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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090109T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090109T053000
DTSTAMP:20261111T110951
CREATED:20231223T222432Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130250Z
UID:63732-1231479000-1231479000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Tibet: Connectivity\, Capabilities and Consequences
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Arvind GuptaDiscussants: Ravi Sawhney and Rahul K Bhonsle \nSince 1951\, China had fueled massive economic investment in Tibet. In recent decades\, infrastructure assumed the salience in China’s Tibet strategy\, especially under its ‘Go West’ policy\, launched by Jiang Zemin in 2000. The stated goal was to usher Tibet into an era of modernity and prosperity. The policy gained more urgent priority since 2003 when Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao showed greater commitment to make Tibet a part of China’s economic miracle. The 1\,100 kilometer railway to Lhasa that cost $4.2 billion has symbolized China’s success in Tibet. Even the Indian Defence Minister Mr. A K Antony accepted the fact that there was no comparison of such development on the Indian side\, when he visited a forward location in December 2007. \nIn 2007\, China’s State Council had approved 180 projects for Tibet that would cost over 770 billion yuan ($10.2) during the Eleventh Five Year Plan. Reports suggest that more than 77 percent projects have already commenced. According to the Tibet Autonomous Regional Development and Reform Commission\, over 200 billion Yuan were spent during the year 2008.  \nOn October 14\, 2008\, Chinese military engineers and workers began digging a tunnel in Tibet’s Galung La Mountain in Nyingchi Prefecture to build the most difficult highway to China’s last road-less Medog County that borders Arunachal Pradesh. China’s state media prominently highlighted the significance of the 141 km long road connecting Medog with Tibet’s main East-West highway. The project will be completed by 2010.  \nThe great concern for India is the South-North Water Transfer Project (SNWTP)\, also known as the ‘Great Western Line’. The project is worth China’s $60 billion that aims to divert more than 40 billion cubic meters of water annually from China’s longest river\, the Yangtze\, and its tributaries through a tunnel under the Yellow River to northern China. The initial phase is expected to be ready by 2010. But a section of the route has already been used for meeting the water requirements during the Beijing Olympics. The initial two routes of the project will take water from the middle and lower reaches of the Yangtze basin through the Yellow River to Beijing\, Tianjin\, and other booming cities in the north. The third route plans to divert waters from Tibet’s Yalong\, Dadu and Jinsha rivers to the northern plains. The Brahmaputra project forms the second phase of the third route. The project was envisaged on the assumption that by 2030 the Yangtze basin will not have sufficient water for transfer to the north. The major concern here is: why is China going ahead with the SNWTP if there is inadequate water available for rerouting? \nThe project’s aim is to divert the Tsangpo at the Shoumatan Point (the ‘Big U-turn’) for constructing the world’s largest hydroelectric plant at the knick-zone to generate 40\,000 Megawatts of electricity\, and for diverting 200 billion cubic meters of water annually to the arid north. The project will involve enormous engineering complexity on the scale of the Tibet railway system and the Three Gorges dam. Media reports also suggest China’s proposal to use nuclear explosives to blast a 15 kilometer tunnel at the U-turn. \nThe great challenge for India regarding the project is that India has no water sharing treaty with China. China has rarely bothered to share information prior to flood situations. As a result India often becomes vulnerable to environmental threats. Also\, there is no record of China consulting the lower riparian states before undertaking construction of dams upstream. \nAs the economies of India and China grow\, both are going to compete not only for oil and gas but also for water resources. One can conclude that China as the upstream state would treat water as a strategic commodity.  \nPoints raised during the Discussion \n\nChina is unwilling to discuss the issue with India at the bilateral level. \nThere is a need to discuss water diversion by China at the United Nations and the issue also needs to be brought before the International Court of Justice. \nThe potential impact on India of China blocking the Brahmaputra river needs to be examined. \n\nPrepared by Dr. M.Mahtab Alam Rizvi\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/tibet-connectivity-capabilities-and-consequences
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090116T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090116T053000
DTSTAMP:20261111T110951
CREATED:20231223T222431Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130250Z
UID:63729-1232083800-1232083800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:An Exploratory Framework for India’s relationship with ‘New Nepal’
DESCRIPTION:Chair: P. StobdanDiscussants: Ashok Mehta and Sangeeta Thapliyal \nThe paper\, An Exploratory Framework for India’s Relationship with New Nepal\, was presented by Dr. Nihar Nayak. Professor P. Stobdan was the Chair. Maj. Gen. (Retd.) Ashok Mehta and Prof. Sangeeta Thapliyal were the external discussants; and Dr Smruti Pattanaik and Dr. Pushpita Das were the internal discussants.  \nThe paper brought out the complexities associated with the Indo-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship signed on July 31\, 1950. It identified some key elements which should be incorporated to make the Treaty more acceptable to both sides. At the outset\, the presentation briefly focused on the important Articles of the Treaty\, highlighting that the key objective of the agreement was to promote peace and friendship between the two states. Mutual politico-economic\, socio-cultural linkages and security requirements were underlined as common concerns. Highlighting the element of reciprocity\, the paper argued that one key element of the treaty was that it offered economic opportunities in India for Nepalese nationals against Nepalese assurances that India’s security concerns would be respected. The external political environment in the form of the shadow of the Cold War was one of the overwhelming factors shaping concerns and perceptions on both sides. Chinese adventurism in Tibet and apprehensions over Communist influence in Nepal were some of the factors that drove the two countries towards a settlement of issues.  \nDr. Nayak argued that over the years\, the treaty has emerged as a nationalistic issue and is considered a major constraint on Nepal’s independent foreign policy. In fact\, during his official visit to India in 2008\, the Nepalese Premier emphasized that there should be a “clear revision” of the treaty. Highlighting the Nepalese and Indian perspectives\, the paper brought out the key irritants associated with the treaty. While Nepal was overwhelmingly concerned with issues relating to security and the unilateral imposition of restrictions on the free movement of people across the border; India was conversely concerned with the number of Nepali immigrants and the presence of ISI in Nepal\, who could be working in tandem with Chinese intelligence. \nDr. Nihar Nayak pointed out that despite irritants and opposition from both sides\, especially Nepal\, the treaty has not been abrogated by either side\, an issue which he considered curiously serious\, because Clause 10 provides for abrogation as a viable option. The paper also highlighted the mutually beneficial relationship between the two countries. On trade\, Dr. Nayak argued that India is Nepal’s largest trading partner. Seventy per cent of total Nepalese trade is with India. Also\, bilateral trade and investments have greatly improved between the two countries. India’s share in Nepal’s total trade made a quantum jump form 26 per cent in 1996-97 to almost 41 per cent in 2000-01. In fact amongst the SAARC countries\, India’s trade growth has been the fastest with Nepal and total trade stands at half a billion dollars accounting for around 25 per cent of total India-SAARC trade. However\, hydro-projects\, transit and employment benefits to Nepalese migrants in India are possible areas of cooperation between the two countries. Notwithstanding the mutual benefits\, the relationship between the two countries remains strained. New Nepal\, Dr. Nayak argued\, provides an opportunity towards strengthening bilateral ties between the two countries. He suggested that the treaty needs adjustment\, review and updating\, keeping in view changing security and economic realities. Both governments\, he emphasized\, also need to agree not to allow the use of their respective territories for activities harmful to the national security interests of the other. Also\, both countries should not enter into any kind of military alliance with third countries. \nMaj. Gen. Ashok Mehta argued that the concept of New Nepal is questionable\, as it is an ongoing process. He pointed out that the fact that there was no earlier call for abrogation of the treaty was incorrect as the call for change had come from Manmohan Adhikari. He noted that the main problem with the 1950 treaty was that all provisions of the treaty were in breach in themselves and none of them were operational. He also pointed out that one of the main problems with the 1950 treaty was that the implications of the treaty had not been studied in detail\, engendering parochial politics for vested interests. Gen. Mehta underlined the importance of identifying new concerns in Nepal\, pointing out that Nepal and Pakistan were two factors which ought to be taken into account while discussing India-Nepal relations.  \nProf. Sangeeta Thapliyal noted that the paper needs to revisit the underlying context of its title. She argued that it was important to identify the groups and political actors in Nepal opposed to the treaty. She also noted that Nepal’s fears need to be taken into account and consequent ramifications for the treaty. It was also important to discuss what kind of a relationship India wanted with Nepal. \nDr. Smruti Pattanaik pointed out that the issue of abrogation is directly linked with political posturing. The 1950 treaty needed to be seen in the context of identity politics. She pointed out that domestic politics in Nepal was primarily responsible for the failure of the 1950 treaty and that there was a need to bring out the Indian perspective on the treaty more clearly. Dr Pushpita Das pointed out that it was important to argue why India should opt for a revision of the treaty.  \nSome of the points raised during the discussion were: \n\n\nThe issue of remittances going to Nepal was important. \nIssue of perceptional factors regarding the image of Nepali workers in India should be considered. Also\, identification cards and certificates need to be issued to Nepali migrants in India. \nIt was important to outline the status of Indian business interests in Nepal. \nDomestic concerns are far more important to Maoists in Nepal than the 1950 treaty. \nThe 1950 treaty could offer a broader framework for a better Indo-Nepal bilateral relationship. \n\nPrepared by Medha Bisht\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/an-exploratory-framework-for-indias-relationship-with-new-nepal
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090213T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090213T053000
DTSTAMP:20261111T110951
CREATED:20231223T222327Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130250Z
UID:63723-1234503000-1234503000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Terror Financing in Bangladesh
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Arvind GuptaDiscussants: Bhaskar Roy and Sanjay Bharadwaj \n“Terror Financing in Bangladesh” by Dr. Anand Kumar outlined key factors that contribute to terror financing in Bangladesh. Dr. Kumar’s primary argument was that sustenance and maintenance of terror organizations is often built on the edifice of a strong financial base and that terror cannot make much headway without finance.  \nThe author at the outset drew attention to the issue of state accountability in dealing with terrorism as terrorist activities often emanated from domestic territorial space. He emphasized that intelligence gathering\, law enforcement\, and imposition of new financial controls were important levers to curb the functioning of terrorist groups. In this context\, he argued that the Government of Bangladesh has made only half hearted attempts to contain terrorist activities in its soil.  \nThe presentation focused on three aspects: the Beneficiary Groups and Institutions involved in terrorism; the sources of terror finance in Bangladesh; and\, the responses of the Bangladesh Government and international institutions. Finally\, the paper briefly touched upon the policy relevance of the findings.  \nMain Beneficiary Groups and Institutions\nDr. Kumar argued that the main beneficiaries of terror finance in Bangladesh have been Jamaat-e-Islami and Ahle Hadith Andolon Bangladesh (AHAB). Both organizations have maintained links with Islamic groups like Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh\, Jamaatul Mujahideen Bangladesh\, Alhikma\, Harkat ul Jihad etc. Money is used for recruitment and training purposes. Funding is also being channelled to build a large number of mosques and madarsas\, which are playing an instrumental role in radicalizing society at the district and village levels.  \nSources of Terror Financing \nSome sources listed as potential feeders for financing terrorist activities\, as argued by Dr. Kumar\, were Islamic NGOs\, Saudi charities\, individuals\, money laundering\, fake currency\, drugs and underworld. Dr. Kumar asserted that post 9/11\, Islamic NGOs have increasingly become important in the fight against terrorism. In order to support the argument\, he cited the steps taken by United States to halt the flow of funds to terrorist organizations through Executive Order 13224 and related elements of the USA Patriot act. He argued that as oversight mechanisms were absent\, no financial scrutiny of the Islamic charities is undertaken\, which further complicates the problem of tackling terror financing. The Saudi Government’s patronage of charities such as International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) and the World Association of Muslim Youth (WAMY) was also brought to attention. He cited the example of Al Haramain\, a Riyadh based Muslim Charity\, which was opened in Cox Bazar in 1992 to help Rohingya refugees but continued to operate in Bangladesh uninterrupted despite it being banned by the United Sates and Saudi Arabia. The connection between Al Haramain and terrorism was revealed in 2002\, when linkages were made between Al Haramain and its suspected links to terror funding and trafficking of women and children under the garb of providing Islamic education. As far as individual support is concerned\, links to Bin Laden were cited. Dr. Kumar argued that funds were flowing into Bangladesh in the form of Hundi through Jessore\, Chittagong and Dhaka. He added that Bangladesh in recent years has also become a major source of fake currency. Fake currency was being printed in Chapai Nawabgunj and then being dumped into India. The nexus between drugs and terror finance also became evident when in 2005\, the National board of Revenue found that business companies in Bangladesh were smuggling heroine to U.K. and that profits accrued form trafficking in narcotics often went for funding Islamist groups.  \nResponses of Bangladesh Government and International Institutions \nPolicy to tackle terror financing was expedited after the series of bomb blasts in 2005. The BNP enacted the Foreign Donations (Voluntary Activities) Regulation (Amendment Act\, 2004). However\, political motivations have often been an impediment for sustained political action and an overt emphasis on NGOs let the real culprits go scot-free. The enactment of Money Laundering Prevention Act\, 2002 also proved ineffective as it was full of operational loopholes. Similarly the dismal record of Bangladeshi Banks in checking terror finance was also brought to attention. The author argued that Bangladeshi banks have received approximately 236 suspicious transitions since the MLPA was enacted in 2002\, but till date there has been no progress on the issue due to procedural problems.  \nThe author further argued that pressure from the United States has proved ineffective in triggering a behavioural change within Bangladesh. However\, he also noted the renewed interest of the United Nations in dealing with the problem of terror financing in Bangladesh since 2001. In 2005\, Government of Bangladesh became a party to the UN International Convention for the suppression for the financing of terrorism. The Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering is another key forum where Bangladesh is engaging to get transparency into the system of terror finance.  \nThe author concluded by stating that the issue of terror finance was a daunting challenge facing the government and political will needed to be strengthened in order to tackle the issue in a holistic manner.  \nSome of the points raised during the discussion were: \n\n\nOne should be careful of classifying all charities as sources for terror finance. Classification of Madarsas is also needed. \nDomestic\, regional and international issues responsible for terror financing should also be analysed. \nCauses of terrorism are generally found in the lack of development in Bangladesh\, which is perhaps becoming an important catalyst for recruiting people. \nOne needs to revisit pre 1971 years of undivided Pakistan to seek linkages between Pakistan and terrorism in Bangladesh. ISI links to terror financing should also be explored. \nSources on linkages between terror financing and their sources should be more diversified. \n\nThe seminar was chaired by Dr. Arvind Gupta\, LBSC Chair\, IDSA. Mr. Bhaskar Roy and Prof. Sanjay Bharadwaj were the external discussants; and Dr. Uttam Sinha and Capt. Alok Bansal were internal discussants  \nPrepared by Medha Bisht\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/terror-financing-in-bangladesh
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090220T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090220T053000
DTSTAMP:20261111T110951
CREATED:20231223T222326Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130250Z
UID:63720-1235107800-1235107800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Religious Assertion in Malaysia
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Sudhir DevareDiscussants: Baladas Ghoshal and C. S. Kuppuswamy \nThe major argument of the paper was that the government’s stance with regard to constraining religious assertion in Malaysia has been biased against non-Muslims. The government and society are carefully balancing their economic and religious interests\, so that the situation does not get worse. The internal security act has helped in constraining the influx of rigid religious assertion\, but the subdued disposition of civil courts and predominance of Shariah courts has created dissent among Christians\, Buddhists and Hindus. Economic development has led to the projection of Malaysia as one of the model states of development\, but religious assertion by the majority has created rifts within society. The emergence of a strong opposition and the probable change in leadership of the ruling coalition would mean that religion would become a more important factor in the coming years. Within Malaysian Society there has been awareness that increasing Islamisation or religious assertion threatening social religious harmony would not augur well for the future\, but religious issues have not been adequately addressed so far and neither has inter-faith dialogue been promoted. While the current situation is not alarming\, the future role of religious groups as well as political parties would determine whether Malaysia would stay on course as an economic power in the region or be derailed by religious polarisation. The constraints imposed by the state are working but there are strong indications of religious assertion having proliferated in society. \nAmbassador Sudhir Devare chaired the seminar. Prof. Baladas Ghoshala and Shri S.C.S. Kuppuswamy were the external discussants; and Alok R. Mukhopadhyay and Udai Bhanu Singh were the internal discussants. The following points were raised during the discussion: \n\nAs the lower income Malay Muslim is not economically strong\, he is worried about the political rights of the Chinese who are the economically stronger section of the population. \nModernization is perceived as an attack on Islam. \nThe question of Malaysians demanding the status of ‘Bhumiputras’ was raised and it was stated that they are an ethnically mixed race. Malaysia is the only country in Asia where ethnicity is synonymous with religion. Malay means Muslim. \nDoubts were also raised regarding the figures which state that Malay Muslims constitute 60 per cent of the country’s population. \nThe influence of the Deobandi sect reaches Malaysia from Bangladesh. \nThe Iranian Revolution presented a utopian world to the Muslim mindset; a Muslim country under Muslim laws could be established. \nMigration of rural Malays to urban areas and the consequent social dislocation has led to people leaning on Islam as a crutch\, thus facilitating the emergence of Islam as a factor in politics. \nIslamic schools are no longer under the control of the government but under the control of the Ulema. \nThere is also a heightened sense of insecurity among Malay women and a lot of social pressure. \nThe younger generation is becoming more religiously inclined and radicalized. \nOngoing changes in Malaysia might affect bilateral ties with India. Though Hindraf is seen as an internal issue\, India has raised this issue during bilateral talks.\n\nPrepared by Gunjan Singh\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/religious-assertion-in-malaysia
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090220T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090220T053000
DTSTAMP:20261111T110951
CREATED:20231223T222326Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130250Z
UID:63722-1235107800-1235107800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Rethinking Strategic Doctrine in the Indo-Pak Context
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Hari PrasadDiscussants: Arun Sahgal and Manpreet Sethi \nStrategic doctrine is taken here to be implemented by a combine of war fighting land\, air\, naval and joint doctrines in conjunction with nuclear doctrine. While with respect to China\, India has a doctrine of ‘dissuasive deterrence’\, it is contended in this paper that with respect to Pakistan it has moved from a deterrent doctrine to a more proactive and offensive doctrine that potentially countenances compellence. This paper looks at India’s strategic doctrine with respect to Pakistan. The hypothesis of this paper is that there has been a movement in India’s war fighting doctrine from deterrence to also countenance compellence. The paper attempts to assess this by first establishing the nature of the change and then analyzing its implications with respect to Indian grand strategy\, prospective political aims in conflict and likely effectiveness. The proposed direction of change forms its concluding recommendations. \nFrom a defensive and reactive mindset of the earlier years that gave rise to criticism that India lacks a strategic culture\, change in a compressed time period has been witnessed of late. These changes in nuclear and conventional doctrines are contrary to the logical expectation of the Nuclear Age necessitating deterrent doctrines. India is the status quo and stronger power in the regional India-Pakistan dyad. This should have logically led to a deterrent doctrine with a defensive bias\, since India\, not seeking any territorial gains at the expense of others\, could be expected to be more interested in preserving its interests and position. This has not been entirely borne out and instead India has apparently acquired a more offensive strategic doctrine in relation to its western front. \nAt the structural level\, the strategic cul de sac forced on India by Pakistan’s continuing proxy war is a reason for this change. Pakistan’s venturesome strategy has been attributed to the advent of the Nuclear Age dating to the covert acquisition of nuclear capability by Pakistan by the late eighties. In order to get Pakistan to forego its doctrine of sub conventional provocation\, deterrence has its limitations. Instead\, compellence\, going beyond the coercive diplomacy of the Operation Parakram kind\, may be necessary.  \nIndia’s straitened defence budgets through the nineties – brought on by liberalization – lead to a drawdown of the conventional deterrent. The ‘stability-instability paradox’ made its appearance with Pakistan choosing to engage India at the sub-conventional level. Stability at the upper nuclear and conventional level\, led to instability at the sub conventional level. This climaxed in Pakistani incursion across the Line of Control in Kargil in 1999. It has been posited that there is space for conventional operations between sub conventional and nuclear war. India has therefore moved towards an offensive doctrine that can be characterized as one of ‘compellence’\, when the land\, sea\, air and joint doctrines are taken conjointly with nuclear doctrine.  \nThe prognosis of future Limited War is that it would be short duration\, high intensity and from a ‘cold start’. It is expected that international pressures and need to limit costs would entail a short duration. To offset international pressures in the crisis management stage and for getting enemy defence under prepared\, a ‘cold start’ has been deemed necessary. This would enable India to make military gains through surprise\, by undercutting the mobilization differential that was earlier in favour of Pakistan.  \nIndia’s land warfare doctrine is essentially to create the conditions of launch of the major offensive by the strike corps. A salient ‘fire break’ between the pivot corps offensives in the first phase and the following strike corps deep offensives in the next phase can be discerned\, even though these offensive operations are likely to be in a seamless sequence\, not lending itself to breakdown in ‘phases’. This ‘fire break’ constitutes the crucial decision point in which India’s strategic\, political and diplomatic might needs to be combined with the impending application of military force to ensure Pakistan complies with Indian aims. The launch of the strike corps would be equivalent of a failure of grand strategy for it would bring the nuclear factor unmistakably into the reckoning. Since offensive operations would have to reckon with the nuclear reaction threshold of Pakistan\, a nuclear doctrine of ‘massive’ punitive retaliation comes under question. There is a case for move of nuclear doctrine to ‘flexible’ punitive retaliation. \nThere is need for maximizing synergy between the politico-diplomatic and military prongs of strategy to coincide with the ‘firebreak’ between launch of pivot and strike corps offensives. To keep these a seamless continuum is to unleash a ‘doomsday machine’. Launch of strike corps offensives\, unless it is as a counter offensive to Pakistani corps offensives as part of their ‘offensive defence’ doctrine\, would be to enter an uncertain strategic realm. Therefore\, a public shift from ‘massive’ punitive retaliation to ‘flexible’ punitive retaliation is in order at the nuclear level. At the conventional level must be taken into cognizance the ‘firebreak’ between the offensives of the pivot and strike corps as the key exit point with war termination pressures being maximized by an orchestration of Indian war grand strategy to culminate at this juncture\, if not prior to launch of cold start forces.  \nThe following points were raised during the discussion:  \n\nIt is difficult to make a sharp distinction between compellence and deterrence as the former is subsumed in the latter.\nIndia’s doctrine is not an offensive one\, but is reactive and therefore lends itself to deterrence as against compellence.\nBetter integration and jointness among the services is required to achieve war aims in future wars.\n\nPrepared by by Dr. Amarjeet Singh\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/rethinking-strategic-doctrine-in-the-indo-pak-context
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090227T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090227T053000
DTSTAMP:20261111T110951
CREATED:20231223T222326Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130250Z
UID:63719-1235712600-1235712600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Pakistan’s Strategic Thinking
DESCRIPTION:Chair: V.G PatankarDiscussants: Kalim Bahadur and Ajay D Behera \nPakistan’s self image\, geographical location and history have influenced the country’s strategic thinking. In the initial years\, Pakistan perceived itself to be a weak state and believed that India posed an existential threat to its security. However\, Islamabad’s thinking evolved over a period of time through its experience in various wars with India\, tension on the western borders\, developments in communications\, military doctrines\, military technology and weapons systems. For instance\, after its defeat in the 1971 war with India\, Pakistan decided to develop nuclear weapons. Following the acquisition of a nuclear capability was acquired in 1987\, nuclear deterrence became an important element of Pakistan’s strategic thinking. Similarly\, Islamic jihad based on young recruits from Pakistan mosques and madrassas played an important role in the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989.  \nDrivers for Pakistan’s Strategic Outlook\nPakistan has suffered from a small state syndrome ever since its inception. It feels a strong sense of disadvantage vis-à-vis India. Being one-fourth its territory and one-eighth of its population\, Pakistan feels pressured by being in the vicinity of a much larger Hindu dominated India.  \nPakistan was conscious of the fact that any attack from its perceived adversaries\, India to its East and Afghanistan/erstwhile Soviet Union in the West would leave it with very little strateg