BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//MP-IDSA - ECPv6.15.12.2//NONSGML v1.0//EN CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH X-ORIGINAL-URL:https://idsa.in X-WR-CALDESC:Events for MP-IDSA REFRESH-INTERVAL;VALUE=DURATION:PT1H X-Robots-Tag:noindex X-PUBLISHED-TTL:PT1H BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:Asia/Kolkata BEGIN:STANDARD TZOFFSETFROM:+0530 TZOFFSETTO:+0530 TZNAME:IST DTSTART:20110101T000000 END:STANDARD END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120420T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120420T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T230409 CREATED:20231223T134353Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130242Z UID:63170-1334899800-1334899800@idsa.in SUMMARY:In Pursuit of a Shield:US\, Missile Defence and the Iran Imperative DESCRIPTION:Chairman: Professor Satish KumarDiscussants: Dr. Probal K. Ghosh\, Cdr. Abhijit Singh \nThe paper dealt with US efforts to counter Iran’s missile ‘threat’ and ensure security of its allies like Israel and Turkey and safeguard its interests and the regional repercussions of such measures. The paper began by discussing the Iran threat as flagged in key US policy documents including the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)\, 2006 National Military Strategy to Combat WMD and the February 2010 Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) Review and the solution articulated (missile defence) to deal/hedge against such a threat. Pertinent among these measures being erected in consort with allies like the NATO and GCC countries at sea as well as on land across the Bush and the Obama administration were examined. The next section examined Iran’s missile inventory and its developing capabilities. \nThe pursuit of such ‘defensive’ measures has led to complications in US-Russia arms control efforts\, uncertainties in Iran’s relations with its neighbours like Turkey and has generated regional strategic tensions (NATO-Russia) as well. Russian contentions that the real focus of such measures is to constrain its strategic capabilities despite US officials insisting that it was directed against Iran were pointed out. NATO’s November 2010 Lisbon Summit explicitly avoided naming Iran as the intended target of Obama’s Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) at the instance of Turkey\, which agreed to host a X-band radar at Kurecik 700 kms from the Iranian border in September 2011 on the condition that data would not be shared with Israel. The strong US-Israel missile defence cooperation was noted\, with Arrow Block 4 version tested in February 2012. It was pointed out that the Arrow – first inducted into the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) in 2000 – was the first operational theatre missile defence system in the world. The paper noted that there was the distinct possibility of Obama’s PAA being extended to the Gulf region\, with senior US policy makers expressing such a desire publicly in recent times. The UAE became the first international partner to buy the THAAD missiles from the US in December 2011. \nThe paper ended by flagging possible implications for Indian security given that these efforts relate to developments in what Indian policy makers have called its ‘proximate neighbourhood’. Among these included greater regional strategic uncertainties coupled with rising military expenditures\, energy security complications as a result of a possible incident at sea\, and possible deterrence complications given that American BMD systems provides the justification for both Russia and China to continue their nuclear modernization efforts. \nProf. Kumar noted that the issues examined in the paper have a fundamental bearing on regional and global security. He added that the ‘reset’ in US-Russia relations has been affected by the US missile defence policy with regard to Iran. \nDr. Ghosh began his comments by noting that the paper was ‘well-crafted’ but with certain loopholes which can be plugged to make it better. His comments dealt with the BMD architecture\, Russia-US imbroglio and Iran’s capabilities. He wanted the author to examine some of the US programmes that had been mothballed as well as programmes like the Hypersonic Glide Kill Vehicle\, which could be the future of BMD. Dr. Ghosh reminded the audience that Obama’s PAA was in many ways similar to the 1996 document Capstone Requirements Document (CRD) specifying NMD operational requirements which was scrapped because the capabilities could not mature. Dr. Ghosh noted that the Bush-era system did not cover Turkey\, Greece\, Bulgaria\, and parts of Romania. He also noted that the US had rejected the Russian suggestion to host US radars at Gabaladarya\, Azerbaijan directly overlooking Iran instead of in Poland and Czech Republic. On Russian contentions specifically\, Dr. Ghosh stated that they were a bit overblown given that Russia could potentially overwhelm US interceptors by sheer numbers at its disposal. He concluded his remarks by noting that an Iranian ICBM capability ‘was still some distance away’. \nCdr. Singh commended the effort to bring out a coherent paper by the author despite not having a military background. He gave a geo-strategic context to the issue in the light of declining Russian influence over ‘buffer’ states after the break-up of the Soviet Union\, and the genuine apprehensions of countries like Poland and Georgia over the resurgent Russia. He pointed to intra-NATO divisions over the issue\, which are being played up by Russia. In his opinion\, the technological basis of the US system was sound. He however termed the ‘threat’ from Iran as ‘over-stated’ given that Iranian IRBM capabilities have prominent North Korean/Chinese links and an Iranian ICBM capability was far away. Iranian cruise missile capabilities though are potent and are being still further developed. Cdr. Singh pointed out that Iranian threats to close the Straits of Hormuz were real\, even though it could be for a limited period. He stated that as a concept\, BMD was a ‘brilliant\, strategic idea’ equivalent to a ‘strategic tent’ rather than a ‘strategic fortress’. \nInternal Discussant Cdr. S.S. Parmar noted that in the event of clashes\, it will not involve missile defences per se but conventional capabilities. He also noted that Iran could swarm US ships with shore-based batteries making defences against short-range missiles ineffective. Cdr. Parmar pointed to the importance of maps and tables to more clearly convey information. The other Discussant Kapil Dharaj Patil pointed out that Iranian perceptions of the US missile defence system was absent in the paper. He added that it was important to note the ‘threat construction’ by US and NATO vis-à-vis Iran’s capabilities. \nDG\, IDSA Dr. Arvind Gupta noted that though the paper is an important update\, it could do with more analysis. He pointed out that implications for Indian security if any have to be more clearly brought out and the author’s own assessment of the US efforts has to be included in the concluding section. The paper could also benefit by incorporating maps/tables. Chinese reactions to the issue could also be pointed out. On issues like budgetary pressures being faced by the Obama administration that the paper flags\, a more focussed effort can be made to go into the pertinent details. \nOther points of discussion that were flagged from the floor included regional responses to US BMD efforts\, specifically from countries like Saudi Arabia and the GCC\, assessment of Iranian capabilities or lack of it\, and the efficacy of the BMD systems being pursued by the US\, among others. \nReport prepared by Shri Kiran Jai Prakash\, Research Intern\, Nuclear and Arms Control Centre\, and Sam Rajiv. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/in-pursuit-of-a-shieldus-missile-defence-and-the-iran-imperative CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120420T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120420T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T230409 CREATED:20231224T103522Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T014044Z UID:64088-1334899800-1334899800@idsa.in SUMMARY:Indian Economic Miracle: A Model for Nepal DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/indian-economic-miracle-a-model-for-nepal CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120525T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120525T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T230409 CREATED:20231224T103515Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130242Z UID:64087-1337923800-1337923800@idsa.in SUMMARY:Analysis of Terrorist Financing - Funding Pattern and Sources of Contributions DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Brig Rumel Dahiya\, SM (Retd)Discussants: Shri Balesh Kumar\, Special Director\, Enforcement Directorate\, Maj-General Umong Sethi (Retd) and Shri Raghuraman\, CEO\, NATGRID URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/analysis-of-terrorist-financing-funding-pattern-and-sources-of-contributions CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120608T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120608T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T230409 CREATED:20231223T134352Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130242Z UID:63167-1339133400-1339133400@idsa.in SUMMARY:Does India need a grand strategy? DESCRIPTION:Chair: Ambassador Satish ChandraDiscussants: Maj General B K Sharma and Dr Happymon Jacob \n \n\nInterrogating the concept of grand strategy and whether India needs a centrally articulated design for the conduct of its statecraft constitutes the core thinking put forward by the paper. In contrast to other major states in the world\, the Government of India has so far shied away from publicly articulating a grand strategy\, thereby attracting comments that this is an anomaly that needs to be remedied. Proponents of grand strategy argue that the absence of a publicly articulated and coherent grand strategy gives rise to various concerns: armed forces acquire technologies without a strategy; government departments pursue their specific interests without reference to overarching national goals; and\, diplomats have a hard time explaining India’s behaviour to foreign interlocutors. \nThe author identifies several benefits which flow out of formulation of a grand strategy: \n\nFirst\, it will help departments to develop short and medium term plans in accordance with the overall national intent. \nSecond\, it will help policy makers view their policy initiatives holistically and highlight crosscutting issues. \nThird\, it can provide a basis for prioritising resource allocations. \nFourth\, it will improve coordination among agencies\, increase synergies and provide direction to individual and collective actions.\n\nFifth\, it can enhance communication and cooperation with other states. \nSixth\, it will encourage policy makers to think systematically about the long term consequences of their actions. \nSeventh\, it will be useful to test the robustness of current organisational structures\, processes and resources. \nEighth\, it will help citizens to evaluate whether particular actions of the state are aligned with the nation’s core values and interests. \nNinth\, it will be useful to promote structured and focused research on core issues and areas that are identified as national priorities.\nTenth\, it would be useful for educating the strategic leadership.\n\nBesides these functional uses\, proponents also emphasise that grand strategy is a key great power status symbol\, thus making a strong case in public imagination for a centrally articulated design. While the author acknowledges the benefits and obvious usefulness which seem to be associated with a grand strategy\, he argues that there are several barriers to formulation of such a strategy. \nThe first barrier to the making of a grand strategy is the absence of conceptual clarity. The term has come to mean different things to different thinkers depending on their vision of the world\, their conceptions about the nature of power\, their institutional affiliations\, and the interests they seek to pursue. Moreover\, in the absence of a universally accepted definition and shared meaning\, the term ‘grand strategy’ has come to exist as an ambiguous concept and as differing images\, ranging from a fully developed plan of action to subtler aspects such as individual visions and world views. The author lists out seven such images: \n\nAs a Plan: grand strategy is viewed as a plan of action articulated by the nation’s top leadership who gathers an expert group to conduct wide ranging consultations with important stake holders both within and outside the government and bring out a draft grand strategy for top leadership sanction.\nAs a Vision: grand strategy as a vision\, a representation of strategy created in the mind of the leader. Grand Strategy as a guiding idea offers flexibility to bureaucratic agents to adapt their actions according to needs of the circumstances\, however\, this image of grand strategy captures only a part of the strategy process and needs to be supplemented by institutional competence.\nAs Politics: Unlike the prescriptive nature of the previous images\, according to this image\, a grand strategy emerges out of bargaining and compromise among various stake holders within the state. This image of grand strategy runs the risk of being distorted to suit interests of particular coalitions and interest groups. Furthermore\, enduring differences among key stake holders in terms of values\, beliefs\, and interests might severely impact the success of a neatly formulated strategy by expert planners.\nAs a Paradigm: Grand strategy imagined as a paradigm is a simplified version of reality\, a general perspective of the world view widely shared among the elite. This image of grand strategy lays out the map and provides a certain conception about the nature of the world\, but fails to meaningfully capture the complexity of current realities. Realism and liberalism are two such paradigms which provide a short hand guide for interpreting specific events and developments but cannot be substituted for strategy making.\nAs Thought: According to this image\, strategic competence of a state is judged not by its material achievements but by the quality of its thought\, presented and preserved in the written form. In overemphasizing the ideational dimension of strategy\, the role of verbally articulated ideas\, and the utility of force in the international system\, this image of strategy underplays the tacit dimension of strategic cultures.\nAs Harmonisation of Ends and Means: Grand strategy in this image is all about ensuring that ends do not over step available means\, and resources are not wasted\, with the former leading to failure of strategy and the latter involving opportunity costs. However\, matching ends and means is not a neutral process and involves more optimal employment of national resources placing a premium on ethical and political judgment. \nAs a Pattern: According to this image\, grand strategy is a pattern of the past. The process of looking back to look ahead is seen as useful in explaining past behaviour and providing clues to future strategies.\n\nThe second barrier to the making of a grand strategy is the associated costs and risks of its benefits. Firstly\, articulation of a clear set of goals to set the nation on the right course in a turbulent internal and external environment is a self contradictory objective as it is difficult to predetermine opportunities and risks in a turbulent strategic environment. Secondly\, though grand strategy is useful in promoting coordination among agencies within the government\, tight regulation of behaviour may diminish the capacity for peripheral vision. Thirdly\, in attempting to reduce ambiguity by formulating a grand strategy\, the scope for strategic action\, which thrives in the domain of inconsistency\, could be curtailed. Fourth\, efforts to define a state and underline its uniqueness through its grand strategy might generate narrow stereotyping and runs the risk of obscuring complexity. Lastly\, a publicly articulated grand strategy may lead to further fragmentations in a politically fraught public space. \nExistence of divergent views on what constitutes India’s core interests and how best to promote them is identified as the third barrier to the formulation of a grand strategy. The paper observes that in the absence of a clear consensus on critical issues of national significance (such as settlement of border disputes\, response to terrorism\, strategy on Pakistan\, China\, etc.) among political parties\, government institutions\, and civil society groups\, a grand strategy that articulates a particular approach on any of these issues will be politically contested. Finally\, lack of resourceful and competent institutional arrangements which foster wide ranging dialogues and promote synthesis of different points of view is cited by the paper as another barrier to the making of a grand strategy. In addition to this point\, the author stressed on the necessity to undertake interdisciplinary forward looking studies and dialogues to open up critical dimensions that will bear upon long term prospects of the country. In conclusion\, the author remarked that he has attempted to problematise the concept of grand strategy in the paper and comments on the skewed and unbalanced nature of the contemporary discourse on grand strategy. \nKey Discussion Points:\n\nThe bottom-line of the images is that the leadership and the entire political elite should take ownership of the grand strategy if it is to be sustained for a long time.\nGrand strategy should be goal-oriented. At the nub of it is the question: “What’s your goal for the country?” \nNational leadership wants to operate in a state of ambiguity. Putting out a grand strategy document in the public domain would attract questions about accountability.\nThe National Security Council should be at the driving seat of any such initiative. An objective and scenario building approach should be employed.\nSuggestions for the paper included: contextualizing the discussion to focus on India; engaging with existing debates (Luttwak\, Busan\, Liddell Hart\, etc.); including illustrations to describe various typologies of grand strategy; bringing out the role of culture\, history\, and the linkage between ideology and vision in the formulation of grand strategy; indicating revisions and new pathways to the makers of grand strategy; including a working definition of grand strategy; and\, some exploration of whether elite and social consensus lead to grand strategy or vice versa?\n\nReport prepared by Bhavna Tripathy\, Project Assistant (IDSA-DRDO ST2050 Project) at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/does-india-need-a-grand-strategy CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120622T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120622T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T230409 CREATED:20231223T134307Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130241Z UID:63166-1340343000-1340343000@idsa.in SUMMARY:Quality Assurance (QA) in Army Procurements DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: S KalyanramanDiscussants: Manoj Shrivastava and VS Raghuvanshi \nMahendra Prasad began his presentation by focusing on his ongoing research project which attempts to unfurl various aspects of quality assurance (QA) in army procurements\, an area understudied so far. He mentioned that “Quality Assurance (QA) in Army Procurements\,” was the first paper in a series of papers encompassing the Project Work entitled “Synergising QA for Speedy Defence Procurement and Ensuring Quality.” In the next paper\, effectiveness of the QA in Army procurements plan to be critically analysed using the failure data which would be collected from the defects reported on newly acquired equipment during their warranty period. In the third paper\, case studies of few selected procurement cases would be carried out. The final paper will explore the best QA practices and how these can be applied in our context to evolve a better QA system. \nIntroducing the paper\, the author said that defence procurements are done primarily under two heads – capital and revenue. The former is guided by DPP\, and include: fifteen years Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan (LTIPP)\, five years Services Acquisition Plan (SCAP)\, and Annual Acquisition Plan (AAP)\, which is a subset of SCAP and is a two year Roll On plan. The latter is guided by DPM and includes mainly replacement equipment and assemblies\, spares\, components for maintenance and operation of already sanctioned assets. QA checks of all the hardware procured by Army are carried out by DGQA. Further\, he elaborated upon the various stages of the evolution of DGQA. In its course of evolution\, in 1968\, Directorate of R&D (General) was bifurcated into Directorate of Inspection (General Stores) and Directorate of R&D (General Stores). Directorate General of Inspection was re-designated as Directorate General of Quality Assurance (DGQA) on 04 Jul 1987. At present\, DGQA Organisation is under the overall control of Department of Defence Production and Supplies in the Ministry of Defence. Further\, Lt Col Prasad delved on the functions of DGQA which provides QA cover to the entire range of Arms\, Ammunitions\, Equipments and Stores on procurement. He then talked about functions which are specific to procurement\, like\, vetting of response of vendors to Request for Information (RFI)\, assist in formulation of General staff Qualitative Requirements (GSQRs)\, assist in preparation of Requests For Proposals (RFPs) etc. \nSubsequently\, Prasad talked about Procedure of Acceptance of Capital and Revenue Procurements which is similar if not the same for both capital and revenue procurements. The first and foremost step here is that after placement of supply order an Acceptance Test Procedure (ATP) incorporating all the tests and certification for acceptance of the product ordered is prepared. In his analysis Prasad observed that the conditions laid down for acceptance are extremely stringent and capital intensive for vendors participating in the bidding process. The stakes are very high as finally only one vendor is likely to get the contract. Expenditure incurred by all other vendors not winning the bid therefore becomes wasteful expenditure and discourages them from fielding their equipment. It has been observed that many vendors withdraw at this stage. Moreover\, lack of multi-skilled engineering staff with DGQA is invariably evident from the fact that the number of DGQA staff attending a meeting (especially pre-bid meetings with vendors and technical evaluation committee meetings) exceeds those from other departments/ branches/ directorates. On the draft ATP he said that it is prepared by the vendor on whom the supply order is placed. Since a vendor has a vested interest\, it may not mention some very important tests for which he does not have the facility and/or certifications\,. To improve QA in Army procurements\, Mahendra Prasad made following important recommendations:\n \n\nIn order to cut costs and time required for technical and environmental evaluation it was recommended that only those tests should be undertaken by DGQA\, which are not possible to be carried out anywhere else at various laboratories accredited by National Accreditation Board for Testing and Calibration Laboratories (NABL) in the country.\nReputed vendors may be permitted self-certification on case to case basis taking into account their past performance.\nTo address the interaction problems of user and WE directorate with DGQA\, it is felt that a single window system for interaction with DGQA will go a long way to obviate this long-standing sore point.\nFor creation of a pool of staff possessing multiple skills\, bifurcation of staff into broad streams as mechanical\, electronics and computer science and inter directorate postings may help. \nRegarding ATP it is felt that a well-researched and stringent ATP can minimise occurrence of a number of defects due to material and manufacturing inadequacies\, after the equipment is put into service. \nThe selection process of the officer cadre needs a complete revamp. \n\nLt Col Prasad concluded by saying that for the success of any military mission\, right equipment\, at the right time\, in the hands of soldiers is as important a factor as the training and physical fitness of soldier himself. Thus\, factors causing delay in procurement of Army hardware need to be identified\, analysed and eliminated. Two most important features that equipment in the hands of soldiers must possess are high reliability and military ruggedisation. \nDiscussion Points \n\nSince the DGQA is overburdened\, the agency should divest itself of the task of promoting small scale industries.\nMany discussants shared Prasad’s point that the expenditure incurred by all other vendors not winning the bid becomes wasteful expenditure and discourages them from fielding their equipment. It was suggested that those vendors whose bid were rejected must be compensated in a suitable manner. For this suitable provisions in DPP need to be included.\nIt was argued that authorising regulatories of foreign governments to certify their countries’ product is a tricky proposition\, since in these days of cut-throat competition\, many countries would not mind promoting their own companies\, even if it compromises the quality. Moreover\, the advanced countries may give the certification with the belief that India does not have the requisite testing facilities to check the veracity of the foreign certification.\nIt was pointed out that Customer Service Directorate for single window interaction is in the anvil. It will reduce the time lag considerably. \nSince many agencies are involved in the process of procurement\, an empowered central authority is desirable. Increasing the autonomy of the DGQA would be a welcome step.\nIt was suggested that the DPP should be elaborately dealt with in the paper to see how different agencies’ roles have been incorporated in it. \nSignificantly\, one discussant argued that quality assurance done by DGQA merely involves checking specifications and parameters given in GSQR. It would be better to grade the product in some order of quality level to enable selection of best product within budgetary allocation.\nIt was argued by one participant that QA is an unending process and specific to particular environment. What is quality for US may not find acceptance in the Indian conditions. \nMany participants agreed with the author’s observation that the two most important benchmarks of QA are high reliability and military ruggedisation. Soviet equipments were very good on these criteria and were widely regarded as soldier-friendly.\nConsumer-interface\, which is very strong in many countries\, lacks attention in India. It remains to be seen whether the DGQA is evolving towards TQM (total quality management) or not\, since in TQM consumer is the focal point. \nAssurance level is a standard statistical tool across the world for quality analysis\, but DGQA does not have its assurance level defined. \nRegarding the lack of qualified technical officers to oversee the process of procurement\, it was pointed out that mere recruitment of technically qualified persons for QA job will not yield much\, unless periodic training aiming at updating their technical knowledge is ensured\, since technology is fast changing. Moreover\, while selecting officers for the QA job more emphasis should be on aptitude than knowledge; the later can be imparted at the time of training. High integrity and passion for the job should be the benchmark for selection of officers. \nIt was argued that Ordnance Factory’s services can be better utilized in production of defence materials\, since they have very good infrastructure facilities at their disposal.\nIt was pointed out that a product failed to meet specifications at the trial stage is accepted later subject to “rectification” without any further trial. \n\nChairperson’s Remarks\nDr. S. Kalyanaraman complimented Lt Col Prasad for a very comprehensive and detailed presentation on a topical issue concerning the Indian Army. He suggested a slight tinkering with the title to bring it in sync with the content of the paper and his research design. \n(Report prepared by Amit Kumar\, Research Assistant IDSA) URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/quality-assurance-qa-in-army-procurements CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120706T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120706T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T230409 CREATED:20231224T103514Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130241Z UID:64086-1341552600-1341552600@idsa.in SUMMARY:Defense Planning in India: Role of Civil-Military Relations DESCRIPTION:Chair: Vice Admiral (retd) PS DasDiscussants: Shri Amit Cowshish\, Air Marshal M. Matheswaran and Lt Gen (retd) JP Singh URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/defense-planning-in-india-role-of-civil-military-relations CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120720T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120720T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T230409 CREATED:20231223T134306Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130241Z UID:63163-1342762200-1342762200@idsa.in SUMMARY:Estimating Self-Reliance in India's Defence Production DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Shri Vinod MisraDiscussants : Dr Selvamurthy and Shri Amit Cowshish \nThis paper attempts to estimate the self-reliance index of India’s defence production. While estimating the index\, it also focuses on three important issues; the approach towards self-reliance (as understood in the Indian context)\, data problems in estimating the index and the methodology used to arrive at the index. The paper suggests that a separate budgetary classification be made in the Defence Services Estimates to facilitate computation of self-reliance in a more objective manner. This necessitates suitable changes in the classification handbook for defence that mandates the concerned officials of the Indian Defence Accounts Department to book a particular expenditure. \nMr. Behera argued that the concept “self-sufficiency” differs from “self-reliance”\, though these have alternatively been used in the Indian context. Self-sufficiency means producing everything in-house that the armed forces need\, whereas self-reliance refers to “equipping the armed forces with a whole range of equipments that may come from foreign and domestic sources”. However\, he argues that ‘self-sufficiency’ is not an ideal path for a country like India since India’s industrial and Research and Development (R&D) base is not yet sufficiently developed. \nMr Behera describes three phases of India’s defence industrialisation process from the perspective of the aim of self-reliance; from independence to mid-1960s\, from mid-1960s to mid-1980s\, and from late 1980s till present. In the first phase\, self-sufficiency was an overall economic principle behind its industrial development as the leadership at that time felt that the state-led intervention was the best way to overcome the de-industrialisation of economy that was caused by two centuries of the British rule. However\, despite some successes\, this model had faced considerable weaknesses because of the low level of defence allocation and defence R&D\, in addition to the lack of a civil industrial base which had a major impact during this phase. \nIn the second phase\, according to the author\, the events of 1960s\, particularly the 1962 border war with China and the 1965 Indo-Pak war\, brought a major change in India’s defence policy\, and the term self-reliance replaced self-sufficiency in defence production. Not only India’s defence budget as percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) increased in the subsequent years but also the approach towards arms procurement policy and indigenous defence production. Moreover\, unlike in the first stage of industrialisation\, in the second stage of India’s defence industrialisation\, more attention was paid to license-production rather then indigenous production\, based on its own design and developmental efforts. However\, this led to dependency on the license-based defence production\, particularly on the Soviet Union. India’s aeronautics industry is such a case whose dependency continues till now. And\, in the third phase\, with increasingly aware of the pitfalls of the overdependence on Soviet Union\, India began to change its approach to defence industrialisation\, from license-based production to production based on indigenous design. In this regard\, India and Russia signed in 1998 an intergovernmental agreement to jointly produce a supersonic cruise missile\, BrahMos and in 2007 two more intergovernmental agreements were signed for co-development and co-production of a Multi Role Transport Aircraft and a Firth Generation Fighter Aircraft. Thus\, there has been emphasis on self-reliance and co-production with higher importance on promoting the participation of Indian private sector defence production. \nA 10-year self-reliance plan formulated in 1992\, under the then Scientific Advisor to the Defence Minister\, Dr A.P.J. Abdul Kalam\, defined the self-reliance in the form of an index\, reflecting the percentage share of indigenous content in total procurement expenditure. Mr Behera held that this definition serves as the only methodology for estimating the self-reliance index\, primarily because of the difficulty of putting together a log of information about what is critical and what is not\, and updating it regularly with technological development. However\, this estimation is not straightforward\, primarily because of lack of consistent data in the public domain. \nMr Behera pointed out that India’s heavy dependence on arms import for defence preparedness defies the very objective of self-reliance that it has set for itself. The 1992 Abdul Kalam committee indicated that the share of indigenous contribution to total procurement expenditure would progressively increase from 1992-93 estimation of 30 per cent to 70 per cent by 2005. Although India has developed a vast defence industrial base over the years\, the objective of achieving 70 per cent self-reliance has not been achieved till now. He concluded by stating that the self-reliance index has barely improved from 1992-93 estimation of 30 per cent to 36.4 per cent in 2011-12 which indicates the failure of India’s defence industrialisation process and demands serious retrospection. \nMajor Points of Discussion and Suggestions: \n\nAt present\, India’s total defence R&D budget accounts for about six per cent of defence budget which in itself is less than two per cent of GDP. Compared to this\, other countries\, particularly the US and China spend a higher percentage of their defence budget on R&D. \nIt would be significant to look into and assess where India now stands at the global scenario on self-reliance in defence production. As the Indian economy is growing\, it is looking for the indigenisation of defence production. This is important not only to meet its own defence requirements for safeguarding its vital national security interests but also to play a larger role beyond its immediate neighbourhood. \nAlthough today India has reached 100 percent self-reliance in terms of deterrence\, it needs to minimize the dependency on foreign countries for its defence needs by further enhancing and indigenisation of its defence production sectors. \nIndia has already developed a good platform for co-production and development of defence equipment with Russia\, now it should look for such joint production with other countries. \nIndia’s private defence sector is very weak\, and it cannot take big projects. However\, it can contribute in the defence production sector by joining with public sectors. For this\, capacity building of the private sector is very important if it is to undertake future defence projects. \nThe author pointed out that Kalam Committee Report has weaknesses which needed to be addressed. In this regard it was suggested that the methodology adopted by Kalam Committee and others such as Dr. Balachandran’s can be analysed in order to find out their strengths and weaknesses\, and then the author can refine and adopt his own methodology for this study. \nThe conclusion part of the paper also needs to be moderated. As the kind of data required for estimating self-reliance index is not available in public domain\, the author needs to state it as a limitation in the paper’s conclusion. The author also needs to mention what kind of data is required to estimate the self-reliance in India’s defence production. \n\nRemarks by the Chairperson \nOutlining the present status of self-reliance in India’s defence production\, Mr Vinod Kumar Misra said that the extent of India’s arms imports hamper indigenisation of its Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs). Imports of defence raw-materials and technologies have also been a problem. In addition\, it needs to sustain those imported technologies for a long time. However\, self-reliance in defence production is a log term process and it will gradually take place in India. In this context\, India’s new offset policy can be a significant game changer. However\, for its success\, it needs to identify the kind of defence technologies that it wants to manufacture and then should focus on creating capacity on those core items. Mr Misra pointed out that India’s defence production sector and R&D also suffer capability gap and the Joint Ventures with Russia and Israel for co-production and development of defence equipment can be one way of meeting this capability gap. There is also a strong case for increasing Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the defence production sector but India has to find out the ways to give a push to it. So far as policy announcement is concerned\, Indian government has recently issued policy guidelines for engaging the private sector. Some progress has been made in this regard but still time will take in involving private enterprises in big projects. \nReport prepared by Dr Saroj Bishoyi\, Research Assistant\, IDSA URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/estimating-self-reliance-in-indias-defence-production CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120727T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120727T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T230409 CREATED:20231223T134306Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130241Z UID:63162-1343367000-1343367000@idsa.in SUMMARY:Counter-Insurgency Best Practices and their Applicability in the Northeast DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: General Satish Nambiar \nDiscussants: Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain\, Military Secretary\, Integrated Headquarters (Army)\, Ministry of Defence\nProf. Rajesh Rajagopalan\, School of International Studies\, Jawaharlal Nehru University. \nDr. Namrata Goswami’s paper defines insurgencies as violent struggle against the state for legitimacy and influence over relevant populations. In order to win against any insurgency\, the first core insight for any counter-insurgency force is to gain the support of the population. Coupled with population support is the criticality of efficient intelligence though these are not the ultimate required measures. Dr. Goswami’s paper discusses counter-insurgency best practices and the means to operationalize these practices on the ground by identifying nine best practices. \nThe paper selects the best practices based on a literature survey on counter-insurgency theory\, doctrines and manuals of the Indian\, British and US military and also on the field experiences of the author in Northeast India to have a more focused study. The author affirms that insurgency is unique after having conducted work on the ground in the conflict affected states in Northeast India. But\, there are certain common features of counter-insurgency that are valid across time and space as indicated by the literatures on counter-insurgency which is used as the frame of reference by the author in the paper. Based on the works on counter-insurgency which have been utilized in this paper\, the author has identified nine best practices spanning across time and space for detailed study in this paper: Primacy of Political Goals; Centre of Gravity; Population; Counter-Propaganda; Resolute Leadership; Intelligence; Unity of Effort; Appropriate Force Structures; Rule of Law; and Operational Clarity. The paper offers to test the applicability of these counter-insurgency best practices to the Northeast of India. For the purpose of the paper\, counter-insurgency is defined as “those military\, paramilitary\, political\, economic\, psychological\, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency”. \n\nPrimacy of political goals: It involves planning\, preparation and execution of counter-insurgency within political framework. The role of the military in flushing out insurgents from certain areas is considered to be a supportive role. For instance\, British\, U.S. and Indian military forces have signified the importance of military. However\, citing the cases of Mizoram and Assam\, Dr. Goswami emphasises on the importance of political goals. In the paper\, she has pointed out how the Mizo National Front (MNF) became a platform to express against the heavy response of the Indian military. It was during the strong political leadership of Pu Laldenga of MNF that the Mizo conflict was resolved in 1987 through staunch negotiations.\nCentre of gravity-population: Insurgent groups aim to persuade the population by utilizing the strategy of coercion and intimidation to generate support for their political cause. While countering these insurgency groups\, the operation of the armed forces should be carried out in a civilian landscape\, not in military camps\, and the counter-insurgency forces need to know that such operations are people-centric operation. For this\, there are certain practical ways of gaining support of the population\, namely\, having day to day contacts with the population\, organising collective work\, identify local cells of the insurgent\, prevent too much movement\, and finally provide security to the population. Besides this\, there is also a need to gather information on three different types of population in any insurgency-affected areas\, namely\, minority support base for the insurgent; a passive neutral majority; and a minority which is against the insurgency. According to this paper\, insurgency groups such as United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA)\, the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM)\, and MNF have all garnered support from the people. But\, over the period of time\, support for these groups has dwindled down. Insurgency will continue unless security is guaranteed to the population in this region. \nCounter-propaganda: the insurgency groups intend to impose control over the population. These groups aim to win over the people by propagating their political cause\, often by promising them better political empowerment\, better economic status\, better security etc. Such propaganda appears an easy task to the insurgency groups as they do not have to deliver any of those promised goals in the near term. However\, countering such propaganda remains an arduous task for the counter-insurgency forces. For this\, the strategy for counter-propaganda should be focused on exposing the weakness and false promises made by the insurgents. This strategy can only be materialized by ‘by obtaining the neutrality of the population\, visible presence of counter-insurgent forces to provide security\, establishing the authority of the state by providing basic needs\, propaganda directed at insurgent rank and file\, followed by an effective surrender policy’.\nResolute leadership: In order to carry out a successful operation\, the involved leader must possess a clear conceptual understanding of the mission. For this\, he or she should have a thoughtful understanding of the nature of the problem. The leadership should exhibit ‘resoluteness\, act in an ethical manner and always keep the national priorities and goals in clear perspective’. His or her leadership qualities should also be shown at all levels\, and the leader should able to synchronise with various agencies with the aim of protecting the population and instilling in them a sense of security.\nIntelligence: This is one of the most important counter-insurgency measures. The absence of thorough and specific intelligence would only make the counter-insurgency operations ineffective. For this\, the commander needs to form a sound intelligence network with the involvement of intelligent staffs possessing a ‘clear understanding of the operational environment\, physical geography\, the external influence\, role of media and internet’. Means through which intelligence can be gathered are: lines of communication\, belief systems\, values\, identity\, culture\, social norms\, grievances\, insurgent strength and vulnerabilities\, safe havens\, insurgent intelligence network\, etc. Intelligence should be used to understand the root causes of the insurgency.\nUnity of effort: There needs to be an integrated approach in counter-insurgency. This involves ‘showcasing of administrative capacities\, economic resources\, propaganda\, military superiority and the like’. Operations in such cases should be guided by a single strategic narrative that is visible across all lines of operation. This practice involves the coordination of political\, social\, economic and the military aspects of the counter-insurgency. The author specifies the roles of politicians\, bureaucrats\, army\, police\, local leaders\, NGOs and media. A successful unity of effort can be achieved if there is a single command and coordination centre. Furthermore\, civil-military relations are also important in this context. \nAppropriate ‘military’ force structures: It is important that the force is used to its minimum. This is because operations should aim to neutralise insurgents and not eliminate them. Also\, minimum force should be used in order to reduce the fear that civilian population experiences due to the heavy presence of armed forces. The force structure should be able to respond to given context even though it is a small operation team.\nRule of law: The counter-insurgent forces need to act according to certain accepted rule of law. Any operation in a given region should be within the framework of a legal mandate and conduct must meet the highest legal standards. With such rules\, the involved forces can avoid any disproportionate use of force. This will not breed alienation amongst the civilians. Forces have to be briefed about the rules of engagement with regard to arrests\, searches\, warrants\, interrogation techniques\, intelligence gathering by issuing a Standard Operating Procedure. Acts such as Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act of 1958 amended in 1972 are perceived by the common people as neutralising their fundamental rights granted by the Indian Constitution. It is difficult to control population under distress and the state must offer its people ‘a good deal working within the rule of law’ in order to isolate the insurgents. \nOperational clarity: It is important to have clarity of purpose in any counter-insurgency operation. There has to be a unified command structure with only a single direction. The political aims should also be crystal clear. Further\, the armed forces should clearly map the conflict zones. Involved forces must be clear about their allocated tasks\, and short and long term targets. For all these\, the most significant clarity is that the forces should be very clear that these operations must be people friendly ones. Challenges with reference to clarity of operations arise due to prevalence of multiple levels of decision makers in the insurgency-affected states like in the North East.\n\nThe author reemphasises in the conclusion that the aim of the insurgents is not to kill but spread parallel government to establish their own legitimacy. Hence\, the aim of the counter-insurgency forces should be to root out these parallel structures of government. \nMajor Points of Discussion and Suggestions to the Author:\n\nThere are dissimilarities among insurgencies but many general practices can be applied anywhere. There has to be no uniform approach to stages of insurgency rather different approaches to conflict.\nThe success story of Sri Lanka where controlled empowerment of the security forces was utilized has to be referred.\nProper identification of current stakeholders in engagement of counter-insurgency has to be taken into consideration.\nThere has been a role of media and civil society but a larger involvement is required to have major impact on civilian population.\nThe aspect of winning hearts and minds with more emphasis on the physical\, psychological\, social and economical factors has to be utilised for defeating insurgency. Attitude within the military has to change and it has to be reiterated that they are not just for kills. Home and heart battalion has to be engaged.\nCentre of Gravity as one of the best practices consist of both strengths and weaknesses be it physical\, psychological\, philosophical and ideological.\nIt is difficult to define the best practice of resolute leadership where military leadership has been tenure based.\nThere is a need to incorporate more technical intelligence and information operation in counter-insurgency measures.\nThere has to be more operational clarity in the practices and continuity has to be maintained.\nIf the mentioned features are best practices or best principles has to be reflected on again.\nConcession is the key to strategy and the hardcore best practice has to be to wean away support and the ultimate solution has to come from political front.\nSealing of borders will be difficult to achieve instead the borders need to be secured.\n\nReport prepared by Srishti Pukhrem\, Research Assistant\, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/counter-insurgency-best-practices-and-their-applicability-in-the-northeast CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120727T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120727T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T230409 CREATED:20231224T103115Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130241Z UID:64085-1343367000-1343367000@idsa.in SUMMARY:Challenges Expected for IAF till 2030 DESCRIPTION: URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/challenges-expected-for-iaf-till-2030 CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120830T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120830T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T230409 CREATED:20231224T103114Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T013804Z UID:64084-1346304600-1346304600@idsa.in SUMMARY:Management of India Pakistan Border DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/management-of-india-pakistan-border CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120907T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120907T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T230409 CREATED:20231223T134206Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130241Z UID:63157-1346995800-1346995800@idsa.in SUMMARY:Reframing Institutions: A Study of the Relevance of Southern African Customs Union DESCRIPTION:Chair: Amb. HHS ViswanathanExternal Discussants: Dr SK MohantyInternal Discussants: Ms Ruchita Beri\, Ms. Shebonti Ray Dadwal \nMajor Highlights of the Paper: This paper broadly addresses the significance of the African continent in India’s foreign policy with special reference to the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) in India’s engagement in southern and sub Saharan Africa. A study of SACU’s relevance becomes significant in light of the increasing regional and sub-regional integration in Africa. \nThe study traces the development pattern of southern Africa and the underlying components of economic power. It then reviews the SACU Agreement of 2002 and how it deviates from the 1969 agreement. The author also focuses on the nature of inequality among the SACU member states – South Africa\, Botswana\, Lesotho\, Namibia and Swaziland – and its bearing on inter-state relations. The possible roles that SACU can play in the future and how\, if at all\, it could contribute to redefinition of the geopolitical environment of the region are also explored. On policy considerations\, this paper addresses the implications of SACU for Indian foreign policy specifically towards Southern Africa. \nSACU’s role is seen as crucial in addressing the inequality in inter-state relations\, given that South Africa also dominated in its hinterland for decades. Among SACU member states\, inequality between South Africa and the BLNS states exists not only on economic terms but also in their respective views towards international politics. At the regional level\, SACU can represent the interests of its members in other oragnisations such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC). In a region peppered with landlocked countries\, an integrated approach becomes essential; SACU can help members coordinate policies and reconcile sovereign differences. SACU will prove to be a decisive player in formulating the equation of regional power in the years to come\, according to the author. \nSince SACU as an organization is more homogeneous and more open to diplomatic efforts\, its relevance for India becomes imminent. One role it could play is in hedging three primary types of risks associated with engaging in a region such as southern Africa – political\, legal and financial. SACU could also assist in greater Indian engagement in the form of institutional capacity-building at the national\, regional and pan African level. In general\, SACU can help solidify India’s role in South-South cooperation and portray it as an ‘inclusive power’. It could also help facilitate stronger ties with Angola\, Mozambique or Tanzania which could further India’s engagement with the SADC. In addition\, building stronger bilateral ties with Namibia and Botswana can give India strategic access to the Atlantic Ocean and Central Africa. India could also assist Namibia and Botswana in setting up institutions in public governance\, professional banking and other tertiary sector businesses\, in order that it counters exploitative tendencies in the region and enhance its image in the development sector. \nMajor Points of discussion and Suggestions to the Author:\n\nThe mechanism through which resources have been shared in SACU’s common reserve pool could be explored further\, since this could be relevant for other regions in the world such as South Asia where the idea of common reserve pool could be implemented.\nFurther study of SACU’s importance and implications for India could be useful for policy making bodies\, for example how India can gain from integrating with SACU (India currently cooperates with at least eight other regional economic communities in Africa)\, and vice versa. In addition\, SACU cannot be studied in isolation from Africa’s numerous other regional economic communities. Given South Africa’s dominant role in this organisation and the region\, the question of whether SACU has succeeded in addressing inequities among member states needs to be explored further. \nA review of China’s role in Africa relating to this study could be undertaken given the level of China’s engagement on the African continent. \nA comparative study could be undertaken to study the relevance for India of signing a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with SACU versus the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)\, which includes all SACU member states. Also\, if SACU has succeeded as an institution\, the study could explore what lessons India could draw from this (particularly relating to the SAARC). \nWhile the study suggests that South Africa could act as a gateway to sub-Saharan Africa\, given that there is an amount of resentment regarding South Africa’s dominant role in the region\, it would be worth exploring if this is indeed useful. \n\nReport prepared by Princy Marin George\, Research Assistant\, Africa\, Latin America\, Caribbean and UN Centre URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/reframing-institutions-a-study-of-the-relevance-of-southern-african-customs-union CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120921T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120921T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T230409 CREATED:20231223T134152Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130241Z UID:63156-1348205400-1348205400@idsa.in SUMMARY:One Hundred Years of Kautilya’s Arthasastra DESCRIPTION:Chair: Dr S KalyanaramanExternal Discussants: Ambassador K P Fabian\, Professor Navnita Chadha Behera and Col VMB KrishnanInternal Discussants: Mr. Saurabh Mishra and Ms. Nupur Brahma \n \nThe central argument of this paper is that Kautilya\, the ancient strategic thinker of India\, has been neglected and not been given his due in the Indian strategic thinking. It seeks to revive the study of Kautilya’s Arthasastra and establish it in the contemporary security studies. The paper examines the discourse that has evolved through the last 100 years\, since the Arthasastra was first discovered and translated. The paper attempts to find out the answers of the questions raised on the strategic culture in India as some academicians even go to the extent of declaring an absence of strategic culture in India. The paper tries to document and deal with almost all the scholarly controversies related to the Arthasastra during this period and relates a whole tradition of political and strategic thinkers (makers of the kingly science) like Manu\, Brihaspati\, Sukra\, Parasara\, Vysas and Chanakya as recognised in the Panchtantra. \nThe difficulty in studying Kautilya and his times are due to the cartographic gaps\, poor state and progression of maps and the controversies about the age and identity of the author. The contemplations about the age of the work vary between 4th century BCE and 3rd Century ACE. There are different views about the authorship of the Arathasastra as well: One holds that Kautilya was a single person who wrote it by himself and the other claims it to be a compiled “work by authors under the rubric of Kautilya.” A few scholars find the traces of all strategies and diplomacy within the Arthasastra while others allege that its importance is magnified and overstated. \nIt is interesting to note that Kautilya’s four upayas (devices)—sama\, dana\, bheda\, danda—to achieve the goals of diplomacy have a remarkable similarity with Morganthau’s sections in his realist theory about divide and rule\, compensation\, armaments\, and alliances. The paper discusses Kautilya’s theories of the seven elements of state (prakritis)\, six measures of foreign policy (sadgunya)\, the circle of states (rajamandala)\, the kinds of conquest (vijaya) and war (yudha). \nCountries of Southeast Asia have also been influenced by the Kautilyan concepts of mandala\, cakra and chakravartin. In 1929\, Herbert H. Gowen traced how in course of time niti or the old Indian rulers as embodied in treatises\, became a system coveted and adopted by foreign potentates. The spread of the Indian ideas took a long route through nitisastra\, panchtantra\, Hitopdeca\, Qalila and Dimnah and Beast Fables to pass into Persia\, Arabia\, North Africa\, Spain and Provence. \nThe paper elucidates nine reasons for the neglect of the study of Kautilya: \n\nA-historic nature of the Indian civilisation and oral tradition\,\nLack of proper battle accounts available from Indian sources and over-reliance on Greek and Graeco-Roman sources\,\nAbsence of holistic teaching and education and domination of a western discourse\,\nKautilya’s suspended status between schools of nationalists and Marxists\,\nLack of policy focus and absence of serious study in think tanks\,\nLack of language skills and preservation of texts\,\nKautilya not being a soldier like Sun Tzu\, Clausewitz\, Jomini or Liddell Hart\,\nInterpretation by antisocial elements and narrow mindedness\,\nMisunderstanding brahmin scholars\, over exaggeration of brahmanism and perception of male chauvinism.\n\nMisconceptions exist about Kautilya and his statecraft. Kautilya is looked upon as Machiavellian which distorts the correct picture. The difference between Machiavelli and Kautilya is regarding the subject matter of their works and methodology. The former was narrower limiting himself to the unification of Italy\, leaving the questions of economy aside\, while the latter had a holistic view of the vijigishu: consolidating the empire in almost the entire Indian subcontinent. \nCondemnation of Kautilya as an unethical teacher is due to the ignorance about his work. The image of Chanakya as a cunning brahmin is stereotypical in nature. Some scholars consider Kautilya’s work as immoral and repudiated by the Indians themselves while Lankavatarasutra refers to Kautilya as rsi and Somadeva refers him as nyayavid. The reasons for such diverse image might be in the imaginations of some playwrights influenced by their contemporary contexts. The paper finds Kautilya too serious a business to be left to linguists or historians alone. Most of the work on Kautilya lies in the category where the scholar does not read the text but keenly quotes from what some commentator had said superficially. \nMisquoting Kautilya does more harm than good. One main reason for him being misunderstood is the use of Kautilyan terms as a simplistic jargon. The paper gives instances of misunderstanding and misrepresentation of Kautilya. Blanket use of the mandala makes it the most misunderstood term as people contemplate and extrapolate it to any extent they want. It is also said that the matsya nyaya and the mandala theory of Kautilya’s Arthasastra are the two evils. \nResearching Kautilya is a level playing field for all as it is not limited to historians only. There are no classified documents or files to be consulted and unearthed. This knowledge lies scattered across the domains of archaeology\, philosophy\, linguistics\, history\, political science and religious texts. Public perception about Kautilya is based mainly on folklore\, mythology and limited on readings and research. \nThis paper suggests that the Kautilya moment has now arrived. The care and preservation of ancient archives is essential. The science\, politics and statecraft of the Arthasastra need to be preserved and practiced in ways in which Indian classical music has survived and thrived. There is a need for state patronage\, sponsorship and financial backing for the study of Arthasastra. Research and training for this purpose must be undertaken and encouraged at all the levels. \nMajor points of discussion and suggestions to the author:\n\nUnder the influence of Gandhian values and Nehru’s\, thought there was no space for Kautilya to make his mark.\nKautilya is also considered a part of the Indian philosophical system. As the Indian ways of knowing the reality has a non-dualistic mode of thinking\, Kautilya goes beyond matsya nyaya. He elucidates how to deal with realpolitik while actually looking at the norms and tries to give ways where anarchy can be overcome. \nIt is difficult to understand Kautilya because military history and historical sociology are not taught in the Indian universities at all. A problem of language exists in the study of Arthasastra as the strategists are disconnected from Sanskrit. We also need to maintain a critical space with regards to the Anglo-American influence while keeping in mind that we generally impose ipso facto the modern jargon and terminology on ancient contexts. \nKautilya’s work should not be taken as the Bible. Reading of original translation is must to avoid distortions and we should read Chanakya not only because we aspire to become a great power but also because the world would be a more peaceful place by understanding him.\nAs we generally restrict ourselves to the Indian heartland while digging into the history of Indian strategic culture\, the outlook (caricature) of Kautilya also inhibits his acceptability.\nWe need to know more about how the Arthasastra was followed in Kautilya’s time. Arthasastra requires a rereading in the context of modern state and democracy.\n\nReport prepared by Saurabh Mishra\, Research Assistant IDSA. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/one-hundred-years-of-kautilyas-arthasastra CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20121005T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20121005T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T230409 CREATED:20231223T134152Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T013652Z UID:63155-1349415000-1349415000@idsa.in SUMMARY:The Afghan War Warrants A Paradigmatic Shift for State-Building DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nChair: Dr. Ashok K. BehuriaDiscussants: Prof. Riyaz Punjabi and Dr. D Subachandran\, \nMajor Highlights of the Paper: The Afghan state whose security and legitimacy is warred for and which is sought rebuilt has meagre institutional remnants indicating a direction and the case is thus more or less a tabula rasa. The counterinsurgency campaign is effectively a state- (re)building endeavour as well as a military undertaking. Ms. Muska Dastageer’s paper poses two crucial questions; first\, ‘which overarching state construct is NATO\, United States Forces Afghanistan (USFOR-A) and Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) contributing to the building of?’ and second\, ‘will the institutional remnants of corroded\, yet still\, extant systems of societal organisation coalesce favourably with this nascent state?’ She wants to examine whether ‘bringing security back in’ in the area of state-building-in the foundational Hobbesian sense-within conflict-beleaguered environments could mark an optimised understanding of what it takes to engineer a state that is home grown i.e. non-Westphalian. \nMs. Dastageer identified two variables that fundamentally alter the state making equation. The first variable looks at state-as making of war and the second variable\, the colonial tautology and Pakistan. Thus\, she made an attempt to situate state-building in Afghanistan in both its temporal-spatial contingency and a regional realm. \nThe presenter argued that organisations such as NATO and USFOR-A\, their raison d’etre and conduct-underlying vision\, are shaped by the theoretical discourse of the rationalist actor based\, realist paradigm. The initial failures in Afghanistan –traversing the strategic-operation-tactical divides-can arguably be attributed to a slowness\, an inertia\, on the part of NATO to adjust to a different world. \nShe sought to demonstrate the validity of the micro-macro nexus of an intrastate war with interstate tensions attributable to colonial legacies. She argued\, state building as espoused by the Security Primacy Doctrine- an approach interlinking state-building with security setting and the security-setting corpus traversing institutional strategic-operational-tactical divides-warrants the avoidance of rigid template-following and calls for it to be commensurable with the temporal spatial contingencies. It calls for a continuously iterative modus operandi with the onus being on ANSF\, the concrete security-setters in question\, to assure the conferral of legitimacy to the Afghan Government. \nThe presenter argues that the study is not merely pertinent for the Afghan case\, but furthers the argument that Afghanistan figures as a laboratory for future conflicts arising along the intrastate chasms that is the legacy for post-colonial states of a past of Western hegemony. \nMajor point of discussion and suggestions to the author: \n\nWhile the paper was appreciated by the discussants\, they suggested that the paper needed to bring out more Afghan approach to the problem. The paper should also include the non-official perceptions in Afghanistan. In other words paper needs to address the local perception.\nIt was also suggested that incorporation of an explanation of idea of Afghanistan in the paper would help the reader to understand whether Afghanistan has been studied as a nation or a state.\n\nReport prepared by Gulbin Sultana\, IDSA URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-afghan-war-warrants-a-paradigmatic-shift-for-state-building CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20121019T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20121019T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T230409 CREATED:20231224T103015Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T013452Z UID:64083-1350624600-1350624600@idsa.in SUMMARY:Politics and Perceptions of Indian Aid to Nepal DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nChairperson: Maj Gen Ashok K Mehta (Retd)Disscussants: Professor Sangeeta Thapliyal\, Mr Bishnu Prasad Lamsal and Dr Rajiv Ranjan Chaturvedy URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/politics-and-perceptions-of-indian-aid-to-nepal CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20121102T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20121102T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T230409 CREATED:20231224T103015Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T013348Z UID:64082-1351834200-1351834200@idsa.in SUMMARY:Coping with China in the Asia-Pacific: India’s Calibrated Approach DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nChairperson: Amb. R RajagopalanDiscussant: Dr Pramit Pal Chaudhuri URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/coping-with-china-in-the-asia-pacific-indias-calibrated-approach CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20121207T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20121207T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T230409 CREATED:20231223T134008Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130241Z UID:63145-1354858200-1354858200@idsa.in SUMMARY:Effectiveness of Quality Assurance (QA) in Army Procurements DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Brig Rumel Dahiya (Retd)External Discussants: Lt Col Sanjay Pande\, Lt Col VS Raghuvanshi and Col OP SinghInternal Discussant: Col Venu Gopal \nMajor Highlights of the Paper: \nThis is second paper of a research project entitled “Synergising QA for Speedy Defence Procurement and Ensuring Quality.” The first paper studied various aspects of quality assurance (QA) in army procurements\, from a point of view of efficiency. The current paper critically analyses the effectiveness of the QA in Army procurements and looks at the ways in which the failure data collected from the defects reported on newly acquired equipment during their warranty period can be used to strengthen the Quality of QA. \nThe difficult and inhospitable terrains (from Thar to Siachen\, the variation in temperature is more than 100 degrees) in which the Indian Army has to operate warrants that the soldier and equipment both have to be rugged enough to bear this variation in terrain and climate. One such instance of terrain difficulty was the high failure rates of INSAS (Indian Small Arms System) at Kargil\, where the rifle encountered some reliability problems in the very cold climate. The paper therefore stresses the imperative that the equipment in the hands of soldiers must be of superb quality and ought to have a high in-built reliability\, in addition to being rugged. The QA of the equipment must therefore be focused to ensure these aspects. \nDelving on the effectiveness or lack thereof of QA\, the paper says that an effective QA of equipment will ensure that the equipments perform their intended function under given operating conditions\, repeatedly\, with the optimum maintenance when operated in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions. Effective QA in turn ensures that there are no or negligible complaints against the product that has been quality-assured. An ineffective QA on the other hand is evident from the numerous complaints of product failure\, especially during its warranty period and for reasons attributable to the design\, material and production process\, once the product is put into service. \nThe basic argument in the paper is that the well established system of defect reporting\, which happens to be the most important feedback from the user\, is not being fully exploited to trace back the causes that lead to occurrence of defects in field. A detailed analysis of the contemporary defect reporting practice and what ails it has been carried out. Some of the major findings of the study are: \n\nThough the time lines for defect reporting and investigation are clearly laid down\, they are seldom followed. Investigation and closure of many defects takes more than six months and in quite a few cases more than a year. Keeping defective equipment for such long duration without preservation causes further deterioration and also deprives the user of the services of that equipment. \nThe user feels maximum pinch if only one number of that type of equipment is authorised to them on which the defect report is initiated. For instance\, if only one generating set is authorised to a minor unit deployed in an operational area\, and that remains unavailable to them for want of a defect investigation for a year\, the unit is condemned to live without electricity for that duration\, unless it borrows one from some other unit.\nMany times the officers commanding workshops are under tremendous pressure to improve equipment availability\, which discourages them from reporting certain defects\, and instead carry out repairs of the defective equipment and put them back into service. Thus many defects go unreported\, leading to a distortion in the feedback data on QA through defect reporting.\nIn case of equipment not being under warranty period\, there is a tendency to avoid defect reporting.\nMultiplicity of agencies involved in the QA process makes coordination difficult\, leading to poor QA at times. \nQA of products offered by Ordnance Factories and Defence Public Sector Undertakings need a complete revamp. \n\nTo improve effectiveness of QA in Army procurements\, the paper makes following important recommendations: \n\nDGQA must constantly strive to improve the quality or effectiveness of the QA it does on the equipment procured\, by making corrections in their QA tools on the basis of dual input i.e. feedback from the field Army in the form of Defect Reports (DRs)\, as well as from expert judgement.\nThe Officers and staff of DGQA undergoing various courses at Defence Institute of Quality assurance (DIQA) can be given projects on individual cases as part of their course curriculum. \nIt is imperative to maintain a database of DRs at AsHSP or technical directorates in a suitable form and regularly update them. \nIt is necessary that the users (field Army) report the defects meticulously. \n\nThe paper concludes by saying that in order to ensure that for the Indian Army to perform its operational tasks efficiently and effectively\, it is necessary that only high quality and reliable equipment and weapon system are provisioned. QA organisation responsible for ensuring quality and reliability of these equipment and weapon systems therefore needs to be empowered by the Department of Defence Production. The organisation too\, needs to empower itself internally by continuously improving its ability and upgrading its skills. Creation of a Quality Assurance Information System (QAIS) based on the suggested model\, wherein feedback from users is analysed to identify the root cause of the problems and their application to relevant activity of QA\, coupled with expert judgement in the form of internal and external audit of the quality of QA\, would prevent stagnation of these activities and result in a dynamically improving and evolving effectiveness of the organisation\, which is highly desirable at the moment. \nMajor Points of discussion and Suggestions to the Author:\n\nThere is involvement of multiple agencies in the QA process from DRDO to DGQA. Synergisation of efforts therefore becomes necessary in order to achieve desired results.\nQuality starts from raw material stage\, whereas the quality check commences at a much advanced stage of weapon development. This gap sometimes leads to poor quality weapons getting quality clearance.\nThe failure or defect reporting system has its own problems\, which results in less number of defect reports. Online filling of DRs should be permitted to expedite the reporting process. Moreover\, instead of waiting for the equipment to break down\, advance defects report can be sent based on the performance monitoring of the weapon. It should be ensured that DRs are not confined to manufacturing defect alone; rather it should also incorporate defects arising out of poor maintenance. \nSampling procedure of DGQA and QA of items developed by DRDO can be looked into to suggest measures to plug the gaps in the system.\nThe real test of the equipment is not in its survivability during the warranty period\, but through the life-cycle of the weapon\, as there is less likelihood of the weapon developing problem in its early years.\nIt is not possible to check at design stage weapons that are produces abroad\, because DGQA cannot afford to place its staff for the entire duration of designing\, which is usually very long. \nA comparative study of QA process in some advanced countries should be undertaken to learn the best practices in QA.\nThere are 16 functions of DGQA in its Charter of duties. But there is a question mark whether the DGQA is adequately staffed to perform these duties. \n\nReport prepared by Amit Kumar\, RA\, IDSA URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/effectiveness-of-quality-assurance-qa-in-army-procurements CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20121214T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20121214T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T230409 CREATED:20231224T102930Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T013252Z UID:64080-1355463000-1355463000@idsa.in SUMMARY:Defense Offsets: Promises and Problems DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nChairperson: Shri Vinod MisraDiscussant: Shri Deba R Mohanty URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/defense-offsets-promises-and-problems CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20121214T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20121214T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T230409 CREATED:20231224T103014Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T013117Z UID:64081-1355463000-1355463000@idsa.in SUMMARY:Equilibrium in Higher Defence Organisation: Lessons for the Future DESCRIPTION:1030 to 1300 hrs \nChairperson: Dr. Manoj K JoshiDiscussant: Shri Amit Cowshish and Maj General B K Sharma (Retd) URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/equilibrium-in-higher-defence-organisation-lessons-for-the-future CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20121221T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20121221T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T230409 CREATED:20231224T102930Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130241Z UID:64079-1356067800-1356067800@idsa.in SUMMARY:Impact of Local State Politics on Indo- Bangladesh Relations DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Ambassador I P KhoslaDiscussants: Shri K Srinivasan\, Shri Anil Kamboj and Dr Joyeeta Bhattacharjee URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/impact-of-local-state-politics-on-indo-bangladesh-relations CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130118T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130118T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T230409 CREATED:20231223T134007Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130241Z UID:63142-1358487000-1358487000@idsa.in SUMMARY:Equipment and Force Structure Requirements to Meet External Threats 2032 DESCRIPTION:Chair: Air Marshal Anil Chopra (Retd)\, AVSMExternal Discussants: Wg Cdr Vikram Munshi\, Wg Cdr Amit GoelInternal Discussants: Wg Cdr Ajey Lele\, Cdr SS Parmar \nMajor Highlights of the Paper\nThis paper addresses the equipment and force structure required to meet external challenges 2032. The current paper is second in the series of four papers that Gp Capt Kapur intends to do on a project “IAF Deep Multidimensional Change 2032: Imperatives and a Roadmap.” The previous paper was “Challenges for IAF 2032.” The next two papers in the series are “Organisational Structure Optimisation\,” and “Organisation and Technology Issues Related to the 2032 IAF.” The critical role of Air Power post World War-II has been well established. Indian Air Force is no exception and hence its battle readiness is of utmost interest to our military planners. The paper therefore discusses a very important element of combat readiness\, i.e. equipment support and force structure. While equipment support and force structure is only one out of many aspects of combat readiness it is perhaps the most important one. \nThe paper makes a comparative study of the Indian Air Force (IAF)\, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) and the Chinese Air Force (PLAAF). Since PAF and PLAAF have posed serious security challenges before the country in the past and are likely to pose the same in the future\, the study makes a comparative assessment of their strength and weaknesses in order to put the IAF’s requirements in perspective. The author’s projection takes into account the likely scenario of a two-front war\, involving both China and Pakistan. The paper forcefully argues that numbers (Squadrons and aircrafts) even in this hi-tech age matter for engaging the enemy. This projection of requirements is also based on the estimated sortie generation capability of the three forces. Significantly\, the paper shows that the Indian Air Force has an edge over the Chinese Air Force in this regard. \nSince the North Eastern border is the most likely theater of war with China\, the paper gives a detailed assessment of the requirements of the IAF to ensure its combat readiness. After taking into account geography\, infrastructure & reach factor\, the combat efficiency comparison of IAF: PLAAF comes to 1.4:1.0. Another important finding of the paper is that the IAF needs 724 (40 Sqn)/ 929(52Sqn) fighter aircrafts in North East and North to counter Chinese threat for a clear victory. \nGiven India’s rising power status\, engaging in Out of Area Contingency Operation (OOAC) is likely and India may be asked to play an increasingly important role in such Ops. The paper therefore looks into this aspect and suggests the need for Special Forces and heavy lift capability. It projects the need for deployment of one Division size force of the army requiring IAF’s provision of airlift through 1 Sqn C-17+1 Sqn C-130J/ MTA for OOAC. Further\, the need for an expeditionary air base capability has been highlighted. \nThe paper ends with a set of specific recommendations. Some of the important recommendations in the paper are: \n\nInfrastructure build-up including roads/ rail/ and Modernisation of Air Field Infrastructure (MAFI) should be accorded highest priority. \nInduction of BMD should be done in phases.\nUpgradation of electronic warfare and information warfare capabilities must be continued as planned with greater vigour.\nSeparate OOAC force under Joint Expeditionary Command should be set up. \nIAF should actively push forward technological development in-house and in collaboration with universities/ labs and similar competent institutions.\nMoD should explore the possibility of developing expeditionary airbase forces. \nIAF must expedite its build up towards the sanctioned 45 squadrons and then look at further force development to be able to meet these external challenges well.\n\nMajor Points of Discussion and Suggestions to the Author:\n\nThe number of fighter planes and Squadron strength recommended in the paper is slightly on the heavier side and it can be rationalized by incorporating inputs from serving and retired military professionals.\nIn nuclear age full fledged war is at best a remote possibility. Similarly\, the advent of long-range missiles has reduced the heavy dependence on aircrafts. These factors should also be kept in mind before arriving on any numbers.\nThe study would benefit by undertaking scenario building exercise about the kind of threats that India will face in the next two decades time. Projection of requirements should be based on the nature of threats. \nThe study could benefit by incorporating a tabular chart of the inventory of the three air forces (IAF\, PAAF\, and PLAAF). It will give the reader a comparative perspective.\nChina’s military modernization plan is time-bound and it sticks to its deadlines\, whereas the Indian modernization plan is not shaping as desired. \nThe increased strength of the IAF both in terms of Squadron strength and availability of aircrafts has to be supported by a commensurate level of infrastructure in order to make them operationally viable.\nTactical and technological aspect is more important than the numerical superiority as far as war fighting goes. In this regard\, the paper would benefit by focusing on cyber capability and information warfare capability of the IAF.\nThe restructuring of MoD is long overdue. One Joint Secretary looks after Army and Air Force. This situation must change for the better.\nIAF needs to focus on the service aspect of aircrafts\, which leaves much to be desired. Better serviceability of aircrafts in effect means more number of aircrafts available for operational jobs. \n\nReport prepared by Amit Kumar RA IDSA URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/equipment-and-force-structure-requirements-to-meet-external-threats-2032 CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130201T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130201T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T230409 CREATED:20231223T133951Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130241Z UID:63139-1359696600-1359696600@idsa.in SUMMARY:Before the Cut: The Global Politics of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Air Marshal Anil Chopra (Retd)\, AVSM\, VM\, VSMDiscussants: Shri Gulshan Luthra and Shri Deba R Mohanty \nAbout Presentation: \nThe paper\, titled “Global Politics of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter”\, analyses the ongoing debate on the issue of whether or not to continue with the programme. The author has studied the various political and economic dimensions of issue at hand\, and highlighted the budgetary constrain and exponentially high cost of the project. The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter programme\, which many find lucrative\, has drawn the interest of countries like Iran and Singapore. The fact is that due to budgetary constrain and rising defence labour costs\, the US defence production was pushed towards international collaboration. This deal is often quoted as “Mother” of all defence deals. However\, the author calls it a “Trillion Dollar Baby” citing the fact that deal has so far exceeded $1.45 trillion. He also tries to investigate as to the influence partners have had in the programme so far. The author’s study is based on data sources on defence acquisitions\, in which he aims to analyse the politics of international arms production and arms transfer propaganda. \nOne of the main arguments of the paper is that even though this is a joint programme and many countries especially UK are amongst its investors\, the US has tried to dominate the programme. Synergies of cooperation are lacking\, evident in the fact that US has not shared the source codes. The author notes that the schedule and cost overruns raise the question mark with reference to its affordability\, lethality and stealth-ability in future endeavour. The author was pessimistic about the programme being a viable alternative due to massive costs involved; partner countries do not have the option of dragging their feet. \nThe key points of the discussion and suggestions to the author: \n\nIt’s too early to discuss about F-35 in present scenario when only 30% of this programme has been accomplished until now. In addition\, so far this aircraft has not demonstrated its ability and technological prowess as well.\nF-35 programme will replace the three US aircraft carrier fleet and will be able to perform in all three areas of Army\, Navy and Air force\, but it will be producing more than 2000 aircraft\, so the cost involved will be offset over the period of time.\nIf this aircraft is able to fulfil its goal in future\, utility of the technology involved will override the considerations of politics and economics.\nThe comparative analysis of sophistication of the programme could have involved other fifth generation aircraft such as Indo-Russia FGFA\, Chinese J-20 and the economic and technology hurdles that these programme confront.\nIf it is a niche product; if it is able to demonstrate its ability\, affordability will not matter as countries like Saudi Arabia\, Taiwan and South Korea could be probable customers.\nThe “Cost” has to be clearly defined as to what it involves such as future up- gradation\, repair and spare parts and other such areas.\nThe perspective on international alliance model could have been clearly defined.\nThe US has invested huge capital in its critical time; hence sharing source code is not justifiable. \n\nReport prepared by Parveen Bharadwaj\, Research Intern\, IDSA. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/before-the-cut-the-global-politics-of-the-f-35-joint-strike-fighter CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130201T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130201T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T230409 CREATED:20231223T133951Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130241Z UID:63140-1359696600-1359696600@idsa.in SUMMARY:The Evolution of Chinese Military Doctrine DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Lt Gen Satish Nambiar\, PVSM\, AVSM\, VrC (Retd)External Discussants: Maj Gen (Retd) B K Sharma\, Cdr Kamlesh Kumar AgnihotriInternal Discussants: Brig Mandeep Singh\, Dr. Jagannath P Panda \nThis paper discusses the factors responsible for the evolution of the Chinese military doctrine and attempts to chalk out its nuances. Its core premise is that a military doctrine is a component of a nation’s grand strategy for security and\, at times\, it may not be stating actual military conditions but is simply a declaration of its strategic intent. The paper finds that Chinese have learned from their and others’ experience. China’s threat perception and relations with the nations of the world has changed with time influencing their military doctrine. Over the years\, the Chinese have evolved four broad military doctrines: \n\nThe Maoist ‘People’s War Doctrine: It prevailed during the “Lean one side phase” of the Chinese foreign policy. Maturing during the CCP’s revolutionary struggle and the Japanese invasion in the 1930s\, this predominant military doctrine lingered up to the late 1970s and its vestiges remained till the 1980s. This essentially guerrilla doctrine is still alive in academic debates. In 1960s\, Mao and Lin Piao interpreted it as Flexible National Defence applicable to conventional war based on the premise of “trading territory for time”. The doctrine envisaged when the enemy launches the first offensive\, the revolutionary forces\, mindful of the enemy’s technological and material superiority\, would quietly follow a subsequent strategic retreat\, strategic stalemate and strategic counter-offensive. The fight would essentially be in the rural areas from where the revolutionary army would draw its strength out of the masses indoctrinated by the communist party. This infantry-centric doctrine relied on the use of staggering man-power aimed at overcoming technological superiority through inferiority. Air-power had just a supporting role and the navy was almost non-existent.\nThe doctrine addressed the worst case scenario of an all-out attack including a nuclear strike. The US was the enemy for this doctrine\, purely on ideological basis\, for about two decades. There is nothing to suggest that any counter-offensive against the US was also planned. However\, according to the author\, terming it defensive would also be inappropriate. The doctrine hugely underappreciated the role of international diplomacy. It was often debated whether the strategy of “luring the enemy in the deep” was a strategy worth pursuing as the ‘modernisers’ in China argued that the enemy should not be allowed to crash the gates. \n\nPeople’s War under Modern Conditions: The US was the doctrinal imperial enemy from the beginning; later the Soviet Union too was declared an enemy. The doctrine emerged in the light of the receding Cultural Revolution and the party’s resentment against politicisation of the PLA entailed the dilution of army’s political role. Industrial and real estate development along the Manchurian border had made “luring enemy” into depth an imponderable tactic. The pragmatic leadership assumed a greater role and a rapprochement started with the US in 1971 with an imperiled relationship with the USSR. Deng Xiaoping felt that a major military conflict was unlikely and there would be no war over the next five to seven years. This doctrine had a limited focus concerned with the conduct of war. The Core issue addressed was how to deal with a major and large-scale Russian invasion with minimum human cost without vacating the territory. It envisaged that the enemy would be taken head on in the initial phase of the conflict\, denying him an entry into the Chinese territory. Regulars and guerrillas would even cross the border to interdict the enemy by hindering the enemy’s mobility or striking at its rear. The professional military would lead the war. The protracted war was no longer a feature of the Chinese military doctrine and a National mobilisation would be in case of a completely illogical possibility of an all-out invasion by USSR. The compulsive filibustering about enemy nuclear strikes\, essential characteristic of the People’s War\, was absent in this doctrine. China reiterated its commitment to no first-use of nuclear weapons and accorded equal attention to various components of military power.\nLocal and Limited War Doctrine: The doctrine was officially promulgated in 1985. The focus shifted from large scale conventional military conflict to local\, small\, and limited wars. It was prompted by a new understanding of the international situation that the world was moving towards multipolarity in which the US would retain its prominence. The premise for the doctrine was the prevailing nuclear stalemate in the world which would not allow large-scale wars\, but the unequal levels of technology would prompt the Great Powers into adventures to test these technologies in battle conditions. It focused on small-scale wars caused by civil-conflicts\, territorial claims and ethnic tensions in a multi-polar world. It seems that the Chinese view these wars as politically-motivated freak incidents which needed fighting accompanied by talking. Border conflicts\, maritime territorial conflicts\, “surprise air attacks”\, fighting off an enemy’s sudden limited thrust into Chinese border and retaliatory punitive attacks by China were the major war exigencies mentioned in the doctrine. Taiwan emerged as a new security scenario and the proliferation of high tech weapons in the neighbourhood were also visualised as security concerns.\nLimited War under High Tech Conditions: Though the disintegration of the USSR in 1991 ended any possibility of large-scale invasion of China\, the American show of military technology in the Gulf War of 1992\, stunned it. Now limited war became the only focus\, and high technology provided a new and complete framework. The doctrine\, for the first time\, accepted the normative superiority of technology over men. It explicitly included the elements of offence and\, for the first time\, took the war beyond Chinese territory. The war would be local; borders are “strategic frontiers” and “victory” would be achieved “through elite troops”. China would not start any war; however\, if it senses any hostile enemy movement\, it will seize the “initiative”\, by “striking first”. The new doctrine would ensure “victory over inferiority through superiority’. Instead of long-drawn wars\, local wars would be “quick battles to force quick resolution”. Instead of luring enemy into the Chinese depth\, an “in-depth strike” would be carried out in enemy territory. The doctrine visualises a battle field scenario; known as war zone campaign (WZC). Preparations should be undertaken by keeping the diversities of military regions in view.\n\nThe paper also refers to two other doctrines which are disputed to be independent military doctrines: \nInfomatised War (RMA): The discourse on revolution in military affairs (RMA) adds another dimension of “infomatised war” to the “limited war under high tech conditions”. Ideally\, RMA is a holistic concept comprising social\, economic\, political and technological components. The Chinese discourse on infomatised warfare is based on the Chinese belief that information determines international relations and the outcome of wars. Chinese believe that digitized governance is the Achilles’ heel of the militarily advanced countries and this is where China can score in their depth. The Chinese assume that gathering precise and complete information in a literal sense is possible; and once there is correct information\, one can bring the enemy to its knees even without fighting. In fact\, information deterrence can prove more effective than nuclear deterrence. Information relating to cyberspace has the highest prominence in the Chinese discourse on infomatised war as well as RMA. The doctrine is quite offensive and the preferred tactics in this warfare are “surgical removal”\, “selective attacks” and “precision raids” by missiles or other superior electronic weapons or computer science. \nAnti-Access-Area Denial (A2/AD): This is essentially an American term. The perceived Chinese A2/AD has a limited objective of holding back American forces in Taiwan contingency till the PLA troops land in Taiwan and build defences. The battle objectives are mainly to harass American troops to delay their access to the centre of action. However\, as of now\, these capabilities have defensive purpose and are still in nascent stage with questionable quality. \nThe author concludes that over the last two decades\, Chinese military doctrine has changed from being inward looking to looking-beyond-its-borders and more importantly seaward doctrine. Chinese military capabilities have persistently moved towards matching doctrinal expositions. However\, the possession of asymmetric warfare capabilities as visualised under infomatised war doctrine by China and its ability to deploy them in conflict is a subject of speculation. \nMajor points of discussion and suggestions to the author: \n\nThere is hardly any literature available on the Chinese military doctrine. Whatever available is mostly western and we are left to our imaginations to chalk out any Chinese military doctrine. \nChina has never fought war the way it was articulated. \nThe Chinese are still grappling with the idea of a war doctrine. \nNowadays\, Navy is used not for territorial gains but political ones. It has an important role in the “strategic guidelines” of China. \nSome western scholars argue that the Chinese military is overstretched. \nChinese are looking for an exosphere umbrella which has not yet come. \nNational army versus political army is an outdated debate and the civil-military relations in China went up to a new level during the Hu Jintao period. \nChina’s economic rise has substantiated its military doctrinal practice. \nPLA’s international exposure has helped develop its doctrine. \nIndia should draw some lessons from the evolution of the Chinese military doctrine. \nThe overall role of a nuclear doctrine in a military doctrine should be examined in detail. \nEscalation dominance control is very important in the Chinese doctrines. \n\n(report prepared by Saurabh Mishra\, Research Assistant IDSA) URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-evolution-of-chinese-military-doctrine CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130208T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130208T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T230409 CREATED:20231224T102915Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T013003Z UID:64078-1360301400-1360301400@idsa.in SUMMARY:Equipping UN Forces: Challenges & Remedies DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nChair: Shri Amit Cowshish \nExternal Discussant: Col P Chandok and Col S Bhatia URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/equipping-un-forces-challenges-remedies CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130301T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130301T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T230409 CREATED:20231223T133950Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130241Z UID:63138-1362115800-1362115800@idsa.in SUMMARY:The State of Sri Lankan Tamil Politics in the Post LTTE Period DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Professor S D MuniDiscussant: Shri M R Narayan Swamy and Dr N Manoharan \nDr. Ashok K Behuria began the presentation by stating that this paper was largely based on the field visit to Sri Lanka. The paper studies the perceptions of a wide range of people to understand the Tamil mindset after the war. The Tamil speaking people constitute 24% of the population\, of which the Sri Lankan Tamils comprise 11% while the Tamil Muslims and the Indian Tamils are 9% and 4% respectively. The paper focussed only on the Sri Lankan Tamil perspective and their expectations from India. There have not been many drastic changes in the Tamil demands since independence. The demands of the Tamil political parties ACTC and later ITAK were the following: a) federal Sri Lanka with one or more Tamil States with autonomous powers\, b) parity of Tamil with Sinhala as official languages\, c) repeal law disenfranchising Indian Tamils\, and d) cessation of dryland colonization schemes. \nPresident Bandaranaike came out with the Sinhala Only Act in 1956. Immediately afterwards he made a pact with the Tamils in 1957\, which is known as the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact. There was resistance from the majority community in a big way; UNP\, a centralist party\, staged a march from Colombo to Kandy. In the following years UNP leader Dudley Senanayake and Chelvanayakam had a pact but it could not be implemented due to massive resistance from the SLFP\, which had earlier signed a similar pact with the same Tamil leader. Such competitive maximalist stance characterised the nature of ethnic politics in Sri Lanka. \nThus\, the pacts granting greater autonomy to the Tamils could not be implemented. From the 1950’s onwards there was increasing colonisation by the Sinhalese migrants in the Tamil areas. Further\, the riots in 1958\, 1961 and 1974 led to further alienation of the Tamil community. Ethnic outbidding was prevalent in the Sri Lankan Tamil parties as well and a similar pattern persists even today. Its nature transformed from a passive politics to a militant form in the 1970s. In 1972\, the Tamil parties came together and formed the Tamil United Front (TUF). In1976 TUF renamed itself as Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF). \nThere was the perception that the Tamils became militants because India was backing them. However\, there is no evidence to prove this existed before the 1970s and 80s. In the 1980s India intervened in a big way resulting in the formulation of the 13th Amendment. Dr. Behuria points that Sri Lanka borrowed many things from the Indian federalism to envisage the devolution in Sri Lanka\, but it was a mistake. Sri Lanka is different from the Indian experience and is not as diverse as India. Both the LTTE and Sri Lankan government wanted the Indian forces out of their state. \nNone of the agreements could be implemented because it did not satisfy the maximalist expectations of the LTTE on one hand and the totalitarian aspirations of the Sinhalese chauvinist constituency on the other. In 2001\, LTTE allowed the political front TNA to come up and it was almost a mouth piece of LTTE. From then on\, the TNA began to dominate the North and also had a considerable presence in the East. There were 18 rounds of dialogue between TNA and the Government in 2011\, but they could not reach a political settlement. The demands of the TNA included; \n1. Resettlement and rehabilitation of the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)\, 2. Removal of High Security Zones (HSZs) and disarming of paramilitary forces operating in the North and East\, 3. The issue of political prisoners and detainees being detained at various places under the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) and Emergency regulations\, before May 2009. \nThey agreed on the 13th Amendment as the starting point for the negotiations. Some sections of the Tamil community believe that this is not enough and at the same time parties like TNFP completely reject it. There is an opinion that it is an Act that will further lead to the domination of provinces by the centre. The talks were put on hold by Rajapaksa government and it stressed on seeking a political settlement through multi-party discussions in the Parliamentary Select Committee (PSC) \nPerception on India\nIndia’s insistence for the 13th Amendment and Rajapaksa’s reservations about it is cited as instances of India’s inability to comprehend the changing realities in Sri Lanka. The Sinhalese and the Tamils have moved away from 13th amendment for different reasons. The former considers it as an ‘imposition from outside’\, while the latter regards it as an ‘indecent compromise of Tamil interests.’ In Jaffna\, the Tamils feel that India had used them for its own interest. They urge that India must ensure that they get their due from the Sri Lankan government. However\, some of them also feel India will sooner than later stop due to Rajapaksa’s China blackmail. There is an open recognition of the dangers of militant politics and denunciation of LTTE’s policies vis-à-vis India. \nWhile concluding\, Dr. Behuria opined that this dialogue is unlikely to lead to a solution. There exists a rightwing in the majority community. It was observed that the Sinhalese government delegates were highly unhappy while talking about the devolution of the police power and the land power. In such context\, India must quietly play its role for finding a way for resolving the problem. \nMajor points of discussion and suggestions to the author:\n\nInitially the demand was for 50-50 representation and after independence it developed as language\, autonomy\, independent state and now devolution. These issues have to be analysed with the particular situation at that point of time. These are\, the end of colonialism\, post-colonial pre-LTTE\, during LTTE and post LTTE. Along with situation another variable is strength that is demographic\, political\, economic\, military\, diplomatic\, strength of opposition against the government and the external support.\nWhat the Sri Lankan state has tried to do is to keep the Tamils apart by different legislations and also by trying to cooperate with external forces like the UK\, Israel\, the US\, India and now China. How did this all affect the Sri Lankan politics\, what were the internal conflicts within the Sinhalese community and how groups like JVP used the Tamil issue as a rallying point need to be looked into.\nThere is the need for encouraging and strengthening moderate politics\, unifying the Tamil polity which is divided and the creation of a broad front which includes moderate Sinhalese voices that stand for more devolution.\nThe Sri Lankan government should have accepted that a lot of damage was done during the war and shown the readiness for reconciliation and rehabilitation. In the present scenario\, the people who never supported LTTE have turned against the state. The belief that the LTTE is coming back\, perfectly supports Rajapaksa to pursue his oppressive policies.\nIndia should have a fresh thinking in term of the 13th Amendment and encourage all moderate voices to come together. For this purpose the Indian civil society and think-tanks can play an important role. \nResearch paper of this nature should focus on issues like the way forward\, the dynamics of the Sinhalese and Muslim parties\, the significance of Divineguma Bill etc. In the present scenario the devolution is going to be an impossible task and in such a context the position that TNA would take needs to be looked at closely. \nIndia should not only focus on the Tamil issue but also look at issues like disappearance of the journalists in Colombo\, the impeachment of the Chief Justice etc. hence a broader approach should be evolved.\nThere is a difference in perceptions of the new elite and the old one. The voice of the new elite is more dominant today. Having a broader approach is a very tall work and the dominant voice is not for any solution. A macro-pattern can be discerned that is maximising the demand by both sides.\nSLMC is not fond of Rajapaksa but at the same time\, they are concerned about power and they want to be seen as an equal force with Sri Lankan Tamils. Thus\, this issue is focused in the North and the East. Also delimitation of constituency is carried out in such a manner the Tamil are becoming minorities in all the areas. \nThe Sri Lanka government is not at all sincere in its implementation of 13th Amendment. \n\nReport prepared by Ms Deepa Varughese URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-state-of-sri-lankan-tamil-politics-in-the-post-ltte-period CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130301T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130301T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T230409 CREATED:20231224T102914Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T012740Z UID:64077-1362115800-1362115800@idsa.in SUMMARY:Emerging Powers and Africa DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nChairperson: Ambassador Rajiv BhatiaDiscussants: Shri Ravi Bangar and Shri Manish Chand URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/emerging-powers-and-africa CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130308T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130308T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T230409 CREATED:20231224T102914Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T012843Z UID:64076-1362720600-1362720600@idsa.in SUMMARY:Federalising India’s Neighbourhood Policy: Balancing the State Interest with the National DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nChairperson: Shri Rajiv SikriDiscussants: Dr Suresh K Goel\, Dr Nitya Nanda and Prof. Rekha Saxena URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/federalising-indias-neighbourhood-policy-balancing-the-state-interest-with-the-national CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130315T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130315T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T230409 CREATED:20231223T133906Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130240Z UID:63134-1363325400-1363325400@idsa.in SUMMARY:Mapping the Role of External Players in Pakistan occupied Kashmir DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Amb Phunchok StobdanExternal Discussants: Capt Alok Bansal\, Dr. D. Subachandran and Dr. Mathew JosephInternal Discussants: Dr. Smruti Pattanaik and Shri Vishal Chandra \nIn her paper titled “Mapping the Role of External Players in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir” Dr Priyanka Singh examined the role of external actors in PoK – China\, the US and the UK – post-2005 earthquake. \nDr. Singh identified the following critical drivers for external interest in the PoK\, i.e.\, the strategic location (PoK connects Central Asia with the Indian subcontinent and shares border with China); resources (hydel and minerals)\, expanding Chinese footprints; growing interests of the western countries (presence though international aid agencies\, NGOs\, etc.); developmental initiatives as opportunities for investment; and the emergence of diaspora interest. China in particular is involved in the construction of several hydropower projects in PoK – the Diamer-Bhasha Dam in Gilgit Baltistan\, the Bunji Dam\, the Neelum Jhelum project and raising the height of the Mangla Dam in the so called AJK. \nThe Chinese involvement in PoK\, as the paper highlighted\, is long standing. China is in possession of Aksai Chin and the Trans Karakoram Tract\, both of which are part of the erstwhile princely state of J&K. China also played a critical role in the construction of the Karakoram Highway that was completed in 1978. China also plans to build a railway to enhance connectivity to PoK. Citing sources\, Dr. Singh said that there was a strong possibility that more than 10\,000 PLA (Peoples’ Liberation Army) soldiers were present in PoK. \nClearly\, PoK is of significant strategic interest for China. Hydropower projects aside\, it is opening banks and constructing road networks across PoK. The region also provides China access to Arabian Sea and a strategic communication link through Gwadar port of Balochistan (also built by China) to oil rich regions of west Asia\, through which China can transport energy. Aware of the fact that the region borders its restive Xinjiang province\, Beijing considers POK important to have a credible security presence so as to insulate its borders from the fundamentalist forces operative in Afghanistan-Pakistan region. It fears the percolation of such forces could fan the secessionist challenge in Xinjiang. In addition\, China is also involved in activities like Widening/realignment of the Karakoram Highway\, building a new 17 km stretch of the Karakoram Highway\, a proposed road link between Jaglot in Gilgit and Skardu in Baltistan\, Mangla dam raising project and investment of $300 million in housing and communications sector. \nFocusing on the US interests in the region\, Dr Singh argued that its increasing interest in the region could be partly to monitor the use of funds granted by it for socio-economic development in the region\, and partly to keep a close watch on the Chinese presence especially in Gilgit-Baltistan. This explains the US decision to provide financial assistance for Diamer-Bhasha dam. She also stated that this was well in line with its earlier policy to provide assistance for the Satpara dam near Skardu. \nDwelling on the interest shown by the UK\, she said that it could be due to the presence of PoK Diaspora community in UK. She also mentioned that Mirpuri was second largest spoken language in UK after English. About the involvement of France\, she made the audience aware that France had extended Rs. 9 billion (68 million Euros) as soft loan for the extension of an existing dam in PoK. This project aims at building a new 48 MW run-of-river hydro-power project in the Jaggran valley of PoK. In addition to this\, a French concern is also involved in a two-year capacity-building programme for government agencies in AJK such as the Hydro Electric Board\, which is responsible for implementing the Jagran II project. France\, like other countries\, contributed substantially to the post 2005 earthquake reconstruction and rehabilitation work in PoK. \nDr. Singh stated that the Russian interest in PoK was relatively new and that Russia had recently offered to take the contract for Diamer-Bhasha dam without bidding for it. She also discussed that role played by countries like Japan; even the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED) has also expressed its keenness to participate in the building of the Diamer-Bhasha dam in PoK. Germany and Saudi Arabia were interested in the developmental sector— pertaining to education\, health\, housing etc. — especially after the 2005-earthquake. Even Indonesia\, Like Japan\, has expressed its willingness to offer expertise and extend “maximum co-operation” in the horticulture sector in Gilgit Baltistan. Considering that Gilgit Baltistan\, even after the demographic tampering by Pakistan\, has a substantial Shia population\, Dr. Singh said that Iran had a natural interest in the region. \nThe author then went on to suggest that that PoK could well turn into a geopolitical battleground given the renewed interest of western countries in the region to countervail China. Dr. Singh concluded by saying that the presence of important external players and their growing interest in PoK may provide tacit recognition to Pakistan’s illegal claim over the territory. Though there was not much that India could do about the growing Chinese footprints in PoK\, the presence of countries like the US and Russia\, it was hoped\, could act as a balancer in the region. \nDuring the course of the discussion\, the following points were raised to strengthen the paper: \n\nThe role of Pakistan needed to be analyzed and likewise the implication for India. \nThe presence of international organizations was inadequately covered.\nThe differences in Chinese approach towards GB and PoK needed to be sharpened. Also the presence of Chinese Army required to be studied in detail — whether such presence is offensive/defensive or to provide security to Chinese workers? Further\, Chinese reaction to the presence of other countries in PoK was also felt wanting.\nSome information on the role of Iran and Saudi Arabia in the PoK was essential. \nFrom a geopolitical perspective\, how the US would balance China in PoK would be a good research question to explore.\n\nReport prepared by Anwesha Ray Chaudhuri\, Research Assistant\, IDSA URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/mapping-the-role-of-external-players-in-pakistan-occupied-kashmir CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130322T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130322T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T230409 CREATED:20231224T102815Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130240Z UID:64075-1363930200-1363930200@idsa.in SUMMARY:Land Locked and Transit Developing Countries: Nepal’s Transit Trade Negotiations with India DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Lt Gen Y M Bammi (Retd) \nDiscussants: Dr Nisha Taneja and Dr Ram Upendra Das URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/land-locked-and-transit-developing-countries-nepals-transit-trade-negotiations-with-india CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130426T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130426T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T230409 CREATED:20231223T133807Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250311T070955Z UID:63131-1366954200-1366954200@idsa.in SUMMARY:Malaysia-India Defence Cooperation: A Need for Paradigm Shift before Strategic Partnership DESCRIPTION:Chairman: Lt Gen Y M Bammi (Retd)External Discussants: Ambassador Preet Mohan Singh Malik and Professor Man Mohini KaulInternal Discussants: Shri Vishal Chandra and Dr Rahul Mishra \n \n \nMajor Arguments of the Paper: The core argument of this paper is that a paradigm shift is necessary in order to take the defence relationship between Malaysia and India to a higher plane. The author has approached the subject from the Malaysian perspective\, and her prescription about paradigm shift relates to the Malaysian state. By paradigm shift she means a change in the mindset of Malaysians in general and the government in particular. The change of mindset here implies that Malaysia should stop viewing India from the old prism of a developing or backward nation. \nThe author has traced the genesis of the defence relationship between the two countries to the pre-independence days\, when the British Indian forces made important contributions in Malaya. However\, Cold-War saw a drift in the relationship. End of the Cold War again brought important changes in the way Malaysia saw defence cooperation with India. Changed geopolitical realities made Malaysia cooperate with India. Malaysia regards its defense and security cooperation with India as vital and highest form of cooperation. The MoU on Defense Cooperation signed in 1993 is the most important mechanism to boost the bilateral cooperation in defence sector between the two countries. \nThe author then goes on to explain the depth of the military cooperation by giving details of the cooperation-service wise. The level of interaction is deepest between the navies of the two countries largely because cooperation in Andaman and Malacca Straits maritime area holds vital strategic importance for both Malaysia and India. However\, the author has also attached importance to the contribution of the Indian Air Force in maintenance and tactical training of the RMAF. Moreover\, Malaysia sees India as a stabilizer in the region. \nThe author analysed the discourse on defence cooperation between the two countries under two broad themes:\ni Malaysia-India Defense cooperation is on the right track.\nii The relationships lacks substance and volume. \nThe author subscribes to the latter viewpoint and holds the Malaysian mindset primarily responsible for such a state of affairs. In conclusion she said that Defense MoU signed between the two countries was a major milestone as India was the first country outside the region with which Malaysia signed such an agreement. However\, since then progress has been limited. Many items listed in the MoU have not been implemented. The volume of defence cooperation needs to be increased. Malaysia cannot ignore India’s rise and must utilize its capabilities. And for this\, the author said\, Malaysian perception about India must change. \nMajor Points of Discussion and Suggestions to the Author: \n\nIt will be useful for the author to discuss the military doctrines of both India and Malaysia upfront to set the context for the study. It will also bring out clearly the points of convergence and divergence between the two\, which will help in policy prescription.\nThe Andaman Sea touches Thailand\, Malaysia\, and Singapore. So\, it is one of the potential areas of deeper cooperation between the navies of these countries and Indian Navy.\nOne of the main irritants for India in the relationship is Malaysia’s policy of equating Pakistan with India. Equating India with China is admissible\, but not Pakistan.\nThe paper would be enriched if its takes into account the US rebalancing in Asia-Pacific. Since the rebalancing envisages major role for India\, it will be worthwhile to dwell upon Malaysia’s stand on it and explore meeting grounds to further the defence cooperation.\nIndia’s Look East Policy and interaction with ASEAN led to better appreciation of each other’s position on security issues. For this reason\, the Look East Policy merits some attention in the paper.\nSignificantly\, it was pointed out that cooperation between the two countries in the Andaman Sea and the Straits of Malacca should not become hostage to the apprehension or fear of the Malaysian authorities\, as the need for cooperation on this issue is greater than any apprehension. \nAuthor should analyze the reasons for non-implementation of many of the items in the MoU.\nChina is an unreliable partner of ASEAN. It first signs a code of conduct and then violates it. Its aggressive postures vis-à-vis Vietnam bears testimony to this fact.\nThe defence cooperation between India and Malaysia is mainly in the maritime arena. However\, it is a fact that the land forces dominate the Malaysian military. It is important therefore\, that the cooperation between the two armies intensify. \nMalaysia’s apprehensions of India arise not because of either the Maldives Ops or the IPKF Ops\, but because of the 1998 nuclear tests and the Theatre Command in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. \nThe China factor should be devoted sufficient attention. The asymmetry that exists between the two countries limits Malaysia’s options vis-à-vis China. It has therefore\, adopted the policy of constructive engagement with China\, notwithstanding the fact that China is not a natural choice for them. Malaysia’s engagement is mostly economic. However\, the China factor also inhibits Malaysia in making faster moves in defence cooperation with India. \n\nReport prepared by Amit Kumar\, Research Assistant\, IDSA URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/malaysia-india-defence-cooperation-a-need-for-paradigm-shift-before-strategic-partnership CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130503T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130503T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T230409 CREATED:20231224T102814Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130240Z UID:64073-1367559000-1367559000@idsa.in SUMMARY:Turkey and its Quest for Leadership Role in the Region DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Brig Rumel Dahiya\, SM (Retd)External Discussants: Shri Saeed Naqvi\, Professor Ashwini Mahapatra and Col Ravinder GurungInternal Discussants: Dr Ashok K Behuria and Dr P. K. Pradhan URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/turkey-and-its-quest-for-leadership-role-in-the-region CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR