BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//MP-IDSA - ECPv6.15.12.2//NONSGML v1.0//EN CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH X-ORIGINAL-URL:https://idsa.in X-WR-CALDESC:Events for MP-IDSA REFRESH-INTERVAL;VALUE=DURATION:PT1H X-Robots-Tag:noindex X-PUBLISHED-TTL:PT1H BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:Asia/Kolkata BEGIN:STANDARD TZOFFSETFROM:+0530 TZOFFSETTO:+0530 TZNAME:IST DTSTART:20160101T000000 END:STANDARD END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20170303T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20170303T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T193707 CREATED:20231224T102115Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250227T235917Z UID:64033-1488519000-1488519000@idsa.in SUMMARY:Is India Losing its Salience in the IOR to China? DESCRIPTION:1030 to 1300 hrs URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/is-india-losing-its-salience-in-the-ior-to-china CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20170415T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20170415T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T193707 CREATED:20231224T102115Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130237Z UID:64032-1492234200-1492234200@idsa.in SUMMARY:Transfer of Defence Technology – Exploring the Avenues for India DESCRIPTION:Venue: Seminar Hall I (Second Floor) \nDiscussants:\nS Guruprasad\nSujeet Samaddar\nAshok Kanodia\nVinay Kaushal\nJyotirmai Vyas URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/transfer-of-defence-technology-exploring-the-avenues-for-india CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20170505T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20170505T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T193707 CREATED:20231224T102114Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250227T235401Z UID:64031-1493962200-1493962200@idsa.in SUMMARY:Waiting for Godot:India and United Nations Security Council Reform DESCRIPTION:Participation in the Fellow Seminars is by invitation only.\nMedia person accredited with foreign media and foreign diplomats may seek prior permission from DDG\, IDSA @ telephone no. 26146832.\n\n\n\n\n1030 to 1300 hrs\n\n\nVenue: Seminar Hall I (Second Floor) URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/waiting-for-godotindia-and-united-nations-security-council-reform CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20170601T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20170601T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T193707 CREATED:20231224T102114Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250227T235236Z UID:64030-1496295000-1496295000@idsa.in SUMMARY:Peace Process in Nepal: Differences\, Dialogue and Digression DESCRIPTION:1030 to 1300 hrs \nVenue: Seminar Hall I (Second Floor) URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/peace-process-in-nepal-differences-dialogue-and-digression CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20170609T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20170609T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T193707 CREATED:20231224T102114Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250227T235106Z UID:64029-1496986200-1496986200@idsa.in SUMMARY:Securing Peace? Regime Types and Security Sector Reform in the Patani and Bangsamoro Peace Processes\, 2011-2016 DESCRIPTION:Participation in the Fellow Seminars is by invitation only.\nMedia person accredited with foreign media and foreign diplomats may seek prior permission from DDG\, IDSA @ telephone no. 26146832.\n\n\n\n\n1030 to 1300 hrs\n\n\nVenue: Seminar Hall I (Second Floor) URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/securing-peace-regime-types-and-security-sector-reform-in-the-patani-and-bangsamoro-peace-processes-2011-2016 CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20170623T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20170623T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T193707 CREATED:20231224T102015Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250227T234940Z UID:64028-1498195800-1498195800@idsa.in SUMMARY:Why China Supports Pakistan on Terrorism? DESCRIPTION:Participation in the Fellow Seminars is by invitation only.\nMedia person accredited with foreign media and foreign diplomats may seek prior permission from DDG\, IDSA @ telephone no. 26146832.\n\n\n\n\n1030 to 1300 hrs\n\n\nVenue: Seminar Hall I\, IDSA URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/why-china-supports-pakistan-on-terrorism CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20170713T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20170713T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T193707 CREATED:20231224T102015Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250227T234801Z UID:64027-1499923800-1499923800@idsa.in SUMMARY:India’s Strategic Security Cooperation with Israel: Scope and Analysis DESCRIPTION:Participation in the Fellow Seminars is by invitation only.\nMedia person accredited with foreign media and foreign diplomats may seek prior permission from DDG\, IDSA @ telephone no. 26146832.\n\n\n\n\n1100 hrs URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/indias-strategic-security-cooperation-with-israel-scope-and-analysis CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20170818T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20170818T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T193707 CREATED:20231224T102014Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250227T234635Z UID:64026-1503034200-1503034200@idsa.in SUMMARY:Turkey as a 'Model' for Arab World: Myth or Reality? DESCRIPTION:Participation in the Fellow Seminars is by invitation only.\nMedia person accredited with foreign media and foreign diplomats may seek prior permission from DDG\, IDSA @ telephone no. 26146832.\n\n\n\n\n1030 to 1300 hrs\n\n\nVenue: Seminar Hall I (Second Floor) \nChairperson: Shri Talmiz Ahmad\nExternal Discussants: Shri Sanjay Singh and Prof A K Mohapatra\nInternal Discussants: Dr Smruti S Pattanaik and Dr Adil Rasheed URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/turkey-as-a-model-for-arab-world-myth-or-reality CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20170825T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20170825T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T193707 CREATED:20231224T102014Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250227T234411Z UID:64025-1503639000-1503639000@idsa.in SUMMARY:Partial Accommodation without Conflict: India as a Rising Link Power DESCRIPTION:Participation in the Fellow Seminars is by invitation only.\nMedia person accredited with foreign media and foreign diplomats may seek prior permission from DDG\, IDSA @ telephone no. 26146832.\n\n\n\n\n1030 to 1300 hrs\n\n\nVenue: Seminar Hall I \, IDSA URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/partial-accommodation-without-conflict-india-as-a-rising-link-power CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20171027T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20171027T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T193707 CREATED:20231224T102014Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250227T233134Z UID:64024-1509082200-1509082200@idsa.in SUMMARY:India’s Military Modernisation and its Impact on Conventional Defence Strategies DESCRIPTION:Participation in the Fellow Seminars is by invitation only.\nMedia person accredited with foreign media and foreign diplomats may seek prior permission from DDG\, IDSA @ telephone no. 26146832.\n\n\n\n\n1030 to 1300 hrs\n\n\nVenue: Seminar Hall I (Second Floor)\, IDSA URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/indias-military-modernisation-and-its-impact-on-conventional-defence-strategies CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20171213T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20171213T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T193707 CREATED:20231224T101915Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250227T234229Z UID:64023-1513143000-1513143000@idsa.in SUMMARY:India-Taiwan Ties: Can They Move Beyond China’s Shadow? DESCRIPTION:Participation in the Fellow Seminars is by invitation only.\nMedia person accredited with foreign media and foreign diplomats may seek prior permission from DDG\, IDSA @ telephone no. 26146832.\n\n\n\n\n1030 to 1300 hrs\n\n\nVenue: Room No 005 (Ground Floor)\, IDSA URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/india-taiwan-ties-can-they-move-beyond-chinas-shadow CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20180105T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20180105T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T193707 CREATED:20231224T101914Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250227T234011Z UID:64022-1515130200-1515130200@idsa.in SUMMARY:Debating Security in Japan DESCRIPTION:Participation in the Fellow Seminars is by invitation only.\nMedia person accredited with foreign media and foreign diplomats may seek prior permission from DDG\, IDSA @ telephone no. 26146832.\n\n\n\n\n1030 to 1300 hrs\n\n\nVenue: Seminar Hall I (Second Floor)\, IDSA URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/debating-security-in-japan CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20180119T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20180119T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T193707 CREATED:20231223T132907Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130236Z UID:63061-1516339800-1516339800@idsa.in SUMMARY:The Nitisara or the Elements of Polity by Kamandaka: Continuity and Change from Kautilya’s Arthashastra DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Amb A. N. D. Haksar (Retd)External Discussants: Prof. Jayati Srivastava\, Dr. Medha Bisht\, Dr. Saurabh MishraInternal Discussants: Gp. Capt. K. K. Khera\, Col. Vikrant Deshpande \nMajor Arguments of the Paper\nSince India is one of the longest surviving civilisations\, there is likelihood that principles of statecraft are continuing through ages. This paper probes this possibility and argues that many concepts and principles of statecraft in India have not changed and that continuity is embedded in the vocabulary and concepts in the Indian tradition. They have survived due to their own enduring logic. This paper compares Arthasastra and Nitisara and analyses the enduring continuities in statecraft\, diplomacy and aspects of warfare. It seeks answers to the following questions: (a) What are the continuities and changes in the vocabulary and concepts from Kautilya’s Arthasastra to Nitisara?; (b) What is the vocabulary of Kamandaka in a stand-alone mode?; and\, (c) What is the contemporary relevance of the answers to these findings? \nThe author found both texts are ahistorical\, dealing with the acquisition of wealth and its distribution and emphasising on war as the last resort. Some common aspects adhered to in both the texts are: mastering of control over the senses including non-violence; the need to ensure that the state of matsyanyaya does not prevail; anvikshiki; maintaining balance among dharma\, artha and kama; importance of intelligence; the seven prakrits and twelve vijigisus in a circle of kings or mandala theory; six measures of foreign policy; the upayas in which there is no war mongering and use of force is the last resort; issues of disasters (vysanas) that may afflict the constituent elements (prakrits) and how to overcome them prior to the execution of a policy; duties of diplomats and intelligence gathering; and\, aspects of war and use of power by sticking to the priorities of mantra-shakti (counsel or diplomacy)\, prabhav-shakti (economic and military power)\, and utsah-shakti (leadership). \nThe paper also points out the dissimilarities in concepts employed by the two texts. To begin with\, while Kautilya’s work is inspired by statesmanship and is of a complex nature often questioning earlier scholars\, Kamandaka’s is a lucid and academic work and an abridged version of the Arthasastra. In terms of uniqueness\, Kamandaka stands out for deliberating at length not only on the four upayas (as mentioned in the Arthasastra) of sama \, dana\, bheda and danda but also the powerful concept of Upeksha (a combination of neglect or diplomatic indifference and the supreme virtue of patience) which was the strategy adopted by the Indian freedom movement. The impact of Kamandaka can be further seen on the Hitopadesa by Narayana\, which has 90 verses of Kamandaka including sixteen types of alliances. \nIn the end\, the paper argues that India’s geo-cultural space extends beyond the Himalayas up to Central Asia. This has also been highlighted by the History Division of the Ministry of External Affairs in the second White Paper published in 1959 “Historical Background of the Himalayan Frontier of India\,” in which the Raghuvamsha of Kalidas is mentioned. In both this White Paper and in the text of Kamandaka\, there is mention of the Kushan empire and Kanishka. \nMajor points of discussion and suggestions to the author\n\nThe time frame of both the Arthasastra and Nitisara as well as the context in which they were written forms a significant background for the comparison process. Further\, the Buddhist influence on Kamandaka and Kautilya can enrich the paper by providing another dimension. \nThematic structuring of the paper can be done on the basis of Kamandaka’s notions on war\, tactics\, ethics\, dharma\, etc.\, and an overall idea can be given about what is distinctive about Indian texts as compared to western texts. \nWhen one approaches a non-western text\, the method adopted should be devoid of an interpretative orientation and frames of comparison. Further\, the techniques of communication should be picked carefully focusing on the inclusive macro tradition over multiple micro traditions.\nMethodology adopted by these texts can be discussed in the paper along with historical similarities and dissimilarities as well as political situation of that time while explaining the central themes of both\, mentioning their categorization along with the reason for dissimilarities and commonalities. \nThe difference between Nitisara and Arthasastra lies in the idea of legitimacy which changed over time. While Arthasastra was dependent on deliverance of kingly duties\, Nitisara focuses on valour and the military qualities of the ruler.\nAuthor’s personal opinion should come out more strongly amongst the commendable literature survey and referencing. And\, to extend its reach to the masses\, the paper can be made more lucid.\n\nReport prepared by Ms. Lakshmi Priya\, Research Assistant\, IDSA. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-nitisara-or-the-elements-of-polity-by-kamandaka-continuity-and-change-from-kautilyas-arthashastra CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20180405T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20180405T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T193707 CREATED:20231224T101914Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250227T233825Z UID:64021-1522906200-1522906200@idsa.in SUMMARY:India - Kenya Maritime Security Cooperation: An Appraisal DESCRIPTION:Participation in the Fellow Seminars is by invitation only.\nMedia person accredited with foreign media and foreign diplomats may seek prior permission from DDG\, IDSA @ telephone no. 26146832.\n\n\n\n\n1030 hrs\nVenue: Seminar Hall I (Second Floor) URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/india-kenya-maritime-security-cooperation-an-appraisal CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20180413T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20180413T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T193707 CREATED:20231224T101914Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250227T233638Z UID:64020-1523597400-1523597400@idsa.in SUMMARY:India-Africa Cooperation in Human Resource Development: Education\, Training and Skills DESCRIPTION:Participation in the Fellow Seminars is by invitation only.\nMedia person accredited with foreign media and foreign diplomats may seek prior permission from DDG\, IDSA @ telephone no. 26146832.\n\n\n\n\n1030 to 1300 hrs URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/india-africa-cooperation-in-human-resource-development-education-training-and-skills CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20180525T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20180525T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T193707 CREATED:20231224T101900Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130236Z UID:64019-1527226200-1527226200@idsa.in SUMMARY:Synthesis of Eurasian Trade Corridors: India‘s Strategic Centrality in the Emerging System DESCRIPTION:Venue: Room No. 005 (Ground Floor). URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/synthesis-of-eurasian-trade-corridors-indias-strategic-centrality-in-the-emerging-system CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20180601T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20180601T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T193707 CREATED:20231224T101859Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130236Z UID:64018-1527831000-1527831000@idsa.in SUMMARY:Manifestation of ISIS in India DESCRIPTION:Venue: Room No. 005 (Ground Floor) URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/manifestation-of-isis-in-india CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20180816T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20180816T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T193707 CREATED:20231224T101859Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130236Z UID:64017-1534397400-1534397400@idsa.in SUMMARY:Response to Quest for NAGALIM by Ethnic Groups/Tribes outside Nagaland DESCRIPTION:Venue: Seminar Hall I (Second Floor). URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/response-to-quest-for-nagalim-by-ethnic-groups-tribes-outside-nagaland CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20180831T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20180831T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T193707 CREATED:20231224T101859Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130236Z UID:64016-1535693400-1535693400@idsa.in SUMMARY:India - Japan Security Cooperation: Dynamics and Prospects DESCRIPTION:Venue: Seminar Hall I (Second Floor) URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/india-japan-security-cooperation-dynamics-and-prospects CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20180914T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20180914T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T193707 CREATED:20231224T101859Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130236Z UID:64015-1536903000-1536903000@idsa.in SUMMARY:Is there an Indian Way of Multilateralism? A Conceptual Inquiry DESCRIPTION:Venue: Room No. 005 (Ground Floor) URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/is-there-an-indian-way-of-multilateralism-a-conceptual-inquiry CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20190822T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20190822T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T193707 CREATED:20231224T101857Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130236Z UID:64014-1566451800-1566451800@idsa.in SUMMARY:Structural Reforms in PLA and Future Assessed Capabilities DESCRIPTION:Venue: Room No. 005 (Ground Floor) \nTopic: Structural Reforms in PLA and Future Assessed Capabilities URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/structural-reforms-in-pla-and-future-assessed-capabilities CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20210409T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20210409T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T193707 CREATED:20231224T101857Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130235Z UID:64013-1617946200-1617946200@idsa.in SUMMARY:India’s Response to the China Threat Since 1949 DESCRIPTION:Chair: Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General\, MP-IDSA \nPresenter: Dr. S. Kalyanaraman\, Research Fellow\, MP-IDSA \nExternal Discussants: Lt Gen J.S. Bajwa\, UYSM\, SM (Retd) and Prof Srikanth Kondapalli URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/indias-response-to-the-china-threat-since-1949 CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20230207T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20230207T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T193707 CREATED:20231223T131248Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130235Z UID:62953-1675747800-1675747800@idsa.in SUMMARY:Report of Fellows Seminar on The Geopolitics of Europe's Quest for Energy Security: Significant Achievements amid Myriad Challenges DESCRIPTION:A MP-IDSA Fellows Seminar by Dr. Swasti Rao\, Associate Fellow\, on “The Geopolitics of Europe’s Quest for Energy Security: Significant Achievements amid Myriad Challenges” was held on 7 February 2023. It was chaired by Prof. Gulshan Sachdeva\, Professor\, Jawaharlal Nehru University\, New Delhi. The external discussants were Dr. Lydia Powell\, Distinguished Fellow\, Observer Research Foundation (ORF)\, and Mr. Rajeev Lala\, Associate Director\, S&P Global. Ms. Anandita Bhada\, Research Analyst at MP-IDSA\, was the internal discussant. \nExecutive Summary \nAlmost a year into the war in Ukraine\, European nations have fast-tracked their energy diversification in order to reduce their dependency on Russia. The main issues are policies adopted by Europe to diversify\, the available options\, and prognosis for the future. \nDetailed Report\nThe Chair\, Prof. Gulshan Sachdeva\, in his opening remarks\, stated that diversification of energy supplies would likely have a major geopolitical implication. For example\, Europe moving towards the US for oil and Russia diversifying its energy exports away from Europe\, towards Asia would significantly impact the international arena. \nDr. Swasti Rao began her presentation with a question – “Does Europe want to diversify its energy requirements from Russia?” She replied in the affirmative but pointed out that the main issue is implementing this vision. The speaker then highlighted the structure of her paper before briefly delving into the ongoing developments in Russia-Ukraine war. \nDr. Rao stressed that Europe is seeking to completely wean itself away from Russian crude oil\, natural gas and coal. She highlighted Europe’s dependency on Russian energy amidst the differentiation in patterns and volume of such trade. She elaborated on the internal and external differences in Europe regarding the diversification process. She pointed out Europe’s plans to focus on alternative fuels in the form of hydrogen and nuclear\, apart from creating new energy maps and import corridors. The fact is that today Europe is looking into both short-term and long-term energy measures\, anchored to avoiding any potential dependency. For Europe\, the supply chains should not only be cost-effective but also more resilient.  \nDr. Rao highlighted the diversification measures undertaken by Europe. These include import diversification\, short-term energy imports\, protection of the most venerable cohorts\, and acceleration to new renewables.  \nThe speaker elaborated on the macro and micro energy trends in Europe – both before and since the conflict started. At the macro level\, there has been a systemic and sustainable shift away from Russian energy. At the micro-level\, Europe has sought to cut down domestic demand apart from transition to renewables. These steps are\, however\, hampered by limitations that include pipeline disruption\, oil re-routing\, global liquefaction capacity\, and failure to meet market goals. \nMoving to the issue of transition to renewables such as green hydrogen\, blue hydrogen\, and bio-methane\, Dr. Rao highlighted the sense of urgency in the form of new European pathways to develop these alternatives. She also referred to Europe’s attempts at developing new import corridors. She emphasised that one of the reasons for Europe’s ongoing support to Ukraine is anchored to Ukraine emerging as a promising option for green hydrogen. \nOn the issue of expanding avenues of energy cooperation between India and Europe\, Dr. Rao referred to the Trade Technology Council and ongoing bilateral discussions in the field of hydrogen. \nDr. Rao concluded by stating that Europe appears to have shown a strong political will to diversify yet it would need strong political leadership in what would likely be a very painful period ahead. \nDr. Lydia Powell:\nDr. Powell\, while complimenting the author for her presentation\, felt that there is scope for enhancing the analytical rigour of the paper by moving beyond the summarizing and descriptive aspects. This includes a more rigorous analysis of the post-Ukraine energy situation in Europe and its future. She observed that the speaker could qualitatively improve the section on “geopolitics of Europe’s quest for energy security”. \nDr. Powell gave a few more suggestions to improve the paper. First\, she suggested revising the opening section\, particularly the framing of whether the European Union (EU) can replace Russia in the context of energy. Second\, one needs to dwell on who the winners and losers of the current geopolitical scenario are – this includes Russia\, EU and the US. Also\, whether Russia’s calculations are long-term vis-à-vis short term? Third\, the speaker could address the question of whether the fossil fuel and nuclear industries are the winners in this climate. Fourth\, the speaker should address whether Asia has become the winner given the renewed focus on the continent amidst Russia’s growing energy exports to India and China. Similarly\, has the developing world lost out in the short term on account of their energy crisis? Fifth\, the paper must address its policy relevance\, particularly for India. \nMr. Rajeev Lala:\nMr. Rajeev Lala highlighted the need to add a caveat around hydrogen – “hope”\, especially on green hydrogen. Meanwhile\, there exists two proponents around hydrogen; one is the blue hydrogen proponent (led by Saudi Arabia) and the other being the green hydrogen proponents (led by Japan\, Korea\, Switzerland\, and South Korea). The key issue is financing\, as both technologies are expensive; hence it is still most policymakers’ hope. \nThere also exists a significant variation in European countries dependency on Russia. This has a direct bearing on each country’s national position on Russia with the most critical stand being taken by countries which have the least dependency. Mr. Lala suggested the need for a chart to show this correlation by providing the examples of energy dependencies of Germany and the United Kingdom on Russia. \nThe discussant called upon Dr. Rao to focus on the interconnectivity issue and the status of interconnectors across Europe. Meanwhile\, a section could be added on the risks for 2023 and what could go wrong. \nMr. Lala elaborated on ongoing discussions on “winter approaching” and its potential impact on Ukraine\, and stressed that winter has in fact already arrived in South Asia in the June-August period since all the gas markets are interconnected. He referred to its impact on Pakistan which is undergoing a prolonged energy crisis. In the same vein\, Europe’s energy diversification could impact the Indian gas market\, which the author should also focus on. \nMs. Anandita Bhada:\nThe discussant stressed on the need to highlight the winners and losers of the ongoing crisis. She referred to the eastern European countries\, who being less economically developed\, have found cheaper Russian energy more attractive. Ms. Bhada felt that the importance of interconnectors must be emphasized since several eastern European countries are landlocked or have a small coastline. In this\, the significance of Poland-Lithuania interconnector should be emphasised. She also referred to the concept of projects of common interests which help secure energy across the continent. This includes the Baltic Gas Pipeline connecting Norway via Denmark to Poland. \nApart from raising the question of financing\, Ms. Bhada highlighted the use of rare earth elements sourced from China for energy transition to renewables. She wondered whether a significant focus on renewables would mean Europe would have an increased dependence on China for rare-earth elements? Ms. Bhada also observed that the Brexit deal must be resolved for any substantial gains between Europe and the United Kingdom. Finally\, regarding the reduction of demand\, she pondered that by the time there is a reduction in the market for Russian energy sources\, the need for the substitute would increase; thus\, how would Europe balance it out?  \nProf. Gulshan Sachdeva:\nThe Chair complimented the author for her work. He also highlighted some of the areas of the paper which could be further improved. \nFirst\, the title could be formulated for a more precise understanding. Too many aspects within the title may create problems. There is also a need for more in-depth analysis of the geopolitical factors at play. \nSecond\, there is a need to have a discussion on the concept of energy security and what is the European understanding of energy security. There is also need to discuss the history of the European understanding of energy security from the past to the current era. \n Third\, Prof Sachdeva opined that the Literature Review might not be needed but gave the researcher the discretion to keep or remove it. \nFourth\, he highlighted the need to re-arrange the paper. In the introduction\, the researcher could highlight the European concept of energy security\, and then delve into the current geopolitical situation as a result of which Europe has chosen to adjust its energy security policies. \nFifth\, concerning the figures\, there is a need for primary data\, and the use of multiple graphics is confusing for the readers. For example\, a graph could be there for the situation before the Ukraine war and the current situation. \nSixth\, there is a need to refer to more primary documents from the European Union; for instance\, the Repower EU Plan needs to be added. \nSeventh\, Prof. Sachdeva observed that on India-EU collaboration\, the researcher could avoid the over-emphasis on hydrogen since it may divert from the crux of the paper. In this\, the paper needs to focus more on the impact of energy diversification on India. A country like India is significantly dependent on Russian arms and energy\, and there could be severe implications for the geopolitics of the Eurasian region. \nEighth\, the author must expand the conclusion. \nQuestions and Comments \nDeputy Director General\, Maj. Gen. (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi (Retd.)  agreed with the Chair on specific aspects of the paper which need to be reviewed. He observed that multilateralism is weakening\, maybe to a certain extent even fracturing\, which has led to multipolarity and emergence of regional groupings. In the past\, regional groupings were linked to geography but several of those links are now fractured. In the same vein\, he observed that geopolitics and ideology are fracturing existing trade agreements\, for example\, the EU- Russian energy mix and the US-China trade war. New alignments are shaping up\, and old friends and alliances are finding themselves on opposite sides of the energy alignment; simultaneously\, they are adapting and harmonizing with the current geopolitical situation. \nOn green hydrogen\, he emphasised that Indian researchers have been active. Nevertheless\, cost is a factor and the focus has also been more on blue hydrogen. The questions of economics trumping geopolitics and the success of the shift to hydrogen could be addressed. \nThe Q/A session broadly revolved around the themes of transition to greener energy\, energy security\, energy politics within Europe\, nuclear energy option\, North-South divide\, India’s ability to deal with global risks and the need to focus on West Asia.  \nThe speaker responded to the comments and questions. \n(Report prepared by Dr. Jason Wahlang\, Research Analyst\, Europe and Eurasia Centre\, MP-IDSA) URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/report-of-fellows-seminar-on-the-geopolitics-of-europes-quest-for-energy-security-significant-achievements-amid-myriad-challenges CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20230531T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20230531T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T193707 CREATED:20231223T130948Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130235Z UID:62930-1685511000-1685511000@idsa.in SUMMARY:MP-IDSA Fellows Seminar: Defence Public Sector Units and Exports DESCRIPTION:MP-IDSA Fellows Seminar by Dr. S. Samuel C. Rajiv\, Associate Fellow\, on ‘Defence Public Sector Units and Exports’ was held on 31 May 2023. It was chaired by Mr. Amit Cowshish\, Former Financial Advisor (Acquisition) Ministry of Defence\, and Former Distinguished Fellow\, MP-IDSA. The external discussants for the paper were Dr. Manisha Mathur\, Sr. Dy. GM\, International Marketing\, Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) and Dr. Sameer Patil\, Senior Fellow\, ORF\, Mumbai. Gp. Capt. (Dr.) Rajiv Kumar Narang (Retd.)\, Senior Fellow\, MP-IDSA\, and Col. (Dr.) Rajneesh Singh\, Research Fellow & Centre Coordinator\, Defence Industry and Economics Centre\, MP-IDSA\, were the internal discussants. \nExecutive Summary\nIn recent years\, India has experienced a significant surge in defence exports. The paper explored the primary issues faced by DPSU’s in research and development\, marketing\, and competition from international aerospace businesses. The DPSUs’ future success in the fiercely competitive defence export market would be essential for India’s military manufacturing and indigenisation aims. \nDetailed Report\nThe Chair\, Mr. Amit Cowshish opened the session by highlighting the 23 per cent growth in India’s defence exports from Rs. 686 Crore in Financial Year (FY) 2013-2014 to Rs. 16\,000 Crore in FY 2022-2023. This denotes the advancement in the design and development of the Indian defence industry in the global defence manufacturing sector. \nDr. Rajiv in his paper ‘Defence Public Sector Units and Exports’ noted that during the ten-year period 2012-23\, India exported defence equipment worth about Rs. 67\,500 cr. Exports surged from Rs. 446.77 crores in 2012-13 to Rs. 15\,918.16 cr in 2022-23. The paper examined issues related to exports by DPSUs and the Ordnance Factory Board (OFB). \nDr. Rajiv stated that ships overwhelmingly comprise the quantity of defence exports from India\, followed by helicopters/aircraft and sensors (radars etc). This is as against major global defence exporters\, like the US\, Russia\, France\, China and the UK\, for whom aircrafts constitute the major chunk of exports. The share of DPSU defence exports was over 56 per cent during 2013-14 and was about 9 per cent in 2021-22. The OFB share in the defence exports pie has reduced from nearly 3 per cent in 2013-14 to less than 1 per cent in 2021-22. \nDuring the ten-year period from 2012-22\, around Rs. 9600 crores is the value of exports (both defence and civil) executed by eight DPSUs. Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) has accounted for more than 37 per cent of all exports by DPSUs\, followed by Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) at over 30 per cent and Goa Shipyard Limited (GSL) at nearly 13 per cent. As for exports by the OFB during 2012-22\, about Rs. 688 crore worth of items/equipment have been exported. The OFB has exported various items like brake parachutes and ammunition to many countries over the years. \nDr. Rajiv gave certain examples of some significant export items by DPSUs. These included Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs) and helicopters to countries like Mauritius\, Sri Lanka\, Nepal\, Afghanistan\, Seychelles\, Namibia\, Ecuador and Suriname. Some of the significant contracts that the DPSUs did not succeed in securing have included the $300 mn contract for Frigates by Philippines in 2016 (which went to a South Korean firm) and $900 mn contract for Trainer Aircraft by Malaysia (which was again bagged by a South Korean competitor in 2023). \nDr. Rajiv then highlighted issues relating to DPSUs and R&D\, their marketing and strategic partnership efforts and use of Lines of Credit. He noted that most DPSUs have tie-ups with academic and research institutions like IITs. BEL has more than 300 collaborative R&D partners\, including with more than 150 MSMEs.  BEL has also been granted a total of 24 patents\, Mishra Dhatu Nigam Limited (MIDHANI) – five and Bharat Earth Movers Limited (BEML) – 12 patents respectively\, while shipyards like Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers (GRSE) have filed over 100 IPRs out of which more than 60 have been granted. BEL has the highest R&D spending among DPSUs while average R&D spending of Bharat Dynamics Limited (BDL) over the five-year period from 2017-22 has been less than 2 per cent. DPSUs have also been making efforts to increase their marketing footprint overseas\, with BEL\, HAL and GRSE at the forefront of such efforts. Dr. Rajiv noted that countries like Bangladesh\, Sri Lanka\, Mauritius\, and Surinam have used LoCs to source Indian defence equipment. \nDPSUs are actively participating in Request for Information (RFIs) and Request for Proposal (RFPs)\, to enhance their export profiles. Mazagon Dock Limited (MDL)\, for instance\, as of December 2021\, had responded to over 30 RFIs and RFPs\, involving nearly 200 vessels. The last vessel that was exported by MDL though was way back in 2014. DPSU shipyards point out that highly competitive markets and low pricing of the products from North–East Asian countries were some of the challenges. DPSU’s like HAL will continue to have stiff competition from global aerospace majors with their T-50 (Korea Aerospace Industries and Lockheed Martin)\, T-7A (Boeing and SAAB)\, or M 346 (Leonardo) Trainer Aircrafts. HAL though unveiled a new Hindustan Lead in Fighter (HLFT-42) Trainer Aircraft at the Aero India 2023. \n Goa Shipyard Limited (GSL) expects export order book of Rs. 1200 crore during 2021-25\, including OPVs and Corvettes to the Philippines Navy\, Fast Interceptor Boats (FIBs) to Comoros and Floating Docks to Sri Lanka. New DPSU corporate entities like Munitions India Limited (MIL) hope to increase exports from the existing 2 per cent of annual Value of Issue to 8 per cent by next year. \nGoing forward\, Dr. Rajiv noted that DPSU’s face a highly competitive export market for defence products. DPSUs are some of the biggest defence companies in the world in terms of sales. With the government’s stress on Atmanirbhar Bharat and ambitious targets relating to defence production\, defence exports and defence indigenisation\, the ability of the DPSUs to contribute to the exports pie will continue to be in focus. \nDr. Manisha Mathur\nDr. Mathur began by complimenting the author for the meticulous presentation of data and stated the need to analyse the challenges and various initiatives to increase India’s defence exports. She spoke about the various initiatives which Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) has been making in the expanding global defence market. \nDr. Mathur delved into the challenges in dealing with developing countries in the South Asian region\, particularly on the limited flexibility in the operations of the DPSUs compared to Chinese counterparts. In comparison\, the private sector might have greater flexibility. She delved into the various initiatives and efforts by the Indian Government\, High Commissions\, and Embassies to provide support through brand promotion\, participation in exhibitions\, and financial assistance such as Lines of Credit (LoC) from the Export-Import Bank of India to facilitate exports to these developing countries. Secondly\, she flagged that India is not part of the NATO supply chain\, which could have added to the exports pie. Thirdly\, Dr. Mathur stressed the need to focus on R&D\, customised solutions\, product support\, and leveraging licensed production of Russian platforms. However\, she also expressed caution in sharing sensitive defence information and maintaining the confidentiality of partner countries in the public. She was optimistic about the future course of defence exports and spoke on the upward trend in collaboration with foreign and private sectors; she was optimistic about swift clearance regarding defence exports and obtaining NOCs (No Objection Certificates). She added that there is growing interest in India’s defence sector\, pushed forward actively by the Raksha Mantri in his visits to countries in India’s extended neighbourhood as well as by a few countries appointing Defence Attaches to explore collaborative partnerships with the Indian defence industry. \nDr. Sameer Patil\nDr. Sameer Patil appreciated the comprehensive research and use of statistics. He stated that the declining share of Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs) might be attributed to factors such as the absence of critical technologies\, poor design capacities\, long gestation periods\, weak industry-academia interface\, and limited success in the commercial arena. He remarked that the paper would benefit from providing background information on the role of DPSUs and the Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) in defence manufacturing and the government’s initiatives to boost defence exports. Dr. Patil further suggested that the author may include an explanation for concepts like legacy liabilities and strategic partnerships and the link between capturing new markets and leveraging partnerships. He indicated that the paper may include a uniform usage of units and currency (USD or INR) throughout for clarity and comparison. \nGp. Capt. (Dr.) Rajeev Narang\nGroup Captain (Dr) Rajeev Narang emphasised the importance of understanding the factors that contribute to successful defence exports and identifying obstacles that hinder them. The Indian Government has implemented initiatives like Make in India\, Strategic Partnerships\, Joint Venture\, Transfer of Technology (TOT)\, and Aatmanirbhar Bharat to achieve self-reliance in technology and become a defence export hub. He commented that as the percentage of defence exports has increased\, the private sector has shown more significant growth than DPSUs. He stated that it is essential to differentiate between DPSUs to assess their value addition and export potential. Gp. Capt. Narang stated that collaboration with global manufacturers\, civil product exports\, and adherence to international standards are crucial to improve technology and export quality. Each institution has strengths\, challenges\, and associated areas influencing their export goals. \nGp. Capt. Narang stated the importance of user feedback from friendly countries\, which is crucial to evaluate the perception and quality of Indian defence products. He stressed that understanding limitations\, hurdles\, and reasons for missed projects helps assess export potential. He discussed the significance of factors like testing facilities\, standardisation\, accreditation\, and quality assurance that contribute to the growth of the export ecosystem. Gp. Capt. Narang elaborated on the challenges in global market entry\, user satisfaction\, supply lines\, and regional variations. Comparison with other countries\, such as China\, highlights the importance of assessing technology transfer and understanding their approach. Collaboration with global manufacturers\, civil product exports\, and understanding international standards and testing procedures play a role in improving technology and export quality. \nCol. (Dr.) Rajneesh Singh\nCol. (Dr.) Rajneesh Singh highlighted the decline in the share of defence exports by DPSUs in recent years from over 56 per cent in 2013-14 to approximately 9 per cent in 2021-22. In contrast\, the private sector’s share has surged to over 90 per cent during the same period. He stressed the need to study the reasons behind this substantial shift to understand the underlying factors. The Ordnance Factories turned DPSUs have witnessed a decline in their share of defence exports. He expanded on the potential reasons for this decline\, including unattractive product lists\, lack of competitive production quality/prices\, and marketing issues that should be  analysed. Col. Singh recommended that Ordnance Factories turned DPSUs should focus on establishing joint ventures with foreign Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs)\, producing critical items through technology transfer\, and engaging in collaborative innovation for defence research and development in niche technology areas. This strategic approach would optimise capacity utilisation\, enhance efficiency\, and facilitate modernisation with capability development. Moreover\, the assessment of defence export volume should carefully consider aspects like After-Sales Maintenance and Support\, overhaul\, and training and clarify whether these services are accounted for when receiving/executing the export order or at the time of payment realisation. \nCol. Singh suggested that a collaborative approach between various government ministries\, including the Ministry of Defence\, Ministry of External Affairs\, Department of Economic Affairs\, and Ministry of Corporate Affairs\, is vital to provide diplomatic support for achieving export orders\, facilitating technology transfer deals\, implementing offsets effectively\, producing dual-use technology items\, establishing joint ventures with foreign OEMs\, and forming strategic market partnerships. Furthermore\, DPSUs can be crucial in supporting defence Micro\, Small\, and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) by providing a suitable forum/platform for exports\, extending market support\, offering technological guidance\, and enhancing capability. Lastly\, to obtain a realistic assessment of the defence industry\, he suggested that a time period longer than a 10 years be considered. Such a timeframe would account for any spikes or irregularities in orders\, ensuring that accurate conclusions are drawn. \nMr. Amit Cowshish\nThe Chair appreciated the suggestions and recommended certain changes to be incorporated into the paper. \nFirstly\, he suggested including a list of policy measures the government has taken as it pertained to defence exports\, including issues like the Open General Export License (OGEL) and other procedural changes. \n Secondly\, he mentioned that\, while the paper focuses on R&D\, marketing efforts\, and LOCs as facilitators\, there is a need for more coverage of the limiting factors. \nThirdly\, Mr. Cowshish flagged data points on exports and value of authorisations and noted that countries like France consider both physical exports and authorisation values\, to get a better picture of the country’s defence exports. \nFourthly\, he clarified that DPSUs also manufacture civilian products and make efforts to segregate defence export figures from civilian products. \nFinally\, he also highlighted the role of the private sector in defence exports\, along with changes in acquisition procedures and offsets. He commented on the limitations of obtaining user inputs and mentioned the limited market in the neighbourhood but expressed hope for success in Southeast Asia\, Central Asia\, and South America. Finally\, the significance of Micro\, Small\, and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) in the defence export story and their collaboration with DPSUs was flagged. \nDr .Rajiv expressed gratitude for the constructive comments and suggestions and stated that he intended to incorporate them to the extent possible while revising the paper and also use the suggestions for future research. \nQuestions and Comments\nThe Director General Amb. Sujan R. Chinoy began his comments on the paper by suggesting the inclusion of the initiatives for critical and emerging technologies between India and the US\, as India was recognised as a major defence partner in 2016 and was given the STA-1 status in 2018 by the US. These steps aim to boost India’s technology and R&D capabilities\, which can potentially impact the country’s defence as well as high-technology exports. He cited the example of the GE 414 afterburning turbofan engine\, on which India and the US are expected to sign a major deal during the visit of Prime Minister Modi to the US. Amb. Chinoy enquired as to how best we can utlisise such opportunities to enhance the domestic manufacturing base. Secondly\, he advised the author to include the contribution of positive indigenisation lists for Atmanirbhar Bharat\, on Indian manufacturing capabilities and its effect on exports. Thirdly\, he  enquired whether we can categorise long-term lease arrangements as defence exports\, like the transfer of the Kilo-class submarine\, INS Sindhuvir to Myanmar. Amb. Chinoy also flagged the Chinese example of using a European engine in the C919 commercial aircraft\, which they are aggressively marketing for exports. He also asked the author to explore the connection between Indian Armed Forces’ procurement decisions and exports. If the Indian Armed Forces purchase in large quantities significant equipment like the LCA Tejas\, given the  Rs 48\,000 crore deal\, it should naturally translate\, sooner or later\, into possible export opportunities for the indigenous fighter aircraft powered by the US engine. Lastly\, Amb. Chinoy flagged the need for appropriate decision-making vis-à-vis R&D investments\, including on aspects relating to when to enter the technology lifecycle and which specific technologies to focus on. \nDeputy Director General Maj. Gen. (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi commented on Dr. Mathur’s statement where she mentioned the importance of entering the NATO supply chain and highlighted the substantial defence budget of the US. Gen. Bakshi flagged the possibility of Indian companies benefiting if and when India and the US sign the Reciprocal Defence Procurement (RDP) Agreement\, which seems to be in the works. He flagged business opportunities in terms of Maintenance\, Repair and Operations (MRO) of Russian equipment in the inventories of other countries\, given the current geo-political scenario. Gen Bakshi suggested that testing and accreditation facilities in the public sector need to be made more accessible to the private sector defence companies as well. The limitations in critical technologies such as chips\, engines\, and precision guided munitions was flagged. \nThe Q/A session broadly revolved around the themes of indigenisation\, defence exports\, joint ventures arrangements\, as well as public and private defence industries. \nThe speaker responded to the comments and questions. \n(Report prepared by Ms. Shayesta Nishat Ahmed\, Research Analyst\, Defence Economics and Industry Centre\, MP-IDSA).   URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/mp-idsa-fellows-seminar-defence-public-sector-units-and-exports CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20230720T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20230720T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T193707 CREATED:20231223T130901Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130235Z UID:62920-1689831000-1689831000@idsa.in SUMMARY:MP-IDSA Fellows Seminar : Influence Operations: Winning Without Waging Wars in the 21st Century DESCRIPTION:An MP-IDSA Fellows Seminar presentation by Dr. Adil Rasheed\, Research Fellow\, on “Influence Operations: Winning Without Waging Wars in the 21st Century” was held on 20 July 2023. It was chaired by Lt. Gen. (Dr.) Rakesh Sharma (Retd.)\, Member\, Executive Council\, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA). The External Discussants were Maj. Gen. Roopesh Mehta\, ADG CD (B) IHQ\, and Mr. Vinit Goenka\, Secretary\, Centre for Knowledge Sovereignty (CKS). Maj. Gen. (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi (Retd.)\, Deputy Director General\, MP-IDSA; Lt. Gen. Akshat Upadhyay\, Research Fellow\, MP-IDSA; and Ms. Shruti Pandalai\, Associate Fellow\, MP-IDSA were Internal Discussants. \nExecutive Summary \nInfluence Operations (IO)\, a battle of narratives\, is considered a new and rapidly-evolving field of study. Russia\, China\, the US\, and Pakistan have been at the forefront of using their strategy. It pertains to clandestine operations that can manipulate and influence individuals’ and governments’ perceptions\, decisions\, and cognition of individuals and governments. IO includes active measures carried out by the erstwhile Soviet Union and is a non-kinetic form of warfare. It also gives each country relying on this strategy plausible deniability while conducting its activities. Social media\, big tech\, and artificial intelligence are crucial in this regard. \nDetailed Report \nIn his opening remarks\, the Chair\, Lt. Gen. (Dr.) Rakesh Sharma (Retd.) stated that Information Warfare (IW) is the future warfare strategy. He further stated that besides India’s victory in 1971\, no wars have genuinely been won in the 21st century. \nDr. Adil Rasheed began by introducing the topic of his paper\, Influence Operations (IO)\, a form of high-tech and hybrid warfare. One of the key definitions provided by the speaker was borrowed from Facebook\, according to which IO refers to coordinated efforts to manipulate or corrupt public debate for a strategic goal. It was initially defined by RAND Corporation in 2009. IO could also be divided into three categories\, i.e.\, political and economic\, information\, and psychological. \nDr. Rasheed clarified that his study encompasses the assessment of IO carried out by Russia\, China\, the United States (US)\, and Pakistan. He added that wars are now fought in the virtual space and cognitive domain. These operations include offline and online measures to infiltrate political institutions and processes of other countries\, making them incapable of going to war. He elaborated on IO benefits\, such as being highly adaptive and effective\, low-cost\, and sustainable in peacetime. Today\, it is associated with a foreign and maligned sharp power technique\, including subversive public diplomacy\, crowd manipulations\, engineering colour revolutions and agitations\, and election meddling. In addition\, social media has amplified IO’s impact through trolling\, flaming\, doxing\, posting dark advertisements\, presenting Potemkin villages of evidence\, and participating in cognitive hacking. \nHe said that countries like China have relied on their diaspora based in foreign countries\, such as the US\, to act as spies and carry out industrial espionage. As per the Mueller Report\, Russia was involved in elected meddling in the US in 2016\, resulting in President Trump’s victory.  \nAt the same time\, the US\, despite referring to IO as a threat to democracy\, has intervened in approximately 81 foreign elections\, often accused by Russia and China of instigating colour revolutions and the Arab Spring. The speaker delved into ISI and ISPR’s (PR wing of ISI) role in spearheading and sustaining Pakistan’s IO\, articulating that ISI engages in Soviet-styled active measures. Simultaneously\, the role of diaspora and radicalisation through madrassas based in Jammu and Kashmir\, Bangladesh\, and Nepal have been essential to Pakistan’s IO strategy. \nThe speaker suggested that therefore\, some key counter-measures India can adopt to address such threats include censorship of programmes aired on online streaming platforms\, formulating a coherent and regulated social media policy and guidelines for protests and agitations\, and reforming madrassas.  \nDr. Rasheed stated that digital and online tactics and techniques are associated with IO strategy\, and some of the counter-measures involve capacity building\, implementing effective and regulatory legal frameworks\, and deterrence. \nMaj. Gen. Roopesh Mehta spoke about the need to simplify IO as a term to counter these operations effectively. He also explained that Information Warfare (IW)/IO timeline is immaterial\, regardless of whether it occurs in peacetime or war. \nIO is a long-term strategy involving a battle of narratives. IO has two fundamental aims: turning a rival power into a modern vassal state or weakening it sufficiently to ensure it is neutralised as a threat. There are multiple layers of intervention concerning IO\, which is not amenable to positive control. He also underscored how high-quality and appealing content must be disseminated swiftly in the IO/IW space as an antidote to misinformation and disinformation. \nFurthermore\, he presented his perspective on the Indian Army’s role in Kashmir and how ISI has been exploiting social media since 2014. Between 2015 and 2017\, i.e.\, when Burhan Wani was active\, there was immense synergy between the local media in the Kashmir Valley and developments in Pakistan. Therefore\, India must draw lessons from this example. As far as China is concerned\, its IO has proven more effective internally\, while its impact externally remains debatable. Nevertheless\, Indian leaders cannot rely on examples of authoritarian states such as Pakistan and China to establish IO-related institutions in the country. The US\, however\, has struggled to be effective in this domain and is a soft target since it has mainly relied on brute force to implement its agendas. \nHe talked about some key issues to be considered while discussing IO/OW. Firstly\, ISIS successfully exploited social media to convince people worldwide to join its caliphate since 2014. Secondly\, social media is an unfair terrain. Thirdly\, India’s geography and diversity make the establishment of centralised control a challenging task. Fourthly\, developments in IO are multiplying faster than legislative actions can be introduced to address them. Fifthly\, information space is a reality. He said that therefore\, these trends require a robust Indian response\, an improved fact check and tech ban eco-system\, collaboration with agencies such as Tech Against Terror\, and sensitising the citizens towards challenges such as fake news and propaganda. \nMr. Vinit Goenka explained how colonisation by might in the erstwhile times has transformed into colonisation by big data today. Additionally\, IO\, a non-kinetic form of warfare\, is not a time-bound strategy. He further presented three cases about IO potency. As per one of them\, India’s western neighbour had used the local Marathi dialect online to stir up agitation against the development of a metro station near the Aarey colony in Mumbai. One of the other examples was a BBC documentary (1998) aired over 83 times in one year about AIDS-afflicted Indian truck drivers as a form of psychological warfare. \nHe recommended that the speaker examine the role of lone wolves who seek to gain notoriety through IO and are not beholden to an ideology or a country. \nMaj. Gen (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi (Retd.) expounded on the multiple terminologies being used in this context\, which he felt\, need to be simplified\, to make the paper more comprehensible. He went on to trace the terminology’s evolution over the past decades. \nIn the World War era\, he explained that the only terms in use were psychological warfare and deception. With the advent of electronic and digital media\, he mentioned the evolving terminologies of perception management\, cyber warfare\, information operations\, and strategic communication. He further delved into the linkages between Arthashastra and IW and how the latter has always been a part of Chinese military strategy in Sun Tzu’s writings\, therefore the concepts are actually age-old. Moreover\, he explained that information operations had been broadly segregated by the US military into two components\, i.e.\, information technical operations and information and influence operations\, an error according to him\, given the Russian and Chinese integrated approach in this domain. \nThe discussant also spoke about how\, in recent times\, unverified bulk transmissions have been occurring with no editorial oversight\, while assessing the differing components of perception management (PM) and the correlation between IW and PM. Additionally\, the US Military Cyber Command Team’s role in training Ukrainians since 2014 against Russian IO\, the inauguration of Singapore’s fourth military branch – Digital and Intelligence Service –\, Chinese and Russian IO\, the need to secure information space\, India’s 2010 IW doctrine\, and the November 2020 regulation about monitoring online streaming platforms was also discussed. In addition\, he underlined the need for states to flood the information space with timely\, credible data to avoid conjecture by uncontrolled media in an information vacuum.  \nRegarding the disclaimer in the the paper wherein Non- State actors and terrorist organisations were not being covered\, he suggested a greater focus on state response to this challenge\, with particular reference to India. He outlined the various organisations working in this space in India and recommended the establishment of an HR vertical in IO/ IW domain.  He also underlined the need to synergise organisations working separately in Cyber\, Cognitive and Physical dimensions\, with a nominated lead agency to better coordinate the state response in the Information domain. He further recommended that we must generate an All of Nation response to this challenge\, and integrate at two levels; Firstly the physical\, cyber\, and technical dimensions\, and Secondly\, Government\, Military\, Industry\, Academia\, and Civil Society. \nFinally he suggested that the speaker may review if IO is actually a new constituent of hybrid warfare\, and whether the cognitive domain is the sixth domain of warfare\, as mentioned in the paper\, or actually a part of the fifth domain- Information Domain\, the first four being land\, sea\, air and space. \nLt. Col. Akshat Upadhyay stated that the speaker must introduce more clarity into his paper\, modify its title and scope\, and provide contextualisation for various terminologies mentioned. He also emphasised the need to expand the IO ambit as part of his research and expound on relevant statistical and anecdotal examples. There is also a need to examine the relationship between IO and truth\, list sharp techniques associated with IO\, and provide a more nuanced understanding of cognitive warfare. \nAt the same time\, the speaker must account for how IO is not inherently malicious or positive and is merely a tool that state and non-state actors can use. It is also a battle of narratives. The discussant presented examples from the Gulf of Tonkin incident (Vietnam War) and humane treatment meted out by Indian officers to dead Pakistani soldiers during the Kargil War to support his argument. Lt. Col. Upadhyay delved into how the paper presented must re-orient from a West-centric approach and assess how Western countries have carried out IO elsewhere. Moreover\, concrete examples are required to support assertions regarding US’ involvement in IO abroad. \nHe also suggested that Dr. Rasheed analyse how the Soviet Union (now Russia) earlier used active measures to weaken NATO and establish continuity between its cold war strategies and contemporary tactics in Ukraine. Furthermore\, India must institutionalise IO instead of relying on reactive counter-measures since the recommendations suggested in the paper will increase countries’ vulnerabilities instead of reducing them. \nMs. Shruti Pandalai lauded that Dr. Rasheed has attempted to simplify a complex and evolving field\, and it is improbable that one can distinguish between IW and IO. She said that there are divergences\, convergences\, and collaboration between Russian and Chinese IO\, as visible in Hong Kong\, Taiwan\, and Ukraine. An assertive China has increasingly adopted Russian tactics\, which have ranged from controlling the diaspora and external and internal narratives in China’s favour. \nAccording to her\, the events in Ukraine demonstrate big tech and the West’s role in controlling and strengthening the narrative in Ukraine’s favour. She also pointed out that US’s Global Engagement Council\, run by the US State Department\, a grouping focused on combating disinformation\, is inward-looking in its outlook.   \nShe pointed out that Dr. Rasheed needs to examine contemporary debates about IO\, including artificial intelligence and big data\, while being more cognisant of Western IO. At the same time\, she emphasised that censorship of online streaming platforms\, as suggested by the speaker\, will be an ineffective deterrent in India. Finally\, she believes it is necessary to focus on lessons learned. \nLt. Gen. Rakesh Sharma (Retd.) suggested modifications to the paper’s title to adequately capture the core arguments and for Dr. Rasheed to account for how states use non-state actors in the IO/IW domain and refrain from using disclaimers. At the same time\, he urged caution in using terms such as hybrid warfare while he elaborated on Chinese IO in the US\, the United Nations Human Rights Council and India\, and Russia’s IO in the United Kingdom during the Brexit vote and differing interpretations about war. Furthermore\, he emphasised the need to establish a national cognitive agency in India. \nHe also recommended that the speaker provide clarification about actors in India empowered to conduct cognitive warfare\, India’s endgame regarding IO against China\, and simplify terminologies used in the paper. \nQ/A Session\nDirector General\, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy affirmed the need to examine all narratives concerning IO\, including the insidious attempts by the West or current adversaries like Pakistan and China to prepare for the future adequately. He suggested that the paper look deeper into the role of IO/IW within India and the transboundary civil society actors’ involvement in these domains since their potency rivals big tech. At the same time\, there is a requirement to assess if proposed Indian narratives are based on consensus and where challenges lie. Finally\, an agnostic approach to values in IO/IW domain must be practiced. \nSome of the other themes discussed in the Q/A session included strategic relevance behind IO/IW in fields of health and disease\, for example\, the anti-vaccine campaign in the West\, the scope of visibility of Indian IO\, the need to analyse vulnerabilities in each segment of the population for antidotes to be forged\, lack of domestic consensus on responding to IO threats against India\, the synergy between state and non-state actors\, and quantification of influence. \nDr. Rasheed responded to the comments and questions raised. \nThis report was prepared by Ms. Saman Ayesha Kidwai\, Research Analyst\, Counter-Terrorism Centre\, MP-IDSA. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/mp-idsa-fellows-seminar-influence-operations-winning-without-waging-wars-in-the-21st-century CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20231026T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20231026T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T193707 CREATED:20240514T030756Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250828T053327Z UID:81218-1698298200-1698298200@idsa.in SUMMARY:Report of MP-IDSA Fellows Seminar: “Iran in the Emerging (Eur)Asian Order: Mapping the Rise of a Regional Middle Power” DESCRIPTION:Dr. Deepika Saraswat\, Associate Fellow\, West Asia Centre\, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA)\, presented her Fellow Paper on “Iran in the Emerging (Eur)Asian Order: Mapping the Rise of a Regional Middle Power” at the MP-IDSA Fellows Seminar held on 26 October 2023. The Seminar was chaired by Professor Gulshan Dietl\, former Professor\, School of International Studies (SIS)\, Jawaharlal Nehru University. The External Discussants were Professor A.K. Ramakrishnan\, Centre for West Asian Studies\, SIS\, Jawaharlal Nehru University and Dr. Meena Singh Roy\, Senior Fellow (West and Central Asia)\, Tillotama Foundation. Dr. Rajorshi Roy\, Associate Fellow\, Europe and Eurasia Centre and Dr. Jason Wahlang\, Research Analyst\, Europe and Eurasia Centre\, MP-IDSA\, were Internal Discussants. Director General of MP-IDSA\, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy and scholars of the Institute attended the Seminar. \nExecutive Summary\nThree noteworthy trends delineate Iran’s emerging middle power behaviour. Firstly\, there is a proactive involvement in Asian multilateralism\, exemplified by active participation in regional institutions like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Secondly\, Iran employs an ideational strategy that leverages its civilisational identity and values as a foundation for nurturing an Asian regional security community. Thirdly\, Iran strategically positions itself as a geographic-civilisational “bridge\,” actively facilitating connections in transcontinental connectivity initiatives spearheaded by major powers\, including China\, Russia\, and India. These trends collectively signify Iran’s role in shaping the geoeconomic landscape of (Eur)Asia. \nDetailed Report\nIn his opening remarks\, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy welcomed the Chair and the External and Internal Discussants. He emphasised the importance of Iran being a part of India’s close neighbourhood and how India’s Act West policy encapsulates geopolitical and civilisational relations. He stated that Iran has special significance in West Asian politics. Amb. Chinoy highlighted that Iran frequently remains in the news for one or other issues like being part of a long-drawn imbroglio in Yemen with the Houthi problem\, Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)\, nuclear postures\, bilateral relations with the US\, and peace and security in the Persian Gulf. He outlined the role of Iran in the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC). \nIt was also noted that Iran has been a general outlier in the international system but gains a significant constituency when required. Its bilateral relations with India are mostly on a reciprocal basis. Amb. Chinoy recalled his tenure at the UN from 1992-1995 and specified that\, particularly in 1994-95\, Iran was instrumental in helping India counter Pakistan-backed human rights resolutions in Geneva. \nIntroducing the topic\, Dr. Deepika Saraswat highlighted the context of Iran’s return to a ‘Look East’ strategy and emerging middle power behaviour. She stated that Iran preferred Eastern partnerships over the West\, advocating closer ties with neighbouring nations and collaboration with countries sharing common goals. As a Persian country\, Iran desired to find a home in Asia to overcome identity isolation. Iran’s preference for the term “West Asia” over “Middle East” indicates this transformative paradigm. Dr. Saraswat further pointed out that Iran strategically channels its investments in Asia\, forging alliances with rising powers such as China\, India\, and Russia. Iran is seeing growing convergence between East\, Central\, West and South Asian regional systems. Dr. Saraswat highlighted the significance of Iran’s outlook in the evolving geopolitical landscape where mega connectivity projects are seen cooperatively\, considering it an opportunity. Iran has placed development-security connections and regional connectivity at the forefront of its regional cooperation initiatives. \nThe Speaker outlined multiple definitions of middle powers to contextualise Iran’s position. Middle powers possess the military and strategic strength requisite to elicit support from great powers during peacetime. Although they may not emerge victorious against great powers in times of conflict\, these middle powers can inflict disproportionate costs upon them. She articulated that being categorised as a middle power involves possessing specific capabilities\, adopting a particular attitude\, and asserting a distinct national identity. \nTo analyse Iran’s behaviour\, Dr. Saraswat used the concept of emerging middle powers\, especially in the post-Cold War era context. Emerging middle powers possess substantial relative power advantages over their smaller neighbours. These nations manifest dissatisfaction with their current standing and aspire to carve an independent trajectory guided by their interests\, values\, and ambitions for regional and global influence. Notably\, many of these middle powers have historical and cultural backgrounds that align with the concept of civilisational states. She highlighted that revisionist emerging middle powers actively seek to reshape the prevailing international order\, often aligning themselves with revisionist great powers in pursuit of their objectives. \nIran has positioned the “Look East” policy or “Asia orientation” as a central focus within incumbent Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi’s led foreign policy framework. The formalisation of Iran’s deepening engagement with Eur(Asia) was marked by its full membership approval in the SCO during the 21st summit\, a development Dr. Saraswat identified as a significant milestone in Iran’s evolving regional strategy. \nPositioned as a middle power\, Iran has demonstrated several key behaviours\, as outlined by the speaker: \nFirstly\, Iran has actively embraced “Asian multilateralism” by participating in regional institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). Initially joining as an Observer in 2004\, Iran applied for full membership in 2008\, ultimately achieving it in 2023. Dr. Saraswat contextualised this Iranian initiative within the institutional balancing framework\, replacing conventional military means with a focus on leveraging multilateral institutions to gain power and influence in world politics. Ebrahim Raisi’s address at the UNGA in 2023\, envisioning a novel and equitable world order rooted in regional cooperation\, was cited as evidence of Iran’s commitment to this approach. The Speaker noted that the withdrawal of the United States from Afghanistan\, coupled with the subsequent takeover by the Taliban\, has not only highlighted the diminishing influence of the US in shaping the regional order but has also triggered a realignment in the regional geopolitical landscape. Iran’s involvement in the 3+3 regional cooperation format to resolve problems of the South Caucasus without the interference of extra-regional and Western countries is a part of its regional diplomacy. \nSecondly\, Iran has employed its civilisational identity and values to construct an ideational strategy to foster an Asian regional security community. Dr. Saraswat highlighted Iran’s practice of framing bilateral ties with Asian powers\, including India and China\, in civilisational terms. Iran’s leaders have offered a conception of Asia as comprising diverse civilisations and cultures\, emphasising regional cultural and ideational autonomy and rejection of the Western normative universalism based on liberal democracy. The call for endogenous security and Asian unity by Iran was noted to align with the Chinese President’s ‘new Asian security concept\,’ emphasising the leadership of Asians in Asian affairs. The Speaker also mentioned  Iran’s effort toward displacing Turkiye’s ethnic-linguistic narrative of pan-Turkism. \nThirdly\, drawing from its notion of geographical centrality\, Iran strategically positions itself as a geographic-civilisational “bridge\,” actively connecting transcontinental connectivity initiatives spearheaded by China\, Russia\, and India. Iran considers itself a civilisational crossroad in the Silk Road narrative. The Speaker argued that Iran looks at the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) with both optimism and fear as BRI proposes to address the development deficit but can have adverse geopolitical implications. BRI may lead to Russia-China’s ‘Great Game’ and can have implications for Iran’s transit potential and bargaining power in Central Asian energy markets. This role underscores Iran’s significance in facilitating broader regional cooperation and integration. Dr. Saraswat also emphasised Iran’s declared foreign-policy priority of developing friendly cooperative relations with Central Asian countries and its pivotal role as a ‘gateway’ in the INSTC. Furthermore\, Iran’s ‘bridge’ role in projects such as BRI\, the Eurasian Economic Union\, and INSTC was underscored\, emphasising the Iranian focus on the complementary nature of these initiatives rather than their competitive dynamics. \nDr. Saraswat noted that Iran is actively articulating a conspicuous regional role in (Eur)Asia by promoting regional autonomy\, aligning with the shared objectives of Russia and China. Notably\, Iran’s observable effort is to enhance its geoeconomic ties with the three principal actors in the region\, namely China\, Russia\, and India. This strategic engagement aims to mitigate the potential challenges of multipolar rivalry and the prospect of Chinese-led hegemonic regionalism. \nProf. A. K. Ramakrishnan offered positive feedback on the paper\, commending its logical argumentation and contribution to comprehending Iran’s (Eur)Asia policy. He suggested additional nuances to enhance the analysis\, emphasising the need to highlight Iran’s quest for both strategic and regional autonomy. Encouraging the inclusion of major trends characterising emerging middle powers\, he underscored the importance of considering major powers entering the geopolitical space as Iran navigates through it. \nThe impact of sanctions and isolation on Iran’s economy\, along with resulting constraints in foreign relations\, particularly with the West\, was noted. Prof. Ramakrishnan stressed the significance of contextualising Iran’s power positioning as an Emerging Middle Power within the context of its historical isolation. He also highlighted the guiding principles of Iran’s foreign policy\, focusing on its revolutionary nature and the pursuit of a dignified existence. \nFurther suggestions included exploring East-West dimensions\, considering Iran’s call for unity and its role in the non-aligned movement within the paper. The importance of recognising Iran as an ideological state\, with domestic politics playing a role in its ideological revivalism\, was emphasised. The recommendation to include immediate neighbouring countries\, including Afghanistan\, aimed at providing a more comprehensive understanding of Iran’s foreign relations. Prof. Ramakrishnan concluded by stating the paper connects conceptual aspects with empirical descriptions and acknowledged the paper’s strength lies in capturing the intricate dynamics of Iran’s foreign policy. \nDr. Meena Singh Roy suggested that the author include a brief abstract and mention that the paper is part of a larger project. The need to clarify the theoretical focus in the title and introduce the hypothesis early on was emphasised. Dr. Roy commended the analytical rigour of the paper but recommended a reconsideration of subtitles for reader comprehension. Acknowledging the paper’s extensive use of primary references\, she suggested supplementary readings for a practical understanding of Iran’s foreign policy. Dr. Roy highlighted Iran’s strategic adaptability and sophistication\, emphasising the importance of understanding its use of strategic assets. \nShe proposed exploring how the international system perceives Iran\, particularly its acceptability in regional groupings like the SCO. Additionally\, Dr. Roy called for a precise analysis to determine whether Iran has attained emerging middle power status. It was suggested that concepts like emerging middle power should be explained early in the paper\, along with clarifying Iran’s narrative regarding (Eur)Asia due to the region’s vastness. Addressing Iran’s regional interests\, she recommended specifying its focus on the INSTC over the Silk Route and assessing its aspirations for regional power status. \nDr. Rajorshi Roy noted that the author has adeptly navigated the complexities of evolving issues\, intricate power dynamics\, and contestations within the paper. The incorporation of International Relations theories was noted as a strength\, rendering the analysis more credible and nuanced in deciphering Iran’s role in (Eur)Asia. Dr. Rajorshi suggested expanding the section on emerging (Eur)Asian politics to include issues related to Central Asian countries\, given their significant relevance. Additionally\, he recommended examining whether Iran possesses the capacity to actualise its identity as a revisionist power and raised questions about whether Russia and China would relinquish space for Iran. Furthermore\, Dr. Rajorshi underscored the importance of exploring the role of the SCO in the context of Eur(Asian) governance\, considering it as a potential backbone in this regard. \nDr. Jason Wahlang raised the issue of the possibility of China overtaking Russia in the region due to Russia’s preoccupation with Ukraine\, citing the Chinese base in Tajikistan as an illustrative example. Dr. Wahlang emphasised the importance of assessing whether Iran could capitalise on these shifting dynamics in the long term. Additionally\, he recommended delving into Iran-Turkiye relations\, particularly in terms of civilisational connections and cultural aspects. Dr. Wahlang highlighted Iran’s role as a Caspian nation alongside Kazakhstan and Russia\, suggesting that further exploration of this aspect would enhance the paper’s value. He also proposed addressing Iran’s focus on non-traditional security issues\, specifically related to water\, considering the Aral Sea and Amu Darya. \nProf. Gulshan Dietl commenced her remarks with the poignant quote\, “today is the best of times\, and today is the worst of times\,” emphasising Iran’s vulnerable position in its immediate neighbourhood. She recommended a clear definition of ‘(Eur)Asia\,’ as it is integral to the paper’s title\, and encouraged the author to provide her own interpretation of an emerging regional middle power. \nProf. Dietl highlighted the relevance of using ‘West Asia’ based on its geographical placement\, referencing Jawaharlal Nehru’s critique of ‘Middle East’ as a colonial term. Considering Iran’s global impact\, Prof. Dietl acknowledged its significant energy resources in proximity to Central Asia but underscored the challenges arising from linguistic and religious differences with neighbouring countries. This isolation\, she noted\, sheds light on Iran’s support for entities like Hezbollah\, Houthis\, and the Palestinians. \nProf. Dietl succinctly outlined challenges faced by Iran\, including sanctions\, which limit its foreign relations\, domestic concerns over election outcomes\, and controversies surrounding issues such as Hijab. She highlighted slogans reflecting domestic sentiments\, such as “Not Gaza\, Not Lebanon; I will die for Iran\,” and observed Iran’s outreach to revisionist major powers like China and Russia. In the broader context of changing world order\, Prof. Dietl emphasised the constraints faced by Iran\, particularly domestic challenges\, during a time when even the United Nations is under scrutiny. \nQ&A Session\nThe Q&A session delved into various themes\, encompassing Iran’s identity as a theological revolutionary state\, the reliability of information about Iran on social media platforms\, definitional and conceptual aspects of emerging middle power\, the nuanced relationship between (Eur)Asia and the security order\, the historical context of the Iranian revolution\, Iran’s ideological positions in relation to other countries\, and the constraints impeding Iran’s realisation of emerging middle power status. Dr. Saraswat addressed and responded to the comments and questions raised during this comprehensive discussion. \nThis report was prepared by Mr. Abhishek Yadav\, Research Analyst\, West Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/report-of-mp-idsa-fellows-seminar-iran-in-the-emerging-eurasian-order-mapping-the-rise-of-a-regional-middle-power CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240506T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240506T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T193707 CREATED:20240506T222936Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250828T053313Z UID:81015-1714973400-1714973400@idsa.in SUMMARY:MP-IDSA Fellow’s Seminar on Evolution of African Maritime Security: Imperatives\, Governance and Challenges DESCRIPTION:The MP-IDSA Fellow’s Seminar presentation by Dr. Abhishek Mishra\, Associate Fellow\, MP-IDSA\, on “Evolution of African Maritime Security: Imperatives\, Governance and Challenges” was held on 29 February 2024. It was chaired by Vice Admiral Satish Kumar Namdeo Ghormade\, PVSM\, AVSM\, NM (Retd.)\, former Vice Chief of Naval Staff. The External Discussants for the paper were Commander Abhijit Singh\, Head\, Maritime Policy Initiative\, Observer Research Foundation (ORF)\, and Dr. Pooja Bhatt\, Consultant\, Ministry of External Affairs and Researcher on Maritime Security and Governance. The Internal Discussants were Ms. Ruchita Beri\, Consultant\, Africa\, Latin America\, Caribbean\, & UN (ALACUN) Centre\, MP-IDSA\, and Cmde. Abhay K. Singh\, Research Fellow & Coordinator\, Southeast Asia and Oceania Centre\, MP-IDSA. \nExecutive Summary\nThe development of a maritime security agenda for African countries has been relatively new\, despite the continent being completely surrounded by water. Following the emergence of the scourge of piracy off the coast of Somalia\, African countries and international actors started to pay due attention to ensuring maritime security. Although armed robbery at sea has sensitised the countries of Africa and the international community to the threats in the African maritime domain (AMD)\, an overemphasis on piracy and armed robbery has skewed perceptions about the African maritime landscape. The challenges today are much broader\, and the resultant strategies employed by African countries go beyond tackling piracy. Thus\, in the present time\, African maritime strategies tend to focus on the common interests of wealth creation and sustainable governance. \nDetailed Report\nDr. Mishra’s research explored the potential of the “blue economy” or “blue growth” approach in mitigating maritime crime in African waters. He also examined the evolution of maritime security within the African context over the past two decades. \nPreviously neglected\, Dr. Mishra argued that Africa’s colonial past fostered a “sea blindness\,” hindering a focus on maritime security. He emphasised the ambiguity of the term “maritime security\,” highlighting the varying interpretations by Till (2018) with hard and soft security distinctions\, Bueger’s (2015) constructivist approach with the Maritime Security Matrix\, and Siebels’ (2020) “Tale of Two Regions” incorporating positive and negative definitions. \nHe further underscored the criticality of Africa’s maritime sector. Firstly\, 38 out of 54 African territories are island nations or coastal states. Secondly\, Africa boasts a vast coastline exceeding 26\,000 nautical miles. Finally\, the number and capabilities of actors threatening the African Maritime Domain (AMD) are continuously rising. These factors necessitate a commensurate response at national\, regional\, and continental levels. \nMoreover\, while explaining the threats and vulnerabilities of the African Maritime Domain (AMD)\, he categorised them into three main areas. Governance issues encompass illicit fishing\, marine pollution\, illegal oil bunkering\, and crude oil theft. Security concerns include armed robbery\, piracy\, and trafficking in weapons\, drugs\, and wildlife. Finally\, humanitarian assistance needs encompass Search and Rescue (SAR)\, Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR)\, and out-of-area emergencies. \nHe then highlighted the Stable Seas Maritime Security Index\, which ranks nations based on nine criteria relevant to Africa\, including global cooperation\, legality\, maritime safety\, coastal well-being\, the blue economy\, fishing practices\, piracy\, illegal trade\, and mixed migration via sea. \nHowever\, Dr. Mishra acknowledged the ongoing debate surrounding maritime security (MS) in Africa. He said that scholars grapple with a unified definition within the African context. Since 2005\, the African Union (AU)\, Regional Economic Communities (RECs)\, and the African Union Commission (AUC) have actively discussed the African Maritime Domain (AMD) primarily in relation to piracy. The initial discourse revealed diverse interests and a complex web of African-international relationships. Notably\, African RECs have collaborated with the United Nations\, International Maritime Organization\, and other nations. \nHe further emphasised Africa’s pre-existing engagement in maritime governance. By 2000\, 37 African nations were already members of the International Maritime Organization (IMO)\, and the continent had a maritime transit charter established in 1993. Additionally\, African countries ratified key agreements like the 1974 SOLAS Convention (safety of life at sea) and the 2004 ISPS Code (security of ships and port facilities). \nThe 2000 International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR) provided the foundation for the first pan-African initiatives to bolster SAR capabilities. Between 2007 and 2011\, five Maritime Rescue Coordination Centers (MRCCs) and twenty-six sub-centers were established in strategic locations like Mombasa\, Cape Town\, Lagos\, Monrovia\, and Rabat. \nDr. Mishra also highlighted the significance of informal gatherings and conferences fostering maritime cooperation since 2005. These include the IMO-sponsored Sea Power for Africa Symposium (SPAS)\, the U.S. Naval Command’s East Africa and Southwest Indian Ocean Maritime Security Conference (EASWIO)\, and the Indian Navy’s Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS)\, alongside regional meetings in Sana’a\, Muscat\, and Dar es Salaam. The establishment of the Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC) in January 2009 marked a further step towards regional cooperation. \nMoreover\, Dr. Mishra made a distinction between the Yaoundé Code of Conduct (YCoC) and the Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC). Adopted in January 2009\, the DCoC focuses on piracy and armed robbery suppression in the Western Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden. Its core objective is to facilitate international cooperation through information sharing\, training nitiatives\, national legislation updates\, and counter-piracy measures. The DCoC+\, established through the 2017 Jeddah Amendment\, addresses additional threats like illegal\, unreported\, and unregulated (IUU) fishing and human trafficking. \nOn the other hand\, the YCoC\, ratified in 2013 by 25 West and Central African nations\, targets a broader range of illicit maritime activities in the Gulf of Guinea\, including piracy\, armed robbery\, and IUU fishing. Information sharing is a central pillar\, achieved through two regional centers: (i) Regional Centre for Maritime Security in Central Africa (CRESMAC) under the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and (ii) the West Africa Regional Maritime Security Centre (CRESMAO) under the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). \nDr. Mishra highlighted key differences. The DCoC\, designed from the outset to combat piracy on the high seas\, actively seeks international assistance. Conversely\, the YCoC prioritizes preserving signatory sovereignty. Additionally\, the YCoC incorporates measures absent from the DCoC\, such as seizing assets linked to illicit activities\, mitigating IUU fishing\, and addressing pollution prevention (a broader maritime concern beyond traditional security). Finally\, the YCoC uses the term “signatories\,” while the DCoC uses “participants.” \nHe moved on to explain Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy (AIM 2050) as a unified effort to revitalize the maritime sector for the continent’s development. AIM 2050 aims to leverage Africa’s waterways and oceans for the benefit of its maritime industries. Additionally\, the African Union (AU) is fostering a maritime security community tailored to Africa’s unique needs\, experiences\, and practices. \nHe discussed the Lomé Charter\, formally known as the African Charter on Maritime Security\, Safety\, and Development in Africa\, signed in October 2016. It builds upon the AIM 2050 Strategy by transitioning maritime security in Africa from a “soft law” approach (non-binding guidelines) to a “hard law” approach with a legally binding treaty. This shift is in contrast to earlier instruments like the DCoC or AIM 2050. Notably\, while 25 nations signed the Lomé Charter\, only Benin\, Senegal\, and Togo have ratified it thus far. \nIn addition to that\, he emphasised the AU’s focus on promoting sustainable utilization of Africa’s ocean resources. He terms the Blue Economy (BE) as the “new frontier for Africa’s renaissance\,” highlighting its significance. The 2018 Sustainable Blue Economy Conference in Nairobi\, Kenya\, served as a key platform to discuss the applicability of the Blue Economy concept in Africa. \nIn conclusion\, Dr. Abhishek acknowledged the mixed success of various community-based and government-led Blue Economy initiatives in Africa. He argued that social equity and ecological sustainability haven’t received the same level of attention as economic benefits. He emphasized that people are the foundation of any successful Blue Economy endeavour. For Africa’s Blue Economy development to thrive\, it must prioritise social fairness\, environmental preservation\, and a robust institutional governance framework. \nThis was followed by Comments from the External Discussants. \nComments and Questions\nFollowing Dr. Mishra’s presentation\, the discussion shifted\, with Cdr. Abhijit Singh emphasizing the value of the “sea blindness” concept in academic and policy circles. He linked national security postures to global commons management\, highlighting how a state’s sea blindness or sea consciousness can impact its ability to address global maritime challenges. He argued that fragmented perspectives and challenges to coordination among African nations hinder effective action. He identified poverty and poor governance (extending to maritime domains) as key issues. He also mentioned CRESMAC and CRESMAO as maritime information centers focused on West and Central Africa. He made the case that we have to identify the challenges facing Africa’s marine sector and provide a targeted set of solutions. He stated that the lack of an Indian policy perspective in the study is the sole area of concern. Lastly\, he said it is essential to assess each of the instruments mentioned above closely. \nDr. Pooja Bhatt then offered insights on Africa’s evolving maritime approach. She noted a shift from the basic needs (food\, security\, and resources) to complex issues like trade\, the security of traditional and non-traditional rights\, and the intricate legal and technical aspects of addressing these challenges. Moreover\, she emphasised the importance of definitions in maritime security. Clear definitions help identify stakeholders and goals\, facilitating collaboration. However\, excessive focus on definitions can hinder progress. She commended the AU’s approach as a valuable model for regional cooperation on maritime security. Dr. Bhatt concluded by urging India to take a leadership role in establishing a dedicated maritime security office within the United Nations\, advocating a collective vision from the Global South on maritime security. \nThis was followed by Comments from the Internal Discussants. \nMs. Ruchita Beri highlighted the historical perception of land as a place to reside and the sea as a passage. This perspective shapes how power and security are traditionally viewed\, often neglecting the maritime domain. She pointed to the Berlin Conference’s impact on Africa\, where colonial powers focused on land wealth and used the seas for resource extraction\, neglecting maritime security concerns. She went on to point out the various narratives developed in maritime security\, shaped by African think tanks and academics. She urged Dr. Mishra to delve into questions pertaining to the root causes of the conduct of the African nations and the persistence of the problems in the region. \nCmde. Abhay Kumar Singh cautioned against a singular view of African maritime security. He identified two key schools of thought within Africa and argued that security is not solely about laws and standards. Power\, strategy\, and wealth are crucial elements for effective maritime security\, and Africa’s challenges in these areas contribute to its maritime insecurity. He asked Dr. Mishra to elaborate on a postmodernist viewpoint\, focusing on the rationale for the existence of this information and the reasons behind the state of affairs. \nThis was followed by Comments from the Floor. \nDirector General\, Amb. Sujan R. Chinoy stated that the whole issue is being explored without delving into the essential question of what it is about Africa’s economic growth that genuinely shapes its marine environment. There is undoubtedly substantial economic hardship that exists in the littoral regions\, which extends to the marine environment and vice versa. Furthermore\, as an Indian researcher studying the topic\, he asked Dr. Mishra to consider the Marine Biodiversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ) and expand on what specific aspect of the G20 proclamation seems to have been tailored specifically for today’s theme. \nWhen the house was opened for questions\, a question regarding Africa’s opposition to Western-led security formations was raised. The panelists responded by highlighting China’s growing role in African security\, noting the 2023 China-Africa Security Forum as a point of geopolitical interest to India. \nVice Admiral Satishkumar Namdeo Ghormade concluded the discussion by emphasising the strategic significance of Africa’s resources and location. He attributed the continent’s vulnerability to a lack of technology\, defensive forces\, and the multitude of challenges it faces. \nThe Report was prepared by Ms. Anusha Khurana\, Intern\, ALACUN Centre\, MP-IDSA. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/mp-idsa-fellows-seminar-on-evolution-of-african-maritime-security-imperatives-governance-and-challenges CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240827T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240827T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T193707 CREATED:20240926T230335Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250828T053301Z UID:82713-1724736600-1724736600@idsa.in SUMMARY:Report of Fellows Seminar on "The Necessity of Military - Civil Technology Fusion (MCTF) for Making India a Global Drone Hub@2030" DESCRIPTION:The MP-IDSA Fellow’s Seminar presentation by Gp. Capt. (Dr.) R.K. Narang (Retd.)\, Senior Fellow\, MP-IDSA\, on “The Necessity of Military – Civil Technology Fusion (MCTF) for Making India a Global Drone Hub@2030” was held on 27 August 2024. It was chaired by Dr. V.K. Saraswat\, former Secretary\, Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO)\, currently Member NITI Aayog. The External Discussants for the paper were Professor Hari Babu Srivastava\, former DG DRDO\, currently Professor of Practice at IIT Delhi\, and Cmde. Jaideep Maolankar (Retd.) from Newspace Research & Technologies Pvt. Ltd. The Director General\, MP-IDSA\, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, the Deputy Director General\, Gp.Capt. (Dr.) Ajey Lele (Retd.) and scholars of the Institute participated in the Seminar. \nExecutive Summary\nThe session deliberated on making India an atmanirbhar (self-reliance) drone hub @2030\, emphasising military-civil drone technology development initiatives\, challenges and the way forward. Key challenges include reliance on imports\, lack of civil drone R&D ecosystem\, gaps in defence UAV development programs and reducing import dependence of critical systems. Recommendations by the speaker included military-civil technology fusion (MCTF)\, designating an existing ministry as a nodal ministry for drone technology\, launching civil drone R&D initiatives\, fostering design capabilities\, building testing infrastructure\, creating indigenous content certification mechanism and formulating Indian standards among others\, on which further discussion took place. \nDetailed Report\nAmb. Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General\, MP-IDSA opened the session by introducing Dr. V.K. Saraswat\, Member of NITI Aayog\, as the Chairperson. He highlighted India’s progress towards greater self-reliance\, emphasising that this does not equate to self-sufficiency. Self-reliance\, he explained\, allows ample room for international collaboration. India has actively engaged with countries such as the United States\, the United Kingdom\, France and others. It is negotiating with global partners on the development of aero engines and other technologies. \nDr. V.K. Saraswat noted thatIndian industry’s efforts toward aatmanirbharta (self-reliance) in the field of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) have been limited\, particularly in the development of those with strategic value. However\, he acknowledged significant progress in civilian drone technology\, with applications ranging from entertainment and agriculture to logistics. The core technology behind drones remains consistent\, with variations primarily in payloads and command and control systems. In the civilian sector\, however\, the understanding of drone technology in India is limited\, with only a few companies excelling in this area. \nFurthermore\, Dr. Saraswat underlined that due to lack of focus\, the civilian sector has largely depended on import of critical components. There are also distinct differences in the requirements for civilian versus military applications. As future warfare is likely to involve large-scale deployment of unmanned systems\, achieving self-reliance in UAV technology requires a mission-driven approach to develop all critical components. \nGp. Capt. (Dr.) R.K. Narang (Retd.) began his presentation by highlighting the critical role of the Semi-Conductor Laboratory (SCL) in Chandigarh in hand-holding of the drone startups\, aimed at exploring the feasibility of developing chips to enhance security. He noted that his presentation addresses four key areas: military-civil drone policies\, technology development\, ecosystems and military-civil technology fusion (MCTF). He emphasised the need for significant reforms in the civilian drone sector\, as well as some improvements in the defence sector. \nAccording to Gp. Capt. Narang\, while India has set the ambitious goal of becoming a global drone hub\, the definition of what this entails remains unclear. He defines it as a “technology and innovation-driven\, high-tech\, high-value civil-military drone industry\, where India is self-reliant in critical technologies\, while also being a global leader in certain niche technologies.” \nThe growth of the Indian drone industry\, he explained\, will depend on proactive R&D\, innovation and the creation of drone technologies. Additionally\, the formulation of Indian standards\, standardisation and trial-based certifications of emerging and enabling drone technologies will play a crucial role in achieving this vision. With standards for drones still evolving\, India must adopt a proactive approach to formulate Indian standards to remain competitive in this sector. \nGp. Capt. Narang further elaborated on the contribution of civil drone policy initiatives\, beginning with the Drone Rules 2021\, which significantly transformed India’s drone sector by addressing operations\, certification\, training\, and Production-Linked Incentives (PLI). He also highlighted certain gaps and limitations in the drone policies. He observed India does not have a policy on certification by a drone technician. The PLI scheme supported drone manufacturing by domestic industry while simultaneously easing the import of drone components\, which\, in turn\, made the industry reliant on imports. Although India has an airworthiness certification mechanism\, there is no indication of whether products or components are indigenous. He also called for reforms in certification of drone batteries by citing an example where an Indian company developed innovative batteries\, but the Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) found it difficult to deviate from predefined standards to give them certification. \nGp. Capt. Narang pointed out that policy initiatives were focused on facilitating drone operation and not on development or the validation of indigenous drone technologies. Notably\, the Ministry of Civil Aviation lacks policies\, structures and mechanisms for atmanirbharta in civil drone technologies. Discussing development challenges\, he emphasised the lack of focus of innovation hubs on addressing the technology gaps. Furthermore\, civil drone development initiatives by the Department of Science and Technology\, MeitY and others are not focused on developing specific drone technologies. Globally\, civil aviation entities are leading development of enabling technologies and integration of drones into their national airspace; however\, similar initiatives by Ministry of Civil Aviation/Directorate General of Civil Aviation are lacking. \nGp. Capt. Narang explained that a major limitation in India is the absence of an R&D vertical within the Ministry of Civil Aviation. In the private sector\, investment in R&D is alarmingly low—that generally varies between 1 to 5 percent in most companies as compared to 10-20 % by global leaders—indicating a lack of focus on technological innovation. He stressed the need for greater demands on industry bodies and the private sector to drive meaningful technological progress. \nGp. Capt. Narang explained that India must also prioritise building an ecosystem for civilian drone test sites\, as some Indian companies are currently forced to test their drones abroad. Accreditation remains a challenge for the Indian drone industry\, and there is a pressing need to archive civil drone test data to facilitate the validation of technologies. Currently\, drone education in India is limited\, with only a few courses like the M.Tech program at IIT Kanpur and a handful of other universities offering specialised education. Strengthening higher education in the drone sector is essential to foster deep research in critical drone technologies within the country. \nFocusing on the defence UAV sector\, Gp. Capt. Narang mentioned that significant policy measures have been implemented\, such as the MAKE-1\, MAKE-2\, and Indigenously Designed\, Developed\, and Manufactured (IDDM) categories in the Defence Acquisition Procedure (DAP). Initiatives like iDEX and the Mehar Baba Competition have also played a key role in advancing technological development in the drone sector. Additionally\, he recommended induction of test pilots and test engineers by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO)\, National Aerospace Laboratories (NAL) and industry to help them in bridging the gap between drone designs and user expectations in UAV programs and the broader development of aviation technologies. \nOn the issue of indigenous content (IC)\, Gp. Capt. Narang emphasised the need for an expert body dedicated to IC certification\, which is currently lacking. India does not have a mechanism to identify indigenous content\, and he stressed the importance of creating one. He drew attention towards the need for archiving indigenous designs and content within Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs) and the DRDO. He recommended reforming the Development Cum Production Partner (DcPP) model to a Development Production and User (DPU) model\, where the user becomes a partner in the process rather than merely a reviewer of technology. \nGp. Capt. Narang also suggested that platforms like GeM should include verticals for iDEX\, Mehar Baba\, or IDDM to promote indigenous technologies. Also\, there is a need to standardise trial methodologies that are universally accepted\, which would help reduce challenges faced by startups in the drone industry. \nGp. Capt. Narang further highlighted the long-standing lack of interest in developing drone engines\, emphasising the urgent need to address this gap. According to him\, internal combustion (IC) engines\, in particular\, remain a weak area for India\, with challenges in commercialisation\, as well as competing with global Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) in terms of quality and efficiency. Another issue is the increasing acquisition of promising Indian startups and talent by foreign companies and VCs\, which calls for concerted efforts to prevent the loss of domestic talent and innovation. \nGp. Capt. Narang proposed the development of a mechanism to test the indigenous content (IC) of materials and software components for greater transparency and clarity. Moreover\, he advocated for the creation of a National MCTF initiative\, alongside a policy for aatmanirbharta in civil drone technology. He also called for designation of an existing ministry as a nodal ministry for civil UAV technology\, a National UAV Technology Mission\, and a National UAV Technology Fund to focus efforts in this critical domain. Additionally\, there is a need for a Positive Indigenisation List across all ministries and the creation of civil drone testing corridors and sites. \nLastly\, he proposed introducing an “IC 1” rating\, in addition to L1 and T1 criteria\, to recognise the highest levels of Indigenous Content in drone technology. \nProf. Hari Babu Shrivastava made several observations and recommendations\, raising key questions such as what defines a “hub” and how the MCTF initiative would benefit society\, industry\, and the economy as a whole. He referenced a report by Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry\, expressing concern that India’s indigenisation process may not keep pace with the country’s projected capabilities by 2030. He also noted that countries like Turkey and Iran have made significant advances in drone exports\, emphasising the need for India to accelerate its efforts in this sector to remain competitive on the global stage. \nCmde. Jaideep Maolankar (Retd.) expressed concern that specific recommendations may not be effective if the mechanisms and processes for implementation remain unchanged. He also raised concerns on the draft of the Military Airworthiness Bill\, pointing out that many issues stem from deep-rooted cultural challenges\, such as a risk-averse mindset and siloed working practices. He noted that many countries are already ahead of India in drone technology\, and instead of following the same path\, India should think ahead and adopt a different approach. \nFor instance\, he suggested that India should focus on collaborative robotics rather than UAVs. He emphasised the importance of understanding business models and advised companies to prioritise customer needs over their own preferences\, highlighting the necessity of focusing on requirements engineering to align with real market demands. \nQuestions and Comments\nAmbassador Chinoy\, in his remarks\, posed the question of how drone technologies can be developed to meet the specific needs of infantry\, particularly in terms of supply delivery and stock management. He also said that regarding engine testing\, the Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE) already has robust facilities\, such as those used for the Kaveri engine. If India’s private sector develops its own engines\, these testing facilities can be made available to support the testing and validation of their designs\, encouraging collaboration between public and private sectors. \nIn his concluding remarks\, Dr. Saraswat said that in India\, the technological lag often leads organisations to import new technologies for commercial use\, rather than focusing on developing their own innovations. This approach creates challenges in increasing indigenous content\, especially in critical technologies. Indigenous content should be measured in terms of critical technology development\, not merely by the percentage of cost of local components in a product. \nAnother issue is India’s reliance on foreign designs\, which are re-engineered and manufactured locally\, highlighting the need to strengthen domestic design capabilities. Additionally\, India should aim to leapfrog technological advancements rather than merely trying to catch up with advanced technologies. \nReport prepared by Mr. Rohit Kumar Sharma\, Research Analyst\, North America & Strategic Technologies Centre. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/report-of-fellows-seminar-on-the-necessity-of-military-civil-fusion-mcf-for-making-india-a-global-drone-hub2030 CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20250530T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20250530T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T193707 CREATED:20250721T035836Z LAST-MODIFIED:20260707T051111Z UID:93026-1748583000-1748583000@idsa.in SUMMARY:Visiting Fellow Presentation: Mr. Abyssinia Abay Mengistu on “India’s Bilateral vs. Multilateral Defence Cooperation: Meeting Ethiopia’s Security Needs”  DESCRIPTION:Mr. Abyssinia Abay Mengistu\, Visiting Fellow\, India-Africa Security Fellowship Programme\, spoke on; “India’s Bilateral vs. Multilateral Defence Cooperation: Meeting Ethiopia’s Security Needs”  at MP-IDSA on 30 May 2025\, Dr. Rajeesh Kumar\, Centre Coordinator\,  Africa\, Latin America\, Caribbean & UN (ALACUN) Centre\, chaired the session. Centre members participated in the discussion. \nExecutive Summary:\nMr. Abyssinia Abay Mengistu’s presentation examined the evolving dynamics of India–Ethiopia defence cooperation\, comparing bilateral mechanisms with multilateral frameworks such as AFINDEX. He highlighted Ethiopia’s critical security challenges\, including escalating cyberattacks and border incursions\, and assessed India’s strategic responses. The presentation outlined how India’s bilateral engagement marked by the 2025 MoU offers tailored solutions in cybersecurity\, surveillance\, and capacity-building\, unlike the more generalized multilateral approaches. Mr. Mengistu stressed the operational and strategic value of bilateralism while acknowledging the complementary role of multilateral platforms. Overall\, the presentation affirmed that India’s bilateral defence partnership with Ethiopia aligns closely with Ethiopia’s evolving security imperatives and enhances India’s credibility as a responsive and trusted partner. \nDetailed Report:\nThe session commenced with opening remarks by Dr. Rajeesh Kumar\, who welcomed the speaker and emphasised the growing importance of India’s security partnerships in Africa\, particularly in the Horn of Africa. He noted Ethiopia’s strategic location\, historical ties with India\, and its pivotal role in regional security architecture. Dr. Kumar introduced the speaker and underscored the significance of examining defence cooperation frameworks that reflect Ethiopia’s evolving security needs. \nMr. Abyssinia Abay Mengistu began his presentation by expressing gratitude to MP-IDSA for the opportunity to conduct this research under the India–Africa Security Fellowship programme. He then outlined a comprehensive investigation into the comparative efficacy of India’s bilateral and multilateral defence engagements\, with particular focus on the India–Ethiopia defence MoU and the Africa-India Field Training Exercise (AFINDEX). \nThe presentation provided an in-depth overview of Ethiopia’s changing security landscape. Mr. Mengistu highlighted that Ethiopia is among the most cyber-attacked countries globally\, citing a dramatic rise in cyber incidents\, including the geopolitical “Black Pyramid War” that targeted critical national infrastructure. He noted that only 25% of Ethiopia’s cyber workforce meets international standards\, underscoring a critical capacity gap. \nIndia’s bilateral value was particularly emphasised. Mr. Mengistu discussed how India’s tri-service Defence Cyber Agency\, cyber emergency response teams\, and specialized institutions such as Defence Information Assurance and Research Agency (DIARA) and the Defence Communication Network serve as strategic assets. He noted that the bilateral MoU signed in February 2025 grants Ethiopia access to these capabilities\, enabling knowledge transfer and institutional collaboration that far outpace what multilateral exercises like AFINDEX currently offer. \nShifting focus to physical security threats\, Mr. Mengistu analysed Ethiopia’s border insecurity\, particularly in its western and southern regions. He referenced repeated cross-border incursions by armed militias using drones and light weapons\, pointing to the Ethiopian state’s limited surveillance and response capacity. In this context\, India’s experience with the Comprehensive Integrated Border Management System (CIBMS) and its operational knowledge from managing borders with Pakistan and China were presented as crucial advantages for Ethiopia under the bilateral agreement. \nAFINDEX\, while valuable for promoting multilateral interoperability\, was critiqued for its narrow scope. Mr. Mengistu noted that its focus on peacekeeping and mine clearance does not adequately address Ethiopia’s contemporary threats\, particularly in the cyber and drone warfare domains. As such\, he argued that bilateralism offers a more responsive and tailored solution. \nThe presentation introduced a layered theoretical framework\, juxtaposing realism and liberal institutionalism.  Mr. Mengistu argued that Ethiopia’s pursuit of cyber sovereignty and strategic autonomy aligns with realist imperatives\, and India’s approach grounded in non-interference and mutual respect makes bilateralism more desirable. \nIn his concluding remarks\, Mr. Mengistu laid out three key takeaways. First\, India’s bilateral cooperation with Ethiopia offers higher operational value\, especially in cyber defence and border management. Second\, multilateral engagements like AFINDEX must evolve in scope to remain strategically relevant. Third\, bilateralism and multilateralism are not mutually exclusive; rather\, they must be balanced intelligently based on the security context. \nQ&A Session\nFollowing the presentation\, a comprehensive round of feedback was given by the scholars of the ALACUN Centre\, MP-IDSA. One of the central points raised was the need to articulate more clearly the rationale behind selecting Ethiopia as the case study. Mr. Mohan underlined that Ethiopia’s strategic relevance must be explicitly anchored in its geopolitical and security significance. \nMr. Mohan also recommended expanding the theoretical framework beyond the realist–liberal dichotomy\, which he noted was insufficient to capture the complexities of India–Ethiopia security cooperation. He suggested to incorporate\, relational security perspective and the concept of security assemblages. These frameworks provide a more nuanced understanding of defence cooperation\, not merely as intergovernmental exchanges but as dynamic networks involving institutions\, technologies\, policy norms\, and training ecosystems. Within this context\, India’s engagement with Ethiopia will be seen as a co-constructed process that evolves through shared learning and capacity-building\, rather than a top-down transfer of expertise. \nDr. Abhishek Mishra commended the depth and timeliness of the study and called for a stronger historical contextualisation of India’s defence engagement with Africa. He suggested tracing the evolution from India’s early military training initiatives and UN peacekeeping contributions to its more recent emphasis on bilateral partnerships. Dr. Mishra proposed a dedicated section titled “Why 2025?” to explain the timing of the India–Ethiopia defence MoU\, situating it within Ethiopia’s post-Tigray recalibration and India’s shifting strategic posture. He also advised that India’s multilateral engagements\, particularly AFINDEX\, be situated within a broader timeline of India–Africa security cooperation\, incorporating reference points such as FOCAC and AU–EU partnerships. \nTo enhance the empirical grounding of the paper\, Dr. Mishra urged the inclusion of official communications\, diplomatic exchanges\, and press releases between India and Ethiopia especially those involving the Joint Commission and recent defence dialogues. In addition\, he recommended a comparative analysis of India’s engagement vis-à-vis other actors\, especially China\, whose presence in Ethiopia spans critical sectors like cybersecurity\, surveillance\, and defence industrial development. \nDr. Saurabh Mishra offered detailed structural and analytical recommendations. He proposed reorganising the paper around Ethiopia’s three primary security concerns: cybersecurity and digital resilience\, border security and drone threats\, and gaps in defence industrial development. These themes\, he noted\, would allow for a more focused comparison of the effectiveness of bilateral and multilateral approaches specifically India’s bilateral MoU and the AFINDEX framework. \nDr. Mishra emphasised the need to explore Ethiopia’s strategic intent in seeking defence partnerships\, including the expected outcomes and long-term goals. He advised reframing the research question to focus on the conditions under which bilateralism provides better alignment with Ethiopia’s needs\, moving beyond a simplistic binary of bilateral versus multilateral engagement. Finally\, he called for the addition of a comparative sub-section analysing China’s evolving security role in Ethiopia especially through its work with Huawei\, China Electronics Technology Group Corporation and AI-driven surveillance and drone technologies to contextualise India’s position within a broader geopolitical competition. \nDr. Rajeesh Kumar offered macro-level guidance on situating the paper within the broader framework of India’s Africa strategy. He recommended anchoring the discussion in key developments such as the India–Africa Forum Summits (2008\, 2015\, 2023)\, the SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) initiative\, and India’s defence diplomacy through its ITEC (Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation Programme)\, naval deployments\, and training missions. He suggested that the India–Ethiopia partnership be portrayed not as an isolated bilateral engagement but as part of a coherent\, values-driven strategy that emphasises non-interference\, inclusivity\, and capacity-building. \nAdditionally\, Dr. Kumar encouraged a brief\, but critical overview of other international actors involved in Ethiopia’s security landscape including China (via Belt and Road Initiative and People’s Liberation Army partnerships)\, Turkey (notably in Unmanned Aerial Vehicle sales and policing support)\, the United Arab Emirates and the United States (via cyber training and military presence in Djibouti). Within this crowded strategic field\, India’s approach should be presented as a sovereign-friendly\, development-oriented alternative that complements rather than competes with existing partnerships. \nFollowing the detailed feedback session\, Mr. Abyssinia Abay Mengistu expressed his heartfelt gratitude to all the discussants for their thoughtful comments\, constructive suggestions\, and critical insights. He acknowledged the value of the discussion in enriching his ongoing research and affirmed his commitment to revising the paper in line with the recommendations received. Mr. Mengistu noted that the perspectives shared would significantly enhance the analytical depth\, empirical grounding\, and policy relevance of his work. \nAs the session concluded\, members of the Africa\, Latin America\, Caribbean & UN (ALACUN) Centre at MP-IDSA extended their best wishes to Mr. Mengistu on the successful completion of his fellowship tenure. The team warmly bid him farewell\, commending his contributions during his time at the Institute and wishing him continued success in his future academic and professional pursuits. \nThe report has been prepared by Mr. Mohanasakthivel J.\, Research Analyst\, MP-IDSA. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/visiting-fellow-presentation-mr-abyssinia-abay-mengistu CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20250620T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20250620T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T193707 CREATED:20250730T224709Z LAST-MODIFIED:20260707T061144Z UID:93153-1750397400-1750397400@idsa.in SUMMARY:MP-IDSA Fellows Seminar “Private Sector Defence Joint Ventures: Exports and Role of Offsets” DESCRIPTION:An MP-IDSA Fellows Seminar conducted by Dr. S. Samuel C. Rajiv\, Research Fellow\, on ‘Private Sector Defence Joint Ventures: Exports and Role of Offsets’ took place on 20 June 2025. It was chaired by Col. (Dr.) Rajneesh Singh (Retd.)\, Research Fellow and Coordinator of the Defence Economics and Industry Centre at MP-IDSA. The External Discussants for the paper were Shri Amit Cowshish\, former Financial Advisor (Acquisition)\, Additional Secretary and Member of the Defence Procurement Board at the Ministry of Defence (MoD)\, and Shri Puneet Sharma\, Indian Defence Accounts Service\, Additional CDA (Air Force)\, PCDA Air Force\, New Delhi. The Internal Discussant was Cmde. Abhay K. Singh (Retd.)\, Research Fellow and Coordinator of the Southeast Asia and Oceania Centre at MP-IDSA. \nExecutive Summary\nThe presentation focused on the private sector defence industry’s role and contribution to India’s defence exports. It examined the exports of private sector defence joint ventures with US\, French\, and Israeli original equipment manufacturers (OEMs). Dr. Rajiv highlighted that the private sector has contributed to India’s defence exports through policies such as offsets. Dr. Rajiv added that changes to offset policies will impact the private sector’s share of exports. With India targeting INR 50\,000 crore in defence exports by 2028–29\, the private sector will be crucial in reaching this target. \nDetailed Report\nCol. (Dr.) Rajneesh Singh (Retd.) began the proceedings by highlighting the growing role of India’s private sector in defence exports\, driven by policy reforms and strategic imperatives. In FY 2024–25\, India’s defence exports reached a record ₹23\,622 crore\, with the private sector contributing ₹15\,233 crore—about 64.5 per cent. Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs) also saw a sharp 42.85 per cent rise in exports. As the government aims for ₹50\,000 crore in defence exports and ₹3 lakh crore in total defence production by 2029\, the private sector—now contributing 21 per cent of defence production—is expected to play a crucial role through innovation\, efficiency\, and global competitiveness. Col.(Dr.)Singh (Retd.) noted that while the defence offsets policy may have contributed to exports by private sector defence companies\, it has not effectively enabled meaningful technology transfers and access to advanced technologies. \nDr. Rajiv began his presentation with an empirical overview of India’s defence export performance over the last decade. Between 2015 and 2025\, India achieved cumulative defence exports worth ₹109\,997.6 crore. A striking feature of this growth trajectory has been the pivotal role played by the private sector\, which accounted for ₹71\,328.97 crore\, representing 65 per cent of total exports. Even as the public sector dominates India’s defence industrial base\, the private sector has played an essential role in contributing a larger share of India’s defence exports in recent years. \nDr. Rajiv gave the historical background of the policy framework relating to offsets\, from the 2006 Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) to the 2020 Defence Acquisition Procedure (DAP)\, highlighting their respective stipulations for offset obligations. The 2006 DPP mandated 30 per cent offsets for defence procurements above ₹300 crore under ‘Buy (Global)’ or ‘Buy and Make with Transfer of Technology’ (ToT) categories. Over the years\, the framework became more nuanced with multipliers for Micro\, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs)\, DRDO-oriented ToTs\, and investments in Defence Industrial Corridors (DICs). By 2020\, offset applicability was limited to contracts above ₹2\,000 crore and excluded intergovernmental agreements (IGAs) and single-vendor cases. The cumulative offset contracts reached US$13.2 billion by March 2025\, with verified claims worth US$6 billion. \nDr. Rajiv then highlighted Indian private sector joint ventures with foreign OEMs. India has procured defence equipment from the US under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) programmes. India was designated a Major Defence Partner in June 2016. Dr. Rajiv highlighted that Tata Advanced Systems Limited (TASL) is a prime example of a successful offset-driven private sector company. TASL subsidiaries such as Tata Boeing Aerospace Limited (TBAL) have become the global sole supplier of Apache AH-64 fuselages\, having delivered nearly 200 units. TASL also collaborates with Raytheon to produce Stinger missile control assemblies. \nThe 2016 Rafale fighter aircraft deal marked a significant advancement in Indo-French defence cooperation\, with an offset requirement of 50 per cent\, significantly above the typical 30 per cent. Three joint ventures—Dassault Reliance Aerospace Ltd. (DRAL)\, Thales Reliance Defence Systems Ltd. (TRDSL)\, and L&T MBDA Missile Systems Ltd.—have been formed to fulfil these commitments. DRAL\, a partnership between Reliance Infrastructure and Dassault Aviation\, commenced operations in 2018\, producing fuselage components for the Falcon 2000 and Rafale aircraft. TRDSL\, on the other hand\, became the first Indian company to assemble and test the AESA radar for export to France. L&T MBDA Missile Systems\, established in 2017\, constructed a missile integration facility in Coimbatore\, investing heavily in infrastructure and Technology Transfer (ToT). \nIndo-Israeli defence collaborations have mainly concentrated on missile systems and unmanned platforms. The Kalyani Rafael Advanced Systems (KRAS) joint venture\, founded in 2015\, was India’s first private missile subsystem manufacturer. KRAS showcases successful high-technology exports from India\, with 95 per cent of its revenues derived from exports. The Adani Group\, another major player\, has partnered with Elbit Systems through several entities\, including Adani Elbit Advanced Systems and Atharva Advanced Systems. These joint ventures produce Sky Striker loitering munitions and Drishti-10 (Hermes 900) UAVs in Hyderabad for international markets. Linked to the Adani group\, Alpha Design Technologies also has significant export sales. \nDr. Rajiv concluded the presentation by noting that while the offset policy has historically catalysed private sector participation and exports\, its evolving scope—especially under DAP 2020—raises both opportunities and challenges. However\, these challenges are offset by promising trends. Private defence firms like Kalyani Strategic Systems Limited (KSSL)\, Solar Industries\, and Zen Technologies have secured substantial export orders independent of offset obligations. Moreover\, global defence spending—particularly by European countries—offers vast opportunities for Indian firms to integrate into global supply chains. \nShri Amit Cowshish\nShri Cowshish began by commending the speaker for a well-structured presentation. He highlighted the limitations of the Defence Offsets Policy in enhancing domestic defence capabilities\, noting that only one offset contract was signed between 2021 and 2025. Shri Cowshish pointed out that the 2020 reforms raised the contract value threshold to ₹2\,000 crore and excluded intergovernmental and single-vendor deals. Although contracts worth US$13.52 billion were signed\, only US$6.85 billion in claims were processed by 2024\, with limited success in integrating Indian firms into global supply chains and minimal gains in technology transfer or innovation capability. \nDesign flaws\, such as permitting vendors to opt for easier offset routes like direct purchases and burdensome bureaucratic procedures\, further weakened the policy’s impact\, leaving it disconnected from broader self-reliance goals under Atmanirbhar Bharat. While acknowledging that the offsets have indeed contributed to India’s defence exports\, as succinctly brought out by the presenter\, Shri Cowshish stressed the need for India to move beyond offsets and develop a cohesive defence industrial strategy focused on targeted R&D\, greater private sector participation\, long-term partnerships with OEMs\, and co-development models built on trust and innovation. \nShri Puneet Sharma\nShri Sharma commended the presentation and stressed the importance of assessing whether current measures effectively enhance indigenous technological capacity. He highlighted the need for focused training in core manufacturing skills to strengthen domestic capabilities. Shri  Sharma highlighted some key changes in the policy framework relating to Atmanirbharta\, including revisions to the Offset Policy with an emphasis on attracting investment and facilitating technology transfer through the provision of higher multipliers\, the establishment of two Defence Industrial Corridors in Uttar Pradesh and Tamil Nadu\, the opening of defence research and development (R&D) to industry\, start-ups\, and academia\, with 25 percent of the defence R&D budget earmarked for this purpose\, and the gradual increase in the defence budget allocation for military modernisation through procurement from domestic sources. \nShri Sharma emphasised the importance of monitoring offset obligation compliance through audits and progress reviews\, to use capital acquisitions to strengthen India’s defence industry by promoting globally competitive enterprises\, boosting R&D capacity in defence\, and supporting related sectors like civil aerospace and internal security. \nCommodore Abhay K. Singh (Retd.)\nCommodore Singh appreciated the presentation for effectively highlighting India’s offset policy’s evolution\, outlining its strengths and weaknesses and its contributions to India’s defence exports. He noted the significant rise in defence exports\, especially by the private sector\, which reached a record ₹21\,083 crore in FY 2023-24\, marking a 32.5 per cent increase over the previous year and a 31-fold jump since 2013-14. With exports now reaching over 100 countries\, India’s defence sector appears to be at a turning point. India’s defence industrial ecosystem is also buttressed by the government’s large defence order pipeline and increasing private sector participation. \nQ&A Session\nThe Q&A session mainly focused on technology transfer\, defence exports\, foreign vendor involvement\, research and development\, joint ventures\, and high-value technological collaborations. Col. (Dr) Singh (Retd.) observed that India has adopted an offset policy to leverage large arms imports to build a strong indigenous defence industry. Despite numerous offset contracts signed since 2005\, Col. (Dr.) Singh (Retd.) reinforced Shri Cowshish’s point that only one offset contract has been signed in recent years. Moreover\, reports by the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) and various analysts have highlighted the policy’s limited success in ToT\, among other factors. \nIt was also pointed out that the offset policy has not been able to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) or bring high-end manufacturing and technology into India. However\, the policy has benefited civilian aerospace component exports. Dr. Rajiv stated that the paper was limited to investigating whether offsets have supported defence exports by enabling domestic sourcing of parts for imported platforms and facilitating joint ventures and component exports by Indian offset partners. The Chair\, Col. (Dr.) Singh (Retd.) mentioned that the Defence Acquisition Procedure (DAP) 2020 is being revised and stated that it will be interesting to see if there will be changes to the offsets policy as well. Dr. Rajiv expressed gratitude for the constructive comments and suggestions for future research. \nReport prepared by Dr. Shayesta Nishat Ahmed\, Research Analyst\, Defence Economics and Industry Centre\, MP-IDSA. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/mp-idsa-fellows-seminar-private-sector-defence-joint-ventures-exports-and-role-of-offsets CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR