BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//MP-IDSA - ECPv6.15.12.2//NONSGML v1.0//EN CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH X-WR-CALNAME:MP-IDSA X-ORIGINAL-URL:https://idsa.in X-WR-CALDESC:Events for MP-IDSA REFRESH-INTERVAL;VALUE=DURATION:PT1H X-Robots-Tag:noindex X-PUBLISHED-TTL:PT1H BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:Asia/Kolkata BEGIN:STANDARD TZOFFSETFROM:+0530 TZOFFSETTO:+0530 TZNAME:IST DTSTART:20130101T000000 END:STANDARD END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140523T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140523T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T200606 CREATED:20231224T102415Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T003431Z UID:64046-1400823000-1400823000@idsa.in SUMMARY:Rebooting Democracy: An Analysis of Nepal’s Second CA Elections DESCRIPTION:Media person accredited with foreign media and foreign diplomats may seek prior permission from DDG\, IDSA @ telephone no. 26146832.\n\n\n\n\n1030 to 1300 hrs URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/rebooting-democracy-an-analysis-of-nepals-second-ca-elections CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140523T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140523T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T200606 CREATED:20231224T102415Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130238Z UID:64047-1400823000-1400823000@idsa.in SUMMARY:Rebooting Democracy: An Analysis of Nepal’s Second CA Elections DESCRIPTION: URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/rebooting-democracy-an-analysis-of-nepals-second-ca-elections-2 CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140523T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140523T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T200606 CREATED:20231224T102415Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130238Z UID:64048-1400823000-1400823000@idsa.in SUMMARY:Nanotechnology: Current Global Trends and Future Military Applications for “Soldier as a System” DESCRIPTION:Chair: Dr W SelvamurthyExternal Discussants: Rear Admiral (Retd) S Kulshrestha and Col Deepak KohliInternal Discussants: Col Vivek Chadha (Retd) and Dr Cherian Samuel URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/nanotechnology-current-global-trends-and-future-military-applications-for-soldier-as-a-system CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140530T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140530T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T200606 CREATED:20231224T102414Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T002834Z UID:64045-1401427800-1401427800@idsa.in SUMMARY:Sectarianism\, Arab Spring and Saudi Foreign Policy DESCRIPTION:Participation in the Fellow Seminars is by invitation only.\nMedia person accredited with foreign media and foreign diplomats may seek prior permission from DDG\, IDSA @ telephone no. 26146832.\n\n\n\n\n1030 to 1300 hrs URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/sectarianism-arab-spring-and-saudi-foreign-policy CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140606T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140606T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T200606 CREATED:20231224T102414Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T002523Z UID:64044-1402032600-1402032600@idsa.in SUMMARY:Changing Geopolitics of Gas: Implications for India DESCRIPTION:Participation in the Fellow Seminars is by invitation only.\nMedia person accredited with foreign media and foreign diplomats may seek prior permission from DDG\, IDSA @ telephone no. 26146832.\n\n\n\n\n1030 to 1300 hrs URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/changing-geopolitics-of-gas-implications-for-india CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140613T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140613T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T200606 CREATED:20231224T102315Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T002354Z UID:64043-1402637400-1402637400@idsa.in SUMMARY:Peacekeeping and Peace-building: Indian Engagements DESCRIPTION:Participation in the Fellow Seminars is by invitation only.\nMedia person accredited with foreign media and foreign diplomats may seek prior permission from DDG\, IDSA @ telephone no. 26146832.\n\n\n\n\n1030 to 1300 hrs URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/peacekeeping-and-peace-building-indian-engagements CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140620T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140620T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T200606 CREATED:20231224T102314Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T002212Z UID:64041-1403242200-1403242200@idsa.in SUMMARY:BCIM and India-China Sub-Regional Interaction: Will Economic Interdependence prevail over Security Syndrome? DESCRIPTION:Participation in the Fellow Seminars is by invitation only.\nMedia person accredited with foreign media and foreign diplomats may seek prior permission from DDG\, IDSA @ telephone no. 26146832.\n\n\n\n\n1030 to 1300 hrs URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/bcim-and-india-china-sub-regional-interaction-will-economic-interdependence-prevail-over-security-syndrome CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140620T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140620T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T200606 CREATED:20231224T102315Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T002303Z UID:64042-1403242200-1403242200@idsa.in SUMMARY:Significance of Border Trade in India's Border Management DESCRIPTION:Participation in the Fellow Seminars is by invitation only.\nMedia person accredited with foreign media and foreign diplomats may seek prior permission from DDG\, IDSA @ telephone no. 26146832.\n\n\n\n\n1030 to 1300 hrs URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/significance-of-border-trade-in-indias-border-management CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140627T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140627T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T200606 CREATED:20231223T133307Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130238Z UID:63090-1403847000-1403847000@idsa.in SUMMARY:US Congress and the Iran Nuclear Issue DESCRIPTION:Chair: Amb. K.C. SinghDiscussants: Prof. Chintamani Mahapatra\, Dr. G. Balachandran and Shebonti Ray Dadwal \nThe paper examined the role of the US Congress vis-à-vis the Iran nuclear issue during the time period of the Obama administration. The paper began with an overview of the Executive-Congressional measures targeting Iran during the Clinton and the Bush administrations. The author noted that there have been 10 statutes/public laws and 26 Executive Orders (EO) targeting Iran since 1979. \nA ‘State of Emergency’ was declared by Clinton in March 1995\, which has been renewed every year since\, most recently on March 12\, 2014. The Clinton administration passed the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) in 1996\, which became the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA) in 2006 when Libya was removed from its purview. The ILSA/ISA was a prime example of ‘secondary sanctions’ targeting companies from other countries for their involvement in Iran’s petro-chemical sector. \nDespite Clinton passing ILSA however\, it was the Obama administration which used ILSA/ISA provisions for the first time in September 2010 to sanctions a Swiss-based company. An important reason for US administrations not using such authorities was their reluctance to target energy companies belonging to allies like Japan and Europe. Prior to Obama\, no authorities existed that targeted crucial financial institutions like the Central Bank of Iran or to curtail Iran’s oil revenues. \nThe Obama administration’s initial policy approach towards Iran has been characterised as ‘engagement’ or ’persuasion’ given that it included the threat of further sanctions if Iran did not respond to its ‘overtures’. Critics instead termed it ‘free-pass engagement’ as according to them the Iranian response was not encouraging. While following the policy of ‘engagement’\, the Obama administration put its weight behind UNSC efforts to pressure Iran. Critics however termed the UNSC measures as being ‘too weak’. \nThere was broad bi-partisan support for Obama’s initial policy framework of ‘engagement’ in the US Congress. Pressure began to build up for a change in policy in the aftermath of the June 2009 electoral violence\, the disclosure on the Fordow enrichment facility in September 2009\, the failure of the October 2009 offer from the Vienna Group (US\, Russia\, France\, IAEA) and concerns generated by the quarterly reports of the IAEA DG to the Board of Governors detailing the increase in Iran’s enrichment material and infrastructure. \nThe paper then went on to give pertinent aspects relating to key sanctions legislations and EO’s passed by the Obama administration. These included the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions and Divestment Act (CISADA)\, signed into law by Obama on July 1\, 2010. US officials have credited CISADA for major energy traders stopping the sale of refined petroleum products to Iran. Section 1245 of the National Defence Authorisation Act 2012 (NDAA\, signed into law on December 31\, 2011) mandated sanctions on foreign central banks if they ‘engage in a financial transaction for the sale or purchase of petroleum or petroleum products to or from Iran’. Exemptions were to be provided if these countries ‘significantly reduced’ their crude oil purchases from Iran. 20 countries got such exemptions by June 2012. By November 2013\, when the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) was signed\, only six countries were importing Iranian oil. These were China\, India\, South Korea\, Japan\, Taiwan\, and Turkey. \nAmong the significant provisions of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act (ITRSHRA)\, which entered into force on February 6\, 2013\, was Section 504 expanding sanctions under Section 1245 of NDAA 2012. It led to the creation of ‘escrow’ accounts in countries importing Iranian oil and severely curtailed Iran’s foreign exchange earnings. The Iran Freedom and Counter-proliferation Act (IFCA) of 2012 targeted Iran’s shipping and ship building sectors as well apart from its energy sector. \nThe Obama administration passed 9 EO’s as well as used authorities present in Iran-related EO’s passed by previous administrations (numbering 17 from 1979 to 1997) as well as functional EO’s relating to terrorism (2001) and WMD proliferation (2005) to target Iran. More than 500 entities and individuals have been designated under the terms of these Executive-Congressional authorities. \nThe paper went on to note that the response to the JPOA has clearly been on partisan lines in the US Congress. The paper noted the pending Iran-related legislation as well as Obama administration’s response to these measures while continuing to bring new sanctions designations based on extant sanctions provisions. The paper closed by briefly pointing to the impact on India as a result of US sanctions\, including designations under the INA on three chemical companies and two individuals during 2004-2006 (which were subsequently not renewed)\, the pressure brought on US EXIM Bank by members of the US Congress in late 2008 to stop its provision of loan guarantees to Reliance which resulted in the company stopping the sale of refined petroleum products to Iran as well as the impact of legislations like Section 1245 of NDAA 2012 which led to India reducing its crude oil imports from Iran. \nDiscussants’ View\nProfessor Chintamani Mahapatra congratulated the author and appreciated the commendable effort made to distil various aspects relating to US Executive-Congressional actions on the Iran nuclear issue. He suggested that the content relating to pertinent legislations could be presented in a more reader-friendly manner. He advised the author to examine the linkages between the laws passed and the politics driving the process\, specifically the impact of lobby groups in shaping US Congressional actions as well as administration policies. Further\, the impact of the sanctions on the Iranians could be explored\, as well as the tensions between the US and its allies in the framing and passing of the laws\, some aspects of which were covered by the author. He pointed out that the US Congress was not a unitary actor\, and that a huge range of factors was at play in how it works\, including lobby groups\, various committees among other pertinent issues. \nDr. G. Balachandran suggested that a list of acronyms could be incorporated as well as a table indicating the significant sanctions provisions and their use to help improve readability. He also suggested that the author could explore issues such as the extent to which the threat of veto by Obama against new sanctions legislations in the post-JPOA period would be effective given that there has been near unanimity in the US Congress in passing strict legislations against Iran\, as has been delineated by the author. Further issues that could be explored were the possible policy options for the US and EU if diplomacy failed and possible contours of an agreement between Iran and the P5+1. \nShebonti Dadwal suggested that more analytical heft could be added to the paper on aspects relating to the efficacy of sanctions\, the possible linkages between issues like US shale gas revolution and Iran-related Congressional actions\, the impact on Iran was well as domestic Iranian reactions to US sanctions measures and whether and how the sanctions have varied across administrations. \nThe Chair urged the author to situate the paper in the broader regional context\, critically look at the debate and divergence if any between the legislative and executive arms of the US government as well as the dynamics between the Republicans and the Democrats affecting Congressional actions. Discussions from the floor related to the impact of regional dynamics like the advance of the ISIS in Iraq and its effect on the Iran nuclear negotiations\, the linkages between the US sanctions and their impact on the trans-Atlantic alliance\, and the role of lobby groups in shaping US Congressional actions as well as US foreign policy as it pertained to the region. \nReport prepared by Aniruddh Mohan\, Research Intern\, Nuclear and Arms Control Centre\, IDSA URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/us-congress-and-the-iran-nuclear-issue CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140704T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140704T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T200606 CREATED:20231223T133306Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130238Z UID:63088-1404451800-1404451800@idsa.in SUMMARY:The Indian Navy’s Growing Maritime Reach: An Unfinished Agenda DESCRIPTION:Chair: Vice Admiral (Retd) Anup SinghExternal Discussant: Cmde (Retd) Rajeev Sawhney and Cdr Gurpreet KhuranaInternal Discussant: Cmde Ajay Chhabra \nThe paper argues that as the pre-eminent maritime force in the Indian Ocean Region\, the Indian Navy has\, in recent years\, witnessed a sharp rise in its contribution to regional maritime security efforts. But beyond the enlargement of its traditional security role\, the navy is also experiencing a relative expansion in its benign and diplomatic functions\, wherein it is the favoured instrument of policy in exerting influence in India’s maritime neighbourhood and facilitating humanitarian and disaster relief operations. Acutely aware of the need to contend with dynamics beyond coastal and near-regional defence\, the Indian Navy has been upgrading its force structure and operations philosophy. The paper seeks to answer the question – in its quest to shape its maritime periphery does the Indian navy need to do more to project power and influence far beyond India’s shores? \nThe paper concludes by saying that the Indian Navy’s maritime reach and operations mind-set has evolved considerably over the past two decades. However\, while its security role in its near regions has grown substantially\, its power-projection capability still remains underdeveloped. The author further argues that the Indian Navy must play a leading role in forging a new maritime order where it is a consequential force for regional stability and public good. There is a need for the Indian Navy to reappraise its forward-operations strategy to include elements of hard-power projection. For this\, it must bring significant improvements in its logistics capabilities\, C4ISR\, air-defence and land-attack (precision strike) functions. Substantive capacity must be complemented by operational ingenuity and doctrinal innovative to create a sustainable distance-operations capability. A key task will be to improve interoperability with other maritime forces\, effective communications and a model of coordinated forward-operations. Moreover\, in expanding its strategic footprint\, logistics supply arrangements and repair and resupply facilities would be of critical importance. \nMajor Points of Discussion and Suggestions to the Author:\n\nWhile benign role is an important aspect of multiple roles that the Indian navy is supposed to play; it must not lost sight of the fact that it is primarily a war fighting machine and hence must keep itself combat ready. Moreover\, since benign missions have become cover up for acquiring offensive weapons and platforms\, India should also keep a tab on such developments.\nIndia’s reluctance to be seen as an expeditionary power is reflected in its effort to couch offshore operations in terms such as OOAC\, HADR\, etc. \nIndia’s expeditionary moves have emanated mostly from Navy\, though the standing committee on defence also recommends and support it.\nIt was opined by many that there is huge pressure on the Indian navy to increase its outreach. However\, the Navy must strike a balance between the growing aspirations and demand on it and the resources it has on disposal. Admittedly\, we have interests elsewhere also in the sea apart from the Indian Ocean\, viz in the South China Sea; but the moot point is that can we afford to support our operations and sustain it with the limited resources we have. It was argued that when we talk about expanding reach\, the sustainability factor must not be lost sight of.\nIt was brought out that special operations could be important component of our power projection strategy.\nIt was highlighted that Indian Navy’s primary role is the support of foreign policy objectives. Naval plans and strategies must adhere to these objectives. It should be in sync with India’s economic diplomacy.\nIt was argued that our forward-operations strategy will get a boost by signing more LSAs. LSA has commercial component and it helps the host nation’s economy. Therefore\, compared to FOBs\, LSAs are more feasible and desirable.\nIt was pointed out that India must keep a tab on Chinese navy which is replicating US strategy of having a strong navy to become a world power. The recent focus of china on maritime security is quite evident.\nIndia must strike a balance between threat and capability approach in strategy making. The capability approach is politically more correct since it refrains from talking about enemy. However\, real threats can’t be ignored and in this regard India must take into account Chinese game plans.\nTo aspire for great power status without developing matching capabilities to fulfil the obligations that come along this status would fail us. India’ reluctance to engage in expeditionary activities or in security architectures can be partly explained thus.\nIt was argued that currently the priority of foreign policy of India is to maximise economic gains to internally stabilise and power-projection therefore\, has been put on the backburner. \nOne reason for India’s reluctance to look beyond its borders is its troubled neighbourhood. Leadership role has to begin with neighbours and it was pointed out by discussants that India’s neighbours are not conducive to India playing an important role at the regional and global level. India is accused of nursing big brotherly attitude towards its neighbours. The China factor is also very important in India’s foreign policy and its quest for leadership role. China is both a determinant and constraint on India’s foreign policy.\nIt was brought up during the discussion that India has to play an important role in the IOR as abdicating its responsibility will allow China to take control of the situation to the detriment of India.\nThe author was advised to analyse some of the overseas deployments of Indian Navy and asses the efficacy of those. Have they demonstrated reach per se of the Indian navy?\nThe paper should also analyse the US sea base model and then explain why it is neither feasible nor desirable in Indian case.\nThe paper would enrich if it also includes the Coast Guard in the scope of the study. Coast Guard can be tasked to specific jobs both in peacetime and during the wartime.\nArctic is importantly becoming a zone of importance and the Indian Navy must explore its options there. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-indian-navys-growing-maritime-reach-an-unfinished-agenda CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140905T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140905T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T200606 CREATED:20231223T133306Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130238Z UID:63087-1409895000-1409895000@idsa.in SUMMARY:West Africa’s Energy Potential: Opportunities and Challenges for India DESCRIPTION:Chair: Amb Niranjan Desai (Retd)External Discussants: Amb H H S Vishwanathan (Retd)\, Prof Girijesh Pant\, Amb V B Soni (Retd)Internal Discussants: Dr Shebonti Ray Dadwal\, Mr Nachiket Khadkiwala \nPresentation:\nAfrica is not a monolith and there are seven regional groupings in the continent. The West African region is home to Africa’s largest population and fastest growing economies with largest proven reserves of energy resources. The region also offers some of Africa’s best examples of peacebuilding and regional integration. The West African states have formed the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). According to Ms Beri\, amid the current debate on the geopolitics of energy\, the spotlight is shifting towards Africa as a source of oil. She\, in her paper\, attempts to assess the West African energy potential and describe the current Indian engagement regarding oil in the region. She also attempts to analyse the opportunities and challenges faced by India with regard to oil and energy cooperation in the region. Nigeria dominates in term of oil production in the West Africa as well as the whole of Africa. Equatorial Guinea\, Ivory Coast\, Gabon and Ghana are other oil producers in the region. Together they stand nowhere when compared to the amount of oil production only by Nigeria. \nIndia imports 75 per cent of its oil and its dependence on the resource is growing rapidly. Most of India’s crude import comes from West Asia through the Persian Gulf. So\, India is trying to follow a twin strategy of diversifying its sources of oil supply and acquiring overseas energy assets. Currently\, India imports around 20 per cent of its crude oil from Africa; and West Africa supplies almost half of it. Nigeria is the largest oil supplier for India from Africa. India’s interest regarding oil in Nigeria had begun in 2001 and now it has replaced the United States (US) as the top importer of the Nigerian oil. Although India has invested in several oil blocks in the region\, only one block in Nigeria is producing currently. India also faces competition from China and other countries. The shale gas revolution in the US has fundamentally changed the widely held assumptions about both the future of energy imports and the role of West African states in supplying them. The question now is not whether the US will depend on West African oil\, but whether it will import oil from West Africa at all. The decline in the US oil import from the region gives India a chance to increase its engagement with the region. The ECOWAS is also focused on improving energy access in the region. It has started the West African Power Pool (WAPP) and the West African Gas Pipeline programmes to increase electricity connections and natural gas transport in the region. It has also created the Regional Centre for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency (ECREEE) in Cape Verde. The Confederation of Indian Industries (CII) has undertaken several steps to increase energy and business engagements with Africa. It organises several regular business conclaves including the annual India-Africa Project Partnership Conclave. Recently\, CII also helped facilitate the participation of some 30 Indian companies in the 11th West African Mining and Power Exhibition (WAMPEX) in Accra\, Ghana to tap into Africa’s growing power and mining sectors. There is also a great potential of cooperation between India and Western Africa in the renewable energy sector. \nDespite all the potential for cooperation\, the engagement with Western Africa faces many problems. The West African countries are riddled with the ‘resource curse’. Nigeria is an example of the problem of plenty. The Indian experience in West Africa tells that it is not easy to do business in the region. It remains doubtful if it can really depend on Nigeria for oil supply. Terrorism and piracy in West Africa are also important issues to be kept in mind. Most of the Western African sources of oil lie offshore and are especially threatened by piracy. There are doubts if the problems in the region can be solved in the short term. However\, India should devise its policies keeping in the local sentiments in mind. It should also intensify its energy diplomacy in the region and look towards new energy producers like Niger and Ghana apart from Nigeria. It should be supportive towards the West African countries’ efforts for conflict resolution within the region. India should avoid delaying projects due to administrative reasons and should seek a partnership with the West African countries on the lines of the ECOWAS vision 2020 that promotes sustainable development. \n Major points of Discussion:\n\nAlthough it may be good in long-term\, just acquiring equity does not solve the energy security problem. \nAlthough the United States (US) may not need oil\, it will not lose interest in the region because it would need business for its companies.\nIndia has a coordination problem among its own agencies and companies. \nThe difficulties created by the generator lobby in West Africa.\nThere remains uncertainty about the prevailing rules and regulations.\nThere are definitional problems regarding piracy as it is happening in territorial waters too.\nThere is a problem of oil bunkering in West Africa.\nHow much weightage should India give to hydrocarbons in its Africa Policy?\nThere is a need of comparative studies regarding West African oil.\nCan India develop a proper supply-chain relationship with the West Africa?\nWill India do better if it goes with an ideological or ideational mission in Africa?\nIs there any possibility of India doing projects in collaboration with third countries in Western Africa?\nChinese sometimes put off Indian companies through tactical games.\nEnergy is not just hydrocarbons. India also needs to look towards the potential of biofuel in West Africa.\nThe oil demand in West Africa is also increasing. Probably there will be little or no oil available for export in future.\nThe issue of illicit financial growth due to the resource based economies in West Africa is also important.\nWill the investment by European countries in the region increase? If yes\, how will it affect India’s policies?\nThe biggest problem at the Indian side is about implementation and follow-up.\n\nReport prepared by Saurabh Mishra\, Research Assistant\, IDSA URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/west-africas-energy-potential-opportunities-and-challenges-for-india CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20141212T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20141212T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T200606 CREATED:20231223T133206Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130237Z UID:63082-1418362200-1418362200@idsa.in SUMMARY:Enhancing Energy Security in Rural Tanzania: Examples of Successful Community Engagement in Rural Electrification from South Asian Countries DESCRIPTION:Chair: Prof. Rajen HarsheExternal Discussants: Ms. Lidya Powell and Mr. Nitya NandaInternal Discussants: Ms. Ruchita Beri and Dr. Smruti S. Pattanaik \nPresentation:\nTanzania is one of the fastest growing economies in Africa and as a result of this the demand for electricity is increasing considerably. However\, the access to electricity and electricity penetration in Tanzania is significantly low\, especially in the rural areas where 90 per cent of the Tanzanian population resides. Biomass (mainly firewood and charcoal) is the dominant source of energy in Tanzania and a major source of domestic energy in rural areas as it is readily available and cheap. But the Government of Tanzania has recognized that the regular consumption of biomass causes substantial damage to the environment and health of its population. \nAs a result of this the government has considered using alternative sources of energy to generate electricity. The paper highlighted the Government of Tanzania’s new initiative the Scaling-up Renewable Energy Programme (SREP) Project which is working to promote clean energy for domestic uses. The government through the SREP wants to transform the country’s energy sector from one that is increasingly fossil-fuel dependent\, to one that uses a more balanced supply of diverse energy resources. This will allow Tanzania to move along a low-carbon development pathway\, increase energy security\, generate new economic opportunities and widen access to energy service. The SREP-Tanzania Investment Programme also constitutes the generation of low-cost and reliable geothermal power. However\, its most important feature is the scaling-up Renewable Energy for Rural Electrification (RERE) Project. RERE Project aims to build an efficient and responsive development infrastructure for renewable energy based on rural electrification that will supply power to 2 million off-grid rural customers. \nHowever\, there are certain obstacles i.e lack of enough resources to implement national energy policy\, low participation of private sector\, energy illiteracy resulting in underappreciation of the benefits of renewable energy and limited expertise in undertaking construction of the projects. But through the SREP Project the government hopes to overcome these economic and policy barriers to ensure the fruitful operation of the renewable energy projects. While Tanzania gets support from key players like the government\, private sector and international organizations like the World Bank\, the Tanzanian government fails to incorporate the local rural community as a part of the SREP Project. The paper argues that it is very crucial to ensure that these renewable energy projects factor in a community (decentralized) engagement approach to supplying energy to the rural areas. The government has to recognize the power and ability of the rural communities to come together and conceptualize localized solutions to their problem. \nIn this context\, the paper provided evidence-based recommendations to the Tanzanian government on the benefits of community participation (or decentralized) power generation in rural Tanzania. Examples of decentralized rural energy generation from India from India provide the structures through which local community can participate in energy generation: \n\nLocal communities independent initiative – hydro power generation project in Putsil located in the Koraput district of Orissa state.\nLocal communities collaborating with the government – biomass gasification in Hosahalli village in Karnataka.\nLocal communities’ collaborating with government and private sector – Mlinda solar electrification project in the Sundarbans in West Bengal.\nLocal communities’ collaborating with government and international donors – The Biomass Energy for Rural India (BERI) Project in Tumkur district in Karnataka.\n\nThe commonality of these four examples is that these projects are small scale\, inexpensive and vested in the communities’ best interest which makes them more sustainable in the long run. \nIn the light of these examples the author has made some recommendations: \n\nTanzania has a strong sense of national community which the government can exploit.\nA holistic approach to renewable energy generation is needed in Tanzania’s rural areas.\nGovernment has to make an effort to build the capacity of the rural population in order to keep the communities actively engaged in the projects.\nSocial marketing campaigns are important to create awareness amongst the rural population on the benefits of electricity in their lives and how they can participate in the local projects.\nCommunity engagement approach is crucial to the success of renewable energy generation projects in Tanzania and to exploit and efficiently utilize existing potential for renewable energy. \n\nMajor points of discussion:\n\nOne can look into the policy dilemma in India regarding whether one should find localized solutions to rural electrification problems or have rural electrification through the national grid. Does such a policy debate exist in Tanzania? \nGrid connectivity is in high demand by rural population in India. Therefore\, through these projects it will be beneficial to find out about the needs of the rural population in Tanzania and not make the mistake of predetermining their energy needs.\nIn rural India the local panchayats are important for implementing and supervising projects\, hence\, examples of local government bodies in rural Tanzania performing similar should be mentioned in the paper.\nDecentralized solutions can be idealistic when one lives is competitive globalized world\, this can put the country at a disadvantage at the global stage.\nLaw of science requires you to use energy to be competitive. Therefore\, one has to think whether decentralised solutions will be cost effective and allow Tanzania to compete at a global level.\nExamples of decentralized rural energy approaches from other African countries can also be considered for policy recommendation. \n\nReport prepared by Ms. Kuhoo Saxena\, Research Intern\, IDSA URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/enhancing-energy-security-in-rural-tanzania-examples-of-successful-community-engagement-in-rural-electrification-from-south-asian-countries CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20150102T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20150102T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T200606 CREATED:20231223T133147Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130237Z UID:63081-1420176600-1420176600@idsa.in SUMMARY:Dharma and Artha DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Prof. Charan Das WadhvaExternal Discussants: Amb. H. H. S. Viswanathan\, Dr. Deepshikha ShahiInternal Discussants: Dr. S. Kalyanaraman\, Saurabh Mishra \nMajor Arguments of the Paper: \nOne of the fundamental aims of political science in Indian traditions was to create the cultural conditions necessary for the pursuit of the four great ends of life\, the purusharthas – ethical goodness (dharma)\, wealth and power (artha)\, pleasure (kama)\, and spiritual transcendence (moksha). The final or fourth individual aim of moksha or liberation/spiritual transcendence is at a personal level of self-realization and is not being included in this paper. Without moksha the concept is of the three goals of human existence consisting of dharma\, artha and kama or trivarga. Each goal is a deep philosophical subject. In statecraft\, the most important ones are dharma and artha\, and it is on these that the author deliberates upon. \nThe paper argues that in ancient Indian traditions dharma and artha play an important role as they relate to statecraft. It has not changed with time. Simplistically\, this is akin to what we may today understand as principle and power. Only artha by itself is insufficient to understand the philosophy of statecraft of the Indian traditions. The author argues that for statecraft and international relations as practised in India\, dharma is an important limb. Kautilya\, the author cum editor of Arthasastra\, never suggested to be selective. He did not ever mention to ignore dharma. It is only later commentators who have given their understanding where the holistic interpretation of dharma with artha is underdeveloped; more so in the domain of statecraft and diplomacy. This paper engages with the concepts in the text and the commentaries and opinions of a number of authors who have dealt with this topic. The paper argues that both dharma and artha are integrated and linked. If artha is like surface water surely dharma is like ground water. Their meaning need to be contextualized in the present milieu and a combination of these two concepts should be judiciously applied in statecraft to herald lasting peace and prosperity. \nMajor Points of Discussion and Suggestions to the Author:\n\nDharma with a capital D signifies the overarching principles of life governing the universe\, whereas dharma with a small d is for specific circumstances. Indian scholars of politics have mostly deliberated upon the latter. Kautilya’s Arthasastra also falls into the second category.\nKautilya was secular in his outlook. His personal religious belief did not affect the conduct of statecraft. It was evident when Chandragupta\, his disciple\, leaned towards Jainism and Kautilya did not get perturbed by this or come in his way.\nThe general western perception of India is that of a land and people who are concerned with other-worldly affairs. However\, it is a fallacy as we know that in the Indian philosophical tradition all four aspects of life\, that is\, Dharma\, Artha\, Kama\, Moksha\, have been given adequate attention.\nKautilya is considered to be immoral and lacking in ethics because of its prescriptions for statecraft. However\, a proper understanding of the Arthasastra suggests that he was very mindful of ethics and morality even in the conduct of state affairs. For instance\, he gives precedence to Dharma Vijaya over Asura Vijaya. \nThe study of Arthasastra and other ancient Indian political texts have assumed significance in the backdrop of the possibility of India emerging as a world Power.\nExisting ‘Western’ IR theories are inadequate to explain India’s rise.\nKautilya’s Arthasastra is a more holistic work than Morgenthau’s Politics Among Nations. Kautilya was the first scholar to establish a link between domestic and foreign policy. He argued that although the policy options before the king for the conduct of the two are different\, there is a direct correlation between the domestic and foreign policies of a state. \nFor Kautilya dharma was limited to the end and did not apply to the means. The king must set his goals in consonance with dharma. Adoption of unethical means to achieve a pious end has not been ruled out. In this he differs from Gandhi who advocated the purity of means as well as end.\nIt was argued that Indian scholars should avoid the tendency of exalting Kautilya and denigrating Western scholarship. A synthesis of the best scholarly tradition of east and west will lead to the furtherance of true knowledge.\nThe author was advised to give current examples to argue his case as to how the Indian state has sought to practice dharma and artha in the conduct of statecraft. That will generate more interest in Arthasastra.\nSince the morality of individual may not be in sync with the state’s morality\, the author needs to deliberate upon different aspects of morality and resolve the dilemma. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/dharma-and-artha CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20150116T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20150116T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T200606 CREATED:20231223T133147Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T002046Z UID:63080-1421386200-1421386200@idsa.in SUMMARY:India-China Riparian Relations: Towards Rationality DESCRIPTION:Chair: Prof. Brahma ChellaneyExternal Discussants: Mr. Sanjay Gupta and Mr. Joydeep GuptaInternal Discussants: Ms. Shebonti Ray Dadwal and Dr. Jagannath Prasad Panda \nKey points of presentation:\nIndia and China have long been associated as rising powers in Asia. In order to boost their economy and growth rates\, they need uninterrupted sources of water supply. Water has emerged as a contentious issue between India and China with complex inter-linkages. The leadership in both the countries acknowledge the water problem as an existential threat. Given the fact that China has 14 land neighbours out of which 13 are riparian neighbours\, it is important to note that it has no water- sharing agreement with any of them. It is in this context the paper argues that it is the principle concern of India to bring water issues into the core of the bilateral discussions with China. The paper also identifies three major elements in India’s concerns over China being an upstream riparian : \n\nDams and diversions;\nThe resultant hydro-politics and power asymmetry; and\nThe impact of climate change\n\nThe paper further suggests\, as a counter approach \, strengthening of diplomatic tools for a structured dialogue that allows apprehensions of the lower riparian regions and states to be recognised and addressed. \nAs many of the regions in the world are lower riparian\, including India\, Dr. Sinha argued that a stable supply of water is critical to India’s growth and development. Since China is an upper riparian region when compared to India\, hence\, the “water rationali ty” or “water as a unifier” perspective becomes an important issue for discussion between the two countries for better riparian relations .\nDr. Sinha also outlined the “power asymmetry” that exists in river basins. Given the political equation between India and China\, the latter will use its upper riparian advantage to circumvent any decision made on India’s behalf. It is also important to consider the food\, energy and water nexus which is highly dependent on the rapidly changing ecosystem. This will prompt nations to take several actions\, many of them unilateral\, to secure resources and territorial sovereignty. It is thus essential that water resource utilisation policy takes into account the impact of climate change in terms of seasonal flow and extreme events. \nDr. Sinha also emphasised the middle riparian position of India and its dependence on the waters of the rivers such as Brahmaputra\, and Indus and Sutlej which originates from the Tibetan plateau (which is under Chinese territorial jurisdictions) and then flows into Bangladesh and Pakistan\, respectively. However\, unlike China\, India being an upper riparian state has had longstanding commitments to bilateral river treaties with the lower riparian states. \nThe paper concluded with the following recommendations: \n\n Any formal water cooperation can be achieved only through a holistic\, bold\, and imaginative diplomacy.\nWater issues should be structured on the principles of international water law\, particularly ‘limited sovereignty’\, ‘no significant harm’ and ‘information sharing’.\nIn addition to what has already been stated in the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed between India and China in 2002\, further accuracy and regular availability of credible hydrological data are vital to the effectiveness of any trans-boundary water arrangement.\nOne of the ways forward is to create a lower riparian coalition. This coalition is not to be militaristic in nature or seen as versus China. It should be about acknowledging and addressing the concerns of lower riparian nations . \n\nKey points from discussion:\n\nIndia needs to build its own understanding of water. The scientific knowledge on water management in India is minimal when compared to China. The Central Water Commission is not in a state to perform any kind of extensive research and development as there is no investment in this area. \nNeed to shift from supply-side to demand-side management. Most of the treaties are focused on supply side and not on demand side principles. Resultantly\, the agricultural productivity in India is lowest.\nCross linkage of issues should be built in order to bring China to the negotiation table. For example\, Tibet c ould be used as a leverage to negotiate water issues with China. Turning Tibet from a territorial/political issue to one of ecological/environmental concern can prompt China to discuss and cooperate on socio-economic and ecological issues.\nAre states and nations the best actor/agent to deal with a holistic issue like water? People’s participation is equally important and their ground knowledge and understanding can be of great value .\nChina is making long-term investments in the hydro- power sector in order to phase out thermal power plants by 2030 and meet their demands for clean energy. Apart from Brahmaputra\, China is also considering water projects on Indus and Sutlej rivers.\nIndia needs to move from bilateral to multilateral diplomacy with lower riparian nations in the region. Realistic approach should be adopted when it comes to formation of a lower riparian coalition. \n\nReport prepared by Mr. Satyam Malaviya\, Research Intern\, IDSA. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/india-china-riparian-relations-towards-rationality CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20150220T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20150220T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T200606 CREATED:20231223T133146Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130237Z UID:63079-1424410200-1424410200@idsa.in SUMMARY:Expanding Footprint of Bangladeshi Terror Network in India DESCRIPTION:Chair: General (Retd.) Y.M. BammiExternal Discussants: Mr. K. Srinivasan and Mr. Malladi Rama RaoInternal Discussant: Ms. Gulbin Sultana \nIndia has often accused Bangladesh of harbouring insurgents and exporting terrorism to India. However\, the October 02\, 2014 Burdwan blast has challenged this notion. The case has demonstrated that terrorist groups are operating from within Indian territory. Anand Kumar’s paper tries to understand how groups such as the Jama’atul Mujaheedin Bangladesh (JMB) have expanded their reach in the Indian state of West Bengal. The paper also attempts to gain a better understanding of their recruitment pattern. The paper highlights the broader issue of how prolonged neglect of the porous India-Bangladesh border and use of migrants for electoral gains has created a permissive environment for the Bangladeshi terrorist networks to operate in India. This has undermined both Indian and Bangladeshi security interests. \nIndia’s sustained pressure on the Bangladeshi Government and the latter’s willingness to stamp out terrorism under the leadership of Sheikh Hasina has made it increasingly difficult for terror groups to function in Bangladesh. Since 2005\, the Bangladeshi Government under Prime Minister Hasina has initiated a serious cracked down on terror and other radical Islamist groups in Bangladesh. The Bangladesh war crime trials were a result of this crackdown. Although this policy saw a subsequent decline in support of terror outfits in Bangladesh\, it also simultaneously pressured terror groups such as the JMB to expand their networks into India. The Indian state of West Bengal has since become a sanctuary for such terror groups. \nThe author argues that West Bengal in general is conducive for growing terrorist networks as it shares a porous border with Bangladesh\, and its metropolitan character not only makes it well-connected to other regions of India but also makes it difficult for government authorities to locate such terror outfits. The October 2014 Burdwan blast has shown that materials such as ammonium nitrate were sourced from Kolkata. The blast also demonstrated that whilst the JMB has been active in India for quite some time\, the Indian Government has not been able to take any effective action against its expanding network. \nAccording to the author\, a major reason for government inaction could be attributed to the role of the ruling party\, the Trinamool Congress (TMC)\, in the state of West Bengal. The TMC has made it easier for extremist forces to operate within the state. For example\, in the case of the accidental Burdwan blast\, upon discovery of the bombs\, the West Bengal police had exploded the bombs by a river side instead of seeking forensic evidence. The TMC Rajya Sabha member Ahmed Hassan Imran is also allegedly linked to the Jama’at. He was one of the founders of the Islamic Students’ Organisation and president of its West Bengal chapter. Imran is also known for inciting violence\, and attending anti-India and anti-Awami League seminars. Moreover\, in spite of charges of inciting communal violence in the district of Parganas\, Imran was made a Rajya Sabha member in February 2014. The TMC has also been extremely reluctant to hand over the Bardwan Blast investigation to the National Investigation Agency (NIA).The author argues that the primary reason for the TMC to allow such groups to flourish in West Bengal is due to electoral support the party receives from the migrant population originating from Bangladesh. \nThe Burdwan blast also indicated the existence of a regional and pan-India terror network. It has been found that there are 58 terror modules operating from West Bengal alone. The funding for such groups comes from across the border and more than a $1 billion worth of taxable goods have been smuggled into India. The terror networks also rely on smuggling fake Indian currency notes. More specifically\, the Saradha scam has revealed that money could be reaching extremist groups through New Delhi to Bangladesh. Whilst such avenues for funding have been known to exist\, it has been extremely difficult to trace the flow of funds to such terror networks. \nAnother interesting development is that the Jama’at has been increasingly targeting female recruits. In doing so\, the Jama’at also supports women’s rights to study\, work and vote. Its strategy is to deepen its terror network by marrying trained women to men who are already working for the terror group. Such couple modelling allows for better indoctrination and greater loyalty to the terror network. \nThe author concludes that whilst there has been seamless cooperation between the Indian and Bangladeshi governments on security issues\, such cooperation is lacking between the state and central levels of government within India. The Burdwan blast should act as a wakeup call for security agencies as well as the political establishment in India. It is clear that Jihadi terror networks are now deeply entrenched in the sub-continent and are looking for opportunities for revival. Unfortunately\, political forces at the state level seem to be allying with Jihadi forces for electoral benefits\, and this is impinging upon the security of the Indian state. The Indian policy on migration and terrorism also needs to be disentangled in order to approach the issue of terrorism in India in a more effective manner. \nSuggestions/Comments: \n\nThe paper must thoroughly explore the concept of ‘Greater Bangladesh’ and the notion of pan-Islamism and their ideological underpinnings\, which the author has outlined in his paper.\nThe China factor needs to be further explored.\nA 2004 survey indicates that there has been a 34 per cent increase in the number of madrassas in the border regions of West Bengal. Why is this necessary when public schools are available in these regions? The author can shed further light on the increase of madrassas.\nThe paper must also factor in the possibility of Sheikh Hasina’s exit. Need to explore how it could change the political and\, more importantly\, the security landscape with respect to terrorism.\nThe paper must examine the kind of support JMB is receiving from Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)\, and how Bangladeshi terror outfits are part of their larger game plan.\nThe author need to further substantiate the observations and arguments made in the paper. For example\, the alleged relationship between Jama’at and TMC\, and how it is weakening the secular forces within Bangladesh. Perhaps\, the section on the relationship between JMB and TMC need to be moderated. \nThe demographic factor may also be considered when discussing the recruitment pattern of the JMB.\n\nReport prepared by Ms. Charisma M.S Kundan\, Research Intern\, IDSA URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/expanding-footprint-of-bangladeshi-terror-network-in-india CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20150417T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20150417T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T200606 CREATED:20231223T133146Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130237Z UID:63077-1429248600-1429248600@idsa.in SUMMARY:China’s Military Reforms: People’s Liberation Army’s Adaptation to Joint Operations DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Lt. Gen. J.S. Bajwa (Retd.)External Discussants: Commander Lalit Kapur\, Gp. Capt. Ravinder Singh ChhatwalInternal Discussant: Col. Vivek Chadha (Retd.) \nChina embarked on its ‘four modernizations’ drive in the late 1970s. However\, it was only over the past two decades that China carried out a comprehensive military modernization program. China gave special impetus to joint operations and informationization. The paper argues that China’s ability to project combat power depended on coordination across all domains — air\, land\, sea\, space\, cyber\, and the electromagnetic spectrum. \nThis paper analyzed the Chinese military transformation with special reference to joint operations. Specifically\, it sought to answer questions relating to the Chinese concept of joint operations\, evolution of its strategy and thinking on joint operations\, initiatives it has undertaken and the degree of success in achieving its goals. \nThe paper concluded that China’s modernization drive has resulted in its growing military prowess\, co-terminus with its emergence as a global economic power. As part of their thinking on revolution in military affairs (RMA)\, the Chinese identified fighting ‘local war under the conditions of informationization’ as its strategy with focus on joint operations. This approach prompted China to undertake reforms to conduct integrated joint operations and to establish joint commands\, prioritize technology-intensive capabilities like space\, cyber space and the electro-magnetic spectrum. \nThe rapid pace of Chinese military modernization and increasing technological gap evident vis-à-vis India has serious consequences\, which needs to be prepared to tackle the emerging threat from China. The author noted that India needs to reduce the gap in technological and strategic capabilities. This would entail building strategic partnerships with neighboring countries and countries with common strategic interests and at the same time focusing on modernization of its armed forces including enhanced integration and capability development. \nMajor Points of Discussion and Suggestions to the Author\n\nIt was argued that joint operations are mainly conducted by US\, which has global interests and power projection capabilities. China claims that its armed forces are for defensive purposes. However\, focus on joint operations and China’s posturing conveys a contrary message that Chinese military build-up is more for power projection than for defensive purposes. The Chinese naval projects and acquisitions specifically are robust in nature and geared up more towards offensive actions.\nThe implication of China’s military modernization for India was discussed at length. It was argued that Chengdu and Lanzhou military regions\, which have operational responsibility for the Sino-Indian border\, do not have naval component limiting any Chinese joint operations. Similarly\, air borne operations cannot succeed in the absence of air superiority. Though China’s enjoys air superiority vis-à-vis Taiwan\, vis-à-vis India\, such a capability is suspect. China has limitations in operating from Tibet due to high altitude. It was pointed out that undertaking a sustained air campaign required good infrastructure\, particularly air fields\, which China currently lacked.\nIt was pointed out that in China’s quest for jointness\, parochial interests are likely to hamper its efforts. The PLA for instance was the dominant force in the Chinese military set up and this could affect jointness.\nIndia’s preparedness to meet any threat depended on its armed forces’ ability to operate jointly. However\, deficiencies on this front included lack of integration as regards communication devices used by the three services. It was argued that integration should start at the functional level instead of just focusing at the Service Headquarter level.\nThe paper would be enriched by examining aspects such as limitations of the Chinese Air Force\, which highlight gaps in China’s quest for jointness.\nThe strategic environment surrounding China should be analyzed in order to understand what really drove Chinese efforts. Is it the nature of threats that China was facing or was it Chinese ambitions that is the driver behind such efforts?\nThe author could explore the manner in which these efforts were driving China’s overall military modernization programme and the lessons that India could learn in this regard.\nThe author would do well to explore the extent of integration in the Chinese armed forces\, specifically whether it was only at the command level or whether it is present also at the combat level.\n\nReport prepared by Amit Kumar\, Research Assistant\, IDSA URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/chinas-military-reforms-peoples-liberation-armys-adaptation-to-joint-operations CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20150508T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20150508T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T200606 CREATED:20231223T133107Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250317T000341Z UID:63076-1431063000-1431063000@idsa.in SUMMARY:An Assessment of Organisational Change in the Indian Army DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Lt. Gen. Satish Nambiar (Retd.)\nExternal Discussants: Brig. Gurmeet Kanwal (Retd.)\, Brig. Rahul Bhonsle (Retd.)\nInternal Discussants: Gp. Capt. Ajey Lele (Retd.)\, Col. Vijai Singh Rana \nThe paper analysed military change in the context of the Indian Army\, with specific focus on organisational innovation and change. It specifically looked at two case studies – the restructuring of the army after the Sino-Indian war of 1962 and the drive towards mechanisation based on the 1975 expert committee recommendations. The paper then assessed the drivers for organisational change in the Indian Army\, with the further aim of deriving policy recommendations which could be apt in light of the ongoing transformation of the Indian Army. \nThe paper identified operational environment and technology as the principle drivers for change. It stated that successful change required supportive political leadership\, professional and visionary military leadership\, long-term strategic assessment\, strong institutional structures and follow up action. The author used the two case studies in relation to conventional threats. The first related to changes post 1962\, which led to an increase in the size of the army by almost 33 per cent. It also saw the raising of divisions which were tailored to the needs of mountain warfare. \nThe second case study assesses the 1975 committee recommendations which were successful in aiding the army’s drive towards mechanisation. Not only was the organisational structure transformed\, the resultant innovations had a lasting impact on the strategic thought of the army\, which continued to guide subsequent adaptations thereafter. The author also pointed to pertinent aspects related to organisational change after the 1999 Kargil conflict and Operation Parakram in 2001\, besides noting changes related to the ongoing transformation. \nMajor Points of Discussion and Suggestions to the Author\n\nIt was pointed out that political support for carrying out military change was very crucial. Top level political intervention was important to achieve unity of thought and unity of purpose. This was particularly relevant in the Indian context where turf war was a glaring feature of the armed forces and the absence of the Chief of Defence Staff affected unity of thought and action. It was noted that political leadership in India has been more than encouraging in this regard. Though lacking an institutional mechanism of interface between top political leadership and the armed forces\, many chiefs have successfully won over political support for bringing about organisational change.\nThe aim of military change should be to have a capability-based force and threat-based force existing simultaneously to deal with the challenges being posed in an era of strategic uncertainty.\nApart from operational environment and technology being drivers of change\, it was noted that post-1962\, changes were largely driven by doctrinal shift in thinking.\nA crucial area of military change related to professional military education and training. The aim of military education and training should be to train for certainty and educate for uncertainty to deal with broad military challenges and threats.\nThe absence of a national security strategy has led to the rise of service-specific doctrines\, which are linear in approach and lack a broad national outlook.\nThe sense of the house was that the Indian army fought bravely in the 1962 war. If not for some strategic miscalculations and a degree of misfortune\, Indian army would have turned the tables on the Chinese despite facing all odds. Moreover\, the engagement of Air Force would have significantly altered the course of the war. Most importantly\, the war did not shatter the morale of the Indian Army\, contrary to the common perception because our soldiers fought fearlessly and ferociously. It was largely the failure of top level military/political leadership. The Indian army would do well to look inward for its failures as this will pave the way for course correction.\nIt was suggested that the paper should look into the aspect of organisational change pertaining to staff. The teeth-to-tail ratio\, recruitment policy and restructuring of the organisation merited the attention of the author.\nThe nature of change should be analysed in order to understand whether change is reactive in nature or whether it was shaping the battlefield favourably.\nThe Kargil review committee was the first attempt at evolving a comprehensive national security system engaging all three services. The Krishna Rao report primarily dealt with the army. In an era of jointness\, efforts to bring about change in the army must find a resonance among the other services. A tri-service approach looking at change would bring far greater dividends than a service-specific approach. In this context\, post-Kargil reform process needed to be better analysed.\nThe Indian army aimed to achieve the capacity of network-enabled to network-centric warfare capability but has not been able to do so. It should be explored as to what are the reasons behind our inability to achieve this capability. Similarly\, the aspect of cyber warfare should be included in the paper to understand the phenomenon of change in its entirety.\n\nReport prepared by Amit Kumar\, Research Assistant\, IDSA. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/an-assessment-of-organisational-change-in-the-indian-army CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20150515T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20150515T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T200606 CREATED:20231223T133106Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130237Z UID:63075-1431667800-1431667800@idsa.in SUMMARY:Iran Sanctions and India DESCRIPTION:Chair: Prof. Girijesh PantExternal Discussants: Prof. Gulshan Dietl\, Nidhi VermaInternal Discussants: Dr. G. Balachandran\, Shebonti Ray Dadwal \nThe paper examined the sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council (UNSC)\, the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) against Iran in the aftermath of the Iranian nuclear issue being referred to the UNSC in February 2006 and the responses and implications for India as a result of these measures. UNSC sanctions primarily involved asset freezes of and travel bans on entities and individuals connected with Iran’s nuclear and missile programmes. India took executive actions to conform to UNSC sanctions measures and prevent possible misuse. These were however in continuation of measures it had been taking prior to 2006 as well (like the June 2005 WMD Act)\, which strengthened its regulatory and legislative mechanisms for preventing the sale of WMD-related materials and technology to wrong hands. The paper dwelt on some pertinent issues relating to the Iran-O-Hind shipping Company (IHSC)\, which was specifically targeted by UNSCR 1929 of June 2010. \nUS and EU sanctions targeting Iran’s crude oil exports have had a significant impact on major importers like India. These measures were based on the contention that Iran was using oil revenues to fund WMD-related programmes\, a concern that was first raised in the preamble to UNSCR 1929. The foundational US sanctions legislation targeting Iran’s petroleum sector was the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) of 1996\, which became the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA) in 2006. The paper gave a brief account of the legislation\, as well as changes carried out in ISA as part of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions and Divestment Act (CISADA) of 2010. CISADA further imposed restrictions on the sale of refined petroleum products to Iran\, affecting Indian companies like Reliance. Section 1245 of National Defence Authorisation Act (NDAA) 2012 targeted the Central Bank of Iran (CBI) for the first time and called for ‘significant reductions’ of imports of Iranian crude and prescribed exemptions from sanctions if a country did so. Section 504 of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act (ITRSHRA) severely curtailed Iran’s foreign exchange earnings by mandating that funds owed to Iran as a result of bilateral trade in goods and services be “credited to an account located in the country with primary jurisdiction over the foreign financial institutions.” \nThe EU Decision of July 2010 and the subsequent EU Regulation of October 2010 (specifically Article 10) impacted payment mechanisms like the Asian Clearing Union (ACU) which India was using to pay for Iranian oil. Further\, prohibition on the provision of insurance services (Article 12) by European-based insurance providers for ships transporting Iranian crude had a negative impact on Indian refineries. The paper briefly described the impact and responses of Indian oil companies like the Chennai Petroleum Corporation Limited (CPCL) and Mangalore Refinery and Petrochemicals Limited (MRPL) to these measures\, as indicated in their annual reports. \nThe US and EU sanctions measures led to a significant reduction in India’s import of Iranian crude\, which came down to less than five per cent of the total imports in 2014-15\, from 13 per cent in 2009-10. Indian policy makers have also often cited the prevailing sanctions regime as negatively affecting India’s investments in Iran’s energy sector. The paper gave a brief account of the status of the agreements signed between Indian and Iranian companies including the December 2009 agreement for the South Pars Phase-II and Farzad-B gas field\, IOCL ‘s investments in the Farsi Block\, among others. The paper closed by noting some of the pertinent developments in the post-Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) period\, including the significant role played by Indian oil companies in JPOA sanctions relief. It ended by noting that the sequencing of sanctions relief as part of a comprehensive nuclear deal would have a bearing on the nature of Iran’s oil trade with key energy partners like India. \nDiscussion and Suggestions to the Author \n\nIndia is not the only state affected by sanctions. It will be interesting to know how other countries have coped with these measures.\nChina for instance seems to be more adept at engaging economically with Iran\, though it is also circumscribed by the same sanctions and it is also part of the P5+1. China has also apparently built a business centre and is in the process of building a petrochemical complex in Chabahar. \nAspects regarding India’s recent decision to go ahead with investing in Chabahar could be explored. What material changes if any has resulted in this decision?\nAn exploration of the context surrounding these various sanctions measures would be useful. What were the reasons underpinning the increase in the nature of sanctions targeting Iran’s petro-chemical sector from 2010 onwards? An examination of US as well as Iran’s domestic political and energy context would throw more light on the issue. \nThe author was urged to conduct interviews with retired or serving policy makers to the extent possible to get inputs on some of the aspects covered in the paper. \nSome forward-looking aspects in terms of policy recommendations could be incorporated into the paper\, including on such issues like the possible impact of an impending deal on Indian businesses and oil companies as well as on India’s balance of trade with Iran. It was pointed out that India would be dealing with a ‘different Iran’ in the aftermath of a nuclear deal.\nThe paper could explore US-EU interaction on the issue of sanctions vis-à-vis Iran and see if there were any divergences or convergences over the issue\, especially since EU countries were significant importers of Iranian oil prior to 2012.\nRegional dynamics specifically the role of Saudi Arabia and the nature of increase in its oil exports in the aftermath of sanctions targeting Iran could be highlighted.\nUS pressure on India vis-à-vis its energy trade with Iran as well as investments in Iran’s energy infrastructure and view towards projects like IPI can be included.\n\nReport prepared by Sourabhi Mukherjee\, Research Intern\, Nuclear and Arms Control Centre\, IDSA. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/iran-sanctions-and-india CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20150522T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20150522T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T200606 CREATED:20231223T133106Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T001818Z UID:63074-1432272600-1432272600@idsa.in SUMMARY:India in Global Governance: Engaging the Counter-Terrorism Regime DESCRIPTION:Chair: Mr. G. K. PillaiExternal Discussants: Dr. Suresh K. Goel and Dr. Rana BanerjiInternal Discussants: Dr. Vinod Kumar and Dr. Saurabh Mishra \nPresentation\nThe paper focuses on the counter-terrorism regime and highlights that there is a gap in the literature in demonstrating India’s evolving role in the norm building process of this regime. In the paper the author focuses on the post-Cold War period and uses the counter-terrorism regime as a case-study to assess whether India’s engagement has been substantial to the global governance of counter-terrorism. There have been studies of India’s role in the counter-terrorism regime but they all focus on the years after the 9/11 incident. However\, Dr. Anant argues that India has been very active and constructive with its engagement with counter-terrorism regime since much earlier. Some examples of India’s constructive contribution in the counter-terrorism regime were: \n\nIndia had played an important role in the drafting of the General Assembly Resolution 40/6 in 1987. India firmly believed that the underlying causes have to be mitigated in order to end the menace of terrorism. India also recognized the difference between terrorism and movements of self-determination and at the same time was wary of terrorism perpetrated by mercenaries with a view to undermining territorial integrity.\nIn 1991\, speaking on the subject of violence related to movements of national liberation\, India held on to its pre-Cold War position that it recognized the right of self defence of legitimate national liberation movements.\nWith regard to terrorism and human rights\, after the Declaration of Human Rights in 1993\, India in this context\, while referring to Pakistan’s involvement in the 1993 Mumbai attacks\, in a country report on human rights in the Third Committee of General Assembly in 1993\, said that terrorism was the greatest impediment to the realization of human rights. \nAt the plenary of the General Assembly in 1995\, India was critical of United Nations doing nothing to defend democracies from extremists and other violent threats.\nAfter the adoption of the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings in 1997\, India pushed the General Assembly to fulfill the commitment made in Resolution 51/210 and set up an Ad Hoc Committee to first adopt an international convention for the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism and\, then a comprehensive convention on international terrorism.\n\nThe paper highlights that India played a crucial role in sponsoring and supporting many resolutions on counter-terrorism in the post-Cold War period. For example: \n\nIn 1996\, India tabled the Draft International Convention on Suppression of Terrorism in the General Assembly\, which aimed to deal with state support to terrorism. India was much ahead of developed states in pointing out the menace of state sponsored terrorism.\nIn 1997\, India co-sponsored a draft resolution on Human Rights and Terrorism\, which was adopted in 1999.\nIndia was the lone country that voted against paragraphs 10 and 11 in the debate of Draft resolution A/C.3/58/L.71: Protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism in 2003\, which made no reference to violation of human rights by terrorists.\nIn 2000\, the General Assembly took up for discussion India’s Draft Comprehensive Convention of International Terrorism.\nIn 2002\, India co-sponsored the Draft Resolution on Hostage Taking and introduced the resolution on Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction in the General Assembly.\nAnd in 2006\, India supported and joined the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy Adopted by the General Assembly.\n\nAlso\, India has been regular in its commitment to the counter-terrorism regime by submitting reports to the concerned UN committees regarding the action it has taken at the national and international levels to curb the menace of terrorism. India has also been vocal in pointing out the problems of non-compliance with anti-terrorism conventions and has urged that a way be found to punish states that abet terrorism. India has made suggestions to make the Counter-Terrorism Committee more effective and accountable through getting more feedback from countries\, increase in interaction between countries and seeking reports to identify violations. Based on all this\, Dr. Anant concludes that India has gone much beyond using existing systems to highlight its concerns regarding international terrorism and the evidence adduced above reiterates the fact that India has been a constructive player in the multilateral counter-terrorism regime. \nDiscussion\n\nIt is important to mention how the Indian government’s position and thinking has changed over the years on the issue of terrorism and how this has been shown through our engagement at the international level.\nHighlighting the difference in the understanding of terrorism and which definition does India support is important.\nDomestic imperative for international suggestions by India has to be mentioned. \nReceptivity to India’s responses with regards to international financing mechanisms of terrorism should be considered.\nInternational monitoring and how India is coping with it internally is of significance.\nPolitics of regime building\, partnership and structural review of the regime should be mentioned as part of the argument.\nContextualization of global and internal terrorism and a link between the two have to be established.\nA watershed event has to be mentioned to show the changes in India’s approach to terrorism at the international level.\nReasons for the failure to build coalitions on terrorism for furthering India’s national interest should be considered.\nPolicy recommendations on how India should form coalitions so it can put its view across at the international level should be analyzed.\nPolitics of compliance and the role of powerful nations should be considered and how has India contributed tobettering compliance among nations should also be included.\nIndia’s role as norm taker or norm maker should be clearly identified.\nSupport by other countries for India at the counter-terrorism regime should be mentioned and also it is important to indicate as to which group India belongs to at the international level.\n\n(This report has been prepared by Ms. Kuhoo Saxena\, Research Intern\, IDSA) URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/india-in-global-governance-engaging-the-counter-terrorism-regime CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20150529T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20150529T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T200606 CREATED:20231223T133106Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T001713Z UID:63072-1432877400-1432877400@idsa.in SUMMARY:Strengthening Nuclear Security: Compliance to the Principal Legal Instruments of Nuclear Security DESCRIPTION:Chair: Dr Arvind KumarExternal Discussants: Dr Sitakanta Mishra and Dr Manish DhabadeInternal Discussants: Mr S Samuel C Rajiv and Ms Sourabhi Mukherji \nPresentation\n Nuclear security concerns during the Cold War era revolved around the concepts of nuclear deterrence and nuclear proliferation. However\, in the 21st century\, due to increased globalization\, political instability and terrorist activities around the world\, there is a greater threat of theft\, sabotage\, unauthorized access\, illegal transfer or other malicious acts involving nuclear or other radioactive substance. In this context the author in this paper points to the urgency of having an international consensus on building a more robust nuclear system with legal instruments which would be put in place to prevent the misuse of sensitive nuclear and radiological material by terrorists. Dr Kazi in her paper highlights the gaps in the nuclear security system where there are no substantial legal instruments that have been developed to control the transfer of these sensitive materials to miscreants. A stronger nuclear security system is also needed due the existence of nuclear weapons in domestically unstable and politically volatile regions. In such places\, the nuclear facilities are susceptible to vulnerabilities like accidents\, miscalculations\, sabotage and pilferage. Therefore\, a nuclear security system with legal instruments would allow more effective regulation and make individual states more accountable for the safety of their nuclear capabilities. Hence\, the need for international cooperation to control nuclear/radioactive sources around the world is of paramount importance for the prevention of nuclear terrorism and ensuring global security.\n Dr Kazi looks at three existing critical instruments for strengthening nuclear security: \n\nConvention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) of 1980\n\nIt is the only legally binding international instrument in the area of physical protection of nuclear material\nIts primary objective is to facilitate the safe transfer of nuclear materials.\n\nAmendment to the CPPNM OF 2005\n\nSenior Expert Group for the Review of the IAEA’s Programme of Activities recommended that a possible revision on the CPPNM should be done to address the issues of prevention of unauthorized possession of nuclear material and access to nuclear facilities\n2005 CPPNM amendment emphasised the importance of sharing best practices that would be critical to developing a stringent physical protection system. \n\nInternational Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) of 2005 \n\nPrevention of the misuse of nuclear/radiological materials.\nRequires State-parties to make every effort to adopt appropriate measures to ensure the protection of radioactive material\, taking into account relevant recommendations and functions of the agency. \n\n\nThese three legal instruments urge cooperation for the prevention\, repression and elimination of terrorism in all forms and calls upon states to criminalize offences related to the misuse of nuclear/radioactive materials. However\, Dr Kazi argues that despite all these efforts\, the legal instruments mentioned above remain ineffective and lack universality. One of the reasons for their ineffectiveness is complacency. Since in reality no incident of this sort has taken place\, there is no urgency in complying with a nuclear security system to protect nuclear/radioactive material. Second\, is the lack of universality\, as countries that do not have stockpiles of nuclear/radioactive material do not feel the need to implement effective controls on nuclear material. Nevertheless\, the author argues that State-parties and non-state parties have the prime responsibility of generating the requisite political will for an effective implementation of these legal instruments. If need be\, incremental transparency in nuclear matters can be effected to generate confidence about its security concerns which could in the future help to produce a necessary political will for making these legal instruments universal. \n Discussion and Suggestions\n\nThe history and evolution of terrorism and the way it has been tackled by states have to be mentioned in the context of nuclear/radioactive materials falling into the wrong hands. \nHistorical debates surrounding the legal instruments for nuclear security system should be elaborated.\nThe difference between nuclear security and nuclear safety has to be mentioned and also how the former is evolving in comparison to the latter. \nEvolution and reforms made in the various Nuclear Security Summits have to be included to have a more comprehensive understanding of the evolution of nuclear security. \nThe politics behind non-compliance should be an integral part of the argument to highlight the lack of universality for the nuclear security system at the international level.\nThe nature of the balancing act has to be taken into consideration in the management of nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation.\nThe human element or negligence of security of nuclear facilities domestically has to be taken into consideration.\n\n(Report prepared by Ms. Kuhoo Saxena\, Research Intern\, IDSA) URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/strengthening-nuclear-security-compliance-to-the-principal-legal-instruments-of-nuclear-security CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20150529T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20150529T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T200606 CREATED:20231223T133106Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T001607Z UID:63073-1432877400-1432877400@idsa.in SUMMARY:India’s Decision Making on Cross Border Natural Gas Pipelines (1989-2012) DESCRIPTION:Chair: Dr. Gulshan Dietl\nExternal Discussants: Ms. Lidya Powell and Mr. Ragunatha Mishra\nInternal Discussants: Dr. Smriti Pattnaik and Dr. Uttam Kumar Sinha \nIn the 21st century a nation’s economy thrives on its efficient and boundless use of energy. In this context\, India holds one of the largest markets of energy consumption in the world. Therefore\, energy security has become the paramount focus of Indian Foreign policy. To achieve this goal\, India is pursuing a broad range of options to diversify its energy sources. It ranges from LNG deals\, buying oil and gas spot markets\, acquisition of oil and gas fields abroad\, etc. One of the options is sourcing of energy supplies from neighbours (immediate and distant) through pipelines because of India’s comparative advantages in transportation costs as compared to other modes such as LNG. In this frame of reference\, Government of India identified three natural gas pipeline options: IPI (Iran-Pakistan-India)\, TAPI (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India) and MBI (Myanmar-Bangladesh-India). Kulkarni’s paper focuses on the decision making process involved on these natural gas pipeline projects from 1989 to 2012 and the factors that have influenced India’s decision making on cross border natural gas pipelines. \nThe paper examines the decision making process in this regard by using “Rational Actor Model Theory”\, which is based on cost benefit analysis and Masuda’s condition for Cross Border Pipelines. Kulkarni investigates the rationale behind India’s joining these projects which are costly and geopolitically controversial. The paper also attempts to understand India’s reasons for pursuing TAPI over IPI and MBI. \nKulkarni acknowledges that there is a clash between India’s need for energy security and its strategic interest. Hence\, taking this into account\, he recommends evolving a balance between the two. \nKey Points from discussion:\n\nThe paper discuss appropriate financial regime and commercial viability through cost benefit analysis. At the centre of any such decision making exercise should be the evolution of a balance between the management of geopolitical risk and commercial viability.\nThe energy demand in India is huge. However\, the demand is unmet because it cannot be transformed into purchasing power. Absence of stakeholders for using LNG to generate power is one example.\nWhy is the government reluctant to pursue gas projects as it has simultaneously pursued projects for LNG ports?\nAny analysis of decision making must include the agencies\, organisational structure and authorities involved in decision making. A critical examination of the decision making process is required.\nWhether any inter-ministerial conflict existed in the government during the course of decision making and implementation of the projects has to be taken into consideration.\nThe decision on applying the Rational Actor Theory and ‘Masuda’s’ model in the context of South Asia must be taken into consideration. A special focus is needed to understand the TAPI gas pipeline given the internal dynamics of India and Pakistan. One of the decision making models that is well suited for the conditions prevailing in South Asia is Richard Snyder’s.\nThe reasons for the government to opt for IPI\, TAPI and MBI rather that Oman–India pipeline or SAGE Pipeline should be carefully analysed. The analysis should also include the costs involved.\nAny decision making process on energy projects must include the following:\n\nProvision of providing excess to energy to every one\nSecuring energy supply\nTrying to limit carbon emissions\nImplementation of choices and alternatives of decision-making process must be in compliance with India’s fiscal and environment policies.\nGas pipeline construction must be looked at from the perspective of strategic investment. The presence of Iran and Unites States in this region should be taken into consideration.\n\n\n\n(Report prepared by Satyam Malaviya\, Research Intern\, IDSA) URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/indias-decision-making-on-cross-border-natural-gas-pipelines-1989-2012 CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20151211T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20151211T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T200606 CREATED:20231224T102131Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T001132Z UID:64039-1449811800-1449811800@idsa.in SUMMARY:Culture\, Context and Capability: American and Indian Counterinsurgencies DESCRIPTION:Participation in the Fellow Seminars is by invitation only.\nMedia person accredited with foreign media and foreign diplomats may seek prior permission from DDG\, IDSA @ telephone no. 26146832.\n\n\n\n\n1030 to 1300 hrs URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/culture-context-and-capability-american-and-indian-counterinsurgencies CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20151211T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20151211T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T200606 CREATED:20231224T102131Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T001241Z UID:64040-1449811800-1449811800@idsa.in SUMMARY:Re-Modeling Indian Defence Industry Apparatus For Accelerating Indigenisation\, Self-Sufficiency And Strategic Capability DESCRIPTION:Participation in the Fellow Seminars is by invitation only.\nMedia person accredited with foreign media and foreign diplomats may seek prior permission from DDG\, IDSA @ telephone no. 26146832.\n\n\n\n\n1030 to 1300 hrs URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/re-modeling-indian-defence-industry-apparatus-for-accelerating-indigenisation-self-sufficiency-and-strategic-capability CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20160311T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20160311T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T200606 CREATED:20231223T133006Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130237Z UID:63070-1457674200-1457674200@idsa.in SUMMARY:Why China Trumps India in the Oil Industry in Angola and Nigeria? DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Ambassador Mahesh Sachdev (Retd.)External Discussants: Prof. Alka Acharya and Prof. Girijesh PantInternal Discussant: Ms. Ruchita Beri \nThe competition between China and India in Africa has been an important and recurrent theme of discussion within the academic community. The paper presented by Raj Verma contributes to the ongoing discussion by making a comparative study of the Chinese and Indian interests and stakes in the oil sectors of the two West African countries: Angola and Nigeria. In recent years\, West Africa has emerged as a major energy producing region with Nigeria and Angola as major players. If Nigeria is the largest oil producer in Africa and has the second largest oil reserves\, Angola is the second largest oil producer and has the third largest oil reserves. Proven oil reserves in Nigeria have increased from 23 billion barrels in 2001 to 37 billion barrels in 2015. In Angola\, proven oil reserves have almost doubled from 5.4 billion barrels in 2001 to nine billion barrels in 2015. Oil production has also increased significantly in Angola. \nThe paper seeks to explain why China’s national oil companies (NOCs) have been able to outperform Indian oil companies (both NOCs and private sector oil companies) in Angola and Nigeria. The paper identifies four reasons in this regard: first\, the Chinese NOCs have more oil blocks in Angola and Nigeria compared to the Indian companies; second\, NOCs from China are able to outbid Indian oil companies when they directly compete for the same oil block; third\, Chinese NOCs are favoured as partners both by the African NOCs as well as the international oil companies (IOCs); and fourth\, Chinese NOCs have access to better quality oil blocks compared to the Indian companies. These four reasons can be attributed to macro level and micro level factors. \nAt macro level\, the difference in the economic\, political and diplomatic support received by the Chinese and Indian oil companies from their respective governments plays a huge role in China outperforming India in Angola and Nigeria. It is important to note that China has foreign exchange reserves of more than US$ 3.33 trillion compared to India’s modest US$ 348.93 billion.\nAt micro level\, access to capital\, rate of return on investment\, pricing of oil\, risk aversion and ability to acquire technology are factors that place Chinese NOCs at an advantageous position. The Chinese NOCs have greater access to cheap capital than the Indian oil companies as they are able to borrow at 0-1 per cent interest rate domestically\, whereas the cost of capital in the domestic market for Indian state owned enterprises including NOCs and private sector enterprises is 10-11 per cent. Moreover\, the Chinese NOCs operate at lower rates of return on investment compared to the Indian oil companies. Similarly\, while the Chinese NOCs operate at a margin of three to four per cent in general\, the Indian NOCs operate at a margin of 10-11 per cent. Indian private enterprises operate at margins close to 18-20 per cent. \nThe Chinese valuations of oil and investment is very high as it is able to take substantial risks due to massive financial resources available to it and hence are able to outbid India by shelving out vast amounts of money to acquire oil blocks. Chinese valuations of the oil blocks in Nigeria and Angola have been on the higher side as Chinese assume that their economy will keep growing at a high rate and the demand for oil will remain a primary mover of international oil prices. While Indian firms have better project management skills\, Chinese are able to purchase technology with greater ease as they have colossal financial resources. Given this asymmetry of power and resources\, it may be difficult for Indian oil companies and other corporations to compete with China in direct competitive bidding for oil assets in Africa. \nDiscussion and Suggestions: \n\nWhile the paper presents a good empirical material\, it needs to be interpreted theoretically.\nIn the recent past\, Chinese state owned enterprises have witnessed significant changes in terms of greater devolution of power taking place.\n\nChina’s energy mix is going through a transformation due to factors such as climate change. In the next 10 to 15 years\, India will become a major global energy player due its sustained economic growth. Taking into consideration these factors\, their impact on the oil sector in Africa has to be analysed.\nWhy China is not reluctant to invest in risky countries like Sudan and Iraq too needs to be analysed.\nRole of domestic institutions in China’s foreign policy making has to be understood in order to comprehend its decision making process for acquiring global energy assets.\nIt is important to explore how change in strategic value of oil assets in coming years is likely to impact or transform China’s policy towards Africa.\n\nIf perceptions matter\, then it is important to analyse why India despite its rich historical connections and diaspora has not been able to sufficiently influence the perceptions of the African people.\nIt should also be noted that Africans are getting disenchanted with Chinese companies as they bring their own labour and do not transfer technology to them.\nThe African perspective on Chinese and Indian engagement in African oil industry needs to be properly understood. Africans are interested in diversifying their energy operators.\nThe political aspect of the Indian and Chinese engagement in Angola and Nigeria needs to be factored in along with the economic aspect.\n\nReport prepared by Mr. Nachiket Khadkiwala\, Research Assistant\, IDSA URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/why-china-trumps-india-in-the-oil-industry-in-angola-and-nigeria CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20160318T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20160318T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T200606 CREATED:20231224T102131Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T001018Z UID:64038-1458279000-1458279000@idsa.in SUMMARY:Decoupling J&K from Pakistan - The Prudent Way Forward DESCRIPTION:Participation in the Fellow Seminars is by invitation only.\nMedia person accredited with foreign media and foreign diplomats may seek prior permission from DDG\, IDSA @ telephone no. 26146832.\n\n\n\n\n1030 to 1300 hrs URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/decoupling-jk-from-pakistan-the-prudent-way-forward CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20160422T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20160422T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T200606 CREATED:20231224T102126Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130237Z UID:64037-1461303000-1461303000@idsa.in SUMMARY:Challenges of Human Resource Management – Transition of a Soldier to second Career DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Lt Gen Mukesh Sabharwal (Retd.) \nDiscussants:\nBrig S K Sharma (Retd.)\nBrig Narender Kumar\nCol Vikram Taneja\nCol Vivek Chadha (Retd.) URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/challenges-of-human-resource-management-transition-of-a-soldier-to-second-career CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20160610T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20160610T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T200606 CREATED:20231223T133006Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130237Z UID:63068-1465536600-1465536600@idsa.in SUMMARY:India's Foreign Policy Options in the Asia-Pacific: A Critical Evaluation DESCRIPTION:The IDSA Fellows Seminar by Dr S. Kalyanaraman\, Research Fellow\, IDSA\, on the topic “India’s Foreign Policy Options in the Asia-Pacific: A Critical Evaluation” was held on Friday\, June 10\, 2016. It was chaired by Sudhir T Devare\, India’s former Ambassador in North Korea\, Visiting Fellow and former Director General of the Indian Council of World Affairs\, New Delhi. To discuss the paper\, two external and two internal discussants participated in the seminar: Prof Sujit Dutta\, the Mahatma Gandhi Chair at the Nelson Mandela Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution\, Jamia Millia Islamia\, Delhi and whose expertise is in Chinese Politics\, Foreign and Security Policies\, India-China Relations\, International Affairs in East Asia\, India’s Strategic Thought\, International Relations; and Rajesh Rajagopalan\, Professor in International Politics at Jawaharlal Nehru University\, New Delhi\, whose areas of research are international relations theory\, military doctrines and nuclear weapons and disarmament; Dr. Uttam Sinha\, Research Fellow at IDSA; and Cdr. Aman Saberwal\, Research Fellow at IDSA. \n In his presentation\, Dr. Kalyanaraman began by highlighting how the Asia-Pacific region is gaining greater salience in both the economic and political spheres\, how China is emerging as a central player in this unfolding dynamic\, and what impact these developments have for India’s security and role in the region. It is against this backdrop that he critically evaluated four policy options that have been prescribed for India. These are: \n Multi-Alignment: Proponents argue that multi-alignment not only enables India to advance its core developmental priorities through greater economic integration at the regional and global levels but also helps preserve its strategic autonomy by avoiding too great a dependence on any one major power. Contrary to these assertions and aspirations\, however\, multi-alignment is unlikely to prove practicable in an Asia-Pacific that is tending towards fragmentation into rival economic and security groupings led by America and China\, respectively. Practising multi-alignment would be impracticable because\, during periods of intensified great power rivalry\, alliances are likely to be rigid and the interactions between rival great powers zero sum and conflictual in nature\, thus rendering membership in multiple groupings impossible and the contradictions involved in pursuing such a policy unmanageable. \n Nonalignment: A modified version of nonalignment\, Nonalignment 2.0\, between China and America is the second policy prescription that has been identified. Advocates contend that nonalignment would help India derive economic\, military and technological benefits from multiple sources as well as enable it to play the role of “a unique bridge” between different countries and groupings. But this idea of replicating the policy adopted during the Cold War to the unfolding circumstances overlooks the fact that the Soviet Union did not pose a threat to India whereas China does. Further\, external balancing in the form of an alliance is necessary given limited domestic economic and military capacities and the growing power asymmetry vis-à-vis China. \n Bandwagoning with China: The third prescription is the establishment of a closer economic relationship and forging of a new political equilibrium with China. While India would indeed gain from a closer economic relationship with China in terms of furthering its domestic economic transformation\, it is highly unlikely that enhanced economic cooperation would either cause an amelioration of rivalry or move the two countries towards a mutually acceptable political accommodation. \n Aligning with America: Alignment with America is the fourth policy choice. Advocates view an alignment with America as necessary to protect India’s core values of democracy\, pluralism and secularism from an authoritarian China aligned with jihad-exporting Pakistan. Further\, an alliance with America is also necessary\, even natural\, given the vast and growing power asymmetry between India and China\, which gulf can be bridged only through external balancing given the lack of “political will and executive capability” to rapidly build up national power through internal balancing. There is no denying the importance of\, and even necessity for\, an alliance with America to counter China’s growing power and consequent ability to reshape the Asian and international order. But two main objections have been articulated by critics to such a policy course. First\, it would prematurely antagonise China and impel that country into adopting overtly hostile policies towards India. The second objection is that an alliance with America would transform India into a junior partner and lead to its enmeshment in various American military misadventures. \n Concluding his presentation\, Dr. Kalyanaraman pointed out that China’s rise to great power status poses major challenges for India’s foreign and security policies. Given that India will not be able to arrive at a mutual political accommodation with China\, and given that dealing with China requires external balancing because of limited internal capacities\, the optimal policy option for India is to forge an alliance with the United States. \n The presentation was followed by comments by the discussants. \n Prof. Sujit Dutta: \n Prof. Dutta began by noting that the paper has raised many interesting ideas which were central to the foreign policy discourse in India. The paper is based on the ‘Offensive Realist’ theory of international relations. The principal argument revolves around the thought that “India needs an alignment with United States to deal with the emerging challenges from China”\, and this has been well articulated. Nehruvian foreign policy has often been criticized thus: it did not look into the realities of power politics clearly and therefore India suffered. The paper has gone to the opposite of the Nehruvian paradigm\, i.e.\, it has dealt with power politics in terms of military alignments which poses problems in many ways. India’s political elite are not very happy with power politics in the international domain although they are happy to practice power politics in the domestic domain. So\, it is very difficult for a consensus based foreign policy on the assumption that power politics should drive India’s foreign policy. Second\, liberal institutionalism and liberal interdependence which are the fundamentals of the liberal peace are also important. China is a trade dependent country. It can ill afford to undermine interdependence. China’s economy is declining and it should understand that India today is a good market. Third\, China’s power has been magnified. China spends on defence much more than India but China’s security paradigm is much more problematic than India’s. India’s defence expenditure should rise for sure but it need not to be same as China’s. Further\, we must not underestimate the overwhelming power of the United States. China is in no position to catch up with the United States anytime soon. We must not overstate China’s power. India’s economy is rising and it will reach up to China’s level soon. So we should analyse what India’s foreign policy is and what changes it requires within the framework of an independent foreign policy. It cannot be done in isolation with other countries but it can be done in cooperation with other countries due to globalization. We need a proactive foreign policy. In this multi-polar world\, balance of power is required so that no single country dominates the others. By getting engaged with the United States in terms of alliance rather than strategic partnership\, we will constrain ourselves. The United States has many flaws in its policies\, like Pakistan policy\, Vietnam policy in the past\, etc. It is important to have relations with all the great powers. India-China relations today are far less acrimonious than at the time when we had no trade relations. \n Prof Rajesh Rajagopalan: \n China has a great impact on other nations in every term\, whether economic or defence. China is larger than all of its key competitors in Asia. China has already surpassed that threshold where it can be balanced by a combination of regional countries. If you have an imbalance of power\, there must be a balance created irrespective of the policies of other countries. The US can anchor the regional countries to create a balance against China. There is a difference between alignment and alliance\, which can be shown by the alignment of China-Pakistan during the cold war\, even when Pakistan had an alliance with the US. They had collaboration on a number of different levels. It is always necessary to point out that difference between alignment and alliance. Alignments have their own problems. One of the problems of American alignment is not just the capacity of the US but its willingness to align\, and this is one of the key problems that India and all other countries face. India has been gradually moving away from nonalignment for the past 30 years. According to various surveys\, the US has public support in India. Inter-dependence has not prevented China from dealing aggressively with countries in South-East Asia and East Asia. China is a dominant power irrespective of its aggressive behaviour. India doesn’t have the power to internally balance China. An alignment is about meeting specific threats. India-US partnership should be looked at from this perspective. \n Uttam Sinha: He pointed to five trends in the changing geopolitics of the Asia-pacific: \n\nThe Chinese moves at developing a counter strategy to deal with US rebalancing to Asia-Pacific region have potentially set the stage for the new polarising order in Asia.\nThere are limits to full convergence of Asian country’s economic interests and their political objectives. It is the natural political dilemma witnessed in the region which will lead china to seek competitive relations with Asian neighbours.\nThe US\, India and China are pushing their respective interests in the region by reaching out to old and new friends. Alliances and partnerships are turning to be dynamic.\nChina and India are going to compete and cooperate at the same time. China will take advantage of the Indian market but on the strategic front relations will be tricky.\nEmergence of new great game –India’s Act East policy\, US rebalance and China’s OBOR.\n\nAman Saberwal: \n\nThe title of the paper is “India’s Foreign Policy options in Asia Pacific”\, but it seems to focus totally on China\, so perhaps a more China centric title could be considered. \nChina’s air force squadrons and aircraft are higher in number than India’s for sure\, but then they also have more service and maintenance complexities than India’s.\nOnly Army and Air Force aspects have been discussed but not the Navy’s in which realm India is more capable. \nIndia’s military strength has been greatly underrated in the paper.\n\nIntervening from the floor\, Director General Jayant Prasad said that there should be emphasis on both internal and external balancing\, as well as an independent foreign policy even while being aligned. But alignment bordering on some kind of alliance system with the US could be dangerous for India. \n In his concluding remarks\, Amb. Sudhir Devare noted that: \n\nIndia should be dexterous rather than being aligned to countries\nChinese aggressiveness has become a matter of concern. \nThe fact of multi-polarity has come in the frame now.\nThe policy of maintaining relations with middle power needs to be continued. The aspect of cooperative security needs to be explored.\n\nPrepared by Urvashi Rathore\, Research Intern\, IDSA URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/indias-foreign-policy-options-in-the-asia-pacific-a-critical-evaluation CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20160715T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20160715T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T200606 CREATED:20231224T102126Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T000530Z UID:64036-1468560600-1468560600@idsa.in SUMMARY:Transfer of Defence Technology – Understanding the Nuances for Optimal Benefits in the Indian Context DESCRIPTION:Participation in the Fellow Seminars is by invitation only.\nMedia person accredited with foreign media and foreign diplomats may seek prior permission from DDG\, IDSA @ telephone no. 26146832.\n\n\n\n\n1030 to 1300 hrs\n\n\nVenue: Seminar Hall 1\, IDSA URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/transfer-of-defence-technology-understanding-the-nuances-for-optimal-benefits-in-the-indian-context CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20161021T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20161021T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T200606 CREATED:20231224T102126Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T000128Z UID:64034-1477027800-1477027800@idsa.in SUMMARY:Kautilya’s Arthashastra and Scientific Thinking DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members\, others on request\, please contact us at cc.idsa@nic.in\n\n\n\n\n1030 to 1300 hrs URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/kautilyas-arthashastra-and-scientific-thinking CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20161021T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20161021T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T200606 CREATED:20231224T102126Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T000314Z UID:64035-1477027800-1477027800@idsa.in SUMMARY:Cyber Warfare DESCRIPTION:Participation in the Fellow Seminars is by invitation only.\nMedia person accredited with foreign media and foreign diplomats may seek prior permission from DDG\, IDSA @ telephone no. 26146832.\n\n\n\n\n1030 to 1300 hrs URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/cyber-warfare CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR