BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//MP-IDSA - ECPv6.15.12.2//NONSGML v1.0//EN
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
X-ORIGINAL-URL:https://idsa.in
X-WR-CALDESC:Events for MP-IDSA
REFRESH-INTERVAL;VALUE=DURATION:PT1H
X-Robots-Tag:noindex
X-PUBLISHED-TTL:PT1H
BEGIN:VTIMEZONE
TZID:Asia/Kolkata
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:+0530
TZOFFSETTO:+0530
TZNAME:IST
DTSTART:20080101T000000
END:STANDARD
END:VTIMEZONE
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090807T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090807T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T031821
CREATED:20231224T104500Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T054930Z
UID:64201-1249623000-1249623000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:The Future of the Peace Process in Nepal
DESCRIPTION:Only by Invitation 1030 to 1300  \nChair: K V RajanDiscussants: Ashok Mehta and Siddarth Varadarajan
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-future-of-the-peace-process-in-nepal
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090828T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090828T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T031821
CREATED:20231223T222039Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130248Z
UID:63684-1251437400-1251437400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Revitalising the Ordnance Factories
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Vinod Kumar MisraDiscussants: V. K Chopra and G Balachandran \nThe aim of this paper is to analyse the reasons behind the poor performance of the ordnance factories (OFs) and recommend measures to revitalize them. To achieve this\, the author\, Laxman Kumar Behera\, identifies six core areas pertaining to OFs. After identifying the problems in these areas he goes on to suggest measures so that the functioning of the Ordnance Factories can be improved. \nStructure and Functioning of Ordnance Factories\nThe author is of the view that the structure of Ordnance factories has several weaknesses\, impacting the functioning of the Board\, and the performance of the factories. \nUnder the current dispensation\, the Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) has limited functional autonomy. Unlike the Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs)\, the OFB is mostly controlled by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) in critical areas such as product development\, research and development (R&D)\, formation of Joint Ventures and in making commercial decisions. These restrictions have not allowed the OFB to graduate into an independent industrial enterprise. \nSecond\, the Board Members\, especially those responsible for the operating divisions and staff functions\, are not geared to take full responsibility in their areas of functioning. It is primarily because the members have neither time nor power under the current setup. Members of the Board are appointed at the verge of their retirement\, providing them very little time to oversee their job. \nThird\, members are considered ‘rubber-heads’\, since most of the production related decisions are taken in the Board meeting and executed through the heads of the concerned factories\, with little central monitoring by the Members who are supposed to head a certain group of factories. \nVarious committees have been constituted from time to time to recommend measures to energize the management of these factories. Despite repeated recommendations by various committees to corporatize the OFB\, the government has not done so\, apparently because of strong opposition from labour unions associated with these factories. The author recommends making these factories autonomous so as to make them independent in their areas of operations. However\, he notes that this autonomy should come with greater responsibility on the part of OFB. And as for making OFB more efficient the MoD needs to outline a time frame by which all the contracts are awarded to OFs on a competitive basis. \nRange and Depth of Ordnance Factories’ Production\nAccording to the author\, OFs have a wide range of products. But these are not enough to meet the requirements of the armed forces\, thus forcing the government to resort to direct import from others. These imports are from various countries such as Israel (towed gun and mortar)\, Italy (naval gun)\, USSR/Russia (naval gun\, towed gun\, SSM launcher and MRL\, Mobile AD system\, tank\, APC\, IFV)\, Sweden (towed gun)\, Poland (ARV)\, Slovakia (ARV)\, South Africa (APC/ISV) and UK (AEW). In addition to direct imports\, some of the items are also license-produced or assembled from SKDs and CKDs\, based on technical assistance from importing countries. \nThe author ascribes the lack of an advanced defence R & D base in India and within the organization in particular as the reason for the import of such a wide range of products. He stresses that the government needs to strengthen the in-house R&D facility of the ordnance factories to overcome this problem. \nExecution of Orders\nThe author views the timely execution of orders by the ordnance factories is often a source of acrimony between the OFB and the Armed Forces. The armed forces officials say that the factories are ‘simply unable’ to meet the production requirements\, affecting their operational readiness. They further say that the shortfall in OF production is often behind schedule\, even after the target for production is lowered from the original requirements. On the other hand\, OFs officials maintain that the shortfall is on account of factors remotely related to their production capabilities. They accuse the army of late finalization and placement of orders\, resulting in delay in the production programme. \nTo resolve this problem the author suggests that since the production could not be augmented in a short span of one year\, the armed forces could consider giving firm orders for 2 to 3 years. It would also be appropriate for the armed forces to engage the OFB more proactively during the stage of the finalization of services’ long-term perspective plan (LTPP)\, especially the part which pertains to factories. \nPricing of OF Products\nThe OFs operate on ‘no loss no profit’ basis. That is to say that the products are supplied to the Armed Forces at a price\, taking into account only the actual cost of production\, which include the costs of material and labour consumed and the overhead charges. However\, according to the author\, this cost plus mechanism of pricing is widely believed to be inefficient on three counts \nFirst\, the new system of determining and fixing the price of major items supplied to the defence forces is not working optimally because of delays in finalising and reporting the cost estimates at the time of price negotiations. \nThe second reason is related to efficiency in the usage of both labour and materials. Officials conversant with the functioning of factories state that the organization has a very high input usage rate\, due to lack of process improvement and skill up-gradation of the labour force. \nThe third factor is the issue of ‘surge capacity’. The surge capacity carries a minimum cost in terms of overhead charges. The only way the cost on this account could be reduced is through better utilisation of labour\, plants\, machinery and stores. Although the factories as a whole have been able to reduce the percentage of overhead charges to total cost of production over the years\, the reduction is hardly due to any efficiency gain. Moreover\, the reduction in overhead charges is not uniform across the group of factories\, which suggests an absence of systematic efforts to curb overhead charges. \nQuality of OFB Products\nThe poor quality of products is yet another area for concern for OFBs. It has been confirmed both in the Parliament and in the Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG) Report. Army officials\, both present and retired\, interviewed by the author said that most of the OF products are below mark\, and often the cause of loss of life to service personnel. To make the quality better the MoD of late has asked OFBs to move towards the process of self-certification\, a norm widely practiced globally. Though OFB has started self-certification of their products\, the items as of now are restricted to low-tech items like clothing and general stores. At present there is no time-frame for covering the entire product range. The author asserts that the MoD in consultation with the OFB should lay down the precise time frame\, by which all the items supplied\, including those overhauled by them\, would be self-certified. \nExports\nDespite giving OFBs some incentives exports have not really gone up over the years. At present\, only a fraction of their sales come from exports. Besides\, not all the factories are in the export business. There are several factors behind OFB’s poor export performance\, some of which are not in its direct control. For instance\, the OFB’s exports are limited to only those countries which do not figure in the ‘negative-list’\, as maintained and conveyed by the Ministry of External Affairs. Similarly\, the OFB cannot export some of its high-value systems such as tanks\, some ammunition and infantry fighting vehicles because they are based on foreign technology\, and require permission from its overseas collaborator for sale to third parties. The export potential is further constrained due to some of the OFB products’ non-compatibility with NATO specifications. \nAlthough the OFB of late has taken a few measures – such as procedural simplification\, hosting an “international generic” and product demonstration in major arms exhibitions – they have not resulted in any significant dividend. The author states that the lack of enthusiasm of customers is primarily because of two factors. First\, international customers are not yet convinced about the competitiveness of OFB products\, in terms of both quality and price. Second\, the OFB has so far not taken a corporate approach in establishing a brand image for its products. \nThe author concludes by saying that unless the foregoing aspects are taken care of\, there is little hope of revitalizing the ordnance factories. \nPoints raised during discussion\n\nInstead of increasing the range and depth of existing products there is a need to improve existing products.\nIs corporatisation the only viable solution to end deficiencies of OFs?\nOFs should give importance to core areas of specialisation and leave other parts to the corporate sector.\nDelays take place in the delivery of new products as it takes some time to prepare prototypes.\nTo increase the efficiency of OFBs the lead time of 42 months can be reduced to 24 months.\nThe credibility of Self Certification needs to be ascertained.\nThere should be a mechanism of Checks and Balances so as to increase the productivity of OFs.\nTechnological absorption is extremely low in OFs.\nThere is no reliable system to access the performance of OFs.\nThe export targets in OFs are set without estimating capacity and hence targets are never met.\nOFs should be run like businesses and should be incentivised.\nStudying OFs and OFBs is considered “unglamorous”. So very few studies are conducted on their way of functioning.\nThere exists a structural problem in the very set up in which OFs operate so the synergy among the Armed Forces\, DRDO and OFs is not present.\nThere is a lack of transparency\, accountability and inadequacy in terms of Information Technology in OFs.\n\nPrepared by Sandeep Anand\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/revitalising-the-ordnance-factories
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090828T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090828T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T031821
CREATED:20231224T104458Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T054727Z
UID:64199-1251437400-1251437400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:India's Nuclear Command and Control: Perspectives from Organization Theory
DESCRIPTION:Only by Invitation 1030 to 1300 hrs \nChair: K SanthanamDiscussants: Gurmeet Kanwal and Manpreet Sethi
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/indias-nuclear-command-and-control-perspectives-from-organization-theory
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090904T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090904T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T031821
CREATED:20231223T222010Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T054616Z
UID:63683-1252042200-1252042200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:The Afghan Maze and India's Options
DESCRIPTION:Only by Invitation 1030 to 1300 hrs \nChair: K C SinghDiscussants: Ravi Sawhney and B R Muthukuma \nThis paper is an attempt to assess options before India as insecurity and political uncertainty returns to Afghanistan. The author argues that with the re-emergence of the Taliban\, some of the old issues that haunted Indian foreign policy makers in the 1990s have re-appeared in a more complex form. He notes that while the US has expanded the scope of its Afghan mission to the east of the Durand Line\, it at the same time appears to be running out of time and strategy.  The US-led ‘war on terror’ remains constrained by the ambivalence of its own allies\, be it the NATO or Pakistan. Amidst these realties\, he points out that India is often expected to play a ‘greater’ (or a different) role in the region\, and yet exercise supreme restraint.  \nThe main argument of the paper is that India as a politically non-interfering and a benign regional economic power holds a better chance of exercising influence within Afghanistan in the long-run. He cautions that any adventurous policy would be counter-productive. India is more likely to be exploited given the highly factional and externalized nature of Afghan politics and conflict. Emphasizing that there are multiple centres of power in a socially polarized Afghanistan\, over-identification with one could lead to alienation and deep suspicion among others. The author argues that a lack of balance in engaging actors could further limit India’s leverage and work to the advantage of forces opposed to its engagement with Afghanistan. It is also important to take into account the multiplicity of extra-regional actors involved and the changed regional environment. The paper observes that lack of coordination among the regional countries on the Afghan issue has to an extent widened the space for big power rivalry around Afghanistan.  \nThe paper raises some key questions. What kind of leverages India has within Afghanistan or in the region? How viable and achievable are India’s desired objectives in Afghanistan in the longer run? Moreover\, before talking of options and counter-strategies\, it is important to assess the nature and level of threat from the Taliban for India\, and what exactly are India’s objectives in Afghanistan. Similarly\, it is equally pertinent to recognise the relevance and perception of India’s actual and expected role across the political and social spectrum of Afghanistan. How far Afghans are willing to go with India’s interests and objectives?  \nThe paper argues that Pakistan shall remain indispensable to the US’ regional agenda. Despite the new Af-Pak strategy\, the US has been unable to push Pakistan beyond a point\, for where are the options before the US if the latter simply refuses to cooperate on the Afghan issue. Similarly\, the US cannot be sensitive to India’s security concerns beyond a point where it begins to impinge on its relationship with Pakistan. In fact\, by ceding territories to the Taliban and other Islamist groups\, Pakistan has increased its leverages and bargaining power. Today the US is dependent on Pakistan more than ever\, right from intelligence sharing on al Qaeda\, to ensuring regular supplies via the Khyber Pass for its growing number of troops\, and checking Taliban and al Qaeda militants from crossing over into Afghanistan. In view of the above\, India’s role and options vis-à-vis Afghanistan are likely to remain reactive and curtailed. The paper posits that patience\, information\, innovation and sustained focus are critical to strengthening India’s position within Afghanistan and the wider region. \nThe paper is broadly delineated into three sections. The first section brings out India’s engagement and objectives in Afghanistan; the second section evaluates the mutual perceptions of India and the Taliban; and the third section examines the implications of the US’ new Af-Pak strategy for India. The paper concludes with perspectives on India’s options in Afghanistan. \nThe author brings out the Indian involvement in Afghanistan. The overthrow of the Taliban regime and the subsequent involvement of the international community in re-building Afghanistan were in consonance with India’s perceived interests and objectives in Afghanistan. India felt vindicated.  For the first time since the end of the Cold War\, India also found its interests converging\, and those of Pakistan conflicting\, with US interests on a regional issue. He points out that in the Indian view a strong\, unified and an independent democratic Afghan state capable of deterring the return of Taliban would be in its interest. India set out to assist in the reconstruction of Afghanistan and in strengthening the capacity of the central administration\, through both bilateral and multi-lateral mechanisms. He points out that India has been conducting training programmes for Afghan government officials since 2003\, and has also deputed Indian civil servants as mentors and guides developing training modules in Afghan ministries and departments since 2007. Since 2006\, India has been extending nearly one thousand scholarships\, both long-term and short-term\, for Afghan students and young professionals in Indian institutions of their own choice on an annual basis.  \nIndia is the sixth largest bilateral donor and the largest regional donor country to Afghanistan with its reconstruction assistance totaling $1.2 billion till date. Around 2003-04\, India announced the commencement of various huge projects in Afghanistan\, such as\, the construction of Zaranj-Delaram road in south-western Nimroz province (completed in 2008); the Salma Dam project in western Herat province (completion by 2011); construction of Afghan parliament building in Kabul (completion by 2011); construction of 220 KV transmission line from Pul-e-Khumri to Kabul and a sub-station at Chimtala to bring additional power from the northern grid to Kabul (completed); restoration of telecommunication infrastructure in 11 provinces; and expansion of national TV network by providing an uplink from Kabul and downlinks in all 34 provincial capitals (completed).  \nThe construction of the 218-km long road linking Zaranj close to the Iranian border with Delaram on the Kandahar-Herat national highway was probably the largest and most challenging of all the Indian reconstruction projects. The Zaranj-Delaram road is supposed to link up Afghanistan’s national highway with the upcoming Iranian port of Chabahar on the Persian Gulf. The project was said to be crucial to improving India’s accessibility to Afghanistan in view of Pakistan’s refusal to provide overland transit facilities for Indian goods. Presently\, India takes a long circuitous route via sea to the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas to transport goods to Afghanistan. This road is also supposed to improve landlocked Afghanistan’s access to the sea for commercial purposes. Similarly\, India’s other huge projects were aimed at strengthening the authority of the Afghan state.  \nIndia later turned towards small development projects based on local needs and community participation. This was also done keeping in view the continuing limitations of the Afghan government in taking developmental activities to people in the provinces. These were projects with direct\, immediate and visible impact on the lives of the Afghan people and enjoyed local support and ownership.   Presently\, 84 such projects mainly in the field of agriculture\, rural development\, education\, health\, vocational training\, and solar electrification are in various stages of implementation in 19 provinces of Afghanistan. In fact\, India’s reconstruction assistance has been multi-sectoral comprising education\, health and services\, transportation\, telecommunications\, civil aviation\, agriculture\, irrigation\, power generation & transmission\, industry\, and rural development. India played a significant role in ensuring Afghanistan’s entry into SAARC as its eighth member in 2007 in order to integrate the Afghan economy with the South Asian region. India also hoisted the Second Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan in November 2006 \nIndian interests in Afghanistan are increasingly being threatened by rising violence and growing instability brought about by the growing influence of the Taliban on either side of the Durand Line. However\, India remains steadfast in its commitment to Afghan rebuilding. Moreover\, unlike projects executed by Western NGOs\, Indian projects are highly appreciated by the Afghan people as they are carried out in full consultation with the concerned Afghan ministries and provincial/district administration\, and are based on the specified requirements of the Afghan people. India thus engaged the people of Afghanistan\, key to the success of any reconstruction or rebuilding policy especially in an in-conflict environment. The author asserts that the Indian commitment to Afghanistan against all odds shows the way forward in Afghanistan. It serves as an example for countries whose commitments to the Afghan mission have been floundering as they keep looking for a way out of Afghanistan. He concludes the section by flagging off the question- Is abandoning Afghanistan a solution? \nThe author notes that India’s stated policy towards the Taliban has been very clear since the beginning. In the Indian view\, the Taliban regime was “obscurantist\, bigoted\, blinkered and sadistic” which took “Afghanistan to a dark age scarcely to be credited in the world today” and that “the Taliban should go\, lock\, stock and barrel.” India strongly believed that the Taliban “have to be extirpated from the roots\, in the interest of not just Afghanistan but also the countries in its neighbourhood\, as well as of the international community”\, and that it is “a collective imperative and obligation” of the international community “no matter how long it takes or how demanding it may become.” By sponsoring the Taliban\, Pakistan created a strategic space for itself inside Afghanistan from where it could carry out anti-India activities with ease\, especially training and mentoring of militants for carrying out subversive activities in India\, while maintaining a denial mode before the international community. India would often cite strong linkages between Pakistani terrorist outfits operating in Kashmir valley and the Taliban regime.  It was in view of the above that India had supported the anti-Taliban coalition\, the United Front (or the Northern Alliance)\, along with Russia and Iran.  \nIn an attempt to gauge Taliban perceptions towards India\, the author referred to articulations by the former Taliban Ambassador to Pakistan\, Abdul Salaam Zaeef\, and the former Taliban Foreign Minister\, Wakil Ahmed Muttawakil. In an interview in February 2001\, Zaeef had spoken of the Talib’s explicit desire to have “normal relations” with India based on a policy of “non-interference”. Zaeef was of the view that as neighbours both countries must have “diplomatic relations and commercial ties.” Zaeef had also asserted that Afghanistan’s close relations with Pakistan “is never an obstacle to have good relations with anyone else” and that adversarial relationship between India and Pakistan “will not have an impact on Indo-Afghan ties.”  \nSimilarly\, the former Taliban Foreign Minister Muttawakil\, in an interview in July 2009\, had argued that “India should look at Afghanistan through its own lens\, not through the Pakistani lens.” He was of the opinion that “one of India’s biggest mistakes was to support the puppet Soviet regime in Kabul because the mujahideen were based in Pakistan” and “India’s second mistake was not to recognise the Taliban.” He further argued that “the Indian government should accept the presence of the Taliban in Afghanistan and support the peace process. After all\, the Taliban are a part of Afghan society.” \nThe paper argues that while the Taliban are a mix of both ethnic and Islamist politics interspersed with geo-political aspirations of regional and extra-regional actors\, it is at the same time neither a credible Islamist nor a wholly ethnic movement as is often projected. This is precisely where\, the paper forewarns\, India has to tread carefully while dealing with Afghanistan. \nThe author asserts that any attempt to expand the mandate of Af-Pak to India would prove counter-productive for the US. Merging Af-Pak with Pak-India\, or mixing the two separate issues of Afghanistan and Kashmir\, will only complicate the environment and work to the advantage of the Taliban\, al Qaeda and pro-Taliban elements within the Pakistani establishment. Though the US has repeatedly ruled out any possibility of India being part of Richard Holbrooke’s mandate\, the division of opinion within the Obama administration remains. In the given circumstances\, the challenge before the Obama administration is to ensure that the Af-Pak strategy is spared from motivated efforts to divert its attention and resources.  \nThe paper argues that the idea of engaging “non-ideologically committed” Taliban\, especially “mid-to-low level” insurgents\, is not likely to bear any concrete results. The white paper on interagency policy group’s report on US policy towards Af Pak warns that the “practical integration” of reconcilable Taliban “must not become a mechanism for instituting medieval social policies that give up the quest for gender equality and human rights.”  \nThe new Af-Pak strategy appears to be very Pakistan-centered as well. The author asserts that the whole idea of setting benchmarks to ensure the effectiveness of the huge aid being doled out to Pakistan is not likely to work vis-à-vis the Afghan Taliban. Where are the options before the US if Pakistan simply refuses to adhere to the conditions attached or fails to meet the benchmarks? Remember how the ISI chief had refused to meet Admiral Mike Mullen and Richard Holbrooke when they had visited Islamabad. The author observes that a flip side of the new strategy is that it could make the US more dependent on Pakistan and thus more open to exploitation\, which in turn could dilute the Af-Pak strategy over a period of time. Though Pakistan argues that targeting militant hideouts inside its territory through drone attacks is strengthening the hands of the Taliban\, but not sending drones will not weaken them either.  \nThe author refers to possible US pressure on India to ‘normalise’ its relations with Pakistan by resuming the composite dialogue in order to ensure that Pakistan is able to concentrate on its western tribal frontiers. Pakistan could use its India-specific threat perceptions to ensure sustained Western pressure on India while militants based in Pakistan carry on with their subversive activities against India. In such a scenario\, the key question for India would be how to react in case of a repeat of a 26/11 Mumbai-style terrorist attack?  \nThe author argues that the centrality of the core goal of disrupting\, dismantling\, and defeating al Qaeda in the new Af-Pak strategy makes the US approach relatively selective as far as anti-India terrorist outfits based in Pakistan are concerned.  It also makes the US agenda narrow in terms of sparing resources and attention for institution-building in Afghanistan. The paper warns that there could be a point where the Indian view may start diverging from those of the US in the region.  \nThe proposed Contact Group on Afghanistan and Pakistan (mainly comprising of US’ NATO and other allies\, Central Asian states\, the Gulf nations and Iran; Russia\, India and China) in the Af Pak strategy is likely to run into rough weather. A West-initiated and dominated contact group on Afghanistan may not be acceptable especially to Russia in view of its known opposition to NATO’s eastward expansion and growing differences on the Georgian issue. While Russia has agreed to provide transit facilities for NATO supplies to Afghanistan\, at the same time it has been re-asserting its influence in the former Soviet space. Same is the case with Iran given the ongoing standoff with the West on its nuclear programme. Not surprisingly\, for China\, the Afghan problem; problem between Afghanistan and Pakistan; and India and Pakistan\, are all inter-related. In the Chinese view\, the new Af-Pak strategy will not succeed until Pakistan is stabilized and India-Pakistan differences are resolved.  \nInterestingly\, an Asian initiative too would not be an easy proposition.  The special international conference on Afghanistan organized by the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) at Moscow on the day the Obama administration announced its new Af-Pak strategy\, and the subsequent UN special conference on Afghanistan at Hague on March 31\, are reflective of the geo-political competition taking place around Afghanistan. The author is of the opinion that India is likely to remain marginalised in the regional processes on Afghanistan in view of the ongoing big power contest (the US\, NATO\, Russia and China) for control over vast Eurasian resources\, unless it gears up for a strong regional diplomacy.  \nPerspectives\nThe author concludes by saying that the biggest challenge before India in Afghanistan is sustaining the momentum of its engagement with the government as well as the people of that country. The paper points out that given the highly externalized security architecture of Afghanistan\, India’s involvement in reconstruction activities would remain entwined with the success and failure of the Western military strategy. In view of India’s stated interest in the stability and security of Afghanistan\, he notes\, India is often expected to ‘do more’\, a veiled reference to India militarily contributing to the Western efforts.  \nIn this regard\, the author pointed out that it is important to grasp whether the Afghans (not only the Afghan government) want Indian boots on Afghan soil?  How different sections of the Afghan population are going to perceive and respond to it? Would it not bring Indian forces in conflict with Pashtuns (even if Indian forces are positioned in a non-Pashtun area)? And\, why India alone should do this? How many other Asian powers are willing to put their boots on the Afghan soil? Is there any support for India’s military involvement at the regional level? And\, is India as a nation prepared to play the ‘game’?  \nIt is clear that the Russians and Chinese are not willing to send their troops to Afghanistan. It is equally important to take into account how Sino-Pakistan relations are likely to play out. In the given circumstances\, India could do much better in terms of training Afghan military officials and contingents at its own facilities within the country or in a third country.  \nToday India is the only country which singularly and vociferously argues for the need to extirpate the Taliban. India remains a lone voice against a chorus calling for reconciliation with the Taliban. Even Kabul and the former opponents of the Taliban\, the National Front\, are willing to reach out to the Taliban\, who are now increasingly considered as part of the solution. Even the Russians to some extent appear to have accepted the idea of engaging the ‘moderate Taliban’. The Russian position is similar to that of Kabul and Washington.  \nThere is no doubt that the Taliban should not be the future of Afghanistan\, at the same time it is more than evident that they cannot be physically eliminated. They are Afghans and part of the Afghan polity. Whether Mullah Omar and Osama bin Laden are alive or dead\, it is their legacy\, their ideas which have to be fought in a patient and collective manner. If categorizing them as ‘moderate’ or ‘good’ and ‘bad’ helps in weakening them\, splitting and splintering them\, so be it. The US missed the opportunity of completely destroying Taliban as an organization\, and to an extent as an ideology\, between 2002 and 2006. An enemy\, a force\, or an ideology which can’t be destroyed\, has to be engaged after a point. The West cannot stay on in perpetuity. This is what keeps the Taliban going and it shall remain so. The other option is to deny a fall back option to the Taliban which exists in Pakistan. But is Pakistan willing to completely de-Talibanise its Afghan policy? Pakistan too is waiting and buying time.  \nOn the US policy which remains al Qaeda-centric\, the author argues that it was clear from day one that Operation Enduring Freedom was not meant for fighting the Taliban in every nook and corner of Afghanistan. The US too seems to have kept the option of integrating them open. Meanwhile\, reconciliation with the Taliban too will not easily come through. Where is the incentive for the Taliban to negotiate when they know that they may not be winning the battles but they are not losing the war either\, and that kills the asymmetry.    \nThe paper observes that India may have to deal with a ‘government’ in Afghanistan that includes Taliban members. Taliban are to be seen as a manifestation of various regressive tendencies resulting from the adversarial politics of the Cold War era. The author states that the Taliban too are not going to stay on in its current form for perpetuity.  The dynamism of Afghan polity would sooner or later consume them or may even present them in a different form. The Indian obsession over the destruction of Taliban is only contributing to its re-hyphenation with Pakistan. Longer the hyphenation\, lesser the chance for India’s candidacy\, as far as regional mechanisms are concerned. Openly engaging Kabul-based former Taliban in New Delhi would send a stronger message to Islamabad than sending forces to Afghanistan. It has to be understood that terrorism is a non-conventional threat which cannot be countered with conventional means alone. At times it requires unconventional measures to address it. Could there be a regional strategy to make the Afghan Taliban relatively independent of Pakistan in order to gradually neutralize them? \nAs for the rising threat levels to India’s presence in Afghanistan\, it is proof of its steadfast approach towards rebuilding of the Afghan state\, something Western countries have been notably lacking. Afghan reconstruction is not about pumping billions of dollars\, but working with and for the Afghans. Today\, the need to protect the achievements of the Bonn Agreement and the political process that flowed from it\, however flawed it may have been\, is more than ever. Never before in the history of Afghan conflict\, has the international community been involved in such a manner in rebuilding a modern Afghan state.  The paper argues that there will be corruption\, violence\, short-sightedness\, misunderstandings\, dissatisfaction\, repeated failures\, but the process must go on. \nGiven the current limitations\, the author recommends that India will have to do some strong diplomacy at the regional level to be able to craft new options in Afghanistan. As part of a regional approach\, India can explore possibilities of forging consensus with countries like Russia\, Iran\, and Turkey to train the Afghan National Army. India can contribute military instructors and trainers\, and the Russians can equip the Army. Turkey’s presence could be significant from NATO’s viewpoint. This can go a long way in taking the load off the US and the NATO so that both could concentrate on fighting the Taliban and al Qaeda. However\, this option is open so far as Western troops are deployed in Afghanistan.   \nThe paper concludes stating that India may not presently have great options in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. But there is one option which India should practice and always protect: the option of not going terribly wrong\, of not over-hyping itself\, in Afghanistan.     \nPoints raised during the discussion: \n\nNeed to explore options of engaging Iran on Afghanistan.\nIn the regional approach dealing with Iranians and Russians will have its own set of problems. \nTaliban ideology is what we have to combat not the Taliban. Education and economic development need to be strengthened on this front.\nThere is no short term strategy for Afghanistan.\nOptions for India require greater analysis.\nWe need to examine socio-economic\, political and military options separately.\nMilitary training\, military supplies and providing military infrastructure as options should be explored\nOne needs to look at the alternatives clearly and military options need to be explored in greater detail.\nThere is a need to fight the Taliban on the basis of ideas.\n\nPrepared by Medha Bisht\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-afghan-maze-and-indias-options
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090911T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090911T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T031821
CREATED:20231223T222010Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T054453Z
UID:63682-1252647000-1252647000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Maritime Security in the Gulf of Aden: Opportunities and Challenges for India
DESCRIPTION:Only by Invitation 1030 to 1300 hrs \nChair: N S Sisodia\nDiscussants: Shishir Upadhyaya and Vijay Sakhuja
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/maritime-security-in-the-gulf-of-aden-opportunities-and-challenges-for-india
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20091023T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20091023T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T031821
CREATED:20231223T222010Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130248Z
UID:63681-1256275800-1256275800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Limitation in Nuclear War: Doctrinal Implication for India of Pakistani Nuclear Use
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Aditya SinghDiscussants: R. Dahiya and Gaurav Kampani \nAim and Scope\nImplications of Pakistani nuclear use for India’s nuclear and conventional doctrine. This paper revisits the ‘Sundarji doctrine’ to assess its suitability for limitation and termination of nuclear war. In a nutshell\, the ‘Sundarji doctrine’ calls for termination of a nuclear war at the lowest level of escalation. \nThe paper then intends to recommend the institution of a standing strategic dialogue mechanism with Pakistan to enable limitation in conflict\, even a nuclear one. The continuing imperative of limitation even in nuclear war compels a review of India’s conventional and nuclear doctrines.  \nSummary\nThe speaker validated the argument that nuclear initiation\, in the context of a future India-Pakistan war\, is with Pakistan. Therefore its implication on India’s nuclear and conventional doctrine would emerge. While validating such an argument the speaker put forth the following arguments. \n\nDemocracy as the chosen political system in India\nIndia’s war strategy which is offensive\, broad front\, highly lethal\, short duration and red line cognisant vis-à-vis Pakistan’s counter strategy which is likely to comprise war avoidance\, conventional defence\, counter offensive with strategic reserves if possible\, and a resort to asymmetric war.\nNine factors which contribute to deterrence instability are:\n\n‘First use’ not ruled out by Pakistan\nPakistan’s lack of strategic depth\nQuestions about the credibility of India’s nuclear doctrine\nMomentum of conflict\nStrategic rationale of the Pakistan army\nRight wing pressure in Pakistan\nFog of war\nNuclear signaling\n\n\nThe possibility of nuclear use increases with the increase in threat to vital interests. Nuclear threat would heighten as the war progresses and the weaker the Pakistan army gets\, especially if it is apprehensive about India’s aims.\n\nHaving put forth the context of future conflict dimensions between India and Pakistan\, the speaker then described the “nuclear dimension of the conflict” and nuclear strike (first) options located within it. \nThe speaker downplayed “decapitation strike” and “first strike” as viable options. Thereby arguing that nuclear use options of a lower order may appear more attractive. The speaker cited the advantages of late nuclear use as it would not be unambiguously illegitimate in case Pakistan is faced with extinction as a state. Pakistan would be resorting to it at a stage in the war when it is vulnerable\, possibly having exhausted other military options.  \nIn essence the paper argued that late nuclear use could prove more dangerous and damaging to India than early use. \nExternal Discussant I (R. Dahiya)\n\nNuclear weapons are not for use\, but to deter others from using them.\nWill rationality prevail in a scenario of nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan?\nThe imperative of controlling the escalation ladder especially by India at every stage of the conflict.\n\nExternal Discussant II (Gaurav Kampani)\n\nThe paper must also include the naval and air dimensions and not restrict itself to the land component.\nInclude a discussion on Pakistan’s civil-military relations\nThe paper must reduce its dependence on secondary sources and include primary sources such as interviews of retired and serving officers of the armed forces.\nThe paper also needs to be clear as to what “cold-start” doctrine actually is.\n\nPrepared by S.Rajasimman\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/limitation-in-nuclear-war-doctrinal-implication-for-india-of-pakistani-nuclear-use
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20091023T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20091023T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T031821
CREATED:20231224T104458Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T054322Z
UID:64195-1256275800-1256275800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Sky's no Limit: An Evaluation of Space-based Solar Power as the Next Major Step in the Indo-US Strategic Partnership
DESCRIPTION:Only by Invitation 1030 to 1300 hrs\nChair: Jasjit Singh\nDiscussants: V. Siddhartha and Subodh Kumar
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/skys-no-limit-an-evaluation-of-space-based-solar-power-as-the-next-major-step-in-the-indo-us-strategic-partnership
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20091030T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20091030T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T031821
CREATED:20231223T222010Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T053835Z
UID:63680-1256880600-1256880600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:GCC - Iran Relations and its Strategic Implications for the Region
DESCRIPTION:Only by Invitation 1030 to 1300 hrs \nChairperson: Saeed NaqviDiscussants: Gulshan Dietl and Anwar Alam \nThe uneasy relationship between the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Iran is one of the main reasons for the continuing conflict in the Persian Gulf region. Iran has difficult relations with both the GCC and its individual members. With the passage of time\, several other contentious issues have emerged\, including the Iranian nuclear programme\, Iran’s island disputes with the UAE\, Saudi-Iran tensions\, ideological differences\, and the strong military presence of the United States in the GCC countries. This paper examines the sources of conflict between the GCC and Iran and analyzes its strategic implications for the Gulf region.   \nThe presence of the United States in the region has been the primary source of tension between the GCC and Iran. Iran has been concerned about the presence of US forces in the region. Tehran accuses the GCC of allowing external powers like the US to maintain a military presence in the Persian Gulf. On the other hand\, the GCC countries are dependent on the US for security. The ideological rivalry between the two and several clashes between Iranian pilgrims and Saudi security forces during the recent Hajj pilgrimage has added fuel to the conflict. That apart\, Saudi support for Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war\, Iran’s nuclear programme\, and regional competition have been major issues of conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia which has also affected the GCC-Iran relationship. \nGCC-Iran tensions are manifested in Iraq which is going through a major transition. Iran is seen as attempting to influence various sections of Iraqi society and polity to gain influence. In post-Saddam Iraq\, Iran has moved from confrontation to cooperation. The GCC states are concerned that Sunni Arabs have been marginalized in the new Iraq and that Iran has come to exercise too much influence over the Shia-dominated government in Baghdad. There is also a worry that Iranians in Iraq may engage in subversive activities against GCC countries and that the civil war may actually spill over into their territories. \nThe friction in GCC-Iran relations is leading to nuclear competition. In 2006 GCC announced its intention to establish a joint nuclear research programme which is primarily driven by their concern over the expanding Iranian nuclear programme. They are also concerned about Iran’s aggressive foreign policy posture in the whole of the West Asian region that includes Iraq\, Lebanon\, and the Palestinian Territories. Individual countries of the GCC have also started their own nuclear programmes. This has led to big nuclear powers strengthening their foothold in the region. Apart from that the interests of the external powers also lie in securing energy supplies\, selling their weapons to GCC countries and establishing military bases in the Gulf. \nThere have been some efforts at reconciliation between Iran and GCC countries though without any tangible results. The issues of contention between the two are serious. This makes the possibility of rapprochement look bleak in the near future. The clash of interests\, the scramble for influence in the region\, and the lack of mutual trust and goodwill have not allowed them to look for an amicable solution. \nPoints raised in the Discussion:\n\nThere is a need to go beyond the Shia-Sunni divide in the region. Alternative perceptions such as ‘Persians vs. Arabs’ or of conflicting ‘national interests’ need to be factored in and analysed to explain why old issues tend to trouble the relationship today.\nThe role of external powers in the region should be examined in greater detail. Iran is worried about the presence and influence of the United States in the region\, because the GCC states are dependent on the US for security. On the other hand\, Israel’s nuclear weapons are a threat for Iran while Iran’s nuclear programme is a threat to Israel.\nThe US-Iraq SOFA accord should not create problems for Iran. Under the terms of the agreement American forces cannot launch an attack on any other country from Iraqi territory.\nThe 10-point proposal made by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad needs to be analyzed in detail because these proposals give a clear indication of Iran’s policy and ambitions in the region.\n\nPrepared by Dr. M. Mahtab Alam Rizvi\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/gcc-iran-relations-and-its-strategic-implications-for-the-region
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20091030T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20091030T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T031821
CREATED:20231224T104453Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130248Z
UID:64194-1256880600-1256880600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Military Modernisation in Southeast Asia: China Factor or Interstate Conflicts?
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Ramesh V PhadkeDiscussants: Chintamani Mahapatra and Shishir Upadhyaya
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/military-modernisation-in-southeast-asia-china-factor-or-interstate-conflicts
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20091113T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20091113T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T031821
CREATED:20231223T222010Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130248Z
UID:63679-1258090200-1258090200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Copenhagen Summit: Climate Change Debate
DESCRIPTION:Amb. Rajagopalan chaired the session while Mr. Mukul Sanwal and Mr. V. Raghuraman were external discussants and Avinash Godbole and Antoine Levesques were internal discussants. \nDr. Uttam Sinha highlighted the core points of the present state of the global Climate Change debate. Developed and developing countries have contrasting priorities about climate change and development. Therefore\, until a common understanding of the framework on emission reductions is developed\, it is difficult to reach an agreement that is acceptable to all. Equity is the key to reach a common action agenda on climate change. Climate change negotiations have lacked transparency\, trust building and strong leadership. The grand deal will be about financial commitments and technology. However\, there have been no firm commitments in this regard. The Obama initiative is unlikely to be approved by the US Senate due to business interests. In India\, there is some opinion that favours mitigation in the national interest\, but other sections favour a wait and watch policy. India has taken a stand on moral grounds and its negotiating position is based on per capita emissions which state that emissions will not cross the levels of the developed world. Various interest groups comprising nations with different interests have emerged leading to Copenhagen. The general response of various states to the climate change debate is based on their developmental objectives and security interests. \nDiscussion\n\nIndia need not be apologetic about its requirements for development. \nThe US has taken the stance of putting its national interest ahead of global needs. Notwithstanding the criticism directed at Washington\, the US has stuck to its stand. \nSome of the scientific literature on climate change is inadequate and thus biased against India and China. \nAssessments based on biased research can be conflicting. Therefore\, India needs to take up its own research on climate change in critical areas like glacial melting. Consumerism in the US will have to be controlled for action on climate change. Otherwise US’ cuts in emissions will be superficial. \nThere is no quick fix technology available as of now for solutions to climate change\, so India should not give in\, based on commitments of technology transfer. India can take gradual mitigation actions that help in the development process. Reducing energy intensity of urban areas can be an important step. Available energy is more evenly distributed to needy sectors of Indian society. Mitigation actions will also help in reducing the adaptive costs of climate change in the future
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/copenhagen-summit-climate-change-debate
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20091113T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20091113T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T031821
CREATED:20231224T104453Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T051606Z
UID:64192-1258090200-1258090200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Mixed Messages: India's Use of Coercive Diplomacy in the 2001-02 Crisis
DESCRIPTION:Only by Invitation 1030 to 1300 hrs \nChairperson: V. G. PatankarDiscussants: I. P. Khosla and Swaran Singh
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/mixed-messages-indias-use-of-coercive-diplomacy-in-the-2001-02-crisis
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20091211T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20091211T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T031821
CREATED:20231224T104453Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T051221Z
UID:64190-1260509400-1260509400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:India and Nuclear Disarmament: Perceptions and Prospects
DESCRIPTION:Only by Invitation 1030 to 1300 hrs \nChairperson: Ramesh PhadkeDiscussants: Swadesh Rana and Swaran Singh
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/india-and-nuclear-disarmament-perceptions-and-prospects
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20091218T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20091218T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T031821
CREATED:20231223T222005Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130248Z
UID:63677-1261114200-1261114200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:To Develop or not to Develop?: The Political Dimension of BMD Procurement in Japan and India
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Dr. Rajaram PandaExternal Discussants: Dr. P.K. Ghosh Senior Fellow\, CAPS and Prof. Chintamani Mahapatra\, JNU \nPresentation\n\nThe paper’s core question “What factors influence why states make the decision to import advanced weapon systems or to develop them indigenously?” \nBoth India and Japan had similar threat perceptions owing to similar kind of neighbourhood situation.\nThe paper discusses the political processes behind BMD acquisition and not its scientific effectiveness or military utility.\nThere is research on suppliers’ perception of arms transfer but litter research on recipients’ perspectives.\nIn the case of Japan\, discussion on BMD began with Reagan’s “Star Wars” address. In the late 1980s and through the 1990s Japanese defence industry conducted research in this area. There was some joint research with the United States as well.\nNorth Korea’s 1998 Taepo Dong I test convinced Japan of BMD’s usefulness and formal joint research with United States began.\nAfter the United States withdrew from ABM treaty\, the Japanese Cabinet decided to introduce BMD systems. As of December 2009 4 SM-3s and 12 PAC-3s are deployed.\nJapan’s Foreign Policy concerns influenced the timing of the BMD deployment. Its perception about threats from the neighbours mattered in the decision about BMD. The Taiwan strait crisis of 1995-96 and earlier Chinese nuclear tests caused the difference. North Korean tests became an incentive to introduce BMD system\, but was not a decisive factor that made Japan decide to join the American system.\nJapan did not consider self reliance because there are restrictions due to import controls and limited R&D budgets.\nIn the case of India\, Pakistan’s acquisition of M-11s caused it to think of BMD. Chinese and Pakistani co-operation was looked at seriously. The political decisions behind it have not been fully analysed.\nIndia has been aiming for self-reliance in its defence procurements.\nIndia’s desire for independent policy also caused it to focus on self reliance. In the cold war period\, the United States and USSR had tied their arms sales to alliance partnerships and there still exist political hurdles to delivery of weapons. Thus indigenisation and diversification have been two pillars of the Indian arms policy.\nDRDO has conducted tests successfully and India should be able to deploy its BMD system by 2011.\nEven if it was economically difficult\, India decided on indigenous development of BMD for political and strategic reasons.\nThus\, foreign policy and threat perceptions matter equally in decisions over BMD policies.\n\nComments and Discussion:\n\nNeed to go deeper into the use of the Defence Industry perspective. 1998 alone cannot be the reason for Japanese policy on BMD. Japan favours two layered system and not two staged system. \nMTCR has been critical in decisions about BMD by different countries.\nIndia decided against co-development because it was turning out to be more expensive.\nJapan’s R&D numbers are impressive; in fact the United States wanted to collaborate with Japan for its own advantage.\nThat Japan became more independent in its foreign policy with the end of Cold War is a very tall claim.\nImpact of the Japanese BMD is going to be same regardless of its origin.\nEconomic benefit of the Japanese BMD programme is an outcome and not a cause. This has happened because the United States has subsidised Japanese BMD programme.\nThere is need to elaborate on the reasons why Japan decided not to develop indigenous capacity when it could and why India decided to do so when it did not have the knowledge.\nEven while the nature of arms transfer has changed and even as marketisation has taken place\, co-operation on BMD still remains a political decision.\nThe author could compare the different nature of relationship that India and Japan have with the United States and its impact on their BMD policy.\nIn Japan\, public opinion has played an important role.\nCredibility of the Indian BMD can be questioned. One should not look at statements but the results of the tests.\nBMD is a work in progress. It is useful for its psychological and political utility. No one would share it if it was perfect.\nIn India this has not been a strategic political decision but a military technical decision.  \n\nReport Prepared by Avinash Godbole\, Research Assistant\, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/to-develop-or-not-to-develop-the-political-dimension-of-bmd-procurement-in-japan-and-india
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20091218T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20091218T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T031821
CREATED:20231224T104423Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T051013Z
UID:64188-1261114200-1261114200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Management of Medical Stores in Indian Armed Forces
DESCRIPTION:Only by Invitation 1030 to 1300 hrs
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/management-of-medical-stores-in-indian-armed-forces
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100115T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100115T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T031821
CREATED:20231224T104423Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T050715Z
UID:64186-1263533400-1263533400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Civil - Military Relations
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Amitabh MatooDiscussants: Mohan Guruswamy and Ashok Mehta
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/civil-military-relations
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100115T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100115T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T031821
CREATED:20231224T104423Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T050837Z
UID:64187-1263533400-1263533400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Non-State Actors and South Asia: A Regional Profile
DESCRIPTION:Only by Invitation 1030 to 1300 hrs \nChairperson: Ramesh V Phadke\nDiscussants: Kalim Bahadur and Alok Bansal
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/non-state-actors-and-south-asia-a-regional-profile
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100122T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100122T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T031821
CREATED:20231223T222005Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T104423Z
UID:63675-1264138200-1264138200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:India's role in Afghanistan & Af-Pak Strategy
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: I. P. KhoslaDiscussants: Ravi Sawhney and Srinath Raghavan \nDr. Shanthie D’Souza’s presentation noted that the Obama administration’s Af-Pak strategy has brought the importance of the region to the forefront as a “hub of terror”. The author notes that US policy in Afghanistan has had its direct ramifications on India. The US withdrawal which is expected to lead to a deterioration of security and conflict will spill over into India. It will compel India to make tough policy choices. While noting that debates on post- US exit strategies are gaining momentum in India\, Shanthie suggests that it would be timely to deliberate on available options in case of the US withdrawal.  \nWhile attempting to interpret the Af-Pak strategy\, the author points out that it appears to be a ‘containment strategy’ aimed at containing the conflict at four levels- Afghanistan\, Pakistan\, Afghanistan-Pakistan border region and the un-stated goal of improving Indo-Pak relations. Shanthie points out that there is little evidence of change from the previous administration’s short term counter terrorism policy of pursuing a political strategy of supporting institutions and programmes. \nShanthie described the problem areas of the strategy where she notes that analysts in the region have viewed the Af-Pak strategy as a ‘reductionist’ strategy and a prelude to a US exit from Afghanistan. President Obama’s December 1\, 2009 speech only reconfirmed such apprehensions.  \nThere are seven problem areas. 1. Draw down of forces; By linking additional troop deployments to a timetable for the drawdown of forces and narrowly defined goals. However\, the strategy misses out on the core essentials of COIN campaigns which hinges on time\, long term commitment\, institution building and a larger political strategy. Moreover\, by announcing the exit\, it runs the danger of working to the advantage of the insurgents and their sponsors who will ‘wait for their time’.  2.Troops surge– Increase in troops numbers; While an increase in troops numbers for a ‘population centric’ policy is an essential step forward\, without clear Rules of Engagement (RoE) in dealing with the tribes\, especially the Pashtuns in South and East Afghanistan\, it could result in further alienation of the people. 3. Civilian Surge– Problem of Unity of Effort- The present strategy has focused on the civic component or the ‘civilian surge’. But the need is not to send more American experts but to build local Afghan capacities in better governance and aid delivery mechanisms. 4. Building Afghan National Security institutions in a limited time frame– A major problem in outlining a time table for downsizing troops hinges on the need for a phased transition to Afghan national security forces\, capable of independent action\, to take over from the US forces in 18 months. There is also a problem of mentoring and funding such huge projects. 5. Transferring authority to credible Afghan government– A credibly elected Afghan president and his capacity to extend his writ beyond Kabul are critical to an eventual US exit plan. The shortcomings of the electoral process\, redressal mechanisms and re-election procedures have highlighted the problems associated with the lack of political sector reforms.  6. Issues of sanctuaries and safe havens– The author points out that in the present scenario\, increased dependence on the Pakistan army and without addressing the issue of ‘sanctuaries’\, selected targeting of the Pakistani Taliban will not significantly dent the Afghan Taliban capability in the long term. 7.  Sources of funding of insurgency– One of the major short comings of the present strategy is the lack of attention paid to the sources of funding for the insurgency. After this\, the paper deals with the regional responses regarding American intentions in Afghanistan.  \nIn the next section\, Shanthie discusses India-Afghan relations. While highlighting the historical developments\, she mentions that India’s relations with Afghanistan have been shaped by shared history\, geography\, culture and economy. On post 9/11 Afghanistan\, India took an active role as an ‘ideational power’ by adopting a soft approach aimed at long term stabilization\, institution building and augmenting economic growth in Afghanistan; integrating Afghanistan in the South Asian framework and reviving the role of Afghanistan as a ‘land bridge’ connecting South Asia with Central Asia. India is the sixth largest bilateral aid donor country\, pledging 1.2 billion dollars and invested in diverse areas such as infrastructure\, communications\, education\, healthcare\, social welfare\, training of officials\, institution building etc.  \nWhile describing the challenges to India’s aid policy in Afghanistan\, Shanthie points out that India needs to accept responsibilities and risks that come with that stature. The growing bonhomie between India and Afghanistan\, coupled with the increased presence of India’s development projects in Afghanistan\, remains the target of the Taliban-led insurgency. Also geopolitical rivalry continues to shape Pakistan’s response to the increasing bonhomie between India and Afghanistan. The deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan has serious consequences for India’s security interests.    \nShanthie has generated three plausible scenarios for the future of Afghanistan. Scenario 1- US withdrawal or draw down of forces- Return of the Taliban; The author points out that in case of a complete US withdrawal\, the probability of the return of the Taliban is not far fetched\, thereby condemning Afghanistan to what US analysts as the worst case scenario. This would also lead to an emboldening of the Al Qaeda\, instability spreading to Pakistan and Central Asia\, thus reducing the region to become a base for Al Qaeda operations. Scenario 2- US limited engagement-‘proxy war’; The most probable scenario beyond 2011 is the reduced US presence in Afghanistan with troops limited to protecting key cities\, a shift from overstretched counterinsurgency operations to internal defence. This would allow Pakistan to continue its ‘hedging’ strategy whereby it will continue supporting the Afghan Taliban to destabilise Afghanistan with the eventual goal of reinstating a pliant regime. Scenario 3- US long term commitments– Building on Afghan state capacities; According to the author\, this is the best case scenario for Afghanistan\, though such a state of affairs is highly unlikely given the reduced public support for the Afghan war in the United States. This would call for additional resources including troops to train and partner with Afghan forces and continuation of the institution building programmes. In this scenario\, India could play a long term role in the training of the Afghan national institutions\, institutional building political\, and security and justice sector reforms. \nIn the last section\, the author suggests policy options for India. According to Shanthie\, India can play an active role in training and building the capacity of Afghan national security forces. India should also reestablish its support base among the Pastun tribes and invest in acquiring better human intelligence. These support groups can be cultivated as protectors of Indian aid projects by making community participation and local ownership a key plank of India’s aid policy. The author cautions that these goals should be achieved in the next 18 months. \nHowever in the scenario of US limited engagement in Afghanistan beyond 2011\, India could continue with its assistance programme in Afghanistan. Shanthie argues that in a revamped diplomatic strategy\, India can work towards creation of Concert of Powers’- a regional grouping including US\, Russia\, EU\, India\, Iran\, Central Asian Republics and China. India could play a lead role in carving out a greater role for the United Nations and deployment of UN forces in Afghanistan symbolizing the UN Security Council’s endorsement would not entirely be a misplaced policy option.  \nShanthie concludes her presentation by suggesting that in near terms\, India needs to pursue a reinvigorated Afghan policy in terms of protecting its projects and carving out a larger regional role in the stabilization of Afghanistan. India needs to consider near term and long term scenarios to rethink its political\, diplomatic and military options. Given the limited time frame\, before the summer 2011\, India will have to make tough policy choices.   \nPoints raised during the discussion. \n\nObama administration should come out with a clear and determined Afghan policy. With frequent changes in the AF-Pak strategy\, desired results can not be achieved.\nIndian policy makers will have to take bold initiatives to develop a regional mechanism to effectively deal with terror activities in the region.\nAfghan nation building is essential to effectively solve its problems. The international community should take effective steps towards this direction. India can play a lead role in this process.\nToo much reliance on Pakistan in the Afghan war is not the right approach. Regional players such as India\, Iran Russia and China should be given more space in order to seek an Afghan solution. \nHowever a solution can only come from within Afghanistan. Global and regional players can help them achieving it.\n\nReport prepared by Sanjeev Kumar Shrivastav\, Research Assistant at the IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/indias-role-in-afghanistan-af-pak-strategy
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100129T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100129T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T031821
CREATED:20231223T222003Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130248Z
UID:63673-1264743000-1264743000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Climate Change\, Environmental Degradation\, Tibet and Implications for South Asian Security
DESCRIPTION:The paper presenter’s aim was to create a new discourse that treats Tibet as a regional\, if not a global\, commons that has wide-ranging implications for all of South Asia from being a source of many important rivers to controlling the Monsoons. Such a discourse that highlights Tibet as being crucial for a wider humanity will put pressure on China to review its activities in Tibet which is resulting in severe ecological degradation. The most pressing problem seems to be the impact on the rivers that flow downwards into the Indian subcontinent and South-East Asia which will all face a considerable reduction in runoff with the receding of glaciers.  \nThe speaker looked at the following 3 aspects through the course of his paper: \n\nThe impact of human activity in Tibet and the changing climate on the countries dependent on this ecosystem.\nThe diversion of rivers originating in Tibet by China.\nPolicies for co-operation and peaceful resolution of conflict.\n\nWhile elaborating on the first point\, it was pointed out how the urbanization of Tibet with infrastructure building\, extension of railways and roads\, and conversion of grasslands will result in demographic changes that will impact the local ways of living. All these factors will\, in turn\, change the nature of the local ecosystem. For example\, the nomads’ lifestyle ensured that the delicate balance of the fragile ecosystem was not disturbed.  \nGlaciers are an important aspect of this ecosystem. However\, there is much contention over whether or not they are melting at a rapid rate (or melting at all). This is due to a dearth of information or facts regarding them. India has around 9\,575 glaciers but research has been done on only 25-30 of them. Thus\, the difficulty of drawing any definite conclusions. However\, the presenter insisted that the people of the Himalayas have noticed the change and he quoted Chewang Norphel who said “I am the scientific data”\, i.e. one doesn’t need a scientific authority to certify what is obvious to the people living there.”    \nDiversion of rivers and construction of dams by the Chinese on rivers like Yarlung Tsangpo (Brahmaputra) or the tributaries of Indus and Sutlej will adversely affect the lower riparian states. China’s increased control of river water will mean an increased security threat for the others. \nThe speaker asserted that a major obstacle to studying the impact of the diversion of rivers is posed by the lack of scientific data that is available in the public domain. The lack of transparency in terms of information results in analysts having to make intelligent guesses. \nIncorporating China in the Indus Water Treaty is one of the solutions proposed for peaceful co-operation as well as a consolidated effort by all the countries of the region to conduct scientific studies on the environmental degradation of the ecosystem caused due to man-made activity and climate change. \nUltimately\, the crux of the presenter’s argument was that a discourse that regards Tibet as a regional (or global) common should be created in order to prevent any adverse effects on other lower riparian countries that would result from unilateral Chinese diversion of rivers in Tibet. \nShri M.S. Menon made some pertinent observations on the issues brought up in this paper. Most importantly he highlighted the confusion regarding global warming\, climate change\, and glacier melts since the causes and effects are “not very clear”. Not to mention\, scientific data can be manipulated to suit particular agendas. He also pointed out that studies regarding the role vegetation cover (including that in Tibet) plays on monsoons are incomplete.  \nThe presenter’s fear of Chinese diversion of rivers and its security implications were reinforced by Shri Menon. Unlike B.G. Verghese who claims that it is near impossible for China to divert water from these rivers due to the terrain\, Menon asserted that China was more than capable of accomplishing such a feat. His remedy for this problem is that India should build a dam in Arunachal Pradesh in order to control the flow of the Brahmaputra. \nThe lack of data on the water flow of rivers should also be addressed. In border areas where civilians are not allowed\, the army should step in to take measurements. In terms of exchange of data between India and China\, the best area to bring up this issue would be in forums concerning biodiversity since they are signatories of the UN Convention on Biological Diversity and project an image of concern for the environment in this regard. He also supported the idea of a reworked IWT that included China. \nDr. A.P. Dimri discussed the technical aspects of climate change and how the Himalayas play a major role in controlling the monsoons\, which is why the topography of Tibet should be looked at in more detail. He also talked about the need to look at regional dynamics of climate change. Cycles of heating and cooling have always existed\, however\, what we should be worried about is the anthropogenic forces that are contributing to climate change.  \nThe discussant explained how the debate around the melting of glaciers is extremely complicated and cannot have a simple answer. Glaciers are viscoplastic in nature. So what might be considered as glaciers melting might actually be a geological phenomenon of glaciers just breaking up. A lot more work needs to be done in this area before anything concrete can be ascertained. He also mentioned that satellite imagery is not entirely reliable data since it does not cover the area throughout the season so one cannot make accurate interpretations.  \nThe internal discussants\, Jaganath Panda and Avinash Godbole\, also raised important points. The former talked about the Chinese strategy that includes the restructuring of the industrialization process and a new focus on local industries in order to show that Tibetan industries are not being destroyed. He also discussed the reasons behind why China wanted to divert water in terms of geography\, social and national tension particularly with the drying up of the Yellow river.  He proposed SAARC and the UN as good forums in which India can engage with China. Godbole put forward two critical questions. First\, if Chinese activity in Tibet affects rivers’ flow to India\, it should also affect rivers flowing into China; so\, why would China want to harm their own water resources? Secondly\, can science and politics be separated? Even scientific data can be manipulated for particular ends.  \nThe Chair\, Arvind Gupta\, summed up the discussions by claiming that we should “learn to live with uncertainty” and evolve precautionary principles rather than keep waiting for concrete data to act. He asserted that China feels secure with its Tibet policies and the diversions of the rivers. It becomes an important strategic tool to engage India in larger Sino-Indian relations.  \nThe report has been prepared by Shubha Kamala Prasad\, an intern at IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/climate-change-environmental-degradation-tibet-and-implications-for-south-asian-security
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100129T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100129T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T031821
CREATED:20231223T222005Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130248Z
UID:63674-1264743000-1264743000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Indo-Africa Narcotics Ties
DESCRIPTION:During the Cold War\, there was a complete focus on the military competition because these two things projected as power and increase security of the states. Given the evolving nature of conflict however\, this no longer holds true. New “soft” threats pose bigger hazards to human beings today. There has been a need to redefine classical security paradigms along the lines of new threats such as internal conflicts\, money laundering\, human rights\, trafficking\, illicit drugs trade\, etc.  \nOne of the non-traditional security threats is the menace of Narcotics Trafficking (NT) and organized transnational crime (OTC). NT today is a problem that exists at the national and at the international level. The narcotics trafficking business is the second largest industry in the world valued at approximately $500 billion in 1994 and approximately $322 billion in 2007\, following the arms sales business only. Production and refining of drugs and the consumption of these drugs almost inevitably happens in two different areas\, so narcotics trade is inherently suited to be a transnational crime. In some instances\, narco-trafficking tends to harm the state because money laundered indirectly or directly makes its way into fuelling separatist groups\, insurgents\, and terrorists\, thus permitting non-state actors to take on the state. Despite this\, many states tend to view narcotics as a domestic or internal security matter.   \nIndia is uniquely placed in the global illicit drugs trade\, sandwiched between the “Golden Triangle” of the North-East and the “Golden Crescent” of the North-West. India is also used as a transit point for drugs from South and South-East Asia onwards to Europe. The profitability of the drugs trade has been made possible by the fact that India is surrounded by weak states with endemic corruption. India’s own security has become intrinsically tied to the strength of states not only within its immediate neighborhood but also at a distance.  \nPresently\, India is not only an exporter of locally grown and/or manufactured drugs\, it is also on the receiving end and serves as a major transit hub in the global narcotics network. India’s connections with Africa\, as well as Africans operating in the rest of the South Asian region\, have single-handedly emerged as one of the gravest and most complex “invisible” security dilemmas. In India alone\, hundreds of Africans are languishing in prisons around the country on drug related offenses. An average of one ton of heroine alone is seized every year all over India. Pockets of African communities in Goa\, Rajasthan and the South often use tourists for “quick trades” or as carriers for transporting drugs to foreign destinations.   \nThere are three types of players involved in NT– “drug barons”\, “strikers” and “couriers”. A drug baron is usually someone who has risen to significance over time and due to the extent of their involvement. The narcotics trafficking menace\, and its associated destabilizing effects\, impacts all levels of society – locally\, nationally and internationally. India today has the highest rate of opiate users in the South Asian region of approximately 3.2 million. In a national survey conducted in 2001-2002 by the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment it was estimated that about 73.2 million people were users of alcohol and drugs. Narcotics addiction among the Indian populace has increased hand in hand with the spread of diseases. Use of synthetic drugs and intravenous drug use\, especially in the North-East states\, has led to the spread of HIV/AIDS among drug users\, introducing a newer grave element to the crisis. Narco-Trafficking has resulted in human security and economic security impacts in India. While legislation under the NDPS Act remains strict\, it does not include the socio-cultural uses of drugs in the Indian context. \nPoints in the Discussion:\n\nNeed to study the involvement of African countries in NT because not all African countries are involved in it.\nAfrican governments do not intervene to control the traffickers particularly in the case of Somalia\, and the percentage of drugs smugglers has increased today. \nThe Role of International Agencies such as the IMF to control the narcotics trade should be discussed in detail.\nNeed to analyze the agencies that provide support to drug traffickers.\nNeed to focus on why Nigeria became the hub of NT\, other countries like Ghana also became the hub but Nigeria is the most populous country in the region\, so its involvement is greater than others.\nHow has globalization created new forms of socialization to control the consumption of drugs?\nWhy Nigeria become the hub for the narcotics trade?\n\nPrepared by M. Mahtab Alam Rizvi\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/indo-africa-narcotics-ties
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100205T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100205T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T031821
CREATED:20231223T222003Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130247Z
UID:63672-1265347800-1265347800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Mapping East Asian Futures 2030
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Ramesh V. PhadkeDiscussants: Srikant Kondapalli and P. K. Ghosh \nThe research objective of this paper is to develop and explore a broader range of plausible scenarios for East Asia in 2030 for flexible policy planning and strategic thinking. According to Ishida\, the paper does not make any predictions but provides alternative possibilities. For this purpose\, Ishida poses four research questions which are: What are the key drivers of the East Asian region? What kinds of future scenarios are plausible towards East Asia in 2030? What will be the implications of future scenarios for policy planning and what are the key strategic challenges\, risks\, uncertainties in the region?.  \nThe paper begins by explaining the regional geo-political characteristics and historical background of East Asia. Ishida points out that geo politically\, China\, Japan\, the United States\, Russia and India are the major players in the region but since the end of the Cold War Russian power and influence have rapidly declined while the influence of China and India has rapidly increased because of their high economic growth. \nThe author analyses contemporary trends and debates on East Asia where he discusses changing geo-politics\, economic liberalization\, democratization and its challenges as well as regional cooperation and regionalisation. After this\, the main drivers or key forces have been identified and explained. The author has identified four key drivers: great power geopolitics; globalization\, politico- economic liberalization; regionalism and regionalization; energy\, resources and the environment.  \nOn the basis of these key drivers\, various scenarios have been developed in a broad spectrum. The author has drawn nine scenarios: 1. Progressive East Asian community: It portrays high optimistic trends of peace and progress at all level. 2. Chaotic East Asia: this depicts extremely negative trends where East Asia will fall down into a vicious politico-economic resulting chaos and disorder. The first two scenarios have been put under a non-polar category. 3. Concert of Great Powers in East Asia: this scenario assumes stability in East Asia will be maintained by the concert of great powers such as China\, Japan\, the United States\, possibly together with Russia and emerging India. This shows the positive trends of great power politics. 4. Tragedy of great power rivalry: This scenario shows the negative trends of great powers’ rivalry and competition. It assumes that East Asian geo-politics will become increasingly competitive thus leading to severe and dangerous arms races and potentially direct military conflicts. Scenarios four and five have been put under the multi-polar category. 5. US-Japan Liberal Pacific Union: This is an optimistic scenario characterized by international liberalism where it shows that the US-Japan will maintain primacy; China will face severe domestic troubles as well as ASEAN will become more liberal-oriented towards US and Japan. 6. US-China Strategic Condominium: This scenario assumes that the United States and rising China will dominate East Asia with their growing political- strategic coordination while the role and influence of Japan\, Russia and India will be marginalized. 7. New Cold War between US/Japan and China: This scenario depicts the negative trends of great powers relations where East Asia will be dominated by competition and rivalry between hegemonic US and rising China. Scenario fifth\, sixth and seventh have been put under bipolar category. 8. American Hegemony: This scenario shows that the United States will continue to maintain its primacy in East Asia while China’s rise and Japan’s role will be constrained by the rivalry between them. 9. Return to China-centric East Asian Order: This scenario assumes Chinese domination in the East Asian geo-political economy and projects that China will establish its hierarchical regional order which will result in a weakening and decline of the US- Japan alliance.  \nIn the last section the paper\, author has discussed key strategic challenges\, risks and uncertainties which largely influence the future course of East Asia. The author has mentioned following points. 1. East Asia region has immense stakes in China’s stability and external relations. 2. The future of US-Japan remains uncertain. If the alliance is considerably weakened or collapses\, the East Asian region will face drastic and unpredictable changes. 3. The stakes are immensely high\, whether changes in international relations will happen in a peaceful manner or with military conflicts among great powers. 4. The East Asian nations need to overcome excessive nationalism to enhance any durable reconciliation\, mutual understanding and trust. 5. East Asia faces some of the most serious military flash points such as the Korean Peninsula\, the Taiwan Strait and the South and East China seas. 6. With rapid economic growth and resurgent nationalism as well as competition\, East Asian nations are heading towards a slow and steady arms race which includes weapons of mass destruction and a space arms race.7. To deal with potential conflicts and crises\, multilateral security cooperation is essential to ensure East Asian security. 8. With deepening globalization and regionlisation\, the Asia-Pacific region faces various emerging security challenges such as international terrorism\, maritime security\, energy and resources\, illicit drugs and human trafficking and climate change. 9.With widening and deepening globalization and economic interdependence\, the regional economy and finance remains fragile to shocks and instability as evident in the global financial/ economic crisis of 2008. \nIshida has provided maps depicting of East Asia and key areas of dispute\, figures on China’s military size\, state of economy\, political freedom\, economic freedom\, prosperity etc in Asia accessed from various sources as part of appendix. However at the end of his presentation\, the author notes that a conclusion is yet to be added in the paper. \nPoints Raised during the discussion\n\nThe paper broadly deals with liberal theory. However ‘Balance of Power’ and ‘Critical’ theories are missing in this study. \nThe paper does not suggest any policy options. The author does not provide his own views on the topic. The paper is heavily relies on survey of literature.\nToo many scenarios have been projected in the paper. It should have been just four scenarios. The wild card scenario is also missing for the paper.\nThe key drivers in the paper actually are not reflected in the scenarios.\nMapping of Comprehensive National Power (CNP) is another key area which has not been covered in this study. The study conducted by the Chinese academy of social sciences and Ashley Tellis could have been utilized. \nThough the size of the whole Asian economy is huge it is still not a match for the Transatlantic region of the world. So many problems still plague Asia such as hunger\, poverty\, malnutrition\, unemployment etc.\n\nThe United States is still a dominant power in the region and remains a wild card.\nDemographic changes have not been touched upon in this paper. China and India have a large young population which should have been analysed. Similarly young Turks in Japan who aspire for change in Japanese politics could have been discussed. \nThe paper points out that India has little security interests in Taiwan Straits which may not be appropriate. \nIn the future\, India may also be included in the six party talks since it is an emerging power. This aspect could have been included in the scenarios.\nTechnology and its impact is one the biggest drivers which has to be mentioned in this paper.\nThere are domestic players and factors as well which highly influence foreign policy making such as the issue of Okinawa or the change of government in Japan which could have been cited as an alternative scenario.\nPoverty in going to be the major issue in 2030. The leadership question is also important.\nThe author point out that a progressive East Asian community is the most optimistic scenario but this requires more explanation.\nMapping East Asia 2030 is an important task. The author needs to mention which futures are important and how it can be arrived at. \nWhile building the scenario\, no time line has been given. The paper also lacks imagination of events. \nHowever the survey of literature is commendable but the author’s own voice is missing.\n\nReport prepared by Sanjeev Kumar Shrivastav\, Research Assistant at the IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/mapping-east-asian-futures-2030
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100219T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100219T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T031821
CREATED:20231223T222003Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130247Z
UID:63671-1266557400-1266557400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Navigating Through Troubled Waters: Bangladesh's Experience with India and Myanmar
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Dr. Arvind GuptaDiscussants: Alok Bansal and General Barmer \nDr. Sreeradha Datta\, notes that Bangladesh’s maritime boundary dispute with India and Myanmar is becoming increasingly salient in their bilateral relations. It is only in recent years that the issue has gained prominence fraying relations. The un-demarcated nature of the maritime boundary line is the source of dispute between Bangladesh and its two neighbours. Both India and Myanmar have overlapping maritime boundary claims with Bangladesh. Bangladesh is the only country among littoral states not to have reached a maritime agreement. Maritime boundary delimitation implies not only the setting of limits of the state’s outer limit of maritime zones including its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and Continental Shelf\, but also its maritime boundary limits vis-à-vis its opposite or adjacent state. Under the dispute settlement provisions of the UNCLOS of 1982 each littoral state is entitled to claim 200 nautical miles (nm) of sea area as its EEZ with all living and non-living resources within these areas are that state’s exclusive property; out of this\, the first 12 nm are the Territorial Sea and the next 188 nm are its EEZ. The resolution of Indo-Bangladesh maritime boundary dispute entails addressing two contentious issues – that of the baselines to demarcate maritime and delimitation boundaries including the outer limit of the overlapping extended continental shelf. Following revision\, the UNCLOS III stipulated that the ‘median’ or the ‘equidistance’ be the principle for maritime boundary demarcation which India supports. Bangladesh strongly opposes the ‘equidistance’ principle given the nature of its coast. With India\, Bangladesh’s dispute specifically surrounds the contrasting claims over what is known as New Moore in India and South Talpatty in Bangladesh. Myanmar’s position is fairly similar to that of India. Rangoon also insists that the equidistance principle be maintained. However as Dr. Datta maintains despite the contentious issues at stake between Bangladesh and its two neighbours and given the geographical condition of Bangladesh there is ample scope in the UNCLOS III to treat Bangladesh’s case with greater flexibility and beyond the strict guidelines of equidistance. India and Bangladesh could agree on a joint survey\, but for now the dispute is being mediated by an independent arbitrator. Finding a modus vivendi is possible according Dr. Datta. While Bangladesh in recent negotiations has agreed to a joint hydrological survey on Teesta River with India allowing the extreme positions over the baseline may thus be bridged.  \nPoints of Discussion\n\nEurope’s context is different from the history that bedevils the India-Bangladesh maritime dispute. History is important in Europe’s case\, but this is not the case between India and Bangladesh.\nThe paper is informative.\nEquity cannot be defined clearly and Bangladesh has its own conception.\nDelineation of the maritime boundary must follow the equidistance principle. Even the ICJ maintains that equidistance is the rule.\nJoint management is the best option as the author has proposed. Sea bed resources can be equally shared.\nIndia is in a scientifically and technically stronger position than Bangladesh\, which lacks technical resource capacities.\nIndia must be magnanimous\, because it will strengthen the Hasina government.\nChina’s role is increasingly worrisome.\nThe author seems to be pleading only Bangladesh’s case. The onus also lies on Bangladesh to demonstrate that it is really in need of the resources.\n\nThe author must highlight the strategic importance of the dispute and China’s role in trying to exploit the problem\, particularly between India and Bangladesh.  \n\nReport prepared by Kartik Bommakanti\, Research Assistant at the IDSA
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/navigating-through-troubled-waters-bangladeshs-experience-with-india-and-myanmar
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100226T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100226T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T031821
CREATED:20231223T221939Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130247Z
UID:63668-1267162200-1267162200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Space Assets and India’s Capability (Specific to Satellite Communication for Defence Forces up to 2020 and Beyond)
DESCRIPTION:Colonel Deepak Sharma treated the subject from the larger point of view of national security. He argued that space assets constitute a sub-set in the broader structure of national security\, and highlighted the important role they play in military defence. According to him\, imagery\, navigation\, signals intelligence\, telecommunication\, early warning and meteorology are the key satellite functions that are vital in military operations. Besides\, on a strategic planning level\, satellite communication would also be crucial to maintain and sustain troops deployed outside.  \nAfter introducing the theme and its relevance in general\, Sharma defined what he means by space system. He argued that space system meant both a satellite and its ground station(s)\, with trained and technically competent manpower attached to them. \nAfter this he produced various tables\, graphs and charts giving a break-up of country-wise and function-wise statistics\, and budgetary estimates of various countries. According to the statistics provided by him\, more than half of the satellites orbiting around the earth are for communication purposes. Also\, the United States dominates commercial and military space. In this section\, he undertook case studies of American\, Chinese\, Indian and Pakistani space programmes and provided a comparative perspective. \nAs for an Indian military space programme\, he argued that “sufficient space capability exists with India to meet the requirements of its defence forces.” He argued that the Indian armed forces should demand for dedicated satellite facilities only when ISRO is unable to fulfill their requirements. He made a case for one competent and qualified agency in each service Headquarters for space systems that should be fully responsible to conceptualize\, plan and implement the project in totality. He recommended that Indian space strategy should be region-focused as its strategic concerns are basically regional. Aspiring for global reach through satellites is neither reasonable nor fesible for India. As to the question of security of space assets\, he argued that much of the fear is misplaced. Identifying an enemy’s satellites orbiting around the earth and\, then\, damaging or destroying them is not that easy\, technologically. He advised that instead of being over anxious about the safety and security of satellites in space\, the somewhat neglected aspect of security of space assets on the ground requires greater attention because the operation of satellites depends upon space centres on the ground.  \nCol. Deepak Sharma’s presentation was followed by a very fruitful discussion. Mr. Yadvendra Singh argued that the effective use of space military technology by the United States in recent wars has prompted other countries to develop this technology. He pointed out that the United States heavily used commercial satellites for military communications in the Gulf Wars. Thus\, using commercial satellites for military purpose is also a part of strategy. He also pointed out that the consequences would be grave if satellite systems were to collapse even for a single day. The damage incurred by such a failure would be 100 times more than in a war. He said that sharing of space and allocating coordinates will be a major issue in international politics in future because countries cannot place their satellites in orbit arbitrarily. Notwithstanding the fact that India started its space odyssey relatively late\, its progress in space science has been impressive. Further\, he said that Chinese business acumen and hard-bargaining have benefited its space programme a lot. Likewise\, the Indian space programme can also take advantage of the worldwide recession and exploit the opportunities presented by it.  \nCol. Navjot Singh averred that Deepak Sharma has performed a commendable job by highlighting the significance of ground space assets. He said that Sharma’s presentation has given ample food for thought. He highlighted the need of adequate laws for the safety and security of space assets and penalization of violators.  \nDr. Pankaj Jha raised several meaningful questions. He wanted to know what India was doing to tackle its vulnerabilities? What international agreements were there to assuage vulnerabilities? What was the international position on debris in space? The other internal discussant Mr. Kartik Bommakanti raised an important methodological issue of academic citation and validation. \nAir Commodore (Retd.) R.V. Phadke said that Sharma’s paper has done yeoman service to the IDSA as the institution was ‘technologically challenged’ and had shown relatively less interest in such studies. He noted that this was the first time that India’s capabilities were discussed; otherwise the general trend has been to highlight deficiencies only.\nFinally\, Col. Deepak Sharma answered many queries posed by various participants and said he would gladly accommodate many of the valuable suggestions in his final draft.  \nThe Chair\, Dr. Arvind Gupta\, wound up the session. In his remarks\, he emphasized the point that the services would have to explain why they need dedicated satellites. He reiterated the point that our space and strategic community should start deliberating about rules of space sharing as it would be an important issue in times to come. Besides\, the issue of debris has also the potential of becoming an important issue in international politics. India should not be caught in a NPT-like situation. Therefore\, he insisted that there should be a national space policy.  \nReport prepared by Dr. Prashant Kumar Singh
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/space-assets-and-indias-capability-specific-to-satellite-communication-for-defence-forces-up-to-2020-and-beyond
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100312T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100312T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T031821
CREATED:20231223T221938Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130247Z
UID:63664-1268371800-1268371800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Energy Related Border Adjustment Measures: Will it Lead to Trade War?
DESCRIPTION:Ms. Shebonti Ray Dadwal\, Research Fellow\, presented her paper titled “Energy Related Border Trade Measures: Can it lead to trade war?” on 12 March 2010. Dr. Arvind Gupta chaired the session. Dr. Nityananda and Prof. V.G. Hegde were external discussants. Col. P.K. Gautam and Dr. Uttam Sinha were internal discussants.  \nShebonti Ray Dadwal highlighted the key aspects of the topic under consideration: \n\nTrade protectionism in the name of climate change is a hot topic. Already several countries have imposed carbon taxes while others are passing bills that authorise application of such taxes.\nThe question to be asked is if this is a disguised method to retain trade superiority.\nThe American Clean Energy and Security Act (ACESA) and similar measures undertaken by the European countries aim to tax imports that are carbon-intensive in the name of prohibiting competitive distortions.\nIt has been criticised as being against the development plans of the developing countries and it is argued that measures like financial assistance and technology transfers will be more effective.\nDeveloping countries\, worried at the prospects of facing fresh trade barriers\, had made their approach clear at the Copenhagen Summit in December 2009 and earlier in Bonn in August 2009\, arguing against any such unilateral measures.\nSuch measures\, it is argued\, would amount to passing of the mitigation responsibilities to the developing countries by the developed countries. Moreover\, such measures go against the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities”.\nWTO as well as UNFCCC rules are not exactly specific on this subject. Moreover\, the subject is extremely complex because of its multilayered nature. There are loopholes that allow exceptions for such policies.\n\nDiscussion:\n\nTrade\, security and wars are interlinked. Historical evidence also proves this fact. In recent times\, trade and terrorism have become linked.\nAt different times\, different groups of countries have focussed on carbon taxes\, and this issue will keep coming up in the future also. \nEnergy industry itself is the most energy-intensive industry. Moreover\, due to diversity in the quality of production\, assessment is going to be extremely complex; understanding the global impact is going to be even more difficult.\nTechnology is not the solution for addressing climate change; technology diffusion is more important than technology transfer. In a way the present debate is also about increasing the returns on the present IPRs.\nThe question to be asked here is whether India is ready for such a war? Do we have the expertise to fight or anticipate the circumstances?\nSince imposition of tariffs is a sovereign right and the WTO is being used by developed countries for pursuing their security agendas\, policy options for developing countries are getting shrunk. Therefore\, anticipation and capacity building to face the potential changes is extremely critical.\nIndividual countries have their agenda clearly worked out\, but it becomes problematic when one has to act as part of groups. It is better to develop consensus based on common interests which can help in setting important negotiating stands.\nIn all likelihood\, carbon taxation will take place and climate change will be used as a non-tariff barrier. Therefore preparing in advance is necessary.\nIt is important to see how the energy mix impacts trade and carbon taxation policies. Geopolitics\, trade and environment are linked. Thus\, there is interplay of politics and bargaining strategies. \nSometimes cap and trade policies can create incentives for efficient industries and can force non-efficient ones to change their methods of operations. \n\nReport prepared by Avinash Godbole\, Research Assistant\, IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/energy-related-border-adjustment-measures-will-it-lead-to-trade-war
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100312T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100312T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T031821
CREATED:20231223T221938Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130247Z
UID:63665-1268371800-1268371800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Sustaining Motivation in Sub-Conventional Warfare
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Ashok MehataDiscussants: Arun Sahgal and N.P. SinghInternal Discussants: Rumel Dahiya and S. Kalayanaraman \n \nMaj. Gen. (Retd.) Ashok Mehta stated at the very outset that India fought its last conventional war in 1971. Since then\, it has been fighting only sub-conventional wars. However\, the real spurt to sub-conventional wars that India has been fighting came in the 1980s with the surge of Sikh and then Kashmiri militancy. As for the term ‘sub-conventional war’\, he said that it simply denotes to anti-terrorist or counter-insurgency operations. He argued that India would continue to fight this mode of warfare for one or two generations more at least. Therefore\, he argued\, the study done by Col. K. C. Dixit was very relevant from the academic as well as policy points of view.  \nColonel K.C. Dixit\, a Research Fellow at IDSA\, examined in his paper the issue of how to keep soldiers’ (in Army tradition the word ‘soldier’ is generically applied to officers\, junior commissioned officers and other ranks) motivation high in the difficult conditions of sub-conventional war. What makes his paper really noteworthy is that it is based on an extensive field trip and personal interviews conducted by him. He went to Jammu and Kashmir in December 2009 and visited army units where he interviewed 880 soldiers. The interviewees were classified in three categories: officers\, junior commissioned officers and other ranks. He asked them 36 questions\, which were wide ranging and covered the entire gamut of a soldier’s life. On the basis of responses given to his questions\, he arrived at certain conclusions. \nHe began by putting forward a simplified version of the definitional aspects of motivation. Then\, he dwelt into the peculiarities of the operational environment in sub-conventional warfare\, juxtaposing it with conventional warfare. He then elaborated upon the factors affecting motivation in sub-conventional warfare. He recounted the absence of cooperation from the side of civil authority\, media propaganda\, lack of intelligence resulting in difficulty in identifying militants\, pressing demand for quick reaction\, problem with soldiers adapting to a new environment\, problem of command and control\, insistence on use of minimum force\, unsatisfactory living conditions\, pressures from human rights organizations\, as prominent factors affecting motivation of soldiers in sub-conventional warfare.  \nAfter analyzing factors affecting motivation\, he brought forward his conclusion that the conditions necessary to keep Indian soldiers motivated are far from being satisfactory. Here\, he made some recommendations to improve the level of motivation among soldiers. His recommendations covered areas like training\, organizational set up\, judicious involvement and participation on the part of soldiers at various levels in decision-making\, unit cohesion\, making tasks challenging\, exciting and meaningful\, media management\, the handling of junior leadership\, delegation of powers\, and many others. He finished his presentation by making a passionate plea for improving and sustaining motivation of soldiers in sub-conventional warfare. \nThe discussants were unanimous on the fact that the study done by Colonel K.C. Dixit was of immense significance and would surely help improve the working conditions of the Indian Armed Forces and increase their efficiency. However\, they and other scholars present during the session made some valid methodological points\, which needed to be addressed. Col. K.C. Dixit accepted these points and assured that he would accommodate them in the subsequent and final draft. \n  Report prepared by Dr. Prashant Kumar Singh.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/sustaining-motivation-in-sub-conventional-warfare
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100319T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100319T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T031821
CREATED:20231223T221839Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130247Z
UID:63662-1268976600-1268976600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:The Obama Doctrine: Deciphering Obama’s Nuclear Policy and What it bodes for India
DESCRIPTION:In his paper “The Obama Doctrine: Deciphering Obama’s Nuclear Policy and What it bodes for India\,” A. Vinod Kumar examined President Obama’s nuclear policies and critically assessed its implications for India. By addressing Obama’s “nuclear policy” as Obama’s “nuclear doctrine”\, the paper attempted to show how America’s nuclear policies achieve a consistent doctrinal character even when successive Presidents promise paradigmatic change. In this light\, the paper was divided into four main sections. First\, the evolution of Obama’s thinking on nuclear weapons was elucidated. Secondly\, the paper detailed how Obama’s nuclear policy was in fact a doctrine in the making. In the next section the paper critically probed where the doctrine could fall apart. And in the final section\, the implications of Obama’s nuclear policy for India were examined.  \nFrom the beginning the paper showed how the purported nuclear policies of Obama were a continuation of Bush’s doctrine. While analysing the genesis of Obama’s thinking about nuclear weapons\, the paper showed how Obama was buffeted between forces of pragmatism in national security issues and those favouring elimination of nuclear weapons. The four statesmen – Henry Kissinger\, George Shultz\, William Perry and Sam Nunn – emphasized nuclear disarmament but paradoxically they also encouraged nuclear modernization. In this context\, the paper argued that though Obama’s nuclear policy favours traditional non-proliferation goals he was also forced to consider aspects of Bush’s dogmatic policies as well. Article IV of the NPT was reemphasized by Obama in the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1887; but even here issues like the need for a credible nuclear deterrent; the absence of prioritization of punitive action on NPT defectors and the absence of practical steps towards complete elimination of nuclear weapons\, according to the paper\, has not created anything new beyond the Bush doctrine. \nBut the need for a credible nuclear deterrent\, the absence of prioritization of punitive actions on NPT defectors and the absence of practical steps towards complete elimination of nuclear weapons all meant that the Obama nuclear doctrine could not go beyond the Bush doctrine. The author also showed how the revival of traditional instruments of the non-proliferation regime\, central to Obama’s vision\, could not escape his predecessor’s doctrinal style. For example\, on the NPT\, the paper asserted that the problems of non-compliance\, constraints on nuclear commerce\, threats from non-state actors\, nuclear test ban\, FMCT\, strengthening safeguards and restrictions on enrichment and reprocessing technologies are all issues that need immediate redressal for the treaty to be strengthened; and these were the issues on which Bush was not decisive. Between merely setting an agenda for the 2010 Review Conference and formulating a grand 21st century version of the NPT\, the paper argued that reviving the NPT could be a long haul. Similarly\, on CTBT\, the paper showed that securing support within the Senate for its ratification would be a difficult task. Most importantly\, it stressed that Obama’s strategies to combat nuclear security and terrorism were a copy from the Bush administration. The paper however suggested that a new framework could be derived through the UNSCR 1540 to ensure that non-state actors do not access sensitive nuclear technology. Alongside\, it also suggested that “the summit could also formalize counter-proliferation instruments like PSI within the non-proliferation edifice so as to generate global templates for prevention and responses.” Therefore\, even in counter-proliferation\, Obama might not devalue Bush’s initiatives. Finally on Ballistic Missile Defences (BMD) and promoting nuclear energy for peaceful purposes\, the paper showed that Obama’s nuclear policies were inadequately grounded. While Obama voted for major cuts in BMD programmes and was non-committal on Bush’s deployment plans\, upon assuming office Obama favoured limited deployment plans to provide minimum protection to the United States and its allies. He cancelled the Kinetic Kill Vehicle programme but remains apprehensive of Iranian\, North Korean\, Chinese and Russian missile modernization. The paper predicts that this could “force Obama to open funding for both missile defence as well as space weapons.” The same ambiguity was reflected in promoting nuclear energy for peaceful purposes; while Obama favoured international nuclear fuel-cycle centres he also felt that over-emphasis on nuclear energy is unwarranted. To conclude\, the paper asserted the continuities of doctrines regardless of the paradigmatic change promised. \nIn the next section\, the paper laid out two important issue areas where Obama’s doctrine might fail. First\, it questioned whether Obama’s nuclear disarmament is at best a utopian dream. The reason for such scepticism according to the author is that (a) total elimination cannot happen at one stroke as this will not be a consensual or sequential movement among the nuclear weapon states; (b) incremental steps towards elimination\, involving test-ban and fissile material cut-off\, would be a long haul; and\, (c) new weapon states that might emerge could reverse the reduction process. The failure to move from non-proliferation to disarmament\, and ever lingering security dilemmas have created more questions about prospective nuclear disarmament ambitions of the President. Second\, reducing the salience of nuclear weapons and maintaining a robust deterrent is a problem. Maintaining extended nuclear deterrence\, sentiments of the armed forces on modernizing the ageing nuclear forces along with demands for RRW and Stockpile stewardship program has created disagreements over Obama’s policies. Therefore\, the paper\, while arguing how Obama’s doctrine could fall apart\, also stressed that reductions and total elimination of nuclear weapons would also imperil CTBT and FMCT operationalisation.  \nFinally\, the paper assessed the implication of Obama’s nuclear policy for India. On a broader platform of integrating India into the non-proliferation regime\, NPT\, CTBT and FMCT options were discussed. On NPT\, notwithstanding India’s apprehensions to join the club as a NNWS\, the paper stated that Obama might not initiate sweeping reforms by opening up the NWS club. Therefore India’s call for a new non-proliferation bargain transcending the NPT centric regime might not fructify. Similarly\, on CTBT\, the paper stated that India cannot accept the treaty without a disarmament roadmap; the possibility of offering sophisticated weapons design data and simulation capabilities by United States to woo India was discussed with a caveat that Obama would not offer such capabilities as it would undermine his larger disarmament objectives. Finally on FMCT\, the paper stated that since India has committed itself to the treaty’s early conclusion without resolving all its contentions\, it might hope for a third party spoilsport if Obama couldn’t rectify the problem areas including verification and the EIF clause. \nSecondly\, discussing the divergent perceptions on disarmament for understanding the implications of Obama’s nuclear policy on India\, the paper drew attention to three factors. One\, the paper stated that India disowns the NPT and believes it could only retain a non-proliferation edifice without conditioning disarmament and therefore India has reservations on the traditional NPT route of Obama to achieve total elimination; two\, the paper argued that Rajiv Gandhi’s Action Plan of June 1988 could be a solution to Obama’s scepticism of not achieving disarmament in his lifetime; and finally\, the paper stated that de-legitimisation of nuclear weapons could be a right step towards total elimination with a universal agreement on no-first use and reduction of the salience of nuclear weapons in security doctrines. The paper was sceptical of the Obama administration taking such paradigmatic steps in the near future to achieve total elimination. \nLast but not the least\, the paper discussed counter-proliferation policy and its implications for India. It noted that the main stumbling block in India’s participation in Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is the reference to IAEA comprehensive safeguards in the 2005 Protocol to the SUA Convention (Suppression of Unlawful Activities at Sea). India’s apprehension is that PSI is being targeted at non-NPT states. On missile defence the paper reiterated that with Obama’s own reservations India might have fewer worries of his policies impinging on Indian interests. Finally\, however\, the paper noted that Obama is likely to push for India’s participation in counter-proliferation initiatives which is in consonance with the Hyde Act but such pressures would also require India’s commitment to support US action against Iran which could prove problematic. \nDiscussion\n\nObama has limited options in seeking an alternative to Bush policies. Therefore\, the study is not presumptuous in giving Obama’s policies a doctrinal character. \nNuclear terrorism is a very serious problem which the paper could consider in more detail. \nThough a pragmatic disarmament timeline is absent there is some hope of progress; therefore the paper could explore how Obama could carry forward this agenda. \nOn Rajiv Gandhi’s Action plan\, the paper could also highlight similarities with Obama’s larger disarmament objectives rather than merely pointing out dissimilarities.\nThe paper could consider the implications of Obama’s policy on the forthcoming NPT RevCon and how it would impact on India. \nThe paper could discuss in more detail the proposed Nuclear Weapons Convention\, the key differences between NWC and NPT obligations\, and how India can cooperate in ensuring its successful implementation.\nWhile the paper initially stated that India might need to adopt a wait and watch policy\, during the discussion the author acknowledged the need for India to be proactive. \n\nReport prepared by Shanmugasundaram Sasikumar\, Research Assistant.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-obama-doctrine-deciphering-obamas-nuclear-policy-and-what-it-bodes-for-india
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100319T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100319T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T031821
CREATED:20231224T104406Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130247Z
UID:64176-1268976600-1268976600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Recent Trends in Myanmar-US Relations: Implications for Myanmar’s Political System
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Udai Bhanu Singh\, in his paper\, pointed out that the United States has been critical of the military regime in Myanmar. The US approach towards Myanmar was essentially based on a policy of sanctions and non-engagement with Myanmar. While China\, ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and neighbouring countries engaged with Myanmar\, the United States continued to practice its policy.  \nOf late\, there has been a shift in the American policy towards Myanmar\, which is making an impact on Myanmar’s SPDC also. In the case of Myanmar\, it is apparent that contrary to its practice in Southeast Asia the US is not following the ‘Security First Policy’. For this\, pointed Dr. Singh\, China could also be one of the important factors.  However\, whether the shift in US policy is significant is yet to be examined. The shift in the US policy towards Myanmar has been evident as the two parties have made several official visits to each others’ capitals.  Still\, the US is consistent on the point that sanctions will remain in place until Myanmar becomes a democracy.  \nAnother contentious issue between Myanmar and the US has been Myanmar’s nuclear programme. While some scholars doubt Myanmar’s nuclear capability and its ability to make nuclear weapons\, one cannot deny the fact that Russia (and possibly North Korea too) has been cooperating with Myanmar on nuclear issues. In the changed circumstances\, SPDC’s objective is to integrate with the international community and to increase the level of manoeuvrability. Drug trafficking is another issue of concern for the US in light of the fact that Myanmar is the world’s second largest drug producer.  \nAnother reason\, as pointed out by Dr. Singh\, is the role of the Burmese diaspora based in the US. The US- and Canada-based Burmese diapsora is playing an increasingly significant role in influencing US policy towards Myanmar. For instance\, the Massachusetts-Burma Law was heavily influenced by the Burmese diaspora based in the US. What are the implications of such a change in the approach?  \n\nThe possibility of change in the Burmese Junta’s policy depends on SPDC’s ability to face the challenges\, both domestic and international. \nThe US so far has focused attention on just one person and just one party\, which has failed to deliver positive results. \n\nPoints of Discussion:\n\nStudying the US policy towards Myanmar will not help without understanding US policy towards the Southeast Asian region. \nThere is a realisation in the US that because of Myanmar its policy towards Southeast Asian region is also getting stifled. \nThe US is not able to engage Myanmar constructively because of domestic legislative constraints.\nThe shift in the US policy is a result of President Barak Obama’s attempt to reach out to recalcitrant countries. China factor is not significant since during the Bush administration nothing was done regarding Myanmar. It is to be noted that Bush administration had the policy of trying to forestall China’s rise in Asia. \nA reference to Andrew Selth’s article on Chinese bases in Myanmar was made during the discussion on Chinese bases in Myanmar. It was said that reports on Chinese bases in Myanmar was an overreaction. \n\nReport prepared by Rahul Mishra.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/recent-trends-in-myanmar-us-relations-implications-for-myanmars-political-system
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100326T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100326T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T031821
CREATED:20231223T221838Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130247Z
UID:63661-1269581400-1269581400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Prospects for India-US Cyber-Security Cooperation
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Cherian Samuel notes that cyber security is a significant domain for policy makers in India to formulate a hands-on approach\, as there is clear evidence over the past decade of an increase of cyber threats worldwide. In his paper\, he searches for scope for cooperation between India and the United States in the area of cyber security\, continuing from the 2002 efforts of the India-US Cyber Security Forum aimed at strengthening cooperation on national security issues between the two countries. \nThe structure of the paper encompasses the approaches to cyber security in both countries and studies the sectoral approaches to cyber security i.e.\, the IT security perspective\, the economic perspective\, the law enforcement perspective and a national security perspective. Dr. Samuel argues that understanding sectoral approaches is essential since harmonizing these perspectives to create a holistic policy on cyber security is required through the inclusion of all these sectors. In the United States\, one finds that policy on cyber security is dominated by the national security perspective\, which has been encouraged under President Obama as well. While there are practical problems relating to harmonizing aspects of privacy and security\, the United States\, unlike India\, has formulated a clear policy towards cyber security as seen in its various declassified goals as well. In India\, while there has been a boom of cyberspace in the past decade\, the focus of policy makers has been economic rather than national security oriented\, as seen in the Information Technology Act of 2000 which concentrates mainly on e-commerce. Following the 26/11 Mumbai attacks\, there have been efforts to introduce amendments in this bill\, which\, however\, continues to lack a clear focus in its goal and is often noted to be an ‘Omnibus Bill’ covering too many issues. \nIn the context of cyber security cooperation between the India and the United States\, Dr. Samuel notes that the interests of both countries can be fulfilled. For India\, capacity building and research development has been cited as a clear objective through this cooperation\, while the United States may feel the need to safeguard its interests given the large number of US companies engaged in outsourcing in India. An asymmetry in the technical capacities of the two countries may have been a reason for the India-US Cyber Security Forum of 2002 not being successful\, along with the lack of a multilateral treaty or body like the United Nations to coordinate and oversee activities and cooperation. The working groups established under the aegis of this Forum – Legal Cooperation and Law enforcement\, Research and development\, Critical Information Infrastructure\, Defence Cooperation and Standards and Software assurance – have been used by Dr. Samuel as a template for his analysis in searching for areas for cooperation and road-blocks on cyber security between the two countries in the future. \nIn the area of Legal Cooperation and Law Enforcement\, the lack of an international legal framework has undoubtedly impacted the avenues for Indo-US bilateral cooperation on this issue. The UN’s Internet Governing Forum (IGF) has proved to be an inadequate mechanism for generating such a framework. On issues relating to Research and Development\, cooperation remains limited since US agencies like the highly secretive National Security Agency (NSA) remains disinterested in sharing technologies that remain its strategic assets. Defence Cooperation in cyberspace encompasses unique issues\, which need to addressed by both countries individually before agreeing on cooperation\, wherein the policy of the state towards cyber crime or cyber terrorism are to be formulated. The US military has only recently begun to conceive cyberspace as a war-fighting domain and India is still far behind on this issue. NATO\, of which the United States is a member\, however has presented an advanced cyberspace cooperation mechanism and may even become a “hub” of coordinating responses to global threats to cyber security. The scope for cooperation between India and the United States\, according to Dr. Samuel\, lies mainly in the field of Critical Information Infrastructure Protection. This forms the focus of the US interest in cyber security partnership with India and this objective resulted in the setting up of the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In) and the National Skills Registry in 2005 to authenticate individuals working in the IT industry. However\, to increase Indo-US cooperation in this field there are gaps that need to plugged in by India\, which has been found to have the highest cyber security regulation but the lowest security adoption rates. \nTherefore cooperation between the United States and India in this sphere is conceivable only when they are both equal in their understanding and responses to threats in cyber space. There is a pressing urge in India to approach this issue holistically\, while taking into account the interests of the various sectors with stakes in cyberspace. The inability of the Indo-US Cyber Security Forum to take off points to the need for a multilateral cooperation framework along with the presence of a legislation covering legal\, technical and national security objectives to regulate India’s policies on cyber security to pave the way for bilateral and international cooperation on this issue.  \nPoints of Discussion\n\nFailure of the Indo-US Cyber Security Forum provides a valuable lesson in strengthening such cooperation in the future. Cooperation with other countries (such as Russia and South Korea) and multi-dimensional cooperation should also be made a priority by India. \nIn order to have equal footing with a world leader like the United States\, India needs the presence of an overarching supervisory authority with over-sight mechanism along with a role for the United Nations. Issues relating to trust and coordination between the parties can be fulfilled through this\, and these terms need to be clarified before embarking on bilateral cooperation. Also\, creating any arrangement without India’s priorities clearly demarcated will remain asymmetrical and therefore non-beneficial for India\nSecurity testing and reliability testing of hardware is essential to ensure that crucial hardware components sourced from third countries is not compromised. A third party auditing organization and the creation of a Cyber Security Fund are areas which need to be flagged for Indo-US cyber security cooperation since both countries have increasing stakes in this domain. \nThere are definite benefits for all sectors with stakes in cyber security in the fructification of Indo-US bilateral cooperation on this issue. India should try to base cooperation on research and development and capacity building to equalize such a partnership\nThe Indian government should also issue directives on cyber security like the US government in order to sensitise Indian private enterprises about data security and dangers from cyber espionage. \nProposed initiatives such as the National Institute of Cryptology Research should be brought on-stream at the earliest.\n\nReport prepared by Saba Joshi\, Intern\, IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/prospects-for-india-us-cyber-security-cooperation
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100416T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100416T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T031821
CREATED:20231223T221838Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130247Z
UID:63659-1271395800-1271395800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:India and Japan: Exploring Strategic Potentials
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Prof. V. P. DuttExternal Discussants: Amb. Rajiv Sikri & Amb. T.C.A. RangachariInternal Discussants: Brig. (Retd.) Rumel Dahiya and Dr. Shamshad Ahmed Khan \nDr. Rajaram Panda presented his paper titled India and Japan: Exploring Strategic Potentials on Friday\, April 16\, 2010. The paper’s main focus was on maritime cooperation between India and Japan and more specifically on the strategic dimensions of this cooperation. Dr. Panda argued that the looming Chinese shadow is the rationale behind this cooperation. First\, he defined what a ‘strategic partnership’ means\, arguing that the canvas of a “strategic relationship” was much larger than mere “political relationship”. A strategic partnership includes “defence\, economic\, and security dimensions in the relationship.” \nDr. Panda emphasized that there was a great convergence of interests between India and Japan in the maritime domain. He highlighted India’s unique geographical position\, which makes its cooperation extremely critical for Japan in securing its sea lanes. Much of Japan’s international trade is dependent upon safety of its sea lanes that pass through the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea. He argued that security of Japan’s maritime and energy supplies prominently figured in its security calculus. \nDr. Panda discussed two high-level important visits in detail: the first being Indian Defence Minister A.K. Antony’s visit to Japan\, and the other Japanese Prime Minister Hatoyama’s visit to India\, which he characterized as a landmark visit. During this visit\, an Action Plan to Advance Security Cooperation Based on the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation was adopted. This plan delineated a host of issue-areas in which a meaningful strategic partnership could be built. However\, he highlighted the Japanese stand on India’s nuclear programme as a major irritant in what is an otherwise cordial relationship. \nDiscussion\nAmb. Rajiv Sikri argued that the economic aspect of the strategic partnership should be part of this paper. He further argued that the China factor was an important factor shaping this strategic partnership\, but it was not the only factor. There are other important factors also which require due focus. Besides\, the importance of China factor will keep varying depending upon who is in power in Japan. The India-Japan relationship is not that undifferentiated as it is being considered. There are more nuances involved in it. He was of the view that the US-Japan alliance had not outlived its utility and should not be underestimated. As to the definition of strategic partnership\, he said that India had very loose definition of the partnership. He further argued that a strategic partnership basically meant macro-level understanding\, not micro. It should be dealt with on that level only. On the question of Japanese investment in India\, he said that Japanese businessmen should understand how business was done in India. He argued that there was no point in Japanese businessmen constantly complaining about India’s business environment. They should follow the example of Korean businessmen and introspect how they have succeeded in India. \nAmb. T.C.A. Rangachari raised some fundamental questions. He asked: if Japan was considered to be a declining power then why there was a need for an India-Japan strategic partnership. Similarly\, why have a strategic partnership with the United States if it is actually declining. If the argument behind these strategic partnerships is a rising China then one must ask as to why China would not be a responsible power. Expressing doubts about China’s rise as a responsible power reflects the influence of Western thinking. He also said that the sea lanes had never been disrupted since World War II\, thus\, the security of sea lanes is not the biggest issue. He argued that we should not be uncritical of Western wisdom\, which had actually projected India as a maritime threat in the 1970s. He further argued that the strategic partnership between India and Japan was ambivalent and Japanese perception of India was changing very slowly. Incidentally\, he said that there was a minority view in Japan that favoured India’s nuclear programme. \nBrigadier Rumel Dahiya argued that the geostrategic importance of Japan must be assessed while exploring any strategic partnership. Dr. Shamshad Ahmed Khan mentioned that the economic aspect needs to be probed more. He further argued that India-Japan defence cooperation has not been strong. He argued that we should also try to understand Japanese laws and constitution\, which prevents Japan from participating in any collective security mechanism. \nConcluding the discussion\, Professor V.P. Dutt said that he felt that Japan’s new foreign policy was dubious\, ambiguous and uncertain. He was of the opinion that Japanese leaders were making very vague statements about their foreign policy and they themselves may not be very clear as to what they want. He raised a larger philosophical point – the Japanese public seems to have lost interest in foreign affairs. Now\, the question is whether Japan will remain confused or it will become even more confused. \nReport prepared by Dr. Prashant Kumar Singh\, Research Assistant\, IDSA
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/india-and-japan-exploring-strategic-potentials
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100416T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100416T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T031821
CREATED:20231223T221838Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130247Z
UID:63660-1271395800-1271395800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Transformation of Conflict: An Analysis of “Op Sadbhavana” in Jammu and Kashmir
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Prof. Amitabh MattooExternal Discussants: Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Hari Prasad and Dr. Suba ChandranInternal Discussants: Dr. Namrata Goswami and Col. (Retd.) Ali Ahmed \n \nDr. Arpita Anant’s paper notes that traditionally the Army defends the borders and\, whenever called in\, helps in counter-insurgency operations and provides aid to the victims of calamities. However\, in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K)\, the Indian Army has extended its mandate to rebuild the lives of people devastated by terrorism.  Operation Sadbhavana (meaning Goodwill)\, launched in 1998\, is an unique attempt to apply the healing touch to win the hearts and minds (WHAM) of people by promoting development activities focuses on their basic needs. \nThe author points out that the doctrine of sub-conventional warfare of the Indian Army released in January 2007 gives a central place to WHAM in counter-insurgency operations. Such attempts\, it is envisaged\, would provide the healing touch during conflict and win over the alienated sections of people in the conflict zones.  \nAccording to Dr. Anant\, from 1998 to 2008\, a total of Rs. 276.08 crore\, allocated by the Ministry of Defence (MoD)\, was spent on various multi-faceted activities under this operation. The Army has been running schools and orphanages\, improving the living standard of the locals by constructing roads and bridges\, installing hand pumps and electrifying villages and giving them free medical services. Excursion and education tours have also been organised during this period.\nDr. Anant adds that the projects are identified and selected jointly with the state administration and the people at the grass root level. The Army acts as a facilitator and catalyst and actively assists in planning\, provides technical assistance\, makes available specialized equipment and supervises it. \nDr. Anant asserts that implementation of the projects under this initiative has had an extremely positive impact on the minds of the local population. Various educational schemes and women empowerment centres have helped in employment generation and transformed many lives. Numerous other community development and healthcare projects have helped in mitigating the hardships of the common man. \nThe author’s tête-à-tête with the civil administration reveals that most of them were very candid in admitting that the Army brought schools\, walking tracks/roads\, small bridges and doctors in areas where the state government could not reach in the difficult years of the insurgency. However\, a common refrain was that there is scope for improvement in coordination between the Army and civil administration. Dr. Anant’s interface with journalists reveals that although the initiative of the Army is very praiseworthy\, real peace will come only with the resolution of the political problem. Some educationists believed that the Army’s initiatives are lacking involvement of the youth in the age group of 18 to 21 years who constitute 60 per cent of the population. Her discussions with the Army reveal that Operation Sadbhavna had a positive impact on the relationship between the people and the Army. However\, some Army officials did believe that the actual impact is only between 50 to 75 per cent of the desired targets. \nDr. Anant’s conclusion is that Operation Sadbhavana has certainly been a successful effort. Although it adds to the responsibilities of the Army\, it has certainly salvaged its image. The ease with which people were interacting with Army officials made this obvious. The unending list of demands\, which ought to be fulfilled by the civil administration\, also proved the same. She points out that the comfort level between the military and the people seemed higher in the Jammu region than in the Valley. Also\, in some places people spoke highly of the Army officials they were interacting with and remembered some officers who had been posted out\, indicating that personalities made all the difference.  \nDr. Anant’s paper suggests following measures for better results:  \n\nCoordination with appropriate civil authorities could be improved.\nProjects like micro-hydel projects that have not worked well could be re-considered. \nThe audit system of Sadbhavana needs to be publicized.\nIn all projects priority should be given to basics. \nQuality of infrastructure projects can be improved.\nCivil society involvement to increase transparency and to add a sense of belonging is necessary. \nEngage the youth in the projects.\nLocal media (rural and urban) could be used to portray best cases and clarify misperceptions.\nTransparency to avoid abuse of power.\n\nDiscussion:\n\nIn J&K what has been achieved through Operation Sadbhavana represents the best feasible for transition to the political process.\nOperation Sadbhavana as a sound strategy for conflict prevention in Ladakh has been widely acclaimed. The scope of the study should be broadened to include this region of J&K as well.\nThe overall aim of Operation Sadbhavana needs to be well-defined. Does it seek out ‘conflict transformation’ or is it just a ‘WHAM’ (winning the hearts and minds) activity?\nOperation Sadbhavana puts the organisational\, medical\, engineering\, transport and educational expertise of the Army at the disposal of the people. It jeopardizes the Army’s primary function of training and deployment for high-intensity conflict.\nMore detailed analysis of the data collected during the field visit will yield many additional important insights and further energize the discussion.\nOrganising children educational tours under the initiative is a good step to showcase the dynamic culture of the country and to witness the fruits of peace and development.\nCases and allegations of corruption and other irregularities against the Army officials engaged in Operation Sadbhavana have been cropping up with alarming regularity of late. This needs to be discussed.\nIf the Army keeps on taking over the functions of the civil administration\, it will further delegitimise the state government.\nThe budget allocation for Operation Sadbhavana is too small to make a big difference in a large state like J&K.\n\nReport prepared by Dr. Imtiyaz Majid\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/transformation-of-conflict-an-analysis-of-op-sadbhavana-in-jammu-and-kashmir
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100423T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100423T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T031821
CREATED:20231223T221808Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130247Z
UID:63658-1272000600-1272000600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Maoist Mass Organisations and Mass Movement
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Brig. (Retd.) Rumel Dahiya\, SMDiscussants: J N Roy and W ChandrakanthInternal Discussants: Dr. Rajiv Nayan and Dr. Nihar Nayak \n \nAccording to Dr. P.V. Ramana\, in order to succeed in its revolutionary agenda of the armed overthrow of the state\, a Communist group requires three magic weapons – strong Party\, strong Army and United Front. The last of these involves the ‘mobilization of people’. His paper focuses exclusively on Maoist Mass Organisations or Front Organisations. \nThe author explains that the Maoists have several mass organisations\, at the State level as well as at the All India level (AIMOS)\, which are primarily of three types: 1) Underground Revolutionary: these are built clandestinely and conduct secret propaganda. 2) Open or semi-open Revolutionary: these directly serve the people’s war as long as there is room for undertaking open revolutionary activities. 3) Mass organisations not directly linked to CPI (Maoist): these are broad-based\, not directly linked to the Maoist parent outfit\, and function under cover with a limited set of activities as its mandate. This type can be further subdivided into three broad categories: (a) fractional work\, (b) party-formed cover organisations\, and (c) legal democratic organisations. \nDr. Ramana elucidates the utilities of Mass Organisations for the Maoists as: One\, they spread the ideology of the outfit among the people in the areas of their operation. Two\, they serve as a recruiting base\, or catchments\, for the underground. Three\, to watch for the future leadership of the outfit emerge from among the ranks of the Mass Organisations. He quotes the example of Mallojula Koteswara Rao alias Kishenji and Naveen who were leaders of the Radical Students Union in Andhra Pradesh and Delhi\, respectively. Four\, members of Mass Organisations are drafted into the ‘people’s militia’\, or the Base Force. Five\, Mass Organisations would enable the Maoists to be ‘heard and seen.’ \nDr. Ramana asserts that the availability of a large number of people as members of mass organisations has enabled the Maoists to create vast numbers of cadres for the people’s militia in the rural and tribal hinterland\, who have participated in all the large-scale synchronized attacks on multiple targets in different parts of the country in Bihar\, Orissa\, Chhattisgarh\, Jharkhand and West Bengal\, beginning with the Koraput raid of February 6\, 2004\, and acquired a new proficiency and vigour in the Jehanabad Jail Break in Bihar on November 13\, 2005. \nDr. Ramana points out that the entire work of the Mass Organisations is guided and supervised by a committee appointed by the apex and all-powerful Central Committee. This committee is known as the Sub Committee on Mass Organisations (SUCOMO)\, formed for the first time in 2001. The purpose of SUCOMO is to provide direction on the issues that need to be taken-up by the Mass Organisations and to provide coordination at the all-India level for State-level Mass Organisations and All India Mass Organisations (AIMOs).  \nIn the next section of the paper\, the author cites two cases from Andhra Pradesh where Mass Organisations got defunct after being quite active and popular for a while.  \nHighlighting the case of Singareni Karmika Samkhya (SIKASA)\, the author mentions that SIKASA took up various issues that mattered for the people dependent upon the Singareni Collieries. These included mine safety\, better working conditions and wages\, exploitation of miners\, rampant alcoholism\, goondaism and exploitation by contractors. To implement its directives\, the tool it used was “terror”. However\, towards the latter half of the 1990s\, the downfall of SIKASA commenced. The reasons included: the collieries accumulated losses of Rs. 1\,250 crore and was referred to the BFIR; severe police crackdown commenced; and liberalisation policies came into force.  \nHighlighting the case of the Andhra Pradesh Radical Students Union (APRSU)\, Dr. Ramana mentions that in the initial years APRSU went through a prolonged debate on whether its mandate should be to limit itself to addressing students’ problems alone\, or to make it a part of the New Democratic Revolution and help build and lead the agrarian revolution in the villages. The latter view prevailed. The various issues taken-up by APRSU during the period of its active functioning\, either when it was underground or worked openly\, included: opposing detention system in schools\, better facilities in welfare hostels\, scholarships for students\, reservation for the underprivileged in educational institutions\, Karamchedu dalit massacre by upper caste landlords\, opposing New Education Policy\, protest marches against alleged fake encounters\, etc.  \nNevertheless\, towards the beginning of the mid-1990s\, the downfall of APRSU commenced and now it is defunct. While the leadership loss contributed significantly to the slow demise of the APRSU\, new ‘economic opportunities’ which threw open several avenues for the angry youth also played an important role in failing to attract students towards the Maoist-fold. \nAccording to Dr. Ramana\, among all the states in the country\, Mass organisations are most active and vibrant in the Bastar region in the central Indian state of Chhattisgarh. In the Dandakaranya region the Mass Organisations in operation are:  \nDAKMS: The organisation started its activities in 1981 in Khammam district of Andhra Pradesh. A person who is at least 16 years of age and is a resident of the village is eligible to become a member of the particular village unit of DAKMS. However\, landlords\, lumpen elements and those suspected to be linked to the police are not granted membership of the unit. The objective in forming DAKMS was to protect the self-respect of the tribal (adivasi) populace\, declare Dandakaranya as a ‘liberated area’\, prevent religious conversions\, fight for the rights of the tribal populace over the land\, fight against privatization and the entry of multi-national corporations (MNCs)\, to fight for better wages and working conditions of the labour involved in collecting kendu leaf (similar to beedi leaf)\, bamboo fellers\, and so on. \nKAMS:	It is one of the most active mass organisations that operates in the Dandakaranya region and fights for the rights of tribal women. All women who are above 16 years of age are eligible to become members of the village unit in which they are resident.  \nAKCS:	It was founded in 1997 to fight for the rights of students and for solving their problems. Some of the issues taken-up by the organisation included effective implementation of mid-day meal scheme in schools\, provide text books free of cost\, grant scholarships\, etc. \nKABS:	It was founded in 1998\, in the Konta and Basuguda areas of Dantewada district (South Bastar). All children between the ages of five and 15 are eligible to become members of KABS. The underlying motive behind forming this organisation seems to be ‘to catch them young’. \nDr. Ramana concluded his presentation by assessing that on a broader national scale\, the Maoists do not have a ‘mass base’\, contrary to the impression that is created\, which is essentially because recurring and frequent acts of ‘violence’ widely dispersed in different parts of the country attract publicity and visibility. The author\, nevertheless\, warns that it should be noted with concern that even the miniscule support they had built over the years has sufficient ‘nuisance value’ for the Indian state. \nDiscussion\n\nThe Maoist movement has tapped into the deep and dangerous undercurrent of alienation\, misery and rage amongst millions of people who have been failed by the economic\, social and political system.\nIn 2006\, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh referred to the Naxalites as the single biggest internal security challenge ever faced by our country. But nothing has been done so far to seriously address the concern.\nThe author’s end assessment that “on a broader national scale the Maoists do not have a mass base” needs further discussion. India now has 223 districts across 20 states that are affected by Maoist activities. This shows that the Maoist potential to penetrate other states\, which had hitherto remained outside their grasp\, has evolved enormously. \nBad governance\, lethargic and corrupt administration\, inefficient police\, and illiteracy among rural populations will ensure that the Maoists keep receiving fresh recruits.\nInconsistent public postures of the top central and state leadership shows that even a basic consensual assessment of the Maoist threat is lacking. More detailed assessment at the end together with recommendations\, including alternative courses of action\, ought to be added to the paper.\nIt is time to recognise that the Maoist movement has grown in the tribal areas because there is a new consciousness among the tribal people about their rights over their resources.\nStudy of Maoists’ linkages to unorganized weapon markets of India\, China\, Myanmar and Bangladesh would be useful.\nThe decline of labour union power in the country has shored up Maoist support.\nMaoists can be countered only through a coherent and well thought out strategy.\n\nReport prepared by Dr. Imtiyaz Majid\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/maoist-mass-organisations-and-mass-movement
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR