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SUMMARY:Fellow Seminar by Dr. MS Prathibha\, Associate Fellow\, MP-IDSA
DESCRIPTION:On 12 September 2025\, Dr. M.S. Prathibha\, Associate Fellow at the East Asia Centre\, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA)\, presented a paper on “Great Changes Unseen in a Century: China’s Conception of the Evolving World Order” for her Fellow Seminar. Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director-General\, MP-IDSA chaired the meeting. Two External Discussants (Professor Rajesh Rajagopalan\, Centre for International Politics\, Organisation and Disarmament\, School of International Studies\,  Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) and Professor T.G. Suresh\, Associate Professor\, Centre for Political Studies\, School of Social Sciences\, JNU) as well as two Internal Discussants (Dr. Saurabh Mishra\, Research Fellow\, Africa\, Latin America\, Caribbean and UN (ALACUN) Centre and Dr. Abhishek Kumar Darbey\, Associate Fellow\, East Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA) commented on the paper. Scholars from MP-IDSA actively participated in the Q&A. \nOpening Remarks by the Chair\nIn his Opening Remarks\, Ambassador Chinoy began by praising the Speaker’s paper as one that was both timely and apposite\, given the worldwide attention being paid to China’s rise. Amb. Chinoy related his experiences during recent trips to China\, where he heard Chinese narratives of confidence in the decline of the United States of America and the commensurate pre-eminence of China\, indicating that China itself believes that its time has come to play a dominant role on the world stage. He posited that China was now prepared to not only keep the US out of its perceived area of interest\, but to replace it as the power underwriting the global order. This is in large part due to General Secretary Xi Jinping\, whose role in the formation of this narrative has been decisive. \nAmb. Chinoy went on to state his fundamental doubt of the premises of this argument. He noted that while China as a nation-state may endure into the future\, it is not a historical given that the same can be said of the Communist Party of China (CPC). Further\, it is not inevitable that Xi’s ambitious ‘China Dream’ would be the means by which that country attains ‘greatness’\, as that inevitably requires that Beijing take some form of action on the self-ruled island of Taiwan. Though there have been some Chinese successes internationally\, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic\, Amb. Chinoy suggested that this may have as much to do with the fact that the US is now showing itself uninterested in playing its role in the current global order\, leading some to view China as a ‘noble equivalent’. \nNevertheless\, the international headwinds China’s economy has faced in recent years is a key reason why it has chosen now to focus internally on developing science and technology as well as innovation as two waves of the next phase of its development. Terming it a lesson in the might of the Scientific Revolution\, Amb. Chinoy called on the Speaker to elucidate further as to how these themes would come together in her presentation. \nPresentation by Dr. M.S. Prathibha\nThanking the Chair for his trenchant remarks\, Dr. Prathibha entered into her presentation with an outline of its structure. She then described the theoretical bases of her presentation\, noting that the future of the world order is indeed uncertain and that there is growing discussion of the role played by China. Pointing out that existing scholarship on China’s role within the international order largely attempted to compare China’s past to its present (for example\, by comparing Xi Jinping’s leadership to his predecessors’)\, which is a Eurocentric perspective\, she stated that her paper would focus only on the CPC’s vision of itself at the helm of China in years to come. \nDr. Prathibha expressed the view that the CPC compares China’s rise to the rise of the West as its operating paradigm. As such\, it does not wish to deconstruct the existing world order\, but to replace key elements of it. Thus\, a key question arises: is China a revisionist world power or an integrationist world power? She proposed that in order to answer this question\, it would be important to understand some of the concepts propounded by Xi Jinping and the CPC\, namely\, the ‘Great Changes Unseen in a Century’ and the ‘New Era’. \nDr. Prathibha highlighted certain definitional aspects of the concept of ‘Great Changes Unseen in a Century’. She noted that a key element of the concept is the role played by the CPC in forming historical judgments about world events\, which it views through its own lens. The CPC argues that the current period of time should be called a ‘New Era’\, where big changes are happening that are leading China to a ‘New Historic Starting Point’. \nThis latter idea sees China at a crossroads\, where export-driven consumption patterns are changing rapidly\, driven in part by falling economic momentum globally. At the same time\, China believes that the world is undergoing a historic power transition from the global West to the global East in tandem with the Fourth Industrial Revolution. Domestically\, this leads to an internal transition whereby the development of a science and technology base in line with ‘higher aspirations of the Chinese people’ is proceeding hand-in-hand with an orientation away from the export-led economic model. \nIn this scenario\, if China can exploit the opportunity accordingly\, the CPC holds that China can become a ‘modern socialist power’ leading the ‘next science and technology revolution’. For this\, the CPC needs to take certain major strategic decisions in the coming years\, which primarily involve encouraging innovation within society so as to provide strategic support to its comprehensive national power. The deadline for these objectives is 2049\, when the CPC reaches its centenary and the ‘China Dream’ is slated to be achieved. The end goal is the completion of the ‘Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation’\, which China after 2049 will notionally have achieved. If this project fails\, however\, Chinese thinkers see their country as falling victim to strategic passivity. \nDescribing the characteristics of the Great Changes\, Dr. Prathibha highlighted that the CPC\, as the entity in control of the ship of the state\, believes that it has a unique mission to seize the historical initiative and exercise strategic judgment in order to steer China through the uncertainty currently prevailing in the world order. At the same\, it is burdened with the responsibility of thinking about the bottom line\, that is\, to prepare for every eventuality\, welcome or unwelcome. She posited that China under Xi Jinping believes that wisdom itself is not enough\, and taking appropriate actions at the appropriate time is equally important. As such\, ‘Chinese-style modernisation’ and other revolutionary changes need to be taken if China is to avoid a second Century of Humiliation\, which it believes the West desires. \nAssessing these concepts in the final portion of her presentation\, the Speaker highlighted the fact that China’s actions have already invited a response and challenge from the global West\, which has resisted Chinese calls for more multipolarity in the global system. In the face of this resistance\, China has begun stressing on the need to reform global governance\, a message through which it seeks to appeal to the Global South. \nHowever\, she expressed scepticism about these moves\, which she proposed reflected an instrumental support for multipolarity as opposed to an earnest seeking of multipolarity. She contended that China at present is merely following global trends out of a desire to win supporters in its domestic quest for glory. She also contended that China at present was determined to partially reject the prevailing Western model\, especially as it impinged upon domestic affairs and internal economic governance. \nComments by External Discussants\nAmb. Chinoy called on Professor Rajesh Rajagopalan to deliver his Remarks on the paper. Prof. Rajagopalan in his review deliberated on some structural aspects of the paper and delivered a critique. He focused on the framing of certain subjects as well as the degree of accessibility for non-specialist readers. \nProf. Rajagopalan queried whether the CPC’s analysis of historical trends could be considered reliable\, as these could well be used as justification for its continued control of Chinese politics. He commented on the ‘pedestrian’ nature of the CPC’s analysis of the so-called ‘Great Changes’\, as it contains nothing ground-breaking or innovative at all. He argued that in fact\, the CPC’s reading of history may be to blame for the strategic ineptitude by which the administration of Xi Jinping has alienated broad swathes of the world. As such\, he doubted whether the reading of history espoused by Xi could significantly alter the world order in his favour. \nAnother salient point raised by Prof. Rajagopalan concerned the Speaker’s analysis of China’s emphasis on unleashing innovation through party fiat. Noting that while scientific innovation has always emerged out of a conducive environment provided by the State\, it is difficult to state that such innovation can be commanded from the top-down. As such\, while scientific progress has societal value as hypothesised by the CPC\, such value can also be used to maintain political control by the Party\, especially if it emerges out of a command economy. \nAmb. Chinoy\, praising Prof. Rajagopalan’s astute observations\, called on Professor T.G. Suresh to deliver his remarks. Prof. Suresh complimented the paper for being substantive and comprehensive\, before sharing his critique of the paper. He first discussed the necessity of characterising the Chinese Government and governance as seen in modern times. He proposed that externally-applied labels such as ‘post-socialist’ or ‘neo-Marxist’ were no longer relevant to describe China’s current rulers. \nSecondly\, he expressed his opinion that the concept of contention between China and the West may not be tenable. He cited the degree of comfort Chinese academics and officials display in talking and working with Western counterparts as proof of this. \nThirdly\, he questioned the basis of the CPC’s judgment on the factors that triggered China’s Century of Humiliation. He contended that unlike the isolationism cited by the Party as the primary cause of the decline of the Qing Empire in the mid-nineteenth century\, contact with the West\, particularly Imperialist Britain through the Opium Wars (1839-1842; 1856-1860)\, may have been the decisive factor for China’s decline. He suggested that the Party may be cherry-picking history to suit present circumstances. \nFinally\, he repeated Prof. Rajagopalan’s contention that a top-down command economy based on a ‘highly totalitarian state and culture’ may not be best placed to encourage the kind of innovation necessary to achieve dramatic advances in science and technology. He stated that China lacks the knowledge-based societal base that is necessary to produce the kind of innovation necessary to successfully navigate the Fourth Industrial Revolution. He also pointed out China currently does not possess the ‘vocabulary of hegemony’ that was a hallmark of both European and American narratives in the past. Thus\, Prof. Suresh contended that the emphasis on science and technology and innovation may be read as a way for the Party to secure a new ‘social contract’ that can justify the continued legitimacy of its rule. \nAmb. Chinoy thanked both External Discussants for their insightful comments and offered his own thoughts on the paper. Noting that China’s heavy reliance on science and technology could be traced back to the 1950s\, he recounted instances where India too played a prominent role as a supplier of advance scientific know-how to the Chinese. He informed the audience that the Sino-Soviet split of the late 1960s could partially be attributed to the Soviet Union’s denial of technology in the wake of Joseph Stalin’s demise in 1953\, which resulted in China and the US coming closer together. Terming current US policies towards China as an echo of the Soviet denial regime\, he noted that there is a continuum in Chinese worldviews. \nOffering his thoughts on various sections of Dr. Prathibha’s paper\, Amb. Chinoy pointed out the importance of distinguishing between decisions made by Xi himself and those made by the Party as an organisation in order to fix ‘responsibility’ for decisions. Addressing the point made by the two External Discussants on the relationship between political regimes and technology development\, Amb. Chinoy stated that technology\, not being as fungible as trade\, intrinsically admitted of a greater role for the sovereign to intervene. He pointed out the experience of several Western powers such as Britain\, France and Germany as illustrative in this regard. \nOn China’s interest in the world order\, he conveyed his impression that China is not interested in ‘reforming’ the current world order\, but to be at the head of it\, while creating parallel structures. He offered the examples of the New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) as analogues of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). \nFinally\, he stated that the extent of Western sanctions on China is a moot question\, as it is clear that the global West will generally follow the lead of the US despite the European Union’s purported claims of being separate from Washington. He then invited the Internal Discussants to deliver their comments on the paper. \nComments by Internal Discussants\nDr. Abhishek Darbey urged the Speaker to consider the Four Global Initiatives launched by Xi as linked to the Great Changes and its end-goal\, the Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation. He also invited the Speaker to consider the clarification of the Great Changes as offered by Yuen Fung\, a commentator with a military background\, who has referred to the concept as ‘a strong political expression of the Chinese people to achieve the Chinese Dream’. \nDr. Saurabh Mishra\, praised the innovative perspective taken by the Speaker’s paper\, but offered technical critique on certain aspects\, such as the use of certain terms in the title as well as the focus placed on statements made by the CPC hierarchy rather than China’s real-world behaviour. \nAmb. Chinoy also offered further thoughts on the Speaker’s paper. He highlighted that the Great Changes concept actually refers to two centuries. The first is the Century of Humiliation from the mid-nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century\, when China was the victim of predatory Western powers. The Party saw itself in this scheme as the political expression of Mao’s phrase\, ‘The Chinese people have stood up’. The end of the Maoist period with Deng Xiaoping’s Reform and Opening Up era from the late 1970s to 2008 would thus conclude\, according to the Party\, with the Century of Unprecedented Changes where China would become a strong socialist power on the world stage. \nAmb. Chinoy also commented on the similarities between Chinese thinking on interstate relations and the US’ thinking\, especially under President Trump. He noted that both China and the US seem now to be running mirror versions of each other’s foreign policy\, where both instinctively do not seek multipolarity in their relations\, preferring to deal with a lone strongman or a small oligarchic elite instead. With these thoughts he invited the Speaker to respond to the Discussants’ Remarks. \nDr. Prathibha responded to some of the comments offered. Firstly\, she answered Prof. Suresh’s statement regarding the CPC’s analysis of the failure of the Qing Empire vis-à-vis imperialist Western powers. She stated that the Party’s interpretation held China’s premodern rulers\, the Qing Empire\, responsible for the Century of Humiliation (instead of the West) because they believe that the Qing failed to adequately create economies of scale despite having a technological edge over Western countries\, instead choosing to retain that technological know-how with the elites. She conveyed that the Party’s understanding of its historical background revolves firmly around the premise that the need for the state to achieve military superiority drives its accommodation of and encouragement to industrial innovation and growth\, not property or common law as theorised by Western academics. \nNext\, the Speaker replied to the ‘social contract’ lens offered by Prof. Suresh. She averred that the Party actually has very little room for serious policy mistakes as these could negatively impact regime legitimacy\, so they are very conscious of ensuring that the correct narrative and policy is followed consistently. The Great Changes concept can also be seen in this light as an attempt to rhetorically justify the continuance of CPC control over China’s governmental machinery. \nQ&A\nAmb. Chinoy invited comments and questions from the floor. Dr. Prashant Kumar Singh\, Research Fellow\, offered an observation that China cannot be considered to be anti-hegemony\, only anti-Western hegemony. It is interested in propounding and propagating a ‘moral realist’ hegemony that it believes would be superior to the West. It has a strong tendency to see the world in its own view. \nThe Speaker added to this observation by noting that China believes the current world order to be rooted in Western ideas that create simplistic binaries between which conflict is unavoidable. As such\, the West is interested in maintaining the current world order in so far as it can help avoid the Thucydides Trap. China’s challenge to this world order draws on its rejection of global governance models based on such paradigms\, instead focusing on state capacity-based approaches as favoured by noted Western academics such as Samuel Huntington. \nProfessor Vijaylakshmi joined the meeting online to offer some comments on the Speaker’s paper as well. She cited the importance of analysing China’s internal debates in context\, and mentioned an internal report prepared by certain CPC-affiliated bodies working on historical issues which explicitly states that ‘liberal democracy is not the pinnacle of human evolution’\, thus drawing a clear demarcation line between the Western penchant for equating Westernisation with modernisation. \nFurther\, she proposed that area studies scholars studying China ought to focus on the formation of a knowledge-producing apparatus within the CPC as a promising field of study. She pointed out that Xi may be surrounded by a group of scholars and strategic thinkers to assist him in the formulation of concepts such as the Great Changes\, so studying these persons’ thought processes may be a fruitful way to develop Indian expertise on China’s strategic culture further. In conclusion\, she noted that the delineation of China’s behaviour alone would not suffice. An understanding of China’s\, and the CPC’s\, ideological underpinnings is necessary too. \nThe Seminar concluded with Amb. Chinoy thanking all present for their participation. \nThe Report was prepared by Dr. Arnab Dasgupta\, Research Analyst\, East Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/fellow-seminar-by-dr-ms-prathibha-associate-fellow-mp-idsa
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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SUMMARY:Fellow Seminar by Gp. Capt. (Dr.) R.K. Narang (Retd.)\, Senior Fellow\, MP-IDSA
DESCRIPTION:Gp. Capt. (Dr.) R.K. Narang (Retd.)\, Senior Fellow\, MP-IDSA\, made a presentation for his Fellow Seminar on “Atmanirbharta in Naval Fighter Aircraft” on 24 October 2025. The Seminar was chaired by Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General\, MP-IDSA. It was attended by serving and retired naval officers\, scientists\, and scholars of MP-IDSA. The External Discussants were Vice Admiral Shekhar Sinha (Retd.)\, Member\, Governing Council\, Indian Council for World Affairs\, Professor Hari Babu Srivastava\, former DG DRDO\, currently Professor of Practice at IIT Delhi & Distinguished Fellow at Vivekananda International Foundation\, and Cmde. Jaideep Maolankar (Retd.)\, Executive Vice President for Technology Development (Aerospace & Defence)\, Newspace Research & Technologies Pvt. Ltd. \nExecutive Summary\nThe session evaluated India’s naval aviation trajectory and indigenous fighter development. Key concerns included inconsistent programme continuity and loss of hard-won technological expertise. Gp. Capt. Narang emphasised that NLCA Mk-I must be inducted in limited numbers for data generation and naval technology validation\, assessed Twin Engine Deck Based Fighter (TEDBF) as obsolete\, and recommended prioritising Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) for long-term capability. He cautioned that shutting Naval Light Combat Aircraft (NLCA) would erode institutional knowledge and that India must choose an “India variant” aligned with national requirements. The discussion underscored the need for continuity\, coordinated development and decisive high-level direction. \n  \nAmb. Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General\, MP-IDSA\nAmb. Sujan R. Chinoy opened the Session by framing the pressures on India’s military aviation to match global standards in both scale and capability\, noting that the pace of technological development and absorption ultimately depends on funding. He traced the Navy’s trajectory in carrier aviation: after committing to the naval LCA Mk-I in 2003\, the service took a step back in 2016\, leaving the aircraft at the stage of a technology demonstrator rather than advancing it toward induction. The Navy has also not committed to the LCA Mk-II or the developing AMCA\, while exploring options such as import of the Rafale Marine and the development of TEDBF. Amb. Chinoy emphasised that TEDBF and AMCA are interlinked\, as their designs and engine requirements cannot be treated separately\, and future progress will hinge on co-development of ~120 kN-class engines with France as well as indigenous development of Kaveri engine. Another point to consider regarding the LCA is that production capacity comprises 8×2 in Bengaluru; 8×1 in Pune\, totalling 24  aircraft per year\, which is constrained by dependence on US G-404/G-414 engines. Given the 30–50 year lifespan of fighter aircraft and India’s challenges in the development of Kaveri engine\, such long-term reliance on external suppliers remains a concern. \n  \nGp. Capt. (Dr.) R.K. Narang (Retd.)\, Senior Fellow\, MP-IDSA\nGp. Capt. Narang began by stating that his paper is built upon three hypotheses: First\, limited induction of Naval LCA Mk-1 (fighter) is essential for data generation\, development & validation of navy specific technologies\, and it will be useful for developing advanced indigenous naval fighters since there is a difference between naval and land based LCA performance. Second\, TEDBF has become obsolete. Third\, the Indian Navy joining AMCA will be better for meeting future threats and self-reliance. With these hypotheses as his organising frame\, Gp. Capt. Narang proceeded to set out the technical lineage\, programme milestones\, platform specifications and the programmatic choices that inform India’s carrier-borne aviation options. \nHe began with the LCA family and the NLCA programme. The LCA Mk-I is a single-engine aircraft with a weight of 13\,500 and up to 3 tons in payload capacity. Gp. Capt. Narang traced the programme chronology precisely as recorded in the transcript. The Indian Air Force issued its requirement in 1983; the Navy submitted requirements in 1985. In 1986 the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) was asked to conduct a feasibility study on NLCA; that study was carried out between 1989 and 1992\, and the resultant report was approved in 1985. The IAF recorded the type’s first flight in 2001; NLCA Mk-1 approval came in 2003; and the naval prototype’s first flight occurred in 2012\, a development Gp. Capt. Narang noted occurred within a relatively short eight-year to nine-year window from formal approval. He recorded the Navy’s withdrawal of consent from the naval LCA programme in 2016\, and yet underlined subsequent operational milestones: NLCA completed landings on INS Vikramaditya (2020) and on INS Vikrant (2023). He stated the sanctioned cost of LCA Mk-1 at INR1\,714 Cr and noted the comparative per-aircraft figure for a single Rafale as roughly INR 2\,000 Cr.+ to illustrate the fiscal implications of import. \nTurning to navalisation features\, Gp. Capt. Narang drew on Cmde Jaideep Maolankar’s assessments to set out what distinguishes NLCA Mk-I for carrier use. Leading Edge Vortex Control (LEVCON) enhances controllability at low speeds; an arrestor hook enables carrier recovery; landing gear has been strengthened to withstand high axle loads during deck landings; and components and Line Replaceable Units have been re-certified from IAF to naval specifications. He acknowledged the known challenges the programme encountered — delays\, technology denial\, structural complexity and component supply delays — but emphasised that indigenous innovation and pragmatic engineering at multiple stages mitigated many of these hurdles. He warned that closure of the NLCA programme would set industry capability back by decades because the scientists and engineers holding project knowledge would eventually retire\, compelling a return to the drawing board rather than building on accumulated experience. \nTo reinforce the operational dimension\, Gp. Capt. Narang screened a demonstration video of NLCA to anchor discussion in flight-test experience and the incremental accumulation of naval-aviation know-how. \nGp. Capt. Narang then introduced LCA Mk-II. LCA Mk-II is a single-engine aircraft of 17.5 tons Maximum All up Weight (AUW) and was developed to meet naval requirements by increasing payload and range. In practice\, the Indian Air Force found the Mk-II particularly useful because reduced drag and increased payload capacity made it effective for replacing Mirage-2000 class aircraft and for boosting squadron strength. Two naval prototypes (NP-3 and NP-4) were approved\, but the Navy redirected sanctioned funds toward the Twin-Engine Deck-Based Fighter (TEDBF). Gp. Capt. Narang recorded that\, notwithstanding earlier setbacks\, the LCA Mk-II project received approval for a prototype in 2023. \nTEDBF is a 4.5-generation twin-engine aircraft weighing around 26 tons. Its higher payload and extended range were conceived to meet carrier requirements and to counter regional threats. Proponents argued TEDBF would require less development time than AMCA. The initial requirement for TEDBF had been forecasted for three carriers; which was not approved. The Navy subsequently acquired the Rafale  through a global RFP for the  Multi Role Carrier Based Fighter (MRCBF). Gp. Capt. Narang stressed that the Navy withdrew consent for N-LCA and for naval LCA Mk-II in 2016 and that in 2017 it issued an RFI for 57 MRCBF\, reflecting a change in procurement preference away from the indigenous naval LCA path. \nOn AMCA\, Gp. Capt. Narang stated that AMCA is twin-engine\, 25-ton weight and incorporates a stealth airframe. He emphasised the Navy’s operational question about whether stealth modules can be reliably maintained in a saline environment\, and he noted that experience with other similar stealth platforms indicates viability\, though the issue remains operationally salient for naval adoption. He compared AMCA’s ambitions with contemporary foreign designs\, observing that China has inducted fifth generation such as the J-35 carrier based fighter and fielded the J-20  land variants\, and has demonstrated J-36 and J-50\, which he characterised as 5+ generation designs with potential to evolve further. Against this regional context\, Gp. Capt. Narang highlighted resource constraints — funding\, manpower and institutional capacity — that affect LCA Mk-II\, TEDBF and AMCA alike. \nOne of the bottlenecks in his account is institutional constraints due to limited design and test resources. ADA is responsible for designing LCA Mk-II\, TEDBF and AMCA; the programmes share test pilots\, production facilities\, certification agencies and supply chains. This commonality\, combined with a limited pool of skilled personnel for design and development\, creates competition for resources and contributes to significant schedule delays. \nGp. Capt. Narang characterised India’s indigenous Kaveri engine experience as ambiguous and mixed\, and he set out unit costs to illustrate procurement pressures: LCA Mk-II costs INR 643 Cr. per aircraft\, while the Rafale-M figure he cited is INR 2\,453 Cr. per aircraft. These numbers\, he argued\, directly condition choices when budgets are constrained and timelines are tight. \nGp. Capt. Narang summarised practitioner inputs to emphasise operational imperatives. He relayed the perspective  of Adm Arun Prakash (Retd.) that a carrier-borne Tejas flight or squadron could perform fleet air-defence duties while generating valuable operational data for follow-on indigenous designs\, tempered by concerns about HAL’s ability to ramp production. He also summarised counsel by Cmde. CD Balaji (Retd.) that maintaining a couple of NLCA squadrons would prudently preserve lessons learned from deck-based fighter development pending a successor design\, thereby avoiding loss of institutional memory. \nIn his concluding assessment\, Gp. Capt. Narang called for systemic reforms: an honest audit and analytical culture to diagnose delays and cancellations; stronger operator-developer feedback loops to generate mission data and validate naval technologies; explicit attention to saline-environment certification for sensitive modules; clearer ownership\, leadership in decision-making and accountability to prevent inaction; adoption of spiral development to permit incremental capability growth; and a higher decision body to ensure roadmaps\, reliable timelines and funding for course corrections. His specific prescription for the Navy aligned with his opening hypotheses: limited induction of LCA Mk-I to generate operational data; rejection of TEDBF as the principal path; and a concentrated effort to modify and operationalise AMCA for naval purposes. He closed by invoking Dr. Abdul Kalam’s words about the broader national imperative that India moves from being a low-cost assembly base to original research\, design and manufacture if true Atmanirbharta in defence is to be realised. \nCmde. Jaideep Maolankar (Retd.)\nCmde. Jaideep Maolankar began by warning that naval carrier aviation does not have a bright future on its current trajectory. Drawing from his experience in the LCA programme as Chief Test Pilot of the LCA Mk-1 (Navy) Fighter\, he said the project suffered deep neglect\, particularly in allocation of resources. The programme functioned on a shoestring budget and was structurally dependent on Air Force designs and resources. Even so\, he argued\, the central lesson is that a naval aircraft can be built indigenously\, since despite resource scarcity the programme delivered results. However\, he cautioned that this success has created a degree of technical arrogance that is unwarranted. \nCmde. Maolankar then outlined his first major point: the Navy’s understanding of aviation fundamentals needs a review . The organisation simultaneously inducts STOBAR carriers and dismisses their relevance\, asserting that naval aviation will benefit with induction of 65\,000-ton plus  carriers for using catapults and EMALS. According to him\, the belief that catapults are indispensable is a myth. There is a strong case for lighter carriers\, and it is better to have two smaller carriers that the Navy is willing to risk than one large carrier considered too precious to expose. In this sense\, he argued\, the Navy must return to basics in its thinking on aircraft and carrier requirements. \nCmde. Maolankar’s second concern was the handling of technology and human resource. “Technology is HR\,” he stated\, noting that lessons from NLCA Mk-I are being lost as those who worked on the programme depart\, due to absence of an indigenous program or retirement. These insights cannot be captured fully through documentation. For example\, during NLCA Mk-I development\, non-critical LRUs underwent recertification and shop testing while critical LRUs—in some instances—were not tested and were allowed to pass based on analysis and risk acceptance. Such judgement calls reflect expertise that cannot simply be recorded; they must be experienced and retained. \nCmde. Maolankar criticised the fact that while the Navy is proud of its ships\, it lacks an indigenous aircraft and has opted instead for Rafale\, which he observed that is likely to become as outdated as TEDBF. He recalled that certain design changes once deemed too risky for Navy LCA Mk-II were later accepted without objection for Rafale\, raising questions about whether such decisions were based on engineering logic or institutional decisions \nCmde. Maolankar also noted that India currently retains only one sanctions-proof technology gained from the United States—carrier suitability design and testing—acquired through paid training of U.S. personnel. However\, the experts who absorbed that knowledge are retiring\, putting even that singular capability at risk. \nShifting to structural concerns\, Cmde. Maolankar said the three pillars of carrier aviation—ship\, aircraft and weapons—should be designed concurrently\, whereas in India they are developed separately. According to him\, the ship should accommodate compromises so that the aircraft remains least compromised\, and weapons must be customised specifically for the aircraft. The lack of such integration is likely to face fundamental challenges. \nCmde. Maolankar pointed out that there is inadequate appreciation of nuances of naval aviation and highlighted inherent flaws in giving priority to land based aircraft at the expense of carrier aviation. Unless the Navy fielded a carrier-aircraft-weapon ecosystem that delivered demonstrable capability\, support would not materialise\, and naval aviation would continue to be undermined. He added that foreign aircraft are obsolete the moment they are inducted and carrier aviation has not attracted due attention\, which contradicts the broader logic of national air power. He noted that TEDBF appears in DRDO posters and Aero India displays yet has no sanction. \nDiscussing the prospect of merging TEDBF and AMCA\, he described the first lesson from Mk-I as the error of adapting a land-based aircraft for naval use\, necessitating Mk-II. The second lesson from the IAF Mk-I programme is that India lacks proper understanding of specifications; certification agencies enforce specifications rigidly instead of using them as guidelines. For AMCA\, the IAF prioritises precision bombing\, whereas the Navy needs anti-ship missiles\, which are heavier and longer. Whether these requirements will be integrated remains uncertain\, and the Navy may end up carrying weapons externally in non-stealth mode as with TEDBF. A merger is only viable\, if Navy takes the lead in developing navy specific fighter. \nHe reiterated the importance of comprehensive data generation\, noting that data from Mk-I should be leveraged for naval aircraft development\, which requires design intuition\, human judgement and data across varied scenarios. \nIn conclusion\, he asserted that both TEDBF and Rafale are likely to become obsolete\, and that AMCA risks obsolescence by the time it is ready. India must take timely decisions if naval aviation is to survive. \nAdm. Shekhar Sinha (Retd.)\nAdm. Shekhar Sinha began by stating that delays in decisions on aircraft carriers stem from the fact that such decisions are taken at much higher levels. He stressed that ships\, especially aircraft carriers\, must not be developed independently of the aircraft intended to operate from them. According to him\, the absence of concurrent development has directly led to problems of weight\, lift and wing fold in naval aircraft\, and the same applies to weapons integration\, which must also occur alongside aircraft development. \nReflecting on past practices\, Adm. Sinha recalled that in the case of the Harrier\, the engine was designed first and the airframe afterwards. Though considered the best approach at the time\, this contributed to the Harrier’s limitations. He contrasted this with the F-35\, whose configuration does not rely on a lift engine. While Harriers use maximum power during take-off and landing\, the F-35 uses maximum power during cruise. \nAdm. Sinha argued that adapting an Indian Air Force platform into a naval aircraft is a fundamentally flawed starting point. Naval fighters should not be derivative variants of Air Force platforms because their operational environments and mechanisms are different. As an example\, he referred to the MiG-29K\, which originated from the MiG-29B airframe and was not suited to naval demands\, resulting in failures during testing. He described this as a continuation of the “jugaad” mentality—forcing a platform into a role for which it was not designed. \nAt this point\, Amb. Chinoy briefly intervened to say that there are rare circumstances in which “jugaad” may be justified\, citing the case of the Mirage-2000 in Kargil\, but agreed that such logic cannot guide complex\, high-end systems. Returning to his point\, Adm. Sinha stressed that while the Navy can propose requirements based on threat perception\, delays occur because decisions pass through several forums and ultimately rest with higher authorities who may not be technical experts. Even so\, he expressed cautious optimism that good decisions will eventually be made. He noted India’s longstanding dependence on imported aircraft and emphasised the need for self-reliance . \nAdm\, Sinha added that future capability will depend on compatibility with emerging weapons. Electrically driven components may be explored\, but each must be certified to withstand landing-induced shocks on carriers. This reinforces the need for trials and data generation. He mentioned that the United States had earlier approached India and that France remains a friend\, suggesting that collaboration could lead to carriers tailored to national requirements. \nAdm. Sinha said that throughout India’s defence research and development history\, the air element has not been taken seriously enough. Import dependence has been persistent\, and only recently has some transfer of technology been insisted upon. Scientists will need to have a bigger role\, since pure science is an intrinsic part of aviation development and engineers alone are insufficient. \nOn the possible merger of TEDBF and AMCA\, he cautioned that there are technical complications. In his view\, ship\, aircraft and weapons development must run concurrently\, and the priority must be futuristic capability. Systems development must take into account shifts in the Indian Ocean Region. He described how Chinese systems are being tested in Pakistan and\, by extension\, against India. He pointed to China’s Beidou satellite network with more than 600 satellites over the Indian Ocean\, enabling tracking that no aircraft or ship can evade. Combined with ISR satellite launches and optical fibre linkage between China’s Western Theatre Command and Rawalpindi\, he argued that India now faces a single front dominated by China rather than a two-front problem. \nAdm. Sinha said that if India wants to reset aviation development without losing gains already made\, programmes must be continued rather than terminated midway. LCA\, he argued\, can preserve and advance carrier-aircraft know-how\, and even a small number of aircraft can serve as development demonstrators. He compared this logic to the Bofors case\, where rather than discarding available technology\, it should be used to support future developments. \nAdm. Sinha concluded by stating that aircraft carriers\, aircraft and weapons must be developed as a composite whole rather than separate efforts. \nContinuing the discussion\, Amb. Chinoy said that both Cmde. Maolankar and Adm. Sinha had highlighted an important point—that TEDBF and AMCA merger should take into consideration  specific naval requirements. Stealth requirements and naval weapon systems may not be compatible and integrating them could compromise stealth itself. If those compromises become unavoidable\, the merger would defeat its purpose. \nAdm. Sinha added that an aircraft carrier\, the fighter designed to operate from it and the weapon systems cannot be developed in isolation. To ensure unified development\, he proposed the establishment of an apex-level coordinating body—potentially a Defence Science and Technology Council—headed at the highest political level and including key national security stakeholders. Such a body would assign responsibility\, set timelines and ensure accountability. \nAmb. Chinoy cited private-sector participation in AMCA as an example of the structural gaps that require such oversight. He noted that the programme is focusing on engines but lacks clarity on scale of requirement and responsibility. He mentioned that the Prime Minister recently called for a fighter engine programme in mission mode. He also noted international trends\, remarking that the J-10 has been viewed favourably in countries such as Indonesia\, which appears to prefer it over Rafale based on perceptions of performance during Operation Sindoor. \nDr. Haribabu Shrivastava\nProf. Haribabu Shrivastava noted at the outset that India has witnessed more programme closures than inductions across the services\, and regardless of the explanations\, the outcome represents a failure for the country. He emphasised the need for a national-level debate on LCA\, TEDBF and AMCA\, with participation from all three services and senior authorities\, and stressed that the decision emerging from such a process should be binding on every stakeholder involved. \nProf. Shrivastava observed that one structural problem in India’s defence ecosystem is the “problem of plenty\,” in which organisations or individuals claim capabilities they cannot practically deliver. This\, he said\, consumes limited resources and time that the country cannot afford to lose. Constraints span funding\, manpower\, manufacturing capacity and available facilities. According to him\, progress will not come from data-sharing alone; there must be reflection on why advancement has stalled. He proposed a comparative study between the IAF and the Navy\, accompanied by an assessment of current assets\, future needs and collaborative avenues. \nWhile India often benchmarks itself against China\, Prof. Shrivastava stated that the financial and manpower bases are not comparable. He pointed out that DRDO employs approximately 7\,000 scientists and only a few thousand work on relevant technologies in the private sector\, illustrating the scale difference with the United States\, China and Russia. Until India reaches that level\, he said\, the country must manage its limitations strategically\, by accepting shortcomings in some areas while securing gains in others. \nProf. Shrivastava also addressed persistent concerns regarding the treatment of engineers as scientists. DRDO\, he explained\, includes its own research corps\, the extra-mural research corps and the DRDO–Industry–Academia Centres of Excellence (DIACoEs). Earlier\, a single proposal would be sequentially forwarded from one DRDO department to another until one eventually granted clearance\, creating prolonged ambiguity and delays within approval chain. However\, national research culture remains risk-averse. Most defence-related academic projects are concentrated in IITs\, where large numbers of schemes leave limited time for direct faculty oversight. M.Tech and PhD scholars develop technology during their studies\, but once they graduate\, the technology effectively disappears with them\, and supervising professors may not know the detailed technical work. The absence of mechanisms to integrate such scholars into defence organisations results in the loss of specialised manpower. He illustrated this with the example of scholars who developed a bulletproof jacket but\, lacking continuity in the system\, later took employment in a pipe manufacturing company. \nProf. Shrivastava concluded that a national debate is essential and that the final decision must be taken at a level that cannot be bypassed—by development agencies\, procurement agencies or any service. \nAmb. Chinoy expanded the discussion by noting that the issue is not limited to the large number of DRDO projects with IITs. As with MTech and PhD research\, when senior directors and professors retire or relocate\, the technologies they worked on move with them\, sometimes even abroad. There is no legacy system\, corporate databank or shared platform to retain and provide access to this accumulated knowledge\, and Amb. Chinoy stressed the need to address this gap\, even by superimposing decisions if voluntary agreement is not achieved. He recalled the Prime Minister’s call for such reforms before the next DRDO Foundation Day and expressed optimism. Adm. Shekhar Sinha differed with Prof. Haribabu’s earlier suggestion of a national debate\, arguing it would create a “too many cooks spoil the broth” scenario and amount to going back to basics. \nQ/A session\nThe Q&A began with a comment noting that the 1986 feasibility study lacked ship motion data and relevant publications\, relying solely on experience from INS Vikrant. Within the LCA programme\, the airframe had not been marinised apart from the engine—already in service on the F-18 Hornet—and faced issues such as delayed thrust recovery after touchdown\, wing loading\, rollers and angle of attack. The comment detailed the structural modifications required for marinisation: strengthening to withstand catapult forces\, increasing undercarriage and nosewheel weight to prevent slamming\, redesigning the cockpit to improve visibility and protect against humidity and salt ingress\, and removing magnesium alloy to reduce corrosion. Persistent procrastination was also highlighted and that outcomes depend on human decision-making rather than equipment alone\, with a call for the Navy to lead naval aviation design and create a dedicated cell for it. \nThe discussion then turned to whether the LCA Navy Mk-I has any meaningful operational role\, given its seventeen-minute endurance at thirty miles from the carrier. This was seen as potentially limiting for training and air defence. In response\, Cmde. Maolankar argued that the question hinges on defining the intended role of the N-LCA. He emphasised that during its final trials it exceeded expectations and therefore warranted continued evaluation to improve performance. He said the N-LCA could be used for data generation and training\, but if its primary purpose is data generation\, then holding it to full operational standards would be counterproductive. \nSupporting this view\, Gp. Capt. Narang said that what is needed now is test data generated in realistic conditions\, which can only be achieved if operational pilots—not test pilots—fly the aircraft. Requirements derived from operational scenarios\, rather than idealised environments\, are necessary for credible development. \nThe debate then moved to whether TEDBF and AMCA should be merged. One intervention argued that a naval fighter must be designed as such from the outset\, as modifying a land-based aircraft later results in long delays and obsolescence. If a merger must happen\, the suggestion was that it should produce an “AMCA Navy” variant\, noting that a carrier-borne aircraft can operate from land\, but a land-based aircraft cannot operate from a carrier. Responding to this\, Gp. Capt. Narang clarified that if a merger produces a naval AMCA that meets national requirements\, he would support it. He noted that the LCA Mk-II programme had benefited the Air Force\, demonstrating that cross-service adaptation is possible\, and that AMCA can also be adapted if required. Whatever platform India chooses now\, he stressed\, will serve the fleet for the next three to four decades\, making the decision strategically decisive. \nA question followed on whether march-in rights through bodies like the Anusandhan National Research Foundation could prevent technology loss. Prof. Shrivastava noted that\, while such rights exist and documentation is thorough\, the “art” of engineering judgment—held by the individuals who worked on the technology—is lost when they leave. While PhD papers and theses are available digitally under the “one nation\, one subscription” framework\, documentation alone cannot reproduce an aircraft. \nAnother participant argued that India is still “landlocked in thinking\,” despite the fact that aircraft are the longest-reach weapon available to a fleet. With a limited number of aircraft and rising threat levels\, platforms must be omni-role and uncompromised. While Rafale and TEDBF are described as outdated\, their avionics are comparable to AMCA except for stealth\, which is less relevant for naval strike roles\, where payload capacity matters more. India\, must be prepared for current contingencies rather than hypothetical future ones. \nTo this\, Gp. Capt. Narang agreed that India must seek the best capability available within its limited manpower\, resources and development capacity. He stated that India does not need a “land” or “naval” variant but an “India variant”—a platform designed to meet national rather than organisational demands\, even if it requires designing from scratch. At the same time\, he warned that China has already deployed the J-35 from carriers\, and India must consider whether TEDBF can credibly compete with aircraft such as the J-35 or J-20. He added that developing technology follows a different trajectory from buying technology\, and historically India has purchased the best available systems rather than developed them. He stressed that India must not fall behind technologically. \nIn closing\, Gp. Capt. Narang said that the art and science of naval fighter development must not be allowed to disappear\, or the larger vision of Viksit Bharat will suffer. Decisions must be taken in national interest\, and now is the appropriate moment for a unified approach. He warned that the naval fighter programme must not face a “Marut moment” due to indecision. On TEDBF\, Rafale and AMCA\, he said that India must field capability that can counter the J-35 and take the most optimal step for the next two decades. He emphasised the importance of giving indigenous aircraft the same leeway that foreign platforms receive\, cited past rotorcraft programmes to show how maturity results from accumulated experience\, and reiterated that technology loss through delays and indecision must be prevented through higher-level intervention. He added that aircraft and carrier design must proceed concurrently and echoed the earlier call for a higher-level scientific decision-making body for the national interest. \nThe Report has been prepared by Ms. Meghna Pradhan\, Research Analyst\, North America and Strategic Technologies Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/fellow-seminar-by-gp-capt-dr-r-k-narang-retd-senior-fellow-mp-idsa
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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