Prime Minister at the East Asian Summit (EAS) in Bali in November 2011 that official resolution of the dispute is under way. The latest scare story about Chinese policy towards Kashmir is the supposed presence of its military personnel in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (POK). Here again\, while the Indian media has dramatized the issue\, General V.K. Singh has offered a far more measured assessment\, noting that there are 3000-4000 Chinese personnel in POK of which only some are security personnel. These security personnel have apparently been assigned to guard the workers and technicians from China who are building infrastructure there – which is a far less sinister assessment than appeared in the media. \nWhereas China-Pakistan ties will continue to complicate the India-China relationship\, the truth is that China is uneasy about its quasi-ally. China has not condemned Pakistan publicly for harbouring terrorists\, but privately it is worried about the country’s role in promoting terrorism and Islamic extremism. Chinese technicians\, engineers\, and workers in Pakistan have been the targets of threats and attacks over the past decade. Recently\, the mining company China Kingho pulled out of a $19 billion deal citing security problems in Pakistan. With the departure of the US from Afghanistan\, China’s anxieties could well increase. Beijing fears that Pakistan could become more radicalized and fragmented\, with Saudi and Salafi influences growing and separatist movements gathering speed. In thirty years\, Pakistan will be a country of 250-330 million people\, armed with nuclear weapons\, and perhaps even more radical and divided than it is today. That is an alarming prospect for China. A moderate\, civilian-led Pakistan\, which is at peace with India\, is preferable. \nThere are signs China recognizes that Beijing and New Delhi are converging in their worry over Pakistan. At the East Asian Summit in Bali in November 2011\, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Premier Wen Jiabao reportedly briefed each other on their recent\, separate meetings with Pakistani Prime Minister Gilani. When military-to-military contacts between India and China were resumed in 2011\, the Indian delegation went not just to Beijing but also to Xinjiang province\, where Uighur separatists with links to Pakistani extremists are fighting for separation. This is the first foreign military delegation to be publicly invited to Xinjiang after the Sino-Soviet split of the 1950s. In another sign that Beijing maintains a certain strategic distance from Islamabad was China’s rather cool response to Prime Minister Gilani’s public statement that the Chinese would build a naval base at Gwadar for Pakistan.\nIf China’s views of Pakistan have begun to change\, so have India’s views. There is a good deal that could be said here\, but the key point is this: New Delhi recognizes that the survival of Pakistan as a moderate Islamic state is crucial for Indian security and that\, terrorism notwithstanding\, it must be engaged in a long-term comprehensive dialogue. \nIn effect\, then\, India and China share a concern about the radicalization and survival of Pakistan. If China worries that India wants to dismantle Pakistan\, it should lay aside that worry. The collapse of Pakistan would be a calamity for India. \nThe Present: Four Pillars of Interaction \nSince 1988\, when Rajiv Gandhi made his famous trip to China\, the two countries have worked consistently to put in place a diplomatic\, political\, military\, and economic system that will maintain stability and lay the foundation for a border settlement as well as normalization. That system has four components or pillars: the border negotiations\, high-level summits\, confidence-building measures\, and bilateral trade. \n With respect to the border negotiations\, in essence the two sides have come to the view that a settlement must await the future. Neither leadership has the political capital to shepherd a final agreement through its political system. Nonetheless\, it is vital that the two governments remain engaged in discussions. The border issue is an emotional one\, and to ignore the problem would be to give greater space to the hardliners on both sides. The appointment of the Special Representatives to take the border talks forward is vital since it is a signal that the top leadership is paying close attention to the process. \n The second stabilizing pillar is high-level summits. There have been more summits between the presidents\, prime ministers/premiers\, and foreign ministers of the two countries since 1988 than in the previous forty years. The media dismisses these meetings as photo opportunities\, but that is precisely why they are important. In a relationship that is prone to misunderstanding\, the highest leadership needs to be seen in each other’s company. Meeting one’s counterparts at the highest levels serves two functions: it gives each side a better sense of the personal qualities and thinking of the leader they are dealing with; and it is a signal to the general public that the other country is not as sinister as the hardliners insist. \n The third pillar of stability is confidence building measures or CBMs. These are well enough known\, so there is no need to describe them here. Like all CBMs\, they are intended to increase the flow of information between the two militaries\, so that if there are misinterpretations of military intentions\, capabilities\, and incidents\, these can be rapidly corrected. CBMs in themselves cannot bring peace; they cannot stop war if one side or other is determined to go to war. They can help prevent accidental war. \nThe India-China CBM menu is a rich one and probably does not need too many more items\, but there are two areas where the two sides will have to give some thought – nuclear weapons and naval CBMs. China has refused to talk to India about nuclear weapons\, but as India nuclearizes\, Beijing will have to begin that conversation in the interest of military stability. In addition\, as the Indian and Chinese navies rub up against each other\, from the South China Sea to the Indian Ocean\, they will need to think about something like the “Incidents at Sea” agreement between the US and Soviet Union during the Cold War. \nWe may need naval CBMs sooner than we think. The Indian press reported that in July 201l\, an Indian naval ship\, the INS Airawat\, which was heading towards a Vietnamese port\, was ostensibly contacted by the Chinese navy. The Indian ship was warned it that it was entering Chinese waters. In the context of China’s growing contention with Vietnam over their respective sea boundaries\, this was quite a serious warning. However\, although the Indian media played up the incident as another instance of Chinese belligerence\, it still remains unclear who contacted the Airawat. James Holmes\, Associate Professor of Strategy at the U.S. Naval War College\, a close watcher of Asian naval developments and certainly no Sinophile\, concluded that the encounter probably never happened. The Indian ship was apparently contacted on an international distress frequency monitored by all ships on the high seas. Moreover\, this frequency operates on line-of-sight communication only. Yet the Indian ship reportedly saw no Chinese naval ships or aircraft in the area. In other words\, the hailing of the Airawat could have been carried out by anyone who had line of sight and who wanted to have a bit of fun! The Indian ship reacted calmly as did the Indian government\, but this episode suggests that naval CBMs – e.g. a naval hotline – might have helped clear up the matter quickly and stop the rumour-mongering. \n The fourth pillar of India-China relations is trade. Trade now stands at over $60 billion. It could well rise to $120 billion by 2013. India is currently running a deficit of more than $20 billion\, and it has made a series of complaints about Chinese trade practices. By itself\, trade is not a condition of stability. For one thing\, if there are huge asymmetries in trade\, conflict could sharpen. For another\, if India or China\, or both\, feel that they can switch their bilateral trade to other partners quickly enough\, then the stabilizing role of trade may not operate between them. As things stand\, however\, both sides see trade as mutually beneficial and as having stabilizing political effects. Given that trade will grow substantially\, we should expect it to contribute to pragmatism on both sides. \nThe Future: Where Are India-China Relations Headed? \nWhat is the future of India-China relations? Are we heading for conflict\, or can the giants of Asia cooperate? \nI have argued that in respect of the historical legacies India and China are fairly well-placed. First\, while they have not found a solution to the border\, they have articulated some key principles\, they continue to talk\, and they have agreed to postpone a final settlement to a fairly distant future. This is sensible given the weakness of the present leaderships and the hardness of public opinion. \nSecond\, over the past several decades\, they have restrained themselves from interfering in each other’s domestic politics. \nThirdly\, the issue of Chinese help to Pakistan has not gone away for India\, but it is worth noticing that China is not Pakistan’s biggest aid giver nor has it come to Pakistan’s military rescue during India-Pakistan hostilities. On Kashmir\, Beijing has remained rather equidistant.\nFourth\, India and China have built a fairly tried and tested diplomatic system for dealing with each other and for maintaining diplomatic and military stability. \nGlobalization\, Rising Power\, and Competition \nThis is the good news. Unfortunately\, there may be storm-clouds ahead. And the fault lies with globalization. \n Thanks to globalization\, India and China are both rising powers\, that is\, powers experiencing high rates of economic growth that look to be sustained for fifty years or more. Three consequences would seem to follow. First\, since economic power will translate into military power\, the two countries could find themselves in an arms race. Second\, with growing economic and military power will come increasing international ambition and a desire for greater international status. Thirdly\, economic growth implies growing demand for at least three scarce resources – food\, water\, and energy. At some point\, India and China could be in competition over them. \n Economic growth has allowed both India and China to bolster their militaries. The two countries have imported more arms than any other countries in the world. China also has a fairly vibrant domestic arms industry. India’s advantage here is that the US and Europe have banned arms sales to China. However\, China is buying quite vigorously from Russia. India may have spent as much as US$50 billion on arms imports since 1999\, but China’s overall defence expenditures amount to three times India’s. \n With economic growth and military modernization\, India and China are all set to stake a bigger claim in the international system. China already is a global player\, and its views count on virtually every issue. India\, powered by its economic growth\, is gaining recognition as a bigger player in global affairs. Its membership in the G-20\, the East Asian Summit\, and growing support for India’s UN Permanent Membership of the Security Council are the clearest indications of its greater salience. India may also become a member of APEC and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Both countries are using their aid programmes but also their cultural influence to elevate their status. \nIf we look at food\, China is expected to account for one-half the increase in the global demand for cereals. While India was more or less self-sufficient in cereals\, by 2020 it will import up to 30 million metric tons. China will consume 40 per cent of the increasing demand for meat. Roots and tubers are important in the Asian diet: China and India will lead the demand here too. China’s agricultural trade deficit is expected to increase to US$ 33.5 billion\, while India’s will increase to US$9.1 billion by 2020. \n Water contention\, already an area of concern\, could grow. The supply of water is falling in both countries\, and demand is growing sharply. China’s supply has fallen by about 15 per cent and India’s by over 25 per cent. China has massive water inequality: northern China has 35 per cent of the population and only 7 per cent of the country’s water resources. Rivers are a key freshwater resource. All of South Asia’s major northern rivers originate in Tibet. China has plans to generate hydroelectricity but may also want to divert river waters\, particularly to its north. While China has begun to share some water data with India\, its long range plans\, especially on water diversion\, are worrying. \n The energy picture also suggests that India and China could come into conflict. Global energy needs will rise by 50 per cent by 2030\, half of it from India and China. China is already the world’s largest energy consumer. Per capita energy use in India will grow by 56-67 per cent and in China by 60-67 per cent. Oil accounts for about 25 per cent of India’s total energy use. This will rise to 35 per cent in 2030. Over 60 per cent of India’s oil comes from the Gulf\, Iran\, and other Middle Eastern sources. India reliance on coal is 42 per cent of its total energy use. Its shortfall of coal is likely to be 100 million metric tons by 2012. Oil accounts for roughly 20 per cent of China’s total energy use. This is expected to rise to 24 per cent in 2030. Its reliance on coal is nearly 70 per cent of its total energy use. Demand for coal in China is growing rapidly and will be 6 billion tons in 2025. Natural gas use will also increase substantially in both cases. \nThe key point here is that India and China will increasingly import their oil\, coal\, and natural gas requirements. Both countries are already foraging for energy in Africa\, the Gulf\, Central Asia\, and Latin America. They have even begun to look at the vast tar sands in Alberta\, Canada\, which may have the second largest reserves of oil after Saudi Arabia. \nConflict Unending? \nDoes all this add up to unending conflict between India and China?\nAs their military power increases\, their international ambitions and status rise\, and their demand for food\, water\, and energy grows\, they may well come into competition and outright conflict. But we should not be too quick to come to that conclusion. \nFirst of all\, it is fair to say that India and China’s arms acquisitions are not necessarily all aimed at the other country. China has more land and sea neighbours than any other major power in the world except Russia –and these include neighbours of some consequence including Russia\, Taiwan\, Japan\, South Korea\, Vietnam\, Indonesia\, India\, and Pakistan. Three of its neighbours are nuclear powers; in addition\, Japan and South Korea could easily go nuclear. Most importantly\, there is the United States’ military presence in Asia. India has a simpler strategic environment\, but it must worry about China and Pakistan\, both of which pose a conventional military and nuclear threat. In short\, while India and China have invested heavily in arms over the past decade\, they do not seem to be locked into an arms race with each other; they do have other concerns as well. \nAs for India and China’s larger international ambitions\, at the moment there is no great competition between them. We in India must accept that Chinas’ influence is far greater given its economic might\, its strategic decisiveness\, and its UN veto. In addition\, China has made gestures towards India’s growing status and has attempted to dampen the sense of competition. For instance\, on India’s eventual elevation to permanent membership\, Beijing has softened. It has not supported India outright\, but in 2005\, it said: “India is an important developing country” which has “an increasingly important influence in the international arena”. China “attaches great importance to the status of India in international affairs” and “understands and supports India’s aspirations to play an active role in the UN and international affairs”. In addition\, it noted that China would consult and cooperate with India on UN reforms. In 2006\, and then again in 2010\, after President Barack Obama’s visit to India\, it made a roughly similar statement. China has welcomed India’s presence in the East Asian Summit\, and there are signs that it will support India’s full membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). \nWhat about the demand for food\, water\, and energy? Here again\, competition may not be as severe as one might expect. Or\, it may be amenable to management\, even cooperation. \nSo\, while both sides are looking to import food and could come into competition\, they could postpone the day of rivalry by increasing domestic output. China has 124 million hectares and India has 162 million hectares of arable land. While China is more efficient in farming its land\, India has more farmland. Both can improve their agricultural systems considerably. \nOn water\, China\, as the upper riparian\, has a special responsibility towards its downstream neighbours including India. However\, as Brahma Chellaney in his recent book\, Water: Asia’s New Battleground suggests\, China and its neighbours could do much more domestically on freshwater supplies. We in India can continue to berate China\, but a huge proportion of the problem is at home. As for China’s purported plans to divert water from India and Bangladesh\, there are at least two constraints\, neither of which is trivial – the engineering challenges of water diversion; and the growing opposition within China. The latter should not be laughed off. For one thing\, massive diversion works will have potentially huge environmental and displacement effects. For another\, there will be worry within China that some parts of the country are “losing” water to other parts. In sum\, China’s plans for water diversion will face significant internal hurdles. These may be more consequential than the external pressures on China. It is worth noting here that Jiao Yong\, Vice Minister of China’s Ministry of Water Resources\, said as recently as November 30\, 2011\, that given the technical\, environmental\, and diplomatic difficulties\, the Chinese government had no plans to divert the Brahmaputra. That said\, it is perfectly in order for India to continue to press China for hydrological data and greater transparency on its riverine plans\, and certainly China should do more to reassure its neighbours. \n Energy too could be an arena of contention\, but even here we should be cautious. For one thing\, China’s energy policies are extremely decentralized\, and many Chinese entities are operating in the energy market as private players. The global energy field is still a market-led field\, and Indian companies are competing not just with Chinese state enterprises but also with private and state-owned enterprises from other parts of the world. It is not a straight fight between India and China: the India-China competition for energy is part of a global scramble for energy with many players\, and India-China may not be the primary axis of competition. \nIn addition\, energy supplies may increase as a result of new discoveries and technologies. The exploitation of the tar sands of Alberta is one example. With new technologies\, oil extraction there is becoming economically more viable. Extracting gas from shale is another example. The US has used the “fracking” process to unearth huge supplies of natural gas. \nAlso\, the mix of energy sources of the two countries is different. India is and will be more reliant on oil\, and China is and will be more dependent on coal. This may also dampen their competition. \nLastly\, India and China may be in a position to cooperate on energy. China has perhaps the leading clean coal technologies in the world\, which India needs; and China has invested massively in alternative energies\, which again India needs – and could get at cheaper rates than from anywhere else. \nIs War Likely? \nFinally\, let us ask the central strategic question: is war likely between India and China? \nHow and why would the two countries end up in war? Some fear that China would attack to settle the border issue in its favour or to prevent India’s rise. Some point darkly to the prospect of war over scarce resources\, particularly water and energy. Whatever the motive for war\, the suggestion seems to be that China would launch a frontal attack as in 1962 – either to grab territory or to punish and coerce India in the competition for scarce resources. \nIs this a realistic possibility? Leaving aside the economic costs of war for China\, I would argue that a Chinese frontal attack as in 1962 is unlikely for at least four military reasons. \nThe first reason is nuclear weapons. China has over 200 nuclear weapons\, and India has about 100. That induces extreme caution on both sides\, even though India’s delivery capabilities at present are largely dependent on long-range aircraft. Conventional war under the shadow of nuclear weapons may still be a temptation; but as India has discovered in relation to Pakistan\, even the side with superior conventional capabilities must be extremely careful given that conventional war could escalate to nuclear confrontation. The recent success of the Agni IV missile test\, reports of an ICBM in the making\, and the development of an SLBM suggest that the Indian deterrent will only be strengthened. \nSecondly\, both sides have airpower that will make a conventional war of any duration and decisiveness very difficult. China’s long supply lines\, essentially from Chengdu\, are vulnerable to air interdiction – the trip is over 4000 kilometres by train and over 2000 kilometres by road. Any attempt by China to disable the Indian Air Force (IAF) in the northeast and West Bengal in a first strike will be a challenge\, as the IAF is thickly deployed there and will be ready for a disabling surprise attack. To the extent that the IAF remains a viable force\, the movement of Chinese ground forces and supplies will be problematic. \nThirdly\, while China has the advantage of the heights on the Tibetan plateau\, its ability to send large forces into India in this sector is limited by geographical constraints – the routes down into India are narrow and winding\, and the PLA will find itself vulnerable to air attack if it breaches Indian ground defences. In addition\, of course\, its supply lines will become increasingly long\, while India will have the advantage of ever-shortening interior supply lines. \nFourth\, Chinese forces will have to take account of possible Tibetan instabilities behind them. It is hard to know if Tibetan underground militias exist and\, if so\, whether or not they would harass the PLA during wartime\, but this is an additional complication for China. \nHaving said that a Chinese attack on India is unlikely because its success is problematic\, there are two additional possibilities we must consider. \nThe first is that the Chinese attack will develop quite differently after an initial attack along the LAC. Chinese forces could supplement their frontal attack by “leapfrogging” over the Himalayas with highly-mobile special forces\, cut off supplies to the Indian front\, and trap Indian units at the LAC. This would depend on China possessing the requisite airlift capability\, very large and sophisticated special forces\, and the ability to suppress Indian ground defences but especially air defences. While China clearly is organizing itself for quick strike attacks with sophisticated mobile forces (for various regional contingencies)\, it is hardly beyond India to counter this given that the Indian military is aware of new Chinese military doctrines and capabilities. In essence\, India must have equivalent forces that it would use for swift counter-attacks. Also\, suppressing Indian defensive fire that would emanate from either ground installations or air platforms will be no easy task for the Chinese airborne forces. Furthermore\, even if Chinese special forces established themselves on the ground behind the Indian side of the LAC\, they would quickly run short of supplies and would be susceptible to ground and air counterattack\, leading to their decimation. In other words\, leapfrogging would be a very high-risk strategy for China. \nThe second possibility is that China would attack at sea – for example\, in the South China Sea or the Indian Ocean. Given the growing reach of both navies\, conflict along these lines cannot be altogether ruled out. However\, here again\, deterrence should prevail. Clearly\, it would be extremely foolish for the Indian Navy to pick a fight with the Chinese in the South China Sea. India’s naval forces in the area will be small\, at least for many years to come\, with extremely long communication and supply lines\, and they would have little chance against a Chinese force. In the Indian Ocean\, the situation would be reversed: the Chinese navy would be a long way from home and very vulnerable. In short\, if the Indian Navy is prudent and avoids confrontation in the South China Sea and if it continues to modernize its fleet\, a naval war also seems remote. \nIn sum\, war between the two countries is not very likely unless one or the other engages in highly provocative\, ill-judged behaviour – and even then\, with nuclear weapons and air power\, it would be very risky to go to war. I assume here that India will not seek to provoke war. My broad conclusion is that China also will avoid hostilities given the military challenges it will face. I have avoided saying anything about the larger developmental and geopolitical and diplomatic constraints on China\, but these would play an additional role in Chinese decision making. \nConclusion: Cooperation Between the Giants of Asia? \nIn conclusion\, let me address the question that serves as the title of this lecture: Can the giants of Asia cooperate? \nMy contention is that as far as the legacies of the past are concerned\, the two countries have tacitly or explicitly cooperated. India and China continue to very publicly negotiate over the border\, even as they have tacitly agreed to leave resolution of the problem to the future. For the most part\, both have resisted the temptation to get involved in each other’s domestic conflicts. Their divergence over Pakistan has narrowed and may narrow further – both worry about the future direction of Pakistani politics. \n I have argued that\, as far as the present is concerned\, there are four pillars of cooperation – border negotiations\, summits\, CBMs\, and trade. These have helped stabilize relations over the past two decades. They will be the substructure for stability and cooperation in the future. There is room for more cooperation in these areas\, particularly in respect of confidence building and trade. \n Finally\, I have suggested that there are challenges ahead – growing military power on both sides\, rising international ambitions\, and increasing demand for food\, water\, and energy – that could bring them into conflict. Yet\, none of these areas of competition quite adds up to unavoidable conflict. In addition\, war seems unlikely. Can India and China positively cooperate on food\, water\, and energy\, particularly the latter two? These are technical areas\, and it will take technical experts to say anything sensible about the nature of cooperation\, but clearly cooperation on water and energy will have to be embedded in a larger strategic understanding between India and China. \nHow will a larger strategic understanding and cooperation over a range of regional and international issues evolve? In all likelihood the four pillars I described earlier will not suffice. My colleague\, Professor Huang Jing\, has suggested that the time has come for a much larger\, more institutionalized device – an “Asian G-2” – with India and China in regular dialogue across a number of issues. As things stand\, they have three dialogues in addition to the summits and border negotiations: the Annual Security Dialogue; the Defence Consultations; and the Strategic Economic Dialogue. These could be steps towards a G-2 mechanism and serve as feeders into an annual G-2 summit\, but they do not amount to a G-2. \nA G-2 dialogue would consider not just bilateral but also international matters including the world economy\, climate change\, disasters\, proliferation\, transnational crime (e.g. high-seas piracy)\, terrorism\, Asian security\, and other challenges of the global commons. Essentially\, the dialogue would serve to map a course of cooperation in light of an agreed charter of key principles. Its purpose would be to set India-China relations in a bigger context. How India and China behave towards each other in the years ahead will depend on their internal politics\, the state of their economies\, relations with other major powers across the world\, regional involvements\, and policies on global issues. Put somewhat differently\, bilateral cooperation will depend on much larger strategic calculations. The two governments will have to ask themselves: should we cooperate with each other given all the other challenges that we face? They will have to carefully weigh the costs and benefits of bilateral cooperation/conflict against the many other threats as well as opportunities in front of them. This process of sober\, measured weighing up will be greatly helped by a regular institutional forum in which they consult and coordinate. An Asian G-2 will not be an alliance directed against any other powers or regional ventures. Nor will it derogate from other Asian institutions\, such as ASEAN\, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)\, APEC\, and EAS. It will certainly not be a condominium in Asian designed to run the affairs of the world’s largest continent. \nThe basis for cooperation between Asia’s giants exists. There is already a fair amount of cooperation. Cooperation in the future is not a given\, and the cooperative system in place today may not be sufficient for emerging challenges. India and China could do well to look at a wide-ranging\, institutionalized form of long-term cooperation. On this may depend the welfare of three billion people and the stability of Asia and international order. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/second-yb-chavan-memorial-lecture-india-and-china-can-the-giants-of-asia-cooperate CATEGORIES:LECTURES ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20111130T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20111130T053000 DTSTAMP:20261101T020754 CREATED:20231223T204543Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T131010Z UID:63244-1322631000-1322631000@idsa.in SUMMARY:Second YB Chavan Memorial Lecture - Remarks By Shri NN Vohra DESCRIPTION:Remarks by Shri NN Vohra after the Second YB Chavan Memorial Lecture delivered by Prof K. Bajpai \nDownload Event Booklet\nShri RD Pradhan and Shri Ajit Nimbalkar\, eminent representatives of the YB Chavan Prathishthan; Dr Arvind Gupta\, officiating Director General IDSA; Prof Kanti Bajpai; Cmdr Parmar; distinguished invitees\, ladies and gentlemen. At the outset\, I would like to compliment the YB Chavan Prathishthan and IDSA for organising valuable Lectures in the memory of the late Sh. Y. B. Chavan. I congratulate Prof. Bajpai for his excellent talk. \nAs many present in this auditorium would recall\, Shri YB Chavan was inducted into the Union Cabinet in the aftermath of the 1962 Sino-India conflict and given the most responsible\, and perhaps the most difficult assignment at that time. He was mandated to streamline the entire security apparatus and augment India’s defence preparedness so that the country would not have to face\, ever again\, such a humiliating situation. An area of Shri Chavan’s priority focus was the functioning of the Intelligence agencies\, and it was on his behest that an intelligence organization\, albeit a very small set-up\, called Special Services Bureau\, was established soon after his taking over charge as the Defence Minister. This Bureau\, to which I was inducted almost over night and deployed in the western Tibetan Sector\, was set up within the echelons of the North Block\, functioning under the direct surveillance of Sh. B. N. Mullick\, the then Director of the Intelligence Bureau. \nI had the fortune of working in two Ministries which Shri Chavan had steered. I worked for over 8 years in the Ministry of Defence and\, later\, in the Ministry of Home Affairs\, where I had further opportunities of seeing lasting evidence of Chavan Sahib’s mature consideration of vital issues relating to the country’s governance\, particularly Centre–State relations and effective management of Internal Security. It would not be out of place to recognize that one of the historical outcomes of Shri Chavan’s deep concern for issues relating to national security was the inception of IDSA. In this context it may also be recalled the valuable contribution made by the late Mr. K Subrahmanyam\, one of the founding fathers of IDSA\, who spent almost his entire career and later life in trying to build a corpus of thinking on security issues. \nToday\, we must pay tribute to this farsighted political leader\, the late Sh. Y. B. Chavan\, for his most outstanding contribution to the overhauling of the defence apparatus. India-China relations\, the theme of today’s talk\, was an issue of great concern for him. \nI compliment Prof Kanti Bajpai for his scholarly talk on “India and China: Can the Giants of Asia Cooperate?”\, for his objective analysis\, his fresh perspective on the present Sino-India relations and the likely future prospects. Needless to say\, both China and India are large\, populous and important countries and the nature of their future relationship\, which has been less than smooth in the years past\, would be of high significance. \nI recall my days in the Defence Ministry\, over two decades ago\, when we held regular meetings to discuss the India-China frontier related issues. Former DG\, IDSA\, N.S. Sisodia\, then Jt Secy Defence\, and A.K. Ghosh\, then Jt Fin Adviser (Defence)\, both of whom worked with me and are present here today\, were involved in many of these meetings. Discussions were also held under the rubric of the China Study Group and in the Core Group of Secretaries which comprised the Defence\, Home\, and External Affairs Secretaries and the Chiefs of internal and external Intelligence Agencies and invited experts like the DG\, ITBP and others. \nIn those days\, one of our concerns\, which cut across many security management discussions\, related to the identification of sources of supply of the weapons used by the subversive/militants elements in North-East\, Punjab\, and J&K. The reports of the Intelligence agencies brought out that most of the weapons and munitions\, used by varied subversive networks\, were of Chinese origin. Reports were also received about the progressive Chinese build up all around India’s frontiers. It was reported that the Chinese were establishing a military presence in Burma\, as then known\, and building a Naval Base along North Coco Islands to exercise surveillance on naval movements and maritime traffic across the Bay of Bengal; China was also reported to be providing varied support to Nepal\, including building of ring roads; doing various things in Bangladesh; providing military\, technical and other support to Pakistan to establish and run ordinance factories and so on. These were some of the worrying reports at that time. \nIndia’s foreign policy has consistently been to have friendly relations with all her neighbours and to work towards a peaceful and harmonious security environment in our region. Notwithstanding India’s peaceful policies it would not do to say that\, as a neighbour\, China has been duly sensitive to India’s concerns. I recall the first visit of an Indian Defence Minister to China\, 30 years after the Sino-India conflict. It was aimed at building trust and a better understanding of each other’s concerns and move towards developing peaceful relations. This visit provided an opportunity to also complain about what India thought was not fair and right on the part of China. The delegation accompanying the then Defence Minister had\, interalia\, prepared a statement which indicated the type and number of weapons\, munitions etc bearing Chinese markings which had been confiscated from varied insurgent/militant groups operating in India. In the meeting with the Chinese Prime Minister\, our Raksha Mantri conveyed India’s concern about the supply of Chinese weaponry to insurgent/militant groups in India. In response\, the Chinese Premier smilingly observed that China exports military equipments or provides free supplies to many countries with whom it has friendly relations and\, consequently\, a couple of thousand weapons found in Manipur\, Nagaland\, Punjab or elsewhere in India should be viewed in the correct perspective! He observed that this also indicated the far reaching popularity enjoyed by Chinese products!! When I murmured something to the Raksha Mantri\, the Chinese Premier said that\, for greater satisfaction\, I could have a separate meeting with Chairperson of the Military Commission\, a veteran Long March General who\, during a detailed discussion later in the day\, outrightly dismissed India’s concerns about China’s border build-up. While discussing the 1962 conflict\, he suddenly warmed up and said “didn’t we tell your friends in Moscow to advise you to stop fiddling around our frontiers. We sent you warnings months and months before the conflict but you people were not inclined to listen to Beijing!” \nIn the context of our prolonged negotiations with the Chinese\, with no outcome so far\, we need to be altogether clear and firm about our objectives and national interests. It would appear that the agreed Guiding Principles for the Resolution of the Boundary Dispute have the potential of leading to a mutually acceptable agreement. These Principles contain reference to “national sensitivities\,” “practical difficulties\,” “reasonable concerns\,” etc; these concepts can be leveraged to enable both sides to address the long standing problem and evolve a mutually acceptable understanding. \nI would\, however\, disagree with Prof Bajpai on the fine distinction sought to drawn between “transgression” and “intrusion”. All “transgressions” have the high risk of evolving into “intrusions”. In any case\, it is not possible to satisfy the affected population on our side with such an intellectual explanation. \nNotwithstanding Beijing’s reluctance to voice its views on Pakistan’s role in fostering terrorism\, which has wreaked havoc in our region\, it can be said that presently there is both growing awareness and concern about the potential of the China-Pak axis affecting regional peace and stability. The growing radicalization of Pakistan is cause for serious concern to India. India has remained of the consistent view that a stable and peaceful Pakistan and friendly relations with Pakistan and China and all our other neighbours\, would be in the best interest of regional peace and stability which\, in turn\, would contribute very significantly to promoting the welfare of the people of India and Pakistan and those living in all the countries in our neighbourhood. \nNeedless to say\, India will have to view the obtaining geo-political scenario with critical objectivity and weave her way\, through the various difficult paths\, to safeguarding her national security interests\, while remaining committed to maintaining peaceful and friendly relations with all her neighbours. \nI agree with Prof. Bajpai that\, in resolving the issues between our two countries\, a difficulty relates to the deficit of “political capital” on both sides. Both the countries face varied problems\, some of which are similar. Finding solutions to problems relating to water and energy scarcities have the potential of engendering both cooperation and conflict\, as both the countries would be competing for securing scarce resources virtually in the same arena. In regard to the severely competitive scenario relating to food\, water and energy\, it could be said that while these are potential arenas of likely future conflicts\, these could also be the areas of future cooperation and mutual benefit. We have roughly 40 million hectares more arable land than China and China enjoys proven salience in the application of highly productive agricultural technologies. The small size of our holdings and the technological wherewithal of the Chinese can pave the way for profitable bilateral cooperation and perhaps even joint ventures being taken up. Even in regard to the issue of water\, which is presently perhaps of much bigger concern for India than China\, cooperation between the two countries could be enormously beneficial\, as all the major rivers in the region originate from the Tibetan plateau. \nWe can perhaps also\, side by side\, enlarge and intensify CBMs to progressively move closer towards the final settlement of the boundary issue. Our leaders would need to evolve an approach which is harmonious with our declared foreign and defence policy objectives and also acceptable to all those who have so far been holding contrary positions. I would conclude by saying that India and China could make a historical contribution to the establishment of peace and prosperity by settling all contentious issues and establishing collaborative ventures in varied mutually beneficial arenas. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/second-yb-chavan-memorial-lecture-remarks-by-shri-nn-vohra CATEGORIES:LECTURES ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20111124T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20111124T053000 DTSTAMP:20261101T020754 CREATED:20231223T204544Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T131011Z UID:63248-1322112600-1322112600@idsa.in SUMMARY:Special Address - Shri M. Ganapathi\, Secretary(West)\, Ministry of External Affairs at the India-Africa Strategic Dialogue DESCRIPTION:Remarks by Shri M. Ganapathi\, Secretary(West)\, Ministry of External Affairs\nat the India-Africa Strategic Dialogue\norganised by Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA)\non November 24-25\, 2011\nActing Director General\, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses and my Distinguished colleague and friend Dr. Arvind Gupta\, Lal Bahadur Shastri Chair\, IDSA\nMs. Ruchita Beri\, Senior Research Associate\, IDSA\,\nMy senior colleagues former Ambassadors\nGeneral Satish Nambiar\nAmbassadors and Excellencies of the Diplomatic Corps\,\nDistinguished visitors from Africa\nDistinguished invitees\,\nFriends\, ladies and gentlemen\, \nI consider it great honour to be given the opportunity to participate in the inaugural session of this India-Africa Strategic Dialogue organised by the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA). IDSA has made a significant contribution in its role as India’s premier think tank on global strategic and security issues. The Institute\, since its inception in 1965\, has enriched the process of policy formulation in India as well as several Asian countries through its diverse array of activities and programme. I am particularly pleased to see that Institute has also focussed its attention towards the continent of Africa. \n2. Today’s Dialogue is particularly important. If the period till the 80’s of the last century was ruled by the Atlantic Ocean\, with the focus shifting towards the Asia Pacific Region from the mid-70’s\, then one could confidently foresay that the coming decades of the 21st century will belong to the Indian Ocean Region and Africa. This is an area of great strategic significance drawing the attention of every significant global player. \n3. In this context\, the Indian Ocean Rim-Association for Regional Cooperation assumes a particular importance. India has assumed the Chairmanship of this Association 10 days ago. This Organisation had been dormant thus far. It is our aim and intention to reinvigorate this Organisation to the larger good of the countries of the region and particularly Africa as a significant membership of this Association is drawn from the African continent. \n4. India’s partnership with the countries of Africa rests on a firm historical foundation of shared colonial past and similarity of post-Independence development experience. The Indian Independence struggle found a greater resonance after Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi went to South Africa and from there returned to India as Mahatma Gandhi. \n5. The presence of the Indian Diaspora in Africa could be seen to have commenced from Southern and Eastern Africa over 250 years ago with a larger number of its people moving towards that continent around 200 years ago. Last year\, we celebrated the 150th Anniversary of the presence of the Indian Diaspora in South Africa. Our identification with issues affecting Africa was evident when India even before it became independent imposed sanctions against the apartheid regime in South Africa. The AFRICA Fund further closely identified India with Africa’s struggle against colonialism and apartheid as the acronym AFRICA stood for Action For Resisting Imperialism\, Colonialism and Apartheid. This Fund\, in fact\, was crystallised in New Delhi in 1986. \nFriends\, Ladies and Gentlemen\, \n6. Ours association with Africa is marked by consultation\, responsiveness and mutual appreciation of each other’s capabilities and constraints. Today\, both India and her African partners realise that they are witnessing an extremely robust phase of their association. Africa is on the move as brought out in the McKenzie Report last year and as we see in the many data of the Mo Ibrahim Index. The new chapter that has been opened in the relationship between a resurgent Africa and a rapidly growing India is anchored in the fundamental principles of equality\, mutual respect and mutual benefit. While India and Africa have come a long way\, we both face daunting challenges of poverty\, hunger and disease. We have no doubt\, however\, that by working together\, India and Africa can set an example of fruitful cooperation in the developing world and naturally where there are challenges\, there are opportunities. \n7. India and the African countries\, through a deliberative mechanism spanning across several platforms\, have arrived at a model of cooperation where the selection of priority areas are being made in full consultation with the intended beneficiaries. Our vision of a partnership with Africa for the 21st Century goes beyond the already strong bilateral relationships and envisages closer cooperation with the African Regional Economic Communities (RECs) as well as the African Union. This new paradigm of cooperation is premised on Africa’s own aspirations for Pan-African institute and development programmes. The wide ranging cooperation and development partnerships between India and Africa encompasses\, amongst others\, the fields of human resources and institutional capacity building\, science & technology; agricultural productivity and food security; industrial growth; development in the health sector; infrastructure development; and Information and Communication Technology. \n8. This development of a three-tiered cooperation structure between India and Africa\, which began with the First India Africa Forum Summit in New Delhi in April 2008 was further reaffirmed at the Second Africa India Forum Summit in Addis Ababa in May 2011. This new framework takes into account Africa’s own aspirations for pan-African institutions and development programmes. The Delhi Declaration of 2008; the Addis Ababa Declaration of 2011; the Africa India Framework of Cooperation of 2008; and the Africa India Framework of Enhanced Cooperation of 2011 bear testimony to this fact. \n9. India’s partnership with Africa has been consultative\, responsive and focused on capacity building and human resource development. Under the rubric IAFS-I and II\, India would be establishing more than 100 capacity building institutions in Africa encompassing wide variety of fields. There is also a provision for 22\,000 scholarships for African students in various academic courses and training programmes including special scholarships focusing on agriculture sciences and fellowships for science and technology. We are confident that this paradigm of cooperation will continue so that we can contribute to the development of Africa’s own capacities for its progress. \n10. India-Africa partnership is also geared towards socio-economic transformation. India’s commercial engagement with Africa is primarily driven by the private sector and the recent years have witnessed a surge in Indian investment in Africa along with an impressive growth in our two-way trade. It is also encouraging to witness an increase in African exports to India\, and in this regard\, the Duty Free Tariff Preference Scheme announced by India for the Least Developed Countries has begun to bear fruit. \n11. The development of infrastructure is a priority for Africa. We are happy to be contributing to this end through the concessional lines of credit extended by us. Africa places a strong emphasis on augmentation of regional connectivity. In this context\, India is contributing towards establishing a new Ethio-Djibouti rail network through a line of credit worth US$ 300 million. The role of the private sector in the operationalisation of some of the letters of credit needs no emphasis. This has acquired prominence through the announcement of Lines of Credit to Africa at the two Forum Summits. Our Prime Minister had announced US$ 5.4 billion as Line of Credit in the First India Africa Forum Summit and an addition US$ 5 billion in this regard during the Second Africa India Forum Summit in Addis Ababa in 2011. \nLadies and gentlemen\, \n12. While there have been political engagement with Africa over the years\, emphasis\, however\, had moved towards economic interaction. There is a felt need for greater engagement between India and Africa on issues of a geo-strategic nature. \n13. India has always been keen to cooperate with Africa on issues of global security. An important example in this regard relates to India being at the forefront of the global efforts against piracy off the coast of Somalia. During the second Africa India Forum Summit in Addis Ababa in May this year\, our Prime Minister announced a contribution of US$ 2 million towards the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The Indian Navy has been extensively sailing the waters of the Indian Ocean providing for EEZ Surveillance and anti-piracy patrolling to some of the countries in Eastern and Southern Africa. \n14. In the area of Defence Cooperation\, the Indian Navy is extensively involved in the Indian Ocean region. The IBSAMAR was an important maritime activity involving the three IBSA countries of India\, Brazil and South Africa. India has carried out extensive hydrographic surveys for countries in the region. These have been beneficial for these countries helping them in their EEZ claims. \n15. Besides piracy\, another common threat facing India and Africa has been that of terrorism. The countries in Africa and India are naturally concerned over this menace. \n16. One important organisation which has played an important role between India and Africa has been the IBSA. This association bringing together India\, Brazil and South Africa has a crucial role not only globally but also in Africa where the IBSA Trust Fund has been used towards providing in the developmental activities of developing countries in the region. \n17. India fully acknowledges the support received from our African partners in getting us elected as the non-Permanent member of the UN Security Council for the period 2011-12. India has never shied away from assuming roles of responsibility when it comes to issues related to Africa in the global fora. \n18. Owing to their rising global politico-economic profile\, both India and Africa are justifiably expected to highlight the concerns of the developing world at various international fora. This shared responsibility calls for a greater understanding of each other and synchronization of our views and response to a variety of global issues that may have a direct bearing on the development prospects of our peoples. \n19. With these words\, I thank you for giving me the honour and privilege of participating in the inaugural event of your Dialogue. We in the Ministry of External Affairs would be happy to receive the suggestions emanating from the Conference towards factoring these in the Africa dimension of India’s foreign policy. I wish the Dialogue all success towards meaningful and productive deliberations over the next two days. \nThank you. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/special-address-shri-m-ganapathi-secretarywest-ministry-of-external-affairs-at-the-india-africa-strategic-dialogue CATEGORIES:LECTURES ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20111103T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20111103T053000 DTSTAMP:20261101T020754 CREATED:20231223T134707Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T131011Z UID:63195-1320298200-1320298200@idsa.in SUMMARY:National Strategy Lecture - Psychological Science\, Strategy and China’s Periphery DESCRIPTION:There is a strong case for strategists to be psychologists too\, as at a certain level they are involved in analysing the thought process of others and attempting to capture the behavioural framework in which those for whom the strategy is being formulated operate. This prescription to leaven strategic planning with insights from psychological science applies to strategists in general. For a member of the strategic community responsible for designing a roadmap for India’s international relations\, this interaction between strategy and psychology involves gaining a comprehensive\, in-depth and multi-spectral understanding of the various countries India engages with. \nAn agenda for applying a psychological science perspective to India’s strategic planning was the key thought of Mr. Ravi Bhoothalingam’s presentation at IDSA on November\, 3 2011. Mr. Bhoothalingam is the Founder and Chairman of Manas Advisory\, a consultancy practice focusing on leadership coaching and India-China business development. He is academically trained in Experimental Psychology and spent significant portions of his career at senior levels in the area of Human Resource Development and with hotels. Mr. Bhoothalingam is a regular speaker and writer on China and an advocate of ‘win-win’ India-China business partnerships based on complementarities in Indian and Chinese capabilities and ways of thinking. \nHis lecture did more than just explore a proposal for multidisciplinarity in the arena of strategic thinking; he embarked on putting some thoughts together in the area of strategy and psychology – an exercise which he describes as bringing together a ‘rather odd combination of subjects’ – and extended this concept to analyse India’s perception of China from a psychological science angle. \nIn his presentation\, Mr. Bhoothalingam attempted to capture the unique and profound relationship between psychological insights and India’s perception of China by breaking the complex research model into simple steps and employing an investigative logic. He initially focused on explaining the importance of establishing linkages between psychology and strategy; he then moved on to tease out the aspects of psychological science pertinent to the study at hand; lastly\, taking key insights from psychological science as a background\, he jointly explored three particular themes: How assertive is China?\, Chinese muscle flexing in the South China Sea and Tibet. He concluded with some thoughts and inferences on India. \nThe speaker observed that as China’s global presence increases\, it is important for India and the world at large to develop a greater understanding of China. The project of ‘getting China right’ bears heavily on India because of the historical experience of the 1962 Sino-Indian war and specific assertions describing the run up to 1962 as ‘a chain of misperceptions and misunderstandings’. There is a possibility that an alternative perspective would throw some fresh light on the causes of going to war and more broadly on how India and China then perceived each other. Mr. Bhoothalingam looked at the two words – ‘perception’ and ‘understanding’ – closely and commented on the inability of the current state of theories of International Relations to adequately and satisfactorily explain and predict state behaviour. \nHe suggested a new multidisciplinary model in which psychology and psychological science play a ‘primary’ role. ‘Primary’ since strategy and state behaviour are\, to some extent\, a function of human behaviour. Moreover\, failure to understand the psychology behind human behaviour will handicap our understanding of state behaviour. This proposal to concede some – if not a predominant – space to psychology in the strategic sphere is not a novel conception. The speaker here acknowledged the emphasis laid by the ‘grandfathers of strategy’ – Sun Tzu\, Kautilya and Plato – on how generals\, princes\, and guardians of state think. \nThe speaker brought out a number of key insights from several dimensions of psychological science by engaging with multiple factors that affect perception. Some of these central thoughts which were succinctly expressed by the speaker by using interesting illustrations during the course of the presentation include: \n\nThere is a difference between ‘what we see’\, ‘what we perceive’\, and ‘what is really there’.\nDuring uncertainties\, the brain tends to piece together bits and pieces of information. Sometimes this piecing together doesn’t always result in an exact portrayal of what the object is.\nAn important area in psychology is the concept of projection. This involves projecting on to somebody else the reason for your own behaviour.\nThe concept of ‘pattern completion’ wherein the brain can mislead by completing a pattern the wrong way.\nLanguage affects perception and thinking. Language and thoughts dynamically interact with each other. Two very different languages like Mandarin and Sanskrit\, because of their different structures\, can give rise to two radically different ways of thinking.\nFocusing illusion: Focusing very hard on something tends to an upward resetting of mental targets. As a result\, whoever’s behaviour is being evaluated usually falls short of the target. \n\nWith this background of psychology in mind\, Mr. Bhoothalingam delved into some of the most crucial questions facing India and the world vis-à-vis China’s growth and rise in the last 4-5 years. In exploring the theme of China’s assertiveness he used an innovative zoom-based approach. The effectiveness of this research method is best appreciated by dividing the various stages of analysis into steps. \nStep 1: India and the South Asian Region\nThe study zooms-in in its first stage and concentrates on China as an actor in the South Asian region with special focus on India. At this point\, the speaker presented a fairly exhaustive and gloomy list of India’s popular areas of disagreement with China: the ‘Airavat’ affair\, Arunachal Pradesh\, Tibet\, border issues\, river water diversions\, China’s String of Pearls strategy\, the Pakistan nexus\, and so on. The list does a good job in corroborating the proposition that a massive Chinese threat is operational in the purview of Sino-Indian relations. \nStep 2: The Global picture\nThe picture now zooms-out and the study looks at China’s role in global issues. On the issue of climate change\, China has generally backed India in the international platform. China has behaved in a reasonably responsible manner in the world financial system\, standing by the Asian region during the 1997 crisis; joining the WTO and agreeing to some very hard conditions; being a good keeper of conventions not only of the WTO but of most of the international systems\, agreements and commitments; China is a member of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and of Kyoto Protocol\, both of which USA is not. \nComing to East Asia\, China has played a very positive role in the Korean Peninsula\, though there is some unease vis-à-vis Japan and ASEAN. Overall\, this list certainly doesn’t look anywhere as scary as the earlier one. So zooming-out and looking at the picture from a different perspective certainly reveals a different scenario. \nStep 3: Temporal series over a period of time\nThe analysis now shifts from an area-based study to a temporal format. The speaker here looks at global perceptions of China as portrayed in some of the most notable books published corresponding to the following time brackets:\n1989- September 11\, 2001: What emerges is the picture of a unipolar world dominated by a triumphant US and a China so vulnerable that it was predicted it would topple over and collapse.\n9/11 – 2008: Landscape changed over the next 8 years with the US intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan. Two sets of question marks pervaded perceptions on China: firstly\, how permanent and sustainable is China’s rise?; and secondly\, what does it mean for India?\n2008 – 2011: Global moods changed drastically after the 2008 financial crisis and we see a reversal of trends wherein China’s profile is rising whereas US is under extreme stress. \nThe speaker goes on to say that while the US has usually chosen routes of either ‘attack’ or ‘isolation’ vis-à-vis its relations with countries like\, Libya\, Iraq\, Afghanistan\, Iran\, North Korea\, etc.\, China has generally kept its options open and opted for engagement. Putting all these insights together\, Mr. Bhoothalingam suggests a methodology of looking at the Chinese threat through lenses tempered by psychological insights. This would enable India to view a massive threat situation as fairly manageable. \nThe South China Sea exemplifies the highly contradictory nature of Chinese behaviour. While on one hand China is moving aggressively and claiming sovereignty\, on the other\, senior Chinese leaders are talking about peaceful coexistence and peaceful resolution of issues. The speaker here suggests not to be led by instinctive gut reactions and label China as indulging in deception by displaying contradictory behaviour. \nHe turns to psychology for testing out another hypothesis to explain China’s contradictory behaviour: the Approach Avoidance behaviour. This approach explains the attractiveness of what is being approached – the South China Sea- as the whole question of what is described by China as sovereignty. However\, what is detracting them is their general unpopularity and their reputation of getting into muscle bound situations with their neighbours. Mr. Bhoothalingam played with the possibility that ‘sovereignty’ here could be an overall code word for certain changes in the regime in the laws of the sea. He suggested that the South China Sea is not a critical issue\, rather a much more classical diplomatic issue with opportunities for India to negotiate. The speaker in this context invoked Mao’s saying of ‘the correct handling of contradictions’. \nMr. Bhoothalingam explained his decision to use the word ‘crisis’ in connection with Tibet by citing the interesting meaning of the word in the Mandarin language. The two characters that make up the word ‘crisis’ are present in two other words: ‘danger’ and ‘opportunity’. Thus\, for the Chinese\, crisis is a combination of danger and opportunity. \nThe speaker observes the crux of this situation as the oddity that Tibet should be a problem at all. He elaborates on his opinion by putting forward two strong arguments: firstly\, there is no governmental problem as far as Tibet is concerned as no government in the world has recognised Tibet as anything other than a part of China; secondly\, in terms of its geopolitical standing\, Tibet does not feature as an oil or gold provider. He therefore observes that\, to this extent\, the possibility of people getting in and controlling it physically are rather remote. But why is this ‘rather low key international priority’ being talked about then? \nThe speaker notes that this is because there is a widespread understanding that the people of Tibet are not being handled justly and the reasonable demands of the Dalai Lama are being brusquely brushed aside by the Chinese. Similarly\, on the Chinese side\, the main issue is one of complete incomprehension about what the so called religious freedom means. Moreover\, there is a great intertwining confusion between religious freedom and China’s nightmare associated with an alternate pole of power as represented by the Dalai Lama. An inability to disintertwine these areas has led to completely inauthentic positions both on the Tibetan and the Chinese side. \nMr. Bhoothalingam stresses that India\, with its strength of somewhat easy acceptance and merging of religious\, philosophical and governance traditions\, has important insights to offer here. In such a situation where both the Chinese and the Tibetans seem to be at a loss to reconcile civil power with some of the diffused areas of Buddhist religion and culture where hard nosed folks of the IR cohort do not want to tread\, India has an opportunity to discreetly but positively contribute for resolution of the Tibetan problem through the application of its knowledge. The speaker observes that once the Tibetan problem is resolved\, the sting of the border issue is taken away. \nMr. Bhoothalingam concluded his extremely insightful and thought provoking talk by offering three guiding pointers for India’s engagement with China: \n\nFirstly\, India’s China strategy has to take into account the existence of opposites\, complementaries and contradictions living together like yin and yang; \nSecondly\, India should focus on its ability to look at these contradictions in the correct perspective. Although there are short term contradictions\, there are long term patterns underlying this and India must be able to unravel these. \nThirdly\, India should not be paralyzed by the border issue and make Sino-Indian relations hostage to resolving the border issue. Multi-modal tracks of engagement should be applied to foster people-to-people ties and manage the border issue at the same time. Moreover\, real engagement requires moving beyond economic relations and trade\, it requires innovative ideas for a Sino-Indian grand project; there must be some drama in India-China relations.\n\nReport prepared by Bhavna Tripathy\, Research Intern at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/national-strategy-lecture-psychological-science-strategy-and-chinas-periphery CATEGORIES:LECTURES,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20111012T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20111012T053000 DTSTAMP:20261101T020754 CREATED:20231223T204643Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T131011Z UID:63251-1318397400-1318397400@idsa.in SUMMARY:Internal Security Lecture Series - Kashmir : The Present and The Future DESCRIPTION: URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/internal-security-lecture-series-kashmir-the-present-and-the-future CATEGORIES:LECTURES ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110926T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110926T053000 DTSTAMP:20261101T020754 CREATED:20231223T204643Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T131011Z UID:63252-1317015000-1317015000@idsa.in SUMMARY:Internal Security Lecture Series - Manipur : The Way Out DESCRIPTION:September 26\, 2011 URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/internal-security-lecture-series-manipur-the-way-out CATEGORIES:LECTURES ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR