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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130201T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130201T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T210605
CREATED:20231223T133951Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130241Z
UID:63140-1359696600-1359696600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:The Evolution of Chinese Military Doctrine
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Lt Gen Satish Nambiar\, PVSM\, AVSM\, VrC (Retd)External Discussants: Maj Gen (Retd) B K Sharma\, Cdr Kamlesh Kumar AgnihotriInternal Discussants: Brig Mandeep Singh\, Dr. Jagannath P Panda \nThis paper discusses the factors responsible for the evolution of the Chinese military doctrine and attempts to chalk out its nuances. Its core premise is that a military doctrine is a component of a nation’s grand strategy for security and\, at times\, it may not be stating actual military conditions but is simply a declaration of its strategic intent. The paper finds that Chinese have learned from their and others’ experience. China’s threat perception and relations with the nations of the world has changed with time influencing their military doctrine. Over the years\, the Chinese have evolved four broad military doctrines: \n\nThe Maoist ‘People’s War Doctrine: It prevailed during the “Lean one side phase” of the Chinese foreign policy. Maturing during the CCP’s revolutionary struggle and the Japanese invasion in the 1930s\, this predominant military doctrine lingered up to the late 1970s and its vestiges remained till the 1980s. This essentially guerrilla doctrine is still alive in academic debates. In 1960s\, Mao and Lin Piao interpreted it as Flexible National Defence applicable to conventional war based on the premise of “trading territory for time”. The doctrine envisaged when the enemy launches the first offensive\, the revolutionary forces\, mindful of the enemy’s technological and material superiority\, would quietly follow a subsequent strategic retreat\, strategic stalemate and strategic counter-offensive. The fight would essentially be in the rural areas from where the revolutionary army would draw its strength out of the masses indoctrinated by the communist party. This infantry-centric doctrine relied on the use of staggering man-power aimed at overcoming technological superiority through inferiority. Air-power had just a supporting role and the navy was almost non-existent.\nThe doctrine addressed the worst case scenario of an all-out attack including a nuclear strike. The US was the enemy for this doctrine\, purely on ideological basis\, for about two decades. There is nothing to suggest that any counter-offensive against the US was also planned. However\, according to the author\, terming it defensive would also be inappropriate. The doctrine hugely underappreciated the role of international diplomacy. It was often debated whether the strategy of “luring the enemy in the deep” was a strategy worth pursuing as the ‘modernisers’ in China argued that the enemy should not be allowed to crash the gates.  \n\nPeople’s War under Modern Conditions: The US was the doctrinal imperial enemy from the beginning; later the Soviet Union too was declared an enemy. The doctrine emerged in the light of the receding Cultural Revolution and the party’s resentment against politicisation of the PLA entailed the dilution of army’s political role. Industrial and real estate development along the Manchurian border had made “luring enemy” into depth an imponderable tactic. The pragmatic leadership assumed a greater role and a rapprochement started with the US in 1971 with an imperiled relationship with the USSR. Deng Xiaoping felt that a major military conflict was unlikely and there would be no war over the next five to seven years. This doctrine had a limited focus concerned with the conduct of war. The Core issue addressed was how to deal with a major and large-scale Russian invasion with minimum human cost without vacating the territory. It envisaged that the enemy would be taken head on in the initial phase of the conflict\, denying him an entry into the Chinese territory. Regulars and guerrillas would even cross the border to interdict the enemy by hindering the enemy’s mobility or striking at its rear. The professional military would lead the war. The protracted war was no longer a feature of the Chinese military doctrine and a National mobilisation would be in case of a completely illogical possibility of an all-out invasion by USSR. The compulsive filibustering about enemy nuclear strikes\, essential characteristic of the People’s War\, was absent in this doctrine. China reiterated its commitment to no first-use of nuclear weapons and accorded equal attention to various components of military power.\nLocal and Limited War Doctrine: The doctrine was officially promulgated in 1985. The focus shifted from large scale conventional military conflict to local\, small\, and limited wars. It was prompted by a new understanding of the international situation that the world was moving towards multipolarity in which the US would retain its prominence. The premise for the doctrine was the prevailing nuclear stalemate in the world which would not allow large-scale wars\, but the unequal levels of technology would prompt the Great Powers into adventures to test these technologies in battle conditions. It focused on small-scale wars caused by civil-conflicts\, territorial claims and ethnic tensions in a multi-polar world. It seems that the Chinese view these wars as politically-motivated freak incidents which needed fighting accompanied by talking. Border conflicts\, maritime territorial conflicts\, “surprise air attacks”\, fighting off an enemy’s sudden limited thrust into Chinese border and retaliatory punitive attacks by China were the major war exigencies mentioned in the doctrine. Taiwan emerged as a new security scenario and the proliferation of high tech weapons in the neighbourhood were also visualised as security concerns.\nLimited War under High Tech Conditions: Though the disintegration of the USSR in 1991 ended any possibility of large-scale invasion of China\, the American show of military technology in the Gulf War of 1992\, stunned it.  Now limited war became the only focus\, and high technology provided a new and complete framework. The doctrine\, for the first time\, accepted the normative superiority of technology over men. It explicitly included the elements of offence and\, for the first time\, took the war beyond Chinese territory. The war would be local; borders are “strategic frontiers” and “victory” would be achieved “through elite troops”. China would not start any war; however\, if it senses any hostile enemy movement\, it will seize the “initiative”\, by “striking first”. The new doctrine would ensure “victory over inferiority through superiority’. Instead of long-drawn wars\, local wars would be “quick battles to force quick resolution”. Instead of luring enemy into the Chinese depth\, an “in-depth strike” would be carried out in enemy territory. The doctrine visualises a battle field scenario; known as war zone campaign (WZC). Preparations should be undertaken by keeping the diversities of military regions in view.\n\nThe paper also refers to two other doctrines which are disputed to be independent military doctrines: \nInfomatised War (RMA): The discourse on revolution in military affairs (RMA) adds another dimension of “infomatised war” to the “limited war under high tech conditions”. Ideally\, RMA is a holistic concept comprising social\, economic\, political and technological components. The Chinese discourse on infomatised warfare is based on the Chinese belief that information determines international relations and the outcome of wars. Chinese believe that digitized governance is the Achilles’ heel of the militarily advanced countries and this is where China can score in their depth. The Chinese assume that gathering precise and complete information in a literal sense is possible; and once there is correct information\, one can bring the enemy to its knees even without fighting. In fact\, information deterrence can prove more effective than nuclear deterrence. Information relating to cyberspace has the highest prominence in the Chinese discourse on infomatised war as well as RMA. The doctrine is quite offensive and the preferred tactics in this warfare are “surgical removal”\, “selective attacks” and “precision raids” by missiles or other superior electronic weapons or computer science.  \nAnti-Access-Area Denial (A2/AD): This is essentially an American term. The perceived Chinese A2/AD has a limited objective of holding back American forces in Taiwan contingency till the PLA troops land in Taiwan and build defences. The battle objectives are mainly to harass American troops to delay their access to the centre of action. However\, as of now\, these capabilities have defensive purpose and are still in nascent stage with questionable quality. \nThe author concludes that over the last two decades\, Chinese military doctrine has changed from being inward looking to looking-beyond-its-borders and more importantly seaward doctrine. Chinese military capabilities have persistently moved towards matching doctrinal expositions. However\, the possession of asymmetric warfare capabilities as visualised under infomatised war doctrine by China and its ability to deploy them in conflict is a subject of speculation. \nMajor points of discussion and suggestions to the author: \n\nThere is hardly any literature available on the Chinese military doctrine. Whatever available is mostly western and we are left to our imaginations to chalk out any Chinese military doctrine. \nChina has never fought war the way it was articulated. \nThe Chinese are still grappling with the idea of a war doctrine. \nNowadays\, Navy is used not for territorial gains but political ones. It has an important role in the “strategic guidelines” of China. \nSome western scholars argue that the Chinese military is overstretched. \nChinese are looking for an exosphere umbrella which has not yet come. \nNational army versus political army is an outdated debate and the civil-military relations in China went up to a new level during the Hu Jintao period. \nChina’s economic rise has substantiated its military doctrinal practice. \nPLA’s international exposure has helped develop its doctrine. \nIndia should draw some lessons from the evolution of the Chinese military doctrine. \nThe overall role of a nuclear doctrine in a military doctrine should be examined in detail. \nEscalation dominance control is very important in the Chinese doctrines. \n\n(report prepared by Saurabh Mishra\, Research Assistant IDSA)
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-evolution-of-chinese-military-doctrine
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130208T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130208T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T210605
CREATED:20231224T102915Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T013003Z
UID:64078-1360301400-1360301400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Equipping UN Forces: Challenges & Remedies
DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nChair: Shri Amit Cowshish  \nExternal Discussant: Col P Chandok and Col S Bhatia
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/equipping-un-forces-challenges-remedies
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130301T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130301T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T210605
CREATED:20231223T133950Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130241Z
UID:63138-1362115800-1362115800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:The State of Sri Lankan Tamil Politics in the Post  LTTE Period
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Professor S D MuniDiscussant: Shri M R Narayan Swamy and Dr N Manoharan \nDr. Ashok K Behuria began the presentation by stating that this paper was largely based on the field visit to Sri Lanka. The paper studies the perceptions of a wide range of people to understand the Tamil mindset after the war. The Tamil speaking people constitute 24% of the population\, of which the Sri Lankan Tamils comprise 11% while the Tamil Muslims and the Indian Tamils are 9% and 4% respectively. The paper focussed only on the Sri Lankan Tamil perspective and their expectations from India. There have not been many drastic changes in the Tamil demands since independence. The demands of the Tamil political parties ACTC and later ITAK were the following: a) federal Sri Lanka with one or more Tamil States with autonomous powers\, b) parity of Tamil with Sinhala as official languages\, c) repeal law disenfranchising Indian Tamils\, and d) cessation of dryland colonization schemes. \nPresident Bandaranaike came out with the Sinhala Only Act in 1956. Immediately afterwards he made a pact with the Tamils in 1957\, which is known as the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact. There was resistance from the majority community in a big way; UNP\, a centralist party\, staged a march from Colombo to Kandy. In the following years UNP leader Dudley Senanayake and Chelvanayakam had a pact but it could not be implemented due to massive resistance from the SLFP\, which had earlier signed a similar pact with the same Tamil leader. Such competitive maximalist stance characterised the nature of ethnic politics in Sri Lanka. \nThus\, the pacts granting greater autonomy to the Tamils could not be implemented. From the 1950’s onwards there was increasing colonisation by the Sinhalese migrants in the Tamil areas. Further\, the riots in 1958\, 1961 and 1974 led to further alienation of the Tamil community. Ethnic outbidding was prevalent in the Sri Lankan Tamil parties as well and a similar pattern persists even today. Its nature transformed from a passive politics to a militant form in the 1970s. In 1972\, the Tamil parties came together and formed the Tamil United Front (TUF). In1976 TUF renamed itself as Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF). \nThere was the perception that the Tamils became militants because India was backing them. However\, there is no evidence to prove this existed before the 1970s and 80s. In the 1980s India intervened in a big way resulting in the formulation of the 13th Amendment. Dr. Behuria points that Sri Lanka borrowed many things from the Indian federalism to envisage the devolution in Sri Lanka\, but it was a mistake. Sri Lanka is different from the Indian experience and is not as diverse as India. Both the LTTE and Sri Lankan government wanted the Indian forces out of their state. \nNone of the agreements could be implemented because it did not satisfy the maximalist expectations of the LTTE on one hand and the totalitarian aspirations of the Sinhalese chauvinist constituency on the other. In 2001\, LTTE allowed the political front TNA to come up and it was almost a mouth piece of LTTE. From then on\, the TNA began to dominate the North and also had a considerable presence in the East. There were 18 rounds of dialogue between TNA and the Government in 2011\, but they could not reach a political settlement. The demands of the TNA included;  \n1. Resettlement and rehabilitation of the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)\, 2. Removal of High Security Zones (HSZs) and disarming of paramilitary forces operating in the North and East\, 3. The issue of political prisoners and detainees being detained at various places under the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) and Emergency regulations\, before May 2009. \nThey agreed on the 13th Amendment as the starting point for the negotiations. Some sections of the Tamil community believe that this is not enough and at the same time parties like TNFP completely reject it. There is an opinion that it is an Act that will further lead to the domination of provinces by the centre. The talks were put on hold by Rajapaksa government and it stressed on seeking a political settlement through multi-party discussions in the Parliamentary Select Committee (PSC) \nPerception on India\nIndia’s insistence for the 13th Amendment and Rajapaksa’s reservations about it is cited as instances of India’s inability to comprehend the changing realities in Sri Lanka. The Sinhalese and the Tamils have moved away from 13th amendment for different reasons. The former considers it as an ‘imposition from outside’\, while the latter regards it as an ‘indecent compromise of Tamil interests.’ In Jaffna\, the Tamils feel that India had used them for its own interest. They urge that India must ensure that they get their due from the Sri Lankan government. However\, some of them also feel India will sooner than later stop due to Rajapaksa’s China blackmail. There is an open recognition of the dangers of militant politics and denunciation of LTTE’s policies vis-à-vis India.  \nWhile concluding\, Dr. Behuria opined that this dialogue is unlikely to lead to a solution. There exists a rightwing in the majority community. It was observed that the Sinhalese government delegates were highly unhappy while talking about the devolution of the police power and the land power. In such context\, India must quietly play its role for finding a way for resolving the problem. \nMajor points of discussion and suggestions to the author:\n\nInitially the demand was for 50-50 representation and after independence it developed as language\, autonomy\, independent state and now devolution. These issues have to be analysed with the particular situation at that point of time. These are\, the end of colonialism\, post-colonial pre-LTTE\, during LTTE and post LTTE. Along with situation another variable is strength that is demographic\, political\, economic\, military\, diplomatic\, strength of opposition against the government and the external support.\nWhat the Sri Lankan state has tried to do is to keep the Tamils apart by different legislations and also by trying to cooperate with external forces like the UK\, Israel\, the US\, India and now China. How did this all affect the Sri Lankan politics\, what were the internal conflicts within the Sinhalese community and how groups like JVP used the Tamil issue as a rallying point need to be looked into.\nThere is the need for encouraging and strengthening moderate politics\, unifying the Tamil polity which is divided and the creation of a broad front which includes moderate Sinhalese voices that stand for more devolution.\nThe Sri Lankan government should have accepted that a lot of damage was done during the war and shown the readiness for reconciliation and rehabilitation. In the present scenario\, the people who never supported LTTE have turned against the state. The belief that the LTTE is coming back\, perfectly supports Rajapaksa to pursue his oppressive policies.\nIndia should have a fresh thinking in term of the 13th Amendment and encourage all moderate voices to come together. For this purpose the Indian civil society and think-tanks can play an important role. \nResearch paper of this nature should focus on issues like the way forward\, the dynamics of the Sinhalese and Muslim parties\, the significance of Divineguma Bill etc. In the present scenario the devolution is going to be an impossible task and in such a context the position that TNA would take needs to be looked at closely. \nIndia should not only focus on the Tamil issue but also look at issues like disappearance of the journalists in Colombo\, the impeachment of the Chief Justice etc. hence a broader approach should be evolved.\nThere is a difference in perceptions of the new elite and the old one. The voice of the new elite is more dominant today. Having a broader approach is a very tall work and the dominant voice is not for any solution. A macro-pattern can be discerned that is maximising the demand by both sides.\nSLMC is not fond of Rajapaksa but at the same time\, they are concerned about power and they want to be seen as an equal force with Sri Lankan Tamils. Thus\, this issue is focused in the North and the East. Also delimitation of constituency is carried out in such a manner the Tamil are becoming minorities in all the areas. \nThe Sri Lanka government is not at all sincere in its implementation of 13th Amendment. \n\nReport prepared by Ms Deepa Varughese
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-state-of-sri-lankan-tamil-politics-in-the-post-ltte-period
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130301T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130301T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T210605
CREATED:20231224T102914Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T012740Z
UID:64077-1362115800-1362115800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Emerging Powers and Africa
DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nChairperson: Ambassador Rajiv BhatiaDiscussants: Shri Ravi Bangar and Shri Manish Chand
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/emerging-powers-and-africa
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130308T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130308T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T210605
CREATED:20231224T102914Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T012843Z
UID:64076-1362720600-1362720600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Federalising India’s Neighbourhood Policy: Balancing the State Interest with the National
DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nChairperson: Shri Rajiv SikriDiscussants: Dr Suresh K Goel\, Dr Nitya Nanda and Prof. Rekha Saxena
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/federalising-indias-neighbourhood-policy-balancing-the-state-interest-with-the-national
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130315T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130315T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T210605
CREATED:20231223T133906Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130240Z
UID:63134-1363325400-1363325400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Mapping the Role of External Players in Pakistan occupied Kashmir
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Amb Phunchok StobdanExternal Discussants: Capt Alok Bansal\, Dr. D. Subachandran and Dr. Mathew JosephInternal Discussants: Dr. Smruti Pattanaik and Shri Vishal Chandra \nIn her paper titled “Mapping the Role of External Players in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir” Dr Priyanka Singh examined the role of external actors in PoK – China\, the US and the UK – post-2005 earthquake.  \nDr. Singh identified the following critical drivers for external interest in the PoK\, i.e.\, the strategic location (PoK connects Central Asia with the Indian subcontinent and shares border with China); resources (hydel and minerals)\, expanding Chinese footprints; growing interests of the western countries (presence though international aid agencies\, NGOs\, etc.); developmental initiatives as opportunities for investment; and the emergence of diaspora interest. China in particular is involved in the construction of several hydropower projects in PoK – the Diamer-Bhasha Dam in Gilgit Baltistan\, the Bunji Dam\, the Neelum Jhelum project and raising the height of the Mangla Dam in the so called AJK.  \nThe Chinese involvement in PoK\, as the paper highlighted\, is long standing. China is in possession of Aksai Chin and the Trans Karakoram Tract\, both of which are part of the erstwhile princely state of J&K. China also played a critical role in the construction of the Karakoram Highway that was completed in 1978. China also plans to build a railway to enhance connectivity to PoK. Citing sources\, Dr. Singh said that there was a strong possibility that more than 10\,000 PLA (Peoples’ Liberation Army) soldiers were present in PoK. \nClearly\, PoK is of significant strategic interest for China. Hydropower projects aside\, it is opening banks and constructing road networks across PoK. The region also provides China access to Arabian Sea and a strategic communication link through Gwadar port of Balochistan (also built by China) to oil rich regions of west Asia\, through which China can transport energy. Aware of the fact that the region borders its restive Xinjiang province\, Beijing considers POK important to have a credible security presence so as to insulate its borders from the fundamentalist forces operative in Afghanistan-Pakistan region. It fears the percolation of such forces could fan the secessionist challenge in Xinjiang. In addition\, China is also involved in activities like Widening/realignment of the Karakoram Highway\, building a new 17 km stretch of the Karakoram Highway\, a proposed road link between Jaglot in Gilgit and Skardu in Baltistan\, Mangla dam raising project and investment of $300 million in housing and communications sector. \nFocusing on the US interests in the region\, Dr Singh argued that its increasing interest in the region could be partly to monitor the use of funds granted by it for socio-economic development in the region\, and partly to keep a close watch on the Chinese presence especially in Gilgit-Baltistan. This explains the US decision to provide financial assistance for Diamer-Bhasha dam. She also stated that this was well in line with its earlier policy to provide assistance for the Satpara dam near Skardu.  \nDwelling on the interest shown by the UK\, she said that it could be due to the presence of PoK Diaspora community in UK. She also mentioned that Mirpuri was second largest spoken language in UK after English.  About the involvement of France\, she made the audience aware that France had extended Rs. 9 billion (68 million Euros) as soft loan for the extension of an existing dam in PoK. This project aims at building a new 48 MW run-of-river hydro-power project in the Jaggran valley of PoK. In addition to this\, a French concern is also involved in a two-year capacity-building programme for government agencies in AJK such as the Hydro Electric Board\, which is responsible for implementing the Jagran II project. France\, like other countries\, contributed substantially to the post 2005 earthquake reconstruction and rehabilitation work in PoK. \nDr. Singh stated that the Russian interest in PoK was relatively new and that Russia had recently offered to take the contract for Diamer-Bhasha dam without bidding for it. She also discussed that role played by countries like Japan; even the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED) has also expressed its keenness to participate in the building of the Diamer-Bhasha dam in PoK. Germany and Saudi Arabia were interested in the developmental sector— pertaining to education\, health\, housing etc. — especially after the 2005-earthquake. Even Indonesia\, Like Japan\, has expressed its willingness to offer expertise and extend “maximum co-operation” in the horticulture sector in Gilgit Baltistan. Considering that Gilgit Baltistan\, even after the demographic tampering by Pakistan\, has a substantial Shia population\, Dr. Singh said that Iran had a natural interest in the region.  \nThe author then went on to suggest that that PoK could well turn into a geopolitical battleground given the renewed interest of western countries in the region to countervail China. Dr. Singh concluded by saying that the presence of important external players and their growing interest in PoK may provide tacit recognition to Pakistan’s illegal claim over the territory. Though there was not much that India could do about the growing Chinese footprints in PoK\, the presence of countries like the US and Russia\, it was hoped\, could act as a balancer in the region. \nDuring the course of the discussion\, the following points were raised to strengthen the paper: \n\nThe role of Pakistan needed to be analyzed and likewise the implication for India. \nThe presence of international organizations was inadequately covered.\nThe differences in Chinese approach towards GB and PoK needed to be sharpened. Also the presence of Chinese Army required to be studied in detail — whether such presence is offensive/defensive or to provide security to Chinese workers? Further\, Chinese reaction to the presence of other countries in PoK was also felt wanting.\nSome information on the role of Iran and Saudi Arabia in the PoK was essential. \nFrom a geopolitical perspective\, how the US would balance China in PoK would be a good research question to explore.\n\nReport prepared by Anwesha Ray Chaudhuri\, Research Assistant\, IDSA
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/mapping-the-role-of-external-players-in-pakistan-occupied-kashmir
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130322T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130322T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T210605
CREATED:20231224T102815Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130240Z
UID:64075-1363930200-1363930200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Land Locked and Transit Developing Countries:  Nepal’s Transit Trade Negotiations with India
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Lt Gen Y M Bammi (Retd) \nDiscussants: Dr Nisha Taneja and Dr Ram Upendra Das
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/land-locked-and-transit-developing-countries-nepals-transit-trade-negotiations-with-india
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130426T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130426T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T210605
CREATED:20231223T133807Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250311T070955Z
UID:63131-1366954200-1366954200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Malaysia-India Defence Cooperation: A Need for Paradigm Shift before Strategic Partnership
DESCRIPTION:Chairman: Lt Gen Y M Bammi (Retd)External Discussants: Ambassador Preet Mohan Singh Malik and Professor Man Mohini KaulInternal Discussants: Shri Vishal Chandra and Dr Rahul Mishra \n \n \nMajor Arguments of the Paper: The core argument of this paper is that a paradigm shift is necessary in order to take the defence relationship between Malaysia and India to a higher plane. The author has approached the subject from the Malaysian perspective\, and her prescription about paradigm shift relates to the Malaysian state. By paradigm shift she means a change in the mindset of Malaysians in general and the government in particular. The change of mindset here implies that Malaysia should stop viewing India from the old prism of a developing or backward nation.  \nThe author has traced the genesis of the defence relationship between the two countries to the pre-independence days\, when the British Indian forces made important contributions in Malaya. However\, Cold-War saw a drift in the relationship. End of the Cold War again brought important changes in the way Malaysia saw defence cooperation with India. Changed geopolitical realities made Malaysia cooperate with India. Malaysia regards its defense and security cooperation with India as vital and highest form of cooperation. The MoU on Defense Cooperation signed in 1993 is the most important mechanism to boost the bilateral cooperation in defence sector between the two countries.  \nThe author then goes on to explain the depth of the military cooperation by giving details of the cooperation-service wise. The level of interaction is deepest between the navies of the two countries largely because cooperation in Andaman and Malacca Straits maritime area holds vital strategic importance for both Malaysia and India. However\, the author has also attached importance to the contribution of the Indian Air Force in maintenance and tactical training of the RMAF. Moreover\, Malaysia sees India as a stabilizer in the region. \nThe author analysed the discourse on defence cooperation between the two countries under two broad themes:\ni 	Malaysia-India Defense cooperation is on the right track.\nii 	The relationships lacks substance and volume. \nThe author subscribes to the latter viewpoint and holds the Malaysian mindset primarily responsible for such a state of affairs. In conclusion she said that Defense MoU signed between the two countries was a major milestone as India was the first country outside the region with which Malaysia signed such an agreement. However\, since then progress has been limited. Many items listed in the MoU have not been implemented. The volume of defence cooperation needs to be increased. Malaysia cannot ignore India’s rise and must utilize its capabilities. And for this\, the author said\, Malaysian perception about India must change. \nMajor Points of Discussion and Suggestions to the Author: \n\nIt will be useful for the author to discuss the military doctrines of both India and Malaysia upfront to set the context for the study. It will also bring out clearly the points of convergence and divergence between the two\, which will help in policy prescription.\nThe Andaman Sea touches Thailand\, Malaysia\, and Singapore. So\, it is one of the potential areas of deeper cooperation between the navies of these countries and Indian Navy.\nOne of the main irritants for India in the relationship is Malaysia’s policy of equating Pakistan with India. Equating India with China is admissible\, but not Pakistan.\nThe paper would be enriched if its takes into account the US rebalancing in Asia-Pacific. Since the rebalancing envisages major role for India\, it will be worthwhile to dwell upon Malaysia’s stand on it and explore meeting grounds to further the defence cooperation.\nIndia’s Look East Policy and interaction with ASEAN led to better appreciation of each other’s position on security issues. For this reason\, the Look East Policy merits some attention in the paper.\nSignificantly\, it was pointed out that cooperation between the two countries in the Andaman Sea and the Straits of Malacca should not become hostage to the apprehension or fear of the Malaysian authorities\, as the need for cooperation on this issue is greater than any apprehension. \nAuthor should analyze the reasons for non-implementation of many of the items in the MoU.\nChina is an unreliable partner of ASEAN. It first signs a code of conduct and then violates it. Its aggressive postures vis-à-vis Vietnam bears testimony to this fact.\nThe defence cooperation between India and Malaysia is mainly in the maritime arena. However\, it is a fact that the land forces dominate the Malaysian military. It is important therefore\, that the cooperation between the two armies intensify. \nMalaysia’s apprehensions of India arise not because of either the Maldives Ops or the IPKF Ops\, but because of the 1998 nuclear tests and the Theatre Command in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. \nThe China factor should be devoted sufficient attention. The asymmetry that exists between the two countries limits Malaysia’s options vis-à-vis China. It has therefore\, adopted the policy of constructive engagement with China\, notwithstanding the fact that China is not a natural choice for them. Malaysia’s engagement is mostly economic. However\, the China factor also inhibits Malaysia in making faster moves in defence cooperation with India.  \n\nReport prepared by Amit Kumar\, Research Assistant\, IDSA
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/malaysia-india-defence-cooperation-a-need-for-paradigm-shift-before-strategic-partnership
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130503T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130503T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T210605
CREATED:20231224T102814Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130240Z
UID:64073-1367559000-1367559000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Turkey and its Quest for Leadership Role in the Region
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Brig Rumel Dahiya\, SM (Retd)External Discussants: Shri Saeed Naqvi\, Professor Ashwini Mahapatra and Col Ravinder GurungInternal Discussants: Dr Ashok K Behuria and Dr P. K. Pradhan
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/turkey-and-its-quest-for-leadership-role-in-the-region
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130503T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130503T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T210605
CREATED:20231224T102814Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130240Z
UID:64074-1367559000-1367559000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Media and India-China Relationship
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Venu RajamonyExternal Discussants: Srikanth Kondapalli and Indrani BagchiInternal Discussants: Shruti Pandalai amd Bijoy Das
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/media-and-india-china-relationship
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130510T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130510T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T210605
CREATED:20231224T102814Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130240Z
UID:64072-1368163800-1368163800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:North Korea's Nuclear Crisis: Strategic Implications
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/north-koreas-nuclear-crisis-strategic-implications
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130517T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130517T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T210605
CREATED:20231224T102729Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130240Z
UID:64071-1368768600-1368768600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:An Analysis of Real Oil Prices Over a Long Time Horizon (1861-2011) and Implications for Forward Naval Deployments
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Shebonti Ray DadwalExternal Discussant: Commodore Sujeet Samaddar and Dr B MohantyInternal Discussant: Cdr S S Parmar
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/an-analysis-of-real-oil-prices-over-a-long-time-horizon-1861-2011-and-implications-for-forward-naval-deployments
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130531T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130531T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T210605
CREATED:20231224T102729Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T012535Z
UID:64070-1369978200-1369978200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:North Korea’s Nuclear Capabilities and Alliance Game with China
DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nChairperson: Ambassador Arundhati GhoseExternal Discussants: Professor Madhu Bhalla amd Professor Swaran SinghInternal Discussants: Dr Rajiv Nayan and Ms Pranamita Baruah
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/north-koreas-nuclear-capabilities-and-alliance-game-with-china
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130607T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130607T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T210605
CREATED:20231224T102729Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T012442Z
UID:64069-1370583000-1370583000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Impossible Devolution? The Failure of Power Sharing Attempts to bring Democratic Stability and Peace to Sri Lanka
DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/impossible-devolution-the-failure-of-power-sharing-attempts-to-bring-democratic-stability-and-peace-to-sri-lanka
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130621T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130621T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T210605
CREATED:20231223T133750Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130240Z
UID:63126-1371792600-1371792600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Factoring RCEP and TPP: China\, India and the Politics of Regional Integration and Coexistence
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Amb (retd) R. RajagopalanDiscussants: Dr. GVC Naidu\, Amb (retd) J.C. Sharma\, S.K. Mohanty\, Durgesh K. Rai \n \nHighlights of the Paper\nDr. Jagannath P. Panda discussed the newly emerging multilateral power politics in Asia in the context of ASEAN initiated Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the United States led Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP). He argued that central to both the RCEP and TPP is the politics and prominence of ASEAN. He highlighted that several aspects of the Sino-US\, Sino-Japanese and US-Japanese dynamics vis-à-vis the RCEP and TPP have been analysed. However\, perceptions of India and China regarding the two groupings have not been adequately studied and the paper aims to discuss this understudied aspect\, noted Dr. Panda. The paper explained the politics\, policy and nuances that India and China attach to RCEP and TPP. Factoring both RCEP and TPP in the ASEAN context\, Dr. Panda argued that China’s tryst with the RCEP under ASEAN+6 is an opportunity for India to maximize its ‘Look East’ policy. He added that RCEP is vital to China politically to address the challenges and concerns it faces from the US ‘pivot to Asia’ policy.  \n	He also noted that China has opposed inclusion of India under the ASEAN+6 and thus the sprit of ASEAN in unifying the leading economies of the region has remained unfulfilled so far. Maritime disputes in the region have widened the gap among the ASEAN partners and ASEAN’s six dialogue partners. These maritime disputes have brought into question the ASEAN+6 concept\, brining into question if the economic ethos of an East Asian Community would ultimately help reduce the existing political differences. It would be interesting to see how China approaches the politics of RCEP and tries to accommodate India and its interests. \nThe paper was structured in four parts. First part drew a comparative outline of RCEP and TPP and policy preferences of China and the US on RCEP and TPP respectively. The second part explained the centrality of ASEAN in the politics of RCEP and TPP and presented a scenario of how the politics of ASEAN is offering a new opportunity in East Asia\, particularly for two regional players\, India and China. The third part discussed the Chinese and Indian perspective vis-à-vis the RCEP and TPP. The fourth part discussed the emerging contours of the political scope and opportunities for China-India politics in ASEAN context.  \nIn conclusion\, Dr. Panda mapped three important structural developments in the East Asian regional order that have taken place during the evolution of RCEP and TPP. First\, a direct Sino-US rivalry seems to be clearly emerging and the ASEAN community is divided between the Chinese and the American worldviews. Second\, the ASEAN-led regional multilateral politics is going to be another important aspect of regional politics\, where engaging with ASEAN and its dialogue partners will be the priority for several countries including India. Third\, China will continue to place most of its foreign policy thrust on ASEAN and South-East Asia. Even as China’s tryst with ASEAN will continue to be the greater deciding factor in the regional politics\, India will continue to emerge as a vital power and RCEP will be a favourable factor for India in this context.  \nMajor points of discussion and suggestions to the author: \n\nIt would be incorrect to assume that RCEP is China led. It is still an ASEAN led process. However\, it can be described as China dominated.\nIt is debatable whether the TPP is a byproduct of the US ‘pivot to Asia’ strategy. The TPP was formalized much before the enunciation of ‘pivot to Asia’ strategy.\nLittle bit of restructuring of the paper is needed; the idea behind the TPP and RCEP and its basic objective should be brought out in the beginning of the paper and then other related issues should be discussed for a better clarity of the issue.\nIt would be wrong to draw a conclusion that RCEP will help moderate China’s behaviour towards the regional countries. The cases of China’s approach to Philippines following Scarborough Shoal dispute where China temporarily halted the imports of banana from the Philippines and restrictions on export of rare earths to Japan following Senkaku spat\, suggest that China puts aside all trade agreements.\nIndia is destined to join the RCEP. But it should be opened to join the TPP. India would loose huge market if it does not join the TPP.\n\n(Report Prepared by Dr. Shamshad A. Khan\, Research Assistant\, IDSA.)
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/factoring-rcep-and-tpp-china-india-and-the-politics-of-regional-integration-and-coexistence
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130628T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130628T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T210605
CREATED:20231224T102729Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T012341Z
UID:64068-1372397400-1372397400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:ASEAN in Myanmar's Foreign Policy
DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/asean-in-myanmars-foreign-policy
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130712T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130712T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T210605
CREATED:20231224T102715Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T010657Z
UID:64067-1373607000-1373607000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Hegemony – Exploring Chinese Conceptions
DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nChairperson: Brig Mandip SinghExternal Discussants: Ambassador S K Bhutani and Shri M V RappaiInternal Discussants: Dr G Balachandran and Dr S Kalyan Raman
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/hegemony-exploring-chinese-conceptions
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130719T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130719T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T210605
CREATED:20231224T102714Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T010552Z
UID:64065-1374211800-1374211800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Social Media – New Web Tool for Communication or an Easy Weapon for Pseudo War
DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nChairperson: Dr Chitralekha DhamijaExternal Discussants: Mr Subimal Bhattacharjee and Mr Kunal MajumderInternal Discussants: Ms Shruti Pandalai and Ms Gunjan Singh
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/social-media-new-web-tool-for-communication-or-an-easy-weapon-for-pseudo-war
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130719T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130719T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T210605
CREATED:20231224T102715Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T010451Z
UID:64066-1374211800-1374211800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:British Reform to Higher Defence Organization: Lessons for India
DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nChairperson: Shri P R ChariExternal Discussant: Maj Gen B K Sharma (Retd) and Brig Gurmeet Kanwal (Retd)Internal Discussant: Dr S Kalyan Raman and Cdr S S Parmar
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/british-reform-to-higher-defence-organization-lessons-for-india
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130726T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130726T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T210605
CREATED:20231224T102714Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T010332Z
UID:64064-1374816600-1374816600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Cyber warfare in the Asian context
DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell\nChairperson: Shri Kiran Karnik\nExternal Discussants: Brig Abhimanyu Ghosh and Col S Burman\nInternal Discussants: Lt Col Sanjiv Tomar and Shri Kapil Patil
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/cyber-warfare-in-the-asian-context
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130802T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130802T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T210605
CREATED:20231223T133707Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130240Z
UID:63120-1375421400-1375421400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Comparative Study between Arthasastra and San Shi Liu Ji( The Thirty Six Strategies)
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Brig Rumel Dahiya\, SM (Retd)External Discussants: Col V M B Krishnan and Group Captain Vinay VittalInternal Discussants: Ms Rukmani Gupta and Dr Saurabh Mishra \nMajor Arguments of the Paper: \nThis paper was a comparative study\, perhaps the first.  between two major books on warfare theory: Kautilya’s Arthasastra and Sunzu’s San Shi Lui Ji  (36 Stratagems). \nDelving on the absence of a comparative study between San Shi LiuJi and Arthasastra\, the author blames lack of interest among political scientists and strategic experts to look at Kautilya. The other reason could be the challenge of comprehending the philosophical and historical traditions of two different cultures represented by these two great strategists. A proper understanding of the philosophical and historical traditions is essential to contextualize these two books. \nThe paper then discusses the similarities between the two texts. It argues that the most striking similarity between the two texts is that for them war is seducere: getting the enemy away from his habits so to get him lost and then destroy him. The importance of shaping false perception in enemy’s mind and to employ time to defeat the enemy by using his weaknesses are the two most important instruments of seduction. In both book it is very clear that the strategists have to decide what the enemy thinks. Both SanShi Liu Ji  and Arthasastra explain seduction in war with very different philosophical concepts drawing from their cultures. \nMajor Points of Discussion and Suggestions to the Author:\n\nWhile San Shi Liu Ji   primarily deals with warfare\, Arthashastra deals with a whole gamut of issues like\, economy\, governace\, politics\, etc. Warfare and victory in war nevertheless are important subject-matters of the Arthashastra \nIt is wrong to portray Arthashastra  as a realpolitik genre. Kautilya’s Arthashastra talks about enlightened self-interest. It is very liberal and welfare-oriented as far as the internal policies of the state is concerned. Significantly\, post-conflict scenario as discussed in Arthashastra  evades scholarly attention. It is very comprehensive and progressive in nature. The Arthashastra  has not altogether forgotten moral precepts\, while dealing with the business of statecraft. \nThe origins of Arthashastra  and SunZu are contested but the origin of San Shi Liu Ji   is not known. The author and the motivation to write the text is yet to be ascertained. \nIndian military does not lay much emphasis on the teaching of  war classics\, unlike China. The study of the war classics will enable the civilian and military bureaucracy in India to ingrain the teachings in these classics in their thought and practise. \nThese two texts are of warring states\, when deception and pre-emptive strikes were common. However\, in the present era of interdependence\, the strategy of deception and pre-emptive strike does not seem to be feasible. \nPower is an important component of strategy alongwith temporal dimension. San Shi Liu Ji   does not devote attention to this aspect of strategy. \nThe author was advised not to use the term Hindu philosophy. Since\, these days the term evokes mixed response\, it was suggested to use the term Indian philosophy. Moreover\, many of the philosophies which western scholars put under a generic term Hindu philosophy today belong to other religions like Buddhism\, Jainism\, etc. \nThe transcendenatl values in Indian philosophy are well established and there are many instances in the Indian tradition of highest sacrifices being made for the sake of these values. It is erroneous therefore\, to say that Kant’s categorical imperative is absent in Indian tradition and value-system.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/comparative-study-between-arthasastra-and-san-shi-liu-ji-the-thirty-six-strategies
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130816T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130816T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T210605
CREATED:20231223T133706Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130240Z
UID:63119-1376631000-1376631000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Interpretation of Concepts in Kautilya’s Arthasastra
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Dr  Ashok BehuriaExternal Discussants: Ambassador H.H.S. Vishwanathan and Dr Medha BishtInternal Discussants: Dr Nihar Nayak and Mr Shyam Hari P  \nMajor Arguments of the Paper:\nThe paper generates a dialogue between past\, present and the future and attempts to understand the Kautilyan concepts such as samdhi\,  vigraha\,  Sadgunya\, desopananta sandhi (surrender of land)\, bhumisandhi (pact for acquiring land)\, and  vyasanas (calamities) and its relevance in the contemporary state behaviour. The paper concludes that concepts of war\, peace and diplomacy as given in the Arthasastra are relevant today and needs to be further studied and explored. \nMajor Points of Discussion and Suggestions to the Author:\n\nArthasastra covers almost every aspect of statecraft including diplomacy. For instance\, the contemporary phenomenon of honey-trap finds a very detailed treatment in Arthasastra. Similarly\, the concept of Rajamandala in the Arthasastra provides a framework for understanding and analyzing the behavior of nations in contemporary international relations.\nGovernance\, and accountability are the buzz words of modern democracies; these concepts are dealt with elaborately in Arthasastra.\nThe entire concept of the welfare state is found in one sutra of Arthasastra which says that in the happiness of the subjects lies the happiness of the state/king.\nThe concept of Vigraha as given in Arthasastra is similar to the concept of Détente in the cold war period and can be examined with reference to the contemporary Sino-Indian relations.\nThe policymakers today are confused between ends and means of foreign policy. In Kautilya’s Arthasastraone finds very clear exposition of what constitute objective and what is strategy in two terms Sadgunya andUpayas.\n Kautilya’s Arthasastra has seven Prakrits orconstituent elements of state\, whereas in western conception of state only four elements find mention. Economy which is the basis of a state is missing in the western conception\, whereas Arthasastra considers it as an important constituent of state.\nSince the world has dramatically changed establishing the relevance of Kautilya’s work will require great amount of scholarship. One way to establish the relevance of Arthasastra is to explore the elements of universality in it\, which transcends temporal dimensions.\n\nReport Prepared by Amit Kumar\, Research Assistant\, IDSA
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/interpretation-of-concepts-in-kautilyas-arthasastra
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130823T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130823T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T210605
CREATED:20231224T102615Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130239Z
UID:64063-1377235800-1377235800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Missile Defence in Southern Asia:  The Emerging Strategic Environment
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Ambassador R RajagopalanExternal Discussants: Professor Swaran Singh and Professor Stephen F BurgessInternal Discussants: Lt Col Sanjiv Tomar and Shri S Samuel C Rajiv
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/missile-defence-in-southern-asia-the-emerging-strategic-environment
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130830T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130830T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T210605
CREATED:20231224T102615Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T010148Z
UID:64062-1377840600-1377840600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Issues in the Management of India-Pakistan International Border
DESCRIPTION:1030 to 1300 hrs
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/issues-in-the-management-of-india-pakistan-international-border
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130906T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130906T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T210605
CREATED:20231224T102614Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T010025Z
UID:64061-1378445400-1378445400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:AQIM Jihad Propaganda
DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/aqim-jihad-propaganda
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130913T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130913T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T210605
CREATED:20231224T102614Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T010414Z
UID:64060-1379050200-1379050200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Defence Innovation in India: The Fault Lines
DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/defence-innovation-in-india-the-fault-lines
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130920T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130920T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T210605
CREATED:20231223T133607Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130239Z
UID:63116-1379655000-1379655000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Iran\,  IAEA and the Challenges of 'Politicised Safeguards' Implementation
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Ambassador R. RajagopalanExternal Discussants: Ambassador Sheelkanth Sharma and Prof. R. RajaramanInternal Discussants: Dr G Balachandran and A Vinod Kumar \nThe paper examined three issue areas that according to the author exemplified the politicised nature of the interactions between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).  These included dispute over access to military sites like Parchin where nuclear-related activities could have taken place; disputes pertaining to the sources as well as the nature of the information being used by the IAEA to carry out its safeguards activities inside Iran; and the ‘nuclear activism’ of Western non-governmental organisations like the ISIS. The paper noted that charges of politicisation by Iran – made justifiably or conveniently – make the task of safeguards implementation by the IAEA that much more complicated and is a factor not only prolonging a resolution of the issues concerned (primarily due to the absence of ‘smoking gun’ evidence of either Iranian complicity or innocence) but even possibly inhibiting it. \nOn Parchin for instance\, despite 10 rounds of talks from January 2012 to May 2013\, Iran and the IAEA have not yet agreed on the contours of a ‘structured approach’ regarding further cooperation. In July 2013\, Iran charged IAEA Director General Yukiyo Amano of ‘partiality’ and accused him of intending to ‘keep open this issue [Parchin] in order to pave the way for Iran’s enemies’. Iran’s arguments for not agreeing to facilitate access pending an agreement on the contours of such access include the failure of the IAEA to deliver ‘all relevant documents related to the Agency’s concerns’\, and the IAEA not allegedly sticking to its end of the bargain on negotiated portions of a possible agreement in subsequent meetings\, during the 10 rounds of talks.  \nIran more specifically contends that since Parchin is a ‘military site\, granting access is a time-consuming process and cannot be permitted repeatedly’ and insists that the Agency focus on a non-nuclear site was beyond its mandate. However\, Iran had given IAEA access to military sites in the past\, like Lavisan-Shian\, Kolahdouz\, and Parchin twice in 2005. Iran’s arguments therefore that it cannot give ‘repeated access’ – when the last time the IAEA was given access was way back in November 2005 – starkly illustrates the limitations of IAEA under INFCIRC/214 (Iran’s safeguards agreement with the IAEA) to draw safeguards conclusions for Iran.  \nAs for the second issue area\, Iran has expressed concern over what it alleged was leaks of confidential information provided to the IAEA on such subjects like ‘plutonium research project’. Iran has also been urging the IAEA to share information about the member-states/sources which indicated ‘possible military dimensions’ (PMD) of its nuclear activities. The paper highlighted the fact that the IAEA therefore faced real challenges in its efforts to broad-base the sources of information as it strives to build a ‘state-level’ safeguards picture\, if the information so generated is not shared or is viewed as having ulterior motives. The IAEA however on its part is faced with the dilemma of protecting genuine sources of information\, to the extent they are.  \nAs for the third issue area\, the paper noted that the role of the ISIS highlighted the political jostling that accompanied safeguards implementation in Iran\, especially on such aspects as posting of IAEA DG reports on its website on the day they are presented to the Board of Governors\, which Iran takes exception to. The ISIS however contends that it is doing a ‘public service’ by disseminating the reports which are not ‘safeguards confidential’. \nThe author went on to highlight safeguards implementation in countries like South Korea and Brazil. In the latter case for instance\, concerns relating to access to a new uranium enrichment facility in 2004 were resolved within the framework of the IAEA. The author highlighted Brazil’s continued reluctance to sign the AP and its nuclear submarine project as issues that could have an impact on how other countries like Iran could view such endeavours. \nIn the light of the as yet unresolved nature of contentions between Iran and the IAEA\, the paper noted on-going IAEA efforts to improve the efficiency and efficacy of safeguards implementation in the face of emerging challenges amidst budgetary\, organisational and legal constraints. In the Iran case\, while budgetary or organisational constraints seem not to have played a negative role (over 800 man-days of inspections were conducted for instance between February 2003 and September 2004)\, lack of adequate legal authority (as embodied in the IAEA Additional Protocol) has hindered its ability to conclude that all of Iran’s nuclear activities are for peaceful purposes. The author closed by noting that even as the IAEA safeguards department has an important role to play\, the resolution of the decade-long imbroglio would however eventually depend on a political understanding between Iran and its P5+1 interlocutors.  \nAmbassador Sharma suggested that safeguards implementation was inherently a ‘political’ job. He pointed out that Iran itself went ‘political’ when it approached the EU-3 after concerns relating to its activities were first brought into limelight in 2002. Amb. Sharma urged the author to also consult the writings of former IAEA officials like Ollie Heinonen and Mohammad El Baradei to get their view on the issues involved. He wanted the author to bring into the paper aspects relating to Iran’s interactions with the P5+1 to situate the Iran-IAEA interactions in the overall political context. Amb. Sharma noted that Iran cannot possibly cite the Brazil case in defence of its own position. \nProf. Rajaraman stated that the paper was exhaustively cited and had clarity in its arguments. He noted that though Iran may or may not cite the issue of safeguards implementation in Brazil\, the author had complete freedom to examine the issue from a purely academic perspective to draw comparison or lessons if any. Prof. Rajaraman proceeded to give a brief presentation on the technical aspects relating to the Iranian nuclear issue\, including on such issues as the different types of Iranian centrifuges and the impact of the Stuxnet virus on the Iranian programme.  He pointed out that Iran could use the same centrifuges in which it had enriched uranium to 3.5 per cent to further enrich it to weapons grade within a considerably shorter amount of time if it so desired\, thus fuelling concerns about a possible breakout. The IAEA remained wary of Iran’s intentions as it had a history of not declaring its nuclear projects to the agency. He noted that it was imperative that ratifies the AP\, and bring all their facilities under IAEA safeguards and inspection. \nDr. G. Balachandran urged the author to examine whether the AP gave the Agency the necessary authority to demand access to sites like Parchin. He further highlighted the fact that the IAEA has been able to verify both ‘correctness’ and ‘completeness’ in close to 80 per cent of states having significant nuclear activities (SNA)and therefore was reasonably successful in its safeguards implementation efforts. This experience should be helpful to the IAEA if and when it is required to verify that all of Iran’s nuclear activities are for peaceful purposes. Vinod Kumar urged the author to provide more empirical elaboration to show the politicisation process in play.  \nDr. Arvind Gupta noted that the paper does a good job of listing the Iranian contentions on the three issue areas that the author has explored and that this was a useful exercise to know where Iran stood. The validity or otherwise of its arguments however are open to contention. Dr. Dany Shoham enquired whether IAEA safeguards implementation in North Korea could be explored by the author as another case study.  \nAmb. Rajagopalan urged the author to more clinically examine the issues in the light of the comments received. He urged the author to provide a few paragraphs on the background to the political dispute between Iran and the P5+1 so that lay reader could more easily understand the issues being discussed. The Chair closed the session by commenting on the larger geo-political issues at stake in the light of the Syria crisis and Mr. Rouhani’s election as the new Iranian President.  \nReport prepared by S. Samuel C. Rajiv and Daneesh Sethna.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/iran-iaea-and-the-challenges-of-politicised-safeguards-implementation
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20131108T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20131108T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T210605
CREATED:20231224T102528Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T005210Z
UID:64059-1383888600-1383888600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Overlapping Regional Security Governance Mechanisms: An Alternative Interpretation of the Difficulties of Regional Cooperation for Afghanistan
DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact\nConference Cell\n\n\n\n\n1030 to 1300 hrs
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/overlapping-regional-security-governance-mechanisms-an-alternative-interpretation-of-the-difficulties-of-regional-cooperation-for-afghanistan
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20131122T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20131122T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T210605
CREATED:20231223T133606Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130239Z
UID:63113-1385098200-1385098200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Threat of Israel’s Regional Isolation and Imperatives for the Future
DESCRIPTION:Event: Fellows’ seminarChair: Ambassador Rajiv  SikriExternal Discussants:  Dr. P R Kumaraswamy\, Mr. Ashok SinghInternal  Discussant: Mr.  S Samuel C Rajiv \nThe paper provides a  comprehensive overview of Israel’s history since its birth in 1948 and examines  the topical threat of its isolation in the West Asian region. A temporal  overview of Israel’s troubled transition since 1948 has been given\, along with a  meticulous account of Israel’s position during Arab spring and its WMD policy (Weapons  of Mass Destruction i.e. Chemical and Nuclear weapons). \nIn his study\, the  author has raised four pertinent research questions; the issue of Israel’s  reorientation of regional policy in recent past\, Effect of Arab Spring on  Israel\, Israel’s policy shift in response to Syrian crisis-Iran nuclear issue\,  and Imperatives for Israel’s regional strategy. \nThe paper was structured in three sections; the  first section elaborates Israel and its  engagement with the region with an exhaustive timeline of Israel’s  relations with its neighbours. The next section analyses impact of Arab Spring on Israel’s regional posture and Israel’s  ambiguous policy on Chemical and Nuclear  weapons. The last section highlights the likely future trends for Israel’s regional engagement. \nIsrael and its Engagement with  the region\nIn  the first section\, the author states that throughout its brief history\,  national security has always dominated Israel’s strategic thought in the  region. Israel’s foreign policy was defined as a culmination of three factors;  its strategic location\, Arab-Israeli conflict and Arab rejection of Israel and  it was further suggested that Israel’s strategic thought was always dominated  by national security. The period of Israel’s engagement in the region has been classified  into three distinct phases; 1948-1991\, 1991-2005 and 2005 onwards. The author  opined that the first phase highlighted Israel’s fight for survival and its  strategy of viewing the region through the spectrum of “peace through security”.  The second phase was one of a reconciliatory approach. During this phase\,  Israel traversed from its traditional security oriented approach to a  distinctly different reconciliatory strategic approach. The author built his  arguments based on Israeli Prime minister Rabin’s land-for-peace policy.  Reference to Madrid conference (1991)\, Oslo Accords (1993) and Oslo II i.e.  Taba Agreement (1995) was made to substantiate the main argument.  This period also witnessed the peace treaty  with Jordan in 1994. The third phase has however witnessed the return of  security oriented approach. In this section\, author outlined the failure of  Ariel Sharon’s Gaza Disengagement Plan of 2005 to bring about any lasting peace.  The author highlighted the impact of other important developments in the region  on Israel’s regional policy; particularly Saddam Hussein’s ouster and ensuing  political shifts in Iraq\, Iran’s escalating influence across the Levant\, and  rise of Hamas and Hezbollah.  The author  pointed out that Israel witnessed a net deterioration in its regional posture  during this period\, particularly towards the end of 2010 when Arab uprisings  engulfed West Asia. \nIsrael and Arab Spring\nDevelopments  in Arab World-particularly regional players-Egypt and Syria were discussed. The  author highlighted how Turkey and Iran tried to make the best of these  revolutions while Israel kept getting pushed into a corner. Author contended  that Arab Spring aggravated Israel’s isolation in the region\, and “rise of Islamists on political maps of the  countries” was highlighted as a major concern for Israel. \nWeapons of Mass Destruction in  the region and Israel\nIn the  section\, the author drew attention towards Israel’s policy of ambiguity on  Chemical and Nuclear weapons. Israel’s regional threat perception was also examined  to understand why Israel maintains this ambiguity. Most importantly\, author  highlighted that destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons is likely to put  enormous pressure on Israel to ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention. Author  referred to various international reports to confirm Israel’s nuclear weapons programme\,  and emphasized that future of Iran-US nuclear deal will be an important factor  in determining Israel’s isolation in the future. \nConclusion: Likely Future Trends\nIn the  last section of the paper\, the author briefly summed up Israel’s equation with  its neighbours to reiterate Israel’s escalating regional isolation. Author noted  that it was time for Israel to think in terms of enhancing confidence building  measures in West Bank and Gaza\, and changing its position on CWC and NPT. Author  suggested that there is a need to signal diplomatic willingness to resolve  Palestine issue and by altering its anti-Iran rhetoric. \nComments and Observations:\n    Mr. Ashok Singh appreciated the  author for extending the scope of his study beyond the clichéd Israel Palestine  issue. He urged the author to interpret Israel’s perception of its own strategic  policy in the region. With respect to Israel’s regional isolation\, he stated  that Israel has a policy of keeping distance and it enjoys the threat. The  author was asked to offer concrete suggestions to guide Israel’s future  imperatives. \nDr. P R Kumaraswamy mentioned that in the current  scenario Iran is perceived as the most potent threat to Israel\, and in light of  recent developments\, Iran is likely to emerge as a decisive player in West Asia.  He urged the author to speculate as to how Israel prepares to face Iran  resurgence- via reconciliation or retaliation. The decline in US engagement  with Israel post-2009 was also underlined\, and he advised the author to comment  on role of US in shaping Israel’s regional policy. \nDr. Samual Rajiv appreciated author’s analysis  of Israel’s regional policy dynamics. He urged the author to focus more on  contemporary issues and also encompass Israeli narrative on peace. \nAmbassador Rajiv Sikri noted that the paper aptly  underlined the issue of Israel’s security oriented approach. He highlighted the  role of US in shaping Israel’s policy and urged the author to include US factor  within the framework of this paper. He pointed out that within Israel\, there is  dwindling public support for hard lined policy and thus it’s essential to  understand public as well as diplomatic perception about regional policy. With  reference to Israel’s policy of ambiguity on Chemical and Nuclear weapons\, he  asserted that Israel will gradually succumb to the compelling regional circumstances  and declare its stocks. \nThe  discussion was followed by Question and Answer round\, where questions regarding  Saudi-Israel cooperation against Iran\, GCC’s economic threat to Israel and Israel’s  internal politics were raised. \n  Chair  concluded the session by commenting on evolving geopolitics of West Asia and India’s  capability to intervene in the region.Report prepared by Divya Malhotra
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/threat-of-israels-regional-isolation-and-imperatives-for-the-future
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20131129T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20131129T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T210605
CREATED:20231223T133606Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130239Z
UID:63112-1385703000-1385703000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Framing of Nationalism in Nepal's Radical Communist Movement: The India Factor
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Brig Rumel Dahiya\, SM (Retd)External Discussants: Ambassador Deb Mukherji and Ms Akashnya ShahInternal Discussants: Dr Anand Kumar and Dr Anshuman Behera \nMr Post Bhadur Basnet\, SAARC Visiting Fellow from Nepal presented his paper titled “Framing of Nationalism in Nepal’s Radical Communist Movement: The Indian Factor” on 29 November 2013.  \nThe paper argues that the Maoists used “negative nationalism”\, based on anti-Indian sentiments\, as one of the key “revolutionary” strategies during the insurgency. The same band of nationalism continues to feature in the radical communist discourse\, though it seems to have lost much of its appeal among the masses during the course of democratic politics in which the Maoists willingly participated since 2005.  \nThe genesis of anti-Indianism goes back to the days of the formation of Nepali state. The 1950 treaty\, which aimed to bring Nepal under the security sphere of India that possibly checked the import of communism to Nepal from China\, has been a major irritant for the communists. India’s security concern requires an India-friendly regime in Nepal and thus India is seen to be meddling in the internal affairs of the country and favouring some actors over the others\, which is viewed as external interference in Nepal’s internal politics and leads to anti-India sentiments amongst the Nepalese people. Moreover\, “not-to-be-an-Indian” is one of the key features in the identity formation process in Nepal. All these features collectively offered a fertile ground to the political actors to manufacture and exploit anti–India sentiments to their benefit over the years.  \nDuring the monarchy period\, the king was successful in sustaining his regime by instigating anti-Indianism and gathering the support of the communists. Once the relationship between the monarchy and the communists was broken\, there was a regime change in Nepal. With the monarchy gone\, the paper argues\, the role of nationalism for political mobilisation is no longer effective.  \nThe Maoists after 2006 have realised that the anti-India card does not work in the changed global\, regional and domestic political matirx. The mainstream faction of the Maoist party led by Prachanda has removed India from its hit-list\, and started talking about the internal nationalism (ethnic federalism and development). However\, the radical faction in the Maoist Party led by Kiran Baidya continues to talk about external intervention and take an anti-Indian line while framing its version of Nepalese nationalism. The presenter argued that while the line of “externalised nationalism” may have lost its glamour\, the Maoist plan for consolidating ‘internal nationalism’ through emphasis on ethnic nationalism has pushed the Nepali state into a state of wilderness.  \nThe presenter provides the following recommendations which according to him can remove the prevailing anti-India sentiments in Nepal: \n\nIndia should pay attention to dissemination of information regarding its approach to Nepal. In this regard\, Indian Embassy should extend its network with journalists. \nIndian investment in Nepal should increase. Other than in the hydro power sector\, India should invest in agriculture in the plains and mid-hills and in the capacity-building of security forces. \nIndia should recognise and analyse the reasons for the spread of anti-India sentiments in Nepal. There are frequent complaints about India micro-managing Nepalese politics. India should address this issue. \nIndia should try to build contacts with all the political actors and should not be seen as favouring some actors over others. While playing its role to build political consensus in matters concerning its security it should take care not to isolate any party and keep a low profile. \nThere should be proper coordination between Ministry of External affairs and intelligence agencies in their approach to Nepal. \n\nComments of the discussants\nThe discussants have made the following observations about the paper:  \n\nThe paper talked about hill-based nationalism rather than Nepali nationalism. \nNationalism has been used in the paper as a synonym of anti-Indianism. \nThe paper gives an impression that China is interested to play its own political game in Nepal. However\, it was argued by the discussants that it was the Nepalese who wanted to play the China card. China is quite pragmatic in its dealings with Nepal.\n \nTo justify the title\, a separate section on India factor should be incorporated in the paper. \nThe paper is detailed and timely. However to make it more up-to-date it should accommodate the analysis on the latest Constituent Assembly (CA) election results.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/framing-of-nationalism-in-nepals-radical-communist-movement-the-india-factor
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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