BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//MP-IDSA - ECPv6.15.12.2//NONSGML v1.0//EN CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH X-WR-CALNAME:MP-IDSA X-ORIGINAL-URL:https://idsa.in X-WR-CALDESC:Events for MP-IDSA REFRESH-INTERVAL;VALUE=DURATION:PT1H X-Robots-Tag:noindex X-PUBLISHED-TTL:PT1H BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:Asia/Kolkata BEGIN:STANDARD TZOFFSETFROM:+0530 TZOFFSETTO:+0530 TZNAME:IST DTSTART:20130101T000000 END:STANDARD END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140110T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140110T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T203625 CREATED:20231224T102515Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T004944Z UID:64057-1389331800-1389331800@idsa.in SUMMARY:The Tamil Nadu Factor: Perspectives of Tamils and Muslims in Sri Lanka DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact\n\n\n\n\n1030 to 1300 hrs\nConference Cell URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-tamil-nadu-factor-perspectives-of-tamils-and-muslims-in-sri-lanka CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140117T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140117T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T203625 CREATED:20231223T133548Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130239Z UID:63107-1389936600-1389936600@idsa.in SUMMARY:Military Change in India: An Appraisal of the Evolving Strategy Towards Pakistan DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Lt Gen HS Lidder (Retd)External Discussants: Vice Adm Anup Singh (Retd)\, Lt Gen Prakash Menon (Retd) and Professor Rajesh RajagopalanInternal Discussant: Col PK Gautam (Retd) \nThis paper primarily made an attempt to understand India’s evolving military strategy towards Pakistan. It analyzes this evolution using the theoretical framework of mlitary change\, which can be conceived of as occurring at three levels: the goals of a military organisation\, its organisational structure\, and the strategy it adopts. The cause of military change can be traced to three sources: a voluntary or externally induced change in the cultural norms of a military organisation; changes in a state’s domestic political orientation or in its national security scenario; and the introduction of new technology. \nThe paper seeks to examine whether military change has occurred in India at any of the three levels identified above and\, if yes\, then what has been the source of that change. With these objectives\, the paper focuses upon the third level of change\, namely strategy. Specifically\, it examines the strategies adopted by the Indian armed forces for the Pakistan front and the changes effected therein over the course of the last six decades. This examination highlights two principal trends. At the operational level of war\, India’s military strategy towards Pakistan changed from attrition to manoeuvre and back to attrition. And the objective of India’s strategy has changed from victory until the 1980s to punishing Pakistan since the 1990s. The paper argues that these changes were caused by India’s evolving security scenario vis-à-vis Pakistan and in particular by the introduction of nuclear weapons\, which have inhibited India’s response to the challenge posed by Pakistan. \nThe paper concludes that civil-military coordination is essential for bringing in sync the military and political objectives within a larger strategic narrative. While such coordination was indeed a consistent feature between independence and the 1999 Kargil conflict\, a divergence has emerged between the political and military leaderships during the last 10 years. This fraying of politico-military coordination is clearly evident in the army’s failure to win political approval for the Cold Start strategy and indeed in its attempt through such a strategy to compel the political leadership into following its timetable for military action. For its part\, the political leadership has also failed to engage with the services to ensure the crafting of a strategy that is both appropriate for a nuclear environment and is dovetailed with broader policy objectives. \nMajor Points of Discussion and Suggestions to the Author:\n\nIt was pointed out that more than lack of trust or anything else\, the civil-military disconnect in India is the result of lack of expertise on military matters among the civilian leadership. This state of affairs can be attributed to the near absence of public discourse on hardcore military subjects. This scenario is\, however\, fast changing with an increasing number of retired military professionals beginning to write and generating a public debate on military issues.\nMilitary strategy in war is different from pre-war planning. The paper needs to spell out clearly which level of strategy is its focus.\nThere is a need to unbundle and elaborate upon the argument about the change in Indian strategy from victory to punishment. It was argued that India’s objective has been to deter Pakistan and the method adopted for that purpose has been punishment and not victory per se. Further\, for India\, victory has not always entailed the defeat of Pakistan or the occupation of its territory. Victory has to be judged in terms of the goals set with punishment also having been a part of victory. \nWith respect to the nuclear factor\, it was pointed out that India has been repeatedly subjected to nuclear blackmail. At the same time\, India’s propensity to up the ante against Pakistan has been severely constrained. The Cold Start has been seen as a viable option in the nuclear backdrop but the ambiguity that surrounds it has outweighed its utility as a strategy.\nWhile formulating any strategy vis-à-vis Pakistan\, India cannot ignore China. It implies that a two front war scenario is a very distinct possibility and India must retool its strategy to meet such challenge.\nThe paper needs to incorporate the role played by the Mukti Bahini in the 1971 war\, a role that was crucial in terms of providing valuable intelligence and reconnaissance support.\nIt was argued that Pakistan’s strategy toward India is one of offensive-defensive\, whereas India’s has been defensive-offensive. This has been reflected time and again in Pakistan’s misadventures against India in the past.\nRegarding Cold Start\, it was pointed out that lessons are learnt from war and that goes into doctrines. Therefore\, the Cold Start\, which is primarily a mobilizational effort\, does not hold much doctrinal value.\nIt was argued that attrition is a safe option. Contrary to attrition\, manoeuvre involves high risk and high gain. Any strategy\, therefore\, should be a combination of both attrition and manoeuvre and it cannot be a case of either or.\nIt was suggested that the paper should focus on political strategy rather than military strategy as everything else flows from the former. It is the political leadership that decides on war and peace after taking into account several factors ranging from domestic to external.\nThe paper would be enriched if it includes Pakistan’s military strategy and objectives vis-à-vis India.\n\nReport prepared by Amit Kumar\, Research Assistant\, IDSA URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/military-change-in-india-an-appraisal-of-the-evolving-strategy-towards-pakistan CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140124T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140124T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T203625 CREATED:20231224T102514Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130239Z UID:64056-1390541400-1390541400@idsa.in SUMMARY:The US Pivot/Rebalance to Asia and the Japanese Response: Implications for India’s ‘Look East’ Policy DESCRIPTION:Chair person: Professor Sreemati ChakrabartiExternal Discussion: Professor K P Vijaylakshmi and Professor Lalima VarmaInternal Discussion: Dr R N Das and Sanjeev Kumar Shrivastav URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-us-pivot-rebalance-to-asia-and-the-japanese-response-implications-for-indias-look-east-policy CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140131T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140131T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T203625 CREATED:20231223T133507Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130239Z UID:63106-1391146200-1391146200@idsa.in SUMMARY:Prospects of Cross Line of Control (LoC) Travel and Trade DESCRIPTION:Chair: Air Vice Marshal (Retd) Kapil KakExternal Discussants: Professor Riyaz Punjabi and Professor K WarikooInternal Discussants: Dr Smruti S Pattanaik and Col (Retd)Vivek Chadha \nDr Priyanka Singh\, in her presentation\, analysed the prospects of travel and trade across the LoC\, which according to her\, were of strategic significance for India. She applauded the efforts made by the respective governments to soften their stand on LoC and discussed the way in which the LoC links were activated by the two governments in the aftermath of the ceasefire of 2003 transcending constitutional barriers in both the Indian state of Jammu & Kashmir and the so called ‘Azad Jammu and Kashmir’ (AJK) under Pakistani occupation. \nShe argued that people-to-people contact\, promoting economic interdependence and making borders irrelevant were imperative for the success of cross-LoC linkage. The presentation also contained informed about the operation of bus service on two routes\, Srinagar-Muzaffarabad and Poonch-Rawalkote\, which were loosely modelled after Delhi-Lahore bus service. It was observed that sustaining lines of trade across the LoC was a significant step forward to soften the LoC\, an important CBM between India and Pakistan. \nShe highlighted the key recommendations of the Working Groups\, which were constituted to recommend measures for softening the LoC for transit and dwelt on the composition of cross LoC trade—comprising mainly of handicraft\, handloom and food items (agricultural and horticultural). Providing further details about cross-LoC trade Dr Singh said that it was not trade in the conventional sense of the term\, and it was duty-free and barter based trade and operates on a limited basis through 1-1.5 ton capacity trucks. \nThe scholar isolated events which catalysed the process of change which included the stakeholder’s meeting at Istanbul in November 2011\, where Jammu & Kashmir Joint Chamber of Commerce and Industry was formed. This was a milestone in institutionalizing trade between the two sides. She also discussed several bottlenecks which are inhibiting process of trade and travel\, which included the never-ending security concerns\, limited scope of trade\, financial constraints\, communication gap\, logistical hurdles\, and vulnerability to misuse. \nIn spite of such hurdles\, she argued that there was a growing demand for additional routes in the region which shows that such linkages are valued by people on both sides of the LoC. She also brought it to the notice of the audience that there was a feeling of being left-out in those regions of Jammu\, Ladakh and Gilgit-Balitstan\, where there are additional demands for cross-LoC linkages. People in these areas believe that too much focus is being laid on the Kashmir valley. The author quoted PM Manmohan Singh to prove this. The PM had in fact acknowledged recently that he was aware of the growing demand from the people in Kargil to have links restored with Gilgit and Baltistan\, as a result of which the opening up of Kargil-Skardu is under consideration. Such links would not merely yield economic dividends\, they would also address the issue of divided families in the state. \nThe author noted that the record of cross-LoC travel so far was impressive and there was surprisingly no major incident of violence\, apart from the one on the tourist facility center in Srinagar\, a day before the bus service between Srinagar-Muzaffarabad started. She mentioned various incidences which affected cross-LoC trade between\, including the 26/11\, which occurred only a month after cross-LoC trade was inaugurated\, the land controversy in Amarnath which flared communal tensions in the valley\, beheading of an Indian soldier by Pakistani border guards and the allegations of drug-smuggling by Pakistani operators resulting in stalling of the process following 47 trucks carrying goods from PoK being withheld by Indian authorities. \nDr Singh raised a pertinent point in her paper that the initiative has remained largely insulated from the larger complexities involving India-Pakistan relations. She held that it was natural to expect India-Pakistan relations would influence the Cross-LoC trade and travel. She mentioned various such instances when\, the bus service was suspended\, like suspension of the Delhi-Lahore bus for about two years in the aftermath of the militant attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001. \nHowever\, she found through her research that there was a tremendous enthusiasm amongst people on both sides about such linkage mainly because it gives them an opportunity to unite with the divided families across the LoC on either side\, and partially due to the economic prospects it offers. The desire in the people of the region to see trade and travel flourish for a secure and better future for themselves was also highlighted. \nHowever\, it was noted that while on the Indian side both the mainstream regional parties in J&K— National Conference (NC) and Peoples’ Democratic Party (PDP)—expressed their faith in cross-LoC linkage the opinion was divided among the political elites of ‘AJK’ on how to approach the issue. Some of them feel emphasis on cross-LoC linkage would dilute the main issue of Kashmir. However\, the business class in AJK is keen to expand trade-ties and has been demanding that cross LoC trade must be put on the agenda at the highest level of talks between India and Pakistan. The pressure from Gilgit Baltistan United Movement (GBUM) to open Kargil-Skardu route was also discussed. \nThe popular demands were listed by the scholar well which were:— enhance transit capacity by increasing the number of vehicles\, increase the trade basket\, promote tourism to allow greater communication amongst people from both the sides\, establish better lines of communication amongst the traders’ community\, overall easing up access to the LoC\, encourage greater participation of the people in the process\, introduce integrated banking system and efficient sales policy\, and above all carve out a well-conceived policy on security. At the same time due care must be taken\, it was argued\, to retain and preserve the quintessential Kashmiri character of the initiative. \nIt was argued that cross LoC interactions could go a long way in managing perceptions not only within Kashmir\, but possibly beyond it in both the countries. However\, such initiatives are likely to stimulate bigger expectations\, and the challenge lies in managing such expectations\, which\, if remain unaddressed for long\, could potentially translate into cynicism\, pessimism and anger\, which is usually the case in conflict ridden areas. \nIt was observed that at the India-Pakistan bilateral level\, establishing cross-LoC linkage is probably one of the most tangible CBMs between the two. Thus\, the fundamental question arises whether cross LoC exchange is a driver of peace? The scholar was of the opinion that in terms of larger long-term gains in pursuit of peace\, both countries need to reflect upon these questions and think whether they are willing to make concessions on the larger political problems\, most importantly on territorial issues. Ultimately the success of cross-Loc exchange during the last few years depended on whether the travel and trade has created an enabling environment\, bridged the gap amongst Kashmiri people\, encouraged collective economic consciousness\, and more importantly reduced the level of frustrations and angst amongst Kashmiris during these years. \nThe author closed by offering some suggestions to boost this initiative which included enhancing the scope of trans LoC interaction\, maximising economic gains and incentives\, opening the line for people other than those belonging to divided families\, exploring additional diversified channels of exchange other than educational and medical needs\, minimize technical problems\, move on from the barter system as it is unsustainable in the long run and explore the option of transit trade by linking the route up to the Central Asian Republics. \nExternal Discussants:\nOne of the external discussants\, Prof Riyaz Punjabi applauded the author and stated that the paper did well to link cross-LoC trade and intra-J&K trade with Indo-Pak Relations. He apprised the gathering that the partition of 1947 did not take into account linguistic affinity\, compulsions of geography and other cross-regional trade interests. He noted that before partition\, Baramulla-Rawalpindi used to be an all-weather route open throughout the year and pointed out that cross-LoC trade would hold enormous potential if we connect the regions of Jammu and Ladakh to Kashmir. \nHe stated that the Gilgit-Baltistan region had far been neglected by the Pakistani government and it was even referred to as ‘Northern Areas’ till 2005. He also recalled an incident when a group of journalists from across the LoC came to Jammu and had a gala time with the people out there\, for which they had to face a very hostile time in Srinagar because the separatist Hurriyat Conference people were extremely displeased with their affinity with the people of Jammu. \nHe also stated that the trade between the two parts of the region has enormous potential which has been hampered due the vested business interests of the political class who find it convenient and profitable to transfer the goods from a third destination\, preferably Dubai. He accepted that there are several challenges one of which was the illegal drugs trade starting from Afghanistan through Pakistan and India to other markets beyond in South-east Asia. Radical elements will continue to push for this through India and Pakistan\, taking advantage of the Cross-LoC and Wagah-Attari trade links. He urged that some mechanism must be found out to deal with such crucial issues in order to keep the cross LoC trade flourishing. In the end he emphasized that barter must be replaced by broader kind transaction system\, may be through banks\, to boost the process further. \nThe other discussant\, Prof K Warikoo\, compared the cross-LoC situation with the situation in the Central Asian Republics. He cautioned the Indian authorities that it was very essential for them to first safeguard the borders before opening it up for trade. He stated that China has settled huge population of Han families\, traders and officers in Kashgar area in order to fully sanitize the border before going for trade. The other border he quoted was the Tajik-Afghan border\, where Taliban had changed the proportion of tribes in furtherance of its interests as it was a very porous border. Coming to the Indian context\, he stated that till 2006\, only 17\,000 people crossed LoC\, while over 10 million people go to Vaishno Devi and over 20 lakh to Amarnath shrine every year. While the Kashmiris are quite vocal about the need for cross-LoC linkage\, they have not utilized this bus service to the extent they were expected to. He stated that it is only the Pahari speaking people from Poonch who have utilized the bus service as they have been the worst sufferers of the partition. He recalled his experience where people of Poonch showed their lands adjoining the border\, on the other side\, while they were confined to our side of the border. Their issues have never been addressed\, not even in the Shimla Agreement. He also urged the international community to change its perception of looking at Kashmir as an underbelly of Central Asia and give it its due importance. \nInternal Discussants\nDr. Smrutti Pattanaik stated that many people in the valley do not want to take the LoC route as the passport/identification verification process itself takes about 6 months to complete. She also stated that despite lot of clamour about the Kargil-Skardu route\, the reservations are more with India than Pakistan\, as majority of people in Kargil are Shia\, whose pain and agony are often overlooked by the Sunni majority dominating the politics in Kashmir. She asked the author to put the present topic in a larger context and clarify whether she is looking at the cross-LoC trade only from the Kashmiri perspective or larger Indo-Pak perspective. She also asked the author to mention whether cross-LoC trade is crucial enough to feature in India’s larger foreign policy domain. The Chairperson\, Kapil Kak noted that we all must have a grand vision for trade and commerce between Central Asia\, Afghanistan\, Pakistan\, India and China. \nCol Vivek Chaddha asked the author to be clear about the questions raised in the paper\, as to whether she was looking at the subject from Indian or Pakistani perspective\, as the security concerns of the two countries were very different. He also urged the author to visit the place and interact with people to take their views into consideration which would be of great importance for this paper. He also asked the author to clarify few topics in the paper which might not be understood by a layman\, like the term “Trade Facilitation Centres”. He also asked the author to include the suggestion of J&K CM Omar Abdullah’s in the paper\, that simple telephonic conversations should be started along with trade and commerce. \nProf Riyaz Punjabi noted additionally that whatever is produced in Kashmir has a huge market within the country\, so we do not need to explore foreign markets for the products of Kashmir. He further stated that it is a cause of concern that very few people from across the LoC visit the shrines in J&K\, particularly Hazratbal\, and Indian government must look into this issue. \nReport prepared by Abhimanyu Singh\, Research Intern\, IDSA. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/prospects-of-cross-line-of-control-loc-travel-and-trade CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140131T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140131T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T203625 CREATED:20231224T102428Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130239Z UID:64055-1391146200-1391146200@idsa.in SUMMARY:The Importance of Nuclear Security: An Asian Perspectives DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Professor R RajaramanExternal Discussants: Shri Amandeep Singh Gill and Dr Sitakanta MishraInternal Discussants: Dr Ashok K Behuria and Shri Kapil Patil URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-importance-of-nuclear-security-an-asian-perspectives CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140207T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140207T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T203625 CREATED:20231224T102428Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130239Z UID:64054-1391751000-1391751000@idsa.in SUMMARY:ASEAN and Conflict management in the South China Sea (SCS) DESCRIPTION:Chair: Professor Baladas GhoshalExternal Discussants: Dr Vijay Sakhuja and Professor Ganganath JhaInternal Discussants: Cdr S S Parmar and Ms M S Pratibha URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/asean-and-conflict-management-in-the-south-china-sea-scs CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140214T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140214T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T203625 CREATED:20231224T102428Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130239Z UID:64053-1392355800-1392355800@idsa.in SUMMARY:China's Tryst with IORA: What Does it Mean for India? DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: V Admiral Anup Singh (Retd)External Discussants: Shri Jayadev Ranade and Professor Baladas GhoshalInternal Discussants: Cdr Abhijit Singh and Ruchita Beri URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/chinas-tryst-with-iora-what-does-it-mean-for-india CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140228T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140228T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T203625 CREATED:20231224T102427Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T004524Z UID:64052-1393565400-1393565400@idsa.in SUMMARY:Culture as a factor in India’s Neighbourhood Policy: Can the States Play Role DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact\n\n\n\n\n1030 to 1300 hrs\nConference Cell URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/culture-as-a-factor-in-indias-neighbourhood-policy-can-the-states-play-role CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140314T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140314T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T203625 CREATED:20231224T102427Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T004637Z UID:64051-1394775000-1394775000@idsa.in SUMMARY:Reforms to United States Higher Defence Organization: Lessons for India DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact\n\n\n\n\n1030 to 1300 hrs\nConference Cell URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/reforms-to-united-states-higher-defence-organization-lessons-for-india CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140321T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140321T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T203625 CREATED:20231223T133506Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130239Z UID:63103-1395379800-1395379800@idsa.in SUMMARY:Arms Trade Offset: Global Trend and ‘Best’ Practices DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Shri V. K. MisraDiscussants: Shri A. K. Ghosh and Shri Amit Cowshish \n \nDr Laxman Kumar Behera’s presentation on “Arms Trade Offset: Global Trend and ‘Best’ Practices” was broadly divided into two parts. While in the first part of his presentation Dr Behera explained about the volumes\, trends\, and emerging issues of global offsets. In the second part he dealt with important aspects of best international practices in arms trade offset policies. Primarily\, Dr Behera surveyed the offset policies of six countries: South Korea\, Turkey\, Canada\, Israel\, Malaysia and UAE which not only have had a declared policy on offsets but have also undertaken periodic revisions based on the experience gained over a period of time. He also referred to Indian offset policy to highlight its convergence and divergence with the policies of those six countries. \nHe said that given the lack of comprehensive official data on arm trade offsets\, the statistics provided by the US Commerce Department’s the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) remains the only official source for any meaningful analysis. According to Behera\, the BIS data is not only defence specific\, but also captures value of offsets and its percentage share in US’ total arms export\, and offset transaction by type (direct and indirect) and category (co-production\, licensed production\, technology transfer etc.). It is however restricted to the US companies which are mandated to report to the US government on any defence export which entails an offset requirement exceeding $5.0 million. \nCiting the 17th BIS report\, Dr Behera said\, during 1993-2011\, 53 US defence companies signed 830 offset-related defence export contracts with 47 countries. The value of associated offsets was $83.73 billion\, representing 68.28 per cent of total arms export value of $122.67 billion. In 2011 alone\, nine US companies signed 59 offset-related defence agreements valued $10.76 billion with 27 countries. The offset value of these contracts was $5.48 billion. Importantly\, among all the offset categories reported by the US companies\, three categories – purchases\, subcontracting and technology transfer – stood out as the most preferred offset transactions. Between 1993 and 2011\, they together represented 81.1 per cent by credit value. However\, the persistent decline in offset percentage post 2003-2005 raises questions about the use of offset. \nIn the second part of his presentation\, Dr Behera elaborated international best practices in arms trade offsets by touching upon key issues: threshold\, percentage\, and multiplier in the offsets; value addition; principle of additionality and causality; offset obligations on domestic enterprises; channelling offsets; establishing long-term relationship through offsets; offset swapping; banking and offset trading; implementation and monitoring\, etc. \nHe said that except for Canada\, India has the highest threshold limit. This means\, unlike most other countries which demand offsets in contracts valued as low as $5-15 million\, Indian industry cannot benefit from such smaller contracts unless the contract value reaches $55 million. India has also the lowest offset percentage requirement among the listed countries. \nMany countries apply the principle of value addition for the purpose of estimating the true value of offset credit which can be claimed by the foreign vendors. The value-addition principle ensures that the foreign vendors get their due offset credit for the local content they are able to achieve in the buying country. In India\, he said\, value addition is determined by subtracting value of imported components i.e. import content in the product and any fees or royalty paid from the final purchase or export price of the eligible products. It is however to be noted that unlike Canada which applies the value addition principle for both products and services\, Indian policy is only restricted to the products. \nHe said that many countries including India allow investment as one of the means for discharge of supplier’s offset obligations. However\, few countries bother to see if such investment\, for which the foreign vendors earn offset credits\, is having any real impact on the exception. The UAE’s revised offset policy brought out in 2010 has incorporated a hybrid model for calculation of offset credit that virtually puts onus on the foreign suppliers to ensure that a part of the offset inflows brings real benefits to the UAE economy. On offset policy at the national level\, the presenter said that some countries including India operate offset policy in the narrow prism of defence procurement only. However\, South Korea and Israel are among those countries whose offset policy is applicable at the national level for both defence and civil procurement. \nIn the conclusion\, Dr Behera said that the role of offsets in arms trade is going to stay for the foreseeable period. Given the shrinking military spending in advanced arms manufacturing countries and the simultaneous increase in defence expenditure by big arms importing countries in Asia and other parts of the world\, offsets would play an ever increasing role in the international arms trade. Particularly\, in a buyers dominating global armament market\, countries\, which have declared offsets policy\, would try to improvise their existing policies to maximise their arms import. \nMoreover\, he reflected that India being one of the biggest arms importers in the world\, and having a declared offset policy since 2005\, it is vital that its policy is not only dynamic and but takes into account some of the fundamental practices followed by other countries. Presently\, however\, the Indian offset policy\, despite having gone through several rounds of revisions still remains a conservative one and lacks some of the fundamental principles adopted by others. Given that offset has a cost premium loaded into the main contract\, he suggested\, it is high time Indian policy makers take a serious look at the policy. \nShri A. K. Ghosh\, former Finance Advisor\, Defence Services\, observed that the conclusion of the paper is not clearly reflecting in both parts of the paper. The author needs to clearly explain why there is a declining trend in the global markets for the offsets? The author also pointed out that India has highest threshold limit as well as the lowest offset percentage requirement. This aspect needs to be relooked\, because India is having a non-aggressive offset policy whereas China is very aggressive in its offset policy. So there is framework or no framework\, China will follow an aggressive offset policy. In this context\, the paper shows a very conservative perspective. Shri Ghose was of the view that the proposal for establishing a long-term offset policy is very crucial. Israel is a case which looks for establishing such a long term relationship. However\, building institutional capability is the key for this on which the author can write forcefully. \nShri Amit Cowshish\, former Financial Advisor (Acquisition)\, Ministry of Defence\, said that though the paper does speak about international practices in arms trade offsets\, but it does not speak about which one is the best practices. It needs to analyze which one is the best practice and why. South Korea’s practice is appreciated but it is not considered as the best practice and many countries are not following this model. Why other countries practices are not considered as the best practice also need explanation. The value of the paper could be enhanced if it expounds in overall where India stands and how effectively it’s offset policy work. The author also spoke about various fundamental lacunas but the author first needs to explain what those fundamentals are. In fact\, the fundamentals are basic features of many countries policy. The author should thus describe which fundamental practices are missing from Indian side. With respect to the management of the offsets\, the author talked about the loopholes in the implementation and monitoring side which requires greater attention. \nMajor Points of Discussion and Suggestions:\n\nWhy there is a declining trend in the global markets for the offsets? What are the main reasons for this?\nIndia’s policy for offset came in 2006\, but that does not mean that it did not have such policy before?\nAny policy works in a particular ecosystem. The UAE does not have its eco-system. So what are the ecosystems of various countries under study?\nThe author has given data up to the year 2011. SIPRI annual reports can be used to update the data in the paper.\nThe author has given some good recommendations for India\, but a fair amount of work should be done to justify those recommendations. \nIndia is very defensive in its offset policy and its offset contracts reflect what it expects.\nIt is a good paper on the arms trade offsets and could be a base paper for further research.\n\nChairperson’s Remarks: Shri V.K. Mishra\, former Financial Adviser (Defence Services)\, highlighting the significance of the paper as well as Indian offset policy and its various challenges\, said that it was expected to have some kind of a transformative impact\, given the major gaps not only in the technology but in infrastructure\, maintenance\, and manufacturing capability. So all in all it was envisioned to provide a fillip to the Indian defence industrialization process. So far much has not happened in this regard. Shri Mishra pointed out that there is misconception that it drags on the acquisition process and tends to unwarranted costs. However\, it should not be seen that way. In fact\, he said\, the offset policy makers had hope that any offsets investment in flow would bring some amount of attractive returns on the investments by the OEMs. Then only it could be sustained. So it will also help in achieving long term relationship with those OEMs and India’s offset partners. These were the expectations. However\, the experience has shown with the kind of guidelines India has with regard to foreign direct investments some worthwhile investments are there. There are also aspects of joint venture guidelines which require much greater clarity. Therefore\, the progress on this front is very much slow in terms of worthwhile JV entities. There is need to move another level where there would have to be priority defined in terms of the each of the request for proposals (RfP’s) that are issued. Thus\, there is a whole range of concerns whether it is technology\, maintenance preparation in overhaul\, infrastructure facility. He concluded the seminar by thanking all the participants for their valuable contributions and making it a success. \nReport prepared by Dr Saroj Bishoyi\, Researcher\, IDSA URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/arms-trade-offset-global-trend-and-best-practices CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140328T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140328T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T203625 CREATED:20231223T133407Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130238Z UID:63101-1395984600-1395984600@idsa.in SUMMARY:Emerging contours of Iran-China Relations: An Overview DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Amb Ishrat AzizExternal Discussants: Prof A K Pasha and Prof Qamar AghaInternal Discussants: Col Rajeev Agrawal and Dr Prashant Kumar Singh \nThe paper holistically examines the nature\, scope and direction of Iran-China bilateral relations. The author\, in this study\, highlights dimensions of political and economic intimacy between Tehran and Beijing and elaborates how the two nations figure in each other’s foreign policy. In the first section\, author deals with the cooperative aspect of the bilateral engagements. A brief background of the Iran-China relations was discussed to place the issue in a historical framework. Civilizational encounters and exchanges were enumerated to suggest that leaders in both the nations cherish the historic memories to nurture and strengthen the relation. The author clearly identified five guiding principles namely; Ideological principles\, Anti-Imperialism\, Persian Nationalism\, Self-Sufficiency and Islamic solidarity\, to enunciate China’s position in Iran’s foreign policy matrix. In the ensuing sections\, points of convergence of interest were discussed at length and important areas of cooperation were highlighted including; Political\, Economic\, Trade and Commerce\, Investment\, Energy and Defence. Intersection of Political relations was established in terms of diplomatic engagement between Iran and China even before the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Author gave a detailed account of the vibrant Economic and energy relations\, trade dynamics and nature of capital investment flow\, followed by specifics on energy and defence cooperation. The question of China’s support for Iran’s Nuclear Programme and China’s strategic balancing between Iran and the US was analyzed in detail. Beijing’s anti-Iran votes in the UN Security Council combined with its normal economic engagements with Tehran were mentioned\, to argue that China has clearly adopted “Middle of the Road” approach towards Iran. \nFurthermore\, author succinctly brought out the challenges of Iran-China relations; with reference to US role in influencing their respective foreign policies. Changing public perception within Iran with regards to China was also discussed. In conclusion\, author stated that China’s approach to Iran is being viewed as increasingly mercantilist and opportunistic\, and thus took the position that despite flourishing economic ties\, the bilateral relations are likely to be riddled with challenges. \nAmbassador Ishrat Aziz recognized and appreciated author’s efforts to coherently analyze Iran-China relations. Thematic unity of the paper was acknowledged. He stated that no relation in contemporary foreign affairs is bilateral per se\, and evidently most engagements are shaped by multilateral concerns. The need to discuss Iran and P5+1 nuclear talks and recent developments\, was highlighted since it is likely to have repercussions on Iran-China relations. \nProf. A.K. Pasha acknowledged the author’s efforts to delve into the intricacies of Iran-Sino relations. He suggested the author to include Khomeini and Sassanid period while discussing the background of Iran-China relations. Dr. Pasha shared that increased movement of students between Iran and China was indicative of growing cultural exchange and the author was asked to analyze cultural aspect of Iran-China ties. It was further stated that foreign policies were not drafted in vacuum and thus there was a need to address the driving force behind Iran’s foreign policy; while dealing with the guiding principles. He also shared his insights on the role played by external players in the changing geo-political landscape of West Asia\, and suggested the author to see how these external factors have influenced Iran-China relations. \nDr. Qamar Agha appreciated author’s holistic and descriptive approach to the subject\, and highlighted scope for further analysis. He opined that Iran is now entering a new phase in its modern history\, and is experimenting with its foreign policy. Despite international isolation\, Iran exhibited an impressive growth over the last three decades; best reflected in its nuclear programme. Commenting on China’s policy\, Dr. Agha raised the question of China-Pak intimacy and its likely impact on Sino-Iran ties. China’s policy of energy diversification was briefly discussed\, and interestingly\, GCC is now being viewed as a famous trade market by China. All these tectonic shifts suggest that” Neither East\, Nor West policy” of Iran is unsustainable. \nCol Rajeev Agarwal agreed with the major arguments put forward by the author and appreciated the author’s attempt to produce a comprehensive paper. He urged the author to clearly articulate the key findings of his study in the conclusion section and suggested that connecting foreign policy directive principles to the specific case of Iran-China bilateral engagement would add more value to the paper. \nDr. Prashant Singh appreciated the topical value and contemporary nature of the paper. He suggested the author to bring out the normative convergence of Iran and China’s foreign policy ideologies and stated that the major developments in Iran-China relations in the last ten years should be the main focus of the paper. Dr. Prashant stated that even though Iran’s perception within China was undergoing slow change\, but impact of these perceptions on Iran’s foreign policy is not confirmed. \nThe discussion was followed by Question and Answer round. US role in influencing China’s and Iran’s respective foreign policy was discussed\, along with impact of political transition in Tehran in August 2013 on Iran-China relations. Questions were raised on China’s strategic balance between Iran and Saudi Arabia; and how Saudi Arabia figured in China’s policy towards West Asia. It was mentioned that despite differences between Iran and Saudi Arabia\, both hold an important place in China’s “West Asia policy.” \nPrepared by Ms. Divya Malhotra\, Research Intern\, West Asia Centre\, IDSA URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/emerging-contours-of-iran-china-relations-an-overview CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140328T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140328T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T203625 CREATED:20231223T133506Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130238Z UID:63102-1395984600-1395984600@idsa.in SUMMARY:From Looks to Action: Thailand-India Strategic Convergence and Defence Cooperation DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Prof Charan D WadhvaExternal Discussants: Prof S D Muni and Prof Ganganath JhaInternal Discussants: Cdr S S Parmar and Dr Udai Bhanu Singh \n \nProf. Wadhwa initiated the event by giving a briefing on India-Thailand bilateral relations which is grounded on historical inheritances. Thailand\, being one of the closest Southeast Asian neighbours of India\, bears many semblances with India in terms of culture\, traditions\, geography and economy. \nFollowed by this brief introduction\, Ms. Chingchit began her presentation. During the Cold War Thailand and other non-communist countries in Southeast Asia considered India as being a close ally of Soviet Union’s and thus maintained a limited engagement. The shift in Thailand’s foreign policy orientation in 1988 allowed India to become Thailand’s natural partner by virtue of its geographic location\, economic potential and geopolitical pre-eminence in South Asia. Finally\, in January 2012\, Thailand and India signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Defence Cooperation after 67 years of diplomatic relations and two decades of collaboration to expand the defence and military ties between the two countries. Prior to 2012\, Indo-Thai defence relation had been largely unaddressed and underdeveloped. Until now\, despite having military engagements in the areas of military exercise\, joint patrol and defence dialogue under bilateral and multilateral frameworks\, the existing defence cooperation between India and Thailand has never been noteworthy. This does not correspond with the increasing significance of India-Thailand partnership and the changing power and security dynamics in Asia. As a part of defence diplomacy\, both sides need to strengthen their military ties to complement their growing engagement in other spheres. However\, it remains to be seen as to what extent and in which domain Thailand and India can manage to push their defence relation forward. \nProf S D Muni mentioned that since no major work has been done on Indo-Thai defence cooperation in India\, Ms. Chingchit’s paper has certain relevance. The data used are mostly primary and hence\, the paper is useful. However\, he recommended that Thai media reports could also be used to get the Thai perspectives on the subject. Prof. Muni argued that the paper lacks strategic background on Indo-Thai relation- how it has been evolving and unfolding. Post Cold War changes could have been brought in the beginning of the paper. He further argued that Thailand has been successfully balancing China and US in the region\, as mentioned by Ms. Chingchit in her paper; however\, most of the Southeast Asian countries have been following the same trend in the region in order to avoid any major conflict. How India is perceived in Thailand was not mentioned in the paper\, Prof. Muni pointed out. Moreover\, the minor defence cooperation between India and Thailand that was in existence before 2012 could have been incorporated in the paper\, opined Prof. Muni. Factors like growing importance of Bay of Bengal\, common concerns like terrorism\, money laundering etc. need to be focused too. \nFollowed by the opinion by Prof. Muni\, Prof. Jha said that Thailand’s geographic location is important and the capability of the Thais in strategic thinking is at par in excellence in comparison to other Southeast Asian countries. He mentioned that the training exercises of Indian National Army were conducted in Phuket. However\, during the Cold War\, some disturbances appeared in the Indo-Thai relations. After this brief phase of bewilderment\, both India and Thailand came closer to each other followed by the Look East Policy of India and formation of BIMSTEC signalled a positive step in India’s relations with Thailand. Between 1998 and 2002\, a lot of other attempts were taken to enhance Indo-Thai relations. In the recent time\, the Daewoo project evokes fascination. At the end of his discussion\, Prof. Jha said that for India\, Thailand is a major stakeholder in its efforts of developing good relations with the Asia Pacific countries. \nCdr Parmar mentioned that not much material is available on Indo-Thai defence cooperation in the newspapers and this explains the limitations of the relationship itself. He stressed on the low activities and low initiatives in the relationship between India and Thailand. He focused on the limitations in the bilateral defence cooperation between India and Thailand which should be emphasized in the paper also. How Thailand can use the multilateral-regional platforms like IORA in enhancing its relations with India\, what are Thailand’s expectations from India and how US and China factors influence the bilateral equations between India and Thailand were some of the major thrust areas identified by Cdr. Parmar. \nDr. Singh said that most of facts of defence relationship between India and Thailand have been covered in the paper. However\, greater attention to the regional security architecture needs to be covered in order to explain the challenges and constraints. Lack of connectivity\, infrastructural gaps exist in the North-eastern region of India\, opening of Myanmar and other related factors need to be explained in the paper. In addition\, Dr. Singh mentioned that the paper has no reference on the regional economic architecture which surely has a deeper impact on the regional security architecture. How the domestic turmoil inside Thailand is likely to influence the defence and security equations of Thailand was also missing in the paper. \nDuring the general discussion\, Prof. Gautam Sen suggested that the aspect of India-Myanmar-Thailand triangle should be discussed in the paper. Another participant\, Mr. Peter Van Der Hoest asked about the factors which are holding India and Thailand back from augmenting their defence cooperation. Ms. Bhattacharyya\, a Post Doctoral Fellow from JNU said that Thailand does not have any external threat perception and hence\, she asked\, why should India and Thailand opt for defence cooperation. As the discussion was continued\, Cdr Parmar asked about India’s position in Thailand’s Look West Policy and the vice versa. Prof. Wadhwa asked about the economic dynamics of Indo-Thai relations focusing on the comparative advantages of comprehensive economic partnership against free trade agreement. \nAs concluding remarks Ms. Chingchit observed that Thailand wants India to play greater role in the region\, to maintain peace and stability in Northeast India as well as develop its infrastructure\, open more markets for Thailand and improve connectivity between India and Southeast Asia. \nThe discussion ended with a positive note on further collaboration and cooperation expected from Thailand in support of India and the vice versa as bilateral relationship is a two way process. \n(Report Prepared by Ms. Sampa Kundu\, Research Assistant\, IDSA) URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/from-looks-to-action-thailand-india-strategic-convergence-and-defence-cooperation CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140411T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140411T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T203625 CREATED:20231223T133406Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130238Z UID:63100-1397194200-1397194200@idsa.in SUMMARY:Indian Ocean Maritime Security Cooperation: Will India Lead? DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: R Adm (Retd) K RajamenonExternal Discussants: Professor Baladas Ghoshal\, Dr. Vijay SakhujaInternal Discussant: Cmd SS Parmar \n \nThe paper focusses on the prospects of Maritime Security Cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and India’s role in it. Maritime security has become a central issue for regional and extra-regional actors. Emerging traditional and non-traditional security challenges largely converge at sea as they impact economic\, environmental\, energy\, human\, food and national security. There are compelling drivers for enhancing maritime security cooperation in the IOR and considerable obstacles to be overcome. \nThe author argues that as the major regional power and an emerging Asian great power India’s willingness and capacity to provide strategic leadership is critical. However\, in view of the alleged civil-military dissonance and the demonstrable lack of political will for reform raises questions about India’s strategic competence and influences perceptions of India’s prospects as a regional leader. Moreover\, India’s strategic policy ambiguity undermines regional trust and confidence. \nNotwithstanding India’s reluctance\, the paper argues that regional actors will increasingly look to India to provide strong\, proactive and coherent leadership; to engender a spirit of cooperation and shared destiny. The paper concludes that India’s strategic leadership presents a key regional security risk\, and an opportunity. \nMajor Points of Discussion and Suggestions to the Author:\n\nThe presence of a large no. of actors espousing different cultural values and strategic attitudes makes the leadership position very challenging and difficult to sustain. Lack of regional cooperation in the IOR is not as much the result of lack of political will as it is the result of lack of material capabilities and consensus. India is trying to evolve that eluding consensus. MILAN is an effort in that direction.\nIt was argued that currently the priority of foreign policy of India is to maximise economic gains to internally stabilise and power-projection therefore\, has been put on the backburner. \nTo aspire for great power status without developing matching capabilities to fulfil the obligations that come along this status would fail us. India’ reluctance to engage in expeditionary activities or in security architectures can be partly explained thus.\nOne reason for India’s reluctance to look beyond its borders is its troubled neighbourhood. Leadership role has to begin with neighbours and it was pointed out by discussants that India’s neighbours are not conducive to India playing an important role at the regional and global level. India is accused of nursing big brotherly attitude towards its neighbours. The China factor is also very important in India’s foreign policy and its quest for leadership role. China is both a determinant and constraint on India’s foreign policy.\nSignificantly\, it was brought up during the discussion that India has to play an important role I the IOR as abdicating its responsibility will allow China to take control of the situation to the detriment of India.\nThe domestic compulsions of India also inhibits India’s leadership role. India’s Israel policy or West Asia policy has largely been hostage to the minority politics. Similarly\, in recent times politics of federalism has acted as a constraint on our foreign policy particularly the neighbourhood policy. \nThe absence of track II in IOR was lamented. It was argued that track I lacks the guidance and inputs of track II and it hampers cooperation among the IOR members.\nIndia does not have a written strategic doctrine and this does not instil confidence in the other countries. In the absence of a well-articulated strategic doctrine ulterior motives can be attributed.\nThe issue of Civil-military relations was discussed in detail. It was agreed that contrary to the western writings on CMR\, which portray as the situation has reached a dead end; the civil-military relations in India is not actually the problem between the civilian leadership and military establishment\, rather it can be described best in terms of higher defence management. \nIt was suggested to the author that an empathetic appreciation of the problems that constrain India’s foreign policy would present a more balanced view of the so called reluctant power. For instance\, one of the primary reasons for this reluctance on part of India stems from its historical experience of the NAM days when India’s idea of Asia was not taken forward.\nOn the question of CMR the author would benefit if he explores the reasons for its overarching presence in the system. One reason could be the role it played in the nation-building in the transitional phase of Indian democracy. \nIndia’s view of IOR should be dealt with in the paper in order to understand its position on the leadership issue. Moreover\, who all support India’s leadership and who not should be listed out.\nThe paper would enrich if it prepares two separate list of problems that India face; one under the heading internal problem and the other external problems. \nIt was brought up during the discussion that multi polarity is the key in the region. In view of this the paper should bring forth India’s role as one of the key players in the region and not hegemon or dominant power.\n\nReport prepared by Amit Kumar\, Research Assistant\, IDSA URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/indian-ocean-maritime-security-cooperation-will-india-lead CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140425T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140425T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T203625 CREATED:20231224T102422Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130238Z UID:64050-1398403800-1398403800@idsa.in SUMMARY:Coping with a Rising China: An Analysis of the Indian Official Discourse 1996 - 2012 DESCRIPTION:Chair: Lt Gen Y M Bammi (Retd)External Discussants: Lt Gen Y M Bammi (Retd) and Ambassador S K BhutaniInternal Discussants: Group Captain Naval Jagota and Mr Avinash Godbole URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/coping-with-a-rising-china-an-analysis-of-the-indian-official-discourse-1996-2012 CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140502T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140502T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T203625 CREATED:20231223T133406Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130238Z UID:63098-1399008600-1399008600@idsa.in SUMMARY:The ULFA\, the PLA\, and the UNLF: Will negotiations Work? DESCRIPTION:Chair: Shri E N Ram MohanExternal Discussants: Dr M Amarjeet Singh and Mr Bidhan S LaishramInternal Discussants: Ms Shruti Pandalai and Ms Gulbin Sultana \nThe paper aims to understand whether the peace negotiations with the armed groups\, i.e.\, the UNLF and the PLA of Manipur\, are viable\, and also underlines the debates generated in Assam as a result of the peace negotiations with the ULFA. \nThe author argues that within the framework of peace negotiations\, it is important to understand the discourse that exists in these societies before negotiating with the armed groups. This is because protracted conflicts play a very significant role in determining the kind of debates that take place in the public sphere. The process of identity formation\, for instance\, would depend on the conflict that an individual has witnessed over time. Taking the Naga peace process into consideration\, a major reason for its efficacy was due to the discourse that existed in the civil society\, i.e.\, one in which the people were demanding that the armed groups should go for peace talks to end the restrictions of the AFSPA in the state. Along with this\, the NSCN (IM) felt that the status quo was not in their favour\, and for its leaders\, projecting the peace process at a high level of visibility was itself an achievement. \nThe situation in Manipur and Assam is very different as compared to this. One reason why the peace process is so problematic is because of existing categorizations of friend and enemy that have been the basis of identity of an individual from the beginning\, which consequently are very difficult to counter. The public discourses in these societies are very narrow and full of assumptions that result in the use of a particular kind of language to describe the other. Let us take a few examples of these existing discourses: \n\nThe Meitei public discourse is energized by a language of seeing themselves as different and alienated\, such that their rights are threatened by other communities and also by the Indian state. This identity and discourse is projected in the two armed groups of Manipur\, the UNLF and PLA. \nThe ULFA discourse also projects the discourse of Assam\, i.e.\, the resources of Assam are not used for purposes that will benefit its people. Additionally\, it questions the basis of Assamese annexation given that the Treaty of Yandaboo of 1826 did not include the Ahom king and was only signed between the Burmese and the British army. \nThe Tangkhul discourse focuses on maintaining their uniqueness and denies the existence of pluralism in its society vis-à-vis the Meiteis. This discourse of difference is evident\, such that an acceptance of the Meiteis would question their demand of a separate state. \n\nTherefore\, given these existing discourses it becomes very disorienting for the armed groups to have peace talks with the government. A ceasefire with the state would pose a question to their authenticity and would mean changing their entire frame of reference. In order to deal with this problem\, it becomes important to begin by challenging these existing discourses of difference. And to counter these exclusivist categorizations\, new frames have to come into existence. \nAlong with these there are other specific challenges that need to be considered. In the ULFA case\, the group has been involved in peace talks with the Government of India since 2011. However\, the legitimacy of these talks has been questioned as most of the leaders who were brought to the table were arrested\, and hence ‘coerced’ into the peace process. Another challenge to the peace talks is the anti-talk faction of Paresh Barua who is not willing to join the negotiations. While looking at the UNLF and PLA’s contention for peace talks\, the most important challenge is an embedded belief that the peace negotiation process is not about conflict transformation or about dealing with the root causes of the problem\, but only a counter-insurgency strategy. They feel it is to ensure the group gets divided\, weakened and militarily dominated. \nTo counter these challenges\, it is important to ensure a significant pre-negotiations stage. Such a stage would involve: \n\nA common understanding of the problem between the government and the armed group\nIdentifying leaders or cadres who would be willing to talk or might influence the top leader\nUse of back channel negotiations\, i.e.\, use of government negotiators to talk actively with the armed group without much of media coverage. This is a significant tool for conflict resolution\, however\, a drawback of this is that the groups that may not be involved might act as spoilers to the process. \n\nIt is also important to remember that negotiations are complex and susceptible to transformation. Four things that are important for the success of a negotiation process are – leadership; the right kind of incentive structures and a common vision; institutional structures that enable the negotiations to succeed; and finally the right kind of implementation. \nKey points that were raised during the discussion:\n\nIn Manipur\, there are various overarching factors that hinder the negotiations between the government and the armed groups. This includes a lack of seriousness on both the sides as both consider status quo as beneficial to them. \nWhile it is true that ethnic identities are being proliferated in the North East\, one must also carefully consider the reasons behind this proliferation – structural as well as political. \nPeace processes are empowering and disorienting. In order to know the reason why the armed groups are not ready for peace talks\, it would be crucial to look into the question as to why is the disorienting part of the peace process more deterring than the empowering part. \nThere is a need to address issues of narrow political discourses within the North East and the absence of informed debate/consciousness on these issues in the rest of the country. \nNarratives that have become the base of grievances of armed groups need to be counter challenged. \nThere exists a need to challenge the lack of response of the Indian state and the issue of racist administrative behaviour that has been a cornerstone in terms of the way Indian establishment behaves with the people in the North East. \nOver time\, there has been a shift of the focus of the armed groups from the ideologies they were formed with\, towards increasing criminal activities. \nIt is important to create more employment opportunities and encourage people to people contact between the population in the North East and the rest of the country. \nReport prepared by Ms. Husanjot Chahal URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-ulfa-the-pla-and-the-unlf-will-negotiations-work CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140502T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140502T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T203625 CREATED:20231223T133406Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130238Z UID:63099-1399008600-1399008600@idsa.in SUMMARY:Egypt’s Faltering Transition: Domestic and Regional Dynamics and Challenges for India DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Ambassador Arundhati GhoseExternal Discussants: Shri Sanjay Singh and Professor Gulshan DietlInternal Discussants: Dr P K Pradhan and Ms Ruchita Beri \nThe paper is an attempt to analytically examine the intricacies of Egypt’s transition\, its domestic-regional dynamics and nature of Indo-Egyptian relations. In the introductory remarks\, author briefly discussed Egypt’s geographic\, demographic\, civilizational and geo-political significance and highlighted Egypt’s centrality in West Asia-North Africa (WANA) region’s strategic landscape. \nAuthor raised four concise research questions which form the major premise of this study; Factors responsible for faltering transition\, Major domestic stake-holders in Egypt’s transition\, External factors influencing the Egyptian transition and reverberations of transition on the region\, and India’s key interests in Egypt. \nIn the first section\, author identified four factors responsible for the flawed transition of Egypt. As per author’s contentions\, SCAF in its short political existence of sixteen months failed to address the popular demands of Egyptians and thus its political miscalculation proved to be an obstruction in Egypt’s democratic ambitions. Author further elaborated how multiple elections and constitutional referenda post-2011 created an element of ambiguity and frustration\, and led to a directionless transition. The third factor responsible for transition’s failure was Muslim Brotherhood’s confusion\, contradiction and hurry in managing the new democratic Egypt. Lastly\, with reference to certain important economic variables\, author affirmed that deplorable economic conditions and inability to revive the Egyptian economy further impeded the transitional movement. \nIn the next section\, author dealt with the major domestic players involved in writing the script of Egypt’s transition. Role played by Egyptian Armed forces\, Political parties (Muslim Brotherhood\, Islamic and secular political parties) and Youth Movements (April 6 movement\, Revolutionary Youth Coalition\, Tamarod) was analytically elaborated by the author. \nThird section of the paper was centered on external dynamics of the transition. Author classified the influences under two major sub-heads; Regional and extra-regional camps. Based on ideological differences and state of diplomatic relations\, author established that Saudi-UAE-Kuwait formed the Anti-Muslim brotherhood lobby\, and Turkey-Iran-Qatar group was labelled as the Pro Muslim Brotherhood camp. Under Extra-regional stake holders\, the case of Russia and U.S. was studied in greater detail. To evaluate Egypt’s impact on the region\, author studied the spread of Political Islam emanating from Egyptian territory\, reaction of neighbours such as Iran and Turkey\, probable trade-effects along Suez Canal and changing US policies. \nLast section of the paper focused on Indo-Egyptian relations by examining the cultural\, civilizational\, diplomatic\, and economic-trade linkages. Special emphasis was laid on nature of bilateral ties in face of the Arab Spring. In conclusion\, author emphatically articulated Egypt’s importance for India and deliberated upon challenges facing New Delhi while dealing with changing regimes in Cairo. \nShri Sanjay Singh congratulated the author for producing a well-structured and analytically sound paper. He stated that developments in WANA region deserve a more detailed mention in the introduction section of the paper to place Egypt in the regional context. He further suggested the author to examine the impact of Iran P5+1 talks and Iraq elections on Egypt. He appreciated author’s detailed analysis of Muslim Brotherhood’s role in Egyptian transition and asked the author to further address intra Muslim Brotherhood clefts. Furthermore\, Shri Sanjay Singh highlighted the centrality of domestic economic forces in shaping the transition. Lastly\, it was stated that even though Egypt is important to India\, GCC remains the centre of attention and thus labelling Egypt as the “vital cog” in India’s foreign policy matrix seemed to be an exaggeration. \nProf. Gulshan Dietl appreciated the cogent and focused study undertaken by the author. She opined that the three years of turbulence have changed the status quo in Egypt and thus the argument that “Egypt is back to square one” remains contestable. While commenting on Egypt’s contemporary relevance\, Prof Dietl mentioned that Cairo as headquarters of Arab league exemplifies Egypt’s centrality to the West Asian region. Additionally\, author was urged to examine the role of Egyptian films and TV in evoking and influencing the public sentiment\, in order to catch the pulse of Egyptian revolution. \nMs. Ruchita Beri acknowledged author’s efforts. She mentioned that though Egypt geographically falls under the African continent\, Egyptians generally alienate themselves from their African identity. She suggested that the author accommodate the issue of Egypt’s participation in the African Union within the subject-matter of this paper\, and also briefly examine Sino-Egypt trade relations. \nDr. P.K. Pradhan complimented the author. A succinct reference to Elie Kedourie’s work on Arab political culture was made to suggest that reminiscence of Mubarak still echoes across Egypt\, even after his ouster from Egyptian political theatre. Sharing his insights on military dominance in Egypt\, Dr. Pradhan asserted that even though the military leader has been removed\, the institutional structures remain intact. He agreed with the author’s contention that military will dominate the domestic politics\, and civilian misrule will not be tolerated by military in Egypt. \nAmb. Arundhati Ghose: The neutral\, non-judgmental and objective approach of the paper was highly appreciated by Amb Ghose. The author was advised to include “people or masses” as another major internal player in Egyptian transition. Demographic profiling of protestors while examining the youth movements was strongly recommended. Amb Ghose emphatically stated that jihadis have contributed to the failure of transition\, and thus the role of Jihadi elements in shaping the transition deserves a mention\, if not detailed scrutiny. \nThe discussion was followed by comments and questions from the floor. The need to examine the future of Egypt was underlined; in order to extrapolate whether Egypt will deteriorate into a failed state or will it bounce back and retain its influence on the region. Questions were raised on US policy towards Egypt post-Mubarak and Israeli view of Arab Spring and Egyptian transition. The issue of Egypt’s excessive dependence on foreign funds was debated and the need to study economic dynamics of Egyptian transition was duly acknowledged. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/egypts-faltering-transition-domestic-and-regional-dynamics-and-challenges-for-india CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140509T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140509T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T203625 CREATED:20231223T133406Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130238Z UID:63097-1399613400-1399613400@idsa.in SUMMARY:Indian Army: Evolving to Adapt Military Change in CI Operations DESCRIPTION:Chair: Lt Gen Mukesh Sabharwal (Retd.)External Discussants: Lt Gen D S Hooda and Maj Gen Umong Sethi (Retd)Internal Discussants: Gp. Capt. Naval Jgota and Col. Vijai Singh Rana \nWhile presenting the paper the author at the outset made it clear that this paper is part of a project that seeks to explain how the Indian army adapts to change in different arenas. The focus of this paper is to understand military change in the context of Counterinsurgency (CI) operations. The paper argues that military change in conventional wars is brought about when armies adopt an approach which is often revolutionary\, driven by cutting edge technology. Its implementation is directed from the highest level\, making it essentially top-down. In contrast\, in CI operations\, this process is evolutionary\, with limited influence of technology. More often than not this is based on bottom-up adaptation\, even if in some cases it manifests in top-down implementation. \nThe paper argues that change is resisted in every organization\, particularly bureaucratic organizations. Moreover\, the nature of resistance is almost similar. It stands true for the military set up also. However\, the Indian army is faced with a paradoxical situation of resistance to change and the utmost need thereof. In this struggle of the opposites\, the later seems to be guiding the army at present and counterinsurgency (CI) operations are a clear manifestation of army’s willingness to change. \nMajor Points of Discussion and Suggestions to the Author: \n\nIt was pointed out by many discussants that LC fence was part of the wider goal of border management and checking counterinsurgency (CI) was just one part of it.\nIndia’s counterinsurgency (CI) Ops model is its own derived out of its unique circumstances.\nIt was shared by many discussants that stress management is quite good in the counterinsurgency (CI) Ops areas. Given the size of armed forces personnel presence in the troubled areas\, no. of untoward incidents like fratricidal killings and suicides etc. are not very alarming.\nIt was argued that there is no tactical level in the counterinsurgency (CI) operations. Every act has got strategic implications. For example\, even one civilian casualty could turn out to be a huge embarrassment for the govt. at the highest level and may bring the army’s action under serious scrutiny.\nIt was pointed out that the North East template was applied in the case of CI operations in J&K. However\, it was realized later that the modus operandi of the insurgent outfits was different in J&K from North East. The army had to adjust its counterinsurgency strategy accordingly.\nThe Indian Military Academy devotes the entire third year to CI and therefore the army has good no. of trained officers at lower level to deal with counterinsurgency operations.\nIt was argued that since insurgency is rebellion against the state and its policies; a counter to it cannot be a wholly militaristic approach. It must be a holistic approach.\nCI is manpower intensive job and hence human resource management should be the focus along with technological innovation.\nThe author was suggested to analyze the role of failures in military operations as one of the important drivers for change; since lessons learnt could also be important drivers for change as is evident in the new US CI doctrine which is based on its experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan.\nThe author was advised to explore the role of Special Forces in CI Ops. The role of US.S Special Forces in similar operations in Iraq and Afghanistan has demonstrated the effectiveness of such forces.\nThe paper discusses change primarily in military context\, whereas CI operates in politico-military environment.\nThe role of intelligence is very important in CI Ops and hence the paper must come out with recommendations to improve our intelligence mechanism.\nCultural factor is an important element of CI Ops. A thorough understanding of the local populace is important for the conduct of a successful operation.\nThe role of neighboring countries in CI must be explored. Though\, soliciting their support should be primarily a diplomatic endeavor\, the scope for military to military cooperation can also be explored simultaneously and the paper should suggest ways and means to do this.\n\nReport prepared by Amit Kumar\, Research Assistant\, IDSA URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/indian-army-evolving-to-adapt-military-change-in-ci-operations CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140509T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140509T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T203625 CREATED:20231224T102420Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130238Z UID:64049-1399613400-1399613400@idsa.in SUMMARY:Changing Patterns in Nepal-China Relations DESCRIPTION:Chair: Maj Gen Ashok K Mehta (Retd)External Discussants: Capt (IN) Alok Bansal and Dr Abanti BhattacharyaInternal Discussants: Dr Nihar Nayak and Dr Prashant Kumar Singh URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/changing-patterns-in-nepal-china-relations CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140516T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140516T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T203625 CREATED:20231223T133348Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130238Z UID:63096-1400218200-1400218200@idsa.in SUMMARY:Indian Maritime Strategy: Drivers and Imperatives DESCRIPTION:Chair: R Adm (Retd) K RajamenonExternal Discussants: R Adm SY Srikhande\, Dr. Vijay Sakhuja and Cdr R MishraInternal Discussants: Commodore Ajay Chhabra \nThe author argues that as the world looks towards Indian Navy to deliver more it is time to take a stock of where India’s maritime strategy stands. The paper traces the evolution of India’s maritime strategy from the pre-natal days of independence and examines if the present day strategy has aided its quest to be seen as a responsible stable provider of security in the IOR and as a reliable partner in its other areas of interest. It also looks at imperatives that require re-examining. The paper also identifies imperatives that require to be included to enable a cogent maritime strategy and place India in its rightful place in the comity of nations as a responsible and stable actor. \nThe paper tries to explain India’s maritime strategy in terms of drivers and imperatives of strategy. It defines driver as an aspect that has a long term effect; is the raison d’etre and has a direct bearing on the strategy. By imperative it means an aspect that could be temporary; impinge on the strategy and would require a solution so that the drivers are not affected. Therefore\, the roles envisaged by the doctrines have been broadly acknowledged as the drivers since they have more or less remained permanent especially since 1998. \nThe author concludes that Indian Maritime Strategy which has been based on a consistent thought process since independence could be viewed as a cognitive articulation of India’s maritime outlook limited by funding\, lack of an enforceable higher directive and inherent internal dynamics of governance. The advantage bestowed by geography and the relative intra-regional balance of power equation that has weighed in India’s favour since 1947 could be lost due to the ingress of external powers like China and their ability to exert influence directly or indirectly both on land and sea. It could also be affected by reluctance of nations like the US in maintaining a safe and stable maritime environment. Either way\, as India is looked upon by most of its neighbours and other IOR nations as a stability and balancing factor with reasonable capacity and capabilities there is a need to: \n\nBolster the maritime strategy with a modern balanced naval force with adequate numbers and a smoother flowing perspective plan that would meet the cardinal dates of upgradation and replacement. This would entail a relook at funding and more importantly timely approval of acquisition plans. \nConnect the Indian Naval outlook with the central thought of the government. This would ensure a continued success of naval diplomacy in consonance with India’s foreign policy.\nEnsure a common\, and when required strong\, stance on issues that are both inimical and beneficial to India’s interests. This would ensure the sanctity of not only the maritime strategy but also indicate stronger internal dynamics within the various elements of the government. \n\nMajor Points of Discussion and Suggestions to the Author: \n\nStrategy\, drivers and imperatives was discussed at length. It was argued that strategy and doctrine are not the same. Strategy should be dynamic and flexible in order to absorb emerging challenges and developments. Securing peace is the ultimate aim of any military. But it must also keep itself ready for war as a last measure to secure peace. So any strategy must have these two pillars as its basis.\nWhile benign role is an important aspect of multiple roles that the Indian navy is supposed to play; it must not lost sight of the fact that it is primarily a war fighting machine and hence must keep itself combat ready.\nIt was pointed out that Indian navy is a hybrid navy. Its software part is British whereas Russia is the major source of its hardware needs. This is both our strength and weakness. On one hand it shows our flexibility and ability to adapt\, to the other makes it difficult for a hybrid navy to strategize.\nPrime minister’s and Defence minister’s speeches\, particularly at commanders’ conferences provide important inputs to the services and it is reflected in their preparation. Since\, the source of inputs flows from the highest authority\, it gives legitimacy to the forces’ actions. However\, these speeches can at best be valuable in policy making; they can’t substitute strategy which is about ends\, ways and means.\nIt was argued that navy can’t develop its strategy in isolation with other two services. Synergy among the services is a sine qua non for a robust and credible strategy.\nIt is a common refrain of other countries that Indian navy should be more responsible. But the question arises that responsible from whose perspective — inimical countries or allies from India’s own perspective. If later is the case then Indian navy has definitely displayed immense maturity and responsibility as is evident in its counter-piracy efforts. \nIt was pointed out that India must keep a tab on Chinese navy which is replicating US strategy of having a strong navy to become a world power. The recent focus of china on maritime security is quite evident.\nIndia must strike a balance between threat and capability approach in strategy making. The capability approach is politically more correct since it refrains from talking about enemy. However\, real threats can’t be ignored and in this regard India must take into account Chinese game plans.\nThe author was advised to elaborate the financial aspect of naval strategy. It needs to be explored that how budgetary side has facilitated or acted as a constraint on strategy.\nThe paper would enrich if it provides a theoretical framework for understanding strategy. Since\, India’s conditions are unique\, a strategy that suits India can be chalked out only if one has in mind the unique set of problems and opportunities India faces. \nSince\, the focus of the paper is on drivers and imperatives\, the historical part of evolution of strategy should be condensed to allow more space to drivers and imperatives; the key part of research.\nThe author could also explore how delays in procurements affect Indian navy’s strategy. Since any strategy is for a particular time frame\, it is worthwhile to see whether delays warrant revisit of strategy or not.\n\nReport prepared by Amit Kumar\, Research Assistant\, IDSA URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/indian-maritime-strategy-drivers-and-imperatives CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140523T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140523T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T203625 CREATED:20231224T102415Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T003431Z UID:64046-1400823000-1400823000@idsa.in SUMMARY:Rebooting Democracy: An Analysis of Nepal’s Second CA Elections DESCRIPTION:Media person accredited with foreign media and foreign diplomats may seek prior permission from DDG\, IDSA @ telephone no. 26146832.\n\n\n\n\n1030 to 1300 hrs URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/rebooting-democracy-an-analysis-of-nepals-second-ca-elections CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140523T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140523T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T203625 CREATED:20231224T102415Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130238Z UID:64047-1400823000-1400823000@idsa.in SUMMARY:Rebooting Democracy: An Analysis of Nepal’s Second CA Elections DESCRIPTION: URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/rebooting-democracy-an-analysis-of-nepals-second-ca-elections-2 CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140523T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140523T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T203625 CREATED:20231224T102415Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130238Z UID:64048-1400823000-1400823000@idsa.in SUMMARY:Nanotechnology: Current Global Trends and Future Military Applications for “Soldier as a System” DESCRIPTION:Chair: Dr W SelvamurthyExternal Discussants: Rear Admiral (Retd) S Kulshrestha and Col Deepak KohliInternal Discussants: Col Vivek Chadha (Retd) and Dr Cherian Samuel URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/nanotechnology-current-global-trends-and-future-military-applications-for-soldier-as-a-system CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140530T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140530T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T203625 CREATED:20231224T102414Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T002834Z UID:64045-1401427800-1401427800@idsa.in SUMMARY:Sectarianism\, Arab Spring and Saudi Foreign Policy DESCRIPTION:Participation in the Fellow Seminars is by invitation only.\nMedia person accredited with foreign media and foreign diplomats may seek prior permission from DDG\, IDSA @ telephone no. 26146832.\n\n\n\n\n1030 to 1300 hrs URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/sectarianism-arab-spring-and-saudi-foreign-policy CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140606T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140606T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T203625 CREATED:20231224T102414Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T002523Z UID:64044-1402032600-1402032600@idsa.in SUMMARY:Changing Geopolitics of Gas: Implications for India DESCRIPTION:Participation in the Fellow Seminars is by invitation only.\nMedia person accredited with foreign media and foreign diplomats may seek prior permission from DDG\, IDSA @ telephone no. 26146832.\n\n\n\n\n1030 to 1300 hrs URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/changing-geopolitics-of-gas-implications-for-india CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140613T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140613T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T203625 CREATED:20231224T102315Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T002354Z UID:64043-1402637400-1402637400@idsa.in SUMMARY:Peacekeeping and Peace-building: Indian Engagements DESCRIPTION:Participation in the Fellow Seminars is by invitation only.\nMedia person accredited with foreign media and foreign diplomats may seek prior permission from DDG\, IDSA @ telephone no. 26146832.\n\n\n\n\n1030 to 1300 hrs URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/peacekeeping-and-peace-building-indian-engagements CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140620T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140620T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T203625 CREATED:20231224T102314Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T002212Z UID:64041-1403242200-1403242200@idsa.in SUMMARY:BCIM and India-China Sub-Regional Interaction: Will Economic Interdependence prevail over Security Syndrome? DESCRIPTION:Participation in the Fellow Seminars is by invitation only.\nMedia person accredited with foreign media and foreign diplomats may seek prior permission from DDG\, IDSA @ telephone no. 26146832.\n\n\n\n\n1030 to 1300 hrs URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/bcim-and-india-china-sub-regional-interaction-will-economic-interdependence-prevail-over-security-syndrome CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140620T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140620T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T203625 CREATED:20231224T102315Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T002303Z UID:64042-1403242200-1403242200@idsa.in SUMMARY:Significance of Border Trade in India's Border Management DESCRIPTION:Participation in the Fellow Seminars is by invitation only.\nMedia person accredited with foreign media and foreign diplomats may seek prior permission from DDG\, IDSA @ telephone no. 26146832.\n\n\n\n\n1030 to 1300 hrs URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/significance-of-border-trade-in-indias-border-management CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140627T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140627T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T203625 CREATED:20231223T133307Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130238Z UID:63090-1403847000-1403847000@idsa.in SUMMARY:US Congress and the Iran Nuclear Issue DESCRIPTION:Chair: Amb. K.C. SinghDiscussants: Prof. Chintamani Mahapatra\, Dr. G. Balachandran and Shebonti Ray Dadwal \nThe paper examined the role of the US Congress vis-à-vis the Iran nuclear issue during the time period of the Obama administration. The paper began with an overview of the Executive-Congressional measures targeting Iran during the Clinton and the Bush administrations. The author noted that there have been 10 statutes/public laws and 26 Executive Orders (EO) targeting Iran since 1979. \nA ‘State of Emergency’ was declared by Clinton in March 1995\, which has been renewed every year since\, most recently on March 12\, 2014. The Clinton administration passed the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) in 1996\, which became the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA) in 2006 when Libya was removed from its purview. The ILSA/ISA was a prime example of ‘secondary sanctions’ targeting companies from other countries for their involvement in Iran’s petro-chemical sector. \nDespite Clinton passing ILSA however\, it was the Obama administration which used ILSA/ISA provisions for the first time in September 2010 to sanctions a Swiss-based company. An important reason for US administrations not using such authorities was their reluctance to target energy companies belonging to allies like Japan and Europe. Prior to Obama\, no authorities existed that targeted crucial financial institutions like the Central Bank of Iran or to curtail Iran’s oil revenues. \nThe Obama administration’s initial policy approach towards Iran has been characterised as ‘engagement’ or ’persuasion’ given that it included the threat of further sanctions if Iran did not respond to its ‘overtures’. Critics instead termed it ‘free-pass engagement’ as according to them the Iranian response was not encouraging. While following the policy of ‘engagement’\, the Obama administration put its weight behind UNSC efforts to pressure Iran. Critics however termed the UNSC measures as being ‘too weak’. \nThere was broad bi-partisan support for Obama’s initial policy framework of ‘engagement’ in the US Congress. Pressure began to build up for a change in policy in the aftermath of the June 2009 electoral violence\, the disclosure on the Fordow enrichment facility in September 2009\, the failure of the October 2009 offer from the Vienna Group (US\, Russia\, France\, IAEA) and concerns generated by the quarterly reports of the IAEA DG to the Board of Governors detailing the increase in Iran’s enrichment material and infrastructure. \nThe paper then went on to give pertinent aspects relating to key sanctions legislations and EO’s passed by the Obama administration. These included the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions and Divestment Act (CISADA)\, signed into law by Obama on July 1\, 2010. US officials have credited CISADA for major energy traders stopping the sale of refined petroleum products to Iran. Section 1245 of the National Defence Authorisation Act 2012 (NDAA\, signed into law on December 31\, 2011) mandated sanctions on foreign central banks if they ‘engage in a financial transaction for the sale or purchase of petroleum or petroleum products to or from Iran’. Exemptions were to be provided if these countries ‘significantly reduced’ their crude oil purchases from Iran. 20 countries got such exemptions by June 2012. By November 2013\, when the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) was signed\, only six countries were importing Iranian oil. These were China\, India\, South Korea\, Japan\, Taiwan\, and Turkey. \nAmong the significant provisions of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act (ITRSHRA)\, which entered into force on February 6\, 2013\, was Section 504 expanding sanctions under Section 1245 of NDAA 2012. It led to the creation of ‘escrow’ accounts in countries importing Iranian oil and severely curtailed Iran’s foreign exchange earnings. The Iran Freedom and Counter-proliferation Act (IFCA) of 2012 targeted Iran’s shipping and ship building sectors as well apart from its energy sector. \nThe Obama administration passed 9 EO’s as well as used authorities present in Iran-related EO’s passed by previous administrations (numbering 17 from 1979 to 1997) as well as functional EO’s relating to terrorism (2001) and WMD proliferation (2005) to target Iran. More than 500 entities and individuals have been designated under the terms of these Executive-Congressional authorities. \nThe paper went on to note that the response to the JPOA has clearly been on partisan lines in the US Congress. The paper noted the pending Iran-related legislation as well as Obama administration’s response to these measures while continuing to bring new sanctions designations based on extant sanctions provisions. The paper closed by briefly pointing to the impact on India as a result of US sanctions\, including designations under the INA on three chemical companies and two individuals during 2004-2006 (which were subsequently not renewed)\, the pressure brought on US EXIM Bank by members of the US Congress in late 2008 to stop its provision of loan guarantees to Reliance which resulted in the company stopping the sale of refined petroleum products to Iran as well as the impact of legislations like Section 1245 of NDAA 2012 which led to India reducing its crude oil imports from Iran. \nDiscussants’ View\nProfessor Chintamani Mahapatra congratulated the author and appreciated the commendable effort made to distil various aspects relating to US Executive-Congressional actions on the Iran nuclear issue. He suggested that the content relating to pertinent legislations could be presented in a more reader-friendly manner. He advised the author to examine the linkages between the laws passed and the politics driving the process\, specifically the impact of lobby groups in shaping US Congressional actions as well as administration policies. Further\, the impact of the sanctions on the Iranians could be explored\, as well as the tensions between the US and its allies in the framing and passing of the laws\, some aspects of which were covered by the author. He pointed out that the US Congress was not a unitary actor\, and that a huge range of factors was at play in how it works\, including lobby groups\, various committees among other pertinent issues. \nDr. G. Balachandran suggested that a list of acronyms could be incorporated as well as a table indicating the significant sanctions provisions and their use to help improve readability. He also suggested that the author could explore issues such as the extent to which the threat of veto by Obama against new sanctions legislations in the post-JPOA period would be effective given that there has been near unanimity in the US Congress in passing strict legislations against Iran\, as has been delineated by the author. Further issues that could be explored were the possible policy options for the US and EU if diplomacy failed and possible contours of an agreement between Iran and the P5+1. \nShebonti Dadwal suggested that more analytical heft could be added to the paper on aspects relating to the efficacy of sanctions\, the possible linkages between issues like US shale gas revolution and Iran-related Congressional actions\, the impact on Iran was well as domestic Iranian reactions to US sanctions measures and whether and how the sanctions have varied across administrations. \nThe Chair urged the author to situate the paper in the broader regional context\, critically look at the debate and divergence if any between the legislative and executive arms of the US government as well as the dynamics between the Republicans and the Democrats affecting Congressional actions. Discussions from the floor related to the impact of regional dynamics like the advance of the ISIS in Iraq and its effect on the Iran nuclear negotiations\, the linkages between the US sanctions and their impact on the trans-Atlantic alliance\, and the role of lobby groups in shaping US Congressional actions as well as US foreign policy as it pertained to the region. \nReport prepared by Aniruddh Mohan\, Research Intern\, Nuclear and Arms Control Centre\, IDSA URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/us-congress-and-the-iran-nuclear-issue CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140704T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140704T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T203625 CREATED:20231223T133306Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130238Z UID:63088-1404451800-1404451800@idsa.in SUMMARY:The Indian Navy’s Growing Maritime Reach: An Unfinished Agenda DESCRIPTION:Chair: Vice Admiral (Retd) Anup SinghExternal Discussant: Cmde (Retd) Rajeev Sawhney and Cdr Gurpreet KhuranaInternal Discussant: Cmde Ajay Chhabra \nThe paper argues that as the pre-eminent maritime force in the Indian Ocean Region\, the Indian Navy has\, in recent years\, witnessed a sharp rise in its contribution to regional maritime security efforts. But beyond the enlargement of its traditional security role\, the navy is also experiencing a relative expansion in its benign and diplomatic functions\, wherein it is the favoured instrument of policy in exerting influence in India’s maritime neighbourhood and facilitating humanitarian and disaster relief operations. Acutely aware of the need to contend with dynamics beyond coastal and near-regional defence\, the Indian Navy has been upgrading its force structure and operations philosophy. The paper seeks to answer the question – in its quest to shape its maritime periphery does the Indian navy need to do more to project power and influence far beyond India’s shores? \nThe paper concludes by saying that the Indian Navy’s maritime reach and operations mind-set has evolved considerably over the past two decades. However\, while its security role in its near regions has grown substantially\, its power-projection capability still remains underdeveloped. The author further argues that the Indian Navy must play a leading role in forging a new maritime order where it is a consequential force for regional stability and public good. There is a need for the Indian Navy to reappraise its forward-operations strategy to include elements of hard-power projection. For this\, it must bring significant improvements in its logistics capabilities\, C4ISR\, air-defence and land-attack (precision strike) functions. Substantive capacity must be complemented by operational ingenuity and doctrinal innovative to create a sustainable distance-operations capability. A key task will be to improve interoperability with other maritime forces\, effective communications and a model of coordinated forward-operations. Moreover\, in expanding its strategic footprint\, logistics supply arrangements and repair and resupply facilities would be of critical importance. \nMajor Points of Discussion and Suggestions to the Author:\n\nWhile benign role is an important aspect of multiple roles that the Indian navy is supposed to play; it must not lost sight of the fact that it is primarily a war fighting machine and hence must keep itself combat ready. Moreover\, since benign missions have become cover up for acquiring offensive weapons and platforms\, India should also keep a tab on such developments.\nIndia’s reluctance to be seen as an expeditionary power is reflected in its effort to couch offshore operations in terms such as OOAC\, HADR\, etc. \nIndia’s expeditionary moves have emanated mostly from Navy\, though the standing committee on defence also recommends and support it.\nIt was opined by many that there is huge pressure on the Indian navy to increase its outreach. However\, the Navy must strike a balance between the growing aspirations and demand on it and the resources it has on disposal. Admittedly\, we have interests elsewhere also in the sea apart from the Indian Ocean\, viz in the South China Sea; but the moot point is that can we afford to support our operations and sustain it with the limited resources we have. It was argued that when we talk about expanding reach\, the sustainability factor must not be lost sight of.\nIt was brought out that special operations could be important component of our power projection strategy.\nIt was highlighted that Indian Navy’s primary role is the support of foreign policy objectives. Naval plans and strategies must adhere to these objectives. It should be in sync with India’s economic diplomacy.\nIt was argued that our forward-operations strategy will get a boost by signing more LSAs. LSA has commercial component and it helps the host nation’s economy. Therefore\, compared to FOBs\, LSAs are more feasible and desirable.\nIt was pointed out that India must keep a tab on Chinese navy which is replicating US strategy of having a strong navy to become a world power. The recent focus of china on maritime security is quite evident.\nIndia must strike a balance between threat and capability approach in strategy making. The capability approach is politically more correct since it refrains from talking about enemy. However\, real threats can’t be ignored and in this regard India must take into account Chinese game plans.\nTo aspire for great power status without developing matching capabilities to fulfil the obligations that come along this status would fail us. India’ reluctance to engage in expeditionary activities or in security architectures can be partly explained thus.\nIt was argued that currently the priority of foreign policy of India is to maximise economic gains to internally stabilise and power-projection therefore\, has been put on the backburner. \nOne reason for India’s reluctance to look beyond its borders is its troubled neighbourhood. Leadership role has to begin with neighbours and it was pointed out by discussants that India’s neighbours are not conducive to India playing an important role at the regional and global level. India is accused of nursing big brotherly attitude towards its neighbours. The China factor is also very important in India’s foreign policy and its quest for leadership role. China is both a determinant and constraint on India’s foreign policy.\nIt was brought up during the discussion that India has to play an important role in the IOR as abdicating its responsibility will allow China to take control of the situation to the detriment of India.\nThe author was advised to analyse some of the overseas deployments of Indian Navy and asses the efficacy of those. Have they demonstrated reach per se of the Indian navy?\nThe paper should also analyse the US sea base model and then explain why it is neither feasible nor desirable in Indian case.\nThe paper would enrich if it also includes the Coast Guard in the scope of the study. Coast Guard can be tasked to specific jobs both in peacetime and during the wartime.\nArctic is importantly becoming a zone of importance and the Indian Navy must explore its options there. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-indian-navys-growing-maritime-reach-an-unfinished-agenda CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140905T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140905T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T203625 CREATED:20231223T133306Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130238Z UID:63087-1409895000-1409895000@idsa.in SUMMARY:West Africa’s Energy Potential: Opportunities and Challenges for India DESCRIPTION:Chair: Amb Niranjan Desai (Retd)External Discussants: Amb H H S Vishwanathan (Retd)\, Prof Girijesh Pant\, Amb V B Soni (Retd)Internal Discussants: Dr Shebonti Ray Dadwal\, Mr Nachiket Khadkiwala \nPresentation:\nAfrica is not a monolith and there are seven regional groupings in the continent. The West African region is home to Africa’s largest population and fastest growing economies with largest proven reserves of energy resources. The region also offers some of Africa’s best examples of peacebuilding and regional integration. The West African states have formed the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). According to Ms Beri\, amid the current debate on the geopolitics of energy\, the spotlight is shifting towards Africa as a source of oil. She\, in her paper\, attempts to assess the West African energy potential and describe the current Indian engagement regarding oil in the region. She also attempts to analyse the opportunities and challenges faced by India with regard to oil and energy cooperation in the region. Nigeria dominates in term of oil production in the West Africa as well as the whole of Africa. Equatorial Guinea\, Ivory Coast\, Gabon and Ghana are other oil producers in the region. Together they stand nowhere when compared to the amount of oil production only by Nigeria. \nIndia imports 75 per cent of its oil and its dependence on the resource is growing rapidly. Most of India’s crude import comes from West Asia through the Persian Gulf. So\, India is trying to follow a twin strategy of diversifying its sources of oil supply and acquiring overseas energy assets. Currently\, India imports around 20 per cent of its crude oil from Africa; and West Africa supplies almost half of it. Nigeria is the largest oil supplier for India from Africa. India’s interest regarding oil in Nigeria had begun in 2001 and now it has replaced the United States (US) as the top importer of the Nigerian oil. Although India has invested in several oil blocks in the region\, only one block in Nigeria is producing currently. India also faces competition from China and other countries. The shale gas revolution in the US has fundamentally changed the widely held assumptions about both the future of energy imports and the role of West African states in supplying them. The question now is not whether the US will depend on West African oil\, but whether it will import oil from West Africa at all. The decline in the US oil import from the region gives India a chance to increase its engagement with the region. The ECOWAS is also focused on improving energy access in the region. It has started the West African Power Pool (WAPP) and the West African Gas Pipeline programmes to increase electricity connections and natural gas transport in the region. It has also created the Regional Centre for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency (ECREEE) in Cape Verde. The Confederation of Indian Industries (CII) has undertaken several steps to increase energy and business engagements with Africa. It organises several regular business conclaves including the annual India-Africa Project Partnership Conclave. Recently\, CII also helped facilitate the participation of some 30 Indian companies in the 11th West African Mining and Power Exhibition (WAMPEX) in Accra\, Ghana to tap into Africa’s growing power and mining sectors. There is also a great potential of cooperation between India and Western Africa in the renewable energy sector. \nDespite all the potential for cooperation\, the engagement with Western Africa faces many problems. The West African countries are riddled with the ‘resource curse’. Nigeria is an example of the problem of plenty. The Indian experience in West Africa tells that it is not easy to do business in the region. It remains doubtful if it can really depend on Nigeria for oil supply. Terrorism and piracy in West Africa are also important issues to be kept in mind. Most of the Western African sources of oil lie offshore and are especially threatened by piracy. There are doubts if the problems in the region can be solved in the short term. However\, India should devise its policies keeping in the local sentiments in mind. It should also intensify its energy diplomacy in the region and look towards new energy producers like Niger and Ghana apart from Nigeria. It should be supportive towards the West African countries’ efforts for conflict resolution within the region. India should avoid delaying projects due to administrative reasons and should seek a partnership with the West African countries on the lines of the ECOWAS vision 2020 that promotes sustainable development. \n Major points of Discussion:\n\nAlthough it may be good in long-term\, just acquiring equity does not solve the energy security problem. \nAlthough the United States (US) may not need oil\, it will not lose interest in the region because it would need business for its companies.\nIndia has a coordination problem among its own agencies and companies. \nThe difficulties created by the generator lobby in West Africa.\nThere remains uncertainty about the prevailing rules and regulations.\nThere are definitional problems regarding piracy as it is happening in territorial waters too.\nThere is a problem of oil bunkering in West Africa.\nHow much weightage should India give to hydrocarbons in its Africa Policy?\nThere is a need of comparative studies regarding West African oil.\nCan India develop a proper supply-chain relationship with the West Africa?\nWill India do better if it goes with an ideological or ideational mission in Africa?\nIs there any possibility of India doing projects in collaboration with third countries in Western Africa?\nChinese sometimes put off Indian companies through tactical games.\nEnergy is not just hydrocarbons. India also needs to look towards the potential of biofuel in West Africa.\nThe oil demand in West Africa is also increasing. Probably there will be little or no oil available for export in future.\nThe issue of illicit financial growth due to the resource based economies in West Africa is also important.\nWill the investment by European countries in the region increase? If yes\, how will it affect India’s policies?\nThe biggest problem at the Indian side is about implementation and follow-up.\n\nReport prepared by Saurabh Mishra\, Research Assistant\, IDSA URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/west-africas-energy-potential-opportunities-and-challenges-for-india CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR