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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101111T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101111T053000
DTSTAMP:20261109T212546
CREATED:20231223T205143Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T131012Z
UID:63274-1289453400-1289453400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Special Address -  45th IDSA Foundation Day Lecture
DESCRIPTION:Venue: IDSA Auditorium \n \nShri A K Antony\, Hon’ble Raksha Mantri & President IDSA will deliver the Presidential Address & Present Awards \nDr Kaushik Basu\, Chief Economic Adviser\, Government of India will deliver the Foundation Day Lecture on Game Theory and Strategic Foreign Policy \nProgramme\n1100 hrs: Arrival of Hon’ble Raksha Mantri and President\, IDSA1102 hrs: Presentation of Bouquets1105 hrs: Opening Remarks: Shri Narendra Sisodia\, Director General\, IDSA1110 hrs: Foundation Day Lecture: Dr. Kaushik Basu1140 hrs: Presidential address and Presentation of Awards: Shri A K Antony\, Hon’ble Raksha Mantri1157 hrs: Vote of Thanks: Dr. Arvind Gupta\, LBS Chair\, IDSA1200 hrs: Refreshments \n\n \n\nDr. Kaushik Basu giving Foundation Day Lecture\n \n\nShri A K Antony\, Hon’ble Raksha Mantri presenting K Subrahmanyam Award to Dr Srikanth Kondapalli\n \n\nShri A K Antony\, Hon’ble Raksha Mantri giving Presidential address
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/special-address-45th-idsa-foundation-day-lecture
CATEGORIES:LECTURES
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101115T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101115T053000
DTSTAMP:20261109T212546
CREATED:20231223T205043Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T131012Z
UID:63270-1289799000-1289799000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Special Address - Dr. Lora Saalman on China and India: Divergence\, Similarity and Symmetry in Security Concerns
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Lora Saalman\, a Beijing-based associate in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace\, has focused her research on Chinese nuclear weapon and nonproliferation policies and Sino-Indian strategic relations. Her presentation at the IDSA focused on the convergence and divergence of Chinese and Indian security concerns in land-based\, naval\, aerospace and nuclear arenas\, with findings derived from extensive textual research and interviews with the academic\, scientific and military communities in both China and India.  \nThe talk centered mainly on security concerns between India and China\, derived from both quantitative and qualitative analysis based on perceptions of India within China\, and vice versa\, and how they have changed over the period from 1991 to 2009. Dr. Saalman found that over time\, the trend line curved upwards on a quantitative scale\, peaking in 2001 during President Bill Clinton’s visit to India\, and the lifting of the 1998 nuclear-test sanctions in 2001\, and again in 2005\, on the announcement of the US-India nuclear deal. Conclusively\, there has been a definite increase in interest in India within China.  \nIn analyzing and comparing content from Chinese and Indian security journals\, there has been a strong interest in China within India\, whereas in Chinese security journals\, the focus has been mainly on two areas – naval concerns within China pertaining to India\, and on the air force. These are also the two arenas in which some Chinese specialists feel India can be comparable or even surpass China in the future. Dr. Saalman’s research separates out three distinct areas of research and analysts in both countries – the military strategists\, the scientists\, and the academics.  \nIn terms of divergence\, it was observed that military strategists in China and India tended to focus on two areas\, namely the navy and the army. Separately\, in China\, there was much more focus on Indian naval developments\, aircraft carriers\, and nuclear submarines (that may give India second strike capabilities in the future)\, whereas in India\, attention was centered on land-based systems on the borders. It was noted that on the Indian side\, there has also been much focus on Chinese cooperation on missiles and weapons technology\, mainly with Pakistan\, while Chinese concerns revolve around the ability of Indian forces to gain military training and engage in military and maritime exercises.  \nIn analyzing gathered data\, Dr Saalman applied social psychology theory to attempt to supplement her analysis of Indian and Chinese perceptions of each other. The theories and ideas used included:\n1. Social Identity – China is an army power from the Indian standpoint\, while the Chinese view India as an ocean power (with Chinese threat perceptions being based on Indian Ocean control\, and Indo-US joint exercises). \n2. Overconfidence Phenomenon and Victim Mentality – China is seen as being on the overconfident side and India in the latter category\, with respect to what it faced during the 1962 border conflict with China. \n3. Hidden and Expressed Attitudes – China’s conspicuous focus on the Indian navy is more of a hidden concern\, and not expressed as much in public\, while in India\, many military and naval officers were found to be dismissive of ideas such as the String of Pearls concept\, or future conflict. Also\, secondhand bias plays a key role in the interaction between the two countries – research work on both sides has relied to a great extent on US analyses of developments between China and India.  \n4. Fundamental Attribution Error – Actors tend to externalize their motivations for events\, while attributing others’ similar actions to innate causes. In applying this to the case at hand\, on acquiring (for example) aircraft carriers or nuclear submarines\, though both countries pursue this\, each side would attribute the others’ action to arrogance and the drive to be a regional hegemon.  \n5. Relative Deprivation – Both countries’ dependence (up until sanctions on India were lifted) on Russian and Israeli imports resulted in indigenization and reverse engineering. \n6. Realistic Group Conflict theory – This applies well to the Indian Ocean situation; with limited resources\, the chances for future conflict grow.  \nIn linking these perceptions to practice\, Dr Saalman proposed recommendations that recognize there is less asymmetry at sea than at the border\, particularly given the challenges of distance\, shipping and the U.S. role that China faces. As such\, stronger cooperation between the two countries in the naval realm may be possible. She suggested this could take many forms\, including establishing a regularized forum for security cooperation\, energy shipments\, and tsunami relief\, or greater engagement in a sea-based version of “Hand-in-Hand” military exercises to confront mutual concerns on piracy.  \nSimilarities between the two countries converge on the areas of aviation and aerospace. Some Chinese technical journals for instance were found to contain miscellaneous references to developments in Indian systems. Dr Saalman also pointed out the use of slogans by China\, such as “Great Power Dream” when referring to India – the idea that India in making pursuits towards the future in terms of military modernization is aiming towards becoming a great power.  \nIn terms of perception\, China has in the past evaluated India’s actions at the border from a very instrumental view. But increasingly\, India’s role at the border is being seen as tending towards heightened militarization\, drawing hostile rhetoric from China on what India’s future intentions are. Dr Saalman also emphasized that though it is not admitted\, both sides have regularly engaged in behaviour that has escalatory potential. But it is important to note that\, on the technical side there has been cooperation between China and India\, as seen in 2002 and 2006 in the space arena.  \nHowever\, most of this cooperation has been in the form of MOUs\, and have lacked any concrete measures. She noted that there are many other areas of potential cooperation between the two countries. Keeping in mind the sensitivities in this relationship\, Dr Saalman recommended joint studies and discussions on air power\, space power\, space policy dialogue\, space navigation\, and non-interference rules for satellites\, some of which occur between the United States and China on a regular basis.  \nOn the role of academic analysts in both countries\, Dr Saalman’s study inferred that both sides predominantly focus on nuclear issues. There is most symmetry in the overarching attention paid to nuclear issues in the two academic communities. On the Chinese side\, the US-India strategic relationship is given recurring attention. On the Indian side\, the issue of nuclear status stood out – the idea that China had conferred upon it early on that it is a nuclear power\, a status that had been denied to India\, tying into the concept of relative deprivation mentioned earlier.  \nDr Saalman also stressed the importance of interaction on definitions of technical terms relating especially to nuclear arsenals\, nuclear energy or nuclear security. She recommended the possibility of adoption of a joint glossary by China and India\, much like the one established for use by Chinese and US scientists and experts. In drawing an analogy with the US-Soviet relationship\, she pointed out that the most engagement between the two countries took place at times of increasing hostilities. Peaking tensions are fertile ground for confidence building and arms control measures to be adopted. \nThe speaker hoped that the takeaway from the talk was that “perceptions can often trump reality”. The Chinese side has for too long being dismissive of Indian threat assessments\, whereas India has had a tendency to be too dismissive of China’s legitimate interests. Also\, there is an academic\, science and military imbalance. In engaging with each other\, there tends to be a schism caused by the varied backgrounds that participants in dialogue come from\, with the Indian side usually consisting of more people from military backgrounds\, while the Chinese side is composed mainly of academics. The recommendation here is to initiate more military to military\, scientists to scientists\, and academic to academic meetings\, to facilitate better understanding.  \nWith respect to dialogue on the Track 1\, Track 1.5 and Track 2 levels\, Dr Saalman pointed out that although there is a significant amount of Track 1 negotiations between China and India\, in agreement with general perception\, the bilateral relationship can gain much more from engagements on the Track 1.5 and Track 2 levels as well (possibly in the form of multilevel\, multilateral forums and negotiation simulations\, as has been done with the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP)). This can contribute largely to reducing second hand bias\, and more importantly\, initiate practice and engagement between China and India. \nMr. Sisodia concluded Dr. Saalman’s extremely insightful presentation by observing that the study is an apt example of academic research being able to deliver policy implications as well – an encouraging reminder to the IDSA research community. He noted that there is significant practical value in this study in terms of managing India’s relationship with China\, and potential future discussions could also touch upon the impact of the strengthening Indo-US partnership on Indo-Chinese relations.  \nReport prepared by Princy Marin George\, Research Assistant\, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/special-address-dr-lora-saalman-on-china-and-india-divergence-similarity-and-symmetry-in-security-concerns
CATEGORIES:LECTURES,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101116T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101116T053000
DTSTAMP:20261109T212546
CREATED:20231223T205043Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T131012Z
UID:63271-1289885400-1289885400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Special Address - Role of Small countries in a Globalised World
DESCRIPTION:Venue: Seminar Hall-ISpeaker: Minister Dr. Aurelia Frick\, Minister of Justice\, Foreign Affairs and Cultural Affairs (Liechtenstein)Chair: Ms. Smita Purushottam \n \nDr. Aurelia Frick is one of the current cabinet ministers of the Liechtenstein government that was elected in the March 2009 Parliamentary elections. She currently holds the portfolio of Ministries of Justice\, Foreign Affairs and Cultural Affairs. Her presentation at the IDSA was on the role of small countries in a globalised world\, by focussing on Liechtenstein as an exemple. \nTo give a better insight into how small countries add value to the international community\, Dr. Frick began with a brief introduction about Liechtenstein. The independent principality of Liechtenstein is located in central Europe and bordered on the east by Austria and on the south\, west\, and north by Switzerland. Along with Uzbekistan in Central Asia\, Liechtenstein is one of the only two doubly landlocked countries in the world (bounded by other land-locked countries only). It is the fourth smallest country in the world\, with a total area of only 160 square kilometres\, inhabited currently by a population of 36\,000. Despite being small in area and population\, it has succeeded in political and economic spheres\, among others.  \nDr. Frick explained as to why Liechtenstein has done well. First of all\, she said\, Liechtenstein has high political stability and a continuing political system. Despite its move from a complete hereditary constitutional monarchy to a parliamentary system with a constitutional monarch (called the Prince)\, the transition has been smooth. They have struck a good balance between the constitutional monarchy and the parliamentary system\, wherein the Prince acts as a stabilising and mediating factor thus contributing to political stability. The Prince deals with foreign relations and one of the successful efforts was Liechtenstein’s successful entry as a member state of the UN in 1990.  \nApart from being only known for stamps\, castles\, and as a tax haven\, Dr. Frick highlighted that Liechtenstein has high culture and a strong industry sector. It has developed a prosperous\, highly industrialized free-enterprise economy and boasts a financial service sector as well as a living standard which compares favourably with those of the urban areas of Liechtenstein’s large European neighbours. In India itself Liechtenstein industries have created 800 jobs. They provide annually 33\,000 jobs within their country\, of whom 17\,000 are foreigners commuting into Liechtenstein. She drove home the point as to how a small country plays a significant role in the world by stating that a country with 36\,000 people provides for 60\,000 jobs worldwide.  \nDr. Frick emphasised the fact that Liechtenstein industries focus primarily on producing high-tech or niche products. Their success in this field is also due to the fact that industries invest 8 per cent in research and development. Liechtenstein has carved a niche for itself in the world economy as a small-scale producer of precision manufactures like optical lenses\, dental products\, high-vacuum pumps\, heating equipment\, electron microscopes\, electronic measuring and control devices\, steel bolts\, knitting machines\, and textiles. These industries are all export based. Other important industries are in pharmaceuticals\, electronics\, ceramics\, and metal manufacturing. The largest industrial companies in Liechtenstein are Hilti (construction services)\, Balzers (electro-optical coatings)\, Hilcona (frozen foods)\, and Ivoclar-Vivadent (dental medical technology). Around 48 per cent of the labour force is engaged in industry\, trade\, and construction. Industry contributes 39 per cent of the GDP\, with 42.2 per cent of the total workforce; financial services 31 per cent of GDP with 17 per cent of the total workforce; and general services 23 per cent of GDP with 38.9 per cent of the total workforce. \nIn terms of being an offshore financial centre\, the Liechtenstein Declaration commits to global standards as developed by the OECD and steps up its participation in international efforts to counteract non-compliance with foreign tax laws. During the recent economic crisis\, Liechtenstein did not face major problems in its economic performance. For instance\, its banks did not need state support.  Liechtenstein has very low unemployment\, i.e.\, 2.5 per cent\, which rose up to only 3.5 per cent during the recent economic crisis. Here\, Dr. Frick said that\, free trade agreements came in the way of the catastrophe. So she emphasised the need to have free trade agreements with other states. Liechtenstein has 22 agreements in this respect. Also\, as Liechtenstein has a small domestic market\, it depends on exports and relies on clients from foreign markets. Therefore it joined EFTA in 1991 and the European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement in 1995 to achieve its economic objectives. \nWith regard to foreign relations\, Dr. Frick stressed that Liechtenstein aims to build good and peaceful relations with other countries\, while maintaining its sovereignty. It endeavours to enhance relations with strong and visible partners\, like India. In this regard\, Liechtenstein (as part of EFTA – European Free Trade Association) had participated in the fifth round of India-EFTA broad based Trade and Investment Agreement ministerial negotiations. It is a member of important international organizations like the UN\, OSCE\, EFTA\, WTO\, and ICC. It has always maintained friendly relations with Switzerland. In 1924\, the Customs Treaty between Liechtenstein and Switzerland entered into force wherein the Swiss franc was adopted as the official currency as it was considered a strong currency for Lichtenstein’s economy.  \nOn a multi-lateral platform Liechtenstein focuses on core areas. Dr. Frick illustrated this point by saying that Liechtenstein is a strong supporter of the International Criminal Court and thus takes a very active role in the Assembly of States Parties of the ICC. Ambassador Wenaweser served as the Chairman of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression\, which was mandated to develop proposals for a definition of the crime of aggression. Thus in this manner\, it seeks to and works for small core or niche areas in order to be visible within international platforms. And so in its small way it wants to bring equilibrium to international security.  \nMs. Smita Purushottam concluded by commending Dr. Frick’s extremely insightful presentation by explaining how small countries play significant roles in the world through the example of Liechtenstein. She ended on the note that Lichtenstein has indeed created not only a niche in manufacturing industries\, but also a niche and important link in world politics.  \nReport prepared by Joyce Sabina Lobo\, Research Assistant\, IDSA
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/special-address-role-of-small-countries-in-a-globalised-world
CATEGORIES:LECTURES,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101122T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101122T053000
DTSTAMP:20261109T212546
CREATED:20231223T204944Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250305T072014Z
UID:63267-1290403800-1290403800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Inaugural Y.B. Chavan Memorial Lecture - The Great Power Game: India in the New World - Professor Sunil Khilnani
DESCRIPTION:Lecture delivered by: Professor Sunil Khilnani \nTopic: The Great Power Game: India in the New World \nSpeakers: Cdr. S.S. Parmar\, Mr. R.D. Pradhan\, Mr. N.S. Sisodia\, Mr. K. Subrahmanyam \nIDSA in collaboration with Yashwantrao Chavan Pratishthan (Mumbai) hosted the inaugural lecture in memory of Mr. Y. B. Chavan on 22 November 2010. Professor Sunil Khilnani delivered the special lecture on The Great Power Game: India in the New World. The Institute was privileged on the occasion by the presence of Mr. K. Subrahmanyam\, Mr. R. D. Pradhan\, and Mr. Ajit Nimbalkar from the Yashwantrao Chavan Pratishthan at the inaugural Y. B. Chavan Memorial Lecture.\nThe Y.B. Chavan memorial lecture has special significance for the Institute keeping in view that Mr. Chavan was the founding President and patron of IDSA. \nBrief Overview\nMr. Y.B. Chavan was born in the state of Maharashtra on March 12\, 1913. He spent many years in jail as a freedom fighter and played a major role in the 1942 Quit India movement. Following India’s independence\, he was appointed Parliamentary Secretary in 1946 and rose to become Chief Minister of the bi-lingual State of Bombay. In 1960\, he became the first Chief Minister of the newly created state of Maharashtra. He was requested by the then Prime Minister Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru to become the Defence Minister in 1962. Subsequently\, he held the offices of Union Home Minister from 1966 to 1970\, Union Finance Minister from 1970 and Foreign Minister from 1974 to 1977. He was also the Chairman of the 8th Finance Commission. In memory of Mr. Chavan\, the Yashwantrao Chavan Pratishtan has given a corpus to the IDSA to hold an annual eminent persons’ lecture series. \nInaugural Remarks by Mr. N.S. Sisodia\nMr. N.S. Sisodia\, Director General IDSA\, in his opening remarks pointed out that Mr. K. Subrahmanyam’s perseverance to honour Mr. Y. B. Chavan led to the Trust granting an endowment enabling IDSA to institute the eminent persons’ lecture series\, with significant support from Mr. R. D. Pradhan and Mr. Ajit Nimbalkar who is on the Trust Board. Mr. Chavan is remembered as a multifaceted personality\, who was not only an eminent freedom fighter but also a visionary defence minister and an intellectual of a certain merit and repute. Most importantly\, the Director General observed that Mr. Chavan\, along with others who were closely associated with the founding of the Institute\, was remarkable in his awareness of the value of promoting independent thinking within a government funded institution; the primary objective of the functioning of such an institution should be to provide an alternative or critical view\, in order that the government’s policy making process is enriched and informed. A large part of the reputation that the IDSA holds today can be traced back to Mr. Chavan’s championing of the autonomy of the institute in its formative years. \nRemarks by Mr. R. D. Pradhan\nMr. R. D. Pradhan shared with the guests his interactions with Mr. Chavan and how the birth of the IDSA was initiated. He expressed his delight at the journey that IDSA has made over the past 45 years. He conveyed his best wishes to all the Trustees\, including the Chairman\, Mr. Sharad Pawar\, and also his gratitude to IDSA for organizing the lecture. He expressed the hope that IDSA would continue the tradition of holding this lecture annually\, and his appreciation to Professor Khilnani for delivering the lecture and to all those who were in attendance at this event. \nY.B. Chavan Memorial Lecture: Professor Sunil Khilnani\nProfessor Sunil Khilnani\, Starr Foundation Professor\, Director of the South Asia Studies Program at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies\, the Johns Hopkins University\, and author of the widely acclaimed book The Idea of India\, delivered the inaugural Y. B. Chavan memorial lecture at the IDSA on The Great Power Game: India in the New World. The primary question that Professor Khilnani proposed to address in the lecture centred on his views on a realistic future for India – Is India likely to become a major power in the next few decades? What kind of role should India aspire to in the changing power game of a globalized world? What would India’s actions mean both for India and the world? \nIn the last two decades\, India has been on a rapid economic rise\, with its relative lack of dependence on exports and a highly regulated financial system moderating the effects of the global economic recession. Professor Khilnani noted that although India’s business and political elites see economic performance as forming the core of the country’s global identity\, this growth has unevenly affected Indian society\, causing widening social and regional inequalities\, and creating political tensions. This newfound and growing self-confidence is pursuant to the fact that India’s international ambitions have always been exceptionally immodest\, and derived not only from the nation’s vast human scale