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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100312T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100312T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T014939
CREATED:20231223T221938Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130247Z
UID:63664-1268371800-1268371800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Energy Related Border Adjustment Measures: Will it Lead to Trade War?
DESCRIPTION:Ms. Shebonti Ray Dadwal\, Research Fellow\, presented her paper titled “Energy Related Border Trade Measures: Can it lead to trade war?” on 12 March 2010. Dr. Arvind Gupta chaired the session. Dr. Nityananda and Prof. V.G. Hegde were external discussants. Col. P.K. Gautam and Dr. Uttam Sinha were internal discussants.  \nShebonti Ray Dadwal highlighted the key aspects of the topic under consideration: \n\nTrade protectionism in the name of climate change is a hot topic. Already several countries have imposed carbon taxes while others are passing bills that authorise application of such taxes.\nThe question to be asked is if this is a disguised method to retain trade superiority.\nThe American Clean Energy and Security Act (ACESA) and similar measures undertaken by the European countries aim to tax imports that are carbon-intensive in the name of prohibiting competitive distortions.\nIt has been criticised as being against the development plans of the developing countries and it is argued that measures like financial assistance and technology transfers will be more effective.\nDeveloping countries\, worried at the prospects of facing fresh trade barriers\, had made their approach clear at the Copenhagen Summit in December 2009 and earlier in Bonn in August 2009\, arguing against any such unilateral measures.\nSuch measures\, it is argued\, would amount to passing of the mitigation responsibilities to the developing countries by the developed countries. Moreover\, such measures go against the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities”.\nWTO as well as UNFCCC rules are not exactly specific on this subject. Moreover\, the subject is extremely complex because of its multilayered nature. There are loopholes that allow exceptions for such policies.\n\nDiscussion:\n\nTrade\, security and wars are interlinked. Historical evidence also proves this fact. In recent times\, trade and terrorism have become linked.\nAt different times\, different groups of countries have focussed on carbon taxes\, and this issue will keep coming up in the future also. \nEnergy industry itself is the most energy-intensive industry. Moreover\, due to diversity in the quality of production\, assessment is going to be extremely complex; understanding the global impact is going to be even more difficult.\nTechnology is not the solution for addressing climate change; technology diffusion is more important than technology transfer. In a way the present debate is also about increasing the returns on the present IPRs.\nThe question to be asked here is whether India is ready for such a war? Do we have the expertise to fight or anticipate the circumstances?\nSince imposition of tariffs is a sovereign right and the WTO is being used by developed countries for pursuing their security agendas\, policy options for developing countries are getting shrunk. Therefore\, anticipation and capacity building to face the potential changes is extremely critical.\nIndividual countries have their agenda clearly worked out\, but it becomes problematic when one has to act as part of groups. It is better to develop consensus based on common interests which can help in setting important negotiating stands.\nIn all likelihood\, carbon taxation will take place and climate change will be used as a non-tariff barrier. Therefore preparing in advance is necessary.\nIt is important to see how the energy mix impacts trade and carbon taxation policies. Geopolitics\, trade and environment are linked. Thus\, there is interplay of politics and bargaining strategies. \nSometimes cap and trade policies can create incentives for efficient industries and can force non-efficient ones to change their methods of operations. \n\nReport prepared by Avinash Godbole\, Research Assistant\, IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/energy-related-border-adjustment-measures-will-it-lead-to-trade-war
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100312T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100312T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T014939
CREATED:20231223T221938Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130247Z
UID:63665-1268371800-1268371800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Sustaining Motivation in Sub-Conventional Warfare
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Ashok MehataDiscussants: Arun Sahgal and N.P. SinghInternal Discussants: Rumel Dahiya and S. Kalayanaraman \n \nMaj. Gen. (Retd.) Ashok Mehta stated at the very outset that India fought its last conventional war in 1971. Since then\, it has been fighting only sub-conventional wars. However\, the real spurt to sub-conventional wars that India has been fighting came in the 1980s with the surge of Sikh and then Kashmiri militancy. As for the term ‘sub-conventional war’\, he said that it simply denotes to anti-terrorist or counter-insurgency operations. He argued that India would continue to fight this mode of warfare for one or two generations more at least. Therefore\, he argued\, the study done by Col. K. C. Dixit was very relevant from the academic as well as policy points of view.  \nColonel K.C. Dixit\, a Research Fellow at IDSA\, examined in his paper the issue of how to keep soldiers’ (in Army tradition the word ‘soldier’ is generically applied to officers\, junior commissioned officers and other ranks) motivation high in the difficult conditions of sub-conventional war. What makes his paper really noteworthy is that it is based on an extensive field trip and personal interviews conducted by him. He went to Jammu and Kashmir in December 2009 and visited army units where he interviewed 880 soldiers. The interviewees were classified in three categories: officers\, junior commissioned officers and other ranks. He asked them 36 questions\, which were wide ranging and covered the entire gamut of a soldier’s life. On the basis of responses given to his questions\, he arrived at certain conclusions. \nHe began by putting forward a simplified version of the definitional aspects of motivation. Then\, he dwelt into the peculiarities of the operational environment in sub-conventional warfare\, juxtaposing it with conventional warfare. He then elaborated upon the factors affecting motivation in sub-conventional warfare. He recounted the absence of cooperation from the side of civil authority\, media propaganda\, lack of intelligence resulting in difficulty in identifying militants\, pressing demand for quick reaction\, problem with soldiers adapting to a new environment\, problem of command and control\, insistence on use of minimum force\, unsatisfactory living conditions\, pressures from human rights organizations\, as prominent factors affecting motivation of soldiers in sub-conventional warfare.  \nAfter analyzing factors affecting motivation\, he brought forward his conclusion that the conditions necessary to keep Indian soldiers motivated are far from being satisfactory. Here\, he made some recommendations to improve the level of motivation among soldiers. His recommendations covered areas like training\, organizational set up\, judicious involvement and participation on the part of soldiers at various levels in decision-making\, unit cohesion\, making tasks challenging\, exciting and meaningful\, media management\, the handling of junior leadership\, delegation of powers\, and many others. He finished his presentation by making a passionate plea for improving and sustaining motivation of soldiers in sub-conventional warfare. \nThe discussants were unanimous on the fact that the study done by Colonel K.C. Dixit was of immense significance and would surely help improve the working conditions of the Indian Armed Forces and increase their efficiency. However\, they and other scholars present during the session made some valid methodological points\, which needed to be addressed. Col. K.C. Dixit accepted these points and assured that he would accommodate them in the subsequent and final draft. \n  Report prepared by Dr. Prashant Kumar Singh.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/sustaining-motivation-in-sub-conventional-warfare
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100319T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100319T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T014939
CREATED:20231223T221839Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130247Z
UID:63662-1268976600-1268976600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:The Obama Doctrine: Deciphering Obama’s Nuclear Policy and What it bodes for India
DESCRIPTION:In his paper “The Obama Doctrine: Deciphering Obama’s Nuclear Policy and What it bodes for India\,” A. Vinod Kumar examined President Obama’s nuclear policies and critically assessed its implications for India. By addressing Obama’s “nuclear policy” as Obama’s “nuclear doctrine”\, the paper attempted to show how America’s nuclear policies achieve a consistent doctrinal character even when successive Presidents promise paradigmatic change. In this light\, the paper was divided into four main sections. First\, the evolution of Obama’s thinking on nuclear weapons was elucidated. Secondly\, the paper detailed how Obama’s nuclear policy was in fact a doctrine in the making. In the next section the paper critically probed where the doctrine could fall apart. And in the final section\, the implications of Obama’s nuclear policy for India were examined.  \nFrom the beginning the paper showed how the purported nuclear policies of Obama were a continuation of Bush’s doctrine. While analysing the genesis of Obama’s thinking about nuclear weapons\, the paper showed how Obama was buffeted between forces of pragmatism in national security issues and those favouring elimination of nuclear weapons. The four statesmen – Henry Kissinger\, George Shultz\, William Perry and Sam Nunn – emphasized nuclear disarmament but paradoxically they also encouraged nuclear modernization. In this context\, the paper argued that though Obama’s nuclear policy favours traditional non-proliferation goals he was also forced to consider aspects of Bush’s dogmatic policies as well. Article IV of the NPT was reemphasized by Obama in the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1887; but even here issues like the need for a credible nuclear deterrent; the absence of prioritization of punitive action on NPT defectors and the absence of practical steps towards complete elimination of nuclear weapons\, according to the paper\, has not created anything new beyond the Bush doctrine. \nBut the need for a credible nuclear deterrent\, the absence of prioritization of punitive actions on NPT defectors and the absence of practical steps towards complete elimination of nuclear weapons all meant that the Obama nuclear doctrine could not go beyond the Bush doctrine. The author also showed how the revival of traditional instruments of the non-proliferation regime\, central to Obama’s vision\, could not escape his predecessor’s doctrinal style. For example\, on the NPT\, the paper asserted that the problems of non-compliance\, constraints on nuclear commerce\, threats from non-state actors\, nuclear test ban\, FMCT\, strengthening safeguards and restrictions on enrichment and reprocessing technologies are all issues that need immediate redressal for the treaty to be strengthened; and these were the issues on which Bush was not decisive. Between merely setting an agenda for the 2010 Review Conference and formulating a grand 21st century version of the NPT\, the paper argued that reviving the NPT could be a long haul. Similarly\, on CTBT\, the paper showed that securing support within the Senate for its ratification would be a difficult task. Most importantly\, it stressed that Obama’s strategies to combat nuclear security and terrorism were a copy from the Bush administration. The paper however suggested that a new framework could be derived through the UNSCR 1540 to ensure that non-state actors do not access sensitive nuclear technology. Alongside\, it also suggested that “the summit could also formalize counter-proliferation instruments like PSI within the non-proliferation edifice so as to generate global templates for prevention and responses.” Therefore\, even in counter-proliferation\, Obama might not devalue Bush’s initiatives. Finally on Ballistic Missile Defences (BMD) and promoting nuclear energy for peaceful purposes\, the paper showed that Obama’s nuclear policies were inadequately grounded. While Obama voted for major cuts in BMD programmes and was non-committal on Bush’s deployment plans\, upon assuming office Obama favoured limited deployment plans to provide minimum protection to the United States and its allies. He cancelled the Kinetic Kill Vehicle programme but remains apprehensive of Iranian\, North Korean\, Chinese and Russian missile modernization. The paper predicts that this could “force Obama to open funding for both missile defence as well as space weapons.” The same ambiguity was reflected in promoting nuclear energy for peaceful purposes; while Obama favoured international nuclear fuel-cycle centres he also felt that over-emphasis on nuclear energy is unwarranted. To conclude\, the paper asserted the continuities of doctrines regardless of the paradigmatic change promised. \nIn the next section\, the paper laid out two important issue areas where Obama’s doctrine might fail. First\, it questioned whether Obama’s nuclear disarmament is at best a utopian dream. The reason for such scepticism according to the author is that (a) total elimination cannot happen at one stroke as this will not be a consensual or sequential movement among the nuclear weapon states; (b) incremental steps towards elimination\, involving test-ban and fissile material cut-off\, would be a long haul; and\, (c) new weapon states that might emerge could reverse the reduction process. The failure to move from non-proliferation to disarmament\, and ever lingering security dilemmas have created more questions about prospective nuclear disarmament ambitions of the President. Second\, reducing the salience of nuclear weapons and maintaining a robust deterrent is a problem. Maintaining extended nuclear deterrence\, sentiments of the armed forces on modernizing the ageing nuclear forces along with demands for RRW and Stockpile stewardship program has created disagreements over Obama’s policies. Therefore\, the paper\, while arguing how Obama’s doctrine could fall apart\, also stressed that reductions and total elimination of nuclear weapons would also imperil CTBT and FMCT operationalisation.  \nFinally\, the paper assessed the implication of Obama’s nuclear policy for India. On a broader platform of integrating India into the non-proliferation regime\, NPT\, CTBT and FMCT options were discussed. On NPT\, notwithstanding India’s apprehensions to join the club as a NNWS\, the paper stated that Obama might not initiate sweeping reforms by opening up the NWS club. Therefore India’s call for a new non-proliferation bargain transcending the NPT centric regime might not fructify. Similarly\, on CTBT\, the paper stated that India cannot accept the treaty without a disarmament roadmap; the possibility of offering sophisticated weapons design data and simulation capabilities by United States to woo India was discussed with a caveat that Obama would not offer such capabilities as it would undermine his larger disarmament objectives. Finally on FMCT\, the paper stated that since India has committed itself to the treaty’s early conclusion without resolving all its contentions\, it might hope for a third party spoilsport if Obama couldn’t rectify the problem areas including verification and the EIF clause. \nSecondly\, discussing the divergent perceptions on disarmament for understanding the implications of Obama’s nuclear policy on India\, the paper drew attention to three factors. One\, the paper stated that India disowns the NPT and believes it could only retain a non-proliferation edifice without conditioning disarmament and therefore India has reservations on the traditional NPT route of Obama to achieve total elimination; two\, the paper argued that Rajiv Gandhi’s Action Plan of June 1988 could be a solution to Obama’s scepticism of not achieving disarmament in his lifetime; and finally\, the paper stated that de-legitimisation of nuclear weapons could be a right step towards total elimination with a universal agreement on no-first use and reduction of the salience of nuclear weapons in security doctrines. The paper was sceptical of the Obama administration taking such paradigmatic steps in the near future to achieve total elimination. \nLast but not the least\, the paper discussed counter-proliferation policy and its implications for India. It noted that the main stumbling block in India’s participation in Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is the reference to IAEA comprehensive safeguards in the 2005 Protocol to the SUA Convention (Suppression of Unlawful Activities at Sea). India’s apprehension is that PSI is being targeted at non-NPT states. On missile defence the paper reiterated that with Obama’s own reservations India might have fewer worries of his policies impinging on Indian interests. Finally\, however\, the paper noted that Obama is likely to push for India’s participation in counter-proliferation initiatives which is in consonance with the Hyde Act but such pressures would also require India’s commitment to support US action against Iran which could prove problematic. \nDiscussion\n\nObama has limited options in seeking an alternative to Bush policies. Therefore\, the study is not presumptuous in giving Obama’s policies a doctrinal character. \nNuclear terrorism is a very serious problem which the paper could consider in more detail. \nThough a pragmatic disarmament timeline is absent there is some hope of progress; therefore the paper could explore how Obama could carry forward this agenda. \nOn Rajiv Gandhi’s Action plan\, the paper could also highlight similarities with Obama’s larger disarmament objectives rather than merely pointing out dissimilarities.\nThe paper could consider the implications of Obama’s policy on the forthcoming NPT RevCon and how it would impact on India. \nThe paper could discuss in more detail the proposed Nuclear Weapons Convention\, the key differences between NWC and NPT obligations\, and how India can cooperate in ensuring its successful implementation.\nWhile the paper initially stated that India might need to adopt a wait and watch policy\, during the discussion the author acknowledged the need for India to be proactive. \n\nReport prepared by Shanmugasundaram Sasikumar\, Research Assistant.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-obama-doctrine-deciphering-obamas-nuclear-policy-and-what-it-bodes-for-india
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100319T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100319T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T014939
CREATED:20231224T104406Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130247Z
UID:64176-1268976600-1268976600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Recent Trends in Myanmar-US Relations: Implications for Myanmar’s Political System
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Udai Bhanu Singh\, in his paper\, pointed out that the United States has been critical of the military regime in Myanmar. The US approach towards Myanmar was essentially based on a policy of sanctions and non-engagement with Myanmar. While China\, ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and neighbouring countries engaged with Myanmar\, the United States continued to practice its policy.  \nOf late\, there has been a shift in the American policy towards Myanmar\, which is making an impact on Myanmar’s SPDC also. In the case of Myanmar\, it is apparent that contrary to its practice in Southeast Asia the US is not following the ‘Security First Policy’. For this\, pointed Dr. Singh\, China could also be one of the important factors.  However\, whether the shift in US policy is significant is yet to be examined. The shift in the US policy towards Myanmar has been evident as the two parties have made several official visits to each others’ capitals.  Still\, the US is consistent on the point that sanctions will remain in place until Myanmar becomes a democracy.  \nAnother contentious issue between Myanmar and the US has been Myanmar’s nuclear programme. While some scholars doubt Myanmar’s nuclear capability and its ability to make nuclear weapons\, one cannot deny the fact that Russia (and possibly North Korea too) has been cooperating with Myanmar on nuclear issues. In the changed circumstances\, SPDC’s objective is to integrate with the international community and to increase the level of manoeuvrability. Drug trafficking is another issue of concern for the US in light of the fact that Myanmar is the world’s second largest drug producer.  \nAnother reason\, as pointed out by Dr. Singh\, is the role of the Burmese diaspora based in the US. The US- and Canada-based Burmese diapsora is playing an increasingly significant role in influencing US policy towards Myanmar. For instance\, the Massachusetts-Burma Law was heavily influenced by the Burmese diaspora based in the US. What are the implications of such a change in the approach?  \n\nThe possibility of change in the Burmese Junta’s policy depends on SPDC’s ability to face the challenges\, both domestic and international. \nThe US so far has focused attention on just one person and just one party\, which has failed to deliver positive results. \n\nPoints of Discussion:\n\nStudying the US policy towards Myanmar will not help without understanding US policy towards the Southeast Asian region. \nThere is a realisation in the US that because of Myanmar its policy towards Southeast Asian region is also getting stifled. \nThe US is not able to engage Myanmar constructively because of domestic legislative constraints.\nThe shift in the US policy is a result of President Barak Obama’s attempt to reach out to recalcitrant countries. China factor is not significant since during the Bush administration nothing was done regarding Myanmar. It is to be noted that Bush administration had the policy of trying to forestall China’s rise in Asia. \nA reference to Andrew Selth’s article on Chinese bases in Myanmar was made during the discussion on Chinese bases in Myanmar. It was said that reports on Chinese bases in Myanmar was an overreaction. \n\nReport prepared by Rahul Mishra.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/recent-trends-in-myanmar-us-relations-implications-for-myanmars-political-system
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100326T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100326T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T014939
CREATED:20231223T221838Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130247Z
UID:63661-1269581400-1269581400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Prospects for India-US Cyber-Security Cooperation
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Cherian Samuel notes that cyber security is a significant domain for policy makers in India to formulate a hands-on approach\, as there is clear evidence over the past decade of an increase of cyber threats worldwide. In his paper\, he searches for scope for cooperation between India and the United States in the area of cyber security\, continuing from the 2002 efforts of the India-US Cyber Security Forum aimed at strengthening cooperation on national security issues between the two countries. \nThe structure of the paper encompasses the approaches to cyber security in both countries and studies the sectoral approaches to cyber security i.e.\, the IT security perspective\, the economic perspective\, the law enforcement perspective and a national security perspective. Dr. Samuel argues that understanding sectoral approaches is essential since harmonizing these perspectives to create a holistic policy on cyber security is required through the inclusion of all these sectors. In the United States\, one finds that policy on cyber security is dominated by the national security perspective\, which has been encouraged under President Obama as well. While there are practical problems relating to harmonizing aspects of privacy and security\, the United States\, unlike India\, has formulated a clear policy towards cyber security as seen in its various declassified goals as well. In India\, while there has been a boom of cyberspace in the past decade\, the focus of policy makers has been economic rather than national security oriented\, as seen in the Information Technology Act of 2000 which concentrates mainly on e-commerce. Following the 26/11 Mumbai attacks\, there have been efforts to introduce amendments in this bill\, which\, however\, continues to lack a clear focus in its goal and is often noted to be an ‘Omnibus Bill’ covering too many issues. \nIn the context of cyber security cooperation between the India and the United States\, Dr. Samuel notes that the interests of both countries can be fulfilled. For India\, capacity building and research development has been cited as a clear objective through this cooperation\, while the United States may feel the need to safeguard its interests given the large number of US companies engaged in outsourcing in India. An asymmetry in the technical capacities of the two countries may have been a reason for the India-US Cyber Security Forum of 2002 not being successful\, along with the lack of a multilateral treaty or body like the United Nations to coordinate and oversee activities and cooperation. The working groups established under the aegis of this Forum – Legal Cooperation and Law enforcement\, Research and development\, Critical Information Infrastructure\, Defence Cooperation and Standards and Software assurance – have been used by Dr. Samuel as a template for his analysis in searching for areas for cooperation and road-blocks on cyber security between the two countries in the future. \nIn the area of Legal Cooperation and Law Enforcement\, the lack of an international legal framework has undoubtedly impacted the avenues for Indo-US bilateral cooperation on this issue. The UN’s Internet Governing Forum (IGF) has proved to be an inadequate mechanism for generating such a framework. On issues relating to Research and Development\, cooperation remains limited since US agencies like the highly secretive National Security Agency (NSA) remains disinterested in sharing technologies that remain its strategic assets. Defence Cooperation in cyberspace encompasses unique issues\, which need to addressed by both countries individually before agreeing on cooperation\, wherein the policy of the state towards cyber crime or cyber terrorism are to be formulated. The US military has only recently begun to conceive cyberspace as a war-fighting domain and India is still far behind on this issue. NATO\, of which the United States is a member\, however has presented an advanced cyberspace cooperation mechanism and may even become a “hub” of coordinating responses to global threats to cyber security. The scope for cooperation between India and the United States\, according to Dr. Samuel\, lies mainly in the field of Critical Information Infrastructure Protection. This forms the focus of the US interest in cyber security partnership with India and this objective resulted in the setting up of the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In) and the National Skills Registry in 2005 to authenticate individuals working in the IT industry. However\, to increase Indo-US cooperation in this field there are gaps that need to plugged in by India\, which has been found to have the highest cyber security regulation but the lowest security adoption rates. \nTherefore cooperation between the United States and India in this sphere is conceivable only when they are both equal in their understanding and responses to threats in cyber space. There is a pressing urge in India to approach this issue holistically\, while taking into account the interests of the various sectors with stakes in cyberspace. The inability of the Indo-US Cyber Security Forum to take off points to the need for a multilateral cooperation framework along with the presence of a legislation covering legal\, technical and national security objectives to regulate India’s policies on cyber security to pave the way for bilateral and international cooperation on this issue.  \nPoints of Discussion\n\nFailure of the Indo-US Cyber Security Forum provides a valuable lesson in strengthening such cooperation in the future. Cooperation with other countries (such as Russia and South Korea) and multi-dimensional cooperation should also be made a priority by India. \nIn order to have equal footing with a world leader like the United States\, India needs the presence of an overarching supervisory authority with over-sight mechanism along with a role for the United Nations. Issues relating to trust and coordination between the parties can be fulfilled through this\, and these terms need to be clarified before embarking on bilateral cooperation. Also\, creating any arrangement without India’s priorities clearly demarcated will remain asymmetrical and therefore non-beneficial for India\nSecurity testing and reliability testing of hardware is essential to ensure that crucial hardware components sourced from third countries is not compromised. A third party auditing organization and the creation of a Cyber Security Fund are areas which need to be flagged for Indo-US cyber security cooperation since both countries have increasing stakes in this domain. \nThere are definite benefits for all sectors with stakes in cyber security in the fructification of Indo-US bilateral cooperation on this issue. India should try to base cooperation on research and development and capacity building to equalize such a partnership\nThe Indian government should also issue directives on cyber security like the US government in order to sensitise Indian private enterprises about data security and dangers from cyber espionage. \nProposed initiatives such as the National Institute of Cryptology Research should be brought on-stream at the earliest.\n\nReport prepared by Saba Joshi\, Intern\, IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/prospects-for-india-us-cyber-security-cooperation
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100416T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100416T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T014939
CREATED:20231223T221838Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130247Z
UID:63659-1271395800-1271395800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:India and Japan: Exploring Strategic Potentials
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Prof. V. P. DuttExternal Discussants: Amb. Rajiv Sikri & Amb. T.C.A. RangachariInternal Discussants: Brig. (Retd.) Rumel Dahiya and Dr. Shamshad Ahmed Khan \nDr. Rajaram Panda presented his paper titled India and Japan: Exploring Strategic Potentials on Friday\, April 16\, 2010. The paper’s main focus was on maritime cooperation between India and Japan and more specifically on the strategic dimensions of this cooperation. Dr. Panda argued that the looming Chinese shadow is the rationale behind this cooperation. First\, he defined what a ‘strategic partnership’ means\, arguing that the canvas of a “strategic relationship” was much larger than mere “political relationship”. A strategic partnership includes “defence\, economic\, and security dimensions in the relationship.” \nDr. Panda emphasized that there was a great convergence of interests between India and Japan in the maritime domain. He highlighted India’s unique geographical position\, which makes its cooperation extremely critical for Japan in securing its sea lanes. Much of Japan’s international trade is dependent upon safety of its sea lanes that pass through the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea. He argued that security of Japan’s maritime and energy supplies prominently figured in its security calculus. \nDr. Panda discussed two high-level important visits in detail: the first being Indian Defence Minister A.K. Antony’s visit to Japan\, and the other Japanese Prime Minister Hatoyama’s visit to India\, which he characterized as a landmark visit. During this visit\, an Action Plan to Advance Security Cooperation Based on the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation was adopted. This plan delineated a host of issue-areas in which a meaningful strategic partnership could be built. However\, he highlighted the Japanese stand on India’s nuclear programme as a major irritant in what is an otherwise cordial relationship. \nDiscussion\nAmb. Rajiv Sikri argued that the economic aspect of the strategic partnership should be part of this paper. He further argued that the China factor was an important factor shaping this strategic partnership\, but it was not the only factor. There are other important factors also which require due focus. Besides\, the importance of China factor will keep varying depending upon who is in power in Japan. The India-Japan relationship is not that undifferentiated as it is being considered. There are more nuances involved in it. He was of the view that the US-Japan alliance had not outlived its utility and should not be underestimated. As to the definition of strategic partnership\, he said that India had very loose definition of the partnership. He further argued that a strategic partnership basically meant macro-level understanding\, not micro. It should be dealt with on that level only. On the question of Japanese investment in India\, he said that Japanese businessmen should understand how business was done in India. He argued that there was no point in Japanese businessmen constantly complaining about India’s business environment. They should follow the example of Korean businessmen and introspect how they have succeeded in India. \nAmb. T.C.A. Rangachari raised some fundamental questions. He asked: if Japan was considered to be a declining power then why there was a need for an India-Japan strategic partnership. Similarly\, why have a strategic partnership with the United States if it is actually declining. If the argument behind these strategic partnerships is a rising China then one must ask as to why China would not be a responsible power. Expressing doubts about China’s rise as a responsible power reflects the influence of Western thinking. He also said that the sea lanes had never been disrupted since World War II\, thus\, the security of sea lanes is not the biggest issue. He argued that we should not be uncritical of Western wisdom\, which had actually projected India as a maritime threat in the 1970s. He further argued that the strategic partnership between India and Japan was ambivalent and Japanese perception of India was changing very slowly. Incidentally\, he said that there was a minority view in Japan that favoured India’s nuclear programme. \nBrigadier Rumel Dahiya argued that the geostrategic importance of Japan must be assessed while exploring any strategic partnership. Dr. Shamshad Ahmed Khan mentioned that the economic aspect needs to be probed more. He further argued that India-Japan defence cooperation has not been strong. He argued that we should also try to understand Japanese laws and constitution\, which prevents Japan from participating in any collective security mechanism. \nConcluding the discussion\, Professor V.P. Dutt said that he felt that Japan’s new foreign policy was dubious\, ambiguous and uncertain. He was of the opinion that Japanese leaders were making very vague statements about their foreign policy and they themselves may not be very clear as to what they want. He raised a larger philosophical point – the Japanese public seems to have lost interest in foreign affairs. Now\, the question is whether Japan will remain confused or it will become even more confused. \nReport prepared by Dr. Prashant Kumar Singh\, Research Assistant\, IDSA
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/india-and-japan-exploring-strategic-potentials
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100416T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100416T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T014939
CREATED:20231223T221838Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130247Z
UID:63660-1271395800-1271395800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Transformation of Conflict: An Analysis of “Op Sadbhavana” in Jammu and Kashmir
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Prof. Amitabh MattooExternal Discussants: Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Hari Prasad and Dr. Suba ChandranInternal Discussants: Dr. Namrata Goswami and Col. (Retd.) Ali Ahmed \n \nDr. Arpita Anant’s paper notes that traditionally the Army defends the borders and\, whenever called in\, helps in counter-insurgency operations and provides aid to the victims of calamities. However\, in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K)\, the Indian Army has extended its mandate to rebuild the lives of people devastated by terrorism.  Operation Sadbhavana (meaning Goodwill)\, launched in 1998\, is an unique attempt to apply the healing touch to win the hearts and minds (WHAM) of people by promoting development activities focuses on their basic needs. \nThe author points out that the doctrine of sub-conventional warfare of the Indian Army released in January 2007 gives a central place to WHAM in counter-insurgency operations. Such attempts\, it is envisaged\, would provide the healing touch during conflict and win over the alienated sections of people in the conflict zones.  \nAccording to Dr. Anant\, from 1998 to 2008\, a total of Rs. 276.08 crore\, allocated by the Ministry of Defence (MoD)\, was spent on various multi-faceted activities under this operation. The Army has been running schools and orphanages\, improving the living standard of the locals by constructing roads and bridges\, installing hand pumps and electrifying villages and giving them free medical services. Excursion and education tours have also been organised during this period.\nDr. Anant adds that the projects are identified and selected jointly with the state administration and the people at the grass root level. The Army acts as a facilitator and catalyst and actively assists in planning\, provides technical assistance\, makes available specialized equipment and supervises it. \nDr. Anant asserts that implementation of the projects under this initiative has had an extremely positive impact on the minds of the local population. Various educational schemes and women empowerment centres have helped in employment generation and transformed many lives. Numerous other community development and healthcare projects have helped in mitigating the hardships of the common man. \nThe author’s tête-à-tête with the civil administration reveals that most of them were very candid in admitting that the Army brought schools\, walking tracks/roads\, small bridges and doctors in areas where the state government could not reach in the difficult years of the insurgency. However\, a common refrain was that there is scope for improvement in coordination between the Army and civil administration. Dr. Anant’s interface with journalists reveals that although the initiative of the Army is very praiseworthy\, real peace will come only with the resolution of the political problem. Some educationists believed that the Army’s initiatives are lacking involvement of the youth in the age group of 18 to 21 years who constitute 60 per cent of the population. Her discussions with the Army reveal that Operation Sadbhavna had a positive impact on the relationship between the people and the Army. However\, some Army officials did believe that the actual impact is only between 50 to 75 per cent of the desired targets. \nDr. Anant’s conclusion is that Operation Sadbhavana has certainly been a successful effort. Although it adds to the responsibilities of the Army\, it has certainly salvaged its image. The ease with which people were interacting with Army officials made this obvious. The unending list of demands\, which ought to be fulfilled by the civil administration\, also proved the same. She points out that the comfort level between the military and the people seemed higher in the Jammu region than in the Valley. Also\, in some places people spoke highly of the Army officials they were interacting with and remembered some officers who had been posted out\, indicating that personalities made all the difference.  \nDr. Anant’s paper suggests following measures for better results:  \n\nCoordination with appropriate civil authorities could be improved.\nProjects like micro-hydel projects that have not worked well could be re-considered. \nThe audit system of Sadbhavana needs to be publicized.\nIn all projects priority should be given to basics. \nQuality of infrastructure projects can be improved.\nCivil society involvement to increase transparency and to add a sense of belonging is necessary. \nEngage the youth in the projects.\nLocal media (rural and urban) could be used to portray best cases and clarify misperceptions.\nTransparency to avoid abuse of power.\n\nDiscussion:\n\nIn J&K what has been achieved through Operation Sadbhavana represents the best feasible for transition to the political process.\nOperation Sadbhavana as a sound strategy for conflict prevention in Ladakh has been widely acclaimed. The scope of the study should be broadened to include this region of J&K as well.\nThe overall aim of Operation Sadbhavana needs to be well-defined. Does it seek out ‘conflict transformation’ or is it just a ‘WHAM’ (winning the hearts and minds) activity?\nOperation Sadbhavana puts the organisational\, medical\, engineering\, transport and educational expertise of the Army at the disposal of the people. It jeopardizes the Army’s primary function of training and deployment for high-intensity conflict.\nMore detailed analysis of the data collected during the field visit will yield many additional important insights and further energize the discussion.\nOrganising children educational tours under the initiative is a good step to showcase the dynamic culture of the country and to witness the fruits of peace and development.\nCases and allegations of corruption and other irregularities against the Army officials engaged in Operation Sadbhavana have been cropping up with alarming regularity of late. This needs to be discussed.\nIf the Army keeps on taking over the functions of the civil administration\, it will further delegitimise the state government.\nThe budget allocation for Operation Sadbhavana is too small to make a big difference in a large state like J&K.\n\nReport prepared by Dr. Imtiyaz Majid\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/transformation-of-conflict-an-analysis-of-op-sadbhavana-in-jammu-and-kashmir
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100423T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100423T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T014939
CREATED:20231223T221808Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130247Z
UID:63658-1272000600-1272000600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Maoist Mass Organisations and Mass Movement
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Brig. (Retd.) Rumel Dahiya\, SMDiscussants: J N Roy and W ChandrakanthInternal Discussants: Dr. Rajiv Nayan and Dr. Nihar Nayak \n \nAccording to Dr. P.V. Ramana\, in order to succeed in its revolutionary agenda of the armed overthrow of the state\, a Communist group requires three magic weapons – strong Party\, strong Army and United Front. The last of these involves the ‘mobilization of people’. His paper focuses exclusively on Maoist Mass Organisations or Front Organisations. \nThe author explains that the Maoists have several mass organisations\, at the State level as well as at the All India level (AIMOS)\, which are primarily of three types: 1) Underground Revolutionary: these are built clandestinely and conduct secret propaganda. 2) Open or semi-open Revolutionary: these directly serve the people’s war as long as there is room for undertaking open revolutionary activities. 3) Mass organisations not directly linked to CPI (Maoist): these are broad-based\, not directly linked to the Maoist parent outfit\, and function under cover with a limited set of activities as its mandate. This type can be further subdivided into three broad categories: (a) fractional work\, (b) party-formed cover organisations\, and (c) legal democratic organisations. \nDr. Ramana elucidates the utilities of Mass Organisations for the Maoists as: One\, they spread the ideology of the outfit among the people in the areas of their operation. Two\, they serve as a recruiting base\, or catchments\, for the underground. Three\, to watch for the future leadership of the outfit emerge from among the ranks of the Mass Organisations. He quotes the example of Mallojula Koteswara Rao alias Kishenji and Naveen who were leaders of the Radical Students Union in Andhra Pradesh and Delhi\, respectively. Four\, members of Mass Organisations are drafted into the ‘people’s militia’\, or the Base Force. Five\, Mass Organisations would enable the Maoists to be ‘heard and seen.’ \nDr. Ramana asserts that the availability of a large number of people as members of mass organisations has enabled the Maoists to create vast numbers of cadres for the people’s militia in the rural and tribal hinterland\, who have participated in all the large-scale synchronized attacks on multiple targets in different parts of the country in Bihar\, Orissa\, Chhattisgarh\, Jharkhand and West Bengal\, beginning with the Koraput raid of February 6\, 2004\, and acquired a new proficiency and vigour in the Jehanabad Jail Break in Bihar on November 13\, 2005. \nDr. Ramana points out that the entire work of the Mass Organisations is guided and supervised by a committee appointed by the apex and all-powerful Central Committee. This committee is known as the Sub Committee on Mass Organisations (SUCOMO)\, formed for the first time in 2001. The purpose of SUCOMO is to provide direction on the issues that need to be taken-up by the Mass Organisations and to provide coordination at the all-India level for State-level Mass Organisations and All India Mass Organisations (AIMOs).  \nIn the next section of the paper\, the author cites two cases from Andhra Pradesh where Mass Organisations got defunct after being quite active and popular for a while.  \nHighlighting the case of Singareni Karmika Samkhya (SIKASA)\, the author mentions that SIKASA took up various issues that mattered for the people dependent upon the Singareni Collieries. These included mine safety\, better working conditions and wages\, exploitation of miners\, rampant alcoholism\, goondaism and exploitation by contractors. To implement its directives\, the tool it used was “terror”. However\, towards the latter half of the 1990s\, the downfall of SIKASA commenced. The reasons included: the collieries accumulated losses of Rs. 1\,250 crore and was referred to the BFIR; severe police crackdown commenced; and liberalisation policies came into force.  \nHighlighting the case of the Andhra Pradesh Radical Students Union (APRSU)\, Dr. Ramana mentions that in the initial years APRSU went through a prolonged debate on whether its mandate should be to limit itself to addressing students’ problems alone\, or to make it a part of the New Democratic Revolution and help build and lead the agrarian revolution in the villages. The latter view prevailed. The various issues taken-up by APRSU during the period of its active functioning\, either when it was underground or worked openly\, included: opposing detention system in schools\, better facilities in welfare hostels\, scholarships for students\, reservation for the underprivileged in educational institutions\, Karamchedu dalit massacre by upper caste landlords\, opposing New Education Policy\, protest marches against alleged fake encounters\, etc.  \nNevertheless\, towards the beginning of the mid-1990s\, the downfall of APRSU commenced and now it is defunct. While the leadership loss contributed significantly to the slow demise of the APRSU\, new ‘economic opportunities’ which threw open several avenues for the angry youth also played an important role in failing to attract students towards the Maoist-fold. \nAccording to Dr. Ramana\, among all the states in the country\, Mass organisations are most active and vibrant in the Bastar region in the central Indian state of Chhattisgarh. In the Dandakaranya region the Mass Organisations in operation are:  \nDAKMS: The organisation started its activities in 1981 in Khammam district of Andhra Pradesh. A person who is at least 16 years of age and is a resident of the village is eligible to become a member of the particular village unit of DAKMS. However\, landlords\, lumpen elements and those suspected to be linked to the police are not granted membership of the unit. The objective in forming DAKMS was to protect the self-respect of the tribal (adivasi) populace\, declare Dandakaranya as a ‘liberated area’\, prevent religious conversions\, fight for the rights of the tribal populace over the land\, fight against privatization and the entry of multi-national corporations (MNCs)\, to fight for better wages and working conditions of the labour involved in collecting kendu leaf (similar to beedi leaf)\, bamboo fellers\, and so on. \nKAMS:	It is one of the most active mass organisations that operates in the Dandakaranya region and fights for the rights of tribal women. All women who are above 16 years of age are eligible to become members of the village unit in which they are resident.  \nAKCS:	It was founded in 1997 to fight for the rights of students and for solving their problems. Some of the issues taken-up by the organisation included effective implementation of mid-day meal scheme in schools\, provide text books free of cost\, grant scholarships\, etc. \nKABS:	It was founded in 1998\, in the Konta and Basuguda areas of Dantewada district (South Bastar). All children between the ages of five and 15 are eligible to become members of KABS. The underlying motive behind forming this organisation seems to be ‘to catch them young’. \nDr. Ramana concluded his presentation by assessing that on a broader national scale\, the Maoists do not have a ‘mass base’\, contrary to the impression that is created\, which is essentially because recurring and frequent acts of ‘violence’ widely dispersed in different parts of the country attract publicity and visibility. The author\, nevertheless\, warns that it should be noted with concern that even the miniscule support they had built over the years has sufficient ‘nuisance value’ for the Indian state. \nDiscussion\n\nThe Maoist movement has tapped into the deep and dangerous undercurrent of alienation\, misery and rage amongst millions of people who have been failed by the economic\, social and political system.\nIn 2006\, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh referred to the Naxalites as the single biggest internal security challenge ever faced by our country. But nothing has been done so far to seriously address the concern.\nThe author’s end assessment that “on a broader national scale the Maoists do not have a mass base” needs further discussion. India now has 223 districts across 20 states that are affected by Maoist activities. This shows that the Maoist potential to penetrate other states\, which had hitherto remained outside their grasp\, has evolved enormously. \nBad governance\, lethargic and corrupt administration\, inefficient police\, and illiteracy among rural populations will ensure that the Maoists keep receiving fresh recruits.\nInconsistent public postures of the top central and state leadership shows that even a basic consensual assessment of the Maoist threat is lacking. More detailed assessment at the end together with recommendations\, including alternative courses of action\, ought to be added to the paper.\nIt is time to recognise that the Maoist movement has grown in the tribal areas because there is a new consciousness among the tribal people about their rights over their resources.\nStudy of Maoists’ linkages to unorganized weapon markets of India\, China\, Myanmar and Bangladesh would be useful.\nThe decline of labour union power in the country has shored up Maoist support.\nMaoists can be countered only through a coherent and well thought out strategy.\n\nReport prepared by Dr. Imtiyaz Majid\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/maoist-mass-organisations-and-mass-movement
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100423T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100423T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T014939
CREATED:20231224T104322Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T050348Z
UID:64172-1272000600-1272000600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Politics of Taliban Reintegration and Reconciliation in Afghanistan
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Ramesh V PhadkeDiscussants: Mahendra Ved and Adil Mehdi
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/politics-of-taliban-reintegration-and-reconciliation-in-afghanistan
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100430T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100430T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T014939
CREATED:20231223T221807Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130247Z
UID:63655-1272605400-1272605400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:India's Security Policy in the Post-Cold War Era
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Dr. Thomas MathewExternal Discussants: Ambassador S. K. Bhutani and Brig. (Retd.) Gurmeet KanwalInternal Discussants: Prof. P. Stobdan and Brig. Raj Shukla \n \nAt the very outset of his presentation\, Dr. Kalyanaraman argued that like any other nation state\, the primary task of India’s security policy has been the structuring of an international environment conducive for development within and the pursuit of autonomy without. It is in this context that he identified\, as the backdrop to his paper\, the three phases of India’s approach to structuring such an environment: \n\nThe first phase\, which lasted from the day India achieved independence to the 1962 war which China imposed on India\, was marked by the idea of promoting peace for generating security. However\, India’s efforts to resolve conflicts through diplomatic means failed to yield results. In Dr. Kalyanaraman’s words “The policy of promoting peace to gain security failed to gain traction in a world dominated by security dilemmas and national\, ideological and power rivalries. A telling blow was delivered to this policy by the war that China imposed on India in 1962”. In the years that followed\, India made a course-correction by building up military and technological capabilities as also signing a security pact with the USSR.\n\nThe latest phase\, marked by the altered realities of the end of Cold War\, gave India a chance to renew its engagements with the major powers of the world as well as with key countries in its extended Asian neighbourhood. Dr. Kalyanaraman identified four features of the post-Cold War geopolitical situation and discussed how India has\, during these years\, sought to position itself.\n\nThe security situation in Afghanistan has changed beyond recognition in the past two decades. Due to a mix of factors including the Soviet withdrawal\, rise of Taliban\, the 9/11 attacks on the US\, and Pakistan’s regional ambitions\, India has been continually seeking to position itself in that country. Dr. Kalyanaraman opined\, “India seems to have begun to recalibrate its policy by reaching out to Iran and Russia…”\nThe second feature of the post Cold War geopolitical map of Asia is the consolidation of American influence in West Asia especially after the 1991 Gulf War. The subsequent push given to the peace process in Palestine had the beneficial impact of enabling India to fully engage Israel. In addition\, India has been engaging countries like Iran\, Saudi Arabia\, Oman and Qatar.\nIn the face of the rise of China\, “India has initiated a series of initiatives to cater for the Chinese challenge. The Indian navy has stepped up its deployments throughout the Asia-Pacific and has been regularly participating in bilateral and multilateral exercises.” \nLastly\, India’s engagement with the major powers has strengthened to a great extent and a self-assured India has begun to adopt a more pragmatic approach to international security issues. For their part major world capitals have also begun to recalibrate their policies in the light of the new reality of India’s greater economic and military-nuclear prowess.\n\n\n\nPoints of Discussion:\n\nThere are nuances to the moralistic approach of India’s foreign policy during the Nehru years.\nIndia’s engagement with the major powers needs greater attention.\nA gradation of India’s engagements/strategic partnerships with countries across the world is required since one possibly cannot compare India’s engagement with the United States and with Seychelles\, for instance. \n\nReport prepared by Rahul Mishra\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/indias-security-policy-in-the-post-cold-war-era
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100507T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100507T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T014939
CREATED:20231223T221807Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130247Z
UID:63654-1273210200-1273210200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Illegal Bangladeshi Migration to India: Impact on Internal Security
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Shri Ajit K DovalExternal Discussants: E N Ram Mohan and J N RoyInternal Discussants: Brig(retd.) Ramel Dahiya and Dr. Smruti S Pattanaik \nStating that that they are around 10-20 million illegal Bangladeshi migrants in India\, Dr. Anand Kumar emphasized the need to understand the security aspects of illegal migration. The 9/11 Commission report points out that practically no communication existed between the security system and the immigration department. Unchecked and unregulated migration flows together with high fertility rates could create an explosive situation. While urbanization is prompting migration towards industrialized nations\, the author pointed to lax immigration control which allowed terrorism to grow thus weakening the internal security. He pointed out that the main problem inherent with illegal migration was the lack of cooperation of Bangladesh on the issue. He pointed out that sending migrants to other countries is the undeclared objective of the foreign policy of Bangladesh. \nThough attempts have been made in India to prevent illegal migration\, they have been relatively weak. The author stated that the socio-political movement started by the Assamese people in 1979 to evict illegal Bangladeshis ended in Assam Accord in 1985. In April\, 2005 a youth organization\, Chiring Chapori Yuva Mancha began a campaign against the illegal Bangladeshi immigrants. Illegal Bangladeshi Migrants are also threat to language and culture of Assam. ULFA which arose as a protest against Bangladeshis lost credibility only when its leaders took shelter in Bangladesh after the Bhutanese operation against the group in December 2003. Arrest of Bangladeshi national S. M. Alam in January 2008 by Assam Police revealed ISI’s plan to turn northeast into a volatile region. The migrants have also spread into other places like Dimapur and Kohima. The illegal migrants are not involved into terrorism in a big way\, but involved in gun running\, fake currency rackets and drug running. \nGrowing population pressure in Bangladesh acts as a push factor whereas growing Indian economy\, relatively less pressure on land and weak state resistance act as pull factor. Islamic fundamentalist extremist groups are growing in Bangladesh and they are able to expand their activities in West Bengal as well. Some of such organistaions are Jamait-e-Islami-e-Hind\, Jamait-Ahle-Hadis\, Students Islamic Organization (SIO)\, Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) and Tabligh-e-Jamat. Four of them are most active.  Meetings have taken place between Jamaat-e-Islami and West Bengal based radical Muslim organizations and it is believed that ISI is behind them. There has been a growth of unauthorized\, illegal madrassas all over West Bengal particularly along the Bangladesh border. They are also using Kolkota and Agartala as bases being close to the border and people from both sides speak the same language. There are also groups which are directly involved in subversive activities such as HUJI. \nSiliguri town acts as gateway to Guwahati\, Gangtok and Kishengunj and also shares the border with Bangladesh\, Bhutan and Nepal. Important highways\, railways tracks\, vital installations such as the airfields of Bagdogra and Hashimara and oil pipelines are located here. Increase in Muslim population in Siliguri and adjoining areas has grown at an astonishing 150% in the past seven years. There are villages in and around Siliguri which have curious population mix and often act as heaven for ISI operatives. The villages have some 2\,000 Pashto and Baloch settlers from Afghanistan along with 6\,000 Iraninas. The increased activity of the ISI has endangered the security of the Siliguri corridor. ISI attempted sabotage in 1999 following a bomb blast at New Jalpaiguri Station. \nOptions for India:\n\nDiplomatic Effort – India has to make diplomatic effort to get Bangladesh to cooperate as illegal migration cannot be solved in an effective manner unless sending country cooperates. Sharing of digital database of its citizens will make it easier.\nFinancial Incentives: India should think of offering illegal migrants financial incentives in the form of liberal trade regime\, an infusion of aid and investment.\nCoercive Diplomacy- The action of security forces should clearly convey to the illegal migrants that they would face greater danger if they try to cross the border. \nBetter Border Management- Fencing\, construction of border roads and proper management of border will make a difference\nUse better Indo-Bangladesh relations- Both the countries have better relations and both side should demarcate remaining 6.5 km of the border and the areas in adverse possession should be negotiated and form well defined border\nUnique Identification Number (UID) scheme – Compilation of data is likely to reduce the comfort level of fresh illegal migrants.\nBar from Voting rights- Bangladeshi who are already in could be allowed to work but should not be allowed to vote and this will diminish their ability to influence government decisions by being a political force.\n\nThe author concluded by pointing out that the illegal Bangladeshi migration was not the core focus of the government but it has been forced to take a close look at the problem as the terror incidents grew in intensity and frequency. He emphasized that India must go for better border management and effective record keeping of its nationals so that outsiders are easily identified and discouraged from infiltrating.   \nDiscussion:\n\nMigration started from partition. Delhi had policy to monitor Bangladeshis to be settled down in Assam. Most of the Pakistani terrorists present in Kashmir enter via Bangladesh and Nepal. Government should do a lot to solve this problem seriously. \nIt’s a complex situation; BSF alone cannot solve the problem. It has socioeconomic and religious dimensions. Density of troops at the border is also lacking so government should provide more troops. For the economically deprived\, criminality is the way of life. The UID card shares only few details that make it difficult to recognize them. Even readmission agreement will not work but better border management is required.\nThe theoretical and international context of migration should be shortened. Terrorists have used the route but illegal Bangladeshi migrants are not charged of terrorist activities. Out of 7 terrorist organizations\, only SIMI is banned. Others continue to have fraternal links with organizations in Bangladesh and West Bengal.\nThe concept should differentiate legal and illegal aspects of migration. The paper needs to have hypotheses.\nThe issue is economic. Illegal migrants act as cheap labour. As Bangladesh cannott expand its space for the huge population\, the expansion is through the illegal migration. Work permit for them is the partial answer\, the problem also have political context. \n\nReport Prepared by Mr Pramod Jaiswal\, Research Assistant\, IDSA
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/illegal-bangladeshi-migration-to-india-impact-on-internal-security
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100528T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100528T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T014939
CREATED:20231223T221707Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130247Z
UID:63652-1275024600-1275024600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Madhesi Movement in Nepal: Implications for India
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Nihar Nayak began by offering some basic facts about the Madhesi movement. Although there exist a number of versions about what the word ‘Madhes’ stands for\, the most popular or accepted version is that it refers to ‘Madhya-desh’\, a region between the hills and the plains. Also known as ‘Terai’\, Madhes region consists of twenty districts\, all of which share their borders with India. Many Madhesis are of Indian origin and thus have strong socio-cultural ethnic linkages across the border. In the paper\, Dr. Nayak flagged three questions: Is the Madhes issue likely to bring in deep-rooted conflict in Nepal? Can external forces take advantage of the situation to India’s detriment? How will Madhesi politics determine the future of Nepal politics and India-Nepal relations in the future?   \nOver the years\, Madhesis have suffered from a sense of discrimination and consequent deprivation. They also feel exploited and discriminated against by the upper caste Pahadi migrant communities. Hindi-speaking Indian Madhesis particularly feel discriminated against by the Nepali state due to the following factors. Firstly\, Indian Madhesis\, under the Citizenship Act of 1964 and the Constitution of 1990\, were debarred from citizenship certificates\, due to which they could neither acquire land ownership nor could avail government benefits. Although the Citizenship Law was amended in November 2006 making it possible for people born in Nepal before 1990 and those residing there permanently to acquire Nepali citizenship\, it has been alleged that many Madhesis and Dalits are still deprived of citizenship. It has also been alleged that instead of taking into consideration the Madhesis’ cultural affiliation with India\, the Nepali government has adopted a discriminatory attitude towards this group by trying to introduce compulsory Nepali language for both official work and as the medium of education in the Madhes region. Despite the fact that the Madhesi population constitutes nearly one-third of the Nepali population\, their share at the level of gazetted level employees is merely 9.9 per cent. Madhesi people have also voiced concerns about the economic exploitation of the resource-rich Madhes region by the Nepali government. Although Madhes contributes 70 per cent of the agricultural production of Nepal\, 65 per cent of the GDP\, and 76 per cent of the country’s total revenue\, the infrastructure in this region is considered to be much poorer than in the hill areas. Allegations have also been made regarding how during the monarchy\, in the name of land reform\, land belonging to Madhesi people were given away to Pahadis.  \nA feeling of deprivation and exploitation made the Terai or Madhes region a hub of the pro-democratic movement during the 1950s and 1960s. During that time\, perceiving India as anti-establishment and the Madhesis as India’s agents\, and fearing that Indian immigrants in Terai might prompt India to claim it as Indian territory\, the Nepali elite adopted stringent policies to curb the Madhesis’ activism. But this led to the emergence of identity-based movement in Madhes\, particularly with the formation of two groups: the Nepal Terai Vongress led by Vedanta Jha in 1951 and the Madhesi Mukti Andolan led by Raghunath Thakur in 1956. At present\, numerous political parties and non-state actors are involved in the Madhesi cause. In this context\, examples of Madhesi Janadhikar Forum (MJF)\, Terai Madhesh Loktantrik Party (TMLP)\, etc.\, can be particularly cited. There also exist a number of major armed groups in the Terai region\, such as the Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha (JTMM)\, Terai Cobra\, Nepal Defence Army (NDA)\, Nepal Janatantrik Party (NJP)\, and Chure Bhawar Ekta Samaj (CBES). Although all these forces are involved in armed revolution in Nepal\, there seems to be a divergence in the goals each of them aspires to achieve. While JTMM demands the establishment of an autonomous Terai region\, and Terai Cobra aspires to launch an armed separatist struggle for a sovereign Terai state\, the objective of NDA is to form a Hindu army with suicide bombers to fight against religious extremism\, conversion\, as well as Maoists. Similarly\, while as a royalist outfit\, the NJP aspires to retain constitutional monarchy and multiparty democracy in Nepal\, the CBES basically demands the establishment of a Chure Bhawar federal region in Terai and is opposed to ‘one Madhesh one Pradesh’ demand.  \nThere are reports of ‘internal tensions and lack of clarity on immediate demands and long term strategy’ of Madhesi groups. While the Madhes-based parties take a soft stand on the issue\, the armed groups are demanding nothing less than sovereignty. Moreover\, the Madhesi political parties are in a dilemma especially regarding whom to take sides with among the major parties. They cannot support a liberal democratic government in Kathmandu as their autonomy demand would be lost. They cannot really support the Maoists basically due to the prevailing fear of losing a multi-party democratic system in Nepal under a Maoist led government. In the meantime\, due to their involvement in kidnapping\, killing and extortion\, some armed groups involved in the Madhesi cause are often dismissed as criminals by most Madhesis themselves. In this scenario of diffused leadership and objectives\, the future of the Madhes cause remains uncertain. \nIn his presentation\, Dr. Nayak tried to draw attention to the fact that unstable Nepal\, particularly the border regions of Terai\, can provide avenues for both China and Pakistan to encourage anti-India elements there\, through arms and fake currency trafficking\, madrasas\, terrorist outfits\, etc. Reportedly\, China has already extended its support to the faction of the MFJ led by Upendra Yadav. In recent time\, the United States too has taken particular interest in the developments of Madhesi region. Although it has listed JTMM on the US terrorist list\, it granted a visa to Upendra Yadav to attend the Terai Diaspora event held in Washington.  \nOver the years\, while treating Madhesi issue as an internal matter of Nepal which can be resolved by accommodating minority rights within the new Constitution\, India has largely taken a stance of non-interference. Even then\, the Pahadis often allege India of encouraging the ‘one Madhes\, one Pradesh’ demand. According to Dr. Nayak\, if such perceptions gain further ground\, it would aggravate the prevailing anti-India sentiments in Nepal and consequently give more space to China and Pakistan to use Nepal as a hotbed for anti-India activities. Ironically\, the Madhesis accuse India of neglecting the Madhesi movement. Recently\, in June 2009\, allegations were raised regarding India’s involvement in engineering divisions in the MJF. Debate has also been brewing in the Terai that the Madhesis have failed to take any concrete decision about their future because of India’s support for the liberal democratic parties opposed to ethnic-based federalism.  \nAccording to Dr. Nayak\, anti-Indianism of the Madhes movement is likely to affect India’s economic interests in Nepal. Frequent protests will affect India’s trade and commercial relations with Nepal. It will also affect India’s hydroelectric projects and the business operations of Indian investors in Nepal. Since the Terai is the link between India and northern Nepal\, a troubled Terai may affect “every major highway\, custom point. The industrial\, economic\, and other fertile resources of Nepal are in Madhesh\, helping circulate trade relationship.”  \nUnder the prevailing circumstances\, India is faced with certain difficult choices. Any constructive attempt by India to salvage the Terai situation through proactive involvement is likely to be interpreted as unnecessary intervention in the internal affairs of Nepal and upset its Pahadi constituency and Nepal Army. At another level\, passive indifference to developments in Terai will be misconstrued as shirking of responsibility by observers at home as well as by the Madhesis themselves. India cannot possibly afford to ignore developments in Nepal and especially the discrimination in Terai. At present\, the best approach for India seems to be to work as a positive facilitator to strengthen the capacity of various democratic institutions to resolve the social tensions in Nepal in general and in Terai in particular. Given India’s leverages in Nepal\, India could also make an earnest effort to bring all political parties together to have a dialogue on the contentious issues.  \nImportant points raised during the discussion of the paper: \n\nFrom a topographical point of view\, Nepal is vulnerable to both India and China. Terai is not only important for India\, but also for Nepal itself. Over the years\, the Nepali government has been trying to make this place inhabited by people ‘friendlier to them’ and people who look like them. The sentiment behind taking such stance by the Nepali government should be respected by the Indian government. \nIn this paper\, more space should be devoted to analyse the impact of the Madhesi movement on India. \nIndia’s concern about the Madhesi problem cannot be anything more than neighbourly.\nNepal suffers from paranoia of being encircled by India. But it does not seem to have a similar problem with respect to China. India has to understand this psyche among the Nepalese.\nThe Madhesi problem should be studied in relation to the challenge of governance that Nepal is currently facing.\nThe strong sense of opportunism among Madhesi leaders makes it difficult for India to get involved in this movement.\nIndian policy vis-à-vis Nepal since the Maoist uprising in 1997 has been to keep other players out of it. But this policy seems to have misfired particularly because of the involvement of so many external actors in it. \nGeo-strategic importance of the Terai region should be analysed in the paper.\nThere is a need to mention the Jan Andolan III.\nThe clash between Madhesis and Maoists in which 21 Maoists were killed should be mentioned. \nDue to Madhesi identity\, Maoist influence in Terai has weakened considerably. Madhesis are expected to become future kingmaker of Nepal. India needs to take that factor into account.\nWith the advent of democracy\, the Muslim vote bank in the Terai has become important.\nThe paper needs to clarify the significant factors for the potential of conflict in Terai. Those factors are basically identified as intra-Madhesi conflict\, Pahadi-Madhesi conflict\, and elements of communal violence. \nIndia should try to harmonize Madhesi politics. It should particularly take interest in brining about economic development in Terai region.\nIndia’s role in brokering the 8-point agreement between the Madhesis and the government should be highlighted. \nFuture of Madhesi politics should be analysed in the paper.\nThe paper also needs to bring out ordinary Madhesi people’s perception about India.\n\nReport prepared by Pranamita Barua\, Research Assistant\, IDSA
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/madhesi-movement-in-nepal-implications-for-india
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100604T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100604T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T014939
CREATED:20231223T221707Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T104317Z
UID:63651-1275629400-1275629400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Radical Islam in the West & South Asia post-26/11: An Exploratory Study
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Prof. Kalim BahadurDiscussants: Brig.(retd.) Rahul Bhonsle and Prof. Anwar Alam \n \nOn June 4\, 2010 Mr. Alok Mukhopadhyay\, an Associate Fellow at IDSA presented his paper titled: “Radical Islam in the West & South Asia post – 26/11: An Exploratory Study.” He started the seminar by summarizing the main points of his paper\, which were divided in four sections. The presentation was divided into sections titled: 1) Radical Islam rising in the US\, 2) Rise and Fall of ‘Londonistan’\, 3) Jihad Jane: New faces of Radical Islam in the West\, and 4) Hyphenated identity or Hyper-Identity.  \nIn the section titled ‘radical Islam rising in the US’ it was noted that the nature of radicalism in the US was remarkably different from that in Europe. Fewer numbers and a higher level of prosperity of Muslim immigrants in the US has meant that Islamic Activism is much less in the US\, in comparison to Europe which has a longer association with Muslim immigrants who came to Europe for blue collared jobs. The Rise and Fall of ‘Londonistan’\, which is an uncomplimentary sobriquet given to radical Islamic activities in London and its mythical tolerance of these activities was mentioned to illuminate the fact that UK has been under a ‘severe’ terrorist threat since January 2010.   \n‘Jihad Jane: New faces of Radical Islam in the West’ in essence argues that many converts to Islam in the West have been radicalized and have been involved in militant activities\, posing a new angle to Islamic radicalism which now seems to be influencing even converts who come from varied backgrounds. Hyphenated identity or Hyper-Identity\, which refers to the plurality in the identity of the migrant youth population (examples\, Pakistani-American\, Turkish-German\, etc.) has been an issue of concern lately. They are seen to be vulnerable to radicalization because of their inability to integrate into Western society for various reasons including prejudice and hence are facing an identity crisis. Mr. Mukhopadhyay pointed out that in the US Muslims becoming terrorists could be better explained by individual pathology than by rising Islamic militancy due to group dissatisfaction.  \nIt is believed that Europe has experienced relative success compared to the US in checking the proliferation of radicalism among sections of the Muslim youth by focusing more on monitoring and prediction of radical behavior which leads to early prevention of attacks. On the other hand\, inadequate information about terrorist networks\, especially in the Af-Pak region\, has led the US to resort to drone attacks which has also led to collateral damage which in turn has increased America’s unpopularity among the Muslim community and has further fueled radical ideologies. The burgeoning international profile of India as an important country and Indians traveling all over the world for business and education has increased the risk of some young Indians being recruited by terrorist networks in many Western cities. The June 2007 terrorist incident in Glasgow was indeed a watershed moment when a young Indian professional was found to be a terrorist. Therefore Mr. Alok Mukhopadhyay stated that security and intelligence cooperation between Western countries and India would benefit India given aforementioned risks and the unstable security situation in South Asia\, especially in the Af-Pak region.  \nIn the discussion that followed Mr. Mukhopadhyay’s presentation\, many issues were discussed. The importance of transnational efforts to de-radicalize was emphasized by pointing out distinct differences in the way the US and Europe have been tackling radicalization. It was suggested that the US has a more nebulous policy towards de-radicalization unlike Europe. It was also suggested that this may be the case because of the relatively recent origins of radicalization within the US. It was noted that India’s de-radicalization policy has been fairly successful and that Western countries could study India’s de-radicalization methods to strengthen their own de-radicalization efforts. Although Pakistan has emerged as the hot bed for Islamic radicalization\, it was noted that no visible steps of de-radicalization had been taken in Pakistan.  \nIt was also suggested that the term ‘radical Islam’ was problematic and a suitable alternative had to be found. Though there was a general consensus about the problematic nature of the term and the need to re-evaluate the terminology\, the lack of a ready alternative led some participants to conclude that people had to compromise with the existing terminology until scholars come up with an acceptable terminology in the future.  \nIn the discussion it was suggested that America’s role in promoting extremism is an important feature that helps explain\, at least to a degree\, the existence of what has come to be known as Islamic extremism. Their support for the Mujahideen during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan is well known and documented. It was implied that Islamic extremism is a phenomenon which has developed into what it is today partly because of US support for extremism in the past decades. It was also stated during the discussion that there was a need to scrutinize\, if not challenge\, the extremist interpretations of Islam by the Islamic community worldwide. If the extremist groups could be theologically ‘defeated’\, eradicating extremism from the minds of the affected sections of the people would become much easier.  \nFinally\, it was mentioned that integration becomes difficult and fault lines become wider during times of economic downturn when fewer resources have to be shared. This leads to a ‘clash of civilization’ scenario where one community is seen as encroaching upon the resources and culture of the host community. As an off shoot effect\, many (not all) young Muslims have voluntarily decided to wear the hijab and burkha\, or have decided to sport beards to assert their identities. On a brighter note\, it was perhaps implied that economic recovery in the future may help ease the tensions between the migrant and host communities. Although an economic boom by itself would not help bridge differences\, it may very well provide a fertile ground for the same.  \nReport prepared by Prashant S. Hosur\, Research Assistant\, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/radical-islam-in-the-west-south-asia-post-26-11-an-exploratory-study
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100611T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100611T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T014939
CREATED:20231223T221707Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130247Z
UID:63650-1276234200-1276234200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:From Islamization to Talibanization: Pakistan's drift towards 'Lebanonisation'
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Prof. Satish KumarDiscussants: Shri A. K. Verma and Prof. Savita Pande \n \nPaper Summary\nThe creation of Pakistan was a unique human-political experiment\, in which an effort was made to create an Islamic\, but sectarian-secular state in which state and religion were to co-exist side-by-side and the socio-political interaction of its subjects was not to be affected by their differing sectarian Islamic identities\, beliefs\, practices and commitments. It was the Barelvis of North India and the Muslim Leaguers of Central India\, East Bengal and West Punjab who spearheaded the movement for creation of a separate homeland for the Muslims of the sub-continent. Later\, they were joined by the Deobandis\, to create a truly Islamic Pakistan in which the Islamic Law – the Shariat – would be supreme. The 1956 Constitution of Pakistan declared Pakistan to be an “Islamic Republic”. \nIn the 1970s\, the concept of Pan-Islamism encouraged by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was instrumental in building a close linkage between Pakistan’s radical Deobandis and the Saudi Wahabis. This increased cooperation had major implications for the growth of radical Islam in Pakistan in particular and in the entire region as a whole in the next decade. Radicalism received a further boost as the madarssas run by Deobandi groups like the Jammat-e-Islami (JI) and other radical Islamic right groups began to be used to brainwash and indoctrinate the youth. The next phase in radicalization of Pakistani Islam under Deobandi influence came during General Zia-ul Haq’s period. General Zia contended that since Pakistan was created in the name of Islam\, it should be supreme in the country.  \nIn the late 1970s\, the Soviet entry into Afghanistan enabled Pakistan to play the great game of espionage and subversion in Afghanistan. Pakistani Islamic parties could also operationalise a wider plan for launching global Islamic activism under Pakistani leadership.  By the end of 1980\, not only massive US military and economic aid was flowing into Pakistan for the Pakistanis and the mujahideen\, also\, over 1 million Afghan refugees entered Pakistan. They became the recruiting ground for the Afghan Islamic mujahideen groups and their Pakistani Deobandi/Wahabi supporters.  \nIn the 1990s\, a group of 200 theological students from Pakistani Deobandi Islamic seminaries – the Taliban (Students) – mysteriously emerged and entered Kandahar from Pakistan. With clear Pakistani official directions and overt and covert assistance\, they took over arms and other local assets of Afghan warlords\, including those of Gulbudin Hikmatyar. Soon\, except for the northern parts of Afghanistan\, the Taliban brought almost the entire country under its control. They began to implement strictest Shariat as per the Deobandi interpretation. Afghanistan was declared by the Taliban as “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan” in 1996 after the capture of Kabul.  \nDuring post 9/11 period\, Pakistan had to end its open support for the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. It was also forced to get more deeply involved with US operations against Taliban/Al-Qaeda in return for easing of US sanctions and receiving massive economic and military assistance from it. However\, these measures were either merely cosmetic\, or were not taken to their logical end and remained half-hearted\, designed to please western audiences. \nAfter the fall of Taliban in late 2001\, Pakistani militants siding with them came back home to further the experiment of introducing Islamic order as per Deobandi/Wahabi precepts in the tribal hinterland of Swat and other areas of FATA. Pakistani government’s inadequacy in dealing with the Taliban became apparent in April 2009 as President Asif Ali Zardari sanctified an agreement (also known as the Swat deal) through an ordinance imposing Shariat in the Swat Valley and the surrounding areas effectively empowering the Taliban and other groups. This followed the passage of a unanimous resolution on the subject by the Pakistani Parliament.   \nAccording to the author\, the core of the problem lies in the lack of public debate within Pakistan over issues regarding how to deal with the present danger from radical Islam. He\, however\, believes that it would still be difficult to Talibanize the whole Pakistani society. The Taliban are likely to encounter stiff resistance from the Barelvis (constituting more than 50 per cent of Pakistani Muslims)\, the Shias (constituting roughly 30 per cent)\, Muhajirs and the ethnic Sindhis.  \nThe Pakistan Army and the ISI now appear to be plumping for exploiting the mass-based evangelical movement of Tabligh Jamaat (TJ) to ideologically take on the Taliban and their allies. However\, if TJ begins to undercut Taliban’s ideological base\, the latter may take recourse to targeting TJ leaders and cadres as it has done with Barelvis and others. That would either dissipate TJ influence as an ideological counter to the Taliban\, or force it to arm itself for self-defence. If that happens\, it could be the actual beginning of ‘Lebanonization’ of Pakistan. Under this situation\, the country could get carved up in various pockets of militarised ethno-sectarian influences and as a consequence the reach and the role of the Government and its institutions may be truncated\, creating a Lebanon-like situation. \nPK Upadhyay concluded the paper by stating that Pakistan can still overcome this serious existential challenge. For that it has to totally transform itself from what it has become in the past sixty years since independence. It has to make the tough choice of either picking up the secularist trail of Jinnah or choosing to go the Lebanese way. \nDiscussion and Suggestions\n\nThe paper does not offer a clear idea regarding where Pakistan might be headed in the future.\nFuture impact of Islamic radicalization of Pakistan on India should be analysed.\nThe paper also needs to analyse the following questions: Can Pakistani military continue to remain united as radicalization spreads? Is Pakistani military likely to radicalize as well? If either of these two possibilities occur\, what will happen to the state of Pakistan? Can the US stabilize Pakistani state? What will be the geo-political impact of such scenarios on India?\nWhat are the author’s own perception regarding the three main words in the title of the paper — i.e.\, islamization\, talibanization and Lebanonization?\nThe paper should be contextualized in terms of how Islam works in Pakistan.\nThe debate over Pakistani Taliban and Afghan Taliban need to be analysed.\nWhat are the possibilities of jihadi groups acquiring nuclear weapons?\nIs it in India’s interest to speed up Pakistan’s drift towards Lebanonization?\nWhat is the role of madrassas in spreading terror?\nWhat is Pakistan’s counterinsurgency approach to dealing with jihadis? \nIf fundamental changes are to occur in Pakistan\, what should be the policy India needs to adopt in the next 10-15 years? \nAs majority of Pakistanis belong to Barelvi group who follow moderate Islam\, Talibanization of Pakistan cannot succeed.\nPakistanization of al-Qaeda can be discussed in the paper.       \nPakistan was initially a Muslim state and not an Islamic state. \nRole of drug money\, small arms smuggling in radicalization needs to be studied.\nThe problem in Pakistan at present lies in CIA’s decision to ask ISI to deal with the mujahedeen. \nPakistan’s role in jihad is in tune with jihadi instincts within its people and military personnel. \nThe threat that looms ahead of Pakistan is of fragmentation.\nThe civil war in Pakistan is led by Pushtoons with Salafi ideas. \n\nReport prepared by Pranamita Baruah\, Research Assistant\, IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/from-islamization-to-talibanization-pakistans-drift-towards-lebanonisation
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100618T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100618T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T014939
CREATED:20231224T104317Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T050155Z
UID:64165-1276839000-1276839000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Perceptions of India’s Neighbourhood Policy in Bangladesh
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Shri Rajiv SikriDiscussants: Amb. Veena Sikri and Prof. Partho S Ghose
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/perceptions-of-indias-neighbourhood-policy-in-bangladesh
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100625T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100625T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T014939
CREATED:20231224T104217Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T050048Z
UID:64164-1277443800-1277443800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:The Emerging Nuclear Security Regime: Challenges Ahead
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Ambassador R Rajagopalan\nDiscussants: Shri R Ramachandran and Dr V Siddhartha
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-emerging-nuclear-security-regime-challenges-ahead
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100702T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100702T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T014939
CREATED:20231223T221702Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130246Z
UID:63648-1278048600-1278048600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Emerging Strategic Scenario in the Western Indian Ocean Region
DESCRIPTION:Senior Research Associate Ruchita Beri presented a Fellows Paper on “Emerging Security Scenario in the Western Indian Ocean Region” on Friday\, July 2\, 2010. Commodore (Retd.) C. Uday Bhaskar chaired the session. \nThe author introduced the subject highlighting the strategic importance of the Western Indian Ocean Region for India. To underscore the importance of the topic\, Beri quoted Robert Kaplan who has dubbed the region as the “centre stage for the global struggles in the twentieth century.” In light of the self-evident and much-discussed strategic importance of the region in global politics\, she averred that since India was strategically placed in the region\, the prevailing security scenario in the region\, particularly the rise of piracy in Somali waters\, impacted on its national interest. Therefore\, it is incumbent on Indian security planners to keep a close watch on unfolding events in the region. \nBeri discussed the problem of piracy in the region at length. She traced the genesis of this problem to the collapse of Somalia’s Said Barre government in 1991. In the wake of the collapse\, anarchy-hit Somalia provided a fertile ground for the rise of piracy. Since then\, the problem of piracy has only aggravated. Various factors such as absence of a central authority\, massive unemployment\, depleting natural maritime resources and resentment against foreign exploitation of these resources have converted Somali fishermen into pirates. Now\, the gravity of the problem can be gauged by the fact that insurance companies have hiked the rates of insurance premium manifold for shipping companies seeking insurance cover for their ships passing through the waters off the Somali coast. Besides\, shipping companies are also redirecting their vessels via the Cape of Good Hope. But as the success stories of the Somali pirates are inspiring and encouraging pirates in areas such as Nigeria and South America\, the redirection of ships may provide only temporary relief. Beri also noted that the pirates enjoyed sympathy and support of the local communities because they were perceived as protectors of the Somali coast. In fact\, pirates describe themselves as “Coast Guards of Somalia”. Against this backdrop\, Beri delineated various initiatives and measures recently taken by the international community to curb piracy. However\, she pointed out the weaknesses in these attempts\, which arise from jurisdictional and other problems related to International Law. \nIn addition\, Beri also focused on the Chinese presence in the African continent. She explained how\, in the last twenty years\, China has embarked on active diplomacy in Africa. She analyzed the basic reasons that were guiding China’s Africa policy and argued that China’s overall geopolitical understanding was dictating its active diplomacy in Africa. China wants to offset the negative impact of American supremacy by having more and more alliances with non-Western powers. Besides\, it is desperate to secure as much African natural resources as possible for its own use and benefit. To maintain its high growth rate\, it is imperative for China to have uninterrupted access to energy resources wherever they are available in the world.  \nBeri stated that the phenomenal rise of the Chinese presence in the Western Indian Ocean Region and the rise of piracy in the region are matters of grave security concern for India. She noted that over 100 Indian citizens have been kidnapped and several Indian naval ships have been deployed in the region. The author was of the view that the Indian Navy seemed to be more aggressive than its Chinese counterpart in acting against the pirates. She also narrated various regional and bilateral measures adopted by India aimed at counterbalancing the Chinese presence in the region. \nDiscussion\nAmbassador Rajiv Bhatia commented that while it is an excellent paper\, the connection between the rise of piracy in the western India Ocean Region and China’s presence there needs to be established in the introductory section of the paper. Further\, he remarked that India should link up with piracy affected parties to curb this problem. Besides\, India should follow a frank and forthcoming diplomacy in intra-Africa disputes. It should not be shy of taking a stand on intra-Africa disputes. He argued that India must not ignore the Chinese presence in the region\, though it also need not lament over it. In addition\, India should not copy the Chinese model of business with African countries. India should monitor China and intensify its engagement with Africa.  \nDr. Vijay Sakhuja commented that a lot of international activities were going on in the region\, though little was being done for regional capacity building. He cautioned that military sales in the region must be carefully watched. Finally\, he advised the author that the conclusion of the paper needed to be made a bit more substantive. \nConstantino Xavier commented that China’s presence in the region and its security stakes in the region needed to be elaborated upon more. He also said that there was a greater need of defining the Indian security stakes in the region\, and security implications of the regional security scenario for India.  \nIskander Rahman noted that it would be an interesting to know how naval rivalry between India and China would affect the region. \nFinally\, Uday Bhaskar argued that a maritime perspective of history – though still developing – needs to be employed to make the study more substantive. \nPrepared by Dr. Prashant Kumar Singh\, Research Assistant\, IDSA
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/emerging-strategic-scenario-in-the-western-indian-ocean-region
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100709T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100709T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T014939
CREATED:20231223T221702Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130246Z
UID:63645-1278653400-1278653400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Securing Andaman and Nicobar islands
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Admiral (Retd.) P S DasDiscussants: Cmde Ashok Sawhney and Cdr Shishir Upadhyaya \n \nPaper Summary\nIndia’s forward presence in the eastern Indian Ocean is enabled by the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. The location and geography of these Islands impart them with immense strategic importance. The archipelago forms India’s southeast frontier. It is also nearer to Southeast Asia than to the Indian mainland (approximately 1200 km away). The 780 km linear extension of the island gives it an extensive north-south spread in the Bay of Bengal\, ideal for generating domain awareness\, which could be utilized for countering traditional and non-traditional threats. The propinquity of these islands to the busy shipping lanes\, especially Malacca strait\, not only provides India with an opportunity to play an important role in the security of the sea lines of communication\, but also to use these islands as a transshipment hub\, a bunkering facility or a duty free port. Proximity of the archipelago to the Southeast Asian countries enables India to foster friendly relations by engaging them through joint operations. It also helps India in keeping abreast of the political and military developments in its extended neighbourhood.  \nAt the same time\, the physical distance and remoteness of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands from the Indian mainland contribute to their vulnerability to both conventional and non-conventional threats. At present\, the probability of a conventional threat to the island chain from its immediate neighbours appears remote. However\, a military threat to the islands could emanate in the form of a possible intervention in the Bay of Bengal by an extra regional power\, especially China\, given its dependence on sea borne supply lines in the Indian Ocean and the need to secure them both from non-state actors and potential adversaries such as the United States and India. Towards this end\, China has been diligently developing port and other infrastructural facilities in the Indian Ocean littoral. While China and the littoral states have maintained that the infrastructure being established is purely for commercial use\, utilization of these facilities by China during a conflict cannot be ruled out. And as part of its distant sea defence strategy\, China now seeks to project its naval supremacy as far as West Asia and to the shipping lanes of the Pacific by deploying warships as escorts for its commercial vessels. Moreover\, for tracking India’s capability and strengths in the Bay of Bengal\, China has been allegedly engaged in gathering intelligence stealthily through various means. Existence of a Chinese naval fleet in the vicinity would also greatly limit the range and extent of Indian naval operations.  \nHowever\, currently what seem to be a cause of immediate concern are non-conventional threats like poaching\, illegal settlements\, gunrunning and use of A&N’s uninhabited islands as hideaways by terrorist groups and smugglers\, and natural disasters. Poaching has emerged as the biggest problem for the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Several factors have contributed to the emergence of these islands as a magnet for poachers. Firstly\, the fishing industry in the islands is underdeveloped. Secondly\, the existence of isolated and uninhabited islands scattered far and wide serves as ideal hideaways for poachers. And finally\, the existing policy of detaining the arrested poachers in a camp\, and then repatriating them to their country in conformity with international law\, has taken away the element of deterrence. Another security concern for the Andaman and Nicobar Islands is the issue of illegal settlements. The trend of illegal Bangladeshi settlers has increased in the aftermath of the Tsunami Rehabilitation work. Dearth of labourers has meant that they are hired from the mainland but who continue to reside in the Island group permanently. The misuse of the Andaman Sea and various uninhabited islands of the archipelago for drug trafficking and gunrunning remains another issue of grave concern. Anti-smuggling operations have revealed that many islands of the archipelago are used as sanctuaries or trans-shipment bases by gunrunners\, terrorists and insurgents. The Andaman and Nicobar Islands are also prone to natural disasters such as earthquakes and volcano eruptions. The Tsunami of 2004 bears testimony to the destruction of life and property caused by gigantic sea waves\, especially to the Nicobar Islands.  \nFollowing the India-China border in 1962 war\, the security of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands was reviewed and the Indian Navy was assigned the responsibility of defending the Island territory. This led to the establishment of a forward naval base\, INS Jarawa\, at Port Blair in 1964. In 1981\, INS Jarawa was rechristened as FORTAN. In 2001\, the Group of Ministers’ Report on ‘reforming the national security system’ recommended replacing FORTAN with a joint Andaman and Nicobar Command. Broadly\, the functions of ANC can be divided into three categories – military\, diplomatic and constabulary.  The military role\, especially during peace time\, involves maintaining deterrence through Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA)\, ensuring physical presence in the area of interest\, and conducting joint exercises. On the diplomatic level\, ANC has been involved in initiatives like Milan\, a biennial gathering of navies of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) for the purpose of promoting regional cooperation and mutual understanding of maritime issues of common concern. Constabulary function for the ANC primarily involves enforcement of the rule of law at sea and conducting low intensity maritime operations to prevent poaching\, illegal migration\, narcotics and arms smuggling.  \nChallenges to securing the Andaman and Nicobar Islands come from a variety of factors. Prominent among them are a difficult topography\, inadequate infrastructure and manpower\, lack of coordination\, inefficient intelligence and pervasive under-development. Concerted efforts are being made by the government to plug the infrastructural gaps for enhancing surveillance\, air defence and coastal security. Assets and manpower are being strengthened. For example\, plans are afoot for building two air bases at Shibpur and Campbell Bay after the airstrips there are lengthened and night operation facilities are provided to enable them to operate all types of aircraft round the clock. A proposal for establishing additional Coast Guard stations at Havelock and Ranggat has been forwarded. The marine police have completed vulnerability gap analysis and have proposed the augmentation of manpower and assets. Besides the development of infrastructure\, grey areas that hamper the effective functioning of the security forces need to be addressed. Firstly\, better coordination between various security agencies\, especially between Coast Guard\, police and forest department has to be ensured. A MDA among them should be created and the SOP needs to be standardized at the earliest.  For the intelligence gathering process both HUMINT and TECHINT need to be made strong and fluent. Above all\, a holistic development of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands has to be undertaken. Tourism can act as a catalyst for the development of the islands as a tourist hub.  \nDiscussion and Suggestions\n\nThere needs to be a change in India’s attitude towards Andaman and Nicobar. Instead of defending it\, Andaman and Nicobar islands should be viewed as the first line of defence.\nThe main aim of India in Andaman and Nicobar region should be to assess the threats from China and Pakistan and build measures to counter them.\nThe importance of the trade routes surrounding the archipelago is bound to increase as India’s trade with China and ASEAN is set to increase in future.\nIndia has not fully realized the importance of the 10 Degree Channel and 6 Degree Channel\, while China is fully aware of the importance of these two important trade routes.\nThe isolated location of these islands is the major problem that India faces.\nA highly efficient surveillance network is a must to monitor non-conventional threats.\nThe communication network needs to be developed to carry out efficient surveillance and monitoring.\nMore manpower and modernization of equipment is a must.\nPeople are as vital an aspect as they can be in the region and genuine attention needs to be paid to grievances of the tribal people of Andaman and Nicobar Islands.\nThe internal political disturbances in South East Asian nations could have a spill over effect on the archipelago.\nBiological threats\, diseases like\, malaria\, SARS\, etc. should also be considered as part of non-conventional threats.\n\nReport prepared by Sana Hashmi\, an Intern at IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/securing-andaman-and-nicobar-islands
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100716T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100716T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T014939
CREATED:20231223T221438Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130246Z
UID:63643-1279258200-1279258200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Foreign Policy Trends in Pakistan
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Shri R BanerjiDiscussants: Prof. Kalim Bahadur and Prof. Savita Pande \n \nThe paper titled “Foreign Policy Trends in Pakistan” concerns itself with the context set by 9/11\, though its key objective was to analyse the most recent trends in Pakistan’s Foreign Policy. The central argument of the paper is that there is no consensus within Pakistan on the issue of relations with the United States and the rise of radical Islamist groups renders the evolution of such a consensus even more challenging.  \nKey Drivers of Pakistani Foreign Policy were identified as: \n\nIncreasing American Intrusiveness\nKarzai’s Inclination to Patch up with Pakistan\nIndia’s Impatience with Pakistan’s Response to Terrorism\nGarnering Continued Strategic Support from China\nMagnifying the India Threat by leveraging its Water Crisis\nEnsuring Adequate Energy Supplies\n\nMs. Kumar argued that within Pakistani circles\, mistrust of the US has increasingly less to do with Indo-US relations\, but about the American presence in the region. Citing examples of this\, she outlined its implications and consequent Pakistani reactions. She also examined the contradictions resulting from Pakistan’s policy objective of playing a central role in the reconciliation process in Afghanistan while simultaneously extending support to the Taliban\, the nature of which was further substantiated.  \nIn relation to India\, it was suggested that the tenor of the Pakistani attitude has been largely self–congratulatory in light of resumption of talks. It was contended moreover that the expected gains from the current round of talks must not be over-estimated. Recent co-operation between Pakistan and China was evaluated and understood as being inconsistent with international opinion and certain US policy pronouncements. Conclusion of the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline deal was deemed yet another instance of safeguarding national interest despite oppositional American pressures. \nThe paper’s overall assessment was that the US is likely to remain a significant element around which foreign policy in Pakistan is shaped. The US continues to perceive Pakistan as a crucial player in the Afghan theatre\, even as the latter has redoubled efforts to minimize the scope for active Indian participation. The argument was made in conclusion that dialogue for its own sake was certainly unlikely to resolve outstanding issues that cloud the Indo-Pakistani relationship.     \nExternal Discussants:\nProf. Kalim Bahadur: On certain very important issues\, national consensus within Pakistan remains intact\, for example the Kerry-Lugar Bill. Condemnation of deployment of non-state actors as instruments of policy was near non-existent in Pakistan. In the same vein\, actions directed by these elements against India enjoyed the tacit support of the establishment. The drone strikes launched from Pakistani soil delegitimised Pakistan’s overt stance that such American actions were counter to its sovereignty. Pakistan’s continued perception of its relationship with China as a useful hedge against both India and the US was also understood as vital to its foreign policy stance. \nProf. Savita Pande: “Memory”\, “external environment” and “state’s domestic composition” are determinants of foreign policy as argued by a recent academic work on the subject. At the institutional level\, there is lack of a clear delineation of responsibilities within the Pakistani establishment vis-à-vis external relations. Such entities as Blackwater were functioning in Pakistan with\, rather that in spite of\, the consent of the Pakistani leadership. Speaking in favour of maintaining an analytical distinction between the Afgan Taliban and the Pakistani Taliban\, Prof. Pande described the optimistic\, pessimistic and pragmatist positions which are all currently in vogue in Pakistan on the matter of dealing with the Pakistani Taliban. China’s pursuit of its own interests in the Af-Pak theatre was briefly examined to draw out lessons for India\, while on the Iran-Pakistan pipeline\, India’s centrality to the viability and success of this project was postulated. \nInternal Discussants\nDr. Behuria mentioned the importance of drawing an analytical distinction between objectives and drivers of foreign policy. Adding to the list of drivers on the domestic front\, he drew attention to the significance of economic decline and political clout of the military in shaping the context for foreign policy design in Pakistan.  \nOnce again separating drivers from relevant issues\, Dr. Kalyanaraman addressed important shifts in the Afghan scenario and corresponding attempts by Pakistan to reposition itself. He further identified the past year or so as the more closely relevant frame of reference for purposes of arriving at helpful conclusions about new developments in Pakistan’s foreign policy. The future of Afghanistan was singled out as a potently useful prism to anticipate Pakistan’s relationship with the US\, China\, Iran and India.  \nDiscussion\nThe need to explicitly comment on the extent to which foreign policy in Pakistan is influenced by the military was highlighted and it was suggested to consider ways in which greater civilian control over policy formulation would change its content and character. The author was suggested to give proposals on how the dialogue might be supplemented to attain key goals on the Indian side. It was advised that a considered assessment be made of greater Pakistani involvement in Afghanistan\, for reasons of achieving strategic depth\, in terms of the backlash that this would have for the Pakistani state. Pakistan’s attempts to strike a balance between its relations with the US and China was identified as meriting close observation. \nChair’s Summary\nThe chair took the view that consensus on key national issues in Pakistan has not quite broken down nor has the influence of the military sustained any erosion. He acknowledged a role for Pakistan in containing the effects of American involvement in Afghanistan while coping with the extremist blowback that this might incur. He concluded by thanking the gathering for a fruitful discussion. \nReport prepared by Kalyani Unkule\, Research Assistant\, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/foreign-policy-trends-in-pakistan
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100806T053000
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DTSTAMP:20261105T014939
CREATED:20231224T104217Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T045908Z
UID:64160-1281072600-1281072600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Nuclear Forensics
DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/nuclear-forensics
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100813T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100813T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T014939
CREATED:20231224T104121Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T045741Z
UID:64159-1281677400-1281677400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Implication of China's Civil Nuclear Cooperation with Pakistan
DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nChairperson: Shri K SanthanamDiscussants: Dr. R R Subramanyan & Shri S K Gupta
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/implication-of-chinas-civil-nuclear-cooperation-with-pakistan
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100820T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100820T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T014939
CREATED:20231223T221438Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130246Z
UID:63641-1282282200-1282282200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:The Institutional Origins and Strategic Determinants of India's Africa policy
DESCRIPTION:Elaborating on his approach to the paper Mr. Xavier disavowed both\, a reductionist/particularistic and an overly generalist/homogenizing prism to assessment of India’s foreign policy. He proceeded to identify a number of limitations relating to existing work on the subject of India in Africa\, including the clubbing together of China and India vis-à-vis Africa and the assumption\, rather that explicit pronouncement\, of a definitive policy posture of India in the region.  \nBriefly reviewing historical ties between India and Africa\, the presenter drew out both high and low points in the relationship. Economic drivers were identified as assuming the central role in determining the nature and direction of evolution of this relationship in the contemporary context.  \nThe key analytical contribution of the paper was identification of intra- and inter-institutional tensions and short-comings that have hindered optimization of India’s role in Africa. On the diplomatic side\, a certain image of African nations has long been responsible for a less than desired Indian presence. Relative informalisation of processes\, lack of continuity and near-absence of lateral co-operation amongst GoI Ministries and Missions in Africa were deemed serious lacunae on the practical side. \nAs far as academic work on Africa produced in India is concerned\, lack of emphasis on field work and consequent regurgitation of known facts and missing policy relevance were viewed as problematic. Business endeavour in Africa by Indian industry was also similarly described as plagued by poor background research. Co-operation between Ministries and business entities was referred to as a “constant fire-fighting exercise”\, resulting eventually in an absence of a coordinated\, concerted and coherent policy and action agenda. The relative merits of ad-hocism and a diffuse character of policy as opposed to one that is well substantiated were thrown up for discussion. \nExternal Discussant: Mr. C. Raja Mohan\nMr. Raja Mohan questioned the assumption that a lack of approximation of India’s model for foreign policy formulation with that of the United States is ipso facto suggestive of a weaker quality of expertise and intelligent input. He hypothesised that examination of certain specific historic episodes was likely to yield interesting insights – some of them departing with the idea that Non-alignment has been the dominant discourse on relations with Africa. On the question of India’s reaction to Apartheid for instance\, he raised the question as to whether this was inspired by anti-colonialism or a preference for universalism.  \nDespite public rhetoric to the contrary\, he emphasized emulation of and competition with China as an undeniably important driver of Indian policy in Africa. Methodologically\, he favoured actions and market-based decisions of business actors more closely rather than political signals as more potent conveyers of the progression of India’s role in Africa.   \nExternal Discussant: Mr. Navdeep Suri\nLauding efforts at public diplomacy by Indian actors in Africa\, Mr. Suri underscored the need for greater publicity for these measures. He emphasized the importance of boots on the ground to deliver desired policy outcomes as equally important\, if not more so\, than official policy pronouncements. He lamented the long-standing experience that the good-will accrued through India’s investment and aid involvement in Africa has failed to translate into tangible gains on the ground for India.  \nMr. Suri recommended better documentation of the “Africa in India” story for the positive ramifications this exercise is likely to yield. On the issue of competition with China he urged appreciation of India’s own unique strengths and an attempt to build on these.     \nInternal Discussants\nOne internal discussant described pan-Africanism as the cornerstone for any definition of policy on that region. She also suggested that the degree of exceptionalism of the problems identified on the institutional side by the paper as regards Africa needs to be established in light of comparative evidence. The value of incorporating views of the Indian military presence in Africa was also spoken in favour of.  \nAnother internal discussant came out in support of Democracy and Aid as crucial drivers meriting in-depth exploration. He recommended spelling out and countering of that image of Africa which gets in the way of its prioritization as a region. On the general trend in academic work on foreign policy in Africa\, he advocated a more theoretically embedded methodological approach.     \nOpen-floor Discussion\nOne participant suggested inclusion of sub-national actors on the African landscape to derive a richer analytical range. Another questioned the adequacy of a pan-African policy alone to incorporate diversity across the Continent. There was a suggestion that yardsticks against which the paper found Indian policy in Africa to come up short would do well to be explicitly set out. Concern was expressed over capacity-related inadequacies across most regions where India’s pursuit of its foreign policy objectives is concerned even as recent achievements were acknowledged.      \nChairs Summary\nThe chair portrayed the African continent as the land of the future. It was his view that India’s diplomatic presence in Africa has a number of achievements to boast of and has played a useful supporting role to India’s business enterprise in Africa. But he equally highlighted the need for recognition of Africa’s felt needs as the over-riding concern for Indian engagement. He took the opportunity to encourage the think tank community to continue making its contribution to influencing policy and educating the wider public.     \nReport prepared by Kalyani Unkule\, Research Assistant\, IDSA
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-institutional-origins-and-strategic-determinants-of-indias-africa-policy
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100827T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100827T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T014939
CREATED:20231223T221438Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130246Z
UID:63640-1282887000-1282887000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:50 years of Indus Water Treaty: Will it Survive?
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Satish ChandraDiscussants: B. G. Verghese and D.K. Mehta \n \nIn an attempt to question whether the Indus Water Treaty holds any tangible ground in today’s day and age\, this paper tracks the origins of the basic conflict\, its origins and the detailed history that eventually led to it being drafted and signed in 1960. In the light of the history of the treaty\, the authors have laid  emphasis on  the first proposal of the World Bank which was based on three very prominent principles: “The Indus basin water resources were sufficient to meet all existing and further uses of both countries; the water resources of the Indus basin should be cooperatively developed treating the Indus basin as a unit; and that the problem of Indus basin water resources should be resolved on a functional and not on a political plane.” The authors however do go on to say that the nature of the treaty did become political in due course of time\, which is why one is obliged to question its survival. \nThe paper dwells on why exactly the treaty was signed and what it meant for both India and Pakistan and what other options either country had during the time of signing. For instance\, the paper elucidates that India as the upper riparian could have chosen not to sign the treaty and use the waters of the Indus river system flowing through its territory\, but it also states rather categorically that India also had its own compulsions to sign the treaty. The building pressure from the US and the World Bank for instance. \nAs the political relationship between the two conflicting nations has seen its ups and down\, the study brings to light how the political dynamics is directly corresponding to the survival of the Indus water treaty. Especially given that now Pakistan has given a notice to India to take the Kishanganga hydroelectric proposal to a neutral expert and also sought to invoke a court of arbitration for the interpretation on the treaty.  \nAnother aspect that this paper seeks to draw attention to is the issue of Jammu and Kashmir\, which the authors feel is one that is often missed. It brings out the strong perception that India’s generosity towards Pakistan (Pakistan getting 80 per cent of the water resources)\, was at the cost of the welfare of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. Besides\, despite there being a general opinion to change the treaty in certain respects\, the paper is very clear in stating that neither side has officially communicated any desire to modify the treaty despite the increasing resentment in public opinion. \nExternal Discussant: Mr. D K Mehta\nOne fact that was brought out very coherently by Mr. Mehta was that as a matter of fact\, perception needs to be corrected. The main shortcoming from India’s side was that there has been no storage of water. At least 3 to 6 feet of water needs to be stored. He stated that it is absolutely imperative if India actually wants to make use of even the 20 per cent of the water that it does have from the Indus water treaty and a daily or a weekly balance needs to be maintained. States affected especially Jammu and Kashmir need to come up with some policies and facilities for storage. As far as the widely acknowledged generosity of India is concerned\, it could be said that India should have probably asked for more at the time of the signing of the treaty. \nExternal Discussant: Mr. B.G. Varghese\nMr. Varghese took a rather clear stand on the issue by saying that government secrecy between ministries needs to be done away with for good. And that this very problem has led to the downfall of many policy implementation programmes. Also the ideas of water storage need to be made clear\, for example\, a dead storage where water is stagnant is not a storage\, but a silt trap. According to him\, India was not being generous\, but had an acute problem of refugees post partition.  Therefore from the point of view of rehabilitation\, India needed to provide some irrigation for the land in question and as an upper riparian India has delivered on the treaty.  \nInternal Discussants \nOne of the internal discussants was of the opinion that this paper very lucidly brings out the “lie that it was a successful treaty.” Also India has not explored the opportunities of hydroelectricity and storage with the water available. The review of this paper must be driven by certain important factors. For instance\, at the time of the signing of the treaty\, short term gains were looked at\, Pakistan has had a hand in politicizing it. Also Ms. Ray asks of the authors to expand on exactly why India accepted the so called unfair terms of the treaty and also to state what “counter measures” can or may India take in the future.  \nAnother discussant raised the doubt whether India was only generous or was just a bad negotiator. \nGeneral Discussion\nIn response to some of the questions raised by the internal discussants\, one member said that contrary to popular belief\, per capita availability is not the issue in Pakistan. It is actually the mismanagement of water made available by this treaty. Emphasis was also laid on sources of information in Pakistan which has made water a very important issue in the country. It has also been instigated by non-state actors like the chief of the Jamaat-ud-Dawah Hafiz Muhammad Saeed\, whose main source of information comes from Urdu dailies that are not particularly pro-India. Furthermore\, the fact that these newspapers have a wide readership does not help matters either. \nChair’s Summary\nThe Chair concluded that what was required was effective policy implementation\, which needs to be reviewed on a regular basis. The chair also spoke at length on how both countries need to evolve and revise the treaty with the changing times. \nReport prepared by Shahana Joshi\, Research Assistant\, IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/50-years-of-indus-water-treaty-will-it-survive
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100903T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100903T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T014939
CREATED:20231223T221438Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130246Z
UID:63639-1283491800-1283491800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:China's Territorial Claim on Arunachal Pradesh Hostile Intentions and Local Fears
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Ambassador C DasguptaDiscussants: Professor Sujit Dutta and Dr. Srinath Raghavan \n \nThe presenter identified the more aggressive stance taken recently by China in staking territorial claims over the North Eastern parts of India as the key motivation for undertaking her study. She also expressed her desire to reach out to the people of the region through her paper. The differences in perceptions between India and China over the line of demarcation of the Sino-Indian border\, with the McMahon line denounced in China as an imperialist imposition\, was identified as a continuing problem. She then went on to examine the Chinese position on the boundary question from realist\, constructivist and neo-liberal perspectives.  \nDescribing China’s approach as “two-track”\, Dr. Goswami underscored China’s enhanced economic and diplomatic engagement with India alongside persistent territorial claims over Arunachal Pradesh. Within the framework of realism\, the paper argued that China was following a “balance of power” framework vis-a-vis the India-US strategic partnership by upping the ante in Arunachal Pradesh to ensure that India remains tied down by its territorial disputes with China\, and is wary of its physical presence in the eastern border. The paper also extensively reviewed the ideational factors underlying such claims as well as their expression both in rhetoric and on the ground. Chinese perceptions of India’s strategic perspectives including its position on issues relating to Tibet – were examined. Viewed from one theoretical lens\, Chinese claims were attributed to  the neo-liberal school regarding exploitation of local mineral resources including  hydro-electric power potential. Infrastructure development sponsored by China and India’s neglect of the same were seen to foster a sense of alienation among communities in the North East. \nPossible alternative scenarios\, based on local narratives as well as on China’s evolving perception of itself as a player in the international system\, were outlined. A policy of aggressive deterrence on India’s part\, coupled with robust diplomatic action\, was advocated. “Act Local\, Think Global” was the message.     \nExternal Discussant: Dr. Srinath Raghavan\nDr. Raghavan drew attention to the intricacies of boundary demarcation processes and their implications for the case under discussion. He questioned the validity of the realist hypothesis that Chinese claims on Arunachal Pradesh were informed by an intent to “balance” India or the United States or both. On the theoretical front\, he also did not find any merit in the neo-liberal model as yielding an enhanced understanding of the situation .  \nIn his analysis\, China’s approach has been consistently marked by a preference for inter-sectoral bargaining and as such\, its stance on Arunachal Pradesh may not be construed as overly aggressive. He ended by projecting a scenario where the boundary dispute between India and China might at some stage be resolved despite all its apparent intractability.    \nExternal Discussant: Prof. Sujit Dutta\nProf. Dutta took the view that the contribution to enhancing the very limited understanding of local perceptions and spectrum of opinion on various key questions in the North East – was the most significant potential contribution of the paper. He cautioned against direct deployment of International Relations theories in deconstruction of Foreign Policy. Instead he favoured “Group-thinking Theory”\, “Rational Choice Theory” and such other cognitive theories that account for domestic motivations and decision-making for delivering richer analytical output.  \nIn his opinion\, the balance of power paradigm fell short of explaining Chinese behaviour as India’s partnership with the US is nowhere near as developed as to pose a threat to and elicit fearful reactions from China. On the practical side he explained the futility of attempting a bargain revolving around the settled population principle. On the question of Tibet he lamented the near-absence of diplomatic engagement by China\, characterizing its approach as self-serving.    \nInternal Discussants\nThe first internal discussant suggested that China’s stance vis-à-vis the North East and perceptions within the North East on critical issues could more usefully form the subjects of two separate papers. He contended that different theoretical perspectives were instrumental in decoding varied and separate aspects of the problem\, pointing to corresponding policy implications.  \nChina’s internal nationalist discourse and its staunchly anti-imperialist tenor were singled out by the second internal discussant as factors laden with implications for policy analysis and diplomatic engagement.       \nOpen-floor Discussion\nOne participant described the significance of shared tribal affinities across borders in the region\, asking why there have been no Chinese overtures to populations south of the McMahon line. For purposes of the study\, he recommended closer examination of the chronology and record of India’s policy pronouncements and actions in the North East over past decades. For a more balanced picture\, one participant suggested incorporation of Chinese writing on the subject.\nAccording to one intervention\, regional affinities in the North East have tended to vary across time and tribal divisions. The role of elites in the North East in playing up the Chinese threat to attract attention from the Indian centre was also mentioned. Water security and the related significance of the Bramhaputra were posited as considerations gaining in importance in China’s strategic calculus over coming decades. Threats posed to indigenous culture in the North-East by recent developments and interactions with surrounding regions were argued to be serious concerns. Addressing developmental concerns in the North East was argued as central to any sustainable resolution of on-going disputes. The gaping need for an in-depth ethnographic study of local conditions and aspirations was repeatedly raised in the house.          \nChairs Summary\nThe Chair advised sharper definition of the research question\, as the explanations for China’s original claims and its resurgent pursuit of these claims are likely to be different. He argued for paying closer attention to the growth-rate differential north and south of the McMahon line to discern implications for the future. He concluded by thanking the gathering for a fruitful discussion. \nReport prepared by Kalyani Unkule\, Research Assistant\, IDSA
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/chinas-territorial-claim-on-arunachal-pradesh-hostile-intentions-and-local-fears
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100910T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100910T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T014939
CREATED:20231223T221338Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130246Z
UID:63638-1284096600-1284096600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Project Management in Border  Roads Organisation and related  Management Concerns
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Shri Amiya Kumar GhoshDiscussants: Shri T P Velayudhan and Shri K K Y Mahinderkar \n \nThe infrastructure development in border areas is very important to bolster troop mobility and logistics supply. Realising the need for creation of a single entity for development of road network in far flung and backward areas of western and eastern sectors of the country Border Roads Organisation (BRO) was established in 1960 with the Director General Border Roads as the executive head. Since then the BRO has been engaged with the development of new roads\, maintenance of existing roads\, construction and maintenance of bridges\, border fencing\, snow clearance operations to keep the airfields\, passes and roads open for maximum period of the year to enable the Army to perform their role effectively and unhindered. The contribution provided by the BRO to maintain and create connectivity to keep the mobility is immense. However\, in the process of discharging the assigned role BRO faces several management challenges. Cost and time overrun has been identified by the presenter as the most persistent management concern of the BRO.  \nThe factors leading to time and cost overrun issue\, according to the speaker include line function set up for construction and supervision; diversification of the services in wide spread areas; lack of technical soundness and correct estimation\, execution methodology\, incorrect and unrealistic technical approach\, loose financial control\, underutilization of manpower resources or non utilization of technical manpower; underutilization or non utilization of the costly equipments; lack of airlift support system. Most of these factors are internal to the organization. There are some external factors as well leading to time and cost overrun\, such as land acquisition problems\, problems of payment of land compensation\, delays in wild life clearance\, forest clearance\, rising cost of construction materials\, unfavourable climatic conditions\, nature of terrain\, extent of rainfall and snowfall\, natural calamities like floods and changing course of rivers\, extremely hot climate and shifting dunes and dust storms in Rajasthan\, rarified atmosphere in high altitude areas\, limited working season\, insurgency\, inhospitable conditions\, shortages of hired labour etc. .  \nAccording to the speaker the process of preparation of works plan needs improvement. In any planning process at the time of its formulation\, the aspects of manpower planning and resource and logistics plan should be given utmost priority. Some of the internal and external factors are controllable by proper project management approach. However\, there are some factors which are beyond the control of the organisation. Therefore\, there is a need to address both types of concerns by adopting a balanced approach and through proper assessment of external factors before initiating execution of any project. Hence there is a need to review the entire system of plan preparation in BRO. Further the creation of large number of jobs needs to be avoided to devote scarce resources to priority sector job\, according to the speaker.  \nExternal Discussant\nBoth the external discussants have agreed that the time and cost overrun is a major problem of the BRO. However\, they felt that a holistic approach is required to analyse the factors leading to time and cost overrun problem. Humane and socio-economic issues involved in border road construction are discussed at length. Both the discussants have brought out the fact that agency and deposit work can not be avoided. There is a healthy match between Agency and General Staff work. Though outsourcing is recognized an essential alternative to supplement the limited departmental capability of BRO\, the inherent risk factor associated with outsourcing was discussed.  One of the external discussants has discussed the organizational complexities and labour problem in length. He has brought out the fact that due to various lucrative schemes available at the state level like NREGA\, BRO no longer attracts labour to work in the border areas under extreme condition. He feels inclusion of these complex issues would enrich the paper.  \nInternal Discussants\nCommand and control is identified as an important problem by one of the internal discussants. According to him recruitment of technically competent people and proper supervision can reduce cost overrun to a large extent. Structuring aspect of the paper was discussed by the other internal discussant.   \nGeneral Discussion\nIt came out very well at the end of the discussion that BRO is working under extreme condition. On the issue of outsourcing when one participant felt that BRO should outsource its work to giants like L&T\, another felt that outsourcing is a partial solution to the problem. The system needs be thoroughly reviewed to rectify the weaknesses. The ecological aspect was also touched upon by one participant.  \nChair’s Summary\nThe chair concluded that BRO is challenged by several problems apart from time and cost overrun. BRO regulations are outdated and they need to be re-looked and reviewed.  \nReport Prepared by Gulbin Sultana\, Research Assistant\, IDSA
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/project-management-in-border-roads-organisation-and-related-management-concerns
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100917T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100917T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T014939
CREATED:20231224T104117Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T045523Z
UID:64154-1284701400-1284701400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Strategic Importance of Turkmenistan for India
DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell\nChairperson: Prof. R P Kaushik\nDiscussants: Prof. Sanjey Pandey and Brig (retd) Arund Sahgal
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/strategic-importance-of-turkmenistan-for-india
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100924T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100924T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T014939
CREATED:20231223T221338Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130246Z
UID:63637-1285306200-1285306200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:The Utility of Force in the India-Pakistan Context
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Maj Gen (retd) D. Banerjee\, AVSM\nDiscussants: Col. Vivek Chadha and Shri Anit Mukherji \n \nAli Ahmed introduced the paper by saying that he is going to bring the practise out of the theory. He assessed the utility of force for India in addressing its Pakistan problem. He explained that India has been a victim of Pakistan’s proxy war for over two decades and relations between the two countries remained very adversarial with costs\, risks\, uncertainties and opportunity costs. To deal with this problem\, India has been adopting a strategy of restraint against Pakistani provocations through subconventional deterrence where option for use of force is being kept in reserve. But the continuation of Pakistan’s proxy war against India proves that subconventional deterrence is only partially effective. In recent years\, India has been attempting to strengthen its deterrence by both defence acquisitions and doctrinal evolution. He pointed out that thinking through the possibility of use of force can help addressing the Pakistan problem. He\, however\, said that any kind of use of force must be in light of India’s national aims and objectives. \nHe provided an overview of political and strategic aims for India in addressing its Pakistan problem with use of force. He also provided operational objectives that are to be provisioned by the implementation of the service doctrines\, to include Cold Start. He opined that once strategic objectives are achieved in light of political aims\, joint objectives are framed from which\, in turn\, service specific objectives are derived. He also spoke about the diplomatic and intelligence instruments for achieving the stated objectives. He emphasised that at the diplomatic level\, use of India’s soft power\, economic leverage and the influence of the Diaspora would be more useful.  \nIn the second part of his presentation\, he outlined the conflict scenarios in which military forces are likely to be used. He said that the proximate cause of conflict between the two countries is most likely to come out from a terrorist attack of the magnitude of Mumbai 26/11 and its linkage with the Pakistan establishment would compel India to take military action. He suggested that for India to see the gains\, economic consequences of such military actions need to be calculated before hand. In the light of aims\, objectives and methods\, he also outlined the three possible outcome scenarios of such military actions as benign\, benign-malign and malign scenarios.  \nHe identified that use of force can be more effective if it is melded with other instruments of national power. Besides\, sweeteners need to be offered to Pakistan; otherwise it would turn into a risky coercive exercise into one of compellence with questionable efficacy. He said that given the attendant problems of application of force\, a non-military resolution of outstanding issues must instead be pursued in right earnest. In the end\, he said that a limited war is useful in conditioning Pakistan\, but for that diplomatic and political prongs need to be worked as much as the military and intelligence prongs of strategy.  \nAnit Mukherji suggested that the paper needs to include interviews of government officials in defence services\, ministry of defence\, politicians\, experts\, etc. He opined that there is not much of discussion on military doctrine in India. So far the Cold Start doctrine has not been operationalised in India. To destroy terrorists camps\, could army really operationalise this. In case of full-fledged war\, it could not be operationalised. He suggested that the lessons learned during Operation Parakram need to be studied. \nCol Vivek Chadha said that utility of force need to be assessed taking into account three areas where international conflict still prevails i.e. i) Afghanistan\, ii) Iraq\, and iii) West Asia. He said that force is not always necessary to achieve the stated strategic objectives. For instance\, despite military mobilization during Operation Parakram\, how far those objectives were achieved. So far as Kashmir issue is concerned\, its solution lies more within than outside. The issue can be resolved within politically and through socio-economic measures. He pointed out that India needs to resolve Kashmir issue within to keep Pakistan out. He suggested that one must look at the timeframe and location of such military actions.  \nCdr. Sarabjeet Singh Parmar suggested a focus on two aspects: i) Grand strategy and ii) Use of military doctrine. He said that these two should be prepared and assessed before taking any military actions. In case of grand strategy\, national values and interests need to be clearly defined and political direction taking into account the international legal limitations should be shaped accordingly. He added that operationalisation of war doctrines and its consequences must be assessed in advance to see military gains. \nProfessor Sumit Ganguly suggested four areas of focus. First\, the presenter needs to come out clearly to describe what lessons could be learned from Bernard Brodie and Clausewitz for India-Pakistan context and how could they be useful in explaining the possible use of force in India-Pakistan conflict. Second\, he said that the deterrence strategy has failed in the context of Pakistan and it has its limitation to deter Pakistan to undo something that has already been done. Third\, citing the US strategic goal of regime change in Iraq and its ramifications\, Prof. Ganguly pointed out that no Indian would like to change the regime in Pakistan. Finally\, he suggested that the political\, strategic and military deterrence strategy that the presenter has proposed is abstract\, and that he needs to explain what exactly could be carried out through these strategies. He added that in case of India-Pakistan conflict\, diplomacy will play a crucial role than military strategy.  \nDiscussion\n\nIn the 1980s NATO had created the Air Land Battle Doctrine in Europe to fight against the USSR. However\, it used this doctrine only during Iraq war. There was a Pakistan connection in September 11\, 2001 terrorist attacks as well as in the recent Times Square plot. Mr. K. Subrahmanyam asked as to why did not the US carry out military operations against Pakistan?\nOne participant asked how the three scenarios detailed by Ali Ahmed applied to incidents like the 26/11 Mumbai attacks? Moreover\, the idea of sweetener has to be fleshed out.\nAnother participant pointed out that one does not go to war to concede. Moreover\, if the fundamental cause of using force against Pakistan is regime change\, then it would bring about the worst result. Instead\, the focus should be on changing the behaviour of the Pakistan Army.\nHow can a limited war gravely affect India’s economy? This assertion needs to be substantiated. Second\, a limited war cannot be fought to effect regime change in Pakistan\, but at best to influence the calculations and strategy of Pakistan. Moreover\, to talk about a general peace with Pakistan at the end of such a conflict is also far-fetched. Further\, instead of attempting the rather difficult task of compelling Pakistan to stop cross-border terrorism\, it would be far more easier for India to exploit the internal turmoil within Pakistan as a means to influence its decision makers.\nIn view of the escalation and de-escalation of war\, de-escalation of war is a very rational choice for India while escalation of war is a rational choice for Pakistan. By escalating limited war\, Pakistan can build international pressure on India. Question is what would be Pakistan’s nuclear option during this limited war.\nSo far as giving sweeteners to Pakistan is concerned\, this has failed in the last 60 years. Whether Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s Lahore diplomacy or Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s opening to Pakistan and providing money to flood victims\, everything fails. During Kargil war\, it was because of US and China’s pressure that Pakistan withdrew troops from Line of Control. Then what kind of sweeteners do you want to give to Pakistan? What is your framework? What you want to exclude and include?\nEngagement through dialogue fails against Pakistan and does not help improve the situation. Can military and intelligence strategy make Pakistan hesitant?\nMany people are worried about the Cold Start doctrine. It was prepared after Operation Parakram. India has fought four wars with Pakistan. After the incidence of 26/11 Mumbai attack\, where you could put the Cold Start doctrine against Pakistan. During chemical or biological war what could be done?\nIn the last ten years\, the international environment has changed significantly. The US fought two wars – Afghanistan and Iraq which led to geopolitical change in this region. India links Pakistan in its Central Asian strategy. India and Pakistan relations will depend on this. What can be done in this regard?\n\nChairperson’s Remarks\nMaj Gen Banerjee complimented Ali Ahmed and said that the paper can be summarized in two points i.e. i) Utility of force against Pakistan and ii) Search for a doctrine to do that which will continue. He pointed out that the use of nuclear option between India and Pakistan will be trilateral where China will be included. However\, he emphasized that nuclear exchange between the two countries during a crisis will tantamount to a policy failure. He concluded by thanking the panellists and the gathering for a constructive engagement.   \nReport prepared by Dr. Saroj Bishoyi\, Research Assistant\, IDSA
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-utility-of-force-in-the-india-pakistan-context
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101021T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101021T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T014939
CREATED:20231223T221338Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130246Z
UID:63636-1287639000-1287639000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:The Domestic Determinants of Iran's Foreign Policy: The Illusion of  Consensus
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Shri Rajiv SikriDiscussants: Cdr. (Retd) M. R. Khan and Prof. Gulshan Dietl \n \nMr Mahan Abedin\, visiting fellow\, introduced his paper by highlighting the significance of studying the foreign policy making process in Iran as it is rising as a regional power. He began by mentioning a note of caution that this academic exercise constituted a unique challenge since the Iranian foreign policy is mired in profound ideological\, political and institutional complexities. \nDescribing the Western and Iranian scholars’ approach to study Iran’s foreign policy making process\, the presenter pointed out that while the Western scholars contend that all things being equal\, Iranian policy is “rational”\, in as much as it is the product of a laborious analytical and consultative process. On the other hand\, the Iranian scholars are less concerned with the actual policies than with the ideological\, political and cultural determinants that shape foreign policy formulation in Iran. However\, both approaches yield suboptimal levels of understanding. He stated that both create a distorted panorama of the Iran’s foreign policy vision and aspirations.  \nContrary to the Western notion of “consensus”\, Mr Abedin argued that the process of foreign policy making process in Iran is considerably more complex; that consensus is either lacking or where it is achieved\, it is at an unacceptably high price. Moreover\, the actual policies often reflect the tensions and divisions bedevilling the Iranian elite\, leading foremost to inadequate implementation. However\, he stated that Iran has made huge inroads in relatively non-contentious foreign policy areas\, namely in the region where it is steadily emerging as the dominant power. But now it is faced with a hostile global climate\, an outcome that is directly tied to the Iran’s antagonistic relationship with the West. \nIn the second part of the presentation\, he spoke about the ideological\, political\, and institutional construction of Iranian foreign policy making process. Outlining the ideological context of foreign policy\, he said that the Islamic Revolution of 1979 dramatically altered the tone and rhetoric of its foreign policy and since then its foreign policy towards many of the countries remained relatively unchanged. He pointed out that faced with the ambitions of a revolutionary Islamic ideology engaged in the relentless pursuit of re-ordering Iran’s relations with the major world powers\, Iranian scholars have struggled to embed the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy within a national framework. He added that still\, a very small number of scholars have attempted a more innovative approach\, namely to weave together the competing and conflicting ideational and ideological strands of foreign policy thinking since the Islamic Revolution.  \nSo far as the efforts to re-define the pan-Islamic aspirations of the post-revolutionary Iranian state is concerned\, more than thirty years of the Islamic Revolution\, it has failed to adequately define its national interests according to a consensual set of ideological and conceptual norms. He held that the complexity is not merely about the inclusion of pan-Islamic themes that tend to complicate foreign policy thinking but it is also about the attempts to redefine the national interests along revolutionary lines\, which necessarily requires a radically new theoretical model for engaging with the major powers\, particularly the US. The confusion also prevails among its diplomatic and the wider foreign policy establishment over the nature and extent of the pan-Islamic policies to be pursued.  \nThe author said that although there are over one hundred officially registered political parties in Iran\, the party system is very weak. The majority of political parties do not represent any identifiable socio-economic interests. However\, three reformist parties i.e. a) the Islamic Iran Participation Front\, b) the Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution\, and c) the National Trust Party are in particular recognised as genuine since they represent broad and identifiable political and ideological interests. He held that in the absence of a strong party-based system\, factions have filled the political vacuum in Iran. In the sphere of Iran’s foreign policy\, three factions i.e. “Principalists”\, “Practicalists” and “Reformists” have an impact on Iran’s external conduct. \nOn the role of the Iranian institutional system in foreign policy making process\, Mr Abedin said that the post-revolutionary Iranian foreign\, defence and intelligence systems are rich with institutions and these play important role in policy making\, particularly in comparison with the pre-revolutionary order. Besides\, the leadership (Valiy-e-Faqih)\, the Supreme National Security Council\, the Islamic Consultative Assembly (National Parliament)\, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps\, and the State Expediency Discernment Council are the other key institutions which play essential role in foreign policy formulation and implementation processes. He held that the existence of such an elaborate system often leads to the marginalisation of the foreign ministry as the country’s main foreign policy centre. Moreover\, the prevailing institutional complexity is partly a product of ideological confusion and the lack of a disciplined party-based political system. Therefore\, the profound philosophical and ideological contradictions that go the very heart of the Iranian system have penetrated into every institution\, the net result of which is lack of consensus on a broad range of domestic and external issues.  \nHe pointed out that Iran’s foreign policy in the region is very successful in pursuing its national interests in the context of Islamic revolutionary beliefs and values. However\, ideology has been a major constraint on its foreign policy outside the region\, as evidenced by the volatile relationship with the West. But it is enormously problematic to label Iran’s foreign policy as “Islamic” or even “Ideological”\, in the light of the profound sense of expediency and flexibility that informs the decisions of Iran’s rulers and their policy makers. Iran has chosen its ideological conflicts selectively\, basing its calculus on issues and determinants that maximise its influence and power in the region. The opposition to Israel is best seen in this context. At the end\, he said that any initiative to improve the foreign policy making process in Iran would do well to focus on the ideology\, politics and the institutional setup. Finally\, he concluded by suggesting that Iranian strategists and policy makers would benefit from the formulation of a clear and comprehensive national security doctrine. In addition\, the recognition of the role of the Civil Society in shaping foreign policy will reduce the more harmful effects in foreign policy and will also help to align the country’s political society with the national security establishment. \nCdr (Retd) M. R. Khan\, citing various articles of the Iranian constitution\, said that the very basis of Iran’s foreign policy consensus is based on its Islamic outlook. In this context\, he referred to Article 152 which deals with the rejection of all forms of domination and the preservation of the independence of the country in all respects and its territorial integrity; Article 153 which deals with “no foreign control”; Article 154 which deals with “Independence\, Support of Just Struggles” and other such constitutional provisions. This reflects Iran’s regional as well as outside regional foreign policy\, Cdr Khan said. Speaking on the geopolitical advantages of Iran and its possession of critical natural resources like Oil and Gas\, he said that in the past\, Iran faced threats from both West and North and when Soviet Union liquidated\, threats from north disappeared. However\, it still faces threats from the West. He opined that because of Iran’s demographic and geopolitical advantages\, it feels that it should get primacy not only in the region but also outside. \nProf. Gulshan Dietl suggested the presenter to improve the paper by incorporating more sources from books and documents. Prof. Dietl also suggested for using more Persian language in the paper to provide an inclusive Iranian perception of foreign policy making. She said that in a democratic country\, factions play important role in shaping foreign policy of the country and these factions should be carefully analysed in the context of Iran. She added that to assess the role of the leader (Valiy-e-Faqih) in Iran’s foreign policy making process\, the author need to better analyse and relate the role of the Supreme National Security Council.  \nWg Cdr. V. Krishnappa said that Iran is a most important player in the region and it aspiring to play the ideological role. The ideological battle between Iran and other regional actors is going on since a long time in search of playing this role. On nationalism and pursuing national interests\, he said that the factions are playing crucial role in Iran in shaping its foreign policy making. He\, however\, said that differences between various factions and political parties are inherent as the foreign policy making process is inherently a very complex process. In this context\, he cited Jawaharlal Nehru’s Non-alignment policy and said that even Nehru’s NAM policy came under criticism. He said that on many of the issues that the author presented such as role of ideology\, political actors\, institutions etc there is lack of coherence and suggested the author to improve on this. He also suggested of studying Iran’s strategic behaviour for better understanding its foreign policy in the context of its security and ideological dimension. \nMr S. Samuel C. Rajiv said that by framing the three level of analysis for studying Iran’s foreign policy making process the author have done good job. He held that consensus on policy issues always do not lead to rational decision making. However\, Iran is very successful in its regional foreign policy where general consensus is built but not at large levels. He suggested that the role of public opinion\, think tanks etc. should be involved in the foreign policy making process for more democratisation of policy making process.  \nDiscussion\n\nOne participant asked Mr Abedin that how he would differentiate between the domestic factors (religion and politics) and international factors (Nuclear\, Gulf\, and the West) which lead to the articulation of Iran’s foreign policy. \nIran views growing power and influence of Israel in the region as a security threat and there is a domestic consensus in Iran on its containment policy towards Israel. \nOne commentator asked for elaboration on how Iran defines its national interests.\nAnother participant wanted to know about the Iran’s perceptions about India’s rising power and its growing role in the West Asia.\nWhat is the domestic consensus on Iran’s nuclear energy policy? How do they view the Western perspectives on Iran’s nuclear policy? How they are going to resolve this problem?\nHow different political parties view Iran’s role as a regional actor? \nThere are different points of view in Iran on various domestic factors which influence its policy making process. What are the main domestic determinants of Iran’s foreign policy?\n\nChairperson’s Remarks\nThere is insufficient understanding outside Iran on how its foreign policy is made. He appreciated for having a stimulated and spirited discussion on this subject. He said that the author has made a good attempt to explain the political structures in Iran’s foreign policy making process. It is also a clear attempt to look at Iran as first a rationalist and then Islamist state. He stated that Iran has regional aspirations and the real issue at present is the place of Iran in the region as a regional power. After Afghanistan and Iraq war\, the West is now after Iran. On its role in Iraq and Afghanistan\, dialogue is resuming with the West\, particularly with the US. He hoped that there will be some settlement on Iran’s regional role. Finally\, he said that Islamic character of Iran is as important as the national character of it and he felt that there is need to do more research on this subject. He concluded by thanking the gatherings for having a constructive engagement.    \nReport prepared by Dr Saroj Bishoyi\, Research Assistant\, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-domestic-determinants-of-irans-foreign-policy-the-illusion-of-consensus
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101029T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101029T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T014939
CREATED:20231223T221338Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130246Z
UID:63635-1288330200-1288330200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Chinese Oil and Gas Pipelines and Sea Routes
DESCRIPTION:Col P. K. Gautam (Retd) Research Fellow presented his paper\, Chinese Oil and Gas Pipelines and Sea Routes\, on 29th October 2010. Dr. Arvind Gupta Chaired the session. Mr. V. Raghuraman and Cdr Agnihotri\, IN were external discussants and Miss. Shebonti Ray Dadwal and Cdr. Sarabjeet Parmar\, IN were the internal discussants. \nHighlights from the paper\nDue to its rising economy\, China’s imports of hydrocarbons are growing rapidly. Therefore\, worried with growing dependence on imports\, with a consequence on domestic policies and strategic stability\, China is pursuing policies to alleviate the increase in import dependence by diversifying the sources and routes of its overall energy imports. China’s quest for energy routes security has led to its policies on oil and gas routes and pipelines as a reflection of geopolitics and foreign policy of the country. Therefore the core focus of the paper is on the current and future developments in Chinese hydrocarbon pipelines and sea routes strategy. \nThe paper is based on two assumptions; a) oil and gas will continue to be the affordable fuels of choice b) as oil is import sensitive\, the main policy focus in China will be on oil. Col Gautam argued that oil and gas pipelines and routes define geo-economic relationship between countries and regions. The paper attempts to discern the security and strategic discourse in the unfolding of land and sea routes of oil and gas. \nWith overall increase in energy consumption\, share of imports is going to rise from 50percent to 80percent as far as China’s national oil requirement is concerned. China also plans to double the usage of gas as a source of energy by 2015 from the 2008 levels. At present 80 percent of Chinese oil is imported via sea and about 40 percent through Malacca straits. Saudi Arabia (20 percent)\, Angola (17 percent)\, Iran (12 percent)\, Oman (8 percent)\, Russia (7 percent)\, Sudan (6 percent)\, Venezuela (4 percent)\, Kuwait (3 percent)\, Kazakhstan (3percent)\, UAE (3 percent) and others (17 percent) are China’s top crude suppliers. Russia\, Australia\, Iran and Qatar are the principle suppliers of LNG.  \nAt present\, in Myanmar dual pipelines for oil and gas transfers is under construction. Gwadar might become the destination for refining imports from Iran to be sent via pipeline to China but it looks like this only remains an idea and not feasible as such due to terrain and costs. There are various other issues involved. Building the Strategic Oil Reserves  capacity of 90 days imports by 2015 is a Chinese aim as it prepares for resource wars scenarios. In addition The Chinese Navy – will become a blue water navy in the next 2 decades and also it will have national tanker fleet- over 50 percent soon due to its good shipbuilding industry. The scenario of arctic meltdown\, by which hydrocarbon energy could be sent using new routes has important implications for the future of china’s energy strategy. \nLearning from the Chinese strategy\, several policy suggestions can be made;\n1.	Energy diplomacy for diversification of sources\,\n2.	National Carrier Fleet- profit in peacetime\,\n3.	Nodal Ministry for energy security\,\n4.	Clear policy on strategic oil reserves\,\n5.	Development of Arctic capable fleet\,\n6.	Using the maritime advantage for energy trade\,\n7.	Development of efficient technologies to reduce import strain. \nDiscussion points\n\nCoal would remain one of the most important energy resources for India; therefore\, along with China and United States\, India would continue to scramble for coal resource. However\, China with its present governance structure with no political checks and balances has an upper hand in exploiting coal reserves worldwide. Africa is now under the Chinese exploitation umbrella and over 97 percent of rare earth is being made in China only to control the metallurgy industry of the world. \nChina is looking at Caspian reserves this shows not only market economics but also a strategic vision. India must strengthen is capacity not only for ensuring continuous supply of oil during peak oil requirements but also engage in oil diplomacy with a long term vision of future requirements. \nThe potential for conflict exists if sufficient and affordable alternatives to hydrocarbons are not found. In such a situation\, the lines of supply will get taut\, supply shrink and tensions will rise. Purely from conflict prevention point of view\, carbon free energy technologies need to be given a renewed priority\, not only to mitigate climate change but violent conflicts. \nIndia must also diversify its sources of oil supply and must move from the Straits of Hormuz and build stronger relations with Africa. A strong public-private partnership in India is required to enable efficacious transnational pipeline. \nRenewable energy sources like ethanol and bio diesel\, wind and solar are high on the India’s national agenda. In India\, shale deposits are found across the Gangetic plain\, Assam\, Rajasthan and many coastal areas therefore India must capitalize on this important resource. \nThere wee different viewpoints on role of surface and submarines in interdicting or securing SLOC and an  Arctic capability for Indian maritime interests in the long run\nCooperation is the key in transboundary energy pipelines and the most workable and practical option.     \nArctic route for oil supply is not feasible for India because it does not have any commercial or security links in the region. \n\n(Report prepared by Avinash Godbole and S. Sasikumar\, Research Assistant\, IDSA)
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/chinese-oil-and-gas-pipelines-and-sea-routes
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101119T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101119T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T014940
CREATED:20231223T221238Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130246Z
UID:63628-1290144600-1290144600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:The Indian Advocacy of Internationalism in the Nehru Years
DESCRIPTION:Summary\nAs the title suggests\, the paper examines one of the significant aspects of Indian foreign policy which was greatly influenced by Nehru’s ideas on internationalism. The purpose of the paper is to explore how this idea of internationalism evolved during the freedom struggle and made a passage thereon to be a part of independent India’s foreign policy. Nehru’s aim in advocating the principles of internationalism was to realise the creation of the ideal of One World centred on the United Nations which represented the world community. Keeping this in mind\, he crafted independent India’s foreign policy composed of five elements: opposition to colonialism\, imperialism and racialism; concept of non-alignment vis-à-vis the two Cold War blocs to preserve Asia in particular as an ‘area of peace’;  prevent internationalization of conflict; disarmament; and peaceful co-existence as embodied in the Panchsheel agreement for the evolution of a peaceful and co-operative international order\, thus paving the way for realising the ideal of One World.  These elements became the framework through which the foreign policy of India was conducted\, mostly connected and identified with ‘non-alignment’. The author clearly expresses that all these elements including non-alignment were designed for the realization of the ideal of One World.  \nThe paper is composed of four sections. First the paper discusses the origins of Indian internationalism and how it emerged as an integral part of the expression of Indian nationalism\, particularly from the 1920s. This had much to do with the developments within Asia in this period. ‘Anti-imperialism’ and ‘solidarity’ with colonised states as well as the idea of ‘Asianism’ were an integral part of the views of the Congress on foreign affairs. This was entwined with the goal of attaining independence and the call for co-operation among nations fighting imperialism. Hence\, Congress and Nehru expressed a commitment to the goals of anti-imperialism and nationalism along with internationalism. Here the paper points to the Congress policy of India not becoming a party to an imperialist war or being forced into one\, thus suggesting the direction of independent India’s foreign relations. These ideas and principles became the key pillars of Indian foreign policy after independence.  \nThe second section focuses on the dilemma that Indian nationalists faced in terms of reconciling their demand for independence from British imperialism with the internationalist responsibility of opposing Nazism\, Fascism and Militarism\, and how they sought to reconcile the two\, particularly in the Quit India Resolution. The Quit India Resolution clearly expressed the Indian approach of internationalism in terms of anti-imperialism\, anti-racialism and freedom for all peoples\, particularly in Asia; the idea of free nations joining together to form the future UN; the importance of the UN serving as the mainstay of a new international order\, a world federation that would work for the common good of all humanity; and global disarmament.  \nSection three discusses the idea of Pan-Asianism\, which provided the backdrop for independent India’s emphasis on Asian solidarity vis-á-vis European imperialism. Nehru’s thoughts in this regard were articulated in his works\, proposing the formation of an “Asiatic Federation of Nations”. The outcome of these ideas\, along with those of the Congress and other Indian thinkers\, was the idea of rallying all Asian countries to promote peace and fashion a normative international order by supporting the UN. This was to lead in the direction of realising the ideal of One World. \nSection four parses through select speeches of Nehru to demonstrate the internationalist framework that guided Indian foreign policy during the Nehru years and argues that the above mentioned ideals\, ideas\, and goals were incorporated since Nehru’s incumbency as Prime Minister in the interim government. Anti-imperialism and non-alignment were a result of the expression of Indian nationalism from the 1920s. This was put to practice along with others: prevention of internationalization of conflict; disarmament; and peaceful co-existence. These elements were incorporated in the wake of developments in Asia—SEATO and CENTO alliances in Asia\, war in the Korean Peninsula\, etc.—which portended possibilities of a world war. The fact that all these elements were an integral part of a unified conception of internationalism and of the imperative of nudging the world towards the ideal of One World centred on the United Nations is clearly evident in Nehru’s speech at the UN General Assembly on 20 Dec. 1956\, wherein he emphasised the significance of UN as representing the world community and how the Cold War and arms race were impediments to realising the ideal of One World.  \nThe paper ends by noting that internationalism was replaced by national interest in subsequent years due to the security concerns faced by India. The paper gives a normative conclusion that national power should be married with the ideals of internationalism. \nExternal Discussant\nProf. Pusphesh Pant: Extolled the paper in terms of the relevance of the subject. However suggestions were made in terms of: the need to contextualize\, and on the paper being Nehru-centric. It was pointed out that the time-line dates back much before the Nehruvian period regarding internationalism. Also there were thinkers within India who had similar or contending views on internationalism. Bearing in mind the age of Nehru\, with regard to his earlier works\, the importance of periodization or framing of exact time-lines on Nehru’s advocacy was stressed upon. Thirdly\, there were movements like the Khilafat which went beyond Pan-Asianism. Fourth\, it was to be noted that Nehru was not a complete idealist. He was practical on matters like the Sino-Indian border issue\, Tibet etc. Fifth\, the need to clarify the context in which internationalism was defined in the paper; Asian solidarity or Afro-Asian solidarity or world solidarity. \nInternal Discussants\nV. Krishnappa: Commended that the author had included Nehru’s advocacy of a global order as the latter could foresee the world in terms of global networks in play. This was important from the strategic as well as the national interest perspective. With regard to the time-line of Nehru’s advocacy\, suggestions were made that it could be located within contemporary representations of Nehru. One of the comments was on how Pan-Asianism could be reconciled with internationalism when materialism had taken over Asia.  \nDr. Rajaram Panda: Reiterated the need for the timeline and contextualisation. He mentioned his reservation regarding the use of phrase -‘surrender of sovereignty’. The paper would also benefit if detailed analysis was made on the role played by India in the Korean War. Inclusion of events like the Japanese victory over China; Tagore’s dialogue with the Japanese philosopher Okakura Tenshin on Asian identity; possibilities of atomic war and Japanese annexation of Korea\, were all imperative. Stress was laid on the need to clarify the context of Pan-Asianism and also the need to categorize the regions of Asia. As it was pointed out in the paper on possibilities of a third World War with regard to Asian developments viz.\, Indo-China War and Korean War\, the significance of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis which brought the world to the brink of a world war needs to be included in this context as well. Suggestion was made on the need to mention Radha Binod Bihari Pal’s dissenting judgment at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East and how this judgment boosted the morale of the Japanese after their defeat in WW-II. Lastly\, as the conclusion was abrupt\, he suggested that the paper would need more elaboration. \nGeneral Discussion\nSeveral comments were made in terms of the paper being a framework of Nehru’s ideas. Nehru\, Tagore\, Gandhi were personalities of their own. The 1920s were different from the 1930s and Nehru’s views on internationalism were not necessarily shared by his colleagues. Nevertheless\, Congress was led to a great degree by Nehru. Differentiation has to be made between Nehru the thinker and Nehru the statesman. As the world is coming close to Nehru/Gandhi ideals\, especially with Obama advocating a world without nuclear weapons\, the need for reviving these themes highlighted in the paper was significant. \nChair’s Summary\nProf. Sumit Ganguly: Noted that changes and comments suggested were vast and hence a book in the making would be a good idea. Prof. Ganguly made three organisational comments: one\, on sections being far too long and thus the need to break them further into sections\, secondly the usefulness of having clearer time-lines or historical periodization\, and finally the conclusion being compressed and abrupt. \nHe also made substantive comments: whether there was even the prospect of UN during 1942 when the Quit India Resolution was pronounced. Discussion and themes are not connected\, but descriptive. For instance\, India’s role in the Korean War needs to be more detailed. Importance to be given to India-China agreement on Tibet as it was a pivotal movement. This should lead and continue the debate on Nehru’s stand. Thirdly\, there is a highly idealized view on Pan-Asianism between pages 14 to 17 which evaporates after the war. No mention of the viciousness of Japan is made. Fourth\, one should note\, as Prof. Pant said\, that Nehru was in the Ahmednagar prison without access to material and news. Nevertheless\, he brilliantly prophesized that Britain would not stand up to Hitler. This suggests that Nehru was not an idealist as he was made out to be.     \nReport prepared by Joyce Sabina Lobo\, Research Assistant at IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-indian-advocacy-of-internationalism-in-the-nehru-years
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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