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BEGIN:VTIMEZONE
TZID:Asia/Kolkata
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:+0530
TZOFFSETTO:+0530
TZNAME:IST
DTSTART:20120101T000000
END:STANDARD
END:VTIMEZONE
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130308T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130308T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T213100
CREATED:20231224T102914Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T012843Z
UID:64076-1362720600-1362720600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Federalising India’s Neighbourhood Policy: Balancing the State Interest with the National
DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nChairperson: Shri Rajiv SikriDiscussants: Dr Suresh K Goel\, Dr Nitya Nanda and Prof. Rekha Saxena
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/federalising-indias-neighbourhood-policy-balancing-the-state-interest-with-the-national
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130315T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130315T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T213100
CREATED:20231223T133906Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130240Z
UID:63134-1363325400-1363325400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Mapping the Role of External Players in Pakistan occupied Kashmir
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Amb Phunchok StobdanExternal Discussants: Capt Alok Bansal\, Dr. D. Subachandran and Dr. Mathew JosephInternal Discussants: Dr. Smruti Pattanaik and Shri Vishal Chandra \nIn her paper titled “Mapping the Role of External Players in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir” Dr Priyanka Singh examined the role of external actors in PoK – China\, the US and the UK – post-2005 earthquake.  \nDr. Singh identified the following critical drivers for external interest in the PoK\, i.e.\, the strategic location (PoK connects Central Asia with the Indian subcontinent and shares border with China); resources (hydel and minerals)\, expanding Chinese footprints; growing interests of the western countries (presence though international aid agencies\, NGOs\, etc.); developmental initiatives as opportunities for investment; and the emergence of diaspora interest. China in particular is involved in the construction of several hydropower projects in PoK – the Diamer-Bhasha Dam in Gilgit Baltistan\, the Bunji Dam\, the Neelum Jhelum project and raising the height of the Mangla Dam in the so called AJK.  \nThe Chinese involvement in PoK\, as the paper highlighted\, is long standing. China is in possession of Aksai Chin and the Trans Karakoram Tract\, both of which are part of the erstwhile princely state of J&K. China also played a critical role in the construction of the Karakoram Highway that was completed in 1978. China also plans to build a railway to enhance connectivity to PoK. Citing sources\, Dr. Singh said that there was a strong possibility that more than 10\,000 PLA (Peoples’ Liberation Army) soldiers were present in PoK. \nClearly\, PoK is of significant strategic interest for China. Hydropower projects aside\, it is opening banks and constructing road networks across PoK. The region also provides China access to Arabian Sea and a strategic communication link through Gwadar port of Balochistan (also built by China) to oil rich regions of west Asia\, through which China can transport energy. Aware of the fact that the region borders its restive Xinjiang province\, Beijing considers POK important to have a credible security presence so as to insulate its borders from the fundamentalist forces operative in Afghanistan-Pakistan region. It fears the percolation of such forces could fan the secessionist challenge in Xinjiang. In addition\, China is also involved in activities like Widening/realignment of the Karakoram Highway\, building a new 17 km stretch of the Karakoram Highway\, a proposed road link between Jaglot in Gilgit and Skardu in Baltistan\, Mangla dam raising project and investment of $300 million in housing and communications sector. \nFocusing on the US interests in the region\, Dr Singh argued that its increasing interest in the region could be partly to monitor the use of funds granted by it for socio-economic development in the region\, and partly to keep a close watch on the Chinese presence especially in Gilgit-Baltistan. This explains the US decision to provide financial assistance for Diamer-Bhasha dam. She also stated that this was well in line with its earlier policy to provide assistance for the Satpara dam near Skardu.  \nDwelling on the interest shown by the UK\, she said that it could be due to the presence of PoK Diaspora community in UK. She also mentioned that Mirpuri was second largest spoken language in UK after English.  About the involvement of France\, she made the audience aware that France had extended Rs. 9 billion (68 million Euros) as soft loan for the extension of an existing dam in PoK. This project aims at building a new 48 MW run-of-river hydro-power project in the Jaggran valley of PoK. In addition to this\, a French concern is also involved in a two-year capacity-building programme for government agencies in AJK such as the Hydro Electric Board\, which is responsible for implementing the Jagran II project. France\, like other countries\, contributed substantially to the post 2005 earthquake reconstruction and rehabilitation work in PoK. \nDr. Singh stated that the Russian interest in PoK was relatively new and that Russia had recently offered to take the contract for Diamer-Bhasha dam without bidding for it. She also discussed that role played by countries like Japan; even the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED) has also expressed its keenness to participate in the building of the Diamer-Bhasha dam in PoK. Germany and Saudi Arabia were interested in the developmental sector— pertaining to education\, health\, housing etc. — especially after the 2005-earthquake. Even Indonesia\, Like Japan\, has expressed its willingness to offer expertise and extend “maximum co-operation” in the horticulture sector in Gilgit Baltistan. Considering that Gilgit Baltistan\, even after the demographic tampering by Pakistan\, has a substantial Shia population\, Dr. Singh said that Iran had a natural interest in the region.  \nThe author then went on to suggest that that PoK could well turn into a geopolitical battleground given the renewed interest of western countries in the region to countervail China. Dr. Singh concluded by saying that the presence of important external players and their growing interest in PoK may provide tacit recognition to Pakistan’s illegal claim over the territory. Though there was not much that India could do about the growing Chinese footprints in PoK\, the presence of countries like the US and Russia\, it was hoped\, could act as a balancer in the region. \nDuring the course of the discussion\, the following points were raised to strengthen the paper: \n\nThe role of Pakistan needed to be analyzed and likewise the implication for India. \nThe presence of international organizations was inadequately covered.\nThe differences in Chinese approach towards GB and PoK needed to be sharpened. Also the presence of Chinese Army required to be studied in detail — whether such presence is offensive/defensive or to provide security to Chinese workers? Further\, Chinese reaction to the presence of other countries in PoK was also felt wanting.\nSome information on the role of Iran and Saudi Arabia in the PoK was essential. \nFrom a geopolitical perspective\, how the US would balance China in PoK would be a good research question to explore.\n\nReport prepared by Anwesha Ray Chaudhuri\, Research Assistant\, IDSA
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/mapping-the-role-of-external-players-in-pakistan-occupied-kashmir
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130322T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130322T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T213100
CREATED:20231224T102815Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130240Z
UID:64075-1363930200-1363930200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Land Locked and Transit Developing Countries:  Nepal’s Transit Trade Negotiations with India
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Lt Gen Y M Bammi (Retd) \nDiscussants: Dr Nisha Taneja and Dr Ram Upendra Das
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/land-locked-and-transit-developing-countries-nepals-transit-trade-negotiations-with-india
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130426T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130426T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T213100
CREATED:20231223T133807Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250311T070955Z
UID:63131-1366954200-1366954200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Malaysia-India Defence Cooperation: A Need for Paradigm Shift before Strategic Partnership
DESCRIPTION:Chairman: Lt Gen Y M Bammi (Retd)External Discussants: Ambassador Preet Mohan Singh Malik and Professor Man Mohini KaulInternal Discussants: Shri Vishal Chandra and Dr Rahul Mishra \n \n \nMajor Arguments of the Paper: The core argument of this paper is that a paradigm shift is necessary in order to take the defence relationship between Malaysia and India to a higher plane. The author has approached the subject from the Malaysian perspective\, and her prescription about paradigm shift relates to the Malaysian state. By paradigm shift she means a change in the mindset of Malaysians in general and the government in particular. The change of mindset here implies that Malaysia should stop viewing India from the old prism of a developing or backward nation.  \nThe author has traced the genesis of the defence relationship between the two countries to the pre-independence days\, when the British Indian forces made important contributions in Malaya. However\, Cold-War saw a drift in the relationship. End of the Cold War again brought important changes in the way Malaysia saw defence cooperation with India. Changed geopolitical realities made Malaysia cooperate with India. Malaysia regards its defense and security cooperation with India as vital and highest form of cooperation. The MoU on Defense Cooperation signed in 1993 is the most important mechanism to boost the bilateral cooperation in defence sector between the two countries.  \nThe author then goes on to explain the depth of the military cooperation by giving details of the cooperation-service wise. The level of interaction is deepest between the navies of the two countries largely because cooperation in Andaman and Malacca Straits maritime area holds vital strategic importance for both Malaysia and India. However\, the author has also attached importance to the contribution of the Indian Air Force in maintenance and tactical training of the RMAF. Moreover\, Malaysia sees India as a stabilizer in the region. \nThe author analysed the discourse on defence cooperation between the two countries under two broad themes:\ni 	Malaysia-India Defense cooperation is on the right track.\nii 	The relationships lacks substance and volume. \nThe author subscribes to the latter viewpoint and holds the Malaysian mindset primarily responsible for such a state of affairs. In conclusion she said that Defense MoU signed between the two countries was a major milestone as India was the first country outside the region with which Malaysia signed such an agreement. However\, since then progress has been limited. Many items listed in the MoU have not been implemented. The volume of defence cooperation needs to be increased. Malaysia cannot ignore India’s rise and must utilize its capabilities. And for this\, the author said\, Malaysian perception about India must change. \nMajor Points of Discussion and Suggestions to the Author: \n\nIt will be useful for the author to discuss the military doctrines of both India and Malaysia upfront to set the context for the study. It will also bring out clearly the points of convergence and divergence between the two\, which will help in policy prescription.\nThe Andaman Sea touches Thailand\, Malaysia\, and Singapore. So\, it is one of the potential areas of deeper cooperation between the navies of these countries and Indian Navy.\nOne of the main irritants for India in the relationship is Malaysia’s policy of equating Pakistan with India. Equating India with China is admissible\, but not Pakistan.\nThe paper would be enriched if its takes into account the US rebalancing in Asia-Pacific. Since the rebalancing envisages major role for India\, it will be worthwhile to dwell upon Malaysia’s stand on it and explore meeting grounds to further the defence cooperation.\nIndia’s Look East Policy and interaction with ASEAN led to better appreciation of each other’s position on security issues. For this reason\, the Look East Policy merits some attention in the paper.\nSignificantly\, it was pointed out that cooperation between the two countries in the Andaman Sea and the Straits of Malacca should not become hostage to the apprehension or fear of the Malaysian authorities\, as the need for cooperation on this issue is greater than any apprehension. \nAuthor should analyze the reasons for non-implementation of many of the items in the MoU.\nChina is an unreliable partner of ASEAN. It first signs a code of conduct and then violates it. Its aggressive postures vis-à-vis Vietnam bears testimony to this fact.\nThe defence cooperation between India and Malaysia is mainly in the maritime arena. However\, it is a fact that the land forces dominate the Malaysian military. It is important therefore\, that the cooperation between the two armies intensify. \nMalaysia’s apprehensions of India arise not because of either the Maldives Ops or the IPKF Ops\, but because of the 1998 nuclear tests and the Theatre Command in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. \nThe China factor should be devoted sufficient attention. The asymmetry that exists between the two countries limits Malaysia’s options vis-à-vis China. It has therefore\, adopted the policy of constructive engagement with China\, notwithstanding the fact that China is not a natural choice for them. Malaysia’s engagement is mostly economic. However\, the China factor also inhibits Malaysia in making faster moves in defence cooperation with India.  \n\nReport prepared by Amit Kumar\, Research Assistant\, IDSA
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/malaysia-india-defence-cooperation-a-need-for-paradigm-shift-before-strategic-partnership
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130503T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130503T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T213100
CREATED:20231224T102814Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130240Z
UID:64073-1367559000-1367559000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Turkey and its Quest for Leadership Role in the Region
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Brig Rumel Dahiya\, SM (Retd)External Discussants: Shri Saeed Naqvi\, Professor Ashwini Mahapatra and Col Ravinder GurungInternal Discussants: Dr Ashok K Behuria and Dr P. K. Pradhan
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/turkey-and-its-quest-for-leadership-role-in-the-region
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130503T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130503T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T213100
CREATED:20231224T102814Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130240Z
UID:64074-1367559000-1367559000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Media and India-China Relationship
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Venu RajamonyExternal Discussants: Srikanth Kondapalli and Indrani BagchiInternal Discussants: Shruti Pandalai amd Bijoy Das
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/media-and-india-china-relationship
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130510T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130510T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T213100
CREATED:20231224T102814Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130240Z
UID:64072-1368163800-1368163800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:North Korea's Nuclear Crisis: Strategic Implications
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/north-koreas-nuclear-crisis-strategic-implications
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130517T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130517T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T213100
CREATED:20231224T102729Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130240Z
UID:64071-1368768600-1368768600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:An Analysis of Real Oil Prices Over a Long Time Horizon (1861-2011) and Implications for Forward Naval Deployments
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Shebonti Ray DadwalExternal Discussant: Commodore Sujeet Samaddar and Dr B MohantyInternal Discussant: Cdr S S Parmar
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/an-analysis-of-real-oil-prices-over-a-long-time-horizon-1861-2011-and-implications-for-forward-naval-deployments
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130531T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130531T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T213100
CREATED:20231224T102729Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T012535Z
UID:64070-1369978200-1369978200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:North Korea’s Nuclear Capabilities and Alliance Game with China
DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nChairperson: Ambassador Arundhati GhoseExternal Discussants: Professor Madhu Bhalla amd Professor Swaran SinghInternal Discussants: Dr Rajiv Nayan and Ms Pranamita Baruah
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/north-koreas-nuclear-capabilities-and-alliance-game-with-china
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130607T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130607T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T213100
CREATED:20231224T102729Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T012442Z
UID:64069-1370583000-1370583000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Impossible Devolution? The Failure of Power Sharing Attempts to bring Democratic Stability and Peace to Sri Lanka
DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/impossible-devolution-the-failure-of-power-sharing-attempts-to-bring-democratic-stability-and-peace-to-sri-lanka
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130621T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130621T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T213100
CREATED:20231223T133750Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130240Z
UID:63126-1371792600-1371792600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Factoring RCEP and TPP: China\, India and the Politics of Regional Integration and Coexistence
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Amb (retd) R. RajagopalanDiscussants: Dr. GVC Naidu\, Amb (retd) J.C. Sharma\, S.K. Mohanty\, Durgesh K. Rai \n \nHighlights of the Paper\nDr. Jagannath P. Panda discussed the newly emerging multilateral power politics in Asia in the context of ASEAN initiated Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the United States led Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP). He argued that central to both the RCEP and TPP is the politics and prominence of ASEAN. He highlighted that several aspects of the Sino-US\, Sino-Japanese and US-Japanese dynamics vis-à-vis the RCEP and TPP have been analysed. However\, perceptions of India and China regarding the two groupings have not been adequately studied and the paper aims to discuss this understudied aspect\, noted Dr. Panda. The paper explained the politics\, policy and nuances that India and China attach to RCEP and TPP. Factoring both RCEP and TPP in the ASEAN context\, Dr. Panda argued that China’s tryst with the RCEP under ASEAN+6 is an opportunity for India to maximize its ‘Look East’ policy. He added that RCEP is vital to China politically to address the challenges and concerns it faces from the US ‘pivot to Asia’ policy.  \n	He also noted that China has opposed inclusion of India under the ASEAN+6 and thus the sprit of ASEAN in unifying the leading economies of the region has remained unfulfilled so far. Maritime disputes in the region have widened the gap among the ASEAN partners and ASEAN’s six dialogue partners. These maritime disputes have brought into question the ASEAN+6 concept\, brining into question if the economic ethos of an East Asian Community would ultimately help reduce the existing political differences. It would be interesting to see how China approaches the politics of RCEP and tries to accommodate India and its interests. \nThe paper was structured in four parts. First part drew a comparative outline of RCEP and TPP and policy preferences of China and the US on RCEP and TPP respectively. The second part explained the centrality of ASEAN in the politics of RCEP and TPP and presented a scenario of how the politics of ASEAN is offering a new opportunity in East Asia\, particularly for two regional players\, India and China. The third part discussed the Chinese and Indian perspective vis-à-vis the RCEP and TPP. The fourth part discussed the emerging contours of the political scope and opportunities for China-India politics in ASEAN context.  \nIn conclusion\, Dr. Panda mapped three important structural developments in the East Asian regional order that have taken place during the evolution of RCEP and TPP. First\, a direct Sino-US rivalry seems to be clearly emerging and the ASEAN community is divided between the Chinese and the American worldviews. Second\, the ASEAN-led regional multilateral politics is going to be another important aspect of regional politics\, where engaging with ASEAN and its dialogue partners will be the priority for several countries including India. Third\, China will continue to place most of its foreign policy thrust on ASEAN and South-East Asia. Even as China’s tryst with ASEAN will continue to be the greater deciding factor in the regional politics\, India will continue to emerge as a vital power and RCEP will be a favourable factor for India in this context.  \nMajor points of discussion and suggestions to the author: \n\nIt would be incorrect to assume that RCEP is China led. It is still an ASEAN led process. However\, it can be described as China dominated.\nIt is debatable whether the TPP is a byproduct of the US ‘pivot to Asia’ strategy. The TPP was formalized much before the enunciation of ‘pivot to Asia’ strategy.\nLittle bit of restructuring of the paper is needed; the idea behind the TPP and RCEP and its basic objective should be brought out in the beginning of the paper and then other related issues should be discussed for a better clarity of the issue.\nIt would be wrong to draw a conclusion that RCEP will help moderate China’s behaviour towards the regional countries. The cases of China’s approach to Philippines following Scarborough Shoal dispute where China temporarily halted the imports of banana from the Philippines and restrictions on export of rare earths to Japan following Senkaku spat\, suggest that China puts aside all trade agreements.\nIndia is destined to join the RCEP. But it should be opened to join the TPP. India would loose huge market if it does not join the TPP.\n\n(Report Prepared by Dr. Shamshad A. Khan\, Research Assistant\, IDSA.)
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/factoring-rcep-and-tpp-china-india-and-the-politics-of-regional-integration-and-coexistence
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130628T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130628T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T213100
CREATED:20231224T102729Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T012341Z
UID:64068-1372397400-1372397400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:ASEAN in Myanmar's Foreign Policy
DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/asean-in-myanmars-foreign-policy
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130712T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130712T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T213100
CREATED:20231224T102715Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T010657Z
UID:64067-1373607000-1373607000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Hegemony – Exploring Chinese Conceptions
DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nChairperson: Brig Mandip SinghExternal Discussants: Ambassador S K Bhutani and Shri M V RappaiInternal Discussants: Dr G Balachandran and Dr S Kalyan Raman
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/hegemony-exploring-chinese-conceptions
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130719T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130719T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T213100
CREATED:20231224T102714Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T010552Z
UID:64065-1374211800-1374211800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Social Media – New Web Tool for Communication or an Easy Weapon for Pseudo War
DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nChairperson: Dr Chitralekha DhamijaExternal Discussants: Mr Subimal Bhattacharjee and Mr Kunal MajumderInternal Discussants: Ms Shruti Pandalai and Ms Gunjan Singh
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/social-media-new-web-tool-for-communication-or-an-easy-weapon-for-pseudo-war
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130719T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130719T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T213100
CREATED:20231224T102715Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T010451Z
UID:64066-1374211800-1374211800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:British Reform to Higher Defence Organization: Lessons for India
DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nChairperson: Shri P R ChariExternal Discussant: Maj Gen B K Sharma (Retd) and Brig Gurmeet Kanwal (Retd)Internal Discussant: Dr S Kalyan Raman and Cdr S S Parmar
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/british-reform-to-higher-defence-organization-lessons-for-india
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130726T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130726T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T213100
CREATED:20231224T102714Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T010332Z
UID:64064-1374816600-1374816600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Cyber warfare in the Asian context
DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell\nChairperson: Shri Kiran Karnik\nExternal Discussants: Brig Abhimanyu Ghosh and Col S Burman\nInternal Discussants: Lt Col Sanjiv Tomar and Shri Kapil Patil
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/cyber-warfare-in-the-asian-context
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130802T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130802T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T213100
CREATED:20231223T133707Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130240Z
UID:63120-1375421400-1375421400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Comparative Study between Arthasastra and San Shi Liu Ji( The Thirty Six Strategies)
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Brig Rumel Dahiya\, SM (Retd)External Discussants: Col V M B Krishnan and Group Captain Vinay VittalInternal Discussants: Ms Rukmani Gupta and Dr Saurabh Mishra \nMajor Arguments of the Paper: \nThis paper was a comparative study\, perhaps the first.  between two major books on warfare theory: Kautilya’s Arthasastra and Sunzu’s San Shi Lui Ji  (36 Stratagems). \nDelving on the absence of a comparative study between San Shi LiuJi and Arthasastra\, the author blames lack of interest among political scientists and strategic experts to look at Kautilya. The other reason could be the challenge of comprehending the philosophical and historical traditions of two different cultures represented by these two great strategists. A proper understanding of the philosophical and historical traditions is essential to contextualize these two books. \nThe paper then discusses the similarities between the two texts. It argues that the most striking similarity between the two texts is that for them war is seducere: getting the enemy away from his habits so to get him lost and then destroy him. The importance of shaping false perception in enemy’s mind and to employ time to defeat the enemy by using his weaknesses are the two most important instruments of seduction. In both book it is very clear that the strategists have to decide what the enemy thinks. Both SanShi Liu Ji  and Arthasastra explain seduction in war with very different philosophical concepts drawing from their cultures. \nMajor Points of Discussion and Suggestions to the Author:\n\nWhile San Shi Liu Ji   primarily deals with warfare\, Arthashastra deals with a whole gamut of issues like\, economy\, governace\, politics\, etc. Warfare and victory in war nevertheless are important subject-matters of the Arthashastra \nIt is wrong to portray Arthashastra  as a realpolitik genre. Kautilya’s Arthashastra talks about enlightened self-interest. It is very liberal and welfare-oriented as far as the internal policies of the state is concerned. Significantly\, post-conflict scenario as discussed in Arthashastra  evades scholarly attention. It is very comprehensive and progressive in nature. The Arthashastra  has not altogether forgotten moral precepts\, while dealing with the business of statecraft. \nThe origins of Arthashastra  and SunZu are contested but the origin of San Shi Liu Ji   is not known. The author and the motivation to write the text is yet to be ascertained. \nIndian military does not lay much emphasis on the teaching of  war classics\, unlike China. The study of the war classics will enable the civilian and military bureaucracy in India to ingrain the teachings in these classics in their thought and practise. \nThese two texts are of warring states\, when deception and pre-emptive strikes were common. However\, in the present era of interdependence\, the strategy of deception and pre-emptive strike does not seem to be feasible. \nPower is an important component of strategy alongwith temporal dimension. San Shi Liu Ji   does not devote attention to this aspect of strategy. \nThe author was advised not to use the term Hindu philosophy. Since\, these days the term evokes mixed response\, it was suggested to use the term Indian philosophy. Moreover\, many of the philosophies which western scholars put under a generic term Hindu philosophy today belong to other religions like Buddhism\, Jainism\, etc. \nThe transcendenatl values in Indian philosophy are well established and there are many instances in the Indian tradition of highest sacrifices being made for the sake of these values. It is erroneous therefore\, to say that Kant’s categorical imperative is absent in Indian tradition and value-system.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/comparative-study-between-arthasastra-and-san-shi-liu-ji-the-thirty-six-strategies
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130816T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130816T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T213100
CREATED:20231223T133706Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130240Z
UID:63119-1376631000-1376631000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Interpretation of Concepts in Kautilya’s Arthasastra
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Dr  Ashok BehuriaExternal Discussants: Ambassador H.H.S. Vishwanathan and Dr Medha BishtInternal Discussants: Dr Nihar Nayak and Mr Shyam Hari P  \nMajor Arguments of the Paper:\nThe paper generates a dialogue between past\, present and the future and attempts to understand the Kautilyan concepts such as samdhi\,  vigraha\,  Sadgunya\, desopananta sandhi (surrender of land)\, bhumisandhi (pact for acquiring land)\, and  vyasanas (calamities) and its relevance in the contemporary state behaviour. The paper concludes that concepts of war\, peace and diplomacy as given in the Arthasastra are relevant today and needs to be further studied and explored. \nMajor Points of Discussion and Suggestions to the Author:\n\nArthasastra covers almost every aspect of statecraft including diplomacy. For instance\, the contemporary phenomenon of honey-trap finds a very detailed treatment in Arthasastra. Similarly\, the concept of Rajamandala in the Arthasastra provides a framework for understanding and analyzing the behavior of nations in contemporary international relations.\nGovernance\, and accountability are the buzz words of modern democracies; these concepts are dealt with elaborately in Arthasastra.\nThe entire concept of the welfare state is found in one sutra of Arthasastra which says that in the happiness of the subjects lies the happiness of the state/king.\nThe concept of Vigraha as given in Arthasastra is similar to the concept of Détente in the cold war period and can be examined with reference to the contemporary Sino-Indian relations.\nThe policymakers today are confused between ends and means of foreign policy. In Kautilya’s Arthasastraone finds very clear exposition of what constitute objective and what is strategy in two terms Sadgunya andUpayas.\n Kautilya’s Arthasastra has seven Prakrits orconstituent elements of state\, whereas in western conception of state only four elements find mention. Economy which is the basis of a state is missing in the western conception\, whereas Arthasastra considers it as an important constituent of state.\nSince the world has dramatically changed establishing the relevance of Kautilya’s work will require great amount of scholarship. One way to establish the relevance of Arthasastra is to explore the elements of universality in it\, which transcends temporal dimensions.\n\nReport Prepared by Amit Kumar\, Research Assistant\, IDSA
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/interpretation-of-concepts-in-kautilyas-arthasastra
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130823T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130823T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T213100
CREATED:20231224T102615Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130239Z
UID:64063-1377235800-1377235800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Missile Defence in Southern Asia:  The Emerging Strategic Environment
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Ambassador R RajagopalanExternal Discussants: Professor Swaran Singh and Professor Stephen F BurgessInternal Discussants: Lt Col Sanjiv Tomar and Shri S Samuel C Rajiv
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/missile-defence-in-southern-asia-the-emerging-strategic-environment
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130830T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130830T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T213100
CREATED:20231224T102615Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T010148Z
UID:64062-1377840600-1377840600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Issues in the Management of India-Pakistan International Border
DESCRIPTION:1030 to 1300 hrs
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/issues-in-the-management-of-india-pakistan-international-border
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130906T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130906T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T213100
CREATED:20231224T102614Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T010025Z
UID:64061-1378445400-1378445400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:AQIM Jihad Propaganda
DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/aqim-jihad-propaganda
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130913T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130913T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T213100
CREATED:20231224T102614Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T010414Z
UID:64060-1379050200-1379050200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Defence Innovation in India: The Fault Lines
DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/defence-innovation-in-india-the-fault-lines
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130920T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130920T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T213100
CREATED:20231223T133607Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130239Z
UID:63116-1379655000-1379655000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Iran\,  IAEA and the Challenges of 'Politicised Safeguards' Implementation
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Ambassador R. RajagopalanExternal Discussants: Ambassador Sheelkanth Sharma and Prof. R. RajaramanInternal Discussants: Dr G Balachandran and A Vinod Kumar \nThe paper examined three issue areas that according to the author exemplified the politicised nature of the interactions between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).  These included dispute over access to military sites like Parchin where nuclear-related activities could have taken place; disputes pertaining to the sources as well as the nature of the information being used by the IAEA to carry out its safeguards activities inside Iran; and the ‘nuclear activism’ of Western non-governmental organisations like the ISIS. The paper noted that charges of politicisation by Iran – made justifiably or conveniently – make the task of safeguards implementation by the IAEA that much more complicated and is a factor not only prolonging a resolution of the issues concerned (primarily due to the absence of ‘smoking gun’ evidence of either Iranian complicity or innocence) but even possibly inhibiting it. \nOn Parchin for instance\, despite 10 rounds of talks from January 2012 to May 2013\, Iran and the IAEA have not yet agreed on the contours of a ‘structured approach’ regarding further cooperation. In July 2013\, Iran charged IAEA Director General Yukiyo Amano of ‘partiality’ and accused him of intending to ‘keep open this issue [Parchin] in order to pave the way for Iran’s enemies’. Iran’s arguments for not agreeing to facilitate access pending an agreement on the contours of such access include the failure of the IAEA to deliver ‘all relevant documents related to the Agency’s concerns’\, and the IAEA not allegedly sticking to its end of the bargain on negotiated portions of a possible agreement in subsequent meetings\, during the 10 rounds of talks.  \nIran more specifically contends that since Parchin is a ‘military site\, granting access is a time-consuming process and cannot be permitted repeatedly’ and insists that the Agency focus on a non-nuclear site was beyond its mandate. However\, Iran had given IAEA access to military sites in the past\, like Lavisan-Shian\, Kolahdouz\, and Parchin twice in 2005. Iran’s arguments therefore that it cannot give ‘repeated access’ – when the last time the IAEA was given access was way back in November 2005 – starkly illustrates the limitations of IAEA under INFCIRC/214 (Iran’s safeguards agreement with the IAEA) to draw safeguards conclusions for Iran.  \nAs for the second issue area\, Iran has expressed concern over what it alleged was leaks of confidential information provided to the IAEA on such subjects like ‘plutonium research project’. Iran has also been urging the IAEA to share information about the member-states/sources which indicated ‘possible military dimensions’ (PMD) of its nuclear activities. The paper highlighted the fact that the IAEA therefore faced real challenges in its efforts to broad-base the sources of information as it strives to build a ‘state-level’ safeguards picture\, if the information so generated is not shared or is viewed as having ulterior motives. The IAEA however on its part is faced with the dilemma of protecting genuine sources of information\, to the extent they are.  \nAs for the third issue area\, the paper noted that the role of the ISIS highlighted the political jostling that accompanied safeguards implementation in Iran\, especially on such aspects as posting of IAEA DG reports on its website on the day they are presented to the Board of Governors\, which Iran takes exception to. The ISIS however contends that it is doing a ‘public service’ by disseminating the reports which are not ‘safeguards confidential’. \nThe author went on to highlight safeguards implementation in countries like South Korea and Brazil. In the latter case for instance\, concerns relating to access to a new uranium enrichment facility in 2004 were resolved within the framework of the IAEA. The author highlighted Brazil’s continued reluctance to sign the AP and its nuclear submarine project as issues that could have an impact on how other countries like Iran could view such endeavours. \nIn the light of the as yet unresolved nature of contentions between Iran and the IAEA\, the paper noted on-going IAEA efforts to improve the efficiency and efficacy of safeguards implementation in the face of emerging challenges amidst budgetary\, organisational and legal constraints. In the Iran case\, while budgetary or organisational constraints seem not to have played a negative role (over 800 man-days of inspections were conducted for instance between February 2003 and September 2004)\, lack of adequate legal authority (as embodied in the IAEA Additional Protocol) has hindered its ability to conclude that all of Iran’s nuclear activities are for peaceful purposes. The author closed by noting that even as the IAEA safeguards department has an important role to play\, the resolution of the decade-long imbroglio would however eventually depend on a political understanding between Iran and its P5+1 interlocutors.  \nAmbassador Sharma suggested that safeguards implementation was inherently a ‘political’ job. He pointed out that Iran itself went ‘political’ when it approached the EU-3 after concerns relating to its activities were first brought into limelight in 2002. Amb. Sharma urged the author to also consult the writings of former IAEA officials like Ollie Heinonen and Mohammad El Baradei to get their view on the issues involved. He wanted the author to bring into the paper aspects relating to Iran’s interactions with the P5+1 to situate the Iran-IAEA interactions in the overall political context. Amb. Sharma noted that Iran cannot possibly cite the Brazil case in defence of its own position. \nProf. Rajaraman stated that the paper was exhaustively cited and had clarity in its arguments. He noted that though Iran may or may not cite the issue of safeguards implementation in Brazil\, the author had complete freedom to examine the issue from a purely academic perspective to draw comparison or lessons if any. Prof. Rajaraman proceeded to give a brief presentation on the technical aspects relating to the Iranian nuclear issue\, including on such issues as the different types of Iranian centrifuges and the impact of the Stuxnet virus on the Iranian programme.  He pointed out that Iran could use the same centrifuges in which it had enriched uranium to 3.5 per cent to further enrich it to weapons grade within a considerably shorter amount of time if it so desired\, thus fuelling concerns about a possible breakout. The IAEA remained wary of Iran’s intentions as it had a history of not declaring its nuclear projects to the agency. He noted that it was imperative that ratifies the AP\, and bring all their facilities under IAEA safeguards and inspection. \nDr. G. Balachandran urged the author to examine whether the AP gave the Agency the necessary authority to demand access to sites like Parchin. He further highlighted the fact that the IAEA has been able to verify both ‘correctness’ and ‘completeness’ in close to 80 per cent of states having significant nuclear activities (SNA)and therefore was reasonably successful in its safeguards implementation efforts. This experience should be helpful to the IAEA if and when it is required to verify that all of Iran’s nuclear activities are for peaceful purposes. Vinod Kumar urged the author to provide more empirical elaboration to show the politicisation process in play.  \nDr. Arvind Gupta noted that the paper does a good job of listing the Iranian contentions on the three issue areas that the author has explored and that this was a useful exercise to know where Iran stood. The validity or otherwise of its arguments however are open to contention. Dr. Dany Shoham enquired whether IAEA safeguards implementation in North Korea could be explored by the author as another case study.  \nAmb. Rajagopalan urged the author to more clinically examine the issues in the light of the comments received. He urged the author to provide a few paragraphs on the background to the political dispute between Iran and the P5+1 so that lay reader could more easily understand the issues being discussed. The Chair closed the session by commenting on the larger geo-political issues at stake in the light of the Syria crisis and Mr. Rouhani’s election as the new Iranian President.  \nReport prepared by S. Samuel C. Rajiv and Daneesh Sethna.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/iran-iaea-and-the-challenges-of-politicised-safeguards-implementation
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20131108T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20131108T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T213100
CREATED:20231224T102528Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T005210Z
UID:64059-1383888600-1383888600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Overlapping Regional Security Governance Mechanisms: An Alternative Interpretation of the Difficulties of Regional Cooperation for Afghanistan
DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact\nConference Cell\n\n\n\n\n1030 to 1300 hrs
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/overlapping-regional-security-governance-mechanisms-an-alternative-interpretation-of-the-difficulties-of-regional-cooperation-for-afghanistan
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20131122T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20131122T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T213100
CREATED:20231223T133606Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130239Z
UID:63113-1385098200-1385098200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Threat of Israel’s Regional Isolation and Imperatives for the Future
DESCRIPTION:Event: Fellows’ seminarChair: Ambassador Rajiv  SikriExternal Discussants:  Dr. P R Kumaraswamy\, Mr. Ashok SinghInternal  Discussant: Mr.  S Samuel C Rajiv \nThe paper provides a  comprehensive overview of Israel’s history since its birth in 1948 and examines  the topical threat of its isolation in the West Asian region. A temporal  overview of Israel’s troubled transition since 1948 has been given\, along with a  meticulous account of Israel’s position during Arab spring and its WMD policy (Weapons  of Mass Destruction i.e. Chemical and Nuclear weapons). \nIn his study\, the  author has raised four pertinent research questions; the issue of Israel’s  reorientation of regional policy in recent past\, Effect of Arab Spring on  Israel\, Israel’s policy shift in response to Syrian crisis-Iran nuclear issue\,  and Imperatives for Israel’s regional strategy. \nThe paper was structured in three sections; the  first section elaborates Israel and its  engagement with the region with an exhaustive timeline of Israel’s  relations with its neighbours. The next section analyses impact of Arab Spring on Israel’s regional posture and Israel’s  ambiguous policy on Chemical and Nuclear  weapons. The last section highlights the likely future trends for Israel’s regional engagement. \nIsrael and its Engagement with  the region\nIn  the first section\, the author states that throughout its brief history\,  national security has always dominated Israel’s strategic thought in the  region. Israel’s foreign policy was defined as a culmination of three factors;  its strategic location\, Arab-Israeli conflict and Arab rejection of Israel and  it was further suggested that Israel’s strategic thought was always dominated  by national security. The period of Israel’s engagement in the region has been classified  into three distinct phases; 1948-1991\, 1991-2005 and 2005 onwards. The author  opined that the first phase highlighted Israel’s fight for survival and its  strategy of viewing the region through the spectrum of “peace through security”.  The second phase was one of a reconciliatory approach. During this phase\,  Israel traversed from its traditional security oriented approach to a  distinctly different reconciliatory strategic approach. The author built his  arguments based on Israeli Prime minister Rabin’s land-for-peace policy.  Reference to Madrid conference (1991)\, Oslo Accords (1993) and Oslo II i.e.  Taba Agreement (1995) was made to substantiate the main argument.  This period also witnessed the peace treaty  with Jordan in 1994. The third phase has however witnessed the return of  security oriented approach. In this section\, author outlined the failure of  Ariel Sharon’s Gaza Disengagement Plan of 2005 to bring about any lasting peace.  The author highlighted the impact of other important developments in the region  on Israel’s regional policy; particularly Saddam Hussein’s ouster and ensuing  political shifts in Iraq\, Iran’s escalating influence across the Levant\, and  rise of Hamas and Hezbollah.  The author  pointed out that Israel witnessed a net deterioration in its regional posture  during this period\, particularly towards the end of 2010 when Arab uprisings  engulfed West Asia. \nIsrael and Arab Spring\nDevelopments  in Arab World-particularly regional players-Egypt and Syria were discussed. The  author highlighted how Turkey and Iran tried to make the best of these  revolutions while Israel kept getting pushed into a corner. Author contended  that Arab Spring aggravated Israel’s isolation in the region\, and “rise of Islamists on political maps of the  countries” was highlighted as a major concern for Israel. \nWeapons of Mass Destruction in  the region and Israel\nIn the  section\, the author drew attention towards Israel’s policy of ambiguity on  Chemical and Nuclear weapons. Israel’s regional threat perception was also examined  to understand why Israel maintains this ambiguity. Most importantly\, author  highlighted that destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons is likely to put  enormous pressure on Israel to ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention. Author  referred to various international reports to confirm Israel’s nuclear weapons programme\,  and emphasized that future of Iran-US nuclear deal will be an important factor  in determining Israel’s isolation in the future. \nConclusion: Likely Future Trends\nIn the  last section of the paper\, the author briefly summed up Israel’s equation with  its neighbours to reiterate Israel’s escalating regional isolation. Author noted  that it was time for Israel to think in terms of enhancing confidence building  measures in West Bank and Gaza\, and changing its position on CWC and NPT. Author  suggested that there is a need to signal diplomatic willingness to resolve  Palestine issue and by altering its anti-Iran rhetoric. \nComments and Observations:\n    Mr. Ashok Singh appreciated the  author for extending the scope of his study beyond the clichéd Israel Palestine  issue. He urged the author to interpret Israel’s perception of its own strategic  policy in the region. With respect to Israel’s regional isolation\, he stated  that Israel has a policy of keeping distance and it enjoys the threat. The  author was asked to offer concrete suggestions to guide Israel’s future  imperatives. \nDr. P R Kumaraswamy mentioned that in the current  scenario Iran is perceived as the most potent threat to Israel\, and in light of  recent developments\, Iran is likely to emerge as a decisive player in West Asia.  He urged the author to speculate as to how Israel prepares to face Iran  resurgence- via reconciliation or retaliation. The decline in US engagement  with Israel post-2009 was also underlined\, and he advised the author to comment  on role of US in shaping Israel’s regional policy. \nDr. Samual Rajiv appreciated author’s analysis  of Israel’s regional policy dynamics. He urged the author to focus more on  contemporary issues and also encompass Israeli narrative on peace. \nAmbassador Rajiv Sikri noted that the paper aptly  underlined the issue of Israel’s security oriented approach. He highlighted the  role of US in shaping Israel’s policy and urged the author to include US factor  within the framework of this paper. He pointed out that within Israel\, there is  dwindling public support for hard lined policy and thus it’s essential to  understand public as well as diplomatic perception about regional policy. With  reference to Israel’s policy of ambiguity on Chemical and Nuclear weapons\, he  asserted that Israel will gradually succumb to the compelling regional circumstances  and declare its stocks. \nThe  discussion was followed by Question and Answer round\, where questions regarding  Saudi-Israel cooperation against Iran\, GCC’s economic threat to Israel and Israel’s  internal politics were raised. \n  Chair  concluded the session by commenting on evolving geopolitics of West Asia and India’s  capability to intervene in the region.Report prepared by Divya Malhotra
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/threat-of-israels-regional-isolation-and-imperatives-for-the-future
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20131129T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20131129T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T213100
CREATED:20231223T133606Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130239Z
UID:63112-1385703000-1385703000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Framing of Nationalism in Nepal's Radical Communist Movement: The India Factor
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Brig Rumel Dahiya\, SM (Retd)External Discussants: Ambassador Deb Mukherji and Ms Akashnya ShahInternal Discussants: Dr Anand Kumar and Dr Anshuman Behera \nMr Post Bhadur Basnet\, SAARC Visiting Fellow from Nepal presented his paper titled “Framing of Nationalism in Nepal’s Radical Communist Movement: The Indian Factor” on 29 November 2013.  \nThe paper argues that the Maoists used “negative nationalism”\, based on anti-Indian sentiments\, as one of the key “revolutionary” strategies during the insurgency. The same band of nationalism continues to feature in the radical communist discourse\, though it seems to have lost much of its appeal among the masses during the course of democratic politics in which the Maoists willingly participated since 2005.  \nThe genesis of anti-Indianism goes back to the days of the formation of Nepali state. The 1950 treaty\, which aimed to bring Nepal under the security sphere of India that possibly checked the import of communism to Nepal from China\, has been a major irritant for the communists. India’s security concern requires an India-friendly regime in Nepal and thus India is seen to be meddling in the internal affairs of the country and favouring some actors over the others\, which is viewed as external interference in Nepal’s internal politics and leads to anti-India sentiments amongst the Nepalese people. Moreover\, “not-to-be-an-Indian” is one of the key features in the identity formation process in Nepal. All these features collectively offered a fertile ground to the political actors to manufacture and exploit anti–India sentiments to their benefit over the years.  \nDuring the monarchy period\, the king was successful in sustaining his regime by instigating anti-Indianism and gathering the support of the communists. Once the relationship between the monarchy and the communists was broken\, there was a regime change in Nepal. With the monarchy gone\, the paper argues\, the role of nationalism for political mobilisation is no longer effective.  \nThe Maoists after 2006 have realised that the anti-India card does not work in the changed global\, regional and domestic political matirx. The mainstream faction of the Maoist party led by Prachanda has removed India from its hit-list\, and started talking about the internal nationalism (ethnic federalism and development). However\, the radical faction in the Maoist Party led by Kiran Baidya continues to talk about external intervention and take an anti-Indian line while framing its version of Nepalese nationalism. The presenter argued that while the line of “externalised nationalism” may have lost its glamour\, the Maoist plan for consolidating ‘internal nationalism’ through emphasis on ethnic nationalism has pushed the Nepali state into a state of wilderness.  \nThe presenter provides the following recommendations which according to him can remove the prevailing anti-India sentiments in Nepal: \n\nIndia should pay attention to dissemination of information regarding its approach to Nepal. In this regard\, Indian Embassy should extend its network with journalists. \nIndian investment in Nepal should increase. Other than in the hydro power sector\, India should invest in agriculture in the plains and mid-hills and in the capacity-building of security forces. \nIndia should recognise and analyse the reasons for the spread of anti-India sentiments in Nepal. There are frequent complaints about India micro-managing Nepalese politics. India should address this issue. \nIndia should try to build contacts with all the political actors and should not be seen as favouring some actors over others. While playing its role to build political consensus in matters concerning its security it should take care not to isolate any party and keep a low profile. \nThere should be proper coordination between Ministry of External affairs and intelligence agencies in their approach to Nepal. \n\nComments of the discussants\nThe discussants have made the following observations about the paper:  \n\nThe paper talked about hill-based nationalism rather than Nepali nationalism. \nNationalism has been used in the paper as a synonym of anti-Indianism. \nThe paper gives an impression that China is interested to play its own political game in Nepal. However\, it was argued by the discussants that it was the Nepalese who wanted to play the China card. China is quite pragmatic in its dealings with Nepal.\n \nTo justify the title\, a separate section on India factor should be incorporated in the paper. \nThe paper is detailed and timely. However to make it more up-to-date it should accommodate the analysis on the latest Constituent Assembly (CA) election results.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/framing-of-nationalism-in-nepals-radical-communist-movement-the-india-factor
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20131220T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20131220T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T213100
CREATED:20231223T133548Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130239Z
UID:63109-1387517400-1387517400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Domestic Politics of Bangladesh and India - Bangladesh Relations
DESCRIPTION:This paper primarily made an attempt to discuss the effect of domestic politics of Bangladesh on India-Bangladesh Relations. It delved into some of the historical processes that resulted in the formation of community-consciousness among the Bengali Muslims whose interests were often at variance with not only the Hindus but also members of their own religion living elsewhere in the country. It was also noted that the Bengal Renaissance further strengthened the community consciousness of Muslims because they perceived it as an upper caste Hindu phenomenon. \nThe author noted that for a brief period\, immediately after liberation of Bangladesh\, India-friendly policies were pursued. India and Bangladesh signed a twenty-five year Treaty of Peace and friendship in 1972 and even decided to sort out border disputes under Indira- Mujib Accord. But this bonhomie proved to be short-lived and after the assassination of Sheikh Mujib\, Bangladesh politics moved on a completely different path. It was alleged that India was selectively aiding groups close to the Awami League serving its political interests. From 1975 to 1990 Bangladesh was first ruled by Gen Ziaur Rahman and subsequently by Gen Ershad. The latter declared Islam as state religion of Bangladesh. With this step Ershad hoped to get greater support of the Islamist forces like Jamaat. But actually this angered Jamaat\, as he had only declared Islam as state religion\, but did not declare Bangladesh to be an Islamic state. \nThe role of army was elaborately dealt in this paper and the author points out that the army played an important role in the politics of Bangladesh. It is also noted how the Bangladesh Army has had closer links with Pakistan and China\, despite the fact that the country was liberated with India’s help and China had refused to recognise Bangladesh in initial years. It was also observed by the author that in recent times the nature of Bangladeshi external trade had changed. The country which was perennially facing trade deficit has managed to considerably narrow it down. Moreover\, it is the only country in the south Asian region which has consistently shown progressive GDP growth\, which is impressive by Bangladesh’s standards. As a result of which the businessman have started playing an active role Bangladeshi politics in recent years. The paper also notes the issue of trade imbalance of Bangladesh with important trading partners like China\, which has replaced India as the largest trading partner. It is interesting to note that both India and China have similar kind of export basket and Chinese exports are now seen replacing Indian exports. \nThe paper referred to an anti-India section which found problems about everything India doid. In comparison\, China has been able to create considerable goodwill by constructing six friendship bridges and a conference centre earlier named as Bangladesh-China Friendship Conference Centre. But when India gave $1billion credit line to Bangladesh for infrastructural development there was great difficulty in finalising the projects. India-Bangladesh agreed to construct a power plant at Rampal. But the anti-India lobby has created an impression that this project is not in Bangladeshi interests. They say that this project would damage the environment of Bangladesh as it is close to Sunderbans. However\, what is to be remembered is that Sunderban is a shared heritage of India and Bangladesh. \nThe author also took into account the fact that the domestic politics was also affecting connectivity in the region. The Bangladesh\, China\, India and Myanmar (BCIM) economic corridor\, which has been in the back burner due to India’s concerns figured in the joint statement when Chinese Prime Minister visited India. Bangladesh wants China to develop its Chittagong port and build even a deep sea port at Sonadia. Moreover\, BCIM wants to link Kolkata with Kunming through Bangladesh and Myanmar. It was also noted that Bangladesh analysts some of whom are hostile to India often try to remind us that if Bangladesh is surrounded on three sides with India\, then India’s northeast is also Bangladesh locked. They want to use it as leverage. They think that if they keep northeast this way then it is not only in the strategic but also economic interests of Bangladesh. \nThat author argued that it had not been easy for any government in Bangladesh to follow India-friendly policies. In fact\, he noted that if you wanted to ruin your political career in Bangladesh politics then get yourself branded as pro-India. The chorus against India becomes shriller the moment Sheikh Hasina comes to power. \nIn Bangladesh\, parties are defined on the basis on their approach towards India. BNP tries to establish its nationalist credentials by being anti-India. Jamaat in any case is anti-India and it espouses Islamic rule in Bangladesh. These two parties have painted Awami League as being pro-India\, while in reality the party at best could be described as being India-friendly. The author makes an inference that on the eve of January 2014 elections\, India was not an issue. This does not mean that India no longer remained important for parties in Bangladesh. Actually there were two other issues of the caretaker government and the perception of Islam under threat which were far more important than India. \nAfter Sheikh Hasina’s visit to India\, it has often been alleged that India has not sufficiently reciprocated her friendly and cooperative gesture\, by not signing the land boundary agreement (LBA) and Teesta Water Sharing agreement\, two big ticket issues which have bedevilled the bilateral relation for a long time. It has also been argued that a greater response from Indian side would have helped Hasina in the January 2014 elections. But the author notes in the paper that such a view is rather simplistic. The solution of major issues between India and Bangladesh is desirable in their own right\, but this may not necessarily translate into electoral goodwill for Hasina. Even if India were to make major concessions and get these issues resolved the hostile section in Bangladesh would never fail to give it a different colour and tell how India has swindled Bangladesh and Hasina has sold-off the country. The author quotes the example of Sri Lanka\, where India gave away the Kachatiwu Island\, but India-Sri Lanka relations at present are far from being friendly. \nThe author closed by noting that the democracy in Bangladesh is at the crossroads. The secular\, progressive and pro-liberation forces are pitted against pro-Pakistan Islamist elements. The deligitimization of anti-Liberation forces can change the flavour of domestic politics in Bangladesh\, because it might be easier for India then to get acceptability of both the major political parties. \nExternal Discussants \nOne of the external discussants\, K. Srinivasan\, cautioned the author that after only 2007 they have been talking of 1971 as a Liberation War. He continued by adding that on anti-terrorism front\, the amount of progress which has been made is commendable even if the issues of water and land boundary agreements remain unresolved. He was also sceptical of the fact that Awami League is India-friendly because it accounts for most irritants to India. \nThe other discussant\, Joyeeta Bhattacharjee\, suggested that it was very essential to first understand the internal politics of Bangladesh\, and in this regard\, the author needed to go back and understand the formation of Awami League and BNP. She further corrected the author that BNP was a centre-right party\, not an anti-India group. Though\, BNP leaders are closer to the Jamaat\, they could not be held as “anti-India”\, rather such observations might irk them. She also considered it important to factor in the perspective of Bangladesh Army in internal politics. She also added that the Awami League government also made use of the China factor very effectively. As because China does not share any direct land boundary with Bangladesh\, like India— which gives rise to fear and scepticism in the minds of common people of Bangladesh— China is regarded as a friendly country. She further noted that it was natural for Bangladeshis to conduct their foreign policy to serve their national interests\, which might not always fulfil India’s expectations. She also counter-argued that India was not a major factor in the internal politics of Bangladesh\, and issues like price rise\, inflation\, caretaker government usually assumed centre-stage in domestic politics.  \nInternal Discussants \nGulbin Sulatana raised four issues. She first asked the author to find out why political parties in Bangladesh regard India and not any other country as a factor in domestic politics and why the business community in Bangladesh preferred to do trade with China ignoring India\, despite having a huge trade deficit with China. She also expressed her doubts about the author’s claims that de-legitimization of anti-liberation forces could change the anti-India mindset of the people in Bangladesh. Lastly\, she urged the author to throw more light on the anti-India section within the Awami League.  \nAnshuman Behera suggested the author to include more historical portions in his paper and look at the peasant movement incited by Haji Shariatullah more critically. He suggested the author to study Bengali renaissance and the role of Brahmo Samaj in it. Moreover\, he argued that the author should ideally include an analysis of Bangladeshi politics during 1947-71 and examine how Bengali nationalism and anti-Indian sentiment shaped up during this period. He also considered it important for the author to discuss other anti-Indian organizations in Bangladesh like Hizb ut-Tahrir and the neo-radicals which played a great role in fuelling anti-Indian sentiments in Bangladesh.  \nLastly\, he said that all neighbouring countries do have a devoted anti-India constituency and  the author needed to provide recommendations as to what should India do in order to erase that sentiment and improve its relations with the neighbours. \nDr. Arvind Gupta noted that it doesn’t matters what Bangladesh thinks about India\, rather it should be noted that how India should deal with its neighbours. Indian scholars must analyse how countries like China\, Turkey and Brazil deal with their neighbours. He also suggested that no matter how much anti-Indianism was there in our neighbours\, we must deal with it  in a pragmatic manner. If polarisation and anti-Indianism is there\, we must accept it. We have learned enough lessons from history that tit-for-tat policy is not going to be in India’s interests. He suggested that there should be more telephone calls and visits between the leaderships of the two countries. The Chair\, Amb. R. Rajgopalan\, commented that India had a distinct advantage vis-à-vis China in Bangladesh because of the long border it shared with Bangladesh\, which India must take full advantage of and use to good effect. \nReport prepared by Abhimanyu Singh\, Research Intern\, IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/domestic-politics-of-bangladesh-and-india-bangladesh-relations
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140103T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140103T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T213100
CREATED:20231224T102515Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130239Z
UID:64058-1388727000-1388727000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:US Factor in Sino–Indian Relations: India’s Fine Balancing
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson:  Prof. Christopher S. Raj \nExternal Discussants: Prof. Chintamani Mahapatra and Prof. Sreeram ChauliaInternal Discussants: Dr. Mahua Bhattacharya and Sanjeev Srivastava
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/us-factor-in-sino-indian-relations-indias-fine-balancing
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140110T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140110T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T213100
CREATED:20231224T102515Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T004944Z
UID:64057-1389331800-1389331800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:The Tamil Nadu Factor: Perspectives of Tamils and Muslims in Sri Lanka
DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact\n\n\n\n\n1030 to 1300 hrs\nConference Cell
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-tamil-nadu-factor-perspectives-of-tamils-and-muslims-in-sri-lanka
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140117T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140117T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T213100
CREATED:20231223T133548Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130239Z
UID:63107-1389936600-1389936600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Military Change in India: An Appraisal of the Evolving Strategy Towards Pakistan
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Lt Gen HS Lidder (Retd)External Discussants: Vice Adm Anup Singh (Retd)\, Lt Gen Prakash Menon (Retd) and Professor Rajesh RajagopalanInternal Discussant: Col PK Gautam (Retd) \nThis paper primarily made an attempt to understand India’s evolving military strategy towards Pakistan. It analyzes this evolution using the theoretical framework of mlitary change\, which can be conceived of as occurring at three levels: the goals of a military organisation\, its organisational structure\, and the strategy it adopts. The cause of military change can be traced to three sources: a voluntary or externally induced change in the cultural norms of a military organisation; changes in a state’s domestic political orientation or in its national security scenario; and the introduction of new technology.  \nThe paper seeks to examine whether military change has occurred in India at any of the three levels identified above and\, if yes\, then what has been the source of that change. With these objectives\, the paper focuses upon the third level of change\, namely strategy. Specifically\, it examines the strategies adopted by the Indian armed forces for the Pakistan front and the changes effected therein over the course of the last six decades. This examination highlights two principal trends. At the operational level of war\, India’s military strategy towards Pakistan changed from attrition to manoeuvre and back to attrition. And the objective of India’s strategy has changed from victory until the 1980s to punishing Pakistan since the 1990s. The paper argues that these changes were caused by India’s evolving security scenario vis-à-vis Pakistan and in particular by the introduction of nuclear weapons\, which have inhibited India’s response to the challenge posed by Pakistan. \nThe paper concludes that civil-military coordination is essential for bringing in sync the military and political objectives within a larger strategic narrative. While such coordination was indeed a consistent feature between independence and the 1999 Kargil conflict\, a divergence has emerged between the political and military leaderships during the last 10 years. This fraying of politico-military coordination is clearly evident in the army’s failure to win political approval for the Cold Start strategy and indeed in its attempt through such a strategy to compel the political leadership into following its timetable for military action. For its part\, the political leadership has also failed to engage with the services to ensure the crafting of a strategy that is both appropriate for a nuclear environment and is dovetailed with broader policy objectives. \nMajor Points of Discussion and Suggestions to the Author:\n\nIt was pointed out that more than lack of trust or anything else\, the civil-military disconnect in India is the result of lack of expertise on military matters among the civilian leadership. This state of affairs can be attributed to the near absence of public discourse on hardcore military subjects. This scenario is\, however\, fast changing with an increasing number of retired military professionals beginning to write and generating a public debate on military issues.\nMilitary strategy in war is different from pre-war planning. The paper needs to spell out clearly which level of strategy is its focus.\nThere is a need to unbundle and elaborate upon the argument about the change in Indian strategy from victory to punishment. It was argued that India’s objective has been to deter Pakistan and the method adopted for that purpose has been punishment and not victory per se. Further\, for India\, victory has not always entailed the defeat of Pakistan or the occupation of its territory. Victory has to be judged in terms of the goals set with punishment also having been a part of victory. \nWith respect to the nuclear factor\, it was pointed out that India has been repeatedly subjected to nuclear blackmail. At the same time\, India’s propensity to up the ante against Pakistan has been severely constrained. The Cold Start has been seen as a viable option in the nuclear backdrop but the ambiguity that surrounds it has outweighed its utility as a strategy.\nWhile formulating any strategy vis-à-vis Pakistan\, India cannot ignore China. It implies that a two front war scenario is a very distinct possibility and India must retool its strategy to meet such challenge.\nThe paper needs to incorporate the role played by the Mukti Bahini in the 1971 war\, a role that was crucial in terms of providing valuable intelligence and reconnaissance support.\nIt was argued that Pakistan’s strategy toward India is one of offensive-defensive\, whereas India’s has been defensive-offensive. This has been reflected time and again in Pakistan’s misadventures against India in the past.\nRegarding Cold Start\, it was pointed out that lessons are learnt from war and that goes into doctrines. Therefore\, the Cold Start\, which is primarily a mobilizational effort\, does not hold much doctrinal value.\nIt was argued that attrition is a safe option. Contrary to attrition\, manoeuvre involves high risk and high gain. Any strategy\, therefore\, should be a combination of both attrition and manoeuvre and it cannot be a case of either or.\nIt was suggested that the paper should focus on political strategy rather than military strategy as everything else flows from the former. It is the political leadership that decides on war and peace after taking into account several factors ranging from domestic to external.\nThe paper would be enriched if it includes Pakistan’s military strategy and objectives vis-à-vis India.\n\nReport prepared by Amit Kumar\, Research Assistant\, IDSA
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/military-change-in-india-an-appraisal-of-the-evolving-strategy-towards-pakistan
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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