and civilizational depth\, but also from a deeply held political vision that views India’s future as being shaped by the legitimacy of its choices and actions. In his analysis\, modern India has viewed itself above all as a political project that struggled to realize itself through human skill and judgment\, rather than assuring its future by entrusting itself to economic or military prowess\, to an ideology or to historical providentialism. Tagore\, Gandhi\, and Nehru’s long-term vision for India\, Professor Khilnani pointed out\, embodied the German historian Reinhart Koselleck’s idea of ‘imagined futures’ – their sense of India’s present\, and of the past causalities that had created the present\, which in turn was shaped by what they believed India’s future would look like. Even if this vision of India’s future differs from the one imagined today\, in Professor Khilnani’s belief\, there would still be elements of past conceptions on India’s future that have force and relevance. \nThe United States\, Europe and China as players in the Great Power Game\nIn analyzing the role of the United States (US) in this power game\, Professor Khilnani noted that the increasing US attention to India is reflective more of an American realization of the fragility of Western power rather than American hopes for India. Indeed\, much of the US’ current valuation of India relates mostly to the volatility of the issues faced by Pakistan\, and to China’s rise to superpower status. India is thus seen as a counter-China; being a democratic\, educated\, technologically smart and entrepreneurial country with an English speaking elite\, India is seen by the US as the more persuadable\, more amenable partner. In the larger frame of the power game\, America’s stance as a great power is unlike that of\, for example\, Britain at its imperial eminence – the US is dependent on less powerful states to sustain its economic prosperity; it imports goods\, capital and people to maintain economic momentum. Of significance here is that this interdependence (that is increasingly becoming a characteristic of modern forms of power) hinges on mutual confidence\, trust and consequently\, legitimacy – in Professor Khilnani’s words\, the capacity to sustain belief not just within but across borders. The US’ projects in Iraq and Afghanistan have forced it to delve into a damage-repair mode\, but\, he noted\, the projection of great power\, and the urge to dominate that it requires\, continues to form the core of America’s global identity. \nNo longer the central arena of the great power game\, Europe is seen as confused and uncommitted on questions of security. With its inward-focused\, conservative and protectionist stance\, Professor Khilnani predicts that\, Europe will be hampered from playing as important a role as it could have otherwise. It has been slow in realizing the changing nature of power in the rest of the world\, and how the ‘theatre of the great power game’ has moved away from Europe\, and into Asia. \nThis shift has been ensured by China’s economic rise. Professor Khilnani noted that this rise has been based on profound economic integration with the rest of the world\, and particularly with the US. Also possessing the largest military in the world\, and the second largest defence budget\, China poses a deep conundrum for the world\, especially for America. But even as the US works to maintain its engagement with China\, the American defence establishment has been attempting to coax India into acting as a buffer against China. He pointed out that with Japan’s stagnation and inability to give its enormous wealth any real meaning in the global arena\, India has acquired new importance for the US. India shares America’s uncertainty about China on the economic and military fronts; moreover\, China is also spreading its influence among India’s neighbours. Dr. Khilnani emphasized that even as India’s relationship with the US strengthens\, it is crucial for the country to ensure its capacity for independent political judgment – a feat China has already demonstrated. A possible prescription for Indian policy makers\, that Professor Khilnani identified\, is that the pattern of aligning temporarily according to shifting global and regional interests rather than forming stable and permanent alliances is likely to persist; his belief is that it would not be in India’s interests to be drafted into US contingency plans against China. \nIndia and its neighbours in the Great Power Game\nProfessor Khilnani also pointed out that India’s geographical location places it in the middle of the world’s most menacing regional environment. Internal conflicts in countries like Nepal\, Sri Lanka\, Burma and Bangladesh pervade India’s own domestic security\, threatening its political and social peace\, in addition to its economic prospects. Most importantly\, in imagining its own future\, he believes that India needs to consider Pakistan’s future as well. The results of the American response to Pakistan’s instability has been disastrous not just for Pakistan but for India as well. Professor Khilnani proposes that India will need to devise a more creative approach to engaging with Pakistan on its own terms; the alternative for India would be to suffer the vagaries of other powers’ policies. \nAfghanistan is the other front on which India needs to adopt independent action. This becomes a pressing need when taken into account that neither the US nor the Europeans have clear or deliverable plans for an exit strategy for Afghanistan. Regional stability is crucial for India to maintain its growth path; a return to the 1990s when Afghanistan became a marshalling ground for violence against India would spell an exacerbation of wider regional insecurity for India. Professor Khilnani suggested that the depth of the crises in these neighbouring societies impedes Indian intervention in resolving the crises\, but it will not be able to take a disengaged stance either (as it did\, for example\, during the power games of the Cold War). India’s mitigation of these battles will determine its own national course. \nIndia’s stakes in the Great Power Game\nProfessor Khilnani pointed out that India has more options now than it once had to decide what kind of power to pursue. In the years following India’s independence\, India devised an alternative definition of power – a negative conception\, in Nehru’s words. This definition was a stance of resistance based on Gandhi’s conviction that apparent weakness could transmute into strength. Nehru turned this strategy (with which India fought down the world’s largest empire) into a principle for international policy. Professor Khilnani believes that Nehru’s strategy was not purely idealistic (or ineffective)\, but was rooted in a realistic assessment of India’s weakness; indeed\, it enabled India to achieve a degree of autonomy and of audibility that was considerable relative to both its own meagre resources\, and to the constrained circumstances of a polarized world. Although India now has the opportunity to enhance its military power (drawing from its rising economic profile)\, he suggested that India will not be able to mimic conventional Western power in military or economic terms. India neither can nor should allow the type of military power it will need to secure itself regionally\, nor its rising economic profile\, to determine the larger power it seeks. \nProfessor Khilnani takes the view that India will be an unusual\, awkwardly shaped global actor – it will have a relatively wealthy state but that state will preside over a predominantly poor citizenry. He noted that in the past\, poor populations generally had poor states\, whose claims could be dismissed by richer\, more powerful states; with the emergence now of China and India\, very large populations are becoming significant world actors\, through their representatives (although selected in diametrically opposite ways). Professor Khilnani pointed out at least two areas where India can leverage its growing global clout – one is to inject the interests of the poor into international negotiations\, and the second\, in matters of international trade\, access to natural resources\, and the environmental effects of economic growth\, to attempt to work out a more inclusive globalization. In this respect\, India is now well positioned to disrupt the status quo. Professor Khilnani’s emphasis lies on his belief that the old approach – the negative power\, of refusal – will no longer do. The global climate change negotiations at Copenhagen was a chance\, in his view\, to demonstrate India’s ‘most prudent future formulation of power’; though India will not be a superpower very soon in terms of military or economic bulk\, its legitimacy in the eyes of the world is a form of power in itself. He stressed that if India desires to have an impact on the international system\, it must take advantage of the mixed character of its own power\, in order to combine force and legitimacy into a new conception. Does the India of today have to exert to even stay relevant\, owing to its search for historical signposts to becoming a global power? In addressing such a question\, Professor Khilnani observed that there are no examples of the kind of role India can play\, but by drawing on its experiences\, India could invent a role for itself; part of what it takes to be a great power is the capacity to redefine what power and greatness are (as Gandhi did for another era)\, rather than only conforming to existing definitions. \nProfessor Khilnani’s assessment is that confronting all the challenges facing India will require the country to develop complicated positions and flexible practices. On contemporary issues and debates\, India would find itself well placed to be a ‘bridging’ power. For example\, its position between the US and China would allow it to play not a balancing-power role but a bridging one. Also\, in addressing increasing security issues as a result of multiple terrorist attacks\, although this is a concern India shares with Western states\, it has refused to see the rhetoric of Islam as an existential threat – this is a significant position to bridge the so-called “clash of civilizations”\, helping to connect Muslim and non-Muslim societies. Most significantly\, Professor Khilnani noted that India sees democracy not as the ‘providential destiny of all human history’\, but as a complicated\, fragile experiment\, that can possibly act as a bridge through which other societies can figure out their freedom and move towards it. He hoped that the conception he left from this address is a realistic recognition of the persistence of division and conflict\, while also adopting a realist assessment of the limits to the utility of force or of economic progress in itself to resolve these; above all\, this conception trusts in human political skills\, wit and judgment. \nRemarks by Mr. K. Subrahmanyam\nIn his closing remarks\, Mr. Subrahmanyam stated that he saw this event as a thanksgiving to Mr. Y.B. Chavan. He pointed out Mr. Chavan’s role in developing the think tank culture in India\, in addition to contributing not only to the founding of the institute\, but also in defending the autonomy of the IDSA. Mr. Subrahmanyam also elaborated on the significance of Professor Khilnani’s ideas\, particularly in their application to issues that contemporary India faces. He emphasized that if India would only eliminate its poverty and its illiteracy\, and if the two legislations that are under consideration in India – the right to education and the right to food security – were implemented\, he could imagine an India that would be an example of incomparable quality to the world. He also proposed the significance of establishing strategic partnerships with countries that are of importance to India\, with Indonesia being a key example – it is the largest Islamic state which is pluralistic and secular. In pointing out that there is a need to think through strategic issues using different paradigms\, Mr. Subrahmanyam noted that the threat posed by China’s rise to the United States for example would come not from the Chinese army but from China’s growing science and technology sector. He also noted that the only reservoir of talent that the United States can realistically tap into would be the English-speaking\, democratic India; thus\, the power that lies in an educated and food-secure population cannot be overemphasized. \nVote of Thanks\nCdr. S.S. Parmar concluded this stimulating discussion by thanking all the speakers for this opportunity to share their ideas and thoughts. \nReport prepared by Princy Marin George\, Research Assistant at IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/inaugural-y-b-chavan-memorial-lecture-the-great-power-game-india-in-the-new-world-professor-sunil-khilnani
CATEGORIES:LECTURES,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101122T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101122T053000
DTSTAMP:20261109T212546
CREATED:20231223T205043Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T131012Z
UID:63273-1290403800-1290403800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Inaugural Y.B. Chavan Memorial Lecture - The Great Power Game : India in the New World
DESCRIPTION:Speaker: Dr Sunil Khilnani\, Starr Foundation Professor\, Director of the South Asia Studies Program at the Paul H Nitze School of Advanced International Studies\, John Hopkins UniversityVenue: IDSA Auditorium \nProgramme\n1630 – 1635: Welcome Address by DG \n1635 – 1640: Address by Shri K Subrahmanyam \n1640 – 1645: Address by representative of Yashwantrao Chavan Pratishthan Mumbai \n1645 – 1730: Talk by Prof Sunil Khilnani on “The Great Power Game : India in the New World” \n1730 – 1800: Question and Answer Session. \nRefreshments
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/inaugural-y-b-chavan-memorial-lecture-the-great-power-game-india-in-the-new-world
CATEGORIES:LECTURES
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101123T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101123T053000
DTSTAMP:20261109T212546
CREATED:20231223T205043Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T131012Z
UID:63272-1290490200-1290490200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Special Address - Talk by Shri Mani Shankar Aiyar on Obama\, Rajiv and the Bomb
DESCRIPTION:Venue: Seminar Hall-I \nSpeaker: Shri Mani Shankar Aiyar\, former Union Minister for the Development of the North-Eastern Region and currently Honourable Member of Parliament\, Rajya Sabha
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/special-address-talk-by-shri-mani-shankar-aiyar-on-obama-rajiv-and-the-bomb
CATEGORIES:LECTURES
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