BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//MP-IDSA - ECPv6.15.12.2//NONSGML v1.0//EN CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH X-ORIGINAL-URL:https://idsa.in X-WR-CALDESC:Events for MP-IDSA REFRESH-INTERVAL;VALUE=DURATION:PT1H X-Robots-Tag:noindex X-PUBLISHED-TTL:PT1H BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:Asia/Kolkata BEGIN:STANDARD TZOFFSETFROM:+0530 TZOFFSETTO:+0530 TZNAME:IST DTSTART:20090101T000000 END:STANDARD END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101029T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101029T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T021456 CREATED:20231223T221338Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130246Z UID:63635-1288330200-1288330200@idsa.in SUMMARY:Chinese Oil and Gas Pipelines and Sea Routes DESCRIPTION:Col P. K. Gautam (Retd) Research Fellow presented his paper\, Chinese Oil and Gas Pipelines and Sea Routes\, on 29th October 2010. Dr. Arvind Gupta Chaired the session. Mr. V. Raghuraman and Cdr Agnihotri\, IN were external discussants and Miss. Shebonti Ray Dadwal and Cdr. Sarabjeet Parmar\, IN were the internal discussants. \nHighlights from the paper\nDue to its rising economy\, China’s imports of hydrocarbons are growing rapidly. Therefore\, worried with growing dependence on imports\, with a consequence on domestic policies and strategic stability\, China is pursuing policies to alleviate the increase in import dependence by diversifying the sources and routes of its overall energy imports. China’s quest for energy routes security has led to its policies on oil and gas routes and pipelines as a reflection of geopolitics and foreign policy of the country. Therefore the core focus of the paper is on the current and future developments in Chinese hydrocarbon pipelines and sea routes strategy. \nThe paper is based on two assumptions; a) oil and gas will continue to be the affordable fuels of choice b) as oil is import sensitive\, the main policy focus in China will be on oil. Col Gautam argued that oil and gas pipelines and routes define geo-economic relationship between countries and regions. The paper attempts to discern the security and strategic discourse in the unfolding of land and sea routes of oil and gas. \nWith overall increase in energy consumption\, share of imports is going to rise from 50percent to 80percent as far as China’s national oil requirement is concerned. China also plans to double the usage of gas as a source of energy by 2015 from the 2008 levels. At present 80 percent of Chinese oil is imported via sea and about 40 percent through Malacca straits. Saudi Arabia (20 percent)\, Angola (17 percent)\, Iran (12 percent)\, Oman (8 percent)\, Russia (7 percent)\, Sudan (6 percent)\, Venezuela (4 percent)\, Kuwait (3 percent)\, Kazakhstan (3percent)\, UAE (3 percent) and others (17 percent) are China’s top crude suppliers. Russia\, Australia\, Iran and Qatar are the principle suppliers of LNG. \nAt present\, in Myanmar dual pipelines for oil and gas transfers is under construction. Gwadar might become the destination for refining imports from Iran to be sent via pipeline to China but it looks like this only remains an idea and not feasible as such due to terrain and costs. There are various other issues involved. Building the Strategic Oil Reserves capacity of 90 days imports by 2015 is a Chinese aim as it prepares for resource wars scenarios. In addition The Chinese Navy – will become a blue water navy in the next 2 decades and also it will have national tanker fleet- over 50 percent soon due to its good shipbuilding industry. The scenario of arctic meltdown\, by which hydrocarbon energy could be sent using new routes has important implications for the future of china’s energy strategy. \nLearning from the Chinese strategy\, several policy suggestions can be made;\n1. Energy diplomacy for diversification of sources\,\n2. National Carrier Fleet- profit in peacetime\,\n3. Nodal Ministry for energy security\,\n4. Clear policy on strategic oil reserves\,\n5. Development of Arctic capable fleet\,\n6. Using the maritime advantage for energy trade\,\n7. Development of efficient technologies to reduce import strain. \nDiscussion points\n\nCoal would remain one of the most important energy resources for India; therefore\, along with China and United States\, India would continue to scramble for coal resource. However\, China with its present governance structure with no political checks and balances has an upper hand in exploiting coal reserves worldwide. Africa is now under the Chinese exploitation umbrella and over 97 percent of rare earth is being made in China only to control the metallurgy industry of the world. \nChina is looking at Caspian reserves this shows not only market economics but also a strategic vision. India must strengthen is capacity not only for ensuring continuous supply of oil during peak oil requirements but also engage in oil diplomacy with a long term vision of future requirements. \nThe potential for conflict exists if sufficient and affordable alternatives to hydrocarbons are not found. In such a situation\, the lines of supply will get taut\, supply shrink and tensions will rise. Purely from conflict prevention point of view\, carbon free energy technologies need to be given a renewed priority\, not only to mitigate climate change but violent conflicts. \nIndia must also diversify its sources of oil supply and must move from the Straits of Hormuz and build stronger relations with Africa. A strong public-private partnership in India is required to enable efficacious transnational pipeline. \nRenewable energy sources like ethanol and bio diesel\, wind and solar are high on the India’s national agenda. In India\, shale deposits are found across the Gangetic plain\, Assam\, Rajasthan and many coastal areas therefore India must capitalize on this important resource. \nThere wee different viewpoints on role of surface and submarines in interdicting or securing SLOC and an Arctic capability for Indian maritime interests in the long run\nCooperation is the key in transboundary energy pipelines and the most workable and practical option. \nArctic route for oil supply is not feasible for India because it does not have any commercial or security links in the region. \n\n(Report prepared by Avinash Godbole and S. Sasikumar\, Research Assistant\, IDSA) URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/chinese-oil-and-gas-pipelines-and-sea-routes CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101119T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101119T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T021456 CREATED:20231223T221238Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130246Z UID:63628-1290144600-1290144600@idsa.in SUMMARY:The Indian Advocacy of Internationalism in the Nehru Years DESCRIPTION:Summary\nAs the title suggests\, the paper examines one of the significant aspects of Indian foreign policy which was greatly influenced by Nehru’s ideas on internationalism. The purpose of the paper is to explore how this idea of internationalism evolved during the freedom struggle and made a passage thereon to be a part of independent India’s foreign policy. Nehru’s aim in advocating the principles of internationalism was to realise the creation of the ideal of One World centred on the United Nations which represented the world community. Keeping this in mind\, he crafted independent India’s foreign policy composed of five elements: opposition to colonialism\, imperialism and racialism; concept of non-alignment vis-à-vis the two Cold War blocs to preserve Asia in particular as an ‘area of peace’; prevent internationalization of conflict; disarmament; and peaceful co-existence as embodied in the Panchsheel agreement for the evolution of a peaceful and co-operative international order\, thus paving the way for realising the ideal of One World. These elements became the framework through which the foreign policy of India was conducted\, mostly connected and identified with ‘non-alignment’. The author clearly expresses that all these elements including non-alignment were designed for the realization of the ideal of One World. \nThe paper is composed of four sections. First the paper discusses the origins of Indian internationalism and how it emerged as an integral part of the expression of Indian nationalism\, particularly from the 1920s. This had much to do with the developments within Asia in this period. ‘Anti-imperialism’ and ‘solidarity’ with colonised states as well as the idea of ‘Asianism’ were an integral part of the views of the Congress on foreign affairs. This was entwined with the goal of attaining independence and the call for co-operation among nations fighting imperialism. Hence\, Congress and Nehru expressed a commitment to the goals of anti-imperialism and nationalism along with internationalism. Here the paper points to the Congress policy of India not becoming a party to an imperialist war or being forced into one\, thus suggesting the direction of independent India’s foreign relations. These ideas and principles became the key pillars of Indian foreign policy after independence. \nThe second section focuses on the dilemma that Indian nationalists faced in terms of reconciling their demand for independence from British imperialism with the internationalist responsibility of opposing Nazism\, Fascism and Militarism\, and how they sought to reconcile the two\, particularly in the Quit India Resolution. The Quit India Resolution clearly expressed the Indian approach of internationalism in terms of anti-imperialism\, anti-racialism and freedom for all peoples\, particularly in Asia; the idea of free nations joining together to form the future UN; the importance of the UN serving as the mainstay of a new international order\, a world federation that would work for the common good of all humanity; and global disarmament. \nSection three discusses the idea of Pan-Asianism\, which provided the backdrop for independent India’s emphasis on Asian solidarity vis-á-vis European imperialism. Nehru’s thoughts in this regard were articulated in his works\, proposing the formation of an “Asiatic Federation of Nations”. The outcome of these ideas\, along with those of the Congress and other Indian thinkers\, was the idea of rallying all Asian countries to promote peace and fashion a normative international order by supporting the UN. This was to lead in the direction of realising the ideal of One World. \nSection four parses through select speeches of Nehru to demonstrate the internationalist framework that guided Indian foreign policy during the Nehru years and argues that the above mentioned ideals\, ideas\, and goals were incorporated since Nehru’s incumbency as Prime Minister in the interim government. Anti-imperialism and non-alignment were a result of the expression of Indian nationalism from the 1920s. This was put to practice along with others: prevention of internationalization of conflict; disarmament; and peaceful co-existence. These elements were incorporated in the wake of developments in Asia—SEATO and CENTO alliances in Asia\, war in the Korean Peninsula\, etc.—which portended possibilities of a world war. The fact that all these elements were an integral part of a unified conception of internationalism and of the imperative of nudging the world towards the ideal of One World centred on the United Nations is clearly evident in Nehru’s speech at the UN General Assembly on 20 Dec. 1956\, wherein he emphasised the significance of UN as representing the world community and how the Cold War and arms race were impediments to realising the ideal of One World. \nThe paper ends by noting that internationalism was replaced by national interest in subsequent years due to the security concerns faced by India. The paper gives a normative conclusion that national power should be married with the ideals of internationalism. \nExternal Discussant\nProf. Pusphesh Pant: Extolled the paper in terms of the relevance of the subject. However suggestions were made in terms of: the need to contextualize\, and on the paper being Nehru-centric. It was pointed out that the time-line dates back much before the Nehruvian period regarding internationalism. Also there were thinkers within India who had similar or contending views on internationalism. Bearing in mind the age of Nehru\, with regard to his earlier works\, the importance of periodization or framing of exact time-lines on Nehru’s advocacy was stressed upon. Thirdly\, there were movements like the Khilafat which went beyond Pan-Asianism. Fourth\, it was to be noted that Nehru was not a complete idealist. He was practical on matters like the Sino-Indian border issue\, Tibet etc. Fifth\, the need to clarify the context in which internationalism was defined in the paper; Asian solidarity or Afro-Asian solidarity or world solidarity. \nInternal Discussants\nV. Krishnappa: Commended that the author had included Nehru’s advocacy of a global order as the latter could foresee the world in terms of global networks in play. This was important from the strategic as well as the national interest perspective. With regard to the time-line of Nehru’s advocacy\, suggestions were made that it could be located within contemporary representations of Nehru. One of the comments was on how Pan-Asianism could be reconciled with internationalism when materialism had taken over Asia. \nDr. Rajaram Panda: Reiterated the need for the timeline and contextualisation. He mentioned his reservation regarding the use of phrase -‘surrender of sovereignty’. The paper would also benefit if detailed analysis was made on the role played by India in the Korean War. Inclusion of events like the Japanese victory over China; Tagore’s dialogue with the Japanese philosopher Okakura Tenshin on Asian identity; possibilities of atomic war and Japanese annexation of Korea\, were all imperative. Stress was laid on the need to clarify the context of Pan-Asianism and also the need to categorize the regions of Asia. As it was pointed out in the paper on possibilities of a third World War with regard to Asian developments viz.\, Indo-China War and Korean War\, the significance of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis which brought the world to the brink of a world war needs to be included in this context as well. Suggestion was made on the need to mention Radha Binod Bihari Pal’s dissenting judgment at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East and how this judgment boosted the morale of the Japanese after their defeat in WW-II. Lastly\, as the conclusion was abrupt\, he suggested that the paper would need more elaboration. \nGeneral Discussion\nSeveral comments were made in terms of the paper being a framework of Nehru’s ideas. Nehru\, Tagore\, Gandhi were personalities of their own. The 1920s were different from the 1930s and Nehru’s views on internationalism were not necessarily shared by his colleagues. Nevertheless\, Congress was led to a great degree by Nehru. Differentiation has to be made between Nehru the thinker and Nehru the statesman. As the world is coming close to Nehru/Gandhi ideals\, especially with Obama advocating a world without nuclear weapons\, the need for reviving these themes highlighted in the paper was significant. \nChair’s Summary\nProf. Sumit Ganguly: Noted that changes and comments suggested were vast and hence a book in the making would be a good idea. Prof. Ganguly made three organisational comments: one\, on sections being far too long and thus the need to break them further into sections\, secondly the usefulness of having clearer time-lines or historical periodization\, and finally the conclusion being compressed and abrupt. \nHe also made substantive comments: whether there was even the prospect of UN during 1942 when the Quit India Resolution was pronounced. Discussion and themes are not connected\, but descriptive. For instance\, India’s role in the Korean War needs to be more detailed. Importance to be given to India-China agreement on Tibet as it was a pivotal movement. This should lead and continue the debate on Nehru’s stand. Thirdly\, there is a highly idealized view on Pan-Asianism between pages 14 to 17 which evaporates after the war. No mention of the viciousness of Japan is made. Fourth\, one should note\, as Prof. Pant said\, that Nehru was in the Ahmednagar prison without access to material and news. Nevertheless\, he brilliantly prophesized that Britain would not stand up to Hitler. This suggests that Nehru was not an idealist as he was made out to be. \nReport prepared by Joyce Sabina Lobo\, Research Assistant at IDSA. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-indian-advocacy-of-internationalism-in-the-nehru-years CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101119T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101119T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T021456 CREATED:20231223T221327Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T045308Z UID:63629-1290144600-1290144600@idsa.in SUMMARY:Why Transnational Energy Pipelines Remain Pipedreams in South Asia DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nChairperson: Prof. Sujit Dutta\nDiscussants: Shri A Karnatak & Dr. Bhupendra Kr. Singh URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/why-transnational-energy-pipelines-remain-pipedreams-in-south-asia CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101126T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101126T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T021456 CREATED:20231223T221238Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130246Z UID:63625-1290749400-1290749400@idsa.in SUMMARY:GCC-Iran Rivalry and Challenges for India in the Gulf DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Air Marshall Inamdar \nDiscussants:\n      External-Prof. Ramakrishnan (JNU)\n      Internal– Brig (retd) Rumel Dahiya & Ms. Princy Marin George \nIndia has huge interests in both Iran and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in terms of securing energy supply\, protecting interests of the Indian diaspora\, enhancing trade and investment\, fighting against piracy and more recently trying to forge strategic partnership with the region. The rising profile of China in the region is another concern for India. \nGCC-Iran relations have been marked by competition and rivalry. Both have engaged in ideological conflicts over Shia-Sunni divide\, territorial disputes\, presence of the United States in the region\, Iranian nuclear programme and Saudi-Iranian relations which has in many ways steered the relationship. This has posed some challenges for Indian foreign policy in the Gulf region in recent times. India’s proximity to one of these players does not augur well with the other. In his paper\, Dr. Prasanta Kumar Pradhan has argued that the political\, ideological and strategic conflicts between Iran and the GCC pose challenges for India in pursuing her interests in the region. \nHe identified five major issues of contention and discussed them in his presentation. \nIdeological rivalry:\nAfter the Islamic revolution\, Ayatollah Khomeini openly declared\, “Our revolution is not limited to the boundaries of Iran. Economic and political difficulties should not compel our officials to forgo the principal task of exporting our lofty Islamic Revolutionary goals…The true meaning of export of our revolution is to awaken the Muslims and their governments so that they can change themselves and not allow their precious resources to be plundered by anti-Muslim outsiders.” By outsiders he meant the Sunnis. The conflicting relations between Iran and the GCC have also aggravated the existing Shia-Sunni divide in the region. \nIranian Nuclear Programme:\nThe Iranian nuclear weapon programme has raised concerns in the minds of the GCC rulers. Initially they recognized Iran’s rights for a peaceful nuclear programme. When evidence emerged about a clandestine programme intended for producing nuclear weapons\, the GCC countries started to support IAEA efforts and looked at the involvement of the UN Security Council as a positive development to prevent Iran from developing nuclear capability. If Iran becomes successful in making nuclear weapons\, it would not only shift the balance of power in the region in favour of Iran but also multiply the threat perceptions of the GCC countries. The threat perception is the natural outcome of the Gulf Arab countries’ perception of Iran as a hegemonic power and the Iranian eagerness to spread their influence into the region. \nTerritorial disputes:\nIranian occupation of three islands namely\, Abu Musa\, Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb in the Gulf which are claimed by the UAE is another issue of contention between the GCC and Iran. To add to the worries of the GCC\, Iran has built a port in the Abu Musa Island. In August 2008\, Iran opened two administrative offices in Abu Musa which\, it claims\, are to help ship registration and maritime rescue. In a statement\, GCC Secretary-General Abdurrahman Al-Attiyah “strongly denounced Iran’s opening of two administrative offices on Abu Musa Island\, which belongs to the UAE and is occupied by Iran.” The GCC fears that this will give Iran greater control of shipping traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. \nPresence of the United States:\nIran alleges the GCC countries of inviting the US to the region and has also alleged them to be the “puppets of the Great Satan”. The possibility that Iran could produce nuclear weapons is a nightmare for the USA. Apart from the nuclear programme\, the US’ threat perception of Iran is dominated by the Iranian support of terrorism\, and its WMD and missile capabilities. Iranian threat perception is understandable as Iran feels itself surrounded by US military forces. \nSaudi-Iranian relations:\nIran has called the Al Saud regime un-Islamic and openly called for its overthrow. Ideological rivalry\, Saudi allegation of Iran flaring up its Shia population in the Eastern Province\, Iranian allegation of Saudi Arabia flaring up its Sunni population\, regional power struggle between the two\, Iranian nuclear programme\, close Saudi-US relations etc. have strained Saudi Arabia’s relations with Iran. Saudi Arabia’s support for Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988 further deteriorated the relationship. Saudi Arabia has also questioned the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme and has supported the USA in imposing sanctions against Iran. \nIndia’s interest in GCC countries:\nFor India its relationship with GCC represents its varied interests in the economic\, political and strategic fields. The Gulf region has been the main source of India’s energy needs supplying around two- thirds of India’s total energy requirements. The Gulf region has been a lucrative market for Indian manufactured goods including textiles\, spices\, food products\, electrical goods and machineries and IT products. India’s five million strong work force in the GCC countries is also an important link. India looks at the GCC countries as partners in tackling terrorism. \nIndia’s interest in Iran:\nIran’s geopolitical and strategic location\, long coastline along the Gulf\, and its influence over the Strait of Hormuz makes it an important country in the region. Iran has the third largest proven oil reserves and second largest proven gas reserves in the world. India eyes Iranian gas for its long term energy security. India\, Iran and Afghanistan are discussing to develop the Chahbahar route through Melak\, Zaranj and Delaram which would facilitate regional trade and transit\, including Afghanistan and Central Asia. Another potential area of cooperation between India and Iran is in maritime security. India supports an Iranian nuclear programme for peaceful civilian purposes but is against the nuclearisation of the Gulf region which will have severe implications for the region in future. \nChallenges for India:\nUS presence and strategic cooperation in the Gulf and the US-Iran conflict pose a serious challenge for India. India cannot fully support US policies in the region\, nor can India completely oppose them. India would require the support of the USA in the region to further its interests. \nChina’s growing economy and thirst for energy has driven its policies in the Gulf. Bilateral trade between China and the GCC topped US $ 70 billion in 2008. China has been using the conflict between the GCC and Iran in the best possible manner. Despite voting against Iran at the IAEA over the nuclear issue\, China has managed to stabilize its relations with Iran. China is viewed by Iran as a counterweight for the USA in the region. On the other hand\, China is viewed by Saudi Arabia and other GCC countries as an important trade partner and a big power in Asia. \nGCC-Iran rivalry is deepening in Iraq. India should build its ties with Iraq but this is taking a lot of time because of the unstable political situation and the social situation. \nIndia is highly dependent on the Gulf region for its energy security as it imports about two thirds of its energy requirement from the region. As the issue of energy is directly related to the regional political conditions and the warmth of the bilateral relations between the countries\, it becomes important to take the relationship up to level of stability. India has huge interests in GCC and Iran and this makes it important for India to calibrate its policies so as to ensure supply of oil from both GCC countries and Iran. \nConclusion:\nDr. Pradhan pointed out that the conflict between Iran and the GCC countries has severe regional implications which would also affect India’s interests in the region. He suggests that the growing Indian interests and influence in the region should be complemented with a sound policy for dealing with the two major powers. For India\, dealing with the USA in the Gulf is a political and strategic challenge while China primarily remains an economic rival. A peaceful and stable Gulf region is in India’s interest and India needs to carefully nurture its policies in the region. \nDiscussion\nThe following issues were raised: It was suggested that Iraq being an important factor in the Iran-GCC conflict that aspect too needs greater analysis. Second\, the differing visions of the security of the Gulf need to be incorporated. Third\, the notion of Gulf regionalism needed attention. It was pointed out that after US military intervention in Iraq\, even Saudi Arabia was offended. India on the other hand is emerging as a balancer with China playing an important role in the region. \nIt was also pointed out that the definition of the Gulf is very conflicting as Iran would like to call it Persian Gulf while the GCC would call it Arabian Gulf. Second\, the Diaspora is extremely important and India used to have a diaspora in Iran where its treatment was not good. The importance of Israel was highlighted and democratisation of GCC was emphasised. Unlike Indian diaspora in the US who are viewed with pride\, Indian diaspora in GCC are viewed as a source of responsibility. However it is this diaspora which has acted as a catalyst in strengthening India’s relation with the GCC. \nReport prepared by Pallavi Pal\, Research Intern\, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/gcc-iran-rivalry-and-challenges-for-india-in-the-gulf CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101203T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101203T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T021456 CREATED:20231223T221138Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130246Z UID:63622-1291354200-1291354200@idsa.in SUMMARY:Indian Parliament and Sino-Indian Relations DESCRIPTION:Chair: Prof. V P DuttDiscussant: Prof. Sumit Ganguly and Amb. Suresh Bhutani \nThe paper argued that the role of parliament in Sino-Indian relations can be assessed under following heads: debates on Addresses by President of India to joint sessions of Parliament\, ‘demands for grants’\, Annual Report of Ministries\, motions and resolutions\, statements\, questions\, etc. In addition\, the role of standing committees\, particularly on defence and external affairs\, and of the parliamentary consultative committees\, as well as exchange of parliamentary delegations and Parliamentary Friendship Groups can also be highlighted as providing a comprehensive picture of the role of the Indian Parliament so far as India-China relationship is concerned. Sino-Indian relations have figured and at times have drawn the attention of both the Houses of parliament. When we talk about Indian Parliament and Sino-Indian relations\, perhaps the role of political parties also figures automatically; after all\, parliament and political parties are intertwined. \nThe role of the Indian parliament in Sino-Indian relations predates even the Independence of the country and can be traced to the Provisional parliament called the Constituent assembly (Legislative) and that of the political parties\, particularly the Congress party\, and even prior to that when Nehru sent a medical mission led by Mohanlal Atal which included the legendary Dr. Dwarkanath Kotnis at a time when China was fighting Japan. \nDebates on foreign policy enable the government to demonstrate that Indian democracy works\, educate the electorate\, and legitimise the foreign policy. Parliamentary debates\, while often eloquent and lively\, merely serve to keep ministers vigilant\, but do not alter policy because they usually follow\, rather than precede\, governmental policy actions. However\, at times of crises\, Parliament rises to the occasion by playing a significant role in foreign policy making. As far as India’s relationship with China is concerned\, there is a degree of consensus among political parties. While the CPM has been sympathetic to China\, Socialists like George Fernandes and Mulayam Singh Yadav have been critical of China. But among major political parties there is a broad consensus. \nSecondly\, the role of parliament is minimized since the nature and structure of foreign policy making in a parliamentary polity is often characterized by a degree of secrecy considering its sensitive and strategic nature. Thirdly\, as far as Sino-Indian relationship is concerned\, South Block at times is not inclined to leave much space for other stake holders including the Parliament for the very reasons mentioned above. These are some of the inherent limitations while working on a project like assessing the role of parliament in Sino-Indian relations. Nevertheless\, parliament continues to be the fulcrum of the legislative and policy-making process and it is the pivotal institution through which omissions and commissions of the government are accounted for. \nAmb. Bhutani highlighted the procedures which parliament employs while discussing foreign policy issues. He also showed that in the initial years foreign policy had an economic dimension. For example\, when Prime Minister Nehru wanted to establish land cooperatives it was not received positively because people thought that he wanted to follow the Chinese or the Soviet model. In that sense\, economic policy was seen as intimately linked with foreign policy. \nOn the other hand\, parliamentary debates on the Tibet/China issue were resented by Beijing. It felt that New Delhi had no right to discuss matters pertaining to Chinese domestic issues and saw it as Indian interference in China’s domestic affairs. Meanwhile Nehru had to let the debates go on since they served as a safety valve when emotions were running high within India after the ‘liberation’ of Tibet by the People’s Republic. As a result of these debates China condemned India as well as the Dalai Lama. \nProf. Sumit Ganguly highlighted the fact that the paper attempts to cover a large gamut of issues and it should try and focus on one or at the maximum two time periods. As the area which is being covered is huge the debates appear to be moving from one topic to another. He also said that there is a need to show that Nehru’s understanding on China was not that nuanced and he was not clear about his stance throughout. He also asserted that the Parliament needs to take a stronger stance on current issues. He stated that Parliament needs to follow what are the outcomes of the scheduled meetings to discuss the border problem and what is the progress being made as a result of these meetings. \nSome other points that were highlighted during the discussion include the comment that paper gave the impression that only Congress members took part in active discussions. There were also suggestions that the author can simply limit his focus on the Indian parliament’s role when it comes to the Tibet issue since in any event the border issue is related to it. \nIn his concluding remarks\, Prof. Dutt stated that Parliament becomes very important in times of crises. He also said that Dalai Lama’s flight and its ramifications have not been included in the paper. He suggested that if the author refers to the Parliament papers and discussions it will add more depth to the argument of the paper. \nReport prepared by Gunjan Singh\, Research Assistant\, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/indian-parliament-and-sino-indian-relations CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101210T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101210T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T021456 CREATED:20231223T221138Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130245Z UID:63619-1291959000-1291959000@idsa.in SUMMARY:Is Reintegration and Reconciliation a Way Forward in Afghanistan? DESCRIPTION:Chair: Mr. Rana BanerjiDiscussants: Professor Anwar Alam and Prof. Gulshan Sachdeva \nPresentation\nThe principle theme of the paper is that “the idea of national reconciliation and integration per se as a precursor to much desired stability in Afghanistan\, however fragile it may be\, cannot be denied”. The main conclusions of the paper are as follows: \n\nWith the level of violence at an all time high\, the Afghan war is certainly peaking and entering into a new phase.\nIn the given circumstances\, Kabul and the West are not in a position to lay down terms for negotiations with the top Taliban.\nThere is a general perception that growing demand for reconciliation with the Taliban in its current form will only work to the advantage of the Taliban and Pakistan. Any withdrawal of the Western troops at this time would almost certainly lead to a Taliban regime. \nA top down approach emphasizing on direct negotiations is not likely to work in the current scenario partly because\, 1) the top insurgent leadership is hostage or takes orders from the Pakistani establishment and 2) they believe that the West will exit soon and thus do not need to negotiate with Kabul or the West.\nThe peace process in Afghanistan at a larger scale may also be considered as a battle between neo – Islamic versus traditional Islamic ideals. \n\nExternal Discussant 1: Dr. Gulshan Sachdeva\nDr. Gulshan Sachdeva highlighted the following points with respect to the presentation: \n\nMany other issues like security\, development\, exit strategies\, aid effectiveness etc. are all going on simultaneously in Afghanistan and need to be discussed\, perhaps in a separate project or paper. \nMost people will agree that some amount of dialogue and reconciliation is needed\, be it in Afghanistan or any other country in conflict.\nThe question to be considered is: how the Reintegration and Reconciliation (R2) process is being discussed in Afghanistan; and what is the context? Furthermore\, is R2 part of an exit strategy or the larger nation building process? Dr. Sachdeva mentioned that these were the poignant questions that could be considered in detail in a separate project\, which would compliment this paper. \nIt was highlighted that the R2 is not a Kabul-led process\, and was an initiative of the West. It was suggested that the R2 has been forced on Kabul by the West. This would make the operationalization of the R2 process extremely difficult. Furthermore\, one needs to go beyond the statements of statesmen to see whether it is a Kabul-led process or not.\nDr. Sachdeva suggested that the paper could also discuss in some detail the question of whether India’s position on R2 is a tactical or a strategic shift\, and whether there is any change in the Indian position and\, if so\, then why? \n\nExternal Discussant 2: Prof. Anwar Alam\nThe following were the suggestions given by Prof. Anwar Alam: \n\nProf. Alam stated that clarity about the objective of the R2 process is needed. He suggested that the difference in the priority with respect to R2 among various countries ought to be considered. R2 has emerged in view of the failure of NATO to tame down Taliban and in the context of US exit strategy. \nProf. Alam stated that the author is right in observing that the peace process is linked to the state building process. But the author must elaborate what he means by state building process. Dr. Alam posed the question: what is the cultural imagination of state building process\, i.e. governance centric state building process? Elaboration on this aspect was suggested for the paper.\nIn addition to the aforementioned points\, Prof. Alam also emphasized on the need to explore the role of Saudi Arabia\, Iran and Pakistan in the R2 process in Afghanistan and how Iran and Saudi Arabia are playing games. \n\nInternal Discussant 1: Col. Ali Ahmed (retd.)\n\nThe military prong was not getting the desired results. Therefore one needed to consider and strengthen the political prong and the peace process; but the peace prong may not go anywhere due to the current form and nature of the conflict. \nIt was suggested that if the US domestic factors change\, the West may have to leave soon\, and without honour.\nThe capability of President Karzai to take care of the peace process was questioned. It was noted that the Karzai government can’t take care of Kabul governance which puts a question mark on its ability to handle the Peace Process. Additionally\, if the peace process catches momentum\, India will have to be on board too and India must use its goodwill during the peace process. \n\nInternal Discussant 2: Dr. Ashok Behuria:\n\nThere are other components in addition to the US and the Taliban to the peace process and R2 such as Pakistan\, Iran\, India\, the US – Pakistan relations\, and India – Pakistan relations. \nDr. Behuria stated that the Taliban would not come to the negotiation table when they are on the rise and the exit of US forces appears imminent. \n\nFloor discussion:\nThe following points were made by the audience: \n\nThe R2 process will not succeed if Pakistan continues to use Taliban as a strategic asset. \nThe Taliban is not keen on supporting Afghan peace process as they are under no pressure to accept this. Furthermore\, Taliban are an ideological party with specific goals which cannot be compromised. \nIndia enjoys a tremendous amount of goodwill among the people of Afghanistan\, but India is not capitalizing on its soft power. \nIt was suggested that the West wants to exit Afghanistan and hence the peace process has been initiated\, therefore the Taliban and many Afghans consider the Kabul-led peace process to be a joke. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/is-reintegration-and-reconciliation-a-way-forward-in-afghanistan CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101224T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101224T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T021456 CREATED:20231223T221125Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130245Z UID:63616-1293168600-1293168600@idsa.in SUMMARY:China’s ‘New Multilateralism’ and the Rise of BRIC: Realist Interpretation of a ‘Multi-Polar’ World Order DESCRIPTION:Dr. Panda’s paper treats the rise of multilateralism in the context of the decline of US power. It locates itself in the larger debate on multilateralism and the rise of new powers. In this context\, it deals with three central questions: a) Is China taking the lead to formulate a ‘New World Order’? b) What is the Chinese perception of BRIC? C) How does the scope of BRIC permit both China and India to cooperate\, whether cooperation is possible or it is just a rhetorical adjustment? \nThe term BRIC (Brazil\, Russia\, India and China) was coined in 2001 and gained currency following the Goldman Sachs Report of 2003. The collective economic capacity of the BRIC countries is huge. With an average annual growth of 10.7 per cent during 2006-08\, BRIC countries have become major contributors to the world economy. By 2050\, BRIC countries will be four of the top six global economies. Similarly other numbers emerging from BRIC have been equally impressive. \nChina’s serious involvement in interest based multilateral institutions has created the debate on whether it seeks to influence\, shape or preserve the status quo in global affairs. Chinese desire of ‘new’ multilateralism with “multi-polarism” indicates a “double-track” strategy to deal with the “rising” Western opposition\, and to shape the Chinese-desired future structure of world politics. The Chinese treat BRIC as not just an economic entity but as one having a strategic component as well. Involvement in multilateral bodies might allow Beijing to deflect doubt about its intentions while continuing to increase its global power and ambitions. It can also allow China to work with mainstream developing countries to expand its clout and formulate new global rules without having to fulfil the requisites of the developed countries. \nRealistic Interpretation of Chinese Strategy\nAccording to the author\, realism would indicate that China’s increasing participation in cross-regional multilateralism is aimed at cooperating with other powers having similar interests for mutual benefit. For instance\, China is associated with BRIC primarily to design its own desired world order. This notion suggests a zero-sum dynamics rooted in a struggle for relative power\, in which countries vie for strengthened ties with rival powers like India. Seen in this light\, BRIC is a gadget of “economic” statecraft as China pursues a “multipolar” strategy. \nPost-Cold war global politics created doubt over the possibility of a unipolar world order. Many strategists relied on structural realism and balance of power to forecast that uni-polarism would not last long. Since the 1980s\, Chinese strategists have emphasized on both ‘uni-polarity’ and ‘multi-polarisation’. There is less agreement\, whether the current world order is really unipolar\, multipolar or in transition. In tandem with these thought processes\, building cooperation and accommodation has been the hallmark of Chinese strategy towards global issues. \nCoordinating policy at the level of BRIC is not easy\, given that their interests clash at the ground level. For instance\, India and Brazil have set their goal for permanent membership of the UN Security Council\, while China and Russia are opposed to it. BRIC could be a catalyst for resolving many pressing problems like the North Korean and Iranian nuclear ambitions\, containing the threats in Pakistan\, stability in Central Asia\, climate change\, running the world trading system\, etc. \nChina’s perception of BRIC\nWhile it is too early to conclude that the USA is no more the supreme power\, Chinese do recognize the importance of “newly emerging powers” as a force. Chinese cooperation in the BRIC format should not necessarily be conceived as a response to US hegemony. For China\, besides reducing the over-dependence on the US on multilateral issues\, cooperating with other BRICs serves several functions like endorsing multi-polar dialogue\, links with developing countries\, economic diplomacy in areas like energy and climate change\, promote public diplomacy. The multi-polarization process is understood in China as involving a twofold scope: the rise of developing countries; and the interactions and readjustments of relations among powers. \nConclusion: China has deepened its cooperation with BRIC and would like to live with the current order of world politics till it grows to a distinctly new higher level. China remains the crucial player in BRIC. Following a “cooperative strategy” remains the key feature in Chinese diplomacy\, as China steps up its calculated steps to gain energy supplies\, reforming international financial institutions\, capturing vibrant markets and countering rising powers in the process\, etc. What China is advocating currently is to advance the global order through an improvement in the global powers’ relations and through overcoming the areas of dissatisfaction for a more transparent and vibrant world order. \nDiscussants\nAmb. S. Bhutani\n\nIn present day international relations\, there is a meshing of economic interests along with commonalities of perceptions on trade\, energy and environment.\nCurrency reforms issue will hurt BRIC since China’s policy is well known. Its willingness to reform policies will be important but its role is also limited. If any other currency devalues then Chinese export led model will also come under threat.\nThe author should use references in a more organised manner; on occasion it is not clear whether it is the perception from the reference cited or the perception of the author himself.\n\nAmb Rajagopalan\n\nIBSA started the trend of interest based multilateral process. Who coined BRIC is irrelevant from the point of view of the present paper\, although it remains a Russian idea to begin with.\nIndia is the common member in all the interest based groups\, then the centrality of China to BRIC as the author argues is questionable. There needs to be more focus on Brazil. Lula has been one of the initiators within BRIC.\nThere is confusion between the title and content. That needs to be sorted out.\n\nInternal Discussants\n\nThere is a contradiction between title and subtitle\, there is no realist critique as such in the paper.\nThere are multiple variables which reduces clarity and diverts focus. In addition\, use of tables at times is unnecessary.\nThere is internal contradiction in the paper. This needs to be looked at more carefully.\n\nGeneral Discussion\n\nThe paper needs more stress on the Russian and Brazilian perspectives of BRIC. That will help gauge the effectiveness of BRIC. How does the MEA approach BRIC can also be factored in the discussion.\nToo many variables make the paper less effective. Some form of tightening would help.\nFuture nature of multilateralism should be discussed.\nWhy author selects BRIC as the most important case is not clear. It needs to be mentioned since BRIC has commonalities with other similar groups. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/chinas-new-multilateralism-and-the-rise-of-bric-realist-interpretation-of-a-multi-polar-world-order CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101224T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101224T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T021456 CREATED:20231224T104020Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T045100Z UID:64141-1293168600-1293168600@idsa.in SUMMARY:Revisiting the Debate on Autonomy of Jammu and Kashmir DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nVenue: Room No. 5\, IDSA \nChairperson: Shri Dhirendra SinghDiscussants: Ms. Sushobha Barve & Shri Iftikhar Gilani URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/revisiting-the-debate-on-autonomy-of-jammu-and-kashmir CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101230T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101230T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T021456 CREATED:20231223T221125Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130245Z UID:63614-1293687000-1293687000@idsa.in SUMMARY:A case for Increasing FDI CAP up to 100 per cent in India's Defence Industry DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Shri V K MisraDiscussants: Shri Amit Kumar Singh and Shri Rahul Gangal \nThis paper revolved around two key questions: Why does India need higher FDI in defence industry? And how much the FDI limit should be increased? Highlighting the present FDI policy of India\, Mr Behera said that India has allowed FDI up to 26 per cent in its defence industry since 2001. However\, the policy has so far not succeeded in attracting any major financial or technological inflows into the country\, primarily because of the lack of incentivisation of the policy to the foreign investors. He argued in favour of increasing FDI cap up to 100 per cent and pointed out that keeping in view India’s underdeveloped R&D and production base\, and various defence industry-related policies and provisions that are contingent upon liberal flow of FDI\, an increase in foreign investment cap up to 100 per cent would be logical\, instead of adopting a fixed cap-based method\, which may be constrained in allowing some desirable inflows. \nMr Behera argued that the absence of any meaningful FDI inflows into India – both\, financial as well as technological – has led to a strong debate in the country. In response to the Ministry of Commence and Industry’s (MoC&I’s) Discussion Paper of July 2010 which argued in favour of increasing FDI cap up to 74 per cent\, a cross section of industrial stakeholders ranging from industrial associations\, labour union\, law firms\, foreign company and consultancy firm have come out with their own views. He said that the views of these stakeholders are divided along three major lines; i) FDI limit be retained at 26 per cent; ii) FDI could be allowed to a maximum of 49 per cent subject to certain conditions such as minimum financial inflows is US $100 million and compulsory inflow of technology; and iii) FDI should be increased to 74 per cent. He pointed out that the majority of the industry as represented by their big associations\, such as the ASSOCHAM\, CII\, and FICCI\, has not favoured an increase of FDI beyond 49 per cent. Moreover\, the conditions they have proposed for 49 per cent FDI is stringent and highly discouraging for any foreign company to opt for this route to enter the Indian defence industry. \nThe author was of the view that in a globalised world\, FDI has been an important vehicle for external source of finance. However\, the volume and growth of inflows notwithstanding\, FDI inflows are often fraught on political grounds\, as inflow of resources are invariably linked with controlling of assets\, which the receiving countries are often reluctant to shed for variety of reasons\, national security being the critical one. He noted that although many counties have devised detailed mechanism to filter foreign investment into strategic sector\, a very few countries have a blanket ban on inflows after a certain level. Among them\, India and UAE have a blanket ban on FDI after a certain threshold. While India does not allow more than 26 per cent FDI in defence industry\, UAE restricts all foreign investment to 49 per cent\, unless the investment falls in its Free Trade Zones. \nIn response to the question why India needs higher FDI in defence industry\, Mr Behera said that foreign investment in defence industry is a part of India’s broader FDI policy\, intended to “bring attendant advantages of technology transfer\, marketing expertise\, introduction of modern managerial techniques and new possibilities for promotion of exports.” However\, even after nine years of its being existence\, the defence FDI policy in its present form has not been able to accrue the intended advantages in a meaningful way. Considering India’s poor R&D and production base\, and the country’s desire to enhance domestic defence production\, Mr Behera suggested that an increase in FDI cap beyond the present limit would be desirable for technology transfer and for meaningful ties between Indian and foreign companies. In addition\, an increase in FDI cap would also likely facilitate effective functioning of the offset policy and “Buy and Make (Indian)” procurement provision. He\, however\, argued that given the sensitivity attached to defence industry and national security\, all defence-related FDI could be subject to wider review by the empowered Foreign Investment Promotion Board (FIPB). \nAt the end\, he said that although a higher FDI cap up to 100 per cent would create an enabling environment for technology transfer\, and setting up joint venture companies\, the indigenous industry\, given its size and base\, would continue to play major role in India’s defence industry. He\, therefore\, concluded by emphasising that there is a greater need for energising the indigenous industry\, both private and public sector\, so as to enable them to play a more pro-active role. \nShri Rahul Gangal: Increasing FDI limit in defence industry is not the only issue. There are other policy dichotomies which also need to be considered while discussing about increasing the FDI limit in defence industry. He focused on some key aspects such as: the foreign investors want ownership in the JVs while making investments in vital sectors. Second\, the present FDI policy is also not generating more interest and motivation among outside investors. Third\, they also want to have insurance of their investments. Fourth\, the investors are interested only investing in those sectors where their interests are protected. They are not interested to create other new JVs if that will not yield interest. Five\, the investors also want to have their position or control over key policy decisions. In addition\, he pointed out the question of what will happen if these JVs start marketing the products to gain profit. He emphasised that these important issues need to be focused while thinking about increasing the FDI limit. \nShri Ashok Kanodia: There is a need to define the national objectives while talking about increasing FDI limit. What actually India wants to achieve by increasing FDI limit in defence industry? The US and other western countries are more concerned about creating jobs. How many jobs and skills have been created in India by FDI? The present FDI policy of India started in 2001 and nine years is a long period to assess the policy. What are the policy initiatives created for the JVs? On purchasing of technologies\, he said that one does not buy defence technologies from a single vendor. He agreed with Mr Behera that many of the policies that he recommended in his paper have already been made to the government case-by-case basis. He pointed out that protecting the Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) and seriousness of the JVs are the two important things which are essential for creating new JVs. Finally\, he said that what nation wants to achieve by increasing FDI limit\, for this\, we need to take a holistic approach while arguing for increasing the FDI limit and for creating new JVs. \nDr G Balachandran: This is a very current and relevant topic. However\, the presenter needs to be very clear and careful while using some concepts and facts. He pointed out that defence technology is very different from other technologies. So the scholar needs to be clear which kind of technology that he is referring to whether it is high technology\, critical technology\, defence technology or any other technologies and what kind of technologies that India would acquire by increasing the FDI limit since there are different license procedures required for each of these technologies. In addition\, by increasing FDI cap up to 49\, 74 or 100 per cent India will not be able to obtain these technologies from foreign companies\, unless the foreign companies’ government approve them. He pointed out that defence technologies are subject to strict regulations as well as international export control laws. So far as defence trade is concerned\, it’s a government to government cooperation. Moreover\, homogenous items or products can be obtained from many countries\, but critical components cannot be obtained because these are subject to stringent export control laws. And one cannot start industry for each item or product. He suggested that first and foremost\, there is need to understand technologies and then which kind of technologies that India wants to obtain by increasing FDI cap and without knowing this one cannot give 100 per cent FDI. \nDiscussion: \n\nIn JVs\, government investment means government control. So\, how to maintain the balance between government investment and control? \nSince last two decades\, China is rapidly modernising its defence system. How this will affect India? And\, how China is able to bring more FDI into its country? \nSo far as the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) is concerned\, how does it would work with India? \nHow does India’s offset policy affect the FDI inflow? How it works in technology imports in terms of defence technology?\nIndia also needs to work on other important issues such as labour laws\, centre-state coordination\, better SEZ schemes and proper institutional mechanisms to attract more FDI in future. \nFDI which is vital to India’s growth has lacked a proper policy document and has been administered primarily through a series of press notes over many years.\nIndia is lagging behind China by 20 years in terms of infrastructure development. As India’s economy is rising and able to sustain its economic growth rate despite the global economic crisis\, it needs to pay greater attention to infrastructure development. Otherwise in long term basis\, it cannot compete with other major powers.\nWhile foreign equity participation has increased in most sectors\, there are still sectors where there is huge potential for FDI inflows. Further increases in FDI ceilings in sectors such as banking\, telecom\, power generation\, civil aviation\, food retailing\, insurance\, investing companies and the real estate sector will be required to achieve this potential. \nDo political parties have any stake in FDI? \n\nChairperson’s Remarks: Shri V.K. Mishra said that India’s defence industry has not attained critical mass in R&D and manufacture sectors. Joint venture\, thus\, is an important route to develop India’s R&D and production base as well as critical infrastructures. There are massive deficiencies in these sectors. So far as the FDI limit in defence industry is concerned\, unless we increase the present limit\, we cannot compete with other countries. India’s JVs in defence sector has been lost so far. However\, there is no dearth of opportunities. He cited that India’s joint venture with Russia in Brahmos missile programme is very successful. He hoped that such JVs will open in many other sectors with other countries. Shri Mishra concluded by observing that India’s defence industry is lagging far behind\, and that’s why new JVs need to be created in this sector by following a liberal FDI policy. But he noted that there is need of greater transparency in defence department to make it more effective. \nReport prepared by Dr Saroj Bishoyi\, Research Assistant\, IDSA URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/a-case-for-increasing-fdi-cap-up-to-100-per-cent-in-indias-defence-industry CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101230T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101230T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T021456 CREATED:20231224T104020Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T044912Z UID:64140-1293687000-1293687000@idsa.in SUMMARY:China’s Defence Diplomacy in Southeast Asia DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nChairperson: Amb. TCA RagachariDiscussants: Prof. Chintamani Mahapatra and Prof. Manmohini Kaul URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/chinas-defence-diplomacy-in-southeast-asia CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110107T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110107T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T021456 CREATED:20231223T221038Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130245Z UID:63612-1294378200-1294378200@idsa.in SUMMARY:International Procedures and Systems of Export Controls of Materials\, Equipments and Technology related to Biological Weapons DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Shri P R ChariDiscussants: Dr B M Gandhi and Dr Moushumi Basu \n \nThe paper describes the existing procedures and systems of international export controls of materials\, equipments and technology related to biological weapons. The author states that Export controls “are tools to ensure that trade flows consistently with treaty obligations embodied in the relevant control regimes\, which is to stay away from states with weapons programs and toward those with commercial\, peaceful interests”. Exports include agents\, equipments and expertise and intangible transfer of knowledge. The major conclusions of the author were that export control of materials and technology related to biological weapons\, in place of being an appropriate response to the advances in biological sciences\, has been a function of security perceptions of states. Secondly\, policy decision regarding export controls must take inputs from the relevant stakeholders; most importantly the biological scientific enterprise and finally export controls remain the most essential element in an overall strategy to limit the spread of biological weapons. \nThe major points of discussions and suggestions to the author: \n\nStudy the impact of these treaties on other countries\,\nIntroduce the other systems and treaties in the introduction\,\nDiscuss the export controls in India with other developed countries and compare them\,\nFurther discuss dual use of Biological Weapons and their use by state as well as non-state actors\,\nStates are conscious about their commercial interests\,\nVerification is the major problem area\,\nBiological items are inherently dual use in nature and thus there is a need for a more effective control mechanism\,\nNeed to add some discussion on UNSC Resolution 1540\, \nExport controls affect development of R&D in Developing countries\,\nGlobalization will lead to loosening of state controls.\n\nReport prepared by Gunjan Singh\, Research Assistant\, IDSA URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/international-procedures-and-systems-of-export-controls-of-materials-equipments-and-technology-related-to-biological-weapons CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110107T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110107T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T021456 CREATED:20231223T221038Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130245Z UID:63613-1294378200-1294378200@idsa.in SUMMARY:Sudan in Transition: Implications for India DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Ambassador ShashankDiscussants: Ambassador Rajeev Bhatia and Professor S N Malakar \n \nMs. Beri’s paper focuses on the upcoming referendum that brings forth the complexities of energy politics in Sudan. The referendum is important for both North and South Sudan. The deep historical and commercial ties between Sudan and India mean that the developments in Sudan pose India with numerous challenges. India’s strategy of engaging with Southern Sudan in recent years\, however\, may reduce any adverse impacts of events. Within Sudan itself\, North Sudan mainly views the possible secession of the South as a disaster due to the extensive oil production in the South – around 90 percent of oil revenues in Sudan come from the southern region of the country. Ms. Beri’s paper aims to investigate the complexities of Sudan in this transition period and its implications for India. \nTalks on post-referendum scenarios began in July 2010 between members of the National Congress Party and the Sudan People’s Liberation movement. The discussion agenda includes issues such as security\, citizenship\, economic and natural resources\, international treaties and legal issues. A crucial issue confronting the government is citizenship owing to the unclear status of Southerners living permanently in Northern Sudan and of Northerners settled in South Sudan. There is also the issue of management of natural resources – Sudan’s discovered reserves are estimated at five million barrels with the majority of these being in the South. Although the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the North and South restored peace beginning in 2005\, Sudan’s main oil producing region\, Abyei\, is situated on the North-South border (Abyei accounts for around 13 percent of the country’s total income from oil exports). This has exacerbated the situation to spill into a boundary dispute over Abyei and the presence of other oil fields in these frontier areas. \nSharing of oil revenue is another area of contention. The CPA mandated equal sharing of oil wealth generated from the oilfields located in the South; however\, here have been doubts about transparency in allocations of generated revenues. The North is heavily dependent on oil revenues generated in the South for the developmental progress of the Northern region. Also\, a large number of Northerners are employed in the Southern oil fields. The failure of both sides to reach an agreement would likely lead to these opportunities vanishing for the North. (Reports indicate that the North has been seeking alternate sources of energy\, particularly hydroelectricity\, to meet this challenge). On the other hand\, the dilemma for the South is about access to oil infrastructure. Facilities such as pipelines\, refineries and storage and export terminals are in the North. A split would mean disruption in the South’s continued usage of this infrastructure. Ms. Beri points out that in the short term\, both the North and South will continue to be dependent on each other for the utilization of oil wealth. Apart from these\, there is also the question of sharing of water resources in the Nile river basin. \nThere are a number of scenarios predicted for Sudan – complete separation into two independent states\, two independent states with an open border\, the confederalist option\, and a unified Sudan. \nAlthough India’s relations with Sudan date back to ancient times\, India had established minimal contact with the South until recently. Ms. Beri observes that the Indian government has supported Sudan on many occasions – India’s Election Commission helped organize Sudan’s first general elections in the late 1950s; Indian engineers played a major role in setting up Sudan’s sugar industry and railways. Politically\, there is mutual support – Sudan has supported India’s aspirations for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council; the Indian government agreed to assist Sudan in entering the World Trade Organisation (WTO); India was given observer status at the March 2006 Summit of the League of Arab States in Khartoum; India also extended it support for the sovereignty\, unity ad territorial integrity of Sudan\, and affirmed that Darfur is an internal crisis that should be resolved by the government of Sudan in consultation with the African Union; India has also sent peacekeepers to the UN Peacekeeping Mission in Sudan. \nThe referendum can also impact India’s substantial investments in Sudan’s energy sector\, largely in the South. Sudan was the first African country that India sought equity assets with. As of January 2010\, Sudan has sought fresh investments by India particularly in the offshore natural gas blocks; India on the other hand has offered its assistance in modernizing Sudan’s oil refineries in addition to providing training for its technicians. One of the biggest challenges for India would be the possibility of a new government in South Sudan undertaking policy changes in the energy sector and canceling standing contracts. The fate of India’s investments in Sudan depends on the outcome of the upcoming referendum in the South. Ms. Beri points out that it is most likely that the South will split and declare itself independent. But taking into account the extent of interdependence between the North and South\, a resumption of hostilities and disruption of oil exports would only cut the cash lifeline that is indispensable to both governments. India’s strategy of engaging with the Government of Southern Sudan beyond oil\, in the recent years\, may reduce the adverse impacts of a split between the North and South. On India’s stance on the issue\, the paper concludes that India should stand with the international community in assisting with a peaceful and stable transition in Sudan. \nDiscussion\nAmbassador Bhatia stressed the importance for India to play a larger political role in this issue\, in addition to having already established a good economic presence in Sudan. The possibility of Ms. Beri’s analysis being shared and discussed with the Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) was also discussed. Professor Malakar laid out the possible impacts of this referendum including on the ethnic\, religious and social compositions of Sudan. India has in common with Sudan the aspects of cultural divisions and a colonial legacy\, and hence holds the hope that the referendum will be successful. Brig. Dahiya suggested that the paper would benefit from being divided into current and likely developments\, the present state of India’s relations with Sudan\, the present and likely state for Sudan\, and the challenges and opportunities for India. He also observed that inter-Sudan dynamics need to be studied further. Another aspect to consider would be the question of which side the African Union and the Arab League would take on the issue; India might want to take a balanced position and not a very proactive approach so as not to act as an irritant to any side. Brig. Dahiya also pointed out that the possible separation of Sudan would have a great deal of impact on the Darfur issue. Ms. Meena Singh Roy noted that the paper can go further than foreseeing a split\, and lay out options for possible policies that the Indian government can adopt on energy security. She also suggested that the role of non-state actors in a post-referendum Sudan be explored. \nAmbassador Shashank concluded the session by emphasizing that the internal dimension of Sudan (with nine neighboring countries that landlock the country\, each holding its own views on the referendum) has to be brought into the paper\, even though the focus is on the referendum itself and its impact on India. He also suggested that IDSA can follow up on this presentation with a smaller meeting with members working on this issue in the Indian government. \nReport by prepared by Princy Marin George\, Research Assistant\, IDSA. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/sudan-in-transition-implications-for-india CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110114T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110114T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T021456 CREATED:20231223T221038Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T044751Z UID:63609-1294983000-1294983000@idsa.in SUMMARY:China’s Military Diplomacy: Investigating PLA’s Participation in UN Peace Keeping Operations DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nChairperson: Prof. V P DuttDiscussants: Prof Madhu Bhalla and Prof Swaran Singh \n \nIn sharp contrast to its reticence till the 1990s\, the past few years have witnessed a notable increase in the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) engagement with the international armies. At present\, China has military contacts with more than 150 countries. It has set up military attaché offices in 112 countries; and 102 countries have opened military attaché offices in China. During the 11th Five-Year Plan\, the PLA has dispatched\, on average\, more than 170 military delegations to foreign countries and hosted more than 200 military delegations per year. It is in this background\, China’s peaceful military activism in the global arena has attracted considerable academic attention. \nDr Prashant Kumar Singh\, in his presentation\, tried to explore the issue further. At the outset\, he made it clear that the paper was neither meant to derive any sensation from the term “military diplomacy” nor did it intend to produce any sensational research. Instead\, Dr Singh attempted to demystify and simplify the term “military diplomacy”. He attempted to pick up and discuss with the audience\, one of the many functions performed by the PLA. \nDr Singh tried to answer nine broad questions in the paper\, including the rationale\, objectives\, and resources consulted\, the meaning of military diplomacy and its relation with China’s foreign policy\, instruments of China’s military diplomacy and the general trends in China’s participation in UN Peace Keeping (UNPK). \nDr Singh said that China’s actual footprint in UNPK in terms of troop as well as financial contribution is widely considered miniscule. In countering the argument\, he pointed out that China’s participation in UNPK is not an isolated and ignorable feature. It is very much moving in sync with the larger agenda set by the government and its foreign ministry and serving China’s national interests in different ways. \nIt is also in the institutional interests of the PLA that it asks for stronger mandates in UNPK. In times to come\, it may emerge as leader of the UN-commanded peacekeeping missions. \nPoints of discussion: \n\nChina’s position on human rights and humanitarian intervention is in contrast with the ethos of UNPK. How is China addressing the contradiction?\nHow is PLA achieving China’s foreign policy goals through UNPK?\nChina’s is a unique case where three segment; the party\, PLA and the State itself are trying to run their own sets of foreign policy. In that regard\, how is PLA competing with other two segments in promoting its own agenda?\nHow is the world community\, especially the US and India responding to PLAs UNPK operations?\n\nReport prepared by Rahul Mishra\, Research Assistant\, IDSA URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/chinas-military-diplomacy-investigating-plas-participation-in-un-peace-keeping-operations CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110121T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110121T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T021456 CREATED:20231224T103921Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T044429Z UID:64134-1295587800-1295587800@idsa.in SUMMARY:Public Finance\, Deficit Reduction\, and the American Military in an Era of Diminished Resources DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nChairperson: Brig (Retd) Gurmeet KanwalDiscussants: Professor K P Vijay Lakshmi and Brig (Retd) Rahul Bhonsle URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/public-finance-deficit-reduction-and-the-american-military-in-an-era-of-diminished-resources CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110121T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110121T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T021456 CREATED:20231224T104011Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T044257Z UID:64135-1295587800-1295587800@idsa.in SUMMARY:Changing Dynamics of China’s Relationship with Nepal: The post-monarchy period DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nChairperson: Prof. V P DuttDiscussants: Amb. K V Rajan and Amb. T C A Rangachari URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/changing-dynamics-of-chinas-relationship-with-nepal-the-post-monarchy-period CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110125T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110125T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T021456 CREATED:20231224T103921Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T043629Z UID:64133-1295933400-1295933400@idsa.in SUMMARY:Negotiating with Maoists DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nModerator: Dr Arpita AnantDiscussants: Shri Prakash Singh and Shri J N Roy URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/negotiating-with-maoists CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110128T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110128T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T021456 CREATED:20231223T220924Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130245Z UID:63602-1296192600-1296192600@idsa.in SUMMARY:Managing India’s Borders: Lessons from the US Experience DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Shri Naveen Verma\, National Security CouncilDiscussants: Professor Chintamani Mahapatra and Shri K Srinivasan \n \nThe paper focuses on how United States manages its borders through the concept of “smart borders”\, enhanced cross border cooperation with neighbours and utilisation of technological solutions and how far these measures are relevant to India’s approach to border management. Smart Border concept encompasses safe and secure flow of people and goods and improvement of transit infrastructure and cross border cooperation. According to Dr. Das\, border management entails facilitating cross border flows of people and goods while concurrently preventing the entry of persons or goods which pose threat to home territories or population. In this context\, the paper summarizes the Indian approach to border management and American practices to conclude that India’s “security centric” approach should be replaced by “smart border” principle for more fluid borders and increased trade efficiency. \nThe major point of discussion and suggestions to the author: \n\nThe paper has given a new perspective on how traditionally borders are managed in India and the challenges posed by the same.\nExcellent comparison of border management in two largest democracies in the world but respective countries have qualitatively/quantitatively different border issues that has to be borne in mind\, for example drug trafficking and large scale illegal migration is a menace to the US while cross border terrorism is an issue for India. \nIndia’s festering border issues with its neighbours and hostile relations pose security challenge to India’s borders and hence India has to keep “security approach” unlike US that has amiable relations with Canada and Mexico (main countries in focus in the paper). \nPolitical economy of US and South Asia are unique by themselves\, hence the fundamental flaw would be to compare how two countries manage their borders.\nIn Indian Context\, “Smart Border” does not seems to be an ideal concept as long as an unstable region prevails. Basic political dilemmas have to be addressed in the region for further improvement in relations between the countries that will entail better border management in the longer run.\nGreater importance to land border management negates the importance of coastal security\, specially post 26/11 threats that emanate from the coasts. Hence\, a new turf to explore in India’s security ambit.\nRole of individual states in border management needs to be incorporated/ evaluated for a robust border security\nOverall\, a security approach complementary with cooperative approach is in India’s interest\, and not smart border approach. \n\nReport prepared by Anwesha Ray Chaudhuri\, Research Assistant\, IDSA URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/managing-indias-borders-lessons-from-the-us-experience CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110128T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110128T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T021456 CREATED:20231223T220925Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130245Z UID:63603-1296192600-1296192600@idsa.in SUMMARY:The Making of Foreign Policy in Bhutan DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Ambassador I P KhoslaDiscussants: Ambassador Dalip Mehta and Professor Mathew Joseph C \n \nDr. Medha Bisht’s paper focused on Bhutan’s Policy shift over a period of time. In the process of explaining this broad aspect\, she tried to answer questions such as: who are the actors in Bhutan driving foreign policy choices? What are the factors that determine Bhutan’s foreign policy choices? \nThe speaker presented the paper in three broad sections. The first section assessed the basic determinants responsible for influencing or making foreign policy decisions in Bhutan. In this section\, she amplified the role of domestic factors in the making of Bhutan’s foreign policy. She argues that while\, geo-strategic location\, national security and economic engagement have shaped Bhutan’s foreign policy preferences\, the political institutions in Bhutan\, particularly\, Monarchy\, National Assembly\, Royal Advisory Council and Monastic Order are also important attributes shaping its foreign policy decision making. According to the speaker\, among the four political institutions mentioned above\, Monarchy and National Assembly emerged as important institutions in shaping foreign policy decisions. \nIn the second section\, the speaker isolated security\, culture and economy as the factors which have predominantly shaped foreign policy preferences of Bhutan. According to her\, while security had played an important role in shaping Bhutan’s relations with China\, cultural factors had played a significant role in determining Bhutan’s position on negotiating the issue of refugees with Nepal. Economic benefits\, on the other hand\, have played an important role in defining Bhutan’s interaction with India. The speaker however argued that these categories were not distinct in relation to the three countries mentioned above. The thrust of the analysis she argued was to highlight the significance of these three factors as the primary determinants in Bhutan’s foreign policy. \nThe third section identified the possibilities of continuity and change in Bhutan’s foreign policy post 2008. Despite Bhutan’s shift to constitutional monarchy\, the King still holds an important place in deciding Bhutan’s external engagements. While mapping out the pattern of change and continuity in Bhutan’s foreign policy engagement in terms of the determinants\, speaker argued that economic engagements would govern Bhutan’s future foreign policy choices and interactions with China in near future could increase. Regarding the role of political institutions in Bhutan\, National Assembly\, National Council\, Gross National Happiness Commission\, Druk and holding Investments\, Royal Service Commission and Anti Corruption Commission would be potential future players. \nExternal Discussants:\nThe external discussants complimented the presenter for a comprehensive and well researched paper. The first external discussant suggested that the paper would benefit if a background mentioning Bhutan’s opening up to the world through Young Husbands expedition was included. The same discussant also felt that the paper should include a discussion on Bhutan –Britain relationship\, future of Indo-Bhutan relations in the context of China-Bhutan relations\, Bhutan shifting from closed medieval society to a modern society\, opening up of Bhutan to the globalised world\, Bhutan’s relations with P5 and some of the important events such as: Nehru’s visit in 1958. According to the discussant\, the paper gave too much importance on National Assembly\, but during 3rd and 4th King National Assembly was basically a rubber stamp. The same view was also echoed by the second external discussant. According to the second external discussant\, political culture required elaboration. He also suggested the speaker to re-look at her argument that economy determines Indo-Bhutan engagement. \nInternal Discussants:\nThe first internal discussant pointed out that the three determinants isolated by the speaker\, i.e. security\, culture and economy could not be compartmentalized in real sense. Political culture\, mentioned by the speaker was more about citizenship issue than of foreign policy. According to the first internal discussant Bhutan’s Trade relations with Assam needed to be substantiated. The discussant also suggested the presenter to address Bhutan’s reaction to the Chinese presence and recommendation for India. The second internal discussant suggested the speaker to elaborate Bhutan Nepal relations. \nGeneral discussion focused on the following issues:\n\nIndia’s Development Assistance to Bhutan\nManifesto of the ruling and opposition parties on Bhutan’s policy towards China and India\nPresence of religious puzzle in Bhutan\nIndian Army’s OP Task in Bhutan\nAttitude of local people of Bhutan towards India\nBhutanese Diaspora\nClimate Change\,\nBinding factor that keeps Bhutan together\n\nChair’s Comments\nAccording to the chair\, the speaker had made an excellent effort to put the narratives into analytical framework. However\, he felt that the title and contents of the paper did not match. He suggested the speaker to incorporate the comments by the discussants and substantiate them with the application of the Small State theory. \nReport prepared by Gulbin Sultana\, Research Assistant\, IDSA. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-making-of-foreign-policy-in-bhutan CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110211T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110211T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T021456 CREATED:20231223T220838Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130245Z UID:63598-1297402200-1297402200@idsa.in SUMMARY:China’s National Interest DESCRIPTION:Chair: Amd. R. RajagopalanExternal Discussant: Prof. Swaran Singh and Prof. Abanti Bhattacharya \n \nThe paper argues that China’s national interest\, and the strategies that China follows to achieve these\, are intricately linked to its priorities at the domestic level. What China defines as its core national interests are relatively stable\, while the policies which are adopted to achieve these are fluid in nature. According to the author\, Chinese writings show that when there is an expansion of economic interest it invariably leads to an expansion of national interest. She concludes by adding that the relationship between military power and economic development which was emphasized by Deng Xiaoping continues to be important even today. Economic development also features as a ‘constant’ and ‘vital’ interest in the classification of national interests. The author’s concluding argument was that while writings on China’s national interests state that peace and development cannot be de-linked\, clarity should be maintained on the priority between the two\, and development should not be compromised to maintain peace\, as argued by Yan Xuetong. \nThe main points of discussion were: \n\nThere is a need to define national interest and what is included and excluded from the core national interest should also be discussed.\nThere is also a need to differentiate between ‘need’ driven and ‘ambition’ driven national interest. Chinese scholars have also not done much work on this topic.\nThere is a need to locate evolution and fluctuation. How and when the choice between sovereignty and regime security does fluctuate.\nThere is a need to study the overemphasis on culture in the context of China’s national interest.\nThe paper needs to bring out the debates within China and explore how the Chinese conception of the national interest is different from the western conception.\nOne needs to also discuss the understanding of the new generation of leadership and whether evolution of national interest in China is a stable or an unstable concept.\nOne also needs to discuss whether national interest is a bourgeoisie concept and discuss the changes after the military modernization and the increase in Chinese confidence.\nIt was suggested that the author could discuss the changes within the concept after the rise of China and the difference between present national interest and future national interest.\nThere is a need to examine the connection between domestic issues and developments and the changes in the concept of national interest.\n One also needs to define peripheral and global interests and the connection between national interest and diplomacy.\n\nReport prepared by Gunjan Singh\, Research Assistant\, IDSA URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/chinas-national-interest CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110211T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110211T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T021456 CREATED:20231223T220924Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130245Z UID:63599-1297402200-1297402200@idsa.in SUMMARY:US Aid to Pakistan: Changing Rules of Engagement and Regional Implications DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Dr G BalachandranDiscussants: Capt (IN) Alok Bansal and Dr Harinder Sekhon \n \nDr Priyanka Singh’s present study focuses primarily on the prevailing dynamics and complexities of US aid to Pakistan\, from an Indian perspective. The key issue that she tried to address in her paper was the lack of a synchronised and substantiated Indian perspective on US aid to Pakistan and its implications for the regional security. \nThe presenter argued that since the inception of US-Pakistan relations\, aid\, both military and non-military\, has been the key instrument of US policy towards Pakistan. However\, the history of US aid to Pakistan shows that the flow and quantum of the aid has been intermittent. Nonetheless\, aid to Pakistan has been subject to geo-strategic challenges which threatened the US interests in the region time and again. After 9/11\, the US has flooded huge aid into Pakistan to meet its objectives\, both in Afghanistan and in Pakistan. \nShe noted that in the post 9/11 era\, the main objectives of US aid to Pakistan are to strengthen Pakistan’s capacity for counterterrorism operations\, help it to prevent the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction\, support it in the development of a moderate\, democratic and civilian government in Pakistan. However\, the author felt that because of the absence of clearly defined objectives on how to utilize the US aid has led to mismanagement and augmented complacency in Pakistan’s government. Pakistan relentlessly forestalled decisive action against the Taliban and al Qaeda inside its territory despite receiving billions in aid since 2001. Consequently\, the March 2009 Interagency White Paper outlining US future strategy on Afghanistan-Pakistan enunciated a new course for US aid in the region. It stated that assistance to Afghanistan and Pakistan should be aligned with United States core goals and objectives and that assistance would be limited without the achievement of results. It also stressed on capacity building of the governments in these countries as a measure to arrive at preferred goals. In addition\, the US also made fundamental changes in its subsequent aid policies towards Pakistan such as through the PEACE Act which granted $ 7.5 billion to Pakistan by placing more drivers for better usage of its aid. \nThe author said that the ongoing discourse in the US on Pakistan’s accountability regarding usage of US aid somehow converges with India’s long held view that aid is being pumped into terror infested Pakistan at the cost of regional security environment. The US aid policy towards Pakistan is also known to lack a coherent strategy being too security centric\, with very little proportions of it reaching the masses out there. In this scenario\, US faces the dilemma of having to increase the aid despite knowing that it may not achieve its desired ends. \nTherefore\, there are fundamental problems in administering US assistance to Pakistan. According to Dr. Singh\, the important problems among them are the constraints within USAID in staff and resources which are vital to timely and just distribution of the funds and constraints in free and safe movement across Pakistan; more aid than what can be effectively absorbed by local institutions; the case of aid failing to reach the deserving sections of Pakistani society leads to anti-Americanism in Pakistan; lack of outreach and failure of US aid to generate goodwill; resistance to various conditions in US aid policy towards Pakistan; lack of visibility and the ratio of success; lack of transparency in US Pakistan dealings and dearth of support systems to conduct monitoring and oversight of aid. \nImplications for India: The author pointed out two important dimensions: first\, the US military aid comprising conventional weapons which are of little use in counterinsurgency operations and are borne with the possibility of being used against India; and\, second\, the non-military assistance and its role in Pakistan’s nation building in terms of a stable and peaceful neighbourhood has a direct bearing on the region and India in particular. According to her\, another argument on India’s security concerns stems from “asymmetric warfare” noted to be a principal tool of Pakistan’s foreign policy. \nAssessing the US aid policy in Pakistan\, she said that huge aid and redemption from several debts has helped Pakistan save itself from an economic breakdown and the resistance that Pakistan security forces offer to the Taliban in their territory which avoided a security breakdown. However\, the author was of the view that any US military aid to Pakistan would be self defeating as this would quietly be absorbed by the Pakistan army. Therefore\, she stressed that there is a need to reconfigure and reorient military assistance to Pakistan driving it more towards counterterrorism and counter insurgency. Finally\, she suggested that US policies should direct the process of managing aid judiciously only on long term basis and it needs to make a modest and a coherent start to initiate measures of checks and balances. \nMajor Points of Discussion and Suggestions:\n\nRelationship between countries based on shared interests and values last long whereas US-Pakistan relations are based on interest which is transient.\nThe US thinks that aid to Pakistan provides leverage. However\, aid to Pakistan has not brought stability in Pakistan and it is now a failed state. \nUS drone attacks in Pakistan\, critical role of Pakistan media\, and various conditions that are attached to aid has led to anti-Americanism. However\, Pakistan still holds centrality in United States global war on terrorism. \nUS aid policy should aim at stopping the radical idea in Pakistan and should encourage moderate forces for forming a democratic and stable government. This could help Pakistan to fight against Taliban and al Qaeda.\nPakistan’s huge procurement of conventional military aid from US like F16s is surely going to be used against India and these are not going to be used against al Qaeda and Taliban.\n\nThe US aid policy has not succeeded in strengthening liberal forces in Pakistan and instead the radical forces are increasing. Moreover\, the crumbling state structures in Pakistan would have serious regional implications. \nThe author needs to provide a historical background of US aid policy towards Pakistan to clearly reflect issues relating to it. During the post-World War II period\, the role of US industrial-military complex should be discussed in the context of US aid policy.\nPakistan became one of the earliest allies of US by joining CEATO and CENTO in early 1950s and received huge military aid from the US. The geo-strategic significance of Pakistan to US during the Cold War period also needs to be dealt with. The US threat perception from the USSR and China also need to be considered in the aid policy. In the past\, however\, US manipulated aid policy to achieve its self interests. \nThe author needs to discuss and highlight about the rationale behind the fundamental changes in recent US aid policy towards Pakistan and new rules of engagement. The author also needs to consult more Pakistan government sources and Pakistani writings. \nThe US aid policy was very successful immediately after the 9/11 war – especially in the war against Taliban and al Qaeda. However\, issues such as changing the mindset of Pakistan extremists\, bringing peace and stability\, and establishing moderate and democratic government in Pakistan came later where it is not successful. \nThe role of US congressional oversight\, especially the role of Department of Defence\, Department of State\, defence committees\, foreign relations committees and various standing committees in the US aid policy need to be discussed and mentioned in the paper for providing a clear and detailed analysis of the US aid policy towards Pakistan.\n\nReport prepared by Dr Saroj Bishoyi\, Research Assistant\, IDSA URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/us-aid-to-pakistan-changing-rules-of-engagement-and-regional-implications CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110225T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110225T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T021456 CREATED:20231223T220838Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130245Z UID:63594-1298611800-1298611800@idsa.in SUMMARY:The Salience of Interdependence in India China Economic Relations\, 1992 -2008 DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Professor V P DuttDiscussants: Shri Ravi Bhoothalingam & Dr Partha Mukhopadhyay \n \nThe paper attempted to answer 3 key questions: \n\nWhat has been the quality and content of trade and investment (beyond an ostensible focus on nominal values) in the India-China dyad?\nHas high “economic interaction” translated to operationalization of “economic interdependence” in the India-China dyad? \nHow could the economic partnership be steered to create “constraint interdependence”?\n\nThe author organized his argument by re-visiting the scholarship on economic interdependence in International Relations theory\, recounting the “Liberal” versus “Realist” prioritization of trade and its relationship with conflict. He outlined the framework that he employed in his study (Crescenzi’s Exit cost-Exit threshold model)\, which deals more directly with the issue of opertionalization of interdependence\, and applied the same to the India-China dyad (focusing chiefly on India’s chief product export in its trade basket with China – Iron Ore). He went on identify the key impediments to engendering further interdependence from the Indian and Chinese side using case analyses of Chinese investment in India (telecom sector)\, and impediments to India’s export expansion (pharma sector) in China. \nBy examining key phases of the trade and investment patterns\, the author argued that operationalization of interdependence was discernible in this dyad post-2004 i.e. the costs incurred by each state (both China and India) to remove itself from the dyad to have increased post-2004\, while much of the earlier phase represented economic interaction which\, unlike economic interdependence\, was relatively costless to change. In particular\, he drew out a schema which applied the Crescenzian framework for India-China economic interdependence to reflect different equilibria obtained in various phases of economic interaction\, and argued that the relationship had moved away from “escalation” (high-level conflict; 1949-1992)\, and was currently moving towards the second notional form of “bargaining equilibrium (1st notional form 1992-2004; post-2004 moves towards second notional form). The author concluded by outlining five key recommendations\, which could steer the relationship towards some sort of “constraint equilibrium” in the future (when economic interdependence constrains the behavior of “challengers”\, and ultimately induces partners to eschew conflict scenarios)\, and argued that the interim of the next 3-4 decades were crucial for India to shape its economic relationship with China. By employing the framework of exit costs and exit threshold\, the author argued that an increasing focus on core sectors of competence could be obtained\, which becomes instrumental in teasing out a more complex understanding of when economic interdependence constrains states from entering into high levels of political conflict. \nDiscussants’ comments\nEXTERNAL\na) Ravi Bhoothalingam [former President\, The Oberoi Group of Hotels; former Director of ITC Limited\, Calcutta]\nMr Bhoothalingam welcomed the approach in the paper viz analysis at the dyadic level\, and pointed out that such an approach brought into focus similar complexities and patterns that were discernible in other dyads (China-Japan\, China-Korea\, China-Taiwan and even China-US) which made the study of economic interdependence and conflict in the India-China dyad more relevant. He pointed out\, however\, that dyadic relationships also exhibited the mathematical “step-function” phenomena\, wherein the economic relationship and political relationship were interrupted by a plateau (citing India-China relations improving until the 1998 nuclear tests\, then exhibiting a plateau where accusations of Chinese goods harming Indian manufacturing were rife owing to business pressure\, followed again by the rising curve of improved bilateral interaction in 2003 and thereonwards). This according to him was demonstrative of the absence of linearity in the economic and political trajectories in a relationship. He identified institutional support as a key factor missing in the Indian approach to dealing with China (knowledgebase\, language capacity\, Joint-research avenues) even as several complementarities existed (entertainment\, education\, consulting\, Infrastructure\, among others) for both countries to build on the relationship. \nb) Dr Partha Mukhopadhyay [Economist\, currently working as Senior Research Fellow with the Centre for Policy Research in New Delhi]\nDr Mukhopadhyay complimented the organization of the argument employed by the author in his paper by applying a framework on the operationalization of interdependence\, focusing on sectoral evidence to support the claim\, and identifying the problem areas. He\, however\, pointed out that the framework could be expanded further to explain the switch in “bargaining” outcomes\, which was also possible (economic payoffs reflecting the switch in “target” and “challenger”). He wanted the author to incorporate the authors’ personal experiences in China in the introduction segment\, and cited the need to update the segment on the healthcare and pharma sector with primary data\, and summarise individual segments in the paper by reverting to the framework employed in the study for conciseness. He felt that disaggregating the hurdles (for instance Indian entry into the active pharmaceutical ingredients’ space\, use of guanxi by Chinese telecom companies\, China’s employment challenges\, etc) would bring further clarity on the challenges that lie ahead in the relationship. \nINTERNAL\na) Dr R. N. Das \nDr Das complimented the author on the paper. He suggested the need to restructure the introduction to reflect the dyadic focus and framework at the outset of the study. In its present structure\, the paper outlines the debate in IR\, which\, according to him\, could be preceded by the restructured introduction. He also pointed out the need to update some references and citations. \nb) Dr. G. Balachandran\nDr Balachandran felt that the two notional forms suggested in the “bargaining equilibrium” status of the Crescenzian framework (original framework) were conflicting\, and that the measurement of “exit cost thresholds” was problematic. According to him\, an entire of set of vectors for goods in the bilateral trade basket should be employed\, to ultimately arrive at a unique scalar. Due to these methodological issues in the original framework\, he found a disconnect between segment 1 of the paper (where the author outlines the framework) and the remaining 4 segments of the paper weak (application of the framework to the India-China dyad). The latter 4 segments\, he clarified\, did stand outstandingly well\, but it was the connection from the 1st to the remaining 4 segments which was problematic\, according to Dr Balachandran. \nThe author clarified that the Crescenzian framework was being applied in the India-China context only with respect to the largest trade category reflected in top export commodity and top import commodity\, and that the paper was not trying to generate a metric of interdependence based on ‘n’- number of goods\, which could be a task of future research. The author acknowledged the need to strengthen the connection between segment 1 and the remaining 4 segments in terms of outlining the Crescenzian framework with the necessary caveats. \nThis was followed by the Q&A segment saw deliberations from the audience on issues such as the interplay of dyadic analysis and the “globalised” world at the systemic level\, concerns on China’s intentions\, effect of interdependence on “core” political concerns\, among other issues. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-salience-of-interdependence-in-india-china-economic-relations-1992-2008 CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110225T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110225T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T021456 CREATED:20231223T220838Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130245Z UID:63595-1298611800-1298611800@idsa.in SUMMARY:India and Iran's Nuclear Issue 2002-2010: Strategic Autonomy\, Regional Stability\, National Security DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Ambassador Arundhati GhoseDiscussants: Ambassador K C Singh & Professor P R Kumaraswamy \n \nRajiv began his presentation by delineating the theme of his paper. In the introduction\, he noted that given the fact that Iran is part of India’s extended strategic neighbourhood\, the Iranian nuclear issue has generated a lot of ‘heat and dust’. He pointed out that the aim of his paper is to distil the Indian government’s policy as well as the nature of the debates in India regarding the Iranian nuclear issue. In this regard\, three broad themes can be discerned in the Indian reactions to the Iranian nuclear issue: ‘Strategic autonomy’ as it relates to India’s foreign policy decision making;’ Regional stability’ as it relates to events in its “proximate neighbourhood”\, the term used by India’s Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao; and ‘National security’ implications on account of operative clandestine proliferation networks. \nRajiv noted that strategic autonomy has been and continues to be a cardinal ordering principle of India’s foreign policy practise\, as Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Sign has called it an ‘article of faith” for India. On the Iran nuclear issue\, India had to take positions at multi-lateral forums like the IAEA and UNSC since the issue was becoming internationalised. While explaining the Government of India’s position on Iran issue\, Rajiv noted that India is walking a tightrope. India voted against Iran at IAEA. However\, India also supported diplomacy and consultations at multilateral forums where initiatives were undertaken to find solutions to the Iranian nuclear impasse. Apart from these efforts\, India did profess its intention to act as a conduit to help in the resolution of the issue. He noted that in August 2005\, for instance\, in reply to a Lok Sabha debate on his visit to the United States\, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh pointed out that India could act as a “bridge reconciling differences between Iran and the other country”. \nRajiv noted that on the domestic front\, the left parties were against India’s decision to vote against Iran at the IAEA. While BJP was not against the Indian decision per se\, but it was critical of the government for its manner of dealing with the Iranian issue. He noted that the US factor has been crucial in India’s Iran policy. Ahead of the second IAEA vote\, then US Ambassador to India David Mulford had warned that the Indo-US nuclear deal could “die” and US congress would “simply stop considering the matter” if India did not vote against Iran at the IAEA. \nDiscussing regional strategic stability\, he pointed out that implications on the regional stability of the possible presence of another additional nuclear weapon power in India’s ‘proximate’ neighbourhood have figured prominently in Indian considerations. Citing several statements by Indian officials\, he noted that Indian policy makers were wary or pessimistic about the possibility of another nuclear weapon power in their ‘proximate’ neighbourhood. Mentioning about India’s proliferation pessimism\, Rajiv noted that India’s pessimism does not seem to be embedded in fears about weak Iranian nuclear organisations but due to the impact on regional security of the spread of sensitive technologies and capabilities. \nWhile discussing about national security imperatives\, Rajiv noted that Iran-Pakistan linkages on nuclear linkages have been revealed by IAEA reports. It stretches as far as back 1987\, with Iran informing the IAEA in October 2003 that it received “drawings of the centrifuge through a foreign intermediary”. These linkages were highlighted again when in Mach 2010\, the Washington Post revealed Pakistani government complicity in giving Iran “bomb-related drawings\, parts for centrifuges to purify uranium and a secret worldwide list of suppliers.” This information has been reportedly found in a 11-page document written by A. Q. Khan. \nIn conclusion\, Rajiv noted that in the Indian responses to the Iranian nuclear issue\, the most important factor has been the issue of independence in Indian foreign policy decisions making\, specifically as it related to interactions with the United States. He\, however\, noted that despite hiccups on account of the nuclear question\, there has been a steady stream of interactions at the highest levels between India and Iran\, including the conduct of strategic dialogues. He pointed out that the next one or two years could be crucial with regard to Iran’s nuclear weapons programme\, and suggested that India’s diplomatic efforts should be focussed on reducing the range of ‘unsatisfactory strategies’ (NSA Shivshankar Menon’s term describing US options vis-a-vis Iran in a Wikileaks cable) and expand the space for the application of ‘satisfactory strategies”. He noted that Indian diplomacy has its task cut out\, especially as these two years coincide with its non-permanent membership in the UNSC. \nPoints raised during discussion\n\nIt is a very well researched paper. However\, author needs to explore the Indian dilemma while analysing India’s Iran policy.\nIndia came close to Iran when Taliban captured Afghanistan but now situation has changed. Iran has been involved in creeping nuclear proliferation activities. The United States has gone after Iran. Iranians wanted to buy time aimed at tiring out the United States. Since India wants closer cooperation with the United States\, it would be worth looking at whether India could have handled Iran policy differently. Was there any alternate way available? \nEarlier Iran was preachy to India with regard to nuclear non-proliferation since it is a NPT signatory and India is not. But Iran was not satisfied as India got several benefits without being a member of the non-proliferation regime which Iran could not get despite being a signatory. On nuclear issue\, India has never agreed with Iran. \nIndia’s Iran policy during UPA-I was different from that being followed by the UPA-II government. \nEvery nation calls itself strategically autonomous. In fact strategic autonomy is a very relative concept. No nation is fully autonomous\, not even the United States.\nIndia cannot be a bridge. To be a bridging power\, a nation needs to be between the two sides. Dealing with the Iranians is very difficult. India should not attempt to be a bridge as it could be knocked out by either side while attempting to play that role. To be a bridge\, we must understand the fundamental problems of both sides. There is a need to look whether there is convergence of interest. \nAuthor needs to explore whether there is any strategic autonomy in India with regards to Iran. He needs to take a step further. He needs to critically examine the statements given by Prime minister and other documents and take his own stand. \nThe LNG deal went through problems after New Delhi signed the energy deal with Tehran. Where did India go wrong?\nChina supported the UN sanctions against Iran. While analysing the domestic debate\, there is need to look at whether this reflected on the positions taken by the left parties in India. \nSouth Asia is a strategic liability for India whereas West Asia is an opportunity. Iran is very important for India because of its energy resources. \nThere are non-parallel interests involved in India-Iran ties. On energy issue\, India wants cooperation with Iran while on nuclear issue India is opposed to Iran’s nuclear programme.\nAuthor has structured the paper very well. However\, paper needs to be more focused with regard to its objectives. \nAuthor needs to look at whether there is any divide between government and influential groups such as media\, think tanks\, etc. Is there any government stand on regional stability? \nIn the paper\, strategic autonomy has been dealt at significant length but regional stability and regional security have been given less coverage. The paper may need some restructuring in order to make it appear even. \nThere is a need to examine what a nuclear Iran would mean for India’s national security interests. \nIt is also necessary to look at the role of minority politics in India while understanding the domestic political debate in India vis-à-vis Iran. \nThanking the speakers for their useful comments and suggestions\, Rajiv noted that the Iran issue is over shadowed by the US factor. Iran could be a major worrying point in the future of India-United States relations. He noted that keeping in mind the prescribed word limit\, he would incorporate these suggestions as much as possible. \n\nReport is prepared by Sanjeev Kumar Shrivastava\, Researcher at IDSA. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/india-and-irans-nuclear-issue-2002-2010-strategic-autonomy-regional-stability-national-security CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110304T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110304T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T021456 CREATED:20231223T220738Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130244Z UID:63590-1299216600-1299216600@idsa.in SUMMARY:Evolution of Sri Lanka’s Counter Insurgency Strategy 2002-2009 DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Maj Gen Dhruv C Katoch\, SM\, VSM (Retd)Discussants: Shri N Manoharan & Shri M R Narayan Swamy \nHemantha Dayaratne’s paper focuses on the Sri Lanka’s counterinsurgency campaign against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). In his view\, the military strategy adopted by the Sri Lankan army offers an example for other countries facing similar internal challenges. He discusses the fragile peace process started in 2002 and critically analyses the role played by Norway in facilitating the process. Dayaratne argues that Norwegian facilitation could not achieve the desired result because: i) of Norway’s inability to inspire the confidence of Sri Lankan Government and its efforts to equate the government with a terrorist organization (LTTE); ii) lack of sincerity on the part of the LTTE\, which used the ceasefire to strengthen itself; iii) differences between then prime minister Ranil Wickramsinghe and then president Chandrika Kumaratunga. Moreover\, Norway was partial towards the LTTE which made the latter even more inflexible. Thus\, the peace process did not succeed. \nAfter Rajapakse’s election as president\, the LTTE launched several attacks\, which forced the government to undertake military action. For its part\, the Sri Lankan government took advantage of the division within LTTE (Karuna’s defection) and through an innovative strategy pushed the LTTE into a small area created by the army called the “no fire zone”. This strategy helped defeat the LTTE. The US war on terror post 9/11 also provided an opportune moment for all out military action against the terrorist group\, LTTE. Dayaratne also states that in this operation preventive measures were taken by the Sri Lankan government to guard against civilian casualties and human rights abuses. He concludes that the failure of the Norwegian Peace Process\, the use of military force and the overall strategy of the Sri Lankan government was entirely judicious and led to a successful campaign \nThe major points of discussion and suggestions to the author were: \n\nExcellent account of the COIN strategy applied by the military and of the Norwegian Peace Process\, but could have been more detailed in terms of providing an insider’s view of the whole process that led to the dismantling of the LTTE.\nThough mainly expressing author’s personal experience \, the paper could have attempted to establish links between the actual evolution of Sri Lanka’s military and COIN Strategy and diplomatic aspects of the process.\nNorway has been singularly blamed for the failure of the peace process without taking into account intrinsic factors like LTTE’s arrogance in the political sphere\, India’s role in neutralizing LTTE camps\, and the fracture in LTTE’s top echelons. \nOne important detail that is missing in the paper is LTTE leader Prabhakaran’s role in the defeat of the outfit\, committing blunders like killing of Indian Prime minister Rajiv Gandhi which led to India’s non-intervention\nThe role of navy and air force both of which had a major contribution in the operations have been overlooked. \nDisparity of information regarding human rights abuses is evident in the paper. \nCOIN campaign can be said to have been successful only if the root causes have been addressed\, which the paper does not mention.\nNot viable to use as a lesson / example of successful COIN strategy for other battlefields like Kashmir\, Afghanistan\, etc. as these cannot be isolated like Sri Lanka.\n\nReport prepared by Anwesha Ray Chaudhuri\, Research Assistant\, IDSA URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/evolution-of-sri-lankas-counter-insurgency-strategy-2002-2009 CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110304T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110304T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T021456 CREATED:20231223T220738Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130245Z UID:63591-1299216600-1299216600@idsa.in SUMMARY:Insider Threat: The New Nuclear Danger DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Ambassador Arundhati GhoseDiscussants: Dr Sitakanta Mishra and Dr Aditi Malhotra \nDr Reshmi Kazi introduced the paper by saying that the danger of insider threats is emerging as the new nuclear threat and the risk of insider threats is invariably linked with terrorists seeking fissile materials to build a nuclear device. In the present paper\, Dr Kazi aimed to analyse the severity of the danger of insider threats. She also tried to address the motivating factors that are greatly responsible for giving rise to potential insider risk to a nuclear establishment. \nDefining the insider threat\, Dr Kazi said that the risk of insider threat is present in all organisations. The potential of this threat lies in the act of a trusted employee who might betray his allegiances and obligations to his employer and cause damage or espionage against the employer or the organisation. Moreover\, access of all people without adequate identification to an organization’s critical facilities increases the chances of potential insider threat to the infrastructure. \nShe pointed out three categories of actors from which there is the risk of insider betrayals: a) psychologically-impaired disgruntled or alienated employees; b) ideological or religious radicals; and c) criminals. She indicated that a trusted employee can develop a malicious intent due to various factors such as vengeance for a seeming wrong; radicalisation for advancement or religious or ideological objectives; and simple unlawful financial gain. Individuals are also motivated to malicious actions because of the growing\, exacerbated or unaddressed discontent with their place or value in the organisation; recruitment by hostile outside entities or groups; infiltration of a malicious actor to a trusted position on an infrastructure operator’s staff; and nuclear industry is affected by workplace trends that currently indicate there will be fewer jobs in the future\, and individuals who are employed will be required to have greater technical skills. However\, according to Dr Kazi\, insider betrayals may not necessarily be from individuals who have been directly affected by discontent or perceived injustice from within the organisation. There might also exist within the category of active insiders\, a subset of unwitting or passive insiders. \nBy highlighting the future trends and the danger of insider threats\, the presenter said that the world of nuclear weapons is expected to gradually undergo revolutionary changes in the coming decades since the nuclear world is surrounded with debates relating to nuclear disarmament\, revamp of the nuclear industry\, emergence of new nuclear states\, rising proliferation\, and spread of nuclear energy. She assumed that the world of nuclear weapons will undergo transformation that will impact issues relating to nuclear weapons in the future which might increase the risk of potential insider threats. \nOn Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme and the severity of the danger of insider threats\, the author stated that in Pakistan there is a strong possibility of insider threats. Quoting David Albright\, she said\, “Pakistan tends to leak vital nuclear information. It’s the nature of the system.” She also cited the famous A Q Khan case which bears testimony to the proliferation of sensitive nuclear technology to several countries and also demonstrates the poor security culture of the state. In addition\, the risk of insider threats is further compounded by a rising wave of Islamist and anti-Western sympathies within Pakistan army and the ISI. \nReferring to some of the recent incidences of insider threats like a group of peace activists’ security breach at Kleine-Brogel Airbase in Belgium in February 2010\, four armed men’s security breach into the Pelindaba nuclear facility in Pretoria in November 2007 etc.\, the presenter said that the case of AQ Khan perhaps posed the greatest insider threat when he was able to proliferate centrifuges\, nuclear technology and blueprints to Iran\, Libya\, and North Korea. She pointed out that the danger of insider threat is a global problem which has to be addressed by all the leading partners of the international community. The presenter felt that it was important for the nuclear institutions and organisations to become wiser to the tactics of potential insiders. While taking adequate steps to secure fissile materials worldwide\, substantial efforts must be made to overhaul the personal reliability programme\, which must transcend beyond merely evaluating the suitability of bodyguards to the management of expanding stockpile of nuclear materials and weapons. \nAs part of this comprehensive effort\, she also recommended suggestions for more safety and security of nuclear reactors. Some of the important recommendations in managing the insider threats are: stabilise the economic status of the nuclear personnel in order to prevent nuclear scientists\, engineers\, workers and guards from stealing nuclear weapons and materials or selling nuclear knowledge; redirect the aging workforce into civil nuclear programmes and thereby provide them alternative employment; expand capabilities of nuclear forensics\, police force and human intelligence to intercept nuclear thieves; strengthening international nuclear emergency search and response capabilities etc. \nIn conclusion\, she said that the danger of insider threat must be managed with intelligence\, process\, and technology through a defence-in-depth strategy. If the systems are maintained according to the security configurations necessary\, duties are segregated\, accounts and passwords are controlled\, and employees are made aware that their actions are being logged and monitored\, there is less likelihood of a disgruntled employee attempting the unwanted activity. \nMajor Points of Discussion and Suggestions:\n\nThe other aspects of insider threats could have been mentioned. \nInternational Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) identified insider threats as violent and non-violent insiders. Violent insiders are active insider threats.\nThe paper could have dealt with the case of North Korea in greater detail and linking with security threat as its nuclear programme is not indigenous.\nIslamisation of Pakistan Army and the deeply religious mindset of the nuclear scientists further compound the danger of insider threats.\nAn insider threat who works with outsiders would pose the most dangerous threat. This dander is also emerging as a new nuclear threat linked with terrorism. \nThe various insider threats should have been further researched in a greater detail and explained.\nWhat are the potential threats to nuclear reactors and what are the nuclear protection safeguard measures have been taken to protect from insider threats? \nThere are a number of international treaties which are responsible for safeguarding nuclear reactors but what the domestic laws and measures exist in this regard.\nThe author has mentioned about various insider threats who are working in different countries like Pakistan\, Iran\, North Korea etc but is there any cross connection? Instead of working on larger issues the author could have been focused on specific issues\, for instance\, the case of Pakistan could have been studied in more details. Perhaps\, the author was trying to do exactly that.\nIs there any possibility for Taliban or extremists getting access to nuclear devices? For small terrorist groups getting access to nuclear devices or weapons and exploding them are not possible. \nAn accident is not an insider threat. If one intents to use sensitive nuclear devices for sabotage\, proliferation and terrorist activity can be said as insider threat. \nIt was suggested that the author needed to clearly define insider threat in order to be able to deal with the issue in a comprehensive manner. Before writing the paper\, the author also needs to visit the places to observe and find out how various reactors are operating\, how they are safeguarded and to note where insider threats can come from.\n\nReport prepared by Dr Saroj Bishoyi\, Research Assistant\, IDSA URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/insider-threat-the-new-nuclear-danger CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110318T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110318T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T021456 CREATED:20231223T220723Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250316T233241Z UID:63586-1300426200-1300426200@idsa.in SUMMARY:Playing ‘catch up’: Japan’s foreign policy towards India – a case of delayed realism DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Dr Rajaram PandaDiscussants: Professor K V Kesavan and Professor Srabani Roy Choudhury \nThe author tried to demonstrate Japan’s approach to India using the three characteristics that she perceived to be the central determinants of policy: 1) the international geopolitical structure\, 2) elite perceptions and dominant norms\, and 3) commercial and economic diplomacy. Through these variables one can see a ‘creeping realism’ in Japan’s India policy\, which the paper demonstrated with two examples\, economic policy and nuclear energy policy. \nNeoclassical realism best explains Japan’s external policy since it allows for a balance between the international structure and domestic variables as against classical realism which is centred on structure alone. Both anarchy as well as domestic considerations of anti-nuclearism have guided Japanese foreign policy. \nPolicy determinants\nThe Role of the US has been central in the post-WW II Japanese policy. Since US-Japan relations were strong in the Cold War days\, India-Japan political relations remained weak. In the recent past\, among other factors\, the US’ endorsement of Indian nuclear policy through the nuclear deal has altered the Japanese policy. The changed Japanese approach to India was a by-product of the post 9/11 US policy in South Asia. \nRise of China is the other important variable in the current Japanese policy. Japan partnered in the Chinese economy because it thought that this will help ameliorate bilateral political relations. However\, recent instances have proved otherwise. Despite security assurances from the US\, the Asian power shift has Japan worried and hence Japan is looking for stronger relations with democratic countries in Asia. Even the hefty increase in the recently announced Chinese defence budget has raised a few eyebrows in Japan. \nJapan’s Policy towards India\na) Economic Interests: Japanese foreign policy has for many years been centred on economic diplomacy. It has served Japanese interests well and is the dominant determinant of Japan’s India policy. However\, economic relations have been weak due to a lot of reasons and there is much scope to improve economic ties. Japan’s economic interest began to accelerate in the mid-2000s\, following the 2003 BRIC report on India’s emerging power status. Sino-Japanese tensions at about the same time provided another impetus. The Japanese private sector for its part looked to diversify by engaging other economies and reducing its dependence on China.\nAmong other factors\, South Korea’s economic success in India following an early initiative might have also prodded Japan. The recently signed CEPA aims to accelerate India-Japan economic ties and pave the way for projects like DMRC. \nb) Nuclear Cooperation: In recent times\, Japan has been forced to play ‘catch up’ so as not to miss out on India’s nuclear energy market. Anti-nuclearism has been an integral part of Japanese policy since it is the only victim of nuclear weapons. Therefore\, Japan’s response to the 1998 tests was among the most severe. Strong domestic public opinion and domestic politics also guided Japanese policy. However\, today\, policymakers do acknowledge that their reaction might have been too harsh. \nNonetheless\, nuclear energy cooperation might be the next major development in India-Japan relations. Increasing crude prices and fears of global warming have revived the nuclear energy debate and thus Japan has been forced to rethink its approach to nuclear cooperation especially given that it has been internationalizing its nuclear industry. Also\, the lucrative energy infrastructure markets abroad might help the revival of Japanese economy. South Korea’s success in this regard might again work as a push factor for Japan. The recent belief in Japan that India’s incorporation into the non-proliferation regime might help control India through further conditions and would allow Japan to monitor Indian policy by participation rather than by abstention might be the ultimate indicator of the policy shift in Japan. There is also an economic component in terms of revenues for participating Japanese companies. Japan was\, however\, likely to draw out negotiations in order to satisfy its domestic audience which is opposed to the deal due to India’s non-membership of NPT. Despite that\, the author felt that the India-Japan nuclear energy deal could be inked as early as in the next two years. But she added the Fukushima crisis could have its impact on the process. \nIn conclusion\, the author argued that the above mentioned factors have contributed to the increasing realist Japanese stance towards India. CEPA and the civilian nuclear energy deal are the drivers of the new Japanese policy which aims at achieving congruence through the development of ‘shared interests’ if not ‘shared values’. Japan is slowly modifying its idealistic stance on nuclear issues in the wake of geopolitical changes. The rise of China is only one of the factors of the new Japanese policy and certainly not its central feature. \nMajor Points of Discussion and Suggestions:\n\nThere is a mutual appreciation of each other’s role in the new Asian order that brings India and Japan closer.\nThere is a need for some details about the history of India-Japan bilateral relations. Japan has followed an independent policy towards India and it has not necessarily been a consequence of the US policy.\nThe author should also include a discussion on the Declaration on Security Cooperation and the subsequent Action Plan along with CEPA. The former will have a bigger impact on India Japan relations.\nThe arguments can be substantiated using trade data. CEPA will open the door for smaller companies which have been absent in India Japan trade relations. However\, how CEPA unfolds post Tsunami remains to be seen.\nNuclear cooperation and competition for permanent UNSC seat are related\, how they develop will be interesting.\nNeoclassical realism needs to be fully utilized as a framework. Domestic consumption can be considered as one important factor under this framework. Timeframe would validate the argument more succinctly.\nThe author should clarify whether it’s delayed realism or reluctant realism on the part of Japan.\nThere needs to be more focus on Indian writings on the subject.\nIn 1998\, Japan was hurt more because of the Indian tests because it had more expectations from India than from Pakistan.\nBilateral maritime cooperation is equally important as nuclear cooperation\, and the author needs to include some discussion on that.\n\nReport prepared by Avinash Godbole\, RA\, IDSA URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/playing-catch-up-japans-foreign-policy-towards-india-a-case-of-delayed-realism CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110318T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110318T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T021456 CREATED:20231224T103810Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T043244Z UID:64124-1300426200-1300426200@idsa.in SUMMARY:Bangladesh- Northeast India- Myanmar: the connectivity corridor DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nChairperson: Professor Partho GhoshDiscussants: Dr Ram Upendra Das and Dr Nitya Nanda URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/bangladesh-northeast-india-myanmar-the-connectivity-corridor CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110325T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110325T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T021456 CREATED:20231223T220638Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250316T235946Z UID:63582-1301031000-1301031000@idsa.in SUMMARY:India-Japan Economic Relations: Focus on the DMIC DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Professor V P Dutt\nDiscussant: Professor Mohammad Badrul Alam \n \nThe broad theme of Dr. Rajaram Panda’s presentation was India-Japan economic relations\, while the key focus was on the Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor (DMIC). At the outset\, he made it clear that the paper would not attempt to examine India-Japan economic relations in detail\, but only examine the development of the Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor project since it is “singularly going to dramatically transform the complexion of India-Japan economic ties in the coming two decades.” \nThe DMIC is a hugely ambitious development project on either side of the Dedicated Freight Corridor (DFC) of the Indian Ministry of Railways with a band of 150-200 kms. It was conceptualised as a global investment and manufacturing destination with emphasis on expanding the manufacturing and services base\, and establish DMIC as the global manufacturing and trading hub. The project\, according to Dr. Panda\, “is going to catapult the bilateral relations to a level that will be the envy of other nations in Asia.” \nCalling DMIC “a unique application of the Public Private Partnership approach to infrastructural development in India\,” Dr Panda added that a holistic approach towards the bilateral relationship is required to reap the benefits of the partnership. In that regard\, materialisation of CEPA (Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement) will strengthen the DMIC\, and India-Japan ties as well. \nPoints of discussion\n\nWhile considering the advantages of DMIC\, the government cannot afford to overlook issues such as land acquisition\, adequate safety measures\, and capability to save the project in case of natural disasters.\nA close examination of links between DMIC and CEPA should be included so that it helps to understand Japan’s rationale for extending support for the project.\nExplaining the role of DMIC and its contribution to overall India-Japan economic relations would add value to the paper. More attention\, therefore\, should be given to the tangible benefits the project accrues to the India-Japan economic relationship.\nRecent incidents in Japan have certainly affected the Japanese economy\, and it will be worthwhile to analyse its impact on the ambitious DMIC project.\n\nReport prepared by Rahul Mishra\, Research Assistant\, IDSA. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/india-japan-economic-relations-focus-on-the-dmic CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110325T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110325T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T021456 CREATED:20231224T103810Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250311T044045Z UID:64122-1301031000-1301031000@idsa.in SUMMARY:Does India have a Neighbourhood Policy? DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Ambassador I P KhoslaDiscussants: Shri Kanwal Sibal and Professor Sujit Dutta URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/does-india-have-a-neighbourhood-policy CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110401T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110401T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T021456 CREATED:20231223T220638Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T103810Z UID:63581-1301635800-1301635800@idsa.in SUMMARY:Nuclear Energy in China & India: A Comparative Study DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Dr G BalachandranDiscussants: Prof Swaran Singh and Dr R Ramachandran \nDr Ch Viyyanna Sastry in his present paper aimed to analyse and compare the nuclear energy development programmes in China and India. The key issues that he tried to address in the paper are: the roadmaps of China and India in securing their energy demands; how both the countries started their nuclear energy programmes; routes through which they are planning to achieve this; and finally to see what are the possible outcomes. \nAt the outset he said that nuclear energy is being viewed by many countries including China and India as one of the potential alternatives to the growing demands on carbon emissions and global warming. The energy deficient countries are also looking for nuclear energy as an alternative source of energy\, because of its steady supply source and the stable and predictability of costs for the full operation of reactors. \nMoreover\, China and India as the two most populous countries with high economic growth rates for the past several years\, they have to generate more energy to sustain their growth rates. Therefore\, as the global plans on nuclear energy expand\, China and India are poised to play a strong role in this area. \nOn China’s nuclear energy programme\, Dr. Sastry said that till recently\, the role of nuclear energy in the overall energy production was quite low amounting to just 2 per cent of the total electricity generation. At present\, China has about 13 nuclear power plants of different capacitates in operation generating about 10.8 GWe. During the eleventh economic plan period for the years 2006-2010\, China set an ambitious goal for new nuclear plant construction for developing about 40 GWe by 2020. In addition\, there are various revised plans and projections in China for achieving even more than 40 GWe by 2020. As the State Energy Bureau (SEB) of China set the target of 50 GWe and the State Council claimed of possibility of achieving 70 GWe by 2020. Dr Sastry pointed out that in pursuit of the set targets\, Chinese government approved the construction of an additional 28 nuclear reactors by 2020 of which 20 are already under construction. Several new reactors are also being planned. \nOn India’s nuclear energy programme\, he explained that Indian civilian nuclear energy programme is based on the three stage programme envisioned by Dr Homi J Bhabha. The first stage of the indigenous nuclear power programme involving setting up of pressurized heavy water reactors is now in industrial domain. With the start of construction of the 500 MWe prototype fast breeder reactors in October 2004\, the second stage has been launched. He opined that it is time for India to accelerate the implementation of the second stage and move towards the development of the third stage of the nuclear power programme. He suggested that in parallel\, India has to continue to work towards development of emerging nuclear energy technologies to address its long term energy requirements which are indeed very large. \nDr Sastry said that despite the criticism based on proliferation\, safety and security of reactors and environmental concerns after the recent Japanese nuclear crisis\, it is possible that India\, along with other Asian countries like China\, Russia and South Korea\, is actively involved in the global resurgence of nuclear power that is being witnessed in the past few years. He held that both China and India are likely to increase their share of nuclear energy significantly in the next decades\, thus\, leading a nuclear renaissance which could revive the nuclear industry. While the Indian target of 20 GWe by 2020 appears achievable\, China too can reach 40 GWe by that time. In addition\, China with its resources\, manpower\, unhindered technology transfers\, the single party governance and not much opposition from the people\, is more likely to reach its desired figures. \nThough nuclear energy is going to play a pivotal role\, he suggested that both the countries have to work on clear technologies to sustain their higher growth rates. The increasing population could be a wild card. \nSo far as the export of future nuclear reactors are concerned\, he said that with passing indigenisation and development of related nuclear infrastructure\, China is certain to become a nuclear exporter in a big way. On India’s export capability\, however\, he said that till it masters the fast-breeder technology\, India should not hesitate to consider offering soft loans to kick start export of its nuclear reactors i.e. Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors (PHWRs). It is possible that many countries would like to start with medium to small nuclear power plants than say 1000 MWe plants. \nAt the end of his presentation\, Dr Sastry said that India was a victim of international politics because of its principled stand against the nuclear proliferation treaty (NPT) and subsequent nuclear tests which led to the formation of the nuclear suppliers group (NSG). He pointed out that the Indo-US nuclear deal has changed the situation enabling India to import nuclear reactors along with the required fuel from outside. Finally\, he suggested that India can become a world leader in the production and running of fast breeders if it manages to run successfully the much-awaited Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR) at Kalpakkam. In fact\, that success is likely to turn a new leaf in the development of nuclear energy. \nMajor Points of Discussion and Suggestions:\n\nAlthough at present the primary emphasis of China’s nuclear programme is on its peaceful uses\, its nuclear programme started for military purposes and in October 1964 it conducted its first nuclear test. However\, India’s nuclear programme was started solely for peaceful purposes and its civil nuclear programme is the oldest among the Asian countries.\n\nThe DAE’s announcement of targetting 10\,000 MWe by the year 2000 and its subsequent failure to achieve it had lessened the image of the department. However\, the main reason for the failure to achieve the stated objective was because of the government’s failure to put equity in this sphere.\nIndia’s civilian nuclear programme would have improved if the Indian government had put more equity in this sector. The situation\, however\, is improving gradually after the successful conclusion of the Indo-US nuclear deal and the follow up measures taken by the Indian government in this regard. \nOn China’s standardisation of nuclear energy reactors\, what are the measures China has taken in this regard and how India can learn this from China?\nSo far as the indigenisation and development of nuclear infrastructures are concerned\, how can India cooperate with China?\nChina has recently taken many safety measures for its nuclear reactors. However\, how it is going to address the issues relating to the safe disposal of nuclear wastes and environmental concerns still remain the major concerns. \nRole of civil society in China is very critical in the Chinese civil nuclear energy programme especially in locating the reactors and addressing the environmental concerns. How civil society in China is going to react in coming years on this needs to be looked into. However\, at present no such major opposition is coming from the civil society. \nVietnam wants to build nuclear energy reactors and China is interested in supporting it\, if this will materialise how it would impact other countries of the region?\nFrom the present Japanese nuclear crisis\, what are the lessons Indian government has learned and what are the safety measures that the government is going to take to face similar situations in the future.\nSo far there is no allegation against India on proliferation concerned activity. It has impeccable track record on nuclear non-proliferation. There is also no case against India of diverting the imported civil nuclear technology or energy for military purposes. \nThe stated objectives of the research paper are not clear enough at present and there are also no clear policy recommendations. The author needs to focus on this and needs to further streamline the paper.\n\nReport prepared by Dr Saroj Bishoyi\, Research Assistant\, IDSA URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/nuclear-energy-in-china-india-a-comparative-study CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110408T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110408T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T021456 CREATED:20231223T220538Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130244Z UID:63577-1302240600-1302240600@idsa.in SUMMARY:Civil-Military Relations in Post-Suharto Indonesia DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Dr R N DasDiscussants: Professor Baladas Ghoshal and Shri C S Kuppuswamy \n \nThe author analysed the developments in civil-military relations in Indonesia especially in the post Suharto era. He highlighted the fact that Indonesia charted its own civil military relation and almost defied the predetermined path laid out by theoreticians. \nHe also argued that military’s disposition in the civilian sphere had declined in the successive administrations since 1998. The military was unwilling to take on direct political role during the time of B J Habibie. Under the Habibie administration\, military introduce few changes in its doctrine and charted out four principles viz. a) the Military would no longer be in forefront of politics; b) It would influence the political process indirectly; c) It would shift its sociopolitical position from occupier to that of influencer and d) It would concede some of its sociopolitical functions to the nonmilitary partners. In the administration of Adburrahman Wahid\, the civilian government appropriated certain function such as appointments and promotion of senior officers which until now the military had exercised. \nIn this paper\, the author discussed various theories of civil-military relations including the Separation and Concordance theory. He argued that the Separation theory is inadequate in explaining the relationship between armed forces\, the political elite\, the society and the institutions in post-Suharto Indonesia. The author highlighted that it is Concordance theory (which takes into account a nation’s historical and cultural context in determining the democratization of the country) better explains the developments in the post Suharto period. \nThe author identified various internal variables\, external variables\, and international variables to enquire the nature and developments in civil-military relations in Indonesia and attempted to extrapolate the future trend of civil military relations. \nAs regards internal variables\, he explained that the internal variable refers to factors internal to the military such as professionalism\, corporate interests\, politicization etc. He highlighted the fact that army with its hierarchic organization and a cohesive characteristic ensures speedy implementation of decisions taken. He stated that it is claimed that armies are agents of modernization\, whether or not they intervene in politics\, since military driven investment has spin-off benefits for the civilian sector as well. He offered the explanation that Indonesian military drew its political strength from the doctrine of “dual function” which assigned it a direct political role beyond its strictly military role. He also enumerated the role of external factors such as political\, social system and governance and the related factors that shaped civil-military relations in Indonesia. \nIn conclusion he emphasised that Indonesia is undergoing societal changes which have their basis in the civil society. Quoting Huntington\, he stated that future problems in civil military relations in new democracies such as Indonesia are likely to come from the failures of democratic governments to promote economic developments and maintain law and order and not necessarily from the military. He speculated that these challenges will be faced with a new interpretation of civil military relations. \nMajor points of discussion and suggestions:\nThe author should highlight the characteristics of Indonesian army and should give more details how it came into existence. \nThe author should give more empirical evidences to the theories discussed in the paper and should test whether these theories are applicable to the Indonesian case. \nThe author should highlight the reason for continued domination of military in Indonesia\, may be in conclusion of the paper. \nThe author should emphasize as to how these three factors (i.e. internal\, external and international) emphasized in the paper interact with each other\, thus influencing the nature of civil military relations. \nA separate paragraph on the socio-political fabric of Indonesia is needed right at the outset\, qualify more explicitly which will help the author’s argument\, the futility of the Separation theory that is discussed in the paper. \nThe author should add a hypothesis\, particularly because the paper discusses about independent variable and dependent variable. The author needs to identify the relationship between the independent variable and dependent variable. \nReport prepared by Shamshad A. Khan\, Research Assistant\, East Asia cluster. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/civil-military-relations-in-post-suharto-indonesia CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR