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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090710T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090710T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T035143
CREATED:20231223T222110Z
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SUMMARY:Maoists' Tactical United Front (TUF) and Urban Movement
DESCRIPTION:Only by Invitation 1030 to 1300 hrs \nChair: A K DovalDiscussants: J N Roy and G D Bakshi \nA Communist party\, according to classical understanding\, requires ‘three magic weapons’ to achieve its goal of capturing political power. These are: Party\, i.e. a strong organisation; Army\, i.e. a body of fighters; and United Front\, i.e. alliances or linkages with groups that would facilitate its ultimate goal. United Front is of two types –– ‘tactical’ and ‘strategic’. The Strategic United Front (SUF) is formed with various underground organisations of the CPI (Maoist)\, which are engaged in waging New Democratic Revolution (NDR). In the Tactical United Front (TUF)\, through forming coalitions with persons and groups that are opposed to the state and its policies\, on one issue or the other\, the Maoists seek to fight the state through ‘peaceful’\, political means\, as well as broaden their support base.  \nThis paper seeks to understand the United Front tactics of the CPI (Maoist). According to the CPI (Maoist)\, “it is essential that we unite with such struggling organisations and build up broad struggles against the ruling classes”. In this light\, this paper also seeks to examine the ‘urban activities’ of the CPI (Maoist).  \nThe TUF is a secret committee. It functions directly under the guidance of the Sub Committee on Mass Organisations (SUCOMO)\, which itself is a sub-set of the all-powerful and apex Central Committee of the CPI (Maoist). In 2002\, the TUF activity took a firm shape with the formation of an outfit known as Forum against Imperialism and Globalisation (FAIG)\, which is a conglomerate of various revolutionary and mass organisations.  \nThe TUF serves the agenda of the Maoists in the following ways: \n\nTo consolidate various ‘anti-imperialist’ struggles and bring them on to one platform on the basis of a common working understanding;\nTo expand the reach of the Maoists to various sections of the society by building contacts with them;\nTo expand over-ground cadre strength\, thoroughly indoctrinate them\, and then completely incorporate them into organisational work\, especially in urban areas;\nPoach partners for potential leaders and ideologues;\nServes as a good cover from the long arm of the state;\nEssentially being a political activity\, it reinforces the military activities\, i.e. armed struggle. \n\nThe activities of the CPI (Maoist) in urban areas –– cities and towns –– need to be understood because of the implications they hold. These activities should be understood together with TUF activities\, because urban presence would give a fillip to TUF activities. The Maoists have also prepared an Urban Perspective Plan\, which is a road map to the type of activities they would undertake in towns in order to enhance their support base. The Urban Movement has a defined role in the political strategy and military strategy of the CPI (Maoist). \nThe Maoists contend that the urban movement should be conducted through various types of mass organisations; the wider the organisations\, the better. These organisations are of different types –– secret revolutionary mass organisations\, open and semi-open revolutionary mass organisations\, open legal mass organisations which are not directly linked to the CPI (Maoist). The last of these would include Maoist-inspired cover organisations and legal\, democratic organisations. \nThus\, the Tactical United Front and Urban Movement are extremely important elements of the CPI (Maoist). These are just about taking shape over the past three to four years. Being political and peaceful in nature\, it is not surprising that TUF activities have not received adequate attention in the media. At the same time\, because they are legitimate\, over-ground\, democratic activities\, the state’s hands are tied-down. At best\, it can keep a close watch on these organisations but cannot halt their activities. However\, if it was possible on the part of the state to prove that outfits that are part of the Maoist-led TUF are\, indeed\, Maoist fronts or have direct linkages with them\, it is then feasible to proscribe such organisations. Because these organisations mobilise\, organise\, propagate and indoctrinate the people to attract them towards over-ground activities (i.e. create a sympathiser base)\, and\, perhaps\, subsequently as part of the underground\, the state should make every effort to expose these organisations and ban them. Moreover\, if and when the Urban Movement catches on among the industrial workers\, the state will have to deal with possible sabotage activities and industrial unrest. Besides\, when the Urban Movement becomes strong\, the state will then have to deal with urban terrorism.  \nPoints raised during the discussion\n\nTactical United Front and Urban Movement require immediate attention at the policy making level.\nThe Maoists’ ideology appealed a lot during Charu Majumdar’s days\, but at the organisational level the group was weak.\nFront organisations are a platform to express dissent in a democracy.\nThickly forested areas are the ideal guerrilla zone.\nMaoists are targeting the unorganised sector.\nThere is need for strengthening intelligence.\nMoving towards urban centres is an indication of the failure of the Maoist movement.\nThere is lack of political will in dealing with the Maoist insurgency.\nState police do not have the capacity to deal with Maoist violence; time might come for the Army to intervene.\nNaxalism is a rural phenomenon.\nUrban areas will become major sources of finance for the Maoists. \n\nPrepared by M. Amarjeet Singh\, Research Assistant at Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/maoists-tactical-united-front-tuf-and-urban-movement
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090710T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090710T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T035143
CREATED:20231223T222210Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T055818Z
UID:63694-1247203800-1247203800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Piracy\, Maritime Terror and Policy Response
DESCRIPTION:Only by Invitation 1030 to 1300 hrs \nChair: Amb. Arjun AsraniDiscussants: Dr. Vijay Sakhuja and Dr. Chintamani Mahapatra \nIn recent years\, piracy and terrorism on high seas are posing serious threats to international security and economic development. With increasing interdependence\, the use of sea route for transportation has become vital. In this paper\, Dr. Panda addresses three main issues: piracy with focus on Somalia and the Gulf of Eden; terrorism impacting trade through Malacca Straits; and policy response of the countries whose trade is adversely affected by sea piracy and terrorism. \nAccording to Dr. Panda\, there exists a very thin line between an act of terrorism and piracy\, primarily because both acts are undertaken to achieve private ends. Still\, there are certain factors which distinguish piracy from terrorism. In terms of ends\, while piracy is usually driven by financial gains\, terrorism is politically motivated. The line between the two\, however\, is still blurred because terrorists could acquire funding for their political ends through piracy – tactically piractical\, but strategically terrorist. In terms of means\, while pirates are usually associated with basic tactics (e.g\, boarding\, theft\, use of force or violence)\, terrorists usually aim at achieving a strategic effect. Today\, piracy and maritime terrorism are no longer considered discrete. In fact\, there is a complex piracy-terrorism continuum.  \nDr. Panda states that both piracy and terrorism have made the Indian Ocean and Malacca Strait region highly insecure. The Indian Ocean is home to many choke points\, such as the Straits of Hormuz\, Straits of Malacca\, Lombok and the Sunda Straits. Any disruption in traffic flow through these points can result in grave and disastrous consequences. As far as the Straits of Malacca is concerned – the sea route transiting it and Singapore is the busiest in the world – 25 percent of world trade passes through this route every year. The criticality of the Malacca Strait is further reinforced by the increase in global economic interdependence and the consequent increase in the volume of mercantile traffic transiting the Strait.  \nTerrorism and piracy have begun to engage the global community\, especially due to the rise in fundamentalist forces after 9/11 and 26/11 attacks in the US and Mumbai\, respectively. The importance of container security to maritime terrorism was particularly felt after the US Navy’s discovery of a group of al-Qaeda terrorists hiding inside a well equipped shipping container in January 2002. While the US is engaged in its search for terrorists and their personification in al-Qaeda on land\, the prospect of a terror ship used by the al-Qaeda terrorizing the maritime arena continues to threaten tranquility at sea. After the recent 26/11 terrorist attack on Mumbai\, guarding sea lanes and territorial waters has become new priorities of naval forces of many countries. \nPiracy in the Malacca Straits has historically been an unresolved threat to ship owners and mariners who ply the 900 kilometer long sea lane. The geography of the Strait makes the region very susceptible to piracy. During 1991-2001\, nearly 2375 incidents of piracy were registered across the world\, with South and Southeast Asia registering the highest number of incidents. The Indian Ocean area too has been invaded with merchant vessels that are suspected to belong to terrorist organizations such as the LTTE and al-Qaeda. In fact\, the LTTE is suspected to own an entire flotilla engaged in dubious maritime trade. As the checking mechanism in place is flawed and entangled in legal matters\, such ships are considered safe for engaging in terrorist-related activities. The Indian Ocean region is notorious for narco-terrorism as well. It is also widely believed that oil leakage at sea might create havoc with the ecology in the maritime environment which would ultimately affect maritime security.  \nThe recent spike in pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia has generated a great deal of international media attention. Somalia’s modern pirates represent not only a very real menace to maritime security\, but also a growing threat to international commerce. The sensational nature of their crimes\, while drawing the ire of the international community\, has also ensured that the Somali pirates remain shrouded in mystery.  \nAccording to Dr. Panda\, instances of piracy around the Gulf of Aden by Somali pirates have increased in recent years basically because of the absence of an effective government in Somalia. In 2008\, piracy off the Somalian coast has more than doubled. So far\, over 60 ships have been attacked. Hijacking ships for ransom is a new model. By most estimates\, the pirates took in around $30 million in 2008\, although actual figures may be many times this amount. Kenya in fact claims that the pirates collected over $150 million in ransom in 2008 alone. The increased threat of maritime piracy has heightened the shipping industry’s financial concerns in the context of the current global economic recession.  \nThere is consensus in the international community that maritime terrorism and piracy ought to be addressed with urgency. The misuse of sophisticated technology by pirates and non-state actors calls for continuous up-gradation of technology to counter those engaged in terrorist activities. However\, despite increased naval presence by major powers\, patrolling one million square kilometres of open sea has so far proved to be a major challenge. The existing international law governing territorial waters also place legal constraints on countries capable of checking maritime terrorism.  \nThough the UN has intervened to check the piracy menace\, it has not been very effective. Still a number of unilateral\, bilateral and multilateral security initiatives pursued so far have been able to become regionally successful in tackling maritime threats. Malaysia has embarked upon several regional maritime security initiatives\, including the establishment of SEARCCT (Southeast Asia Regional Center for Counter-Terrorism) and hosting the IBM’s regional piracy centre. Singapore\, being the most vulnerable state to any major piracy attack or maritime terrorist act\, gives utmost priority in securing the sea lanes of communication (SLOC) for navigation in regional waterways. There are other regional powers as well\, like the US\, Japan\, China and India whose interests are intrinsically embedded with littoral states like Malaysia and Singapore. In view of the overreaching security and economic interests of all trading nations\, a collective security mechanism involving littorals and extra-regional players to share the burden of policing the Malacca Straits through capacity-building\, intelligence and sharing of financial resources\, and technology transfers seems to be the sine qua non for any attempt to securing the SLOCs.  \nIt transpires that regional actors have their own agendas and compulsions to deal with issues of piracy and maritime terrorism. For example\, Japan’s economic interests are so huge that bolstering SLOC security is of top most foreign policy priority at the moment. Elsewhere\, domestic political interests may be a factor in determining a country’s approach towards regional maritime security cooperation. There may be countries like China with great power ambition which might propel them to enhance their maritime profile. Unless a coordinated approach among countries in the region is adopted\, the coming decades might see a fierce battle in the maritime security ‘chess game’ that seems to be pregnant with unpredictable consequences in shaping the geopolitics of the region.  \n \nPoint raised during the discussion:\n \n\nThe issues of piracy and terrorism should be dealt with separately. At the same time\, a clear distinction between the two terms should also be made. \n \nThe author needs to update some of the data he has provided in the paper.\n \nAlthough in case of policy response\, the author basically concentrated on the Japanese government’s policy\, the title of the paper does not indicate a case study of that country.\n \nWhile the paper gives a lot of information on piracy\, maritime terrorism does not seem to be given so much importance.\n \nIt is necessary to take into account how state failure led to poor governance in Somalia.\n \nThe paper needs to address extensively the issue of capacity building to deal with piracy and maritime terrorism.\n \nThe author needs to take into account the following differences between piracy and terrorism: i)While terrorism has a political goal\, piracy does not; ii) Terrorism is basically land based while piracy is sea based; iii) Terrorists basically target state apparatus\, but pirates do not involve in such activities.\n \nThe author has mentioned that terrorists may use piracy as a means to acquire money. This point needs to be elaborated. \n \nWhether piracy leads to statelessness in Somalia or vice versa needs to be analyzed.\n \nThe author also needs to analyze why the Malacca Strait is less prone to piracy than Gulf of Aden. \n \nAnalysis needs to be made on the legal constraints in resolving piracy and maritime issues. \n \nThe author needs to take into account the military solution to piracy.\n \nThe author talked about the linkage between the Al-Shabab\, a Muslim terrorist group and Somali pirates. But such a linkage is yet to be confirmed.\n \nAlthough it has been mentioned that pirates do not usually have a political agenda\, some pirates in Nigeria do have political goals\, i.e.\, to bring about reforms in Nigeria.\n \nThe author needs to elaborate the policy difference between various agencies and governments in dealing with piracy.\n \nSince the author has extensively talked about piracy in Somalia\, he should consider making it a case study in the paper.\n \nThe LTTE case is dominant in the paper. So much emphasis on that terrorist group is not necessary as it can no longer be considered a significant terrorist group.\n \nChina’s growing naval presence needs to be taken into account. The author should extensively deal with the steps China has taken in response to piracy.\n \nThe author needs to elaborate upon how money gets transferred from pirates to terrorists\, and if there actually exists a linkage between piracy and terrorism. \n\nPrepared by Pranamita Baruah\, Research Assistant at Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/piracy-maritime-terror-and-policy-response
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090717T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090717T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T035143
CREATED:20231223T222110Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T055529Z
UID:63691-1247808600-1247808600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Piracy in Somalia: Need to Address the Root Cause
DESCRIPTION:Only by Invitation 1030 to 1300 hrs \nChair: Arvind GuptaDiscussants: Subodh Malakar and Patrick Hoenig \nDuring the last one year Somalia has captured global attention\, due to the surge in piracy off the Somali coast. Piracy off the Somali coast has had a severe commercial\, global and regional impact. The piracy and the resultant dangers posed to international shipping has brought an array of naval deployments from various external actors\, including\, the United States\, EU\, Japan\, China\, South Africa and India. The pirate attacks have disrupted the delivery of humanitarian aid to thousands of Somalis and have had a negative impact on the economies of states neighbouring Somalia. \nThough piracy off the Somali coast is not a new phenomenon and has been going on since the beginning of the Somali civil war in the early 1990’s. The collapse of Said Barre’s government in 1991 ushered in a wave of illegal fishing and waste dumping in Somali waters. However\, few years ago the incidence of piracy was quite limited. The statistics suggest that the incidence of piracy grew from less than five to thirty-five in 2005. In 2006 it declined to a mere ten incidents only to grow in 2007 to thirty-one pirate attacks. In 2008 the problem intensified with the International Maritime Organization (IMO) reporting 134 acts of piracy. The pirates have been operating in small fast crafts and have used an array of firearms mainly from Yemen while attacking ships. \nPirates are making full use of modern technologies such as mobile phones and Global Positioning System (GPS) devices and in some cases they have used mother ships to allow them a longer range. Currently\, there are two main networks of pirates: one based in Puntland (north-eastern Somalia) comprising mainly members of the Majerteen clan\, and others based in central Somalia\, consisting primarily of members of the Habar Gidir clan. However\, to an extent the two networks overlap and cooperate. \nVarious factors have contributed to the rise of piracy off the Somali coast. These factors include: illegal fishing and dumping of toxic waste\, existence of busy sea lanes high rewards and ineffective security structure\, Eritrea’s hostile relationship with Ethiopia and instability within Somalia. \nSeveral measures have been taken by the international community to prevent piracy. Since the beginning of 2008\, the United Nations has issued several resolutions regarding piracy in Somali waters. The US is primarily involved through the deployment of its Naval and aerial units as part of the Combined Task Force CTF-151 under the command of US Navy Rear Admiral Terence Mcknight. In December 2008\, France along with other states initiated Operation Atlanta – a joint naval and aerial operation to protect shipping off the Somali coast and the Gulf of Aden. This year long operation involves 20 ships from Belgium\, France\, Britain\, Germany\, Greece\, the Netherlands\, Spain and Sweden.  \nRegional countries like Oman\, Saudi Arabia and Yemen have been extensively involved in naval efforts. Apart from escorting the ships\, Yemen is constructing\, Global Maritime Distress Service Stations (GMDSS) in Hodeida and Aden. Similarly in a joint project with Italy Yemen is setting up a Vessel Tracking System (VTS) on a chain of bases along the coast that will considerably improve surveillance capabilities. Many Asian countries such as India\, Japan\, China\, Malaysia\, Singapore\, Russia and Pakistan have dispatched their navies to the Gulf of Aden. However\, Yemen remains the most consistent source of arms and military material to Somalia. Though the Yemeni government has introduced some curbs for arms sales in 2008.  \nThus\, in finding a solution to the conflict in Somalia and consequently the piracy issue is for working towards reduction in tensions between Eritrea and Ethiopia. The African Union (AU) and a panel of African elder statesmen in particular should gently push the two countries towards a dialogue. The international community should intensify its efforts in securing the AU’s early deployment of the African Standby force. \n \nPoints in the Discussion:\nNeed to develop a frame work of cooperation at the regional level to prevent piracy\, because regional cooperation is important to strengthening anti-piracy efforts in Somalia. \nEfforts should be made to stem financial flows. Unfortunately most non- state actors supporting the pirates and the Islamists have followed the informal route of Hawala\, creating logistical problems. \nNeed to examine cultural linkages between pirates and Islamist groups. Report suggests more than 70 percent of Somalis support pirates. \nConflicts between Ethiopia and Eritrea are also contributing to emergence of piracy in Somalia as well as in the region. \nNeed to focus Yemeni people’s role in supplying arms and extending cooperation to Somali pirates. What isn’t the Yemeni government curbing support to Somali pirates? There is a need to set up central authority to resolve the problems of piracy. \nNeed to focus UN resolution regarding piracy \nNeed to examine Somali concerns regarding India’s support to prevent piracy in the African region. \nEmphasis should be given on China’s involvement in the region.  \nWhy does Eritrea support Islamist groups in Somalia? \nPrepared by M. Mahtab Alam Rizvi\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/piracy-in-somalia-need-to-address-the-root-cause
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090717T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090717T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T035143
CREATED:20231223T222110Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130249Z
UID:63692-1247808600-1247808600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Thinking about Pakistan's Nuclear Security in Peacetime\, Crisis and War
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Brahma ChellaneyDiscussants: R R Subramanian and Sitakanta Mishra \nThe main focus of this paper is the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal and for this purpose the secrecy of nuclear weapons is the most important aspect. However Clary presumes that even the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan may not have knowledge about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and its placement plans. The paper seeks to collate\, sort through\, and organize the reams of publicly available information to provide a systematic assessment of Pakistan’s nuclear security apparatus. It also attempts to examine the scenarios which are associated with various types of nuclear risks. After reviewing available evidence\, the author concludes that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is reasonably secure. He examines three elements of Pakistan’s nuclear posture – that is peacetime\, crisis and war and under these scenarios he probes the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. The paper concludes by examining the policy implications that emerge from this analysis.  \nThe author examines in detail the scale and general disposition of Pakistan’s nuclear force\, Pakistan’s nuclear command and control as well as role and importance of the Strategic Plans Division (SPD). He elaborates how SPD sought to operationalize the deterrent after the 1998 nuclear tests and come to grips with the A. Q. Khan nuclear supplier network even as it sought to ameliorate international concerns about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. He also analyses the threats to the civilian nuclear apparatus in Pakistan. The author establishes a baseline that during peacetime\, the system is reasonably secure\, though the risk of “insider threats” is perhaps more pronounced than in other established nuclear weapons states. \nDescribing the war time posture\, the author discusses changes in nuclear risk factors in Pakistan. There is a corresponding increase in nuclear risk in the event of India-Pakistan crises. He points out three dangers associated with Pakistan nuclear arsenal during war time. First\, there is a modest increase in the risk of an accident since Pakistan’s road infrastructure is poor and the traffic system is terrible. For the liquid-fueled missiles\, the mobile platform would have to be accompanied by a highly flammable fuel. It appears likely that mobile launchers would be sent away from the forward edge of battle that means they would most likely be sharing the road with internally displaced people also moving away from combat. All of this contributes to the potential for accident in transport. Second\, maintaining a communications link between the mobile launcher and the National Command Authority may prove difficult during an attack on command and control nodes. Third\, there has been some concern about the security of mobile nuclear units\, when they are away from the static and reinforced security provided at a fixed storage sites. Though Clary points out that this concern is overblown since any mobile launcher is likely to be accompanied by a large security team. He points out that a risky situation which is not completely under the control of central policymakers raises the most critical question\, whether commanders of individual nuclear units either have the authority or the technical ability to launch weapons if they believe Pakistan’s nuclear redlines have been crossed. According to the author there is insufficient information today to definitively conclude one way or the other on this matter.  \nIn the last section\, Clary examines how such a system would likely respond under the stresses of large-scale domestic instability or internal crisis. Distinguishing between different types of instability can assist with thinking about associated nuclear risks. He describes five different types of instability which can lead to associated nuclear risks. First\, the most extreme form of risk would be the take over of Pakistan by radical Islamists\, a scenario that Bruce Riedel has documented at length. Second\, an internal coup within the Pakistani Army would result in Islamist officers overthrowing the more moderate current Army leadership. This is one route by which it can be imagined an Islamist Pakistan despite the fact there is no majority support for such a regime. Third\, there might be an internal coup attempt or some sort of lower-level fracturing within the Pakistani officer corps. Lower-level officers of an Islamist bent\, perhaps together or separately with ethnic Pashtuns\, angered by support to the United States or Pakistan’s operations along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border might be able to launch a successful\, localized mutiny. Fourth\, Pakistan faces a sudden loss of territory to Islamic or separatist insurgents. Fifth\, this is related to some sort of sudden\, multifaceted state collapse. After describing these scenarios\, Clary concludes that the current Pakistan command and control arrangement appears to be designed to confront the most plausible scenarios with regards to domestic instability in Pakistan. He suggests that the international community should continue efforts to stabilize Pakistan\, in part so that scenarios that currently seem implausible\, do not become more likely. \nClary concludes his presentation by putting forward two recommendations\, one to India and second to the United States. His recommendations appear to be guided by the concerns related to Pakistan’s reactions to Indian and American actions. He suggests Indian policy makers have a clear strategic vision on their broader strategic equations while making efforts to improve the accuracy of nuclear-capable missiles and programs to develop missile defenses. India must take into greater account Pakistan’s reactions to its technical developments and decisions. Clary also suggests to the United States that its officials must take into account Pakistan’s reactions to U.S. discussions about Islamabad’s nuclear stewardship. While acknowledging that US officials have taken the right tone\, he points out that discussion about whether or not\, there are U.S. plans to secure Pakistani nuclear weapons in a worst-case scenario are remarkably unhelpful. Clary concludes his presentations on a cautious note that nuclear risks are shared risks and awareness of this interrelationship is one of the important consequences of the nuclear revolution.  \nPoints Raised during the discussion: \n\nIt is difficult to conclude that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenals are in safe hands. Intent\, motivation and capability of nuclear weapons are crucial factors which must be taken into consideration while discussing Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and its security.\nSabotaging the nuclear installations in Pakistan may be possible. This danger cannot be ignored. Similarly dangers posed by a dirty bomb also exist.\nIt is worth examining how Pakistan’s emergency response mechanism works. However the threat level should not be exaggerated. \nThere is a need to identify grey areas in Pakistan’s nuclear security apparatus.\nThere should not be too much attention on Pakistan’s heavy water and natural uranium research reactor\, Khushab.\nThere could be a comparison between North Korea and Pakistan but Pakistan’s nuclear programme cannot be compared with Iran’s.\nPakistan nuclear arsenal is India specific. \nThe question remains how safe and secure is Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. Pakistan has developed a code system which runs the risk of being decodified.\nIt is important to understand that all is not well within the Strategic Plans Division (SPD) in Pakistan. SPD is facing a lot of pressure to be staffed by politicians. The New establishment in Pakistan is planning to put its own people inside SPD. There is a power tussle within SPD.\nThere is a poor security culture in Pakistan which is evident by the release of nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan. The situation in Pakistan cannot be brought under control.\nChina factor has not been taken into consideration. \nThe author should use interviews within Pakistan to obtain more data on the subject. \nIt is very difficult to stop nuclear black marketing with laws and regulations.\nThe paper should have mentioned the Special Forces Programme as well. \nThe paper should highlight what are the fundamental problems in Pakistan. Pakistan is not a normal state\, rather it is an abnormal state. There are fundamental challenges to Pakistan’s security\, including radicalization both of society and even more importantly the military \nPeople implementing the Personal Reliability Programme in Pakistan seem to have a Jihadi mindset. In such a scenario personal reliability cannot work.\n\nPrepared by Sanjeev Kumar Shrivastav\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/thinking-about-pakistans-nuclear-security-in-peacetime-crisis-and-war
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090724T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090724T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T035143
CREATED:20231223T222110Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T055423Z
UID:63690-1248413400-1248413400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Changing Nature of Insurgency in Northeast and Role of Bangladesh
DESCRIPTION:Only by Invitation 1030 to 1300 hrs \nChair: Rajaram PandaDiscussants: J N Roy and K Srinivasan \nThe paper analyzes the ongoing insurgency in the North East and argues that the nature of insurgency in the region is changing due to the alliance between Islamist terror and local insurgent groups. Indian insurgent groups seem to be a tactical tool in the hands of the ISI to fulfill its long-term objectives. These outfits seem to be losing autonomy of action and act more at the behest of outside powers.  \nThe paper contends that Pakistan and its external intelligence agency the ISI have used Indian Insurgent Groups as a potent tool to penetrate North Eastern states and that the ISI wants to achieve its own objectives through these groups. ISI has been involved in funding\, training and arming these rebel groups in order to keep India’s hand tied. Despite the independence of Bangladesh an interesting conformity has been seen in Pakistani and Bangladeshi discourses towards the North East. The meetings of Islamic parties in Bangladesh and closed door groups of their counterparts in Assam regularly talk of Greater Bangladesh. The active support to illegal migrants by BDR and Bangladeshi authorities is well known. The entry of Islamists has made the insurgency in the northeast far more complex. Now over a dozen Muslim extremist organizations exist in the North East with an estimated strength of 3\,500 volunteers. Most have mushroomed in Assam. They are not indulging in violence but carrying out recruitment\, sending youth for training to Bangladesh and Pakistan\, dumping weapons and explosives and creating support structures along the border. Based on interrogations of arrested Muslim militants\, a former chief minister tabled a report in the Assam assembly\, revealing that large numbers of Muslim youth from Assam were being trained by the ISI and the DGFI (Bangladesh intelligence) to destabilize Assam and facilitate illegal immigration.  \nIslamists have been a major tactical tool in the hands of forces inimical to India. HuJI had tried to present itself as a Messiah for the migrant Bangladeshi population with the start of the Bodo-Muslim clashes in Assam. Though\, the ISI and the DGFI have astutely managed to cow down the indigenous population through the ULFA and the NDFB. The migratory pressure is likely to worsen the conflict. From August to October 2008\, a series of clashes took place between Bodos and Muslims. Clashes also erupted between Rabhas and Muslims. The general assessment was that motives behind these attacks were anti-immigrant sentiment\, which run deep in Assamese politics. But it was also felt that pressure on land and occupation was also an important issue. Bodos say that migrants have taken 37 per cent of tribal land and the government has given them pattas. The population of Bangladeshi migrants has also increased phenomenally.  \nIn the North East mobilization along communal lines is going on because of the activities of SIMI\, Tablighi Jamaat and Jamiat-ul-Ulema Hind. In fact\, fourteen similar organizations supported the Assam United Democratic Front (AUDF)\, an exclusivist Muslim formation which contested both national as well as state assembly elections. Though formed a few months before the assembly election\, the AUDF bagged the third largest number of votes capturing 10 assembly seats. The lesson from Assam seems to be that despite a fragmented polity\, there is sufficient consolidation of Muslim votes behind an unapologetically Muslim political outfit to ensure electoral victory despite a very high overall voter turnout. In its private confabulations\, the party envisions itself as the political rallying point for Bangladeshi Muslims. The security implications of political Islam in a region with over 30 per cent Muslim population is dangerous for the future of the state. The risk lies in Assam becoming a Muslim majority state in the future. The ISI\, DGFI and the Islamists are bound to exploit this in the days to come.  \nThe government’s hands are tied as the ISI has managed to activate smaller outfits like the DHD (J) to cause mayhem. They are not able to give adequate attention to these undercurrents which are taking place in pockets dominated by Bangladeshi migrants. This has made many security analysts believe that an Islamic fundamentalist upsurge would pose a much bigger challenge to the state than the three-decade-old insurgency spearheaded by the banned ULFA. It is possible that militancy in Assam may be hijacked by these elements and IIGs. It is also felt that a similar fate awaits all Northeastern states. For the time being\, Islamists have chosen to use groups like the ULFA\, NDFB and ATTF as a short term tactical tool in the fulfillment of their long-term objective.  \nDiscussion:\n\nOne should focus on reliable sources for information. Sensitive topics should use tools of interrogation and interviews as data feeders. One has to be cautious that news agencies are susceptible to planted information and thus should be avoided.\nThere is no linearity in the analysis and conclusions should take into account the diverse issues and responses of various actors. Ground realities need to be contextualized with the main argument of the paper.\nNeed to take into account that SIMI and Tablighi Jamaat are not really active in the conflict areas. Any conclusions on the activities of SIMI need to be probed further.\nOne needs to explore how ground realities in the North East are matching the intentions of the DGFI and the ISI.\nMeetings between North East insurgent groups and Islamic groups are leading to growing criminalization in the North East.\nOne needs to explore the role of NGOs\, who are increasingly being funded by Arab countries. \nOne needs to look into the grievances of Muslims in the North East and explore the role of the DGFI in particular. The way the ISI works in Pakistan and DGFI in Bangladesh is remarkably different. \nThe sources for the arguments need to be expanded.\nOne needs to look into the political and ethnic dynamics in the North East before talking about the ISI’s role in the North East.\nTablighi Jamaat should not be roped into the discussion as it is a Barelvi group and unlikely to be using radicalization as a tool.\nJoint Ventures/Meetings between other Northeastern groups and Islamic outfits need to be monitored closely.\nHow sustainable would be the nexus between secessionist outfits and terrorist groups? The nature and objectives of the two are completely different.\n\nPrepared by Medha Bisht\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/changing-nature-of-insurgency-in-northeast-and-role-of-bangladesh
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090731T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090731T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T035143
CREATED:20231223T222040Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T055152Z
UID:63688-1249018200-1249018200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Will Japan go Nuclear?
DESCRIPTION:Only by Invitation 1030 to 1300 hrs \nChair: Rajaram PandaDiscussants: J Madan Mohan and Sitakanta Mishra \nThe tremendous transformation in the strategic and security environment of Japan in the last decade has once again influenced the nuclearization debate in the country. North Korea’s second nuclear test followed by the launch of three short-range missiles on May 25\, 2009 and the subsequent launch of seven ballistic missiles into the Sea of Japan on July 4\, has prompted widespread speculation on Japan’s principled position on non-proliferation and disarmament. The international community is worried whether Japan will abandon its nuclear abstinence and acquire a nuclear capability. In this paper\, the author makes an effort to analyze circumstances under which Japan might consider crossing the nuclear Rubicon. An attempt is also been made to trace the nuclearization debate which has resurfaced in Japan periodically when the national interest seems is threatened.  \nThe Japanese position on the nuclear weapons option has been ambivalent. Japan has never made any official decision on whether or not to exercise the nuclear option. Still its pacifist constitution clearly deters the state from maintaining land\, sea and air forces\, as well as other war potential. The right of state belligerency too has been denied in the Japanese constitution. The constitution’s stance on nuclear arms\, however\, remains ambiguous and it has led many pro-nuclear advocates to debate the possibility of Japan developing nuclear weapons for defensive purposes. Although the Constitution may be interpreted to allow for possession of nuclear weapons\, the Atomic Energy Basic Law of 1955 clearly emphasizes the essence of Japan’s policy in maintaining a peaceful\, transparent nuclear programme. Besides\, Japan has also adopted the ‘Three Non-Nuclear Principles’ expressing the policy of not possessing\, not producing\, and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan. This position was reiterated in 1976 when it ratified the NPT and committed not to produce or acquire nuclear weapons. However\, though the validity of these principles has been upheld by successive cabinets\, the degree of restraint that these principles place on Japan’s nuclear policy remains uncertain. Most importantly\, they do not represent a legal restraint\, because Diet resolutions are passed as an expression of the will of the chamber and are non-binding. Further\, over the years\, allegations have been made regarding the violation of the third principle of the three non-nuclear principles right from the Cold War period. Still\, the support for a robust nuclear weapon policy has not gained enough momentum and Japan continues to remain committed to an anti-nuclear policy.  \nThe dynamic changes in the regional and security areas of Japan have deeply influenced the revival of the nuclear debate in Tokyo. Due to factors like the expanding nuclear programme of China and North Korea; the failure of the Six Party Talks; growing suspicion among the Japanese people over the credibility of the U.S nuclear umbrella; the increasing proximity of U.S.-China bilateral relations\, etc.\, there has emerged an open debate within Japan about whether it should adopt the policy of nuclear disarmament.  \nAt present\, many security analysts are of the view that Japan may go nuclear within the next ‘ten to fifteen years’. According to the author\, Japan might compromise its principled stand on nuclear armament if the following scenarios unfold: the weakening of the US-Japan alliance; a North Korean nuclear attack on Japan; a war in the Korean Peninsula; a reunified nuclear Korea; a North Korean nuclear test; Chinese nuclear expansion; U.S. withdrawal from the region; possible breakdown of the NPT; rise of a new generation of nationalistic Japanese politicians; China’s response to a sudden collapse of North Korea. Although some of the above scenarios are extreme\, they cannot be disregarded altogether by Japan. \nWhile explaining the implications for India\, the author states that Japan’s decision to acquire nuclear weapons will be a major setback for the NPT. States like India who are not part of the NPT because of its discriminatory nature will be demoralized to uphold the principles and obligations of the treaty which it has done so far.  \nAccording to the author\, in order to avoid nuclearization of Japan\, a comprehensive and prioritized plan is required. As part of the plan\, following measures should be adopted: the US must provide clear assurances of its security umbrella for Japan; efforts should be made for the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue; measures should also be made to establish regional organizations for security and trade\, facilitating greater cooperation and mitigating distrust among Asian countries; and above all\, the U.S. and the other NPT members must take initiatives to strengthen the NPT regimes so that all countries feel secure in it including Japan. \nPoints raised during discussion: \n\nIf Japan decides to go nuclear\, it has to deal with two main hurdles: i) it has to revise domestic laws and conventions related to Japan’s stance on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation\, which is going to be quite complicated; ii) it also has to withdraw from the NPT\, a step which will definitely be against Japan’s national interest.\nThere has occurred an attitudinal shift in the current nuclear debate in Japan. Although the Japanese population is considered to be suffering from the so-called ‘nuclear allergy’\, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has called for active discussion of possible nuclear weapons option. The opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)\, which is projected to be the virtual winner of the upcoming August 30 general election in Japan\, has also talked about a ‘radical revision’ of the Japan-U.S. Security alliance and advocated an independent security policy for Japan. \nEven if Japan decides to pursue the nuclear option\, it will probably do so with the tacit support of the U.S.\nThe U.S. will inevitably reduce its involvement in Asia over the longer term. It will eventually lead Japan to think seriously about its nuclear option for national security.\nEngagement in Iran\, Iraq and Afghanistan won’t make the U.S. compromise its security pact with Japan. \nIt is true that Japan has not gone nuclear yet. However\, the real question is how long Japan can prevent itself from going nuclear. \nIn the near future\, Japan will probably decide to keep its nuclear option ambiguous\, as it will enhance its bargaining power with the West\, particularly the U.S.\nYukiya Amano of Japan is the new chief of the IAEA. His election will probably intensify the gap between Japan’s ardent support for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation on the one hand\, and Japan’s aspiration to go nuclear for national security reasons on the other hand.\nIn terms of method and theory\, the paper could be expanded in scope. Instead of a one-dimensional approach\, it should adopt a multidimensional approach in drawing the scenarios. In the paper\, the author has identified the scenarios assuming that Japan will go nuclear in the near future. Instead\, she should build scenarios keeping in mind different possibilities in terms of outcomes. \nMost of the scenarios drawn by the author are not realistic enough. The bilateral security arrangement between Japan and the U.S. is still going strong. China has been a security threat to Japan throughout its history. Contrary to assumptions made by security analysts regarding the nuclear issue of North Korea provoking Japan to go nuclear\, the North is still not considered such a big threat by most Japanese. Only the hawks in Japan offer the excuse of China and North Korea to discuss Japan’s nuclear option. \nInstead of offering ten different scenarios\, most of which are not ‘realistic’ enough\, the author should concentrate on four or five ‘most probable’ scenarios.\nThe paper is very light with respect to the implications for India. \nThe author needs to take into account the contributions of the strong anti-nuclear movements (especially the hibakusha movements) within Japan. \nIn the paper\, the author mentions that the constitution of Japan does not talk about nuclear weapons. However\, Japan’s Defence White Paper 2008 interprets that the constitution bans possessions of WMDs\, ICBMs and fighter bombers. \nThe author needs to discuss the anti-nuclear culture within Japan.\nThe paper needs to analyze the positions of major political parties (particularly the LDP and DPJ) over the nuclear issue in the last few decades\, their stances on the same issue before and after the upcoming election in August.\nThe author needs to categorize the scenarios into two parts: one\, Japan going nuclear and the second\, Japan maintaining an ambiguous position on the nuclear issue.\nAs for public opinion\, instead of concentrating on the present situation alone\, the author should analyze public opinion on nuclear issues over the last two or three decades.\nThe author needs to discuss in detail the domestic compulsions which are driving Japan’s path to nuclearization. \n\nPrepared by Pranamita Baruah\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/will-japan-go-nuclear
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090731T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090731T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T035143
CREATED:20231223T222110Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T055043Z
UID:63689-1249018200-1249018200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Understanding Chinese Perceptions of India
DESCRIPTION:Only by Invitation 1030 to 1300 hrs \nChair: Rajiv SikriDiscussants: Srikanth Kondapalli and Rajeswari Rajagopalan \nThe objective of this is paper is to understand the China’s strategic perception of India. To do so the author Manjeet S Pardesi divides the paper in two broad sections. In first he analyses the validity of the arguments of two prominent scholars who are of the view that there exists an asymmetry of mutual perceptions between India and China. The author then identifies problems in their arguments. In the second section he goes on to show that the Sino-Indian rivalry is not quite one sided and asymmetrical as often claimed and believed to be. It is asymmetric only to the extent that India regards China as its “principal rival”\, and China regards India as its “strategic rival”. The author then puts forward four prominent themes which\, according to him\, shape China’s perception of India. He concludes by arguing that\, contrary to popular belief\, India has always been on the strategic radar of China and that its recent economic rise has only accentuated Chinese security concerns vis-à-vis India. \nThe first section begins with Susan Shirk’s argument. According to Shirk the focus of Chinese strategic and military planning continues to be East Asia- in Taiwan Straits and in South China Sea rather than India. The Chinese don’t see India as any kind of strategic threat. The author points out three problems with Shirk’s one sided rivalry theory. \nFirst Shirk does not define what she means by the concept of rivalry. Consequently\, she conflates the notions of “strategic rivalry” and “principal rivalry”. \nSecond\, she does not give adequate consideration to the assessment of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)\, including that of China’s military analysts and their perceptions of India. Thirdly\, she does not attempt to adequately understand the nature of the Sino-Pakistani “entente cordiale” and the reasons behind China’s proliferation of strategic technologies to Pakistan. Based on these three points\, the author argues that China is far more concerned about its security vis-à-vis India than argued by Shirk \nJohn W. Garver is the second scholar whose arguments are examined by the author in the paper. According to Garver China appears dismissive of any security challenge from India even as India perceives a serious threat from its northern neighbor. He supports his analysis based on two forms of evidence. Firstly he shows that China’s public Media and journals have systematically downplayed Indian threats to China’s security while opposite is the case with Indian Journals. And Secondly\, he argues that the status quo – defined as the outcome of China’s invasion of Tibet\, the outcome of the 1962 Sino-Indian border war\, and the Sino-Pakistani entente – all favor China. Consequently\, China does not perceive a serious security threat from India. These arguments\, according to Garver\, point towards the existence of asymmetrical threat perception between India and China. \nThe author is of the view that Garver’s analysis of Sino-Indian mutual perceptions by demonstrating “asymmetrical coverage” in foreign policy journals is inadequate to prove the existence of an asymmetry of threat perception between the two. \nAfter demonstrating that there exist flaws in the arguments which point towards the existence of an asymmetrical relationship between the two countries\, the author comes out with his own findings. The author is of the view that today China’s emerging perception of India is guided and influenced by four prominent themes. They are namely strategic implications of India’s economic growth\, Indo–U.S and Indo–Japanese strategic partnerships\, India’s Look East strategy and India’s growing military power. In sum it is the author emphasizes that recent Chinese analyses of the rise of India’s growing economic strength\, military capabilities\, and diplomatic relationships has fundamentally led to a new image of India in China. While India was perceived in the context of the status of Tibet\, Sino-Indian border issues\, and the security situation in the subcontinent in the past\, recent analyses of India regard it as a growing strategic player in Asia and beyond. This does not mean that the older issues have become unimportant. Instead\, it means that the Chinese have begun to seriously acknowledge India’s growing strategic profile and its impact on the security architecture of Asia. \nPoints Raised During Discussion\n\nWhile evaluating the Chinese perceptions of India\, the roles of the institutional actors in the Chinese establishment are very important. The significant institutions in this regard are the Politbureau Standing Committee\, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs\, the People’s Liberation Army and the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce.\nIn China apart from the Realist and Neo-Realist School of thought on Sino-Indian relations\, there is also a growth of Constructivist School of thought which looks at Sino-Indian relations from a “Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai” perspective.\nThe author is advised to look into the arguments of more scholars before drawing a conclusion. Consulting one or two samples might lead to a wrong or one sided conclusion.\nThe author needs to incorporate more official Chinese views to substantiate his arguments. Moreover\, sources like the PLA Daily and Chinese language articles on the same topic should also be included in the paper to make the findings more authentic.\nWhile the author promises to bring out the Chinese perceptions of India based on a “Socio-Psychological process”\, the arguments used are realist and neo-realist in nature.\nThe author should include more Indian authors and their perceptions of China rather than giving emphasis to American authors.\nIndia’s stand on Tibet needs to be elaborated in the paper as it would be difficult to understand the Chinese perceptions of India without understanding it.\nThe author has devoted almost half of his paper to refute the arguments of two scholars. Instead\, he should focus more on the main theme of the paper.\n\nPrepared by Sandeep Anand\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/understanding-chinese-perceptions-of-india
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090807T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090807T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T035143
CREATED:20231223T222039Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130248Z
UID:63686-1249623000-1249623000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Evaluating EU’s role in the Af-Pak Region
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Shantanu ChowdhuryDiscussants: Gulshan Sachdeva and Peter Garretson \nThe paper attempts to analyse the role of European Union in the Afghan-Pak region. Strategy in Af-Pak region has been widely debated since the U.S. President Barack Obama outlined a new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan on March 27\, 2009. European Union is a significant player in Afghanistan and the major member countries of the EU have been engaged in various programs in Afghanistan relating to security\, police training\, democratic institution-building\, counter-narcotics\, judicial reform apart from making their combined military contribution to International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). However it is to be highlighted that the numbers do not actually reflect the combat-readiness\, interoperability\, stating power and the mandate dictated by national parliaments of the contributing member countries of the European Union. \nMukhopadhyay attempts to curve the role of EU in the Pak-Afghan region as a security actor. Initially the paper deals with the present European perception of the Pakistan-Afghanistan region and how it evolved since 2001. Instances from the major EU member countries e.g. Germany and the UK have been taken into account. According to the author\, it is a widespread belief in Europe that the EU always plays a secondary role to the US in conflict zones and in particular the success of their forces in Afghanistan would solely depend on the success of the ISAF. The EU aspiration is however apparent when the ‘low-profile’ Union wants to come out from the shadow of the US and attempts to project itself as a ‘credible’ global actor. The author points out that there has been a silent surge of European forces in Afghanistan while the total number of European troops in November 2006 was approximately 17\, 400\, it reached almost 27\, 400 in March 2009. As in July 2009 the number of European forces is approximately 29\,100 which is almost 45 per cent of the 64\,500-strong ISAF. On the eve of the Afghan presidential election on August 20th\, it is likely that the additional European forces would also be provided to conduct the elections. \nThe author discusses the outcome of the recently held first EU-Pakistan summit on June 17\, 2009 in Brussels. He emphasizes that by taking the decision to hold the summit with Pakistan\, the EU has accepted the obvious that Pakistan is no more the solution as a frontline state against terror but on the contrary the growing threat emanating from there is severally threatening the European security. The author suggests that the summit should be seen as a collective recognition by the European states that Pakistan is crucial to tackle the quick phenomenon of Islamic radicalisation process in the EU as whole. \nMukhopadhyay critically analyses the role of European media in augmenting the general awareness but also exaggeration of threats linked with Pakistan. A recent British instance in this regard has been analysed where a Sunday Times (July 4\, 2009) news report warned of an imminent overthrow of Pakistani state by British militants specifically the radical Islamist group\, Hizb ut-Tahrir (HuT) by adopting means such as infiltrating the Pakistani Army as well as to persuade students in Pakistani institutes of higher education to establish a Caliphate based on stringent Sharia Laws. The author suggests that the British media should be more circumspect to publish such sensational reports which rather help the Radical Islamists of different hue to get more media coverage for which they always attempt hard. \nIn the subsequent section\, Mukhopadhyay analyses the divergence of approach which is observable between the US and its European counterparts particularly the United Kingdom. The US approach is an archetypal pillar-based counter-terrorism concept where President Obama underlines that the American aim stands on three Ds\, Disrupt\, Dismantle and Defeat Al Qaeda in the region in order to ‘prevent’ their return. According to the author\, it is apparent from the text where the US objective is to provide and preserve ‘international security\, on the other hand the European objective is more to secure their homeland as it is apparent in European policy documents. As a matter of fact\, following the US instance the UK also came out with its own policy document titled as “UK policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan: The way forward”. The author points out that divergence in approach may also be identified in a post-9/11 scenario where most of the European countries have honed their counter-terrorism skills\, revamped their own security apparatus\, put in place a stricter visa regime and finally enhanced pan-European and even international intelligence cooperation\, rather than solely depending on combating Taliban forces in Afghanistan for which their forces are neither equipped nor ready. \nMukhopadhyay concludes his presentation by pointing out that initially the European forces were sent to Afghanistan mainly as a gesture of solidarity since NATO for the first time had invoked the Article 5 of collective self-defence. It should be noted that both the EU and NATO primarily worked on consensus and member countries were at liberty to undertake individual\, bilateral or an exclusive group-based approach. However repeated reminders by the NATO leadership have not been able to increase the European force level required to have a decisive turn to stabilise Afghanistan in a post-Taliban scenario. The European analysts have been emphasising on a coherent EU approach\, however still individual and bilateral approaches are continued as rules of the day. According to the author as the developments gets murkier in Afghanistan which is evident in insurgency reaching the Punjabi heartland of Pakistan\, terrorist attacks claiming lives of European nationals as well as diplomats and security at European homeland is threatened from the Afghan-Pak region\, it is high time to have a careful evaluation of European Union’s approach towards Af-Pak region. \nPoints raised during discussions\n\nIn fact Durand line is the real genesis of Af-Pak. Afghanistan is not prepared to renew it.\nBecause of 9/11\, there has been complete paradigm shift in international relations.\n\nSecurity contributions by European Union members are essential. Without it the US forces may be suffering fatigue factor.\nPakistan’s role has been very diabolical while dealing with the Taliban. Till 2001 they were openly supporting Taliban. After 9/11\, they tactically changed their role. In a statement Special envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke said that Pakistan is concerned about eliminating Taliban in Pakistan but not in Afghanistan.\nIt should be understood that United States and NATO forces are fighting a war for us. Taliban is injurious to India.\nIt needs to be analysed what relevance Europeans have for India. Europeans are capable of shaping the forces in Afghanistan. The European number of troops have gone up from 17\, 000 to 29\,000.\nEuropeans are over represented in many institutions in Afghanistan.\n\nIt can be observed that in last two years\, Europe is now focusing on Pakistan simultaneously with Afghanistan.\nDiscussing about ‘European Union’ is confusing. It is better to discuss ‘Europe’ and its role in the Af-Pak Region.\nWhile analyzing the role of EU in the Af-Pak region\, it should be analysed that what is the overall utility of this analysis for the Indian policy makers and also what can Indian policy makers do to shape EU’s actions.\nIt should also be analyzed in the paper that what are the population size\, GDP and actual size of European forces and how much contributions these EU member countries have made to ISAF.\nThe paper should also discuss why is it important to have an extra- regional actor in the Af-Pak region.\nEuropean Union supports war but simultaneously they facilitate Islamic organizations as well.\nThe paper appears to be focusing more on Pakistan than Afghanistan.\nThe paper should also highlight how the Af-Pak region is a threat to European multiculturalism.\nEurope has an important role to play in counter narcotics operations in Afghanistan.\nPan-European proposition is problematic in nature.\nThe author should mention the relevance and importance of this subject. For that purpose a backgrounder would be worth incorporating. The focus of this paper needs to be sharper.\nTo deal with the crisis in the Af-Pak region\, regional approach would not be proper. Instead collective approach would be helpful.\nThere are roughly 10\,000 to 15\,000 thousand insurgents fighting in Afghanistan. A RAND study of all the insurgency in last 45 years around the world reveals that every insurgency takes on an average 14-15 years to die. But Afghanistan insurgency may take longer time\, about 15-20 years\, because of its topography and natural location.\nIn history insurgents have never negotiated. At this time it is not possible to have negotiated settlement because at present\, insurgents are having upper hand. It may happen two-three years later but not now. Taliban is loosing the battle but not the war.\nIf European forces withdraw form the region\, it will have direct implications for Afghanistan. It will have implications for India as well.\nIndia can not intervene in Afghanistan because it will not be acceptable to Pakistan.\nThe main question to be examined is what can lead to strategic success in Afghanistan.\nUnited States can not talk to Taliban without the help of India.\nEuropean counter terrorism structures are very recent. To resolve the Afghanistan problem\, support of Pakistan in essential.\nIt is interesting to observe that post Xinxiang riots whether China will start rethinking about its role in Af-Pak region.\nIran has a major role to play in stabilizing Afghanistan.\n\nPrepared by Sanjeev Kumar Shrivastav\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/evaluating-eus-role-in-the-af-pak-region
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090807T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090807T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T035143
CREATED:20231224T104500Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T054930Z
UID:64201-1249623000-1249623000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:The Future of the Peace Process in Nepal
DESCRIPTION:Only by Invitation 1030 to 1300  \nChair: K V RajanDiscussants: Ashok Mehta and Siddarth Varadarajan
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-future-of-the-peace-process-in-nepal
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090828T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090828T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T035143
CREATED:20231223T222039Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130248Z
UID:63684-1251437400-1251437400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Revitalising the Ordnance Factories
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Vinod Kumar MisraDiscussants: V. K Chopra and G Balachandran \nThe aim of this paper is to analyse the reasons behind the poor performance of the ordnance factories (OFs) and recommend measures to revitalize them. To achieve this\, the author\, Laxman Kumar Behera\, identifies six core areas pertaining to OFs. After identifying the problems in these areas he goes on to suggest measures so that the functioning of the Ordnance Factories can be improved. \nStructure and Functioning of Ordnance Factories\nThe author is of the view that the structure of Ordnance factories has several weaknesses\, impacting the functioning of the Board\, and the performance of the factories. \nUnder the current dispensation\, the Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) has limited functional autonomy. Unlike the Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs)\, the OFB is mostly controlled by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) in critical areas such as product development\, research and development (R&D)\, formation of Joint Ventures and in making commercial decisions. These restrictions have not allowed the OFB to graduate into an independent industrial enterprise. \nSecond\, the Board Members\, especially those responsible for the operating divisions and staff functions\, are not geared to take full responsibility in their areas of functioning. It is primarily because the members have neither time nor power under the current setup. Members of the Board are appointed at the verge of their retirement\, providing them very little time to oversee their job. \nThird\, members are considered ‘rubber-heads’\, since most of the production related decisions are taken in the Board meeting and executed through the heads of the concerned factories\, with little central monitoring by the Members who are supposed to head a certain group of factories. \nVarious committees have been constituted from time to time to recommend measures to energize the management of these factories. Despite repeated recommendations by various committees to corporatize the OFB\, the government has not done so\, apparently because of strong opposition from labour unions associated with these factories. The author recommends making these factories autonomous so as to make them independent in their areas of operations. However\, he notes that this autonomy should come with greater responsibility on the part of OFB. And as for making OFB more efficient the MoD needs to outline a time frame by which all the contracts are awarded to OFs on a competitive basis. \nRange and Depth of Ordnance Factories’ Production\nAccording to the author\, OFs have a wide range of products. But these are not enough to meet the requirements of the armed forces\, thus forcing the government to resort to direct import from others. These imports are from various countries such as Israel (towed gun and mortar)\, Italy (naval gun)\, USSR/Russia (naval gun\, towed gun\, SSM launcher and MRL\, Mobile AD system\, tank\, APC\, IFV)\, Sweden (towed gun)\, Poland (ARV)\, Slovakia (ARV)\, South Africa (APC/ISV) and UK (AEW). In addition to direct imports\, some of the items are also license-produced or assembled from SKDs and CKDs\, based on technical assistance from importing countries. \nThe author ascribes the lack of an advanced defence R & D base in India and within the organization in particular as the reason for the import of such a wide range of products. He stresses that the government needs to strengthen the in-house R&D facility of the ordnance factories to overcome this problem. \nExecution of Orders\nThe author views the timely execution of orders by the ordnance factories is often a source of acrimony between the OFB and the Armed Forces. The armed forces officials say that the factories are ‘simply unable’ to meet the production requirements\, affecting their operational readiness. They further say that the shortfall in OF production is often behind schedule\, even after the target for production is lowered from the original requirements. On the other hand\, OFs officials maintain that the shortfall is on account of factors remotely related to their production capabilities. They accuse the army of late finalization and placement of orders\, resulting in delay in the production programme. \nTo resolve this problem the author suggests that since the production could not be augmented in a short span of one year\, the armed forces could consider giving firm orders for 2 to 3 years. It would also be appropriate for the armed forces to engage the OFB more proactively during the stage of the finalization of services’ long-term perspective plan (LTPP)\, especially the part which pertains to factories. \nPricing of OF Products\nThe OFs operate on ‘no loss no profit’ basis. That is to say that the products are supplied to the Armed Forces at a price\, taking into account only the actual cost of production\, which include the costs of material and labour consumed and the overhead charges. However\, according to the author\, this cost plus mechanism of pricing is widely believed to be inefficient on three counts \nFirst\, the new system of determining and fixing the price of major items supplied to the defence forces is not working optimally because of delays in finalising and reporting the cost estimates at the time of price negotiations. \nThe second reason is related to efficiency in the usage of both labour and materials. Officials conversant with the functioning of factories state that the organization has a very high input usage rate\, due to lack of process improvement and skill up-gradation of the labour force. \nThe third factor is the issue of ‘surge capacity’. The surge capacity carries a minimum cost in terms of overhead charges. The only way the cost on this account could be reduced is through better utilisation of labour\, plants\, machinery and stores. Although the factories as a whole have been able to reduce the percentage of overhead charges to total cost of production over the years\, the reduction is hardly due to any efficiency gain. Moreover\, the reduction in overhead charges is not uniform across the group of factories\, which suggests an absence of systematic efforts to curb overhead charges. \nQuality of OFB Products\nThe poor quality of products is yet another area for concern for OFBs. It has been confirmed both in the Parliament and in the Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG) Report. Army officials\, both present and retired\, interviewed by the author said that most of the OF products are below mark\, and often the cause of loss of life to service personnel. To make the quality better the MoD of late has asked OFBs to move towards the process of self-certification\, a norm widely practiced globally. Though OFB has started self-certification of their products\, the items as of now are restricted to low-tech items like clothing and general stores. At present there is no time-frame for covering the entire product range. The author asserts that the MoD in consultation with the OFB should lay down the precise time frame\, by which all the items supplied\, including those overhauled by them\, would be self-certified. \nExports\nDespite giving OFBs some incentives exports have not really gone up over the years. At present\, only a fraction of their sales come from exports. Besides\, not all the factories are in the export business. There are several factors behind OFB’s poor export performance\, some of which are not in its direct control. For instance\, the OFB’s exports are limited to only those countries which do not figure in the ‘negative-list’\, as maintained and conveyed by the Ministry of External Affairs. Similarly\, the OFB cannot export some of its high-value systems such as tanks\, some ammunition and infantry fighting vehicles because they are based on foreign technology\, and require permission from its overseas collaborator for sale to third parties. The export potential is further constrained due to some of the OFB products’ non-compatibility with NATO specifications. \nAlthough the OFB of late has taken a few measures – such as procedural simplification\, hosting an “international generic” and product demonstration in major arms exhibitions – they have not resulted in any significant dividend. The author states that the lack of enthusiasm of customers is primarily because of two factors. First\, international customers are not yet convinced about the competitiveness of OFB products\, in terms of both quality and price. Second\, the OFB has so far not taken a corporate approach in establishing a brand image for its products. \nThe author concludes by saying that unless the foregoing aspects are taken care of\, there is little hope of revitalizing the ordnance factories. \nPoints raised during discussion\n\nInstead of increasing the range and depth of existing products there is a need to improve existing products.\nIs corporatisation the only viable solution to end deficiencies of OFs?\nOFs should give importance to core areas of specialisation and leave other parts to the corporate sector.\nDelays take place in the delivery of new products as it takes some time to prepare prototypes.\nTo increase the efficiency of OFBs the lead time of 42 months can be reduced to 24 months.\nThe credibility of Self Certification needs to be ascertained.\nThere should be a mechanism of Checks and Balances so as to increase the productivity of OFs.\nTechnological absorption is extremely low in OFs.\nThere is no reliable system to access the performance of OFs.\nThe export targets in OFs are set without estimating capacity and hence targets are never met.\nOFs should be run like businesses and should be incentivised.\nStudying OFs and OFBs is considered “unglamorous”. So very few studies are conducted on their way of functioning.\nThere exists a structural problem in the very set up in which OFs operate so the synergy among the Armed Forces\, DRDO and OFs is not present.\nThere is a lack of transparency\, accountability and inadequacy in terms of Information Technology in OFs.\n\nPrepared by Sandeep Anand\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/revitalising-the-ordnance-factories
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090828T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090828T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T035143
CREATED:20231224T104458Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T054727Z
UID:64199-1251437400-1251437400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:India's Nuclear Command and Control: Perspectives from Organization Theory
DESCRIPTION:Only by Invitation 1030 to 1300 hrs \nChair: K SanthanamDiscussants: Gurmeet Kanwal and Manpreet Sethi
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/indias-nuclear-command-and-control-perspectives-from-organization-theory
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090904T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090904T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T035143
CREATED:20231223T222010Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T054616Z
UID:63683-1252042200-1252042200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:The Afghan Maze and India's Options
DESCRIPTION:Only by Invitation 1030 to 1300 hrs \nChair: K C SinghDiscussants: Ravi Sawhney and B R Muthukuma \nThis paper is an attempt to assess options before India as insecurity and political uncertainty returns to Afghanistan. The author argues that with the re-emergence of the Taliban\, some of the old issues that haunted Indian foreign policy makers in the 1990s have re-appeared in a more complex form. He notes that while the US has expanded the scope of its Afghan mission to the east of the Durand Line\, it at the same time appears to be running out of time and strategy.  The US-led ‘war on terror’ remains constrained by the ambivalence of its own allies\, be it the NATO or Pakistan. Amidst these realties\, he points out that India is often expected to play a ‘greater’ (or a different) role in the region\, and yet exercise supreme restraint.  \nThe main argument of the paper is that India as a politically non-interfering and a benign regional economic power holds a better chance of exercising influence within Afghanistan in the long-run. He cautions that any adventurous policy would be counter-productive. India is more likely to be exploited given the highly factional and externalized nature of Afghan politics and conflict. Emphasizing that there are multiple centres of power in a socially polarized Afghanistan\, over-identification with one could lead to alienation and deep suspicion among others. The author argues that a lack of balance in engaging actors could further limit India’s leverage and work to the advantage of forces opposed to its engagement with Afghanistan. It is also important to take into account the multiplicity of extra-regional actors involved and the changed regional environment. The paper observes that lack of coordination among the regional countries on the Afghan issue has to an extent widened the space for big power rivalry around Afghanistan.  \nThe paper raises some key questions. What kind of leverages India has within Afghanistan or in the region? How viable and achievable are India’s desired objectives in Afghanistan in the longer run? Moreover\, before talking of options and counter-strategies\, it is important to assess the nature and level of threat from the Taliban for India\, and what exactly are India’s objectives in Afghanistan. Similarly\, it is equally pertinent to recognise the relevance and perception of India’s actual and expected role across the political and social spectrum of Afghanistan. How far Afghans are willing to go with India’s interests and objectives?  \nThe paper argues that Pakistan shall remain indispensable to the US’ regional agenda. Despite the new Af-Pak strategy\, the US has been unable to push Pakistan beyond a point\, for where are the options before the US if the latter simply refuses to cooperate on the Afghan issue. Similarly\, the US cannot be sensitive to India’s security concerns beyond a point where it begins to impinge on its relationship with Pakistan. In fact\, by ceding territories to the Taliban and other Islamist groups\, Pakistan has increased its leverages and bargaining power. Today the US is dependent on Pakistan more than ever\, right from intelligence sharing on al Qaeda\, to ensuring regular supplies via the Khyber Pass for its growing number of troops\, and checking Taliban and al Qaeda militants from crossing over into Afghanistan. In view of the above\, India’s role and options vis-à-vis Afghanistan are likely to remain reactive and curtailed. The paper posits that patience\, information\, innovation and sustained focus are critical to strengthening India’s position within Afghanistan and the wider region. \nThe paper is broadly delineated into three sections. The first section brings out India’s engagement and objectives in Afghanistan; the second section evaluates the mutual perceptions of India and the Taliban; and the third section examines the implications of the US’ new Af-Pak strategy for India. The paper concludes with perspectives on India’s options in Afghanistan. \nThe author brings out the Indian involvement in Afghanistan. The overthrow of the Taliban regime and the subsequent involvement of the international community in re-building Afghanistan were in consonance with India’s perceived interests and objectives in Afghanistan. India felt vindicated.  For the first time since the end of the Cold War\, India also found its interests converging\, and those of Pakistan conflicting\, with US interests on a regional issue. He points out that in the Indian view a strong\, unified and an independent democratic Afghan state capable of deterring the return of Taliban would be in its interest. India set out to assist in the reconstruction of Afghanistan and in strengthening the capacity of the central administration\, through both bilateral and multi-lateral mechanisms. He points out that India has been conducting training programmes for Afghan government officials since 2003\, and has also deputed Indian civil servants as mentors and guides developing training modules in Afghan ministries and departments since 2007. Since 2006\, India has been extending nearly one thousand scholarships\, both long-term and short-term\, for Afghan students and young professionals in Indian institutions of their own choice on an annual basis.  \nIndia is the sixth largest bilateral donor and the largest regional donor country to Afghanistan with its reconstruction assistance totaling $1.2 billion till date. Around 2003-04\, India announced the commencement of various huge projects in Afghanistan\, such as\, the construction of Zaranj-Delaram road in south-western Nimroz province (completed in 2008); the Salma Dam project in western Herat province (completion by 2011); construction of Afghan parliament building in Kabul (completion by 2011); construction of 220 KV transmission line from Pul-e-Khumri to Kabul and a sub-station at Chimtala to bring additional power from the northern grid to Kabul (completed); restoration of telecommunication infrastructure in 11 provinces; and expansion of national TV network by providing an uplink from Kabul and downlinks in all 34 provincial capitals (completed).  \nThe construction of the 218-km long road linking Zaranj close to the Iranian border with Delaram on the Kandahar-Herat national highway was probably the largest and most challenging of all the Indian reconstruction projects. The Zaranj-Delaram road is supposed to link up Afghanistan’s national highway with the upcoming Iranian port of Chabahar on the Persian Gulf. The project was said to be crucial to improving India’s accessibility to Afghanistan in view of Pakistan’s refusal to provide overland transit facilities for Indian goods. Presently\, India takes a long circuitous route via sea to the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas to transport goods to Afghanistan. This road is also supposed to improve landlocked Afghanistan’s access to the sea for commercial purposes. Similarly\, India’s other huge projects were aimed at strengthening the authority of the Afghan state.  \nIndia later turned towards small development projects based on local needs and community participation. This was also done keeping in view the continuing limitations of the Afghan government in taking developmental activities to people in the provinces. These were projects with direct\, immediate and visible impact on the lives of the Afghan people and enjoyed local support and ownership.   Presently\, 84 such projects mainly in the field of agriculture\, rural development\, education\, health\, vocational training\, and solar electrification are in various stages of implementation in 19 provinces of Afghanistan. In fact\, India’s reconstruction assistance has been multi-sectoral comprising education\, health and services\, transportation\, telecommunications\, civil aviation\, agriculture\, irrigation\, power generation & transmission\, industry\, and rural development. India played a significant role in ensuring Afghanistan’s entry into SAARC as its eighth member in 2007 in order to integrate the Afghan economy with the South Asian region. India also hoisted the Second Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan in November 2006 \nIndian interests in Afghanistan are increasingly being threatened by rising violence and growing instability brought about by the growing influence of the Taliban on either side of the Durand Line. However\, India remains steadfast in its commitment to Afghan rebuilding. Moreover\, unlike projects executed by Western NGOs\, Indian projects are highly appreciated by the Afghan people as they are carried out in full consultation with the concerned Afghan ministries and provincial/district administration\, and are based on the specified requirements of the Afghan people. India thus engaged the people of Afghanistan\, key to the success of any reconstruction or rebuilding policy especially in an in-conflict environment. The author asserts that the Indian commitment to Afghanistan against all odds shows the way forward in Afghanistan. It serves as an example for countries whose commitments to the Afghan mission have been floundering as they keep looking for a way out of Afghanistan. He concludes the section by flagging off the question- Is abandoning Afghanistan a solution? \nThe author notes that India’s stated policy towards the Taliban has been very clear since the beginning. In the Indian view\, the Taliban regime was “obscurantist\, bigoted\, blinkered and sadistic” which took “Afghanistan to a dark age scarcely to be credited in the world today” and that “the Taliban should go\, lock\, stock and barrel.” India strongly believed that the Taliban “have to be extirpated from the roots\, in the interest of not just Afghanistan but also the countries in its neighbourhood\, as well as of the international community”\, and that it is “a collective imperative and obligation” of the international community “no matter how long it takes or how demanding it may become.” By sponsoring the Taliban\, Pakistan created a strategic space for itself inside Afghanistan from where it could carry out anti-India activities with ease\, especially training and mentoring of militants for carrying out subversive activities in India\, while maintaining a denial mode before the international community. India would often cite strong linkages between Pakistani terrorist outfits operating in Kashmir valley and the Taliban regime.  It was in view of the above that India had supported the anti-Taliban coalition\, the United Front (or the Northern Alliance)\, along with Russia and Iran.  \nIn an attempt to gauge Taliban perceptions towards India\, the author referred to articulations by the former Taliban Ambassador to Pakistan\, Abdul Salaam Zaeef\, and the former Taliban Foreign Minister\, Wakil Ahmed Muttawakil. In an interview in February 2001\, Zaeef had spoken of the Talib’s explicit desire to have “normal relations” with India based on a policy of “non-interference”. Zaeef was of the view that as neighbours both countries must have “diplomatic relations and commercial ties.” Zaeef had also asserted that Afghanistan’s close relations with Pakistan “is never an obstacle to have good relations with anyone else” and that adversarial relationship between India and Pakistan “will not have an impact on Indo-Afghan ties.”  \nSimilarly\, the former Taliban Foreign Minister Muttawakil\, in an interview in July 2009\, had argued that “India should look at Afghanistan through its own lens\, not through the Pakistani lens.” He was of the opinion that “one of India’s biggest mistakes was to support the puppet Soviet regime in Kabul because the mujahideen were based in Pakistan” and “India’s second mistake was not to recognise the Taliban.” He further argued that “the Indian government should accept the presence of the Taliban in Afghanistan and support the peace process. After all\, the Taliban are a part of Afghan society.” \nThe paper argues that while the Taliban are a mix of both ethnic and Islamist politics interspersed with geo-political aspirations of regional and extra-regional actors\, it is at the same time neither a credible Islamist nor a wholly ethnic movement as is often projected. This is precisely where\, the paper forewarns\, India has to tread carefully while dealing with Afghanistan. \nThe author asserts that any attempt to expand the mandate of Af-Pak to India would prove counter-productive for the US. Merging Af-Pak with Pak-India\, or mixing the two separate issues of Afghanistan and Kashmir\, will only complicate the environment and work to the advantage of the Taliban\, al Qaeda and pro-Taliban elements within the Pakistani establishment. Though the US has repeatedly ruled out any possibility of India being part of Richard Holbrooke’s mandate\, the division of opinion within the Obama administration remains. In the given circumstances\, the challenge before the Obama administration is to ensure that the Af-Pak strategy is spared from motivated efforts to divert its attention and resources.  \nThe paper argues that the idea of engaging “non-ideologically committed” Taliban\, especially “mid-to-low level” insurgents\, is not likely to bear any concrete results. The white paper on interagency policy group’s report on US policy towards Af Pak warns that the “practical integration” of reconcilable Taliban “must not become a mechanism for instituting medieval social policies that give up the quest for gender equality and human rights.”  \nThe new Af-Pak strategy appears to be very Pakistan-centered as well. The author asserts that the whole idea of setting benchmarks to ensure the effectiveness of the huge aid being doled out to Pakistan is not likely to work vis-à-vis the Afghan Taliban. Where are the options before the US if Pakistan simply refuses to adhere to the conditions attached or fails to meet the benchmarks? Remember how the ISI chief had refused to meet Admiral Mike Mullen and Richard Holbrooke when they had visited Islamabad. The author observes that a flip side of the new strategy is that it could make the US more dependent on Pakistan and thus more open to exploitation\, which in turn could dilute the Af-Pak strategy over a period of time. Though Pakistan argues that targeting militant hideouts inside its territory through drone attacks is strengthening the hands of the Taliban\, but not sending drones will not weaken them either.  \nThe author refers to possible US pressure on India to ‘normalise’ its relations with Pakistan by resuming the composite dialogue in order to ensure that Pakistan is able to concentrate on its western tribal frontiers. Pakistan could use its India-specific threat perceptions to ensure sustained Western pressure on India while militants based in Pakistan carry on with their subversive activities against India. In such a scenario\, the key question for India would be how to react in case of a repeat of a 26/11 Mumbai-style terrorist attack?  \nThe author argues that the centrality of the core goal of disrupting\, dismantling\, and defeating al Qaeda in the new Af-Pak strategy makes the US approach relatively selective as far as anti-India terrorist outfits based in Pakistan are concerned.  It also makes the US agenda narrow in terms of sparing resources and attention for institution-building in Afghanistan. The paper warns that there could be a point where the Indian view may start diverging from those of the US in the region.  \nThe proposed Contact Group on Afghanistan and Pakistan (mainly comprising of US’ NATO and other allies\, Central Asian states\, the Gulf nations and Iran; Russia\, India and China) in the Af Pak strategy is likely to run into rough weather. A West-initiated and dominated contact group on Afghanistan may not be acceptable especially to Russia in view of its known opposition to NATO’s eastward expansion and growing differences on the Georgian issue. While Russia has agreed to provide transit facilities for NATO supplies to Afghanistan\, at the same time it has been re-asserting its influence in the former Soviet space. Same is the case with Iran given the ongoing standoff with the West on its nuclear programme. Not surprisingly\, for China\, the Afghan problem; problem between Afghanistan and Pakistan; and India and Pakistan\, are all inter-related. In the Chinese view\, the new Af-Pak strategy will not succeed until Pakistan is stabilized and India-Pakistan differences are resolved.  \nInterestingly\, an Asian initiative too would not be an easy proposition.  The special international conference on Afghanistan organized by the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) at Moscow on the day the Obama administration announced its new Af-Pak strategy\, and the subsequent UN special conference on Afghanistan at Hague on March 31\, are reflective of the geo-political competition taking place around Afghanistan. The author is of the opinion that India is likely to remain marginalised in the regional processes on Afghanistan in view of the ongoing big power contest (the US\, NATO\, Russia and China) for control over vast Eurasian resources\, unless it gears up for a strong regional diplomacy.  \nPerspectives\nThe author concludes by saying that the biggest challenge before India in Afghanistan is sustaining the momentum of its engagement with the government as well as the people of that country. The paper points out that given the highly externalized security architecture of Afghanistan\, India’s involvement in reconstruction activities would remain entwined with the success and failure of the Western military strategy. In view of India’s stated interest in the stability and security of Afghanistan\, he notes\, India is often expected to ‘do more’\, a veiled reference to India militarily contributing to the Western efforts.  \nIn this regard\, the author pointed out that it is important to grasp whether the Afghans (not only the Afghan government) want Indian boots on Afghan soil?  How different sections of the Afghan population are going to perceive and respond to it? Would it not bring Indian forces in conflict with Pashtuns (even if Indian forces are positioned in a non-Pashtun area)? And\, why India alone should do this? How many other Asian powers are willing to put their boots on the Afghan soil? Is there any support for India’s military involvement at the regional level? And\, is India as a nation prepared to play the ‘game’?  \nIt is clear that the Russians and Chinese are not willing to send their troops to Afghanistan. It is equally important to take into account how Sino-Pakistan relations are likely to play out. In the given circumstances\, India could do much better in terms of training Afghan military officials and contingents at its own facilities within the country or in a third country.  \nToday India is the only country which singularly and vociferously argues for the need to extirpate the Taliban. India remains a lone voice against a chorus calling for reconciliation with the Taliban. Even Kabul and the former opponents of the Taliban\, the National Front\, are willing to reach out to the Taliban\, who are now increasingly considered as part of the solution. Even the Russians to some extent appear to have accepted the idea of engaging the ‘moderate Taliban’. The Russian position is similar to that of Kabul and Washington.  \nThere is no doubt that the Taliban should not be the future of Afghanistan\, at the same time it is more than evident that they cannot be physically eliminated. They are Afghans and part of the Afghan polity. Whether Mullah Omar and Osama bin Laden are alive or dead\, it is their legacy\, their ideas which have to be fought in a patient and collective manner. If categorizing them as ‘moderate’ or ‘good’ and ‘bad’ helps in weakening them\, splitting and splintering them\, so be it. The US missed the opportunity of completely destroying Taliban as an organization\, and to an extent as an ideology\, between 2002 and 2006. An enemy\, a force\, or an ideology which can’t be destroyed\, has to be engaged after a point. The West cannot stay on in perpetuity. This is what keeps the Taliban going and it shall remain so. The other option is to deny a fall back option to the Taliban which exists in Pakistan. But is Pakistan willing to completely de-Talibanise its Afghan policy? Pakistan too is waiting and buying time.  \nOn the US policy which remains al Qaeda-centric\, the author argues that it was clear from day one that Operation Enduring Freedom was not meant for fighting the Taliban in every nook and corner of Afghanistan. The US too seems to have kept the option of integrating them open. Meanwhile\, reconciliation with the Taliban too will not easily come through. Where is the incentive for the Taliban to negotiate when they know that they may not be winning the battles but they are not losing the war either\, and that kills the asymmetry.    \nThe paper observes that India may have to deal with a ‘government’ in Afghanistan that includes Taliban members. Taliban are to be seen as a manifestation of various regressive tendencies resulting from the adversarial politics of the Cold War era. The author states that the Taliban too are not going to stay on in its current form for perpetuity.  The dynamism of Afghan polity would sooner or later consume them or may even present them in a different form. The Indian obsession over the destruction of Taliban is only contributing to its re-hyphenation with Pakistan. Longer the hyphenation\, lesser the chance for India’s candidacy\, as far as regional mechanisms are concerned. Openly engaging Kabul-based former Taliban in New Delhi would send a stronger message to Islamabad than sending forces to Afghanistan. It has to be understood that terrorism is a non-conventional threat which cannot be countered with conventional means alone. At times it requires unconventional measures to address it. Could there be a regional strategy to make the Afghan Taliban relatively independent of Pakistan in order to gradually neutralize them? \nAs for the rising threat levels to India’s presence in Afghanistan\, it is proof of its steadfast approach towards rebuilding of the Afghan state\, something Western countries have been notably lacking. Afghan reconstruction is not about pumping billions of dollars\, but working with and for the Afghans. Today\, the need to protect the achievements of the Bonn Agreement and the political process that flowed from it\, however flawed it may have been\, is more than ever. Never before in the history of Afghan conflict\, has the international community been involved in such a manner in rebuilding a modern Afghan state.  The paper argues that there will be corruption\, violence\, short-sightedness\, misunderstandings\, dissatisfaction\, repeated failures\, but the process must go on. \nGiven the current limitations\, the author recommends that India will have to do some strong diplomacy at the regional level to be able to craft new options in Afghanistan. As part of a regional approach\, India can explore possibilities of forging consensus with countries like Russia\, Iran\, and Turkey to train the Afghan National Army. India can contribute military instructors and trainers\, and the Russians can equip the Army. Turkey’s presence could be significant from NATO’s viewpoint. This can go a long way in taking the load off the US and the NATO so that both could concentrate on fighting the Taliban and al Qaeda. However\, this option is open so far as Western troops are deployed in Afghanistan.   \nThe paper concludes stating that India may not presently have great options in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. But there is one option which India should practice and always protect: the option of not going terribly wrong\, of not over-hyping itself\, in Afghanistan.     \nPoints raised during the discussion: \n\nNeed to explore options of engaging Iran on Afghanistan.\nIn the regional approach dealing with Iranians and Russians will have its own set of problems. \nTaliban ideology is what we have to combat not the Taliban. Education and economic development need to be strengthened on this front.\nThere is no short term strategy for Afghanistan.\nOptions for India require greater analysis.\nWe need to examine socio-economic\, political and military options separately.\nMilitary training\, military supplies and providing military infrastructure as options should be explored\nOne needs to look at the alternatives clearly and military options need to be explored in greater detail.\nThere is a need to fight the Taliban on the basis of ideas.\n\nPrepared by Medha Bisht\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-afghan-maze-and-indias-options
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090911T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090911T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T035143
CREATED:20231223T222010Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T054453Z
UID:63682-1252647000-1252647000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Maritime Security in the Gulf of Aden: Opportunities and Challenges for India
DESCRIPTION:Only by Invitation 1030 to 1300 hrs \nChair: N S Sisodia\nDiscussants: Shishir Upadhyaya and Vijay Sakhuja
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/maritime-security-in-the-gulf-of-aden-opportunities-and-challenges-for-india
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20091023T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20091023T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T035143
CREATED:20231223T222010Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130248Z
UID:63681-1256275800-1256275800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Limitation in Nuclear War: Doctrinal Implication for India of Pakistani Nuclear Use
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Aditya SinghDiscussants: R. Dahiya and Gaurav Kampani \nAim and Scope\nImplications of Pakistani nuclear use for India’s nuclear and conventional doctrine. This paper revisits the ‘Sundarji doctrine’ to assess its suitability for limitation and termination of nuclear war. In a nutshell\, the ‘Sundarji doctrine’ calls for termination of a nuclear war at the lowest level of escalation. \nThe paper then intends to recommend the institution of a standing strategic dialogue mechanism with Pakistan to enable limitation in conflict\, even a nuclear one. The continuing imperative of limitation even in nuclear war compels a review of India’s conventional and nuclear doctrines.  \nSummary\nThe speaker validated the argument that nuclear initiation\, in the context of a future India-Pakistan war\, is with Pakistan. Therefore its implication on India’s nuclear and conventional doctrine would emerge. While validating such an argument the speaker put forth the following arguments. \n\nDemocracy as the chosen political system in India\nIndia’s war strategy which is offensive\, broad front\, highly lethal\, short duration and red line cognisant vis-à-vis Pakistan’s counter strategy which is likely to comprise war avoidance\, conventional defence\, counter offensive with strategic reserves if possible\, and a resort to asymmetric war.\nNine factors which contribute to deterrence instability are:\n\n‘First use’ not ruled out by Pakistan\nPakistan’s lack of strategic depth\nQuestions about the credibility of India’s nuclear doctrine\nMomentum of conflict\nStrategic rationale of the Pakistan army\nRight wing pressure in Pakistan\nFog of war\nNuclear signaling\n\n\nThe possibility of nuclear use increases with the increase in threat to vital interests. Nuclear threat would heighten as the war progresses and the weaker the Pakistan army gets\, especially if it is apprehensive about India’s aims.\n\nHaving put forth the context of future conflict dimensions between India and Pakistan\, the speaker then described the “nuclear dimension of the conflict” and nuclear strike (first) options located within it. \nThe speaker downplayed “decapitation strike” and “first strike” as viable options. Thereby arguing that nuclear use options of a lower order may appear more attractive. The speaker cited the advantages of late nuclear use as it would not be unambiguously illegitimate in case Pakistan is faced with extinction as a state. Pakistan would be resorting to it at a stage in the war when it is vulnerable\, possibly having exhausted other military options.  \nIn essence the paper argued that late nuclear use could prove more dangerous and damaging to India than early use. \nExternal Discussant I (R. Dahiya)\n\nNuclear weapons are not for use\, but to deter others from using them.\nWill rationality prevail in a scenario of nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan?\nThe imperative of controlling the escalation ladder especially by India at every stage of the conflict.\n\nExternal Discussant II (Gaurav Kampani)\n\nThe paper must also include the naval and air dimensions and not restrict itself to the land component.\nInclude a discussion on Pakistan’s civil-military relations\nThe paper must reduce its dependence on secondary sources and include primary sources such as interviews of retired and serving officers of the armed forces.\nThe paper also needs to be clear as to what “cold-start” doctrine actually is.\n\nPrepared by S.Rajasimman\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/limitation-in-nuclear-war-doctrinal-implication-for-india-of-pakistani-nuclear-use
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20091023T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20091023T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T035143
CREATED:20231224T104458Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T054322Z
UID:64195-1256275800-1256275800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Sky's no Limit: An Evaluation of Space-based Solar Power as the Next Major Step in the Indo-US Strategic Partnership
DESCRIPTION:Only by Invitation 1030 to 1300 hrs\nChair: Jasjit Singh\nDiscussants: V. Siddhartha and Subodh Kumar
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/skys-no-limit-an-evaluation-of-space-based-solar-power-as-the-next-major-step-in-the-indo-us-strategic-partnership
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20091030T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20091030T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T035143
CREATED:20231223T222010Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T053835Z
UID:63680-1256880600-1256880600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:GCC - Iran Relations and its Strategic Implications for the Region
DESCRIPTION:Only by Invitation 1030 to 1300 hrs \nChairperson: Saeed NaqviDiscussants: Gulshan Dietl and Anwar Alam \nThe uneasy relationship between the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Iran is one of the main reasons for the continuing conflict in the Persian Gulf region. Iran has difficult relations with both the GCC and its individual members. With the passage of time\, several other contentious issues have emerged\, including the Iranian nuclear programme\, Iran’s island disputes with the UAE\, Saudi-Iran tensions\, ideological differences\, and the strong military presence of the United States in the GCC countries. This paper examines the sources of conflict between the GCC and Iran and analyzes its strategic implications for the Gulf region.   \nThe presence of the United States in the region has been the primary source of tension between the GCC and Iran. Iran has been concerned about the presence of US forces in the region. Tehran accuses the GCC of allowing external powers like the US to maintain a military presence in the Persian Gulf. On the other hand\, the GCC countries are dependent on the US for security. The ideological rivalry between the two and several clashes between Iranian pilgrims and Saudi security forces during the recent Hajj pilgrimage has added fuel to the conflict. That apart\, Saudi support for Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war\, Iran’s nuclear programme\, and regional competition have been major issues of conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia which has also affected the GCC-Iran relationship. \nGCC-Iran tensions are manifested in Iraq which is going through a major transition. Iran is seen as attempting to influence various sections of Iraqi society and polity to gain influence. In post-Saddam Iraq\, Iran has moved from confrontation to cooperation. The GCC states are concerned that Sunni Arabs have been marginalized in the new Iraq and that Iran has come to exercise too much influence over the Shia-dominated government in Baghdad. There is also a worry that Iranians in Iraq may engage in subversive activities against GCC countries and that the civil war may actually spill over into their territories. \nThe friction in GCC-Iran relations is leading to nuclear competition. In 2006 GCC announced its intention to establish a joint nuclear research programme which is primarily driven by their concern over the expanding Iranian nuclear programme. They are also concerned about Iran’s aggressive foreign policy posture in the whole of the West Asian region that includes Iraq\, Lebanon\, and the Palestinian Territories. Individual countries of the GCC have also started their own nuclear programmes. This has led to big nuclear powers strengthening their foothold in the region. Apart from that the interests of the external powers also lie in securing energy supplies\, selling their weapons to GCC countries and establishing military bases in the Gulf. \nThere have been some efforts at reconciliation between Iran and GCC countries though without any tangible results. The issues of contention between the two are serious. This makes the possibility of rapprochement look bleak in the near future. The clash of interests\, the scramble for influence in the region\, and the lack of mutual trust and goodwill have not allowed them to look for an amicable solution. \nPoints raised in the Discussion:\n\nThere is a need to go beyond the Shia-Sunni divide in the region. Alternative perceptions such as ‘Persians vs. Arabs’ or of conflicting ‘national interests’ need to be factored in and analysed to explain why old issues tend to trouble the relationship today.\nThe role of external powers in the region should be examined in greater detail. Iran is worried about the presence and influence of the United States in the region\, because the GCC states are dependent on the US for security. On the other hand\, Israel’s nuclear weapons are a threat for Iran while Iran’s nuclear programme is a threat to Israel.\nThe US-Iraq SOFA accord should not create problems for Iran. Under the terms of the agreement American forces cannot launch an attack on any other country from Iraqi territory.\nThe 10-point proposal made by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad needs to be analyzed in detail because these proposals give a clear indication of Iran’s policy and ambitions in the region.\n\nPrepared by Dr. M. Mahtab Alam Rizvi\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/gcc-iran-relations-and-its-strategic-implications-for-the-region
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20091030T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20091030T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T035143
CREATED:20231224T104453Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130248Z
UID:64194-1256880600-1256880600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Military Modernisation in Southeast Asia: China Factor or Interstate Conflicts?
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Ramesh V PhadkeDiscussants: Chintamani Mahapatra and Shishir Upadhyaya
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/military-modernisation-in-southeast-asia-china-factor-or-interstate-conflicts
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20091113T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20091113T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T035143
CREATED:20231223T222010Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130248Z
UID:63679-1258090200-1258090200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Copenhagen Summit: Climate Change Debate
DESCRIPTION:Amb. Rajagopalan chaired the session while Mr. Mukul Sanwal and Mr. V. Raghuraman were external discussants and Avinash Godbole and Antoine Levesques were internal discussants. \nDr. Uttam Sinha highlighted the core points of the present state of the global Climate Change debate. Developed and developing countries have contrasting priorities about climate change and development. Therefore\, until a common understanding of the framework on emission reductions is developed\, it is difficult to reach an agreement that is acceptable to all. Equity is the key to reach a common action agenda on climate change. Climate change negotiations have lacked transparency\, trust building and strong leadership. The grand deal will be about financial commitments and technology. However\, there have been no firm commitments in this regard. The Obama initiative is unlikely to be approved by the US Senate due to business interests. In India\, there is some opinion that favours mitigation in the national interest\, but other sections favour a wait and watch policy. India has taken a stand on moral grounds and its negotiating position is based on per capita emissions which state that emissions will not cross the levels of the developed world. Various interest groups comprising nations with different interests have emerged leading to Copenhagen. The general response of various states to the climate change debate is based on their developmental objectives and security interests. \nDiscussion\n\nIndia need not be apologetic about its requirements for development. \nThe US has taken the stance of putting its national interest ahead of global needs. Notwithstanding the criticism directed at Washington\, the US has stuck to its stand. \nSome of the scientific literature on climate change is inadequate and thus biased against India and China. \nAssessments based on biased research can be conflicting. Therefore\, India needs to take up its own research on climate change in critical areas like glacial melting. Consumerism in the US will have to be controlled for action on climate change. Otherwise US’ cuts in emissions will be superficial. \nThere is no quick fix technology available as of now for solutions to climate change\, so India should not give in\, based on commitments of technology transfer. India can take gradual mitigation actions that help in the development process. Reducing energy intensity of urban areas can be an important step. Available energy is more evenly distributed to needy sectors of Indian society. Mitigation actions will also help in reducing the adaptive costs of climate change in the future
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/copenhagen-summit-climate-change-debate
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20091113T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20091113T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T035143
CREATED:20231224T104453Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T051606Z
UID:64192-1258090200-1258090200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Mixed Messages: India's Use of Coercive Diplomacy in the 2001-02 Crisis
DESCRIPTION:Only by Invitation 1030 to 1300 hrs \nChairperson: V. G. PatankarDiscussants: I. P. Khosla and Swaran Singh
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/mixed-messages-indias-use-of-coercive-diplomacy-in-the-2001-02-crisis
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20091211T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20091211T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T035143
CREATED:20231224T104453Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T051221Z
UID:64190-1260509400-1260509400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:India and Nuclear Disarmament: Perceptions and Prospects
DESCRIPTION:Only by Invitation 1030 to 1300 hrs \nChairperson: Ramesh PhadkeDiscussants: Swadesh Rana and Swaran Singh
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/india-and-nuclear-disarmament-perceptions-and-prospects
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20091218T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20091218T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T035143
CREATED:20231223T222005Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130248Z
UID:63677-1261114200-1261114200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:To Develop or not to Develop?: The Political Dimension of BMD Procurement in Japan and India
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Dr. Rajaram PandaExternal Discussants: Dr. P.K. Ghosh Senior Fellow\, CAPS and Prof. Chintamani Mahapatra\, JNU \nPresentation\n\nThe paper’s core question “What factors influence why states make the decision to import advanced weapon systems or to develop them indigenously?” \nBoth India and Japan had similar threat perceptions owing to similar kind of neighbourhood situation.\nThe paper discusses the political processes behind BMD acquisition and not its scientific effectiveness or military utility.\nThere is research on suppliers’ perception of arms transfer but litter research on recipients’ perspectives.\nIn the case of Japan\, discussion on BMD began with Reagan’s “Star Wars” address. In the late 1980s and through the 1990s Japanese defence industry conducted research in this area. There was some joint research with the United States as well.\nNorth Korea’s 1998 Taepo Dong I test convinced Japan of BMD’s usefulness and formal joint research with United States began.\nAfter the United States withdrew from ABM treaty\, the Japanese Cabinet decided to introduce BMD systems. As of December 2009 4 SM-3s and 12 PAC-3s are deployed.\nJapan’s Foreign Policy concerns influenced the timing of the BMD deployment. Its perception about threats from the neighbours mattered in the decision about BMD. The Taiwan strait crisis of 1995-96 and earlier Chinese nuclear tests caused the difference. North Korean tests became an incentive to introduce BMD system\, but was not a decisive factor that made Japan decide to join the American system.\nJapan did not consider self reliance because there are restrictions due to import controls and limited R&D budgets.\nIn the case of India\, Pakistan’s acquisition of M-11s caused it to think of BMD. Chinese and Pakistani co-operation was looked at seriously. The political decisions behind it have not been fully analysed.\nIndia has been aiming for self-reliance in its defence procurements.\nIndia’s desire for independent policy also caused it to focus on self reliance. In the cold war period\, the United States and USSR had tied their arms sales to alliance partnerships and there still exist political hurdles to delivery of weapons. Thus indigenisation and diversification have been two pillars of the Indian arms policy.\nDRDO has conducted tests successfully and India should be able to deploy its BMD system by 2011.\nEven if it was economically difficult\, India decided on indigenous development of BMD for political and strategic reasons.\nThus\, foreign policy and threat perceptions matter equally in decisions over BMD policies.\n\nComments and Discussion:\n\nNeed to go deeper into the use of the Defence Industry perspective. 1998 alone cannot be the reason for Japanese policy on BMD. Japan favours two layered system and not two staged system. \nMTCR has been critical in decisions about BMD by different countries.\nIndia decided against co-development because it was turning out to be more expensive.\nJapan’s R&D numbers are impressive; in fact the United States wanted to collaborate with Japan for its own advantage.\nThat Japan became more independent in its foreign policy with the end of Cold War is a very tall claim.\nImpact of the Japanese BMD is going to be same regardless of its origin.\nEconomic benefit of the Japanese BMD programme is an outcome and not a cause. This has happened because the United States has subsidised Japanese BMD programme.\nThere is need to elaborate on the reasons why Japan decided not to develop indigenous capacity when it could and why India decided to do so when it did not have the knowledge.\nEven while the nature of arms transfer has changed and even as marketisation has taken place\, co-operation on BMD still remains a political decision.\nThe author could compare the different nature of relationship that India and Japan have with the United States and its impact on their BMD policy.\nIn Japan\, public opinion has played an important role.\nCredibility of the Indian BMD can be questioned. One should not look at statements but the results of the tests.\nBMD is a work in progress. It is useful for its psychological and political utility. No one would share it if it was perfect.\nIn India this has not been a strategic political decision but a military technical decision.  \n\nReport Prepared by Avinash Godbole\, Research Assistant\, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/to-develop-or-not-to-develop-the-political-dimension-of-bmd-procurement-in-japan-and-india
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20091218T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20091218T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T035143
CREATED:20231224T104423Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T051013Z
UID:64188-1261114200-1261114200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Management of Medical Stores in Indian Armed Forces
DESCRIPTION:Only by Invitation 1030 to 1300 hrs
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/management-of-medical-stores-in-indian-armed-forces
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100115T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100115T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T035143
CREATED:20231224T104423Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T050715Z
UID:64186-1263533400-1263533400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Civil - Military Relations
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Amitabh MatooDiscussants: Mohan Guruswamy and Ashok Mehta
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/civil-military-relations
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100115T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100115T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T035143
CREATED:20231224T104423Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T050837Z
UID:64187-1263533400-1263533400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Non-State Actors and South Asia: A Regional Profile
DESCRIPTION:Only by Invitation 1030 to 1300 hrs \nChairperson: Ramesh V Phadke\nDiscussants: Kalim Bahadur and Alok Bansal
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/non-state-actors-and-south-asia-a-regional-profile
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100122T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100122T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T035143
CREATED:20231223T222005Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T104423Z
UID:63675-1264138200-1264138200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:India's role in Afghanistan & Af-Pak Strategy
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: I. P. KhoslaDiscussants: Ravi Sawhney and Srinath Raghavan \nDr. Shanthie D’Souza’s presentation noted that the Obama administration’s Af-Pak strategy has brought the importance of the region to the forefront as a “hub of terror”. The author notes that US policy in Afghanistan has had its direct ramifications on India. The US withdrawal which is expected to lead to a deterioration of security and conflict will spill over into India. It will compel India to make tough policy choices. While noting that debates on post- US exit strategies are gaining momentum in India\, Shanthie suggests that it would be timely to deliberate on available options in case of the US withdrawal.  \nWhile attempting to interpret the Af-Pak strategy\, the author points out that it appears to be a ‘containment strategy’ aimed at containing the conflict at four levels- Afghanistan\, Pakistan\, Afghanistan-Pakistan border region and the un-stated goal of improving Indo-Pak relations. Shanthie points out that there is little evidence of change from the previous administration’s short term counter terrorism policy of pursuing a political strategy of supporting institutions and programmes. \nShanthie described the problem areas of the strategy where she notes that analysts in the region have viewed the Af-Pak strategy as a ‘reductionist’ strategy and a prelude to a US exit from Afghanistan. President Obama’s December 1\, 2009 speech only reconfirmed such apprehensions.  \nThere are seven problem areas. 1. Draw down of forces; By linking additional troop deployments to a timetable for the drawdown of forces and narrowly defined goals. However\, the strategy misses out on the core essentials of COIN campaigns which hinges on time\, long term commitment\, institution building and a larger political strategy. Moreover\, by announcing the exit\, it runs the danger of working to the advantage of the insurgents and their sponsors who will ‘wait for their time’.  2.Troops surge– Increase in troops numbers; While an increase in troops numbers for a ‘population centric’ policy is an essential step forward\, without clear Rules of Engagement (RoE) in dealing with the tribes\, especially the Pashtuns in South and East Afghanistan\, it could result in further alienation of the people. 3. Civilian Surge– Problem of Unity of Effort- The present strategy has focused on the civic component or the ‘civilian surge’. But the need is not to send more American experts but to build local Afghan capacities in better governance and aid delivery mechanisms. 4. Building Afghan National Security institutions in a limited time frame– A major problem in outlining a time table for downsizing troops hinges on the need for a phased transition to Afghan national security forces\, capable of independent action\, to take over from the US forces in 18 months. There is also a problem of mentoring and funding such huge projects. 5. Transferring authority to credible Afghan government– A credibly elected Afghan president and his capacity to extend his writ beyond Kabul are critical to an eventual US exit plan. The shortcomings of the electoral process\, redressal mechanisms and re-election procedures have highlighted the problems associated with the lack of political sector reforms.  6. Issues of sanctuaries and safe havens– The author points out that in the present scenario\, increased dependence on the Pakistan army and without addressing the issue of ‘sanctuaries’\, selected targeting of the Pakistani Taliban will not significantly dent the Afghan Taliban capability in the long term. 7.  Sources of funding of insurgency– One of the major short comings of the present strategy is the lack of attention paid to the sources of funding for the insurgency. After this\, the paper deals with the regional responses regarding American intentions in Afghanistan.  \nIn the next section\, Shanthie discusses India-Afghan relations. While highlighting the historical developments\, she mentions that India’s relations with Afghanistan have been shaped by shared history\, geography\, culture and economy. On post 9/11 Afghanistan\, India took an active role as an ‘ideational power’ by adopting a soft approach aimed at long term stabilization\, institution building and augmenting economic growth in Afghanistan; integrating Afghanistan in the South Asian framework and reviving the role of Afghanistan as a ‘land bridge’ connecting South Asia with Central Asia. India is the sixth largest bilateral aid donor country\, pledging 1.2 billion dollars and invested in diverse areas such as infrastructure\, communications\, education\, healthcare\, social welfare\, training of officials\, institution building etc.  \nWhile describing the challenges to India’s aid policy in Afghanistan\, Shanthie points out that India needs to accept responsibilities and risks that come with that stature. The growing bonhomie between India and Afghanistan\, coupled with the increased presence of India’s development projects in Afghanistan\, remains the target of the Taliban-led insurgency. Also geopolitical rivalry continues to shape Pakistan’s response to the increasing bonhomie between India and Afghanistan. The deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan has serious consequences for India’s security interests.    \nShanthie has generated three plausible scenarios for the future of Afghanistan. Scenario 1- US withdrawal or draw down of forces- Return of the Taliban; The author points out that in case of a complete US withdrawal\, the probability of the return of the Taliban is not far fetched\, thereby condemning Afghanistan to what US analysts as the worst case scenario. This would also lead to an emboldening of the Al Qaeda\, instability spreading to Pakistan and Central Asia\, thus reducing the region to become a base for Al Qaeda operations. Scenario 2- US limited engagement-‘proxy war’; The most probable scenario beyond 2011 is the reduced US presence in Afghanistan with troops limited to protecting key cities\, a shift from overstretched counterinsurgency operations to internal defence. This would allow Pakistan to continue its ‘hedging’ strategy whereby it will continue supporting the Afghan Taliban to destabilise Afghanistan with the eventual goal of reinstating a pliant regime. Scenario 3- US long term commitments– Building on Afghan state capacities; According to the author\, this is the best case scenario for Afghanistan\, though such a state of affairs is highly unlikely given the reduced public support for the Afghan war in the United States. This would call for additional resources including troops to train and partner with Afghan forces and continuation of the institution building programmes. In this scenario\, India could play a long term role in the training of the Afghan national institutions\, institutional building political\, and security and justice sector reforms. \nIn the last section\, the author suggests policy options for India. According to Shanthie\, India can play an active role in training and building the capacity of Afghan national security forces. India should also reestablish its support base among the Pastun tribes and invest in acquiring better human intelligence. These support groups can be cultivated as protectors of Indian aid projects by making community participation and local ownership a key plank of India’s aid policy. The author cautions that these goals should be achieved in the next 18 months. \nHowever in the scenario of US limited engagement in Afghanistan beyond 2011\, India could continue with its assistance programme in Afghanistan. Shanthie argues that in a revamped diplomatic strategy\, India can work towards creation of Concert of Powers’- a regional grouping including US\, Russia\, EU\, India\, Iran\, Central Asian Republics and China. India could play a lead role in carving out a greater role for the United Nations and deployment of UN forces in Afghanistan symbolizing the UN Security Council’s endorsement would not entirely be a misplaced policy option.  \nShanthie concludes her presentation by suggesting that in near terms\, India needs to pursue a reinvigorated Afghan policy in terms of protecting its projects and carving out a larger regional role in the stabilization of Afghanistan. India needs to consider near term and long term scenarios to rethink its political\, diplomatic and military options. Given the limited time frame\, before the summer 2011\, India will have to make tough policy choices.   \nPoints raised during the discussion. \n\nObama administration should come out with a clear and determined Afghan policy. With frequent changes in the AF-Pak strategy\, desired results can not be achieved.\nIndian policy makers will have to take bold initiatives to develop a regional mechanism to effectively deal with terror activities in the region.\nAfghan nation building is essential to effectively solve its problems. The international community should take effective steps towards this direction. India can play a lead role in this process.\nToo much reliance on Pakistan in the Afghan war is not the right approach. Regional players such as India\, Iran Russia and China should be given more space in order to seek an Afghan solution. \nHowever a solution can only come from within Afghanistan. Global and regional players can help them achieving it.\n\nReport prepared by Sanjeev Kumar Shrivastav\, Research Assistant at the IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/indias-role-in-afghanistan-af-pak-strategy
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100129T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100129T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T035143
CREATED:20231223T222003Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130248Z
UID:63673-1264743000-1264743000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Climate Change\, Environmental Degradation\, Tibet and Implications for South Asian Security
DESCRIPTION:The paper presenter’s aim was to create a new discourse that treats Tibet as a regional\, if not a global\, commons that has wide-ranging implications for all of South Asia from being a source of many important rivers to controlling the Monsoons. Such a discourse that highlights Tibet as being crucial for a wider humanity will put pressure on China to review its activities in Tibet which is resulting in severe ecological degradation. The most pressing problem seems to be the impact on the rivers that flow downwards into the Indian subcontinent and South-East Asia which will all face a considerable reduction in runoff with the receding of glaciers.  \nThe speaker looked at the following 3 aspects through the course of his paper: \n\nThe impact of human activity in Tibet and the changing climate on the countries dependent on this ecosystem.\nThe diversion of rivers originating in Tibet by China.\nPolicies for co-operation and peaceful resolution of conflict.\n\nWhile elaborating on the first point\, it was pointed out how the urbanization of Tibet with infrastructure building\, extension of railways and roads\, and conversion of grasslands will result in demographic changes that will impact the local ways of living. All these factors will\, in turn\, change the nature of the local ecosystem. For example\, the nomads’ lifestyle ensured that the delicate balance of the fragile ecosystem was not disturbed.  \nGlaciers are an important aspect of this ecosystem. However\, there is much contention over whether or not they are melting at a rapid rate (or melting at all). This is due to a dearth of information or facts regarding them. India has around 9\,575 glaciers but research has been done on only 25-30 of them. Thus\, the difficulty of drawing any definite conclusions. However\, the presenter insisted that the people of the Himalayas have noticed the change and he quoted Chewang Norphel who said “I am the scientific data”\, i.e. one doesn’t need a scientific authority to certify what is obvious to the people living there.”    \nDiversion of rivers and construction of dams by the Chinese on rivers like Yarlung Tsangpo (Brahmaputra) or the tributaries of Indus and Sutlej will adversely affect the lower riparian states. China’s increased control of river water will mean an increased security threat for the others. \nThe speaker asserted that a major obstacle to studying the impact of the diversion of rivers is posed by the lack of scientific data that is available in the public domain. The lack of transparency in terms of information results in analysts having to make intelligent guesses. \nIncorporating China in the Indus Water Treaty is one of the solutions proposed for peaceful co-operation as well as a consolidated effort by all the countries of the region to conduct scientific studies on the environmental degradation of the ecosystem caused due to man-made activity and climate change. \nUltimately\, the crux of the presenter’s argument was that a discourse that regards Tibet as a regional (or global) common should be created in order to prevent any adverse effects on other lower riparian countries that would result from unilateral Chinese diversion of rivers in Tibet. \nShri M.S. Menon made some pertinent observations on the issues brought up in this paper. Most importantly he highlighted the confusion regarding global warming\, climate change\, and glacier melts since the causes and effects are “not very clear”. Not to mention\, scientific data can be manipulated to suit particular agendas. He also pointed out that studies regarding the role vegetation cover (including that in Tibet) plays on monsoons are incomplete.  \nThe presenter’s fear of Chinese diversion of rivers and its security implications were reinforced by Shri Menon. Unlike B.G. Verghese who claims that it is near impossible for China to divert water from these rivers due to the terrain\, Menon asserted that China was more than capable of accomplishing such a feat. His remedy for this problem is that India should build a dam in Arunachal Pradesh in order to control the flow of the Brahmaputra. \nThe lack of data on the water flow of rivers should also be addressed. In border areas where civilians are not allowed\, the army should step in to take measurements. In terms of exchange of data between India and China\, the best area to bring up this issue would be in forums concerning biodiversity since they are signatories of the UN Convention on Biological Diversity and project an image of concern for the environment in this regard. He also supported the idea of a reworked IWT that included China. \nDr. A.P. Dimri discussed the technical aspects of climate change and how the Himalayas play a major role in controlling the monsoons\, which is why the topography of Tibet should be looked at in more detail. He also talked about the need to look at regional dynamics of climate change. Cycles of heating and cooling have always existed\, however\, what we should be worried about is the anthropogenic forces that are contributing to climate change.  \nThe discussant explained how the debate around the melting of glaciers is extremely complicated and cannot have a simple answer. Glaciers are viscoplastic in nature. So what might be considered as glaciers melting might actually be a geological phenomenon of glaciers just breaking up. A lot more work needs to be done in this area before anything concrete can be ascertained. He also mentioned that satellite imagery is not entirely reliable data since it does not cover the area throughout the season so one cannot make accurate interpretations.  \nThe internal discussants\, Jaganath Panda and Avinash Godbole\, also raised important points. The former talked about the Chinese strategy that includes the restructuring of the industrialization process and a new focus on local industries in order to show that Tibetan industries are not being destroyed. He also discussed the reasons behind why China wanted to divert water in terms of geography\, social and national tension particularly with the drying up of the Yellow river.  He proposed SAARC and the UN as good forums in which India can engage with China. Godbole put forward two critical questions. First\, if Chinese activity in Tibet affects rivers’ flow to India\, it should also affect rivers flowing into China; so\, why would China want to harm their own water resources? Secondly\, can science and politics be separated? Even scientific data can be manipulated for particular ends.  \nThe Chair\, Arvind Gupta\, summed up the discussions by claiming that we should “learn to live with uncertainty” and evolve precautionary principles rather than keep waiting for concrete data to act. He asserted that China feels secure with its Tibet policies and the diversions of the rivers. It becomes an important strategic tool to engage India in larger Sino-Indian relations.  \nThe report has been prepared by Shubha Kamala Prasad\, an intern at IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/climate-change-environmental-degradation-tibet-and-implications-for-south-asian-security
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100129T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100129T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T035143
CREATED:20231223T222005Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130248Z
UID:63674-1264743000-1264743000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Indo-Africa Narcotics Ties
DESCRIPTION:During the Cold War\, there was a complete focus on the military competition because these two things projected as power and increase security of the states. Given the evolving nature of conflict however\, this no longer holds true. New “soft” threats pose bigger hazards to human beings today. There has been a need to redefine classical security paradigms along the lines of new threats such as internal conflicts\, money laundering\, human rights\, trafficking\, illicit drugs trade\, etc.  \nOne of the non-traditional security threats is the menace of Narcotics Trafficking (NT) and organized transnational crime (OTC). NT today is a problem that exists at the national and at the international level. The narcotics trafficking business is the second largest industry in the world valued at approximately $500 billion in 1994 and approximately $322 billion in 2007\, following the arms sales business only. Production and refining of drugs and the consumption of these drugs almost inevitably happens in two different areas\, so narcotics trade is inherently suited to be a transnational crime. In some instances\, narco-trafficking tends to harm the state because money laundered indirectly or directly makes its way into fuelling separatist groups\, insurgents\, and terrorists\, thus permitting non-state actors to take on the state. Despite this\, many states tend to view narcotics as a domestic or internal security matter.   \nIndia is uniquely placed in the global illicit drugs trade\, sandwiched between the “Golden Triangle” of the North-East and the “Golden Crescent” of the North-West. India is also used as a transit point for drugs from South and South-East Asia onwards to Europe. The profitability of the drugs trade has been made possible by the fact that India is surrounded by weak states with endemic corruption. India’s own security has become intrinsically tied to the strength of states not only within its immediate neighborhood but also at a distance.  \nPresently\, India is not only an exporter of locally grown and/or manufactured drugs\, it is also on the receiving end and serves as a major transit hub in the global narcotics network. India’s connections with Africa\, as well as Africans operating in the rest of the South Asian region\, have single-handedly emerged as one of the gravest and most complex “invisible” security dilemmas. In India alone\, hundreds of Africans are languishing in prisons around the country on drug related offenses. An average of one ton of heroine alone is seized every year all over India. Pockets of African communities in Goa\, Rajasthan and the South often use tourists for “quick trades” or as carriers for transporting drugs to foreign destinations.   \nThere are three types of players involved in NT– “drug barons”\, “strikers” and “couriers”. A drug baron is usually someone who has risen to significance over time and due to the extent of their involvement. The narcotics trafficking menace\, and its associated destabilizing effects\, impacts all levels of society – locally\, nationally and internationally. India today has the highest rate of opiate users in the South Asian region of approximately 3.2 million. In a national survey conducted in 2001-2002 by the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment it was estimated that about 73.2 million people were users of alcohol and drugs. Narcotics addiction among the Indian populace has increased hand in hand with the spread of diseases. Use of synthetic drugs and intravenous drug use\, especially in the North-East states\, has led to the spread of HIV/AIDS among drug users\, introducing a newer grave element to the crisis. Narco-Trafficking has resulted in human security and economic security impacts in India. While legislation under the NDPS Act remains strict\, it does not include the socio-cultural uses of drugs in the Indian context. \nPoints in the Discussion:\n\nNeed to study the involvement of African countries in NT because not all African countries are involved in it.\nAfrican governments do not intervene to control the traffickers particularly in the case of Somalia\, and the percentage of drugs smugglers has increased today. \nThe Role of International Agencies such as the IMF to control the narcotics trade should be discussed in detail.\nNeed to analyze the agencies that provide support to drug traffickers.\nNeed to focus on why Nigeria became the hub of NT\, other countries like Ghana also became the hub but Nigeria is the most populous country in the region\, so its involvement is greater than others.\nHow has globalization created new forms of socialization to control the consumption of drugs?\nWhy Nigeria become the hub for the narcotics trade?\n\nPrepared by M. Mahtab Alam Rizvi\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/indo-africa-narcotics-ties
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100205T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100205T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T035143
CREATED:20231223T222003Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130247Z
UID:63672-1265347800-1265347800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Mapping East Asian Futures 2030
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Ramesh V. PhadkeDiscussants: Srikant Kondapalli and P. K. Ghosh \nThe research objective of this paper is to develop and explore a broader range of plausible scenarios for East Asia in 2030 for flexible policy planning and strategic thinking. According to Ishida\, the paper does not make any predictions but provides alternative possibilities. For this purpose\, Ishida poses four research questions which are: What are the key drivers of the East Asian region? What kinds of future scenarios are plausible towards East Asia in 2030? What will be the implications of future scenarios for policy planning and what are the key strategic challenges\, risks\, uncertainties in the region?.  \nThe paper begins by explaining the regional geo-political characteristics and historical background of East Asia. Ishida points out that geo politically\, China\, Japan\, the United States\, Russia and India are the major players in the region but since the end of the Cold War Russian power and influence have rapidly declined while the influence of China and India has rapidly increased because of their high economic growth. \nThe author analyses contemporary trends and debates on East Asia where he discusses changing geo-politics\, economic liberalization\, democratization and its challenges as well as regional cooperation and regionalisation. After this\, the main drivers or key forces have been identified and explained. The author has identified four key drivers: great power geopolitics; globalization\, politico- economic liberalization; regionalism and regionalization; energy\, resources and the environment.  \nOn the basis of these key drivers\, various scenarios have been developed in a broad spectrum. The author has drawn nine scenarios: 1. Progressive East Asian community: It portrays high optimistic trends of peace and progress at all level. 2. Chaotic East Asia: this depicts extremely negative trends where East Asia will fall down into a vicious politico-economic resulting chaos and disorder. The first two scenarios have been put under a non-polar category. 3. Concert of Great Powers in East Asia: this scenario assumes stability in East Asia will be maintained by the concert of great powers such as China\, Japan\, the United States\, possibly together with Russia and emerging India. This shows the positive trends of great power politics. 4. Tragedy of great power rivalry: This scenario shows the negative trends of great powers’ rivalry and competition. It assumes that East Asian geo-politics will become increasingly competitive thus leading to severe and dangerous arms races and potentially direct military conflicts. Scenarios four and five have been put under the multi-polar category. 5. US-Japan Liberal Pacific Union: This is an optimistic scenario characterized by international liberalism where it shows that the US-Japan will maintain primacy; China will face severe domestic troubles as well as ASEAN will become more liberal-oriented towards US and Japan. 6. US-China Strategic Condominium: This scenario assumes that the United States and rising China will dominate East Asia with their growing political- strategic coordination while the role and influence of Japan\, Russia and India will be marginalized. 7. New Cold War between US/Japan and China: This scenario depicts the negative trends of great powers relations where East Asia will be dominated by competition and rivalry between hegemonic US and rising China. Scenario fifth\, sixth and seventh have been put under bipolar category. 8. American Hegemony: This scenario shows that the United States will continue to maintain its primacy in East Asia while China’s rise and Japan’s role will be constrained by the rivalry between them. 9. Return to China-centric East Asian Order: This scenario assumes Chinese domination in the East Asian geo-political economy and projects that China will establish its hierarchical regional order which will result in a weakening and decline of the US- Japan alliance.  \nIn the last section the paper\, author has discussed key strategic challenges\, risks and uncertainties which largely influence the future course of East Asia. The author has mentioned following points. 1. East Asia region has immense stakes in China’s stability and external relations. 2. The future of US-Japan remains uncertain. If the alliance is considerably weakened or collapses\, the East Asian region will face drastic and unpredictable changes. 3. The stakes are immensely high\, whether changes in international relations will happen in a peaceful manner or with military conflicts among great powers. 4. The East Asian nations need to overcome excessive nationalism to enhance any durable reconciliation\, mutual understanding and trust. 5. East Asia faces some of the most serious military flash points such as the Korean Peninsula\, the Taiwan Strait and the South and East China seas. 6. With rapid economic growth and resurgent nationalism as well as competition\, East Asian nations are heading towards a slow and steady arms race which includes weapons of mass destruction and a space arms race.7. To deal with potential conflicts and crises\, multilateral security cooperation is essential to ensure East Asian security. 8. With deepening globalization and regionlisation\, the Asia-Pacific region faces various emerging security challenges such as international terrorism\, maritime security\, energy and resources\, illicit drugs and human trafficking and climate change. 9.With widening and deepening globalization and economic interdependence\, the regional economy and finance remains fragile to shocks and instability as evident in the global financial/ economic crisis of 2008. \nIshida has provided maps depicting of East Asia and key areas of dispute\, figures on China’s military size\, state of economy\, political freedom\, economic freedom\, prosperity etc in Asia accessed from various sources as part of appendix. However at the end of his presentation\, the author notes that a conclusion is yet to be added in the paper. \nPoints Raised during the discussion\n\nThe paper broadly deals with liberal theory. However ‘Balance of Power’ and ‘Critical’ theories are missing in this study. \nThe paper does not suggest any policy options. The author does not provide his own views on the topic. The paper is heavily relies on survey of literature.\nToo many scenarios have been projected in the paper. It should have been just four scenarios. The wild card scenario is also missing for the paper.\nThe key drivers in the paper actually are not reflected in the scenarios.\nMapping of Comprehensive National Power (CNP) is another key area which has not been covered in this study. The study conducted by the Chinese academy of social sciences and Ashley Tellis could have been utilized. \nThough the size of the whole Asian economy is huge it is still not a match for the Transatlantic region of the world. So many problems still plague Asia such as hunger\, poverty\, malnutrition\, unemployment etc.\n\nThe United States is still a dominant power in the region and remains a wild card.\nDemographic changes have not been touched upon in this paper. China and India have a large young population which should have been analysed. Similarly young Turks in Japan who aspire for change in Japanese politics could have been discussed. \nThe paper points out that India has little security interests in Taiwan Straits which may not be appropriate. \nIn the future\, India may also be included in the six party talks since it is an emerging power. This aspect could have been included in the scenarios.\nTechnology and its impact is one the biggest drivers which has to be mentioned in this paper.\nThere are domestic players and factors as well which highly influence foreign policy making such as the issue of Okinawa or the change of government in Japan which could have been cited as an alternative scenario.\nPoverty in going to be the major issue in 2030. The leadership question is also important.\nThe author point out that a progressive East Asian community is the most optimistic scenario but this requires more explanation.\nMapping East Asia 2030 is an important task. The author needs to mention which futures are important and how it can be arrived at. \nWhile building the scenario\, no time line has been given. The paper also lacks imagination of events. \nHowever the survey of literature is commendable but the author’s own voice is missing.\n\nReport prepared by Sanjeev Kumar Shrivastav\, Research Assistant at the IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/mapping-east-asian-futures-2030
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100219T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100219T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T035143
CREATED:20231223T222003Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130247Z
UID:63671-1266557400-1266557400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Navigating Through Troubled Waters: Bangladesh's Experience with India and Myanmar
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Dr. Arvind GuptaDiscussants: Alok Bansal and General Barmer \nDr. Sreeradha Datta\, notes that Bangladesh’s maritime boundary dispute with India and Myanmar is becoming increasingly salient in their bilateral relations. It is only in recent years that the issue has gained prominence fraying relations. The un-demarcated nature of the maritime boundary line is the source of dispute between Bangladesh and its two neighbours. Both India and Myanmar have overlapping maritime boundary claims with Bangladesh. Bangladesh is the only country among littoral states not to have reached a maritime agreement. Maritime boundary delimitation implies not only the setting of limits of the state’s outer limit of maritime zones including its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and Continental Shelf\, but also its maritime boundary limits vis-à-vis its opposite or adjacent state. Under the dispute settlement provisions of the UNCLOS of 1982 each littoral state is entitled to claim 200 nautical miles (nm) of sea area as its EEZ with all living and non-living resources within these areas are that state’s exclusive property; out of this\, the first 12 nm are the Territorial Sea and the next 188 nm are its EEZ. The resolution of Indo-Bangladesh maritime boundary dispute entails addressing two contentious issues – that of the baselines to demarcate maritime and delimitation boundaries including the outer limit of the overlapping extended continental shelf. Following revision\, the UNCLOS III stipulated that the ‘median’ or the ‘equidistance’ be the principle for maritime boundary demarcation which India supports. Bangladesh strongly opposes the ‘equidistance’ principle given the nature of its coast. With India\, Bangladesh’s dispute specifically surrounds the contrasting claims over what is known as New Moore in India and South Talpatty in Bangladesh. Myanmar’s position is fairly similar to that of India. Rangoon also insists that the equidistance principle be maintained. However as Dr. Datta maintains despite the contentious issues at stake between Bangladesh and its two neighbours and given the geographical condition of Bangladesh there is ample scope in the UNCLOS III to treat Bangladesh’s case with greater flexibility and beyond the strict guidelines of equidistance. India and Bangladesh could agree on a joint survey\, but for now the dispute is being mediated by an independent arbitrator. Finding a modus vivendi is possible according Dr. Datta. While Bangladesh in recent negotiations has agreed to a joint hydrological survey on Teesta River with India allowing the extreme positions over the baseline may thus be bridged.  \nPoints of Discussion\n\nEurope’s context is different from the history that bedevils the India-Bangladesh maritime dispute. History is important in Europe’s case\, but this is not the case between India and Bangladesh.\nThe paper is informative.\nEquity cannot be defined clearly and Bangladesh has its own conception.\nDelineation of the maritime boundary must follow the equidistance principle. Even the ICJ maintains that equidistance is the rule.\nJoint management is the best option as the author has proposed. Sea bed resources can be equally shared.\nIndia is in a scientifically and technically stronger position than Bangladesh\, which lacks technical resource capacities.\nIndia must be magnanimous\, because it will strengthen the Hasina government.\nChina’s role is increasingly worrisome.\nThe author seems to be pleading only Bangladesh’s case. The onus also lies on Bangladesh to demonstrate that it is really in need of the resources.\n\nThe author must highlight the strategic importance of the dispute and China’s role in trying to exploit the problem\, particularly between India and Bangladesh.  \n\nReport prepared by Kartik Bommakanti\, Research Assistant at the IDSA
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/navigating-through-troubled-waters-bangladeshs-experience-with-india-and-myanmar
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100226T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20100226T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T035143
CREATED:20231223T221939Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130247Z
UID:63668-1267162200-1267162200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Space Assets and India’s Capability (Specific to Satellite Communication for Defence Forces up to 2020 and Beyond)
DESCRIPTION:Colonel Deepak Sharma treated the subject from the larger point of view of national security. He argued that space assets constitute a sub-set in the broader structure of national security\, and highlighted the important role they play in military defence. According to him\, imagery\, navigation\, signals intelligence\, telecommunication\, early warning and meteorology are the key satellite functions that are vital in military operations. Besides\, on a strategic planning level\, satellite communication would also be crucial to maintain and sustain troops deployed outside.  \nAfter introducing the theme and its relevance in general\, Sharma defined what he means by space system. He argued that space system meant both a satellite and its ground station(s)\, with trained and technically competent manpower attached to them. \nAfter this he produced various tables\, graphs and charts giving a break-up of country-wise and function-wise statistics\, and budgetary estimates of various countries. According to the statistics provided by him\, more than half of the satellites orbiting around the earth are for communication purposes. Also\, the United States dominates commercial and military space. In this section\, he undertook case studies of American\, Chinese\, Indian and Pakistani space programmes and provided a comparative perspective. \nAs for an Indian military space programme\, he argued that “sufficient space capability exists with India to meet the requirements of its defence forces.” He argued that the Indian armed forces should demand for dedicated satellite facilities only when ISRO is unable to fulfill their requirements. He made a case for one competent and qualified agency in each service Headquarters for space systems that should be fully responsible to conceptualize\, plan and implement the project in totality. He recommended that Indian space strategy should be region-focused as its strategic concerns are basically regional. Aspiring for global reach through satellites is neither reasonable nor fesible for India. As to the question of security of space assets\, he argued that much of the fear is misplaced. Identifying an enemy’s satellites orbiting around the earth and\, then\, damaging or destroying them is not that easy\, technologically. He advised that instead of being over anxious about the safety and security of satellites in space\, the somewhat neglected aspect of security of space assets on the ground requires greater attention because the operation of satellites depends upon space centres on the ground.  \nCol. Deepak Sharma’s presentation was followed by a very fruitful discussion. Mr. Yadvendra Singh argued that the effective use of space military technology by the United States in recent wars has prompted other countries to develop this technology. He pointed out that the United States heavily used commercial satellites for military communications in the Gulf Wars. Thus\, using commercial satellites for military purpose is also a part of strategy. He also pointed out that the consequences would be grave if satellite systems were to collapse even for a single day. The damage incurred by such a failure would be 100 times more than in a war. He said that sharing of space and allocating coordinates will be a major issue in international politics in future because countries cannot place their satellites in orbit arbitrarily. Notwithstanding the fact that India started its space odyssey relatively late\, its progress in space science has been impressive. Further\, he said that Chinese business acumen and hard-bargaining have benefited its space programme a lot. Likewise\, the Indian space programme can also take advantage of the worldwide recession and exploit the opportunities presented by it.  \nCol. Navjot Singh averred that Deepak Sharma has performed a commendable job by highlighting the significance of ground space assets. He said that Sharma’s presentation has given ample food for thought. He highlighted the need of adequate laws for the safety and security of space assets and penalization of violators.  \nDr. Pankaj Jha raised several meaningful questions. He wanted to know what India was doing to tackle its vulnerabilities? What international agreements were there to assuage vulnerabilities? What was the international position on debris in space? The other internal discussant Mr. Kartik Bommakanti raised an important methodological issue of academic citation and validation. \nAir Commodore (Retd.) R.V. Phadke said that Sharma’s paper has done yeoman service to the IDSA as the institution was ‘technologically challenged’ and had shown relatively less interest in such studies. He noted that this was the first time that India’s capabilities were discussed; otherwise the general trend has been to highlight deficiencies only.\nFinally\, Col. Deepak Sharma answered many queries posed by various participants and said he would gladly accommodate many of the valuable suggestions in his final draft.  \nThe Chair\, Dr. Arvind Gupta\, wound up the session. In his remarks\, he emphasized the point that the services would have to explain why they need dedicated satellites. He reiterated the point that our space and strategic community should start deliberating about rules of space sharing as it would be an important issue in times to come. Besides\, the issue of debris has also the potential of becoming an important issue in international politics. India should not be caught in a NPT-like situation. Therefore\, he insisted that there should be a national space policy.  \nReport prepared by Dr. Prashant Kumar Singh
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/space-assets-and-indias-capability-specific-to-satellite-communication-for-defence-forces-up-to-2020-and-beyond
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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