BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//MP-IDSA - ECPv6.15.12.2//NONSGML v1.0//EN CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH X-WR-CALNAME:MP-IDSA X-ORIGINAL-URL:https://idsa.in X-WR-CALDESC:Events for MP-IDSA REFRESH-INTERVAL;VALUE=DURATION:PT1H X-Robots-Tag:noindex X-PUBLISHED-TTL:PT1H BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:Asia/Kolkata BEGIN:STANDARD TZOFFSETFROM:+0530 TZOFFSETTO:+0530 TZNAME:IST DTSTART:20120101T000000 END:STANDARD END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130628T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130628T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T014317 CREATED:20231224T102729Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T012341Z UID:64068-1372397400-1372397400@idsa.in SUMMARY:ASEAN in Myanmar's Foreign Policy DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/asean-in-myanmars-foreign-policy CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130712T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130712T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T014317 CREATED:20231224T102715Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T010657Z UID:64067-1373607000-1373607000@idsa.in SUMMARY:Hegemony – Exploring Chinese Conceptions DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nChairperson: Brig Mandip SinghExternal Discussants: Ambassador S K Bhutani and Shri M V RappaiInternal Discussants: Dr G Balachandran and Dr S Kalyan Raman URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/hegemony-exploring-chinese-conceptions CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130719T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130719T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T014317 CREATED:20231224T102714Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T010552Z UID:64065-1374211800-1374211800@idsa.in SUMMARY:Social Media – New Web Tool for Communication or an Easy Weapon for Pseudo War DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nChairperson: Dr Chitralekha DhamijaExternal Discussants: Mr Subimal Bhattacharjee and Mr Kunal MajumderInternal Discussants: Ms Shruti Pandalai and Ms Gunjan Singh URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/social-media-new-web-tool-for-communication-or-an-easy-weapon-for-pseudo-war CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130719T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130719T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T014317 CREATED:20231224T102715Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T010451Z UID:64066-1374211800-1374211800@idsa.in SUMMARY:British Reform to Higher Defence Organization: Lessons for India DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nChairperson: Shri P R ChariExternal Discussant: Maj Gen B K Sharma (Retd) and Brig Gurmeet Kanwal (Retd)Internal Discussant: Dr S Kalyan Raman and Cdr S S Parmar URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/british-reform-to-higher-defence-organization-lessons-for-india CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130726T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130726T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T014317 CREATED:20231224T102714Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T010332Z UID:64064-1374816600-1374816600@idsa.in SUMMARY:Cyber warfare in the Asian context DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell\nChairperson: Shri Kiran Karnik\nExternal Discussants: Brig Abhimanyu Ghosh and Col S Burman\nInternal Discussants: Lt Col Sanjiv Tomar and Shri Kapil Patil URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/cyber-warfare-in-the-asian-context CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130802T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130802T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T014317 CREATED:20231223T133707Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130240Z UID:63120-1375421400-1375421400@idsa.in SUMMARY:Comparative Study between Arthasastra and San Shi Liu Ji( The Thirty Six Strategies) DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Brig Rumel Dahiya\, SM (Retd)External Discussants: Col V M B Krishnan and Group Captain Vinay VittalInternal Discussants: Ms Rukmani Gupta and Dr Saurabh Mishra \nMajor Arguments of the Paper: \nThis paper was a comparative study\, perhaps the first. between two major books on warfare theory: Kautilya’s Arthasastra and Sunzu’s San Shi Lui Ji (36 Stratagems). \nDelving on the absence of a comparative study between San Shi LiuJi and Arthasastra\, the author blames lack of interest among political scientists and strategic experts to look at Kautilya. The other reason could be the challenge of comprehending the philosophical and historical traditions of two different cultures represented by these two great strategists. A proper understanding of the philosophical and historical traditions is essential to contextualize these two books. \nThe paper then discusses the similarities between the two texts. It argues that the most striking similarity between the two texts is that for them war is seducere: getting the enemy away from his habits so to get him lost and then destroy him. The importance of shaping false perception in enemy’s mind and to employ time to defeat the enemy by using his weaknesses are the two most important instruments of seduction. In both book it is very clear that the strategists have to decide what the enemy thinks. Both SanShi Liu Ji and Arthasastra explain seduction in war with very different philosophical concepts drawing from their cultures. \nMajor Points of Discussion and Suggestions to the Author:\n\nWhile San Shi Liu Ji primarily deals with warfare\, Arthashastra deals with a whole gamut of issues like\, economy\, governace\, politics\, etc. Warfare and victory in war nevertheless are important subject-matters of the Arthashastra \nIt is wrong to portray Arthashastra as a realpolitik genre. Kautilya’s Arthashastra talks about enlightened self-interest. It is very liberal and welfare-oriented as far as the internal policies of the state is concerned. Significantly\, post-conflict scenario as discussed in Arthashastra evades scholarly attention. It is very comprehensive and progressive in nature. The Arthashastra has not altogether forgotten moral precepts\, while dealing with the business of statecraft. \nThe origins of Arthashastra and SunZu are contested but the origin of San Shi Liu Ji is not known. The author and the motivation to write the text is yet to be ascertained. \nIndian military does not lay much emphasis on the teaching of war classics\, unlike China. The study of the war classics will enable the civilian and military bureaucracy in India to ingrain the teachings in these classics in their thought and practise. \nThese two texts are of warring states\, when deception and pre-emptive strikes were common. However\, in the present era of interdependence\, the strategy of deception and pre-emptive strike does not seem to be feasible. \nPower is an important component of strategy alongwith temporal dimension. San Shi Liu Ji does not devote attention to this aspect of strategy. \nThe author was advised not to use the term Hindu philosophy. Since\, these days the term evokes mixed response\, it was suggested to use the term Indian philosophy. Moreover\, many of the philosophies which western scholars put under a generic term Hindu philosophy today belong to other religions like Buddhism\, Jainism\, etc. \nThe transcendenatl values in Indian philosophy are well established and there are many instances in the Indian tradition of highest sacrifices being made for the sake of these values. It is erroneous therefore\, to say that Kant’s categorical imperative is absent in Indian tradition and value-system. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/comparative-study-between-arthasastra-and-san-shi-liu-ji-the-thirty-six-strategies CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130816T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130816T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T014317 CREATED:20231223T133706Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130240Z UID:63119-1376631000-1376631000@idsa.in SUMMARY:Interpretation of Concepts in Kautilya’s Arthasastra DESCRIPTION:Chair: Dr Ashok BehuriaExternal Discussants: Ambassador H.H.S. Vishwanathan and Dr Medha BishtInternal Discussants: Dr Nihar Nayak and Mr Shyam Hari P \nMajor Arguments of the Paper:\nThe paper generates a dialogue between past\, present and the future and attempts to understand the Kautilyan concepts such as samdhi\,  vigraha\,  Sadgunya\, desopananta sandhi (surrender of land)\, bhumisandhi (pact for acquiring land)\, and  vyasanas (calamities) and its relevance in the contemporary state behaviour. The paper concludes that concepts of war\, peace and diplomacy as given in the Arthasastra are relevant today and needs to be further studied and explored. \nMajor Points of Discussion and Suggestions to the Author:\n\nArthasastra covers almost every aspect of statecraft including diplomacy. For instance\, the contemporary phenomenon of honey-trap finds a very detailed treatment in Arthasastra. Similarly\, the concept of Rajamandala in the Arthasastra provides a framework for understanding and analyzing the behavior of nations in contemporary international relations.\nGovernance\, and accountability are the buzz words of modern democracies; these concepts are dealt with elaborately in Arthasastra.\nThe entire concept of the welfare state is found in one sutra of Arthasastra which says that in the happiness of the subjects lies the happiness of the state/king.\nThe concept of Vigraha as given in Arthasastra is similar to the concept of Détente in the cold war period and can be examined with reference to the contemporary Sino-Indian relations.\nThe policymakers today are confused between ends and means of foreign policy. In Kautilya’s Arthasastraone finds very clear exposition of what constitute objective and what is strategy in two terms Sadgunya andUpayas.\n Kautilya’s Arthasastra has seven Prakrits orconstituent elements of state\, whereas in western conception of state only four elements find mention. Economy which is the basis of a state is missing in the western conception\, whereas Arthasastra considers it as an important constituent of state.\nSince the world has dramatically changed establishing the relevance of Kautilya’s work will require great amount of scholarship. One way to establish the relevance of Arthasastra is to explore the elements of universality in it\, which transcends temporal dimensions.\n\nReport Prepared by Amit Kumar\, Research Assistant\, IDSA URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/interpretation-of-concepts-in-kautilyas-arthasastra CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130823T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130823T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T014317 CREATED:20231224T102615Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130239Z UID:64063-1377235800-1377235800@idsa.in SUMMARY:Missile Defence in Southern Asia: The Emerging Strategic Environment DESCRIPTION:Chair: Ambassador R RajagopalanExternal Discussants: Professor Swaran Singh and Professor Stephen F BurgessInternal Discussants: Lt Col Sanjiv Tomar and Shri S Samuel C Rajiv URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/missile-defence-in-southern-asia-the-emerging-strategic-environment CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130830T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130830T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T014317 CREATED:20231224T102615Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T010148Z UID:64062-1377840600-1377840600@idsa.in SUMMARY:Issues in the Management of India-Pakistan International Border DESCRIPTION:1030 to 1300 hrs URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/issues-in-the-management-of-india-pakistan-international-border CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130906T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130906T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T014317 CREATED:20231224T102614Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T010025Z UID:64061-1378445400-1378445400@idsa.in SUMMARY:AQIM Jihad Propaganda DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/aqim-jihad-propaganda CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130913T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130913T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T014317 CREATED:20231224T102614Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T010414Z UID:64060-1379050200-1379050200@idsa.in SUMMARY:Defence Innovation in India: The Fault Lines DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/defence-innovation-in-india-the-fault-lines CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130920T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130920T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T014317 CREATED:20231223T133607Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130239Z UID:63116-1379655000-1379655000@idsa.in SUMMARY:Iran\, IAEA and the Challenges of 'Politicised Safeguards' Implementation DESCRIPTION:Chair: Ambassador R. RajagopalanExternal Discussants: Ambassador Sheelkanth Sharma and Prof. R. RajaramanInternal Discussants: Dr G Balachandran and A Vinod Kumar \nThe paper examined three issue areas that according to the author exemplified the politicised nature of the interactions between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). These included dispute over access to military sites like Parchin where nuclear-related activities could have taken place; disputes pertaining to the sources as well as the nature of the information being used by the IAEA to carry out its safeguards activities inside Iran; and the ‘nuclear activism’ of Western non-governmental organisations like the ISIS. The paper noted that charges of politicisation by Iran – made justifiably or conveniently – make the task of safeguards implementation by the IAEA that much more complicated and is a factor not only prolonging a resolution of the issues concerned (primarily due to the absence of ‘smoking gun’ evidence of either Iranian complicity or innocence) but even possibly inhibiting it. \nOn Parchin for instance\, despite 10 rounds of talks from January 2012 to May 2013\, Iran and the IAEA have not yet agreed on the contours of a ‘structured approach’ regarding further cooperation. In July 2013\, Iran charged IAEA Director General Yukiyo Amano of ‘partiality’ and accused him of intending to ‘keep open this issue [Parchin] in order to pave the way for Iran’s enemies’. Iran’s arguments for not agreeing to facilitate access pending an agreement on the contours of such access include the failure of the IAEA to deliver ‘all relevant documents related to the Agency’s concerns’\, and the IAEA not allegedly sticking to its end of the bargain on negotiated portions of a possible agreement in subsequent meetings\, during the 10 rounds of talks. \nIran more specifically contends that since Parchin is a ‘military site\, granting access is a time-consuming process and cannot be permitted repeatedly’ and insists that the Agency focus on a non-nuclear site was beyond its mandate. However\, Iran had given IAEA access to military sites in the past\, like Lavisan-Shian\, Kolahdouz\, and Parchin twice in 2005. Iran’s arguments therefore that it cannot give ‘repeated access’ – when the last time the IAEA was given access was way back in November 2005 – starkly illustrates the limitations of IAEA under INFCIRC/214 (Iran’s safeguards agreement with the IAEA) to draw safeguards conclusions for Iran. \nAs for the second issue area\, Iran has expressed concern over what it alleged was leaks of confidential information provided to the IAEA on such subjects like ‘plutonium research project’. Iran has also been urging the IAEA to share information about the member-states/sources which indicated ‘possible military dimensions’ (PMD) of its nuclear activities. The paper highlighted the fact that the IAEA therefore faced real challenges in its efforts to broad-base the sources of information as it strives to build a ‘state-level’ safeguards picture\, if the information so generated is not shared or is viewed as having ulterior motives. The IAEA however on its part is faced with the dilemma of protecting genuine sources of information\, to the extent they are. \nAs for the third issue area\, the paper noted that the role of the ISIS highlighted the political jostling that accompanied safeguards implementation in Iran\, especially on such aspects as posting of IAEA DG reports on its website on the day they are presented to the Board of Governors\, which Iran takes exception to. The ISIS however contends that it is doing a ‘public service’ by disseminating the reports which are not ‘safeguards confidential’. \nThe author went on to highlight safeguards implementation in countries like South Korea and Brazil. In the latter case for instance\, concerns relating to access to a new uranium enrichment facility in 2004 were resolved within the framework of the IAEA. The author highlighted Brazil’s continued reluctance to sign the AP and its nuclear submarine project as issues that could have an impact on how other countries like Iran could view such endeavours. \nIn the light of the as yet unresolved nature of contentions between Iran and the IAEA\, the paper noted on-going IAEA efforts to improve the efficiency and efficacy of safeguards implementation in the face of emerging challenges amidst budgetary\, organisational and legal constraints. In the Iran case\, while budgetary or organisational constraints seem not to have played a negative role (over 800 man-days of inspections were conducted for instance between February 2003 and September 2004)\, lack of adequate legal authority (as embodied in the IAEA Additional Protocol) has hindered its ability to conclude that all of Iran’s nuclear activities are for peaceful purposes. The author closed by noting that even as the IAEA safeguards department has an important role to play\, the resolution of the decade-long imbroglio would however eventually depend on a political understanding between Iran and its P5+1 interlocutors. \nAmbassador Sharma suggested that safeguards implementation was inherently a ‘political’ job. He pointed out that Iran itself went ‘political’ when it approached the EU-3 after concerns relating to its activities were first brought into limelight in 2002. Amb. Sharma urged the author to also consult the writings of former IAEA officials like Ollie Heinonen and Mohammad El Baradei to get their view on the issues involved. He wanted the author to bring into the paper aspects relating to Iran’s interactions with the P5+1 to situate the Iran-IAEA interactions in the overall political context. Amb. Sharma noted that Iran cannot possibly cite the Brazil case in defence of its own position. \nProf. Rajaraman stated that the paper was exhaustively cited and had clarity in its arguments. He noted that though Iran may or may not cite the issue of safeguards implementation in Brazil\, the author had complete freedom to examine the issue from a purely academic perspective to draw comparison or lessons if any. Prof. Rajaraman proceeded to give a brief presentation on the technical aspects relating to the Iranian nuclear issue\, including on such issues as the different types of Iranian centrifuges and the impact of the Stuxnet virus on the Iranian programme. He pointed out that Iran could use the same centrifuges in which it had enriched uranium to 3.5 per cent to further enrich it to weapons grade within a considerably shorter amount of time if it so desired\, thus fuelling concerns about a possible breakout. The IAEA remained wary of Iran’s intentions as it had a history of not declaring its nuclear projects to the agency. He noted that it was imperative that ratifies the AP\, and bring all their facilities under IAEA safeguards and inspection. \nDr. G. Balachandran urged the author to examine whether the AP gave the Agency the necessary authority to demand access to sites like Parchin. He further highlighted the fact that the IAEA has been able to verify both ‘correctness’ and ‘completeness’ in close to 80 per cent of states having significant nuclear activities (SNA)and therefore was reasonably successful in its safeguards implementation efforts. This experience should be helpful to the IAEA if and when it is required to verify that all of Iran’s nuclear activities are for peaceful purposes. Vinod Kumar urged the author to provide more empirical elaboration to show the politicisation process in play. \nDr. Arvind Gupta noted that the paper does a good job of listing the Iranian contentions on the three issue areas that the author has explored and that this was a useful exercise to know where Iran stood. The validity or otherwise of its arguments however are open to contention. Dr. Dany Shoham enquired whether IAEA safeguards implementation in North Korea could be explored by the author as another case study. \nAmb. Rajagopalan urged the author to more clinically examine the issues in the light of the comments received. He urged the author to provide a few paragraphs on the background to the political dispute between Iran and the P5+1 so that lay reader could more easily understand the issues being discussed. The Chair closed the session by commenting on the larger geo-political issues at stake in the light of the Syria crisis and Mr. Rouhani’s election as the new Iranian President. \nReport prepared by S. Samuel C. Rajiv and Daneesh Sethna. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/iran-iaea-and-the-challenges-of-politicised-safeguards-implementation CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20131108T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20131108T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T014317 CREATED:20231224T102528Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T005210Z UID:64059-1383888600-1383888600@idsa.in SUMMARY:Overlapping Regional Security Governance Mechanisms: An Alternative Interpretation of the Difficulties of Regional Cooperation for Afghanistan DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact\nConference Cell\n\n\n\n\n1030 to 1300 hrs URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/overlapping-regional-security-governance-mechanisms-an-alternative-interpretation-of-the-difficulties-of-regional-cooperation-for-afghanistan CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20131122T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20131122T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T014317 CREATED:20231223T133606Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130239Z UID:63113-1385098200-1385098200@idsa.in SUMMARY:Threat of Israel’s Regional Isolation and Imperatives for the Future DESCRIPTION:Event: Fellows’ seminarChair: Ambassador Rajiv SikriExternal Discussants:  Dr. P R Kumaraswamy\, Mr. Ashok SinghInternal Discussant: Mr. S Samuel C Rajiv \nThe paper provides a comprehensive overview of Israel’s history since its birth in 1948 and examines the topical threat of its isolation in the West Asian region. A temporal overview of Israel’s troubled transition since 1948 has been given\, along with a meticulous account of Israel’s position during Arab spring and its WMD policy (Weapons of Mass Destruction i.e. Chemical and Nuclear weapons). \nIn his study\, the author has raised four pertinent research questions; the issue of Israel’s reorientation of regional policy in recent past\, Effect of Arab Spring on Israel\, Israel’s policy shift in response to Syrian crisis-Iran nuclear issue\, and Imperatives for Israel’s regional strategy. \nThe paper was structured in three sections; the first section elaborates Israel and its engagement with the region with an exhaustive timeline of Israel’s relations with its neighbours. The next section analyses impact of Arab Spring on Israel’s regional posture and Israel’s ambiguous policy on Chemical and Nuclear weapons. The last section highlights the likely future trends for Israel’s regional engagement. \nIsrael and its Engagement with the region\nIn the first section\, the author states that throughout its brief history\, national security has always dominated Israel’s strategic thought in the region. Israel’s foreign policy was defined as a culmination of three factors; its strategic location\, Arab-Israeli conflict and Arab rejection of Israel and it was further suggested that Israel’s strategic thought was always dominated by national security. The period of Israel’s engagement in the region has been classified into three distinct phases; 1948-1991\, 1991-2005 and 2005 onwards. The author opined that the first phase highlighted Israel’s fight for survival and its strategy of viewing the region through the spectrum of “peace through security”. The second phase was one of a reconciliatory approach. During this phase\, Israel traversed from its traditional security oriented approach to a distinctly different reconciliatory strategic approach. The author built his arguments based on Israeli Prime minister Rabin’s land-for-peace policy. Reference to Madrid conference (1991)\, Oslo Accords (1993) and Oslo II i.e. Taba Agreement (1995) was made to substantiate the main argument.  This period also witnessed the peace treaty with Jordan in 1994. The third phase has however witnessed the return of security oriented approach. In this section\, author outlined the failure of Ariel Sharon’s Gaza Disengagement Plan of 2005 to bring about any lasting peace. The author highlighted the impact of other important developments in the region on Israel’s regional policy; particularly Saddam Hussein’s ouster and ensuing political shifts in Iraq\, Iran’s escalating influence across the Levant\, and rise of Hamas and Hezbollah.  The author pointed out that Israel witnessed a net deterioration in its regional posture during this period\, particularly towards the end of 2010 when Arab uprisings engulfed West Asia. \nIsrael and Arab Spring\nDevelopments in Arab World-particularly regional players-Egypt and Syria were discussed. The author highlighted how Turkey and Iran tried to make the best of these revolutions while Israel kept getting pushed into a corner. Author contended that Arab Spring aggravated Israel’s isolation in the region\, and “rise of Islamists on political maps of the countries” was highlighted as a major concern for Israel. \nWeapons of Mass Destruction in the region and Israel\nIn the section\, the author drew attention towards Israel’s policy of ambiguity on Chemical and Nuclear weapons. Israel’s regional threat perception was also examined to understand why Israel maintains this ambiguity. Most importantly\, author highlighted that destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons is likely to put enormous pressure on Israel to ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention. Author referred to various international reports to confirm Israel’s nuclear weapons programme\, and emphasized that future of Iran-US nuclear deal will be an important factor in determining Israel’s isolation in the future. \nConclusion: Likely Future Trends\nIn the last section of the paper\, the author briefly summed up Israel’s equation with its neighbours to reiterate Israel’s escalating regional isolation. Author noted that it was time for Israel to think in terms of enhancing confidence building measures in West Bank and Gaza\, and changing its position on CWC and NPT. Author suggested that there is a need to signal diplomatic willingness to resolve Palestine issue and by altering its anti-Iran rhetoric. \nComments and Observations:\n Mr. Ashok Singh appreciated the author for extending the scope of his study beyond the clichéd Israel Palestine issue. He urged the author to interpret Israel’s perception of its own strategic policy in the region. With respect to Israel’s regional isolation\, he stated that Israel has a policy of keeping distance and it enjoys the threat. The author was asked to offer concrete suggestions to guide Israel’s future imperatives. \nDr. P R Kumaraswamy mentioned that in the current scenario Iran is perceived as the most potent threat to Israel\, and in light of recent developments\, Iran is likely to emerge as a decisive player in West Asia. He urged the author to speculate as to how Israel prepares to face Iran resurgence- via reconciliation or retaliation. The decline in US engagement with Israel post-2009 was also underlined\, and he advised the author to comment on role of US in shaping Israel’s regional policy. \nDr. Samual Rajiv appreciated author’s analysis of Israel’s regional policy dynamics. He urged the author to focus more on contemporary issues and also encompass Israeli narrative on peace. \nAmbassador Rajiv Sikri noted that the paper aptly underlined the issue of Israel’s security oriented approach. He highlighted the role of US in shaping Israel’s policy and urged the author to include US factor within the framework of this paper. He pointed out that within Israel\, there is dwindling public support for hard lined policy and thus it’s essential to understand public as well as diplomatic perception about regional policy. With reference to Israel’s policy of ambiguity on Chemical and Nuclear weapons\, he asserted that Israel will gradually succumb to the compelling regional circumstances and declare its stocks. \nThe discussion was followed by Question and Answer round\, where questions regarding Saudi-Israel cooperation against Iran\, GCC’s economic threat to Israel and Israel’s internal politics were raised. \n Chair concluded the session by commenting on evolving geopolitics of West Asia and India’s capability to intervene in the region.Report prepared by Divya Malhotra URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/threat-of-israels-regional-isolation-and-imperatives-for-the-future CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20131129T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20131129T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T014317 CREATED:20231223T133606Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130239Z UID:63112-1385703000-1385703000@idsa.in SUMMARY:Framing of Nationalism in Nepal's Radical Communist Movement: The India Factor DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Brig Rumel Dahiya\, SM (Retd)External Discussants: Ambassador Deb Mukherji and Ms Akashnya ShahInternal Discussants: Dr Anand Kumar and Dr Anshuman Behera \nMr Post Bhadur Basnet\, SAARC Visiting Fellow from Nepal presented his paper titled “Framing of Nationalism in Nepal’s Radical Communist Movement: The Indian Factor” on 29 November 2013. \nThe paper argues that the Maoists used “negative nationalism”\, based on anti-Indian sentiments\, as one of the key “revolutionary” strategies during the insurgency. The same band of nationalism continues to feature in the radical communist discourse\, though it seems to have lost much of its appeal among the masses during the course of democratic politics in which the Maoists willingly participated since 2005. \nThe genesis of anti-Indianism goes back to the days of the formation of Nepali state. The 1950 treaty\, which aimed to bring Nepal under the security sphere of India that possibly checked the import of communism to Nepal from China\, has been a major irritant for the communists. India’s security concern requires an India-friendly regime in Nepal and thus India is seen to be meddling in the internal affairs of the country and favouring some actors over the others\, which is viewed as external interference in Nepal’s internal politics and leads to anti-India sentiments amongst the Nepalese people. Moreover\, “not-to-be-an-Indian” is one of the key features in the identity formation process in Nepal. All these features collectively offered a fertile ground to the political actors to manufacture and exploit anti–India sentiments to their benefit over the years. \nDuring the monarchy period\, the king was successful in sustaining his regime by instigating anti-Indianism and gathering the support of the communists. Once the relationship between the monarchy and the communists was broken\, there was a regime change in Nepal. With the monarchy gone\, the paper argues\, the role of nationalism for political mobilisation is no longer effective. \nThe Maoists after 2006 have realised that the anti-India card does not work in the changed global\, regional and domestic political matirx. The mainstream faction of the Maoist party led by Prachanda has removed India from its hit-list\, and started talking about the internal nationalism (ethnic federalism and development). However\, the radical faction in the Maoist Party led by Kiran Baidya continues to talk about external intervention and take an anti-Indian line while framing its version of Nepalese nationalism. The presenter argued that while the line of “externalised nationalism” may have lost its glamour\, the Maoist plan for consolidating ‘internal nationalism’ through emphasis on ethnic nationalism has pushed the Nepali state into a state of wilderness. \nThe presenter provides the following recommendations which according to him can remove the prevailing anti-India sentiments in Nepal: \n\nIndia should pay attention to dissemination of information regarding its approach to Nepal. In this regard\, Indian Embassy should extend its network with journalists. \nIndian investment in Nepal should increase. Other than in the hydro power sector\, India should invest in agriculture in the plains and mid-hills and in the capacity-building of security forces. \nIndia should recognise and analyse the reasons for the spread of anti-India sentiments in Nepal. There are frequent complaints about India micro-managing Nepalese politics. India should address this issue. \nIndia should try to build contacts with all the political actors and should not be seen as favouring some actors over others. While playing its role to build political consensus in matters concerning its security it should take care not to isolate any party and keep a low profile. \nThere should be proper coordination between Ministry of External affairs and intelligence agencies in their approach to Nepal. \n\nComments of the discussants\nThe discussants have made the following observations about the paper: \n\nThe paper talked about hill-based nationalism rather than Nepali nationalism. \nNationalism has been used in the paper as a synonym of anti-Indianism. \nThe paper gives an impression that China is interested to play its own political game in Nepal. However\, it was argued by the discussants that it was the Nepalese who wanted to play the China card. China is quite pragmatic in its dealings with Nepal.\n \nTo justify the title\, a separate section on India factor should be incorporated in the paper. \nThe paper is detailed and timely. However to make it more up-to-date it should accommodate the analysis on the latest Constituent Assembly (CA) election results. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/framing-of-nationalism-in-nepals-radical-communist-movement-the-india-factor CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20131220T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20131220T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T014317 CREATED:20231223T133548Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130239Z UID:63109-1387517400-1387517400@idsa.in SUMMARY:Domestic Politics of Bangladesh and India - Bangladesh Relations DESCRIPTION:This paper primarily made an attempt to discuss the effect of domestic politics of Bangladesh on India-Bangladesh Relations. It delved into some of the historical processes that resulted in the formation of community-consciousness among the Bengali Muslims whose interests were often at variance with not only the Hindus but also members of their own religion living elsewhere in the country. It was also noted that the Bengal Renaissance further strengthened the community consciousness of Muslims because they perceived it as an upper caste Hindu phenomenon. \nThe author noted that for a brief period\, immediately after liberation of Bangladesh\, India-friendly policies were pursued. India and Bangladesh signed a twenty-five year Treaty of Peace and friendship in 1972 and even decided to sort out border disputes under Indira- Mujib Accord. But this bonhomie proved to be short-lived and after the assassination of Sheikh Mujib\, Bangladesh politics moved on a completely different path. It was alleged that India was selectively aiding groups close to the Awami League serving its political interests. From 1975 to 1990 Bangladesh was first ruled by Gen Ziaur Rahman and subsequently by Gen Ershad. The latter declared Islam as state religion of Bangladesh. With this step Ershad hoped to get greater support of the Islamist forces like Jamaat. But actually this angered Jamaat\, as he had only declared Islam as state religion\, but did not declare Bangladesh to be an Islamic state. \nThe role of army was elaborately dealt in this paper and the author points out that the army played an important role in the politics of Bangladesh. It is also noted how the Bangladesh Army has had closer links with Pakistan and China\, despite the fact that the country was liberated with India’s help and China had refused to recognise Bangladesh in initial years. It was also observed by the author that in recent times the nature of Bangladeshi external trade had changed. The country which was perennially facing trade deficit has managed to considerably narrow it down. Moreover\, it is the only country in the south Asian region which has consistently shown progressive GDP growth\, which is impressive by Bangladesh’s standards. As a result of which the businessman have started playing an active role Bangladeshi politics in recent years. The paper also notes the issue of trade imbalance of Bangladesh with important trading partners like China\, which has replaced India as the largest trading partner. It is interesting to note that both India and China have similar kind of export basket and Chinese exports are now seen replacing Indian exports. \nThe paper referred to an anti-India section which found problems about everything India doid. In comparison\, China has been able to create considerable goodwill by constructing six friendship bridges and a conference centre earlier named as Bangladesh-China Friendship Conference Centre. But when India gave $1billion credit line to Bangladesh for infrastructural development there was great difficulty in finalising the projects. India-Bangladesh agreed to construct a power plant at Rampal. But the anti-India lobby has created an impression that this project is not in Bangladeshi interests. They say that this project would damage the environment of Bangladesh as it is close to Sunderbans. However\, what is to be remembered is that Sunderban is a shared heritage of India and Bangladesh. \nThe author also took into account the fact that the domestic politics was also affecting connectivity in the region. The Bangladesh\, China\, India and Myanmar (BCIM) economic corridor\, which has been in the back burner due to India’s concerns figured in the joint statement when Chinese Prime Minister visited India. Bangladesh wants China to develop its Chittagong port and build even a deep sea port at Sonadia. Moreover\, BCIM wants to link Kolkata with Kunming through Bangladesh and Myanmar. It was also noted that Bangladesh analysts some of whom are hostile to India often try to remind us that if Bangladesh is surrounded on three sides with India\, then India’s northeast is also Bangladesh locked. They want to use it as leverage. They think that if they keep northeast this way then it is not only in the strategic but also economic interests of Bangladesh. \nThat author argued that it had not been easy for any government in Bangladesh to follow India-friendly policies. In fact\, he noted that if you wanted to ruin your political career in Bangladesh politics then get yourself branded as pro-India. The chorus against India becomes shriller the moment Sheikh Hasina comes to power. \nIn Bangladesh\, parties are defined on the basis on their approach towards India. BNP tries to establish its nationalist credentials by being anti-India. Jamaat in any case is anti-India and it espouses Islamic rule in Bangladesh. These two parties have painted Awami League as being pro-India\, while in reality the party at best could be described as being India-friendly. The author makes an inference that on the eve of January 2014 elections\, India was not an issue. This does not mean that India no longer remained important for parties in Bangladesh. Actually there were two other issues of the caretaker government and the perception of Islam under threat which were far more important than India. \nAfter Sheikh Hasina’s visit to India\, it has often been alleged that India has not sufficiently reciprocated her friendly and cooperative gesture\, by not signing the land boundary agreement (LBA) and Teesta Water Sharing agreement\, two big ticket issues which have bedevilled the bilateral relation for a long time. It has also been argued that a greater response from Indian side would have helped Hasina in the January 2014 elections. But the author notes in the paper that such a view is rather simplistic. The solution of major issues between India and Bangladesh is desirable in their own right\, but this may not necessarily translate into electoral goodwill for Hasina. Even if India were to make major concessions and get these issues resolved the hostile section in Bangladesh would never fail to give it a different colour and tell how India has swindled Bangladesh and Hasina has sold-off the country. The author quotes the example of Sri Lanka\, where India gave away the Kachatiwu Island\, but India-Sri Lanka relations at present are far from being friendly. \nThe author closed by noting that the democracy in Bangladesh is at the crossroads. The secular\, progressive and pro-liberation forces are pitted against pro-Pakistan Islamist elements. The deligitimization of anti-Liberation forces can change the flavour of domestic politics in Bangladesh\, because it might be easier for India then to get acceptability of both the major political parties. \nExternal Discussants \nOne of the external discussants\, K. Srinivasan\, cautioned the author that after only 2007 they have been talking of 1971 as a Liberation War. He continued by adding that on anti-terrorism front\, the amount of progress which has been made is commendable even if the issues of water and land boundary agreements remain unresolved. He was also sceptical of the fact that Awami League is India-friendly because it accounts for most irritants to India. \nThe other discussant\, Joyeeta Bhattacharjee\, suggested that it was very essential to first understand the internal politics of Bangladesh\, and in this regard\, the author needed to go back and understand the formation of Awami League and BNP. She further corrected the author that BNP was a centre-right party\, not an anti-India group. Though\, BNP leaders are closer to the Jamaat\, they could not be held as “anti-India”\, rather such observations might irk them. She also considered it important to factor in the perspective of Bangladesh Army in internal politics. She also added that the Awami League government also made use of the China factor very effectively. As because China does not share any direct land boundary with Bangladesh\, like India— which gives rise to fear and scepticism in the minds of common people of Bangladesh— China is regarded as a friendly country. She further noted that it was natural for Bangladeshis to conduct their foreign policy to serve their national interests\, which might not always fulfil India’s expectations. She also counter-argued that India was not a major factor in the internal politics of Bangladesh\, and issues like price rise\, inflation\, caretaker government usually assumed centre-stage in domestic politics. \nInternal Discussants \nGulbin Sulatana raised four issues. She first asked the author to find out why political parties in Bangladesh regard India and not any other country as a factor in domestic politics and why the business community in Bangladesh preferred to do trade with China ignoring India\, despite having a huge trade deficit with China. She also expressed her doubts about the author’s claims that de-legitimization of anti-liberation forces could change the anti-India mindset of the people in Bangladesh. Lastly\, she urged the author to throw more light on the anti-India section within the Awami League. \nAnshuman Behera suggested the author to include more historical portions in his paper and look at the peasant movement incited by Haji Shariatullah more critically. He suggested the author to study Bengali renaissance and the role of Brahmo Samaj in it. Moreover\, he argued that the author should ideally include an analysis of Bangladeshi politics during 1947-71 and examine how Bengali nationalism and anti-Indian sentiment shaped up during this period. He also considered it important for the author to discuss other anti-Indian organizations in Bangladesh like Hizb ut-Tahrir and the neo-radicals which played a great role in fuelling anti-Indian sentiments in Bangladesh. \nLastly\, he said that all neighbouring countries do have a devoted anti-India constituency and the author needed to provide recommendations as to what should India do in order to erase that sentiment and improve its relations with the neighbours. \nDr. Arvind Gupta noted that it doesn’t matters what Bangladesh thinks about India\, rather it should be noted that how India should deal with its neighbours. Indian scholars must analyse how countries like China\, Turkey and Brazil deal with their neighbours. He also suggested that no matter how much anti-Indianism was there in our neighbours\, we must deal with it in a pragmatic manner. If polarisation and anti-Indianism is there\, we must accept it. We have learned enough lessons from history that tit-for-tat policy is not going to be in India’s interests. He suggested that there should be more telephone calls and visits between the leaderships of the two countries. The Chair\, Amb. R. Rajgopalan\, commented that India had a distinct advantage vis-à-vis China in Bangladesh because of the long border it shared with Bangladesh\, which India must take full advantage of and use to good effect. \nReport prepared by Abhimanyu Singh\, Research Intern\, IDSA. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/domestic-politics-of-bangladesh-and-india-bangladesh-relations CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140103T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140103T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T014317 CREATED:20231224T102515Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130239Z UID:64058-1388727000-1388727000@idsa.in SUMMARY:US Factor in Sino–Indian Relations: India’s Fine Balancing DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Prof. Christopher S. Raj \nExternal Discussants: Prof. Chintamani Mahapatra and Prof. Sreeram ChauliaInternal Discussants: Dr. Mahua Bhattacharya and Sanjeev Srivastava URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/us-factor-in-sino-indian-relations-indias-fine-balancing CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140110T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140110T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T014317 CREATED:20231224T102515Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T004944Z UID:64057-1389331800-1389331800@idsa.in SUMMARY:The Tamil Nadu Factor: Perspectives of Tamils and Muslims in Sri Lanka DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact\n\n\n\n\n1030 to 1300 hrs\nConference Cell URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-tamil-nadu-factor-perspectives-of-tamils-and-muslims-in-sri-lanka CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140117T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140117T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T014317 CREATED:20231223T133548Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130239Z UID:63107-1389936600-1389936600@idsa.in SUMMARY:Military Change in India: An Appraisal of the Evolving Strategy Towards Pakistan DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Lt Gen HS Lidder (Retd)External Discussants: Vice Adm Anup Singh (Retd)\, Lt Gen Prakash Menon (Retd) and Professor Rajesh RajagopalanInternal Discussant: Col PK Gautam (Retd) \nThis paper primarily made an attempt to understand India’s evolving military strategy towards Pakistan. It analyzes this evolution using the theoretical framework of mlitary change\, which can be conceived of as occurring at three levels: the goals of a military organisation\, its organisational structure\, and the strategy it adopts. The cause of military change can be traced to three sources: a voluntary or externally induced change in the cultural norms of a military organisation; changes in a state’s domestic political orientation or in its national security scenario; and the introduction of new technology. \nThe paper seeks to examine whether military change has occurred in India at any of the three levels identified above and\, if yes\, then what has been the source of that change. With these objectives\, the paper focuses upon the third level of change\, namely strategy. Specifically\, it examines the strategies adopted by the Indian armed forces for the Pakistan front and the changes effected therein over the course of the last six decades. This examination highlights two principal trends. At the operational level of war\, India’s military strategy towards Pakistan changed from attrition to manoeuvre and back to attrition. And the objective of India’s strategy has changed from victory until the 1980s to punishing Pakistan since the 1990s. The paper argues that these changes were caused by India’s evolving security scenario vis-à-vis Pakistan and in particular by the introduction of nuclear weapons\, which have inhibited India’s response to the challenge posed by Pakistan. \nThe paper concludes that civil-military coordination is essential for bringing in sync the military and political objectives within a larger strategic narrative. While such coordination was indeed a consistent feature between independence and the 1999 Kargil conflict\, a divergence has emerged between the political and military leaderships during the last 10 years. This fraying of politico-military coordination is clearly evident in the army’s failure to win political approval for the Cold Start strategy and indeed in its attempt through such a strategy to compel the political leadership into following its timetable for military action. For its part\, the political leadership has also failed to engage with the services to ensure the crafting of a strategy that is both appropriate for a nuclear environment and is dovetailed with broader policy objectives. \nMajor Points of Discussion and Suggestions to the Author:\n\nIt was pointed out that more than lack of trust or anything else\, the civil-military disconnect in India is the result of lack of expertise on military matters among the civilian leadership. This state of affairs can be attributed to the near absence of public discourse on hardcore military subjects. This scenario is\, however\, fast changing with an increasing number of retired military professionals beginning to write and generating a public debate on military issues.\nMilitary strategy in war is different from pre-war planning. The paper needs to spell out clearly which level of strategy is its focus.\nThere is a need to unbundle and elaborate upon the argument about the change in Indian strategy from victory to punishment. It was argued that India’s objective has been to deter Pakistan and the method adopted for that purpose has been punishment and not victory per se. Further\, for India\, victory has not always entailed the defeat of Pakistan or the occupation of its territory. Victory has to be judged in terms of the goals set with punishment also having been a part of victory. \nWith respect to the nuclear factor\, it was pointed out that India has been repeatedly subjected to nuclear blackmail. At the same time\, India’s propensity to up the ante against Pakistan has been severely constrained. The Cold Start has been seen as a viable option in the nuclear backdrop but the ambiguity that surrounds it has outweighed its utility as a strategy.\nWhile formulating any strategy vis-à-vis Pakistan\, India cannot ignore China. It implies that a two front war scenario is a very distinct possibility and India must retool its strategy to meet such challenge.\nThe paper needs to incorporate the role played by the Mukti Bahini in the 1971 war\, a role that was crucial in terms of providing valuable intelligence and reconnaissance support.\nIt was argued that Pakistan’s strategy toward India is one of offensive-defensive\, whereas India’s has been defensive-offensive. This has been reflected time and again in Pakistan’s misadventures against India in the past.\nRegarding Cold Start\, it was pointed out that lessons are learnt from war and that goes into doctrines. Therefore\, the Cold Start\, which is primarily a mobilizational effort\, does not hold much doctrinal value.\nIt was argued that attrition is a safe option. Contrary to attrition\, manoeuvre involves high risk and high gain. Any strategy\, therefore\, should be a combination of both attrition and manoeuvre and it cannot be a case of either or.\nIt was suggested that the paper should focus on political strategy rather than military strategy as everything else flows from the former. It is the political leadership that decides on war and peace after taking into account several factors ranging from domestic to external.\nThe paper would be enriched if it includes Pakistan’s military strategy and objectives vis-à-vis India.\n\nReport prepared by Amit Kumar\, Research Assistant\, IDSA URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/military-change-in-india-an-appraisal-of-the-evolving-strategy-towards-pakistan CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140124T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140124T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T014317 CREATED:20231224T102514Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130239Z UID:64056-1390541400-1390541400@idsa.in SUMMARY:The US Pivot/Rebalance to Asia and the Japanese Response: Implications for India’s ‘Look East’ Policy DESCRIPTION:Chair person: Professor Sreemati ChakrabartiExternal Discussion: Professor K P Vijaylakshmi and Professor Lalima VarmaInternal Discussion: Dr R N Das and Sanjeev Kumar Shrivastav URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-us-pivot-rebalance-to-asia-and-the-japanese-response-implications-for-indias-look-east-policy CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140131T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140131T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T014317 CREATED:20231223T133507Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130239Z UID:63106-1391146200-1391146200@idsa.in SUMMARY:Prospects of Cross Line of Control (LoC) Travel and Trade DESCRIPTION:Chair: Air Vice Marshal (Retd) Kapil KakExternal Discussants: Professor Riyaz Punjabi and Professor K WarikooInternal Discussants: Dr Smruti S Pattanaik and Col (Retd)Vivek Chadha \nDr Priyanka Singh\, in her presentation\, analysed the prospects of travel and trade across the LoC\, which according to her\, were of strategic significance for India. She applauded the efforts made by the respective governments to soften their stand on LoC and discussed the way in which the LoC links were activated by the two governments in the aftermath of the ceasefire of 2003 transcending constitutional barriers in both the Indian state of Jammu & Kashmir and the so called ‘Azad Jammu and Kashmir’ (AJK) under Pakistani occupation. \nShe argued that people-to-people contact\, promoting economic interdependence and making borders irrelevant were imperative for the success of cross-LoC linkage. The presentation also contained informed about the operation of bus service on two routes\, Srinagar-Muzaffarabad and Poonch-Rawalkote\, which were loosely modelled after Delhi-Lahore bus service. It was observed that sustaining lines of trade across the LoC was a significant step forward to soften the LoC\, an important CBM between India and Pakistan. \nShe highlighted the key recommendations of the Working Groups\, which were constituted to recommend measures for softening the LoC for transit and dwelt on the composition of cross LoC trade—comprising mainly of handicraft\, handloom and food items (agricultural and horticultural). Providing further details about cross-LoC trade Dr Singh said that it was not trade in the conventional sense of the term\, and it was duty-free and barter based trade and operates on a limited basis through 1-1.5 ton capacity trucks. \nThe scholar isolated events which catalysed the process of change which included the stakeholder’s meeting at Istanbul in November 2011\, where Jammu & Kashmir Joint Chamber of Commerce and Industry was formed. This was a milestone in institutionalizing trade between the two sides. She also discussed several bottlenecks which are inhibiting process of trade and travel\, which included the never-ending security concerns\, limited scope of trade\, financial constraints\, communication gap\, logistical hurdles\, and vulnerability to misuse. \nIn spite of such hurdles\, she argued that there was a growing demand for additional routes in the region which shows that such linkages are valued by people on both sides of the LoC. She also brought it to the notice of the audience that there was a feeling of being left-out in those regions of Jammu\, Ladakh and Gilgit-Balitstan\, where there are additional demands for cross-LoC linkages. People in these areas believe that too much focus is being laid on the Kashmir valley. The author quoted PM Manmohan Singh to prove this. The PM had in fact acknowledged recently that he was aware of the growing demand from the people in Kargil to have links restored with Gilgit and Baltistan\, as a result of which the opening up of Kargil-Skardu is under consideration. Such links would not merely yield economic dividends\, they would also address the issue of divided families in the state. \nThe author noted that the record of cross-LoC travel so far was impressive and there was surprisingly no major incident of violence\, apart from the one on the tourist facility center in Srinagar\, a day before the bus service between Srinagar-Muzaffarabad started. She mentioned various incidences which affected cross-LoC trade between\, including the 26/11\, which occurred only a month after cross-LoC trade was inaugurated\, the land controversy in Amarnath which flared communal tensions in the valley\, beheading of an Indian soldier by Pakistani border guards and the allegations of drug-smuggling by Pakistani operators resulting in stalling of the process following 47 trucks carrying goods from PoK being withheld by Indian authorities. \nDr Singh raised a pertinent point in her paper that the initiative has remained largely insulated from the larger complexities involving India-Pakistan relations. She held that it was natural to expect India-Pakistan relations would influence the Cross-LoC trade and travel. She mentioned various such instances when\, the bus service was suspended\, like suspension of the Delhi-Lahore bus for about two years in the aftermath of the militant attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001. \nHowever\, she found through her research that there was a tremendous enthusiasm amongst people on both sides about such linkage mainly because it gives them an opportunity to unite with the divided families across the LoC on either side\, and partially due to the economic prospects it offers. The desire in the people of the region to see trade and travel flourish for a secure and better future for themselves was also highlighted. \nHowever\, it was noted that while on the Indian side both the mainstream regional parties in J&K— National Conference (NC) and Peoples’ Democratic Party (PDP)—expressed their faith in cross-LoC linkage the opinion was divided among the political elites of ‘AJK’ on how to approach the issue. Some of them feel emphasis on cross-LoC linkage would dilute the main issue of Kashmir. However\, the business class in AJK is keen to expand trade-ties and has been demanding that cross LoC trade must be put on the agenda at the highest level of talks between India and Pakistan. The pressure from Gilgit Baltistan United Movement (GBUM) to open Kargil-Skardu route was also discussed. \nThe popular demands were listed by the scholar well which were:— enhance transit capacity by increasing the number of vehicles\, increase the trade basket\, promote tourism to allow greater communication amongst people from both the sides\, establish better lines of communication amongst the traders’ community\, overall easing up access to the LoC\, encourage greater participation of the people in the process\, introduce integrated banking system and efficient sales policy\, and above all carve out a well-conceived policy on security. At the same time due care must be taken\, it was argued\, to retain and preserve the quintessential Kashmiri character of the initiative. \nIt was argued that cross LoC interactions could go a long way in managing perceptions not only within Kashmir\, but possibly beyond it in both the countries. However\, such initiatives are likely to stimulate bigger expectations\, and the challenge lies in managing such expectations\, which\, if remain unaddressed for long\, could potentially translate into cynicism\, pessimism and anger\, which is usually the case in conflict ridden areas. \nIt was observed that at the India-Pakistan bilateral level\, establishing cross-LoC linkage is probably one of the most tangible CBMs between the two. Thus\, the fundamental question arises whether cross LoC exchange is a driver of peace? The scholar was of the opinion that in terms of larger long-term gains in pursuit of peace\, both countries need to reflect upon these questions and think whether they are willing to make concessions on the larger political problems\, most importantly on territorial issues. Ultimately the success of cross-Loc exchange during the last few years depended on whether the travel and trade has created an enabling environment\, bridged the gap amongst Kashmiri people\, encouraged collective economic consciousness\, and more importantly reduced the level of frustrations and angst amongst Kashmiris during these years. \nThe author closed by offering some suggestions to boost this initiative which included enhancing the scope of trans LoC interaction\, maximising economic gains and incentives\, opening the line for people other than those belonging to divided families\, exploring additional diversified channels of exchange other than educational and medical needs\, minimize technical problems\, move on from the barter system as it is unsustainable in the long run and explore the option of transit trade by linking the route up to the Central Asian Republics. \nExternal Discussants:\nOne of the external discussants\, Prof Riyaz Punjabi applauded the author and stated that the paper did well to link cross-LoC trade and intra-J&K trade with Indo-Pak Relations. He apprised the gathering that the partition of 1947 did not take into account linguistic affinity\, compulsions of geography and other cross-regional trade interests. He noted that before partition\, Baramulla-Rawalpindi used to be an all-weather route open throughout the year and pointed out that cross-LoC trade would hold enormous potential if we connect the regions of Jammu and Ladakh to Kashmir. \nHe stated that the Gilgit-Baltistan region had far been neglected by the Pakistani government and it was even referred to as ‘Northern Areas’ till 2005. He also recalled an incident when a group of journalists from across the LoC came to Jammu and had a gala time with the people out there\, for which they had to face a very hostile time in Srinagar because the separatist Hurriyat Conference people were extremely displeased with their affinity with the people of Jammu. \nHe also stated that the trade between the two parts of the region has enormous potential which has been hampered due the vested business interests of the political class who find it convenient and profitable to transfer the goods from a third destination\, preferably Dubai. He accepted that there are several challenges one of which was the illegal drugs trade starting from Afghanistan through Pakistan and India to other markets beyond in South-east Asia. Radical elements will continue to push for this through India and Pakistan\, taking advantage of the Cross-LoC and Wagah-Attari trade links. He urged that some mechanism must be found out to deal with such crucial issues in order to keep the cross LoC trade flourishing. In the end he emphasized that barter must be replaced by broader kind transaction system\, may be through banks\, to boost the process further. \nThe other discussant\, Prof K Warikoo\, compared the cross-LoC situation with the situation in the Central Asian Republics. He cautioned the Indian authorities that it was very essential for them to first safeguard the borders before opening it up for trade. He stated that China has settled huge population of Han families\, traders and officers in Kashgar area in order to fully sanitize the border before going for trade. The other border he quoted was the Tajik-Afghan border\, where Taliban had changed the proportion of tribes in furtherance of its interests as it was a very porous border. Coming to the Indian context\, he stated that till 2006\, only 17\,000 people crossed LoC\, while over 10 million people go to Vaishno Devi and over 20 lakh to Amarnath shrine every year. While the Kashmiris are quite vocal about the need for cross-LoC linkage\, they have not utilized this bus service to the extent they were expected to. He stated that it is only the Pahari speaking people from Poonch who have utilized the bus service as they have been the worst sufferers of the partition. He recalled his experience where people of Poonch showed their lands adjoining the border\, on the other side\, while they were confined to our side of the border. Their issues have never been addressed\, not even in the Shimla Agreement. He also urged the international community to change its perception of looking at Kashmir as an underbelly of Central Asia and give it its due importance. \nInternal Discussants\nDr. Smrutti Pattanaik stated that many people in the valley do not want to take the LoC route as the passport/identification verification process itself takes about 6 months to complete. She also stated that despite lot of clamour about the Kargil-Skardu route\, the reservations are more with India than Pakistan\, as majority of people in Kargil are Shia\, whose pain and agony are often overlooked by the Sunni majority dominating the politics in Kashmir. She asked the author to put the present topic in a larger context and clarify whether she is looking at the cross-LoC trade only from the Kashmiri perspective or larger Indo-Pak perspective. She also asked the author to mention whether cross-LoC trade is crucial enough to feature in India’s larger foreign policy domain. The Chairperson\, Kapil Kak noted that we all must have a grand vision for trade and commerce between Central Asia\, Afghanistan\, Pakistan\, India and China. \nCol Vivek Chaddha asked the author to be clear about the questions raised in the paper\, as to whether she was looking at the subject from Indian or Pakistani perspective\, as the security concerns of the two countries were very different. He also urged the author to visit the place and interact with people to take their views into consideration which would be of great importance for this paper. He also asked the author to clarify few topics in the paper which might not be understood by a layman\, like the term “Trade Facilitation Centres”. He also asked the author to include the suggestion of J&K CM Omar Abdullah’s in the paper\, that simple telephonic conversations should be started along with trade and commerce. \nProf Riyaz Punjabi noted additionally that whatever is produced in Kashmir has a huge market within the country\, so we do not need to explore foreign markets for the products of Kashmir. He further stated that it is a cause of concern that very few people from across the LoC visit the shrines in J&K\, particularly Hazratbal\, and Indian government must look into this issue. \nReport prepared by Abhimanyu Singh\, Research Intern\, IDSA. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/prospects-of-cross-line-of-control-loc-travel-and-trade CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140131T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140131T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T014317 CREATED:20231224T102428Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130239Z UID:64055-1391146200-1391146200@idsa.in SUMMARY:The Importance of Nuclear Security: An Asian Perspectives DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Professor R RajaramanExternal Discussants: Shri Amandeep Singh Gill and Dr Sitakanta MishraInternal Discussants: Dr Ashok K Behuria and Shri Kapil Patil URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-importance-of-nuclear-security-an-asian-perspectives CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140207T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140207T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T014317 CREATED:20231224T102428Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130239Z UID:64054-1391751000-1391751000@idsa.in SUMMARY:ASEAN and Conflict management in the South China Sea (SCS) DESCRIPTION:Chair: Professor Baladas GhoshalExternal Discussants: Dr Vijay Sakhuja and Professor Ganganath JhaInternal Discussants: Cdr S S Parmar and Ms M S Pratibha URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/asean-and-conflict-management-in-the-south-china-sea-scs CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140214T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140214T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T014317 CREATED:20231224T102428Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130239Z UID:64053-1392355800-1392355800@idsa.in SUMMARY:China's Tryst with IORA: What Does it Mean for India? DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: V Admiral Anup Singh (Retd)External Discussants: Shri Jayadev Ranade and Professor Baladas GhoshalInternal Discussants: Cdr Abhijit Singh and Ruchita Beri URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/chinas-tryst-with-iora-what-does-it-mean-for-india CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140228T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140228T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T014317 CREATED:20231224T102427Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T004524Z UID:64052-1393565400-1393565400@idsa.in SUMMARY:Culture as a factor in India’s Neighbourhood Policy: Can the States Play Role DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact\n\n\n\n\n1030 to 1300 hrs\nConference Cell URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/culture-as-a-factor-in-indias-neighbourhood-policy-can-the-states-play-role CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140314T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140314T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T014317 CREATED:20231224T102427Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T004637Z UID:64051-1394775000-1394775000@idsa.in SUMMARY:Reforms to United States Higher Defence Organization: Lessons for India DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact\n\n\n\n\n1030 to 1300 hrs\nConference Cell URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/reforms-to-united-states-higher-defence-organization-lessons-for-india CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140321T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140321T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T014317 CREATED:20231223T133506Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130239Z UID:63103-1395379800-1395379800@idsa.in SUMMARY:Arms Trade Offset: Global Trend and ‘Best’ Practices DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Shri V. K. MisraDiscussants: Shri A. K. Ghosh and Shri Amit Cowshish \n \nDr Laxman Kumar Behera’s presentation on “Arms Trade Offset: Global Trend and ‘Best’ Practices” was broadly divided into two parts. While in the first part of his presentation Dr Behera explained about the volumes\, trends\, and emerging issues of global offsets. In the second part he dealt with important aspects of best international practices in arms trade offset policies. Primarily\, Dr Behera surveyed the offset policies of six countries: South Korea\, Turkey\, Canada\, Israel\, Malaysia and UAE which not only have had a declared policy on offsets but have also undertaken periodic revisions based on the experience gained over a period of time. He also referred to Indian offset policy to highlight its convergence and divergence with the policies of those six countries. \nHe said that given the lack of comprehensive official data on arm trade offsets\, the statistics provided by the US Commerce Department’s the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) remains the only official source for any meaningful analysis. According to Behera\, the BIS data is not only defence specific\, but also captures value of offsets and its percentage share in US’ total arms export\, and offset transaction by type (direct and indirect) and category (co-production\, licensed production\, technology transfer etc.). It is however restricted to the US companies which are mandated to report to the US government on any defence export which entails an offset requirement exceeding $5.0 million. \nCiting the 17th BIS report\, Dr Behera said\, during 1993-2011\, 53 US defence companies signed 830 offset-related defence export contracts with 47 countries. The value of associated offsets was $83.73 billion\, representing 68.28 per cent of total arms export value of $122.67 billion. In 2011 alone\, nine US companies signed 59 offset-related defence agreements valued $10.76 billion with 27 countries. The offset value of these contracts was $5.48 billion. Importantly\, among all the offset categories reported by the US companies\, three categories – purchases\, subcontracting and technology transfer – stood out as the most preferred offset transactions. Between 1993 and 2011\, they together represented 81.1 per cent by credit value. However\, the persistent decline in offset percentage post 2003-2005 raises questions about the use of offset. \nIn the second part of his presentation\, Dr Behera elaborated international best practices in arms trade offsets by touching upon key issues: threshold\, percentage\, and multiplier in the offsets; value addition; principle of additionality and causality; offset obligations on domestic enterprises; channelling offsets; establishing long-term relationship through offsets; offset swapping; banking and offset trading; implementation and monitoring\, etc. \nHe said that except for Canada\, India has the highest threshold limit. This means\, unlike most other countries which demand offsets in contracts valued as low as $5-15 million\, Indian industry cannot benefit from such smaller contracts unless the contract value reaches $55 million. India has also the lowest offset percentage requirement among the listed countries. \nMany countries apply the principle of value addition for the purpose of estimating the true value of offset credit which can be claimed by the foreign vendors. The value-addition principle ensures that the foreign vendors get their due offset credit for the local content they are able to achieve in the buying country. In India\, he said\, value addition is determined by subtracting value of imported components i.e. import content in the product and any fees or royalty paid from the final purchase or export price of the eligible products. It is however to be noted that unlike Canada which applies the value addition principle for both products and services\, Indian policy is only restricted to the products. \nHe said that many countries including India allow investment as one of the means for discharge of supplier’s offset obligations. However\, few countries bother to see if such investment\, for which the foreign vendors earn offset credits\, is having any real impact on the exception. The UAE’s revised offset policy brought out in 2010 has incorporated a hybrid model for calculation of offset credit that virtually puts onus on the foreign suppliers to ensure that a part of the offset inflows brings real benefits to the UAE economy. On offset policy at the national level\, the presenter said that some countries including India operate offset policy in the narrow prism of defence procurement only. However\, South Korea and Israel are among those countries whose offset policy is applicable at the national level for both defence and civil procurement. \nIn the conclusion\, Dr Behera said that the role of offsets in arms trade is going to stay for the foreseeable period. Given the shrinking military spending in advanced arms manufacturing countries and the simultaneous increase in defence expenditure by big arms importing countries in Asia and other parts of the world\, offsets would play an ever increasing role in the international arms trade. Particularly\, in a buyers dominating global armament market\, countries\, which have declared offsets policy\, would try to improvise their existing policies to maximise their arms import. \nMoreover\, he reflected that India being one of the biggest arms importers in the world\, and having a declared offset policy since 2005\, it is vital that its policy is not only dynamic and but takes into account some of the fundamental practices followed by other countries. Presently\, however\, the Indian offset policy\, despite having gone through several rounds of revisions still remains a conservative one and lacks some of the fundamental principles adopted by others. Given that offset has a cost premium loaded into the main contract\, he suggested\, it is high time Indian policy makers take a serious look at the policy. \nShri A. K. Ghosh\, former Finance Advisor\, Defence Services\, observed that the conclusion of the paper is not clearly reflecting in both parts of the paper. The author needs to clearly explain why there is a declining trend in the global markets for the offsets? The author also pointed out that India has highest threshold limit as well as the lowest offset percentage requirement. This aspect needs to be relooked\, because India is having a non-aggressive offset policy whereas China is very aggressive in its offset policy. So there is framework or no framework\, China will follow an aggressive offset policy. In this context\, the paper shows a very conservative perspective. Shri Ghose was of the view that the proposal for establishing a long-term offset policy is very crucial. Israel is a case which looks for establishing such a long term relationship. However\, building institutional capability is the key for this on which the author can write forcefully. \nShri Amit Cowshish\, former Financial Advisor (Acquisition)\, Ministry of Defence\, said that though the paper does speak about international practices in arms trade offsets\, but it does not speak about which one is the best practices. It needs to analyze which one is the best practice and why. South Korea’s practice is appreciated but it is not considered as the best practice and many countries are not following this model. Why other countries practices are not considered as the best practice also need explanation. The value of the paper could be enhanced if it expounds in overall where India stands and how effectively it’s offset policy work. The author also spoke about various fundamental lacunas but the author first needs to explain what those fundamentals are. In fact\, the fundamentals are basic features of many countries policy. The author should thus describe which fundamental practices are missing from Indian side. With respect to the management of the offsets\, the author talked about the loopholes in the implementation and monitoring side which requires greater attention. \nMajor Points of Discussion and Suggestions:\n\nWhy there is a declining trend in the global markets for the offsets? What are the main reasons for this?\nIndia’s policy for offset came in 2006\, but that does not mean that it did not have such policy before?\nAny policy works in a particular ecosystem. The UAE does not have its eco-system. So what are the ecosystems of various countries under study?\nThe author has given data up to the year 2011. SIPRI annual reports can be used to update the data in the paper.\nThe author has given some good recommendations for India\, but a fair amount of work should be done to justify those recommendations. \nIndia is very defensive in its offset policy and its offset contracts reflect what it expects.\nIt is a good paper on the arms trade offsets and could be a base paper for further research.\n\nChairperson’s Remarks: Shri V.K. Mishra\, former Financial Adviser (Defence Services)\, highlighting the significance of the paper as well as Indian offset policy and its various challenges\, said that it was expected to have some kind of a transformative impact\, given the major gaps not only in the technology but in infrastructure\, maintenance\, and manufacturing capability. So all in all it was envisioned to provide a fillip to the Indian defence industrialization process. So far much has not happened in this regard. Shri Mishra pointed out that there is misconception that it drags on the acquisition process and tends to unwarranted costs. However\, it should not be seen that way. In fact\, he said\, the offset policy makers had hope that any offsets investment in flow would bring some amount of attractive returns on the investments by the OEMs. Then only it could be sustained. So it will also help in achieving long term relationship with those OEMs and India’s offset partners. These were the expectations. However\, the experience has shown with the kind of guidelines India has with regard to foreign direct investments some worthwhile investments are there. There are also aspects of joint venture guidelines which require much greater clarity. Therefore\, the progress on this front is very much slow in terms of worthwhile JV entities. There is need to move another level where there would have to be priority defined in terms of the each of the request for proposals (RfP’s) that are issued. Thus\, there is a whole range of concerns whether it is technology\, maintenance preparation in overhaul\, infrastructure facility. He concluded the seminar by thanking all the participants for their valuable contributions and making it a success. \nReport prepared by Dr Saroj Bishoyi\, Researcher\, IDSA URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/arms-trade-offset-global-trend-and-best-practices CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140328T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140328T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T014317 CREATED:20231223T133407Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130238Z UID:63101-1395984600-1395984600@idsa.in SUMMARY:Emerging contours of Iran-China Relations: An Overview DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Amb Ishrat AzizExternal Discussants: Prof A K Pasha and Prof Qamar AghaInternal Discussants: Col Rajeev Agrawal and Dr Prashant Kumar Singh \nThe paper holistically examines the nature\, scope and direction of Iran-China bilateral relations. The author\, in this study\, highlights dimensions of political and economic intimacy between Tehran and Beijing and elaborates how the two nations figure in each other’s foreign policy. In the first section\, author deals with the cooperative aspect of the bilateral engagements. A brief background of the Iran-China relations was discussed to place the issue in a historical framework. Civilizational encounters and exchanges were enumerated to suggest that leaders in both the nations cherish the historic memories to nurture and strengthen the relation. The author clearly identified five guiding principles namely; Ideological principles\, Anti-Imperialism\, Persian Nationalism\, Self-Sufficiency and Islamic solidarity\, to enunciate China’s position in Iran’s foreign policy matrix. In the ensuing sections\, points of convergence of interest were discussed at length and important areas of cooperation were highlighted including; Political\, Economic\, Trade and Commerce\, Investment\, Energy and Defence. Intersection of Political relations was established in terms of diplomatic engagement between Iran and China even before the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Author gave a detailed account of the vibrant Economic and energy relations\, trade dynamics and nature of capital investment flow\, followed by specifics on energy and defence cooperation. The question of China’s support for Iran’s Nuclear Programme and China’s strategic balancing between Iran and the US was analyzed in detail. Beijing’s anti-Iran votes in the UN Security Council combined with its normal economic engagements with Tehran were mentioned\, to argue that China has clearly adopted “Middle of the Road” approach towards Iran. \nFurthermore\, author succinctly brought out the challenges of Iran-China relations; with reference to US role in influencing their respective foreign policies. Changing public perception within Iran with regards to China was also discussed. In conclusion\, author stated that China’s approach to Iran is being viewed as increasingly mercantilist and opportunistic\, and thus took the position that despite flourishing economic ties\, the bilateral relations are likely to be riddled with challenges. \nAmbassador Ishrat Aziz recognized and appreciated author’s efforts to coherently analyze Iran-China relations. Thematic unity of the paper was acknowledged. He stated that no relation in contemporary foreign affairs is bilateral per se\, and evidently most engagements are shaped by multilateral concerns. The need to discuss Iran and P5+1 nuclear talks and recent developments\, was highlighted since it is likely to have repercussions on Iran-China relations. \nProf. A.K. Pasha acknowledged the author’s efforts to delve into the intricacies of Iran-Sino relations. He suggested the author to include Khomeini and Sassanid period while discussing the background of Iran-China relations. Dr. Pasha shared that increased movement of students between Iran and China was indicative of growing cultural exchange and the author was asked to analyze cultural aspect of Iran-China ties. It was further stated that foreign policies were not drafted in vacuum and thus there was a need to address the driving force behind Iran’s foreign policy; while dealing with the guiding principles. He also shared his insights on the role played by external players in the changing geo-political landscape of West Asia\, and suggested the author to see how these external factors have influenced Iran-China relations. \nDr. Qamar Agha appreciated author’s holistic and descriptive approach to the subject\, and highlighted scope for further analysis. He opined that Iran is now entering a new phase in its modern history\, and is experimenting with its foreign policy. Despite international isolation\, Iran exhibited an impressive growth over the last three decades; best reflected in its nuclear programme. Commenting on China’s policy\, Dr. Agha raised the question of China-Pak intimacy and its likely impact on Sino-Iran ties. China’s policy of energy diversification was briefly discussed\, and interestingly\, GCC is now being viewed as a famous trade market by China. All these tectonic shifts suggest that” Neither East\, Nor West policy” of Iran is unsustainable. \nCol Rajeev Agarwal agreed with the major arguments put forward by the author and appreciated the author’s attempt to produce a comprehensive paper. He urged the author to clearly articulate the key findings of his study in the conclusion section and suggested that connecting foreign policy directive principles to the specific case of Iran-China bilateral engagement would add more value to the paper. \nDr. Prashant Singh appreciated the topical value and contemporary nature of the paper. He suggested the author to bring out the normative convergence of Iran and China’s foreign policy ideologies and stated that the major developments in Iran-China relations in the last ten years should be the main focus of the paper. Dr. Prashant stated that even though Iran’s perception within China was undergoing slow change\, but impact of these perceptions on Iran’s foreign policy is not confirmed. \nThe discussion was followed by Question and Answer round. US role in influencing China’s and Iran’s respective foreign policy was discussed\, along with impact of political transition in Tehran in August 2013 on Iran-China relations. Questions were raised on China’s strategic balance between Iran and Saudi Arabia; and how Saudi Arabia figured in China’s policy towards West Asia. It was mentioned that despite differences between Iran and Saudi Arabia\, both hold an important place in China’s “West Asia policy.” \nPrepared by Ms. Divya Malhotra\, Research Intern\, West Asia Centre\, IDSA URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/emerging-contours-of-iran-china-relations-an-overview CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140328T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140328T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T014317 CREATED:20231223T133506Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130238Z UID:63102-1395984600-1395984600@idsa.in SUMMARY:From Looks to Action: Thailand-India Strategic Convergence and Defence Cooperation DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Prof Charan D WadhvaExternal Discussants: Prof S D Muni and Prof Ganganath JhaInternal Discussants: Cdr S S Parmar and Dr Udai Bhanu Singh \n \nProf. Wadhwa initiated the event by giving a briefing on India-Thailand bilateral relations which is grounded on historical inheritances. Thailand\, being one of the closest Southeast Asian neighbours of India\, bears many semblances with India in terms of culture\, traditions\, geography and economy. \nFollowed by this brief introduction\, Ms. Chingchit began her presentation. During the Cold War Thailand and other non-communist countries in Southeast Asia considered India as being a close ally of Soviet Union’s and thus maintained a limited engagement. The shift in Thailand’s foreign policy orientation in 1988 allowed India to become Thailand’s natural partner by virtue of its geographic location\, economic potential and geopolitical pre-eminence in South Asia. Finally\, in January 2012\, Thailand and India signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Defence Cooperation after 67 years of diplomatic relations and two decades of collaboration to expand the defence and military ties between the two countries. Prior to 2012\, Indo-Thai defence relation had been largely unaddressed and underdeveloped. Until now\, despite having military engagements in the areas of military exercise\, joint patrol and defence dialogue under bilateral and multilateral frameworks\, the existing defence cooperation between India and Thailand has never been noteworthy. This does not correspond with the increasing significance of India-Thailand partnership and the changing power and security dynamics in Asia. As a part of defence diplomacy\, both sides need to strengthen their military ties to complement their growing engagement in other spheres. However\, it remains to be seen as to what extent and in which domain Thailand and India can manage to push their defence relation forward. \nProf S D Muni mentioned that since no major work has been done on Indo-Thai defence cooperation in India\, Ms. Chingchit’s paper has certain relevance. The data used are mostly primary and hence\, the paper is useful. However\, he recommended that Thai media reports could also be used to get the Thai perspectives on the subject. Prof. Muni argued that the paper lacks strategic background on Indo-Thai relation- how it has been evolving and unfolding. Post Cold War changes could have been brought in the beginning of the paper. He further argued that Thailand has been successfully balancing China and US in the region\, as mentioned by Ms. Chingchit in her paper; however\, most of the Southeast Asian countries have been following the same trend in the region in order to avoid any major conflict. How India is perceived in Thailand was not mentioned in the paper\, Prof. Muni pointed out. Moreover\, the minor defence cooperation between India and Thailand that was in existence before 2012 could have been incorporated in the paper\, opined Prof. Muni. Factors like growing importance of Bay of Bengal\, common concerns like terrorism\, money laundering etc. need to be focused too. \nFollowed by the opinion by Prof. Muni\, Prof. Jha said that Thailand’s geographic location is important and the capability of the Thais in strategic thinking is at par in excellence in comparison to other Southeast Asian countries. He mentioned that the training exercises of Indian National Army were conducted in Phuket. However\, during the Cold War\, some disturbances appeared in the Indo-Thai relations. After this brief phase of bewilderment\, both India and Thailand came closer to each other followed by the Look East Policy of India and formation of BIMSTEC signalled a positive step in India’s relations with Thailand. Between 1998 and 2002\, a lot of other attempts were taken to enhance Indo-Thai relations. In the recent time\, the Daewoo project evokes fascination. At the end of his discussion\, Prof. Jha said that for India\, Thailand is a major stakeholder in its efforts of developing good relations with the Asia Pacific countries. \nCdr Parmar mentioned that not much material is available on Indo-Thai defence cooperation in the newspapers and this explains the limitations of the relationship itself. He stressed on the low activities and low initiatives in the relationship between India and Thailand. He focused on the limitations in the bilateral defence cooperation between India and Thailand which should be emphasized in the paper also. How Thailand can use the multilateral-regional platforms like IORA in enhancing its relations with India\, what are Thailand’s expectations from India and how US and China factors influence the bilateral equations between India and Thailand were some of the major thrust areas identified by Cdr. Parmar. \nDr. Singh said that most of facts of defence relationship between India and Thailand have been covered in the paper. However\, greater attention to the regional security architecture needs to be covered in order to explain the challenges and constraints. Lack of connectivity\, infrastructural gaps exist in the North-eastern region of India\, opening of Myanmar and other related factors need to be explained in the paper. In addition\, Dr. Singh mentioned that the paper has no reference on the regional economic architecture which surely has a deeper impact on the regional security architecture. How the domestic turmoil inside Thailand is likely to influence the defence and security equations of Thailand was also missing in the paper. \nDuring the general discussion\, Prof. Gautam Sen suggested that the aspect of India-Myanmar-Thailand triangle should be discussed in the paper. Another participant\, Mr. Peter Van Der Hoest asked about the factors which are holding India and Thailand back from augmenting their defence cooperation. Ms. Bhattacharyya\, a Post Doctoral Fellow from JNU said that Thailand does not have any external threat perception and hence\, she asked\, why should India and Thailand opt for defence cooperation. As the discussion was continued\, Cdr Parmar asked about India’s position in Thailand’s Look West Policy and the vice versa. Prof. Wadhwa asked about the economic dynamics of Indo-Thai relations focusing on the comparative advantages of comprehensive economic partnership against free trade agreement. \nAs concluding remarks Ms. Chingchit observed that Thailand wants India to play greater role in the region\, to maintain peace and stability in Northeast India as well as develop its infrastructure\, open more markets for Thailand and improve connectivity between India and Southeast Asia. \nThe discussion ended with a positive note on further collaboration and cooperation expected from Thailand in support of India and the vice versa as bilateral relationship is a two way process. \n(Report Prepared by Ms. Sampa Kundu\, Research Assistant\, IDSA) URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/from-looks-to-action-thailand-india-strategic-convergence-and-defence-cooperation CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140411T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140411T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T014317 CREATED:20231223T133406Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130238Z UID:63100-1397194200-1397194200@idsa.in SUMMARY:Indian Ocean Maritime Security Cooperation: Will India Lead? DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: R Adm (Retd) K RajamenonExternal Discussants: Professor Baladas Ghoshal\, Dr. Vijay SakhujaInternal Discussant: Cmd SS Parmar \n \nThe paper focusses on the prospects of Maritime Security Cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and India’s role in it. Maritime security has become a central issue for regional and extra-regional actors. Emerging traditional and non-traditional security challenges largely converge at sea as they impact economic\, environmental\, energy\, human\, food and national security. There are compelling drivers for enhancing maritime security cooperation in the IOR and considerable obstacles to be overcome. \nThe author argues that as the major regional power and an emerging Asian great power India’s willingness and capacity to provide strategic leadership is critical. However\, in view of the alleged civil-military dissonance and the demonstrable lack of political will for reform raises questions about India’s strategic competence and influences perceptions of India’s prospects as a regional leader. Moreover\, India’s strategic policy ambiguity undermines regional trust and confidence. \nNotwithstanding India’s reluctance\, the paper argues that regional actors will increasingly look to India to provide strong\, proactive and coherent leadership; to engender a spirit of cooperation and shared destiny. The paper concludes that India’s strategic leadership presents a key regional security risk\, and an opportunity. \nMajor Points of Discussion and Suggestions to the Author:\n\nThe presence of a large no. of actors espousing different cultural values and strategic attitudes makes the leadership position very challenging and difficult to sustain. Lack of regional cooperation in the IOR is not as much the result of lack of political will as it is the result of lack of material capabilities and consensus. India is trying to evolve that eluding consensus. MILAN is an effort in that direction.\nIt was argued that currently the priority of foreign policy of India is to maximise economic gains to internally stabilise and power-projection therefore\, has been put on the backburner. \nTo aspire for great power status without developing matching capabilities to fulfil the obligations that come along this status would fail us. India’ reluctance to engage in expeditionary activities or in security architectures can be partly explained thus.\nOne reason for India’s reluctance to look beyond its borders is its troubled neighbourhood. Leadership role has to begin with neighbours and it was pointed out by discussants that India’s neighbours are not conducive to India playing an important role at the regional and global level. India is accused of nursing big brotherly attitude towards its neighbours. The China factor is also very important in India’s foreign policy and its quest for leadership role. China is both a determinant and constraint on India’s foreign policy.\nSignificantly\, it was brought up during the discussion that India has to play an important role I the IOR as abdicating its responsibility will allow China to take control of the situation to the detriment of India.\nThe domestic compulsions of India also inhibits India’s leadership role. India’s Israel policy or West Asia policy has largely been hostage to the minority politics. Similarly\, in recent times politics of federalism has acted as a constraint on our foreign policy particularly the neighbourhood policy. \nThe absence of track II in IOR was lamented. It was argued that track I lacks the guidance and inputs of track II and it hampers cooperation among the IOR members.\nIndia does not have a written strategic doctrine and this does not instil confidence in the other countries. In the absence of a well-articulated strategic doctrine ulterior motives can be attributed.\nThe issue of Civil-military relations was discussed in detail. It was agreed that contrary to the western writings on CMR\, which portray as the situation has reached a dead end; the civil-military relations in India is not actually the problem between the civilian leadership and military establishment\, rather it can be described best in terms of higher defence management. \nIt was suggested to the author that an empathetic appreciation of the problems that constrain India’s foreign policy would present a more balanced view of the so called reluctant power. For instance\, one of the primary reasons for this reluctance on part of India stems from its historical experience of the NAM days when India’s idea of Asia was not taken forward.\nOn the question of CMR the author would benefit if he explores the reasons for its overarching presence in the system. One reason could be the role it played in the nation-building in the transitional phase of Indian democracy. \nIndia’s view of IOR should be dealt with in the paper in order to understand its position on the leadership issue. Moreover\, who all support India’s leadership and who not should be listed out.\nThe paper would enrich if it prepares two separate list of problems that India face; one under the heading internal problem and the other external problems. \nIt was brought up during the discussion that multi polarity is the key in the region. In view of this the paper should bring forth India’s role as one of the key players in the region and not hegemon or dominant power.\n\nReport prepared by Amit Kumar\, Research Assistant\, IDSA URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/indian-ocean-maritime-security-cooperation-will-india-lead CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR