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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110826T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110826T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T000622
CREATED:20231224T103605Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130243Z
UID:64103-1314336600-1314336600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:US Nuclear Weapons Policy and Practice in the Shadow of 9/11
DESCRIPTION:Event: Fellows Seminar \nChairperson: Ambassador Arundhati GhoseDiscussants: Professor Jeffrey Legro and Dr. Manpreet Sethi \nThe paper is an attempt to explore US nuclear weapons policy and practice in the shadow of 9/11. In the first part of his presentation\, Rajiv provided an examination of the major US national strategy and nuclear policy documents after 9/11 and their policy prescriptions regarding the ‘twin threats’ of proliferation and terrorism. Among the documents he examined included 2002 National Security Strategy\, 2002 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)\, 2006 US National Strategy for Combating Terrorism\, 2006 National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction\, 2008 National Security and Nuclear Weapons in 21st Century\, QDR 2010\, and NPR 2010. Citing pertinent portions of these documents\, he stated that they reinforce the importance of nuclear deterrence in US grand strategy and the imperative need to fine-tune its defence capabilities to face the twin threats. He noted that new type of weaponry was sought be developed such as conventional-cum-nuclear ‘bunker-busters’ to tackle the challenges posed by underground facilities (UGF’s). Other strategic innovations included transforming nuclear weapon platforms like the 4 Ohio-class SSBN’s to perform conventional roles and Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) which envisages the use of ICBM’s tipped with conventional warheads to strike high-value “time-sensitive targets” as incoming Defence Secretary Panetta noted.  \nRajiv then points out that while the initial policy response to the twin challenges of proliferation and terrorism by US was to strengthen/fine-tune its deterrence postures\, there has been a reduction in its arms control/disarmament obligations. In this context\, Rajiv provided relevant details about BMD\, FMCT and CTBT across US administrations since 9/11. The latter two have however been put on the front-burner as it were by the Obama administration but it remains to be seen what progress can be achieved. Subsequently\, Rajiv provided an assessment of the reductions in US nuclear arsenals – including in warheads and strategic delivery vehicles (SDV’s). He pointed out the analyses by Hans Christensen and others about the role of negative security assurances (NSA’s) and nuclear targeting war plans on the size of the arsenal. In this context\, he pointed out that the US for the first time in NPR 2010 pledged that it will “continue to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attack.” The document however states that “there remains a narrow range of contingencies in which US nuclear weapons may still play a role in deterring a conventional or CBW attack against the United States or its allies and partners.”  \nIn the last part of his presentation\, Rajiv discussed pertinent aspects relating to US policy initiatives at the bilateral and multi-lateral levels to deal with the ‘twin threats’\, such as PSI\, 2006 Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT)\, G8 Global Partnership Initiative\, Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI)\, Obama’s chairing of the Special Session of the UN Security Council in September 2009 – the first by any American president that resulted in UNSC Resolution 1887\, April 2010 Global Summit on Nuclear Security\, and the entry into force of New START. \nRajiv concluded his presentation by noting that despite significant reductions in the numbers of US nuclear warheads during the decade after 9/11\, coupled with continuing successful bilateral and multilateral efforts to secure vulnerable material and prevent terrorists from acquiring WMD material/know-how\, there has not been a concomitant reduction in the ‘role’ of nuclear weapons in US grand strategy and that there are limited prospects of any change in the foreseeable future.  \nPoints of discussion and suggestions \n\nThe paper is a sharp-edged critique of US nuclear weapons policy but could be improved with beefed up analyses and assessment of some of the issues involved. Aspects relating to ‘role’ can be further delineated into ‘centrality’ and ‘dimensions’ of nuclear use for greater clarity. \nThe author can more closely look at whether there has been an evolution/change in US nuclear weapons policy as a result of 9/11 and examine specifically those aspects where these changes have/have not occurred. The author’s own assessment of his reading of US nuclear weapons policy can be expanded. \nA distinction could be drawn between ‘nuclear weapons policy’ and ‘nuclear policy’. If the former\, aspects relating to FMCT\, CTBT\, and US policy activism at bilateral and multi-lateral fora may not be included. \nIt would appear that Obama has succumbed to the nuclear weapons establishment with regards to arms control and disarmament. \nThe increasing linkages of conventional weapons policy on nuclear weapons policy needs to be highlighted\, especially in the light of the fact that US has superior conventional power/assets at its disposal. \nThe author can look more closely at the debates on US nuclear weapons policy in the aftermath of 9/11 to provide a better context and set the tone for the rest of the paper. \nAn examination of the alternative explanations regarding role of nuclear weapons in US grand strategy\, the challenges that US has faced in implementing some of its policies\, could be better highlighted. \nThe mismatch between US policy objectives and practice can be highlighted. This is especially visible in the context of US relationship with Pakistan and in US efforts to secure vulnerable material worldwide\, most recently highlighted by the case of Belarus refusing to honour its commitments to return material to the US in the face of economic sanctions.\nIn his response\, Rajiv thanked the Chairperson and the Discussants and participation from the floor for the valuable comments and suggestions and promised to incorporate them as much as feasible while finalising the paper.\n\nReport prepared by Sanjeev Kumar Shrivatsav\, Researcher at IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/us-nuclear-weapons-policy-and-practice-in-the-shadow-of-9-11
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20111118T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20111118T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T000622
CREATED:20231223T134706Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130243Z
UID:63194-1321594200-1321594200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:China’s Planning on Border Infrastructure: Post 1996 CBM Period
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Shri Sheo Nandan PandeyDiscussants: Shri Anil Kumar Gautam and Cdr Kamlesh Agnihotri \n1996 was a watershed year when agreements specifying the military CBMs were signed between India and China. The author argues that despite 14 rounds of talks held since then\, India and China have achieved little in terms of common understanding on border settlement\, as there is no mechanism yet on how to solve the border question. In addition\, instances of border intrusions and incursions coupled with the military build-up on both sides suggest that the possibility of military conflict cannot be ruled out. Therefore\, it is important for India to focus on understanding the objectives behind China’s infrastructure build-up in the border regions. \nThe focus of the paper was on the following recent developments in the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR): \n\nPlatforms for developing TAR\nStages of TAR’s development\nSalient features of the development\nRecent developments in defence\, roads\, aviation\, hydropower\, trade\, tourism\nChina’s objectives: stated and unstated.\n\nPlatforms for decision-making on Tibet include the Party Congress which decides on the broad frameworks followed by the Tibet Work Forums\, Five Year Plans (FYP) and the Great Western Development Strategy (GWDS). So far 5 Tibet Work Forums (TWF) have taken place where important decisions relating to Tibet’s infrastructure were taken. The first decided on Tibet’s special status on taxes and development strategy. The second focussed on energy\, communication and transportation development. The third forum has been the most crucial wherein infrastructure got more serious focus\, the aid Tibet programme was launched and 62 projects including roads\, communication\, energy\, water conservancy\, urban infrastructure were undertaken. A total of 716 projects under Aid Tibet program were launched at the total investment of 8 billion RMB. The fourth forum aimed at “leapfrog development”\, as TAR was included in the GWDS. This time around total investment was at 31.2 bn RMB as showcase infrastructure projects like QTR were undertaken. It was followed by the 11th FYP that also stressed on Tibet’s infrastructure; noteworthy projects such as the Galong La Tunnel and Motuo Highway were completed during this period. However\, the author mentioned that there is lack of detailed information about this tunnel in the Chinese language literature. The Fifth TWF of January 2010 set ambitious growth targets for 2015. Some of these focus on social issues like income inequality and others on specific infrastructure projects. At the same time\, it has long term targets of harmonious development in the TAR. Similar targets are part of the 12th FYP. \nAmong the other issues highlighted by the paper are important developments in the defence infrastructure sector in the TAR and the objectives behind these. The author concludes that these activities undertaken by the Chinese reveal their objectives as being defence consolidation\, strengthening administrative control\, changing Tibetan lifestyle\, controlling separatism and using trade as means to prosperity. \nA section of the paper also dwelt on the challenges faced in infrastructure development. These included climatic and topographic conditions\, lack of basic facilities\, all of which lead to higher costs of deployment of troops in addition to the problems of acclimatisation. The Chinese authorities are also unclear about how best to preserve Tibet’s fragile ecology.   \nThe paper provided some suggestions on how India should approach and respond to these developments. \nThe main points of discussion and suggestions were as follows: \n\nSome of the showcase defence technologies are much hyped about. J-20 is still a prototype and at least 12-15 years away from induction. Automated border sensor is also not possible technologically as yet. Therefore monitoring has to be physical.\nIt was suggested that more maps marking specific locations would make the argument more clear as far as major infrastructure projects like airports are concerned.\nIt was suggested that the author could focus on some specific border infrastructure instead of focussing on everything happening in Tibet for a more comprehensive analysis. Road-building must be studied further to know their sustainability under harsh weather conditions and capacity for withstanding tonnage to know how it helps militarily.\nProjects should be categorised by size within FYPs and not mere numbers\, so that their effectiveness can be assessed better. This would help bring clearer focus on distinguishing trade and security infrastructure.\nThere is a need to showcase if and why TAR infrastructure projects are unique and different from development work happening elsewhere in China. This can strengthen the argument from security perspective of India. Otherwise\, its just economic development strategy.\nMore groundwork is needed on why 1996 is the watershed year. Otherwise 1981 and others also look as equally convincing landmarks in India China relations.\n\nReport prepared by Avinash Godbole\, Research Assistant\, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/chinas-planning-on-border-infrastructure-post-1996-cbm-period
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20111118T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20111118T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T000623
CREATED:20231224T103604Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T041143Z
UID:64102-1321594200-1321594200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:A Partnership on Autopilot:  Explaining the Consolidation of Indo-Israeli Ties in the Last Decade
DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/a-partnership-on-autopilot-explaining-the-consolidation-of-indo-israeli-ties-in-the-last-decade
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20111202T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20111202T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T000623
CREATED:20231224T103558Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T041024Z
UID:64101-1322803800-1322803800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:The ‘Tamil Question’ in India-Sri Lanka Relations in the Post LTTE Phase
DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nChairperson: Ambassador I P KhoslaDiscussants: Maj Gen Ashok Mehta (Retd) and Dr N Manoharan
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-tamil-question-in-india-sri-lanka-relations-in-the-post-ltte-phase
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20111209T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20111209T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T000623
CREATED:20231223T134606Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130243Z
UID:63187-1323408600-1323408600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:The Concept of Autonomy in French Strategic Thought
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Bharat WariavwallaDiscussants: Philippe Laurent\, Nicolas Blarel\, Krishnappa Venkatshamy and Lion Koenig \n \nThis paper focuses on the concept of strategic autonomy as a defining element of the French strategic culture while demonstrating how throughout history France has shaped a bi-dimensional concept of autonomy. It emphasizes that the concept of strategic autonomy is key to gaining a deeper understanding of all underlying elements of France’s attitude as a contemporary global actor. By focusing on three specific historical periods spanning the last two centuries\, the author examines the origins of the French definition of autonomy and goes on to highlight the main challenge of contemporary French strategy: to reconcile its limited material power with its global ambitions and its Universalist model. The author notes that the paper is the first stage of analysis of a larger comparative study between Indian and French strategic cultures. \nThe paper argues that the French concept of autonomy\, with its particularities\, is the central ideational element of France’s strategy. It defines the way France perceives the world as well as itself. Though the concept of autonomy all by itself cannot entirely explain French foreign policy or predict France’s positions\, the paper suggests that it gives meaning to France’s past and potentially helps anticipate the French perspective in future. In other words\, even though the concept of autonomy doesn’t explain everything on its own\, it remains significant as far as French strategic culture is concerned.  \nThe paper follows Johnson and Larsen’s definition of strategic culture. It argues that the overarching goal of the study of strategic cultures is to understand strategic behaviour at the global scale. This approach does not reject the idea that states try to achieve their interests rationally\, but considers these interests as not only circumstantial and resulting from the distribution of resources and power in the world\, but also influenced by norms and values and shaped in a certain ideational framework. The paper tries to find elements of consensus\, values\, and ideas which have defined French strategy for a certain period of time. \nIn analysing the historical construction of France’s focus on the concept of autonomy\, the paper focuses on three core historical episodes which it considers to have strong dialectic values: \n\nThe Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars give the philosophical foundation and theoretical base to the concept.\nThe French colonisation process under the Third Republic (1871-1939) illustrates the main paradox in this concept when put into practice. \nThe example of Gaullist policies during the Cold War enables the author to illustrate the greatest challenge of French foreign policy in the 21st century.\n\nThe author prefers the term ‘autonomy’ over ‘independence’\, although both are often used interchangeably\, because of the semantic difference between the two: whereas the latter stresses on the negation of dependence\, the former has a more affirmative nuance. Moreover\, the French concept of autonomy implies a responsibility towards the world. Thus\, in the context of France\, the original concept of autonomy is active and strongly positive. \nThe meaning French autonomy bears today is the result of a tension between two attitudes:  \n\nFirstly\, protective autonomy or a defensive posture marked by fear of imperial expansionism that threatens France’s safety; \nSecondly\, active/affirmative autonomy or imperialist dreams based on France’s glorified past and the urge for spreading its values. \n\nAs a kingdom and then as a nation-state\, France has historically constructed itself in opposition to an empire as well as with the great memory of an empire\, thus constantly oscillating between the two extremes like a pendulum. The French concept of autonomy is therefore essentially bi-dimensional\, the active dimension historically emerging after the defensive element.  \nThe idea of French autonomy contains the paradox of French imperialism. The paper attempts to reconcile the French concept of autonomy with French imperialism by bringing in a Universalist dimension and suggesting that the French model can be viewed as a universal model\, thus\, the notion that what is good for the Frenchmen is good for everyone. Moreover\, identity is a key element in the construction of a strategy according to the French bi-dimensional notion of autonomy. The paper argues that the defence of the national identity is singularly more prominent in the case of France. This is justified by the idea of French exceptionalism\, a nationalist notion that France is granted with a unique role in world history and has the responsibility to offer a certain model to humanity.  \nA specific facet of this responsibility and the memory of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars translate into a self-perceived notion of France as the ‘liberator of nations’. This perception of uniqueness\, stressed by French historiographical frame which designated the French Revolution as the commencement of the Modern Times\, is very close to American exceptionalism and the role it perceives for itself in the world. Although both consider themselves to be carriers of the heritage of the Enlightenment\, the US notion is partially based on religious considerations whereas the French model is more political and is derived from the perceived grandeur of French history. \nIn conclusion\, the paper engages with France’s main challenges and attempts to answer the question: in the aftermath of the Second World War\, how can France continue to exist as a global actor without the material capacities to compete with the greater powers? After the ‘war of twenty years’ that constituted the decolonisation process\, France’s limited material capacities were well-admitted by the French government and the foreign policy was designed accordingly. French autonomy was preserved by framing an ambiguous geopolitical situation whereby independence from all powers would be constantly affirmed\, but alliance with the Western bloc would be presupposed. France’s withdrawal from NATO’s command in 1959 and the Gaullist policy towards the US is a perfect example of this ambiguity. The strength of French foreign policy lies in the geopolitical ambivalence of the French position and not in its material capacities. The French concept of autonomy leads France to transform all technical and economic matters into political decisions (politicization) and refuses to see its foreign policy dictated by its limited material capacities. \nDiscussion and Comments\nMr. Laurent commented on the ability of the paper to successfully assess and summarise the diverse French character. The author received many suggestions for his bigger project of a comparative study. Mr. Blarel pointed out the need to look at a series of case studies and test alternative hypotheses. A suggestion was made to study different phases of colonisation and take into account factors other than strategic culture that marked the enterprise and examine different incarnations of French strategic culture based on different leaders and circumstances. The notion of French strategic culture was further problematised by questioning whether actions are governed by an overarching rhetoric or are they for domestic consumption. \nGp Capt Venkatshamy pointed out the long historical period the paper is trying to engage with and suggested picking up a more specific issue and operationalizing it for a more focused argument. He further raised the issue of convergences and divergences between French and Indian strategic culture and noted a need for the paper to provide a well-fleshed out answer to the question: how are India and France comparable? Towards this end\, he provided a specific pointer to attempt a comparative study between Nehru and De Gaulle.  \nMr. Koenig commented on the merit of the project to theorise an undertheorised concept and suggested some points in connection with paper structure and flow. He suggested disentangling the concept of strategic culture and first exploring the broader concepts of strategy and culture and explaining why they should be studied\, before moving on to the study of strategic culture and examining whether the concept is tautological\, oxymoronic or more than the sum of its parts. He commented on the singular voice/consensus used in the paper and suggested that ruptures in the concept be taken into account. He suggested a more elaborate analysis of the three core historical examples the paper deals with in order to capture a clearer genealogy of the concept.  \nMr. Blarel and Mr. Koenig jointly suggested that the paper should attempt to address the question of homogeneity of strategic culture: can we talk of ‘a’ French strategic culture? \nDiscussion from the floor revolved around:  \n\nthe question of continuity and ruptures in French Strategic culture after and before the colonial era; \nthe element of uniqueness in the French desire for autonomy\, and\, \nsuggestions to clearly define means and goals and frame strategic culture as the ideational base that leads to autonomy. \n\nThe Chair concluded by keenly engaging with the cultural dimension of France’s distinct idea of civilization and its notion that it should give this idea to the colonised nations. He stressed on the impact of civilizations in the Indian context and commented on the importance of French thinking. \nReport prepared by Bhavna Tripathy\, Research Intern at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-concept-of-autonomy-in-french-strategic-thought
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20111209T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20111209T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T000623
CREATED:20231224T103558Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130243Z
UID:64100-1323408600-1323408600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Integration/Jointness in the Indian Military: The Role of Civil-Military Relations
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Dr Manoj JoshiDiscussants: Air Marshal (Retd) S G Inamdar\, Lt Gen (Retd) Satish Nambiar and Vice Admiral (retd) PS Das \n \nThe event began with the welcome address of Dr. Arvind Gupta\, Acting Director general\, IDSA. He welcomed the former home secretary GK Pillai\, who recently superannuated from his post and joined IDSA as a Distinguished Scholar and other distinguished guests.    \nAnit Mukherjee’s Presentation\nAnit Mukherjee presented his paper on the topic “Integration/Jointness in the Indian Military: The Coordination Model and the Role of Civil-Military Relations.” This paper was third in the series of seminars examining civil-military relations and military effectiveness in India. As such this event report should be read in conjunction with the following: \n\nThe Absent Dialogue: Civil-Military Relations and Military Effectiveness in India\nFailing to Deliver: Post Crises Defence Reforms in India\, 1998-2010\n\nIn this paper Anit Mukherjee examines jointness or integration between the three services and the role of civil-military relations.  Like his previous presentations he began by arguing that all too often studies of jointness have turned into a “blame game” and as a departure from that norm this paper argues that the structure of the system is at fault.   \nAnit divided his presentation in four sections. In the first section he made a descriptive analysis of jointness in India’s post-independence wars. While doing so he concentrated on inter-services operations\, higher command of war and the role of the civilian policy-makers. He argued that the 1965 India-Pakistan war was our first real experience with joint operations and in this we were found wanting. Inadequate sharing of information led to an absence of joint planning which was compounded by inter-services rivalry. However after this operation considerable efforts were made by the Indian Air Force\, Army and civilian bureaucrats in emphasizing joint operations\, the results of which was evident in the 1971 Bangladesh war. At the same time victory was an awful teacher as problems in jointness were glossed over. The period after that witnessed considerable inter-services tension usually over turf\, like maritime reconnaissance and ownership of helicopters. In the Indian Peacekeeping Keeping Force operations in the late 1980s\, jointness was notable by its absence. Due to the absence of a joint command the services operated in their own silos. Lack of interoperability also proved to be a handicap during these operations. The Kargil war of 1999 saw considerable army-air force tension and the lack of interoperability was again glaring. The lack of joint planning and training was also self-evident. Unfortunately in all these episodes the role of the Ministry of Defence has been minimal.   \nIn the next section he described four main problems with jointness: the single-service approach\, turf wars\, lack of interoperability and poor training for conduct of joint operations. In the third section\, he explained how each of these problems can be attributed in part to the unique characteristics of civil-military relations.  In the final section he discussed some recent developments like the creation of integrated defence staff (IDS)\, Joint commands and so on but also argued that these will not suffice until there are structural changes both in the Service Headquarters and in the MoD. While conceding that there is no perfect model of jointness\, Anit also argued that “perfect should not be the enemy of good.” He concluded by advocating for the “integrated model” instead of the existing “coordination model of jointness.”      \nDiscussion Points\n\nThere is an urgent need to create awareness about national security and generate a healthy and informed discussion on various dimensions of it. For this to happen however declassification of files is of paramount importance. Service Headquarters must take the lead in this process as it has fallen through the cracks between Service Headquarters and the Ministry of Defence. \nIt was observed by many participants that change off mindset is most essential in order to make any headway in the direction of jointness as equipment\, resource issues\, etc. come only next.  Jointness can be managed by adjusting attitudes. Personality-cult has been the bane of India in all walks of life and military is no exception. \nThe problems in civil-military relations are more cultural than bureaucratic\, a point strongly brought out by many participants. Thus\, the human side of the problem came out prominently during the discussion.  \nThe importance of communication devices for interoperability – an important aspect of jointness was emphasized\, since the devices used by the three services are not at par or matching each other. It was pointed out by some of the participants that integration should start at the functional level instead of just focusing at the Service Headquarter level. Hence\, for instance\, theater commands should be established with joint staff. However it was also appreciated that this idea will face considerable opposition especially from the respective Service Headquarters. \nThe need for promoting domain expertise in the MoD was strongly advocated by many participants. It was pointed out by one of the participants that CDS could have come up in 2003-2004\, but for a latent fear among the political class of an empowered military.\n\nReport prepared by Amit Kumar\, Research Assistant\, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/integration-jointness-in-the-indian-military-the-role-of-civil-military-relations
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20111216T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20111216T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T000623
CREATED:20231224T103558Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T040844Z
UID:64099-1324013400-1324013400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:‘Cultural Citizenship'\, the Media and Identity in India
DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nChairperson: Professor T K OommenDiscussants: Mr Bharat Wariavwalla and Professor Biswajit Das
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/cultural-citizenship-the-media-and-identity-in-india
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20111223T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20111223T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T000623
CREATED:20231224T103553Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130243Z
UID:64097-1324618200-1324618200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Competing Realities in China-India Multilateral Discourse:  Regional\, Cross-Regional and Global Underpinnings
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Ambassador R RajagopalanDiscussants: Ambassador J C Sharma & Professor Sreemati Chakrabarti \n \nDr. JP Panda’s fellow paper titled\, ‘Competing Realities in China-India Multilateral Discourse: Regional\, Cross-Regional and Global Underpinnings’ focused on China and India’s discourse on multilateral forums at regional\, cross-regional and global levels. The paper dispelled the conformist view that in the China-India multilateral context\, associating in various regional and global bodies is mainly a medium of establishing cooperation and maximizing mutual interests. It argued that their increasing multilateral engagement is a potential medium for denying space and holding an edge over each other by acquiring global resources\, forming regional and global identity\, and notably in securing their respective national strategic objectives. \nThe main points made were:\nThe multilateral discourse in the China-India context is underpinned by competitive rather than collaborative engagement. At the regional level\, it is characterized by ‘resources\, rivalry and supremacy in Asia’; at the cross-regional setting\, ‘checking Western influence and aiming for a multi-polar world’ characterize the discourse; while the global scenario is defined by the idea of ‘living as ‘developing country\, aiming to become global powers’. \nChina and India’s contemporary bilateral approach is quite different from the past because of: a) Multi-polarity in world politics; and\, b) Rise of economic and global political processes. \nMultilateral engagement for China and India is not necessarily a fitting medium for collaboration\, but it is a medium of denying space and holding an edge over each other. In that regard\, three spaces narrate the phenomena: a) Resources; b) National security objectives; and\, c) Identity politics.\nDr. Panda further argued that there are certain basic strategic premises that define the Indian and Chinese discourse:  \n\nBoth see each other as part of the ‘non-western’ world structure.\nThey are both large societies.\nThey are the fastest rising economies.\nGeo-strategic conditions are more in China’s favour. \n\nHighlighting the importance of energy resources\, Dr Panda argued that getting access to major sources of resources – oil\, gas\, water and land – has always been a central factor in global power politics. He asserted that the politics over resources and the evolving politics of China and India in multilateral organizations are the two most vital determinants of the current global politics; still one barely connects these two to understand the full spectrum of power relations.  \nHe opined that the politics of China-India polygonal dialogue is an apt example in that regard\, which establishes a link between identity power politics and resource politics at different spatial levels. According to him\, apart from territorial integrity\, the quest for strategic resources and forming their respective global identity as superpowers have received the highest priority in domestic as well as foreign policy stratagem of both Asian powers.  \nIn conclusion\, Dr. Panda pointed out that rise of India’s influence at three levels need not result in reciprocal decline in China’s influence and rise.  He further added that not only the south-south formulation is temporary\, but also the win-win China-India nexus is rhetorical.  \nPoints of Discussion \n\nIndia-China rivalry is reflected in almost all multilateral forums. \nA more comprehensive study of Myanmar’s engagement with both China and India is needed to understand the dynamics of this equation.\nThe paper demands a more detailed study of regional institutions such as WTO\, BOA\, Mekong- Ganga Cooperation\, Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) and the UN. \nA detailed account of the importance of the organisations\, mentioned in the paper\, and how they are being used by China and India is also required.  \n\nReport prepared by Rahul Mishra\, Research Assistant\, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/competing-realities-in-china-india-multilateral-discourse-regional-cross-regional-and-global-underpinnings
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20111223T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20111223T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T000623
CREATED:20231224T103558Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T024504Z
UID:64098-1324618200-1324618200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:UCPN-Maoist’s Two Line Struggle:  A Critical Analysis
DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nChairperson: Lt Gen (Retd) Satish NambiarDiscussants: Maj Gen (Retd) Ashok Mehta & Professor Sangeeta Thapliyal
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/ucpn-maoists-two-line-struggle-a-critical-analysis
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120106T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120106T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T000623
CREATED:20231223T134553Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130243Z
UID:63183-1325827800-1325827800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:India's Naval Shipbuilding Industry: Key Gaps and Policy Options
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Shri V K MisraDiscussants: Commodore (Dr) R K Rana and Commodore (Retd) Sujeet Samaddar \nDeliberations on Mr. Laxman Behera’s paper commenced with Chairperson V K Mishra’s opening remarks. Highlighting the performance of Indian naval shipbuilding industry in the past several years\, he argued that shipbuilding industry has to acquire more strength. This is important given the kind of order book existing at the moment; as of now there is a yearning gap between the requirements and capabilities acquired by India’s shipbuilding industry. He further argued that time had come for India to go beyond the Indian Ocean; it has to acquire more naval capabilities to emerge as a superpower. \nLaxman Behera started his presentation with the point that ever since the first major shipbuilding programme- the Leander Class frigate INS Nilgiri was launched at Mazgaon Dock Ltd in late 1960s\, this industry has grown significantly\, contributing much of the warship requirements of the Indian navy. For Indian naval shipbuilding industry\, self- sufficiency has been a goal for a long-time. However\, for a number of years\, it has been a matter of compulsion rather than choice. Nevertheless\, over the years the Indigenous ship building industry has emerged as the ‘builder’s navy’. \nMr. Behera opined that notwithstanding the establishment of defence shipyards and key procedural framework\, the naval shipbuilding industry has not been able to meet the growing requirement of the naval forces\, resulting in a huge gap in force level. Listing out the details of naval shipbuilding industrial units\, Mr Behera mentioned that India’s overall shipbuilding industry comprises of twenty-seven shipyards\, of which six are under Central Public Sector\, two under State Government and nineteen in the Private Sector domain. However\, not all of these shipyards are involved in naval shipbuilding. Of the six shipyards under the Central Public Sector\, four are under the administration control of Ministry of Defence (MoD) and known as Defence Public Sector Undertaking (PSU) shipyards. Although these four shipyards are primarily responsible for constructive naval ships\, some others\, both in the public and private sector are also involved in the naval shipbuilding.  \nMr. Behera further pointed out that public and private sector shipyards enjoy a unique set of advantages and disadvantages. For the MoD owned shipyards\, their biggest advantage lies in long exposure to shipbuilding\, enabling them to acquire certain construction skills\, design capability and technology. These aspects are crucial for naval shipbuilding\, which unlike the commercial shipbuilding is a difficult task given the complex nature of marrying a vast amount of weapons and sensors into warships\, which are increasingly required to be stealthier and more durable. \nBecause of their lack of experience in building major warships\, the private sector is way behind in these aspects and needs exposure along with technological and design assistance in order to be at par with their public sector counterparts. The biggest disadvantage the public sector shipyards face is the decision-making constraints. The operational and financial autonomy of the PSU shipyards is limited.  It depends on the government for approval of key decisions\, which are often taken at a slower pace. Compared to this\, the private sector has complete autonomy in decision making which facilitates them to meet necessary infrastructural needs at a faster pace. The stark contrast in autonomy of decision-making is evident from the efforts by both private and public sector shipyards in forming strategic partnership. While the former has been able to tie up with major global companies\, the public sector is yet to take off. Examples in this regard are Pipavav and GRSE. \nKey gaps in Indian naval shipbuilding industry\, according to Mr. Behera\, are as under:  \n\nInefficiency and constraints of the Public Sector Shipyards.\nLack of level- playing field to private shipyards.\nLack of design capability of shipyards.\nLack of a strong commercial shipbuilding industry.\nAbsence of a strong ancillary industry.\nLack of synergy between public and private yards.\n\nMr. Behera suggested a number of measures to tackle the prevailing problems. These include; \n\nIncreasing competitiveness- bring in competition within the PSU shipyards by promoting them to compete with the private sector for all kinds of warship projects.\nEmpowering shipyards to take their own decisions\, including design etc\, and allowing them to function in a competitive environment.\nBringing in a transparent policy to facilitate partnership between public and the private sector.\n\nPoints of Discussion: \n\nOther countries of the world including the US\, UK\, Italy etc also have faced similar problems. So\, it would do well for India to learn from those countries.\nPoor R&D is the biggest challenge facing the Indian shipbuilding industry. India has to take the R&D head-on\, in order to overcome the problems faced by the industry. \nSynergy amongst private sector participants is as important as between private and the public sector.\nAbsence of a comprehensive policy or understanding on defence exports is hurting India’s defence industry. \nIt is beyond debate that without the entry of private sector at all levels\, Indian naval shipbuilding industry will not thrive. \n\nReport prepared by Rahul Mishra\, Research Assistant\, IDSA
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/indias-naval-shipbuilding-industry-key-gaps-and-policy-options
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120106T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120106T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T000623
CREATED:20231223T134554Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130242Z
UID:63184-1325827800-1325827800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:India-Saudi Arabia Relations
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Ambassador (Retd) Ishrat AzizExternal Discussants: Professor Gulshan Dietl\, Professor Qamar AghaInternal Discussants: Dr Shebonti Ray Dadwal\, Dr Meena Singh Roy \nDr Pradhan’s paper addresses India’s relations with Saudi Arabia\, arguing that India must look beyond oil and trade in order to engage Saudi Arabia in a strategic partnership. This study also explores Indian interests in cultivating strategic ties with Saudi Arabia and explores the obstacles to building a partnership of this nature. In the past\, India’s relations with Saudi Arabia have been impacted by the Cold War\, regional political dynamics and divergent interests of both countries. India’s relations with Israel\, the Kashmir issue and Indian support for Arab nationalist regimes in Egypt\, Iraq and Syria are other aspects that have created misunderstandings between the two countries. The author sees a shift in Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy following the September 11\, 2011 attacks as since then\, it has been marked by an attempt to look beyond its traditional allies and to build closer relations with other countries\, especially with major Asian powers such as India. \nAn important characteristic of the India-Saudi Arabia relationship is the dominance of trade and business. Saudi Arabia ranks as India’s fourth largest trading partner with a bilateral trade amounting to US$ 25.6 billion in 2010-11\, dominated by crude oil imports. Joint ventures and investments form an important part of commercial relations. The Indian labour force in the Kingdom and Saudi Arabia’s petroleum reserves have constituted the most important part of the bilateral relationship.  \nOfficial visits by leaders of both countries have built on the existing partnership. The Delhi Declaration signed in 2006 aimed to strengthen ties in areas of energy\, trade\, science and technology\, education\, health\, and political cooperation on regional and international issues. The 2010 Riyadh Declaration furthered on this agreement and focuses on enhancing cooperation on counterterrorism\, money laundering\, narcotics\, arms and human trafficking\, and defence and economic cooperation. \nIn forging strategic ties with Saudi Arabia\, the author points out several advantages: \n\nSaudi Arabia’s growing regional profile: Saudi Arabia has been an important regional player in the Gulf and West Asia region owing to its huge petroleum reserves\, the presence of the two holy mosques\, and its growing military power among other factors. It has substantial influence on the regional politics\, especially on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process\, and has cultivated ties with major powers such as the US\, Russia\, China and the EU. Saudi Arabia has also emerged as an influential player in the ongoing Arab Spring. This increasing profile of the country is a call for India to engage further with Saudi Arabia in areas beyond bilateral trade an energy supply.\nSaudi Arabia as a gateway to the Arab and Islamic world: Saudi Arabia enjoys considerable clout in the Arab and Islamic worlds owing to the presence of the two holy mosques in Mecca and Medina. It also enjoys influence in organisations such as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)\, the Arab League and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). The author notes that strengthening ties with Saudi Arabia will provide a unique platform for India to promote its interest and to enable greater access to other countries in the region.\nDefence cooperation: Although India and Saudi Arabia have not signed a defence cooperation agreement\, both countries have conducted joint military exercises and are exploring enhanced military cooperation that includes training to Saudi Arabian forces on tackling terrorism in the mountainous areas bordering Yemen. \nIndia’s stakes in the security of the Gulf region: India sees the Gulf region as falling within its security parameter and has shown readiness to contribute to the security and stability of the region through sharing its own experiences in the areas of counter-terrorism\, maritime security and military training.\nCooperation against terrorism: Although both countries have been victims of terrorism in the past\, Saudi Arabia has faced questions over its alleged funding of religious extremists and the spread of the Sunni Wahhabi brand of Islam. India has indicated its concern on this issue. Following the 9/11 attacks\, Saudi Arabia has taken steps to check the flow of money and disrupting terrorist networks. It has condemned extremism and has been preaching moderation including through religious leaders. Strengthening India’s relations with Saudi Arabia will allow new avenues for India to manage relations within its own neighbourhood and also contribute to the security of the Gulf region.\nFighting piracy: Piracy in the Gulf of Aden and surrounding regions remains a threat to Sea Lines of Communication and thus to the security of the transshipment of goods. Deepening the Indian Navy’s cooperation with its Saudi counterpart will contribute significantly to the fight against piracy.\nEnergy security: India ranks as the fourth largest oil consuming country in the world after the US\, China and Japan. Securing long term energy supplies has been a dominant objective for India in the Gulf region. Saudi Arabia is currently the largest supplier of crude oil to India. With particular reference to the ‘Strategic Petroleum Reserve’\, India needs to move beyond mere commodity trade and engage with Saudi Arabia through energy interdependence. \nSoft power diplomacy: The author notes that the approximately two million strong Indian diaspora in Saudi Arabia have acted as a medium through which the Saudis have shaped their perception of India and its people. The Delhi Declaration of 2006 has aimed to promote exchange of faculty\, students and delegations\, and encourage direct scientific and educational communications between institutions. India has also recently pledged to assist Saudi Arabia in setting up an ICT Centre of Excellence\, as well as institutions of higher learning. India needs to build on portraying itself as a major education hub in Asia that can provide quality education. \n\nIn building his study\, the author looks at both sides of the coin. Saudi Arabia’s perceptions of India have undergone changes following the end of the Cold War and the emergence of India as a stable democracy. Its shift in focus to major Asian countries following 9/11 has aimed at broadening its engagement particularly with India\, China and Japan. The author notes that Saudi Arabia’s ‘Look East’ policy would give it the two distinct advantages of exploring new markets for oil and trade\, and diversifying its diplomatic engagement with the world. However\, Saudi Arabia does harbor certain concerns with respect to India’s engagements in the West Asian region\, particularly with reference to India’s defence cooperation with Iran\, and the supply of arms to India from Israel. These two concerns also pose challenges to furthering India’s interests in the region. \nThe Pakistan factor has also been an important element of the India-Saudi Arabia relationship. The author observes that India’s undue emphasis on the religious factor (that it attributed to close Saudi-Pakistani ties) made it view Saudi Arabia as a ‘lost cause’ for a long period of time. In spite of this\, India’s deepening engagements with Saudi Arabia over the recent past has resulted in building a stronger bilateral relationship. The author also points out that Pakistan’s influence over Saudi Arabia in hindering a stronger Indo-Saudi relationship will have more diminished impact than in the past.  \nThe study concludes by saying that it is imperative for both countries to move beyond ‘buyer-seller relations’. The recent high level visits and agreements are an indication of deepened trust building that will be essential for a long term strategic partnership. The author emphasises the need for both countries to engage with mutual cooperation in multiple fronts of engagement\, with India taking the lead in engaging with Saudi Arabia\, especially in this opportune time when India is looking west and Saudi Arabia is looking east. This will help translate the existing economic ties into a strong strategic partnership. \nMajor Points of Discussion and Suggestions to the author: \n\nThere is a need to explore the use of the term ‘strategic partnership’ to define India-Saudi Arabia relations as they currently exist. A number of panelists disagreed on the assumption that such a partnership already exists between the two countries. Also\, it was observed that this may not be the right time to deepen ties with countries in the region\, taking into account the unforeseen consequences of the ongoing Arab Spring. \nA discussant suggested deeper exploration of the benefits of a strengthened strategic partnership for both India and Saudi Arabia and the impacts of this on regional actors in India’s neighbourhood\, such as China and Pakistan; the balancing acts that both countries have to manage (for the Saudis\, between India and Pakistan\, and for the Indians\, between Saudi Arabia and Iran). \nIt was suggested that the study also explore the problems relating to succession in the Kingdom. King Abdullah has played a fine balancing act between the Islamists and the liberals in the country and it is uncertain if another future ruler will be able to do the same. \nIt was noted that India must strive to engage with countries in the region in such a manner that developments such as the Arab Spring do not impact the fundamental basis of its relations with those countries. People-to-people relations need to be consolidated so that bilateral relations are not overly influenced by regime changes. \nThe discussion also focused on Saudi Arabia’s strong military and religious ties with Pakistan\, and its varied and continuing engagement with the Taliban in Afghanistan. One of the panelists stressed the significance of self-interests in the forging of bilateral relations. In the context of India-Saudi Arabia relations\, both sides have much to gain from economic and defence cooperation. \nPanelists affirmed that despite recent shifts\, the bilateral relationship would remain dominated by economic factors\, with energy trade being the most important element of this. \n\nReport prepared by Princy Marin George\, Research Assistant\, West Asia and Africa Cluster\, IDSA
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/india-saudi-arabia-relations
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120113T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120113T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T000623
CREATED:20231223T134507Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130242Z
UID:63181-1326432600-1326432600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Escalation and De-escalation of Violence in Insurgencies: Insights from Northeast India
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Shri G K PillaiDiscussants: Maj Gen Dhruv Katoch and Shri Sanjoy Hazarika \n \nDr. Namrata Goswami’s paper defines insurgencies as irregular warfare which engages in non-frontal attacks against the adversary with small groups of fighters and which is marked by the absence of fixed battlefields. Insurgencies\, therefore\, involve a complex mix of political legitimisation\, support base\, emotional category\, symbolic gestures and historical narratives buttressed by the elements of time and space. Escalation of violence\, as defined in Dr. Goswami’s paper\, implies increases in the level of conflict over a period of time and de-escalation signifies decreases in the level of conflict over a period of time. \nThe paper\, however\, analyses the escalation and de-escalation process in insurgencies with regard to the National Socialist Council of Nagalim Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM)\, the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA)\, and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and its political front\, the Revolutionary People’s Front (RPF) of Manipur. While the first two insurgency movements have witnessed stages of escalation and de-escalation of violence spreading across decades\, the PLA offers an intriguing example of an insurgent group that continues to remain hostile to peace negotiations. \nThe paper further offers an analysis of the factors leading to the escalation of violence taking into account the three cases mentioned above. Political motivation plays a vital role through which the insurgents garner support from the people for their violent activities. Hence\, political mobilisation is the first vital step in any armed movement in order to acquire critical mass and to create space for conflict escalation. In case of NSCN-IM\, political objective of Naga territorial unification and sovereignty based on the historical narrative of Naga independent status before the British occupation plays a vital role. The ULFA also utilises the politics of Assamese exploitation at the hands of New Delhi in order to vindicate its demand for a separate Assamese homeland. \nThe availability of arms is one of the important factors leading to the escalation of violence level in an insurgency. The easy availability of arms in Northeast India enables the NSCN-IM\, the ULFA and the PLA to sustain their armed movements. Of the United Nation’s estimated 640 million illegal arms in the world\, 40 million small arms are in India alone\, with Manipur accounting 32 percent of small arms. \nState response plays an important role in deciding the escalation or de-escalation of violence in an insurgency. For example\, the state of India responded with massive use of force in response to the insurgent groups in Northeast at their initial stage. As a consequence\, militant groups escalated their violence which resulted in non-combatant deaths. \nPopular support base is one of the important factors which help escalating the violence level of an insurgency. The local support for the insurgent groups of the Northeast of India mentioned above depends on their ability to reflect the grievances of the people in the affected areas like alienation and deprivation\, political marginalisation\, etc. Similarly\, the insurgent groups use violence as a tool to get support from their target population. For example\, ULFA is known for its violence tactics of killing non-Assamese Hindi-speaking people. \nLegitimacy of a particular insurgency movement escalates the violence level. Insurgents use various methods to enjoy legitimacy from a targeted population. These groups engage in violence in order to provoke the regular army to escalate its use of force\, thereby creating enormous hardship for the local population. Disproportionate counter-measures by the state forces only provide these groups an opportunity to act as the security provider for the people. \nExternal support also helps escalating the violence level in a conflict. In the case of Northeast of India\, it shares a 4500 Kilometer highly porous border with China\, Bhutan\, Myanmar and Bangladesh.  Both the NSCN-IM and ULFA have/had their training camps in Myanmar and Bangladesh. Moreover\, both the armed groups had strong connections with the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) of Myanmar. There are lots of instances on how these groups used the bordering countries as their safe heavens. \nTime and space are important factors for the escalation of violence. Time enables irregular groups to wage a protracted war aiming to gradually reduce the political and psychological will of the stronger power. Taking advantage of the strategic dimension of time\, the NSCN-IM has established constituencies for the purposes of recruitment and resource generation. Similarly\, ULFA has taken advantage of time to generate resources for their fight\, recruit new cadres\, establish base areas\, create support networks amongst the local population and spread their ideas. \nThe geography and terrain of a particular place is critical for the continuation of insurgent movements. Without supportive terrain\, lightly armed\, highly mobile insurgents stand little chance to offset the technological superiority of the stronger power.  \nThe organisational structure of an insurgent group plays a very vital role in the escalation of conflict level. A cohesive organization with a strong leadership helps an insurgent group act better. For example the NSCN-IM has a highly centralized political structure known as Government of the People’s Republic of Nagaland (GPRN). Similarly\, both the PLA and the ULFA are highly centralized outfits with radical sense of loyalty. Intra-group conflicts or factionalism with on a group escalates the violence level. This happens because the rival factions adopt an escalated violence means in order to establish social and political dominance. The leadership differences between Muivah and Khaplang in 1988 and the escalated violence level can be a case in point. \nDe-escalation in violence\, according to Dr. Goswami\, is dependant upon the state response to insurgencies\, political motivation\, and absence of popular support\, lack of legitimacy and loss of external support. De-escalation can occur also when the insurgent group identifies an opportunity to resolve the conflict in a positive sum manner if it believes that the state is willing to concede to most of its demands. \nState response to the insurgency movements plays an important role in de-escalating the violence level. The state of India’s response to the insurgency movements can be located with in three conceptual parameters. The proportionate use of force has been the key determining factor of a responsive state in the post 1970s. The significance of proportionality of means and non-combatant immunity are absolutely critical for the Indian state’s response to the insurgencies in the Northeast. Because\, since ULFA\, NSCN-IM and PLA project a certain degree of society support\, the disproportionate use of force by the Indian state can be counter-productive. \nUse of dialogue and negotiation is one of the important responses of the state of India in bringing down the violence level in the Northeast. The ongoing peace talks between the Government of India and the ULFA and NSCN-IM can be a case in point. Similarly\, the grant of greater autonomy and the statehood to some of the areas where the insurgent groups are active can bring down the conflict level. \nLack of legitimacy of an insurgent group may bring down the conflict level. The NSCN-IM is under constant pressure from the civil societies to bring down the violence level. For example\, in 2007 the Naga Hoho (Apex Council) in a strongly worded statement demanded that all Naga factions abstain from violence and give peace a chance. Similarly\, in recent years ULFA’s claim of legitimate representation of Assamese aspiration for political sovereignty has also come under deep critical scrutiny since the outfit is seen as non-transparent and run by a handful of men and women.  \nLack of external support is a major factor in de-escalating the violence level of an insurgency movement. Nearly 30 under-ground ULFA camps were destroyed in Bhutan in 2003 which forced the ULFA to shift its base to Bangladesh. After the crackdown on the militant outfits in Bangladesh by Sheikh Hasina Government in 2009 many of the ULFA leaders were arrested and handed over to India.  \nDr. Goswami’s paper concludes that when the insurgent groups are fighting for the establishment of separate independent statehood\, violent responses by the state is counter-productive and leads to a vicious cycle of violence and counter-violence. The paper finds three key variables with regard to escalation and de-escalation i.e. popular support\, loss of legitimacy and state response. \nMajor points of Discussion and Suggestions\n\nThere is a need to understand the background of all insurgency movements. There is also a need to study various insurgent groups in the northeast separately.\nThere has been abrogation of the constitutional norms by the political party in power in Assam. Hence\, ULFA is a created problem.\nThe deployment of Security Forces as a state response has to be changed. There is a need to find out the sources of funding for these groups since the local funding for them is not sufficient for them to sustain.\nThe time factor has always been with the Government. The time has come not to see the insurgency as simply a military problem. There is a need to take governance issues into consideration.\nThe role of political parties in escalating the violence level should have been discussed.\nThere has been a shift of Insurgents activities i.e. from legitimate demands to criminal activities.\nIt is difficult to decide as when is the perfect situation for conflict resolution.\nThere is a need to address the governance issues because more people have died in governance failure than because of insurgencies.\nInsurgencies in Northeast will be difficult to resolve since there are many stakeholders. It can only be controlled to a point.\nGiving statehood to Nagaland was an end of the bargaining power of state of India\n\nReport prepared by Dr. Anshuman Behera\, Research Assistant\, Internal Security Centre\, Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/escalation-and-de-escalation-of-violence-in-insurgencies-insights-from-northeast-india
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120113T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120113T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T000623
CREATED:20231223T134553Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130242Z
UID:63182-1326432600-1326432600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:The CBMs in Sino-Indian Relations: Need for Revamping and Enlarging the Structural and Institutional Mechanisms
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Shri Gautam H BambewalaDiscussants: Professor Sreeram Sunder Chaulia and Professor Alka Acharya \nThe fellow paper of Dr. R. N. Das focussed on how the Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) play a critical role in India-China relations. According to him their importance is due to the persistence of ‘security dilemma’ in the India- China context. Factors that have led to security dilemma include among others baggage of the 1962 War\, differences in the system of governance\, competition in acquiring greater space at the international arena and the scramble for resources.  \nDr Das opined that India’s threat perception of China is not baseless and\, therefore\, the need for India to establish CBMs with China arises. After the 1962 India- China war\, the bilateral relationship was restored in 1976. The 1979 visit by the then minister of external affairs\, A. B. Vajpayee was a good gesture but it failed to bring warmth in the relationship. During his visit\, China attacked Vietnam\, India considered it undiplomatic and Vajpayee prematurely ended his visit to return to New Delhi in protest. \nThe turning point in the India- China relationship was former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s visit of 1988\, which led to the formation of important CBMs in India- China relations. Prime Minister Narasimha Rao’s landmark visit in 1993 gave a real boost to the CBMs\, which materialised\, according to Dr Das\, due to the visionary leadership of Rao. India and China signed the agreement on troop reduction along the border\, which was followed by arms reduction agreement in 1996. Avoidance of large-scale military exercise and air intrusions was also agreed upon\, among other things. Since 2003\, a number of bilateral visits have taken place; these include the 2003 Vajpayee visit\, 2005 Wen Jiabao visit\, and Pranab Mukherjee’s 2006 visit.  \nIn the context of military CBMs one of the biggest steps taken was to cnduct the ‘Hand in hand 2008’ India- China joint military exercise. The two sides have been taking numerous slow yet steady moves on that count.  \nSince 2006\, India- US relationship started strengthening and that\, according to Dr. Das\, led to rise in Chinese suspicions of India’s intentions to some extent. On the other hand\, India has been wary of Chinese intentions\, as China has been issuing stapled visa to Indian citizens hailing from Jammu & Kashmir\, and Arunanchal Pradesh on several occasions since 2006.  \nDr. Das made several recommendations for strengthening the India- China relations. Checking border transgression and bringing the relationship on an equal footing and on reciprocal basis are prominent among his recommendations. He also recommended that India take its diplomatic steps carefully to avoid any miscommunication with China.  \nThe Chairperson\, Gautam Bambawale\, concurred with Dr. Das that border transgression by Chinese troops and stapled visa are concerns for India. In order to improve relations with India\, China must understand and handle Indian sensitivities carefully.  \nPoints of Discussion:  \n\nSino- Indian boundary question cannot be seen as a purely boundary issue. It is far bigger and complicated. \nChina’s vision of a uni-polar Asia and its position on India’s candidature for UNSC are at cross-purposes with India. \nChina does not want to discuss the nuclear CBMs with India\, as that would automatically approve India’s nuclear power status\, which China doesn’t want. \nResponses from the Chinese side on India’s rise have not been very positive in the past. However\, one must keep in mind that China does have its own insecurities and China’s responses to India’s relations with the US and Japan indication these. \nChina’s cooperation with India on the UNSC issue will help strengthening the relationship. \nThus far\, CBMs have not been able to remove the persistent security dilemma in the India- China context. They have been effective only in managing the relationship. Nevertheless\, contribution of CBMs in maintaining India- China relations has been significant. \nIt is important to assess the effectiveness of CBMs in India- China context\, as that would help in planning further CBMs that could be put in place. \n\nReport prepared by Rahul Mishra.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-cbms-in-sino-indian-relations-need-for-revamping-and-enlarging-the-structural-and-institutional-mechanisms
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120203T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120203T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T000623
CREATED:20231224T103532Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T024155Z
UID:64096-1328247000-1328247000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Nepal-China Relations and its Implications for India
DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nChair: Ambassador K V RajanDiscussant: Ms Akanshaya Shah
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/nepal-china-relations-and-its-implications-for-india
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120217T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120217T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T000623
CREATED:20231224T103532Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T020206Z
UID:64095-1329456600-1329456600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:The European Union and its main Asian Partners: Perspectives on the Dynamics of the EU-India and EU-China Strategic Partnerships
DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-european-union-and-its-main-asian-partners-perspectives-on-the-dynamics-of-the-eu-india-and-eu-china-strategic-partnerships
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120224T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120224T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T000623
CREATED:20231223T134506Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130242Z
UID:63177-1330061400-1330061400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Mahinda Rajapaksa’s India Policy
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Ambassador R RajagopalanDiscussants: Maj Gen (Retd) Ashok Mehta and Dr N Manoharan \nThe paper focused on Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s policy towards India and on how it has been different from that of his predecessors. In evaluating the above\, the scholars posed several questions like in what way his India policy has been different from that of other leaders\, how far has he succeeded in counter-balancing Indian influence? What are the reasons for his success or failure? The paper is broadly divided into three parts beginning with broad trends in Sri Lanka’s India Policy from cold war period to 2005\, post-cold war period and post-2005 period ever since Rajapaksa took over as the President.  \nDuring the Cold War period\, India was perceived as a potential threat and there was an effort in Sri Lanka to balance/offset India’s influence in the island country. Hence\, several Sri Lankan leaders sought to engage regional and extra-regional powers like the USA\, the UK\, Pakistan and China to countervail India through civil-military cooperation. But there was also an attempt to engage India given the perception that India had a decisive influence on the Tamil population. Indian involvement in the Tamil question towards the end of the cold war— sending of Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to fight the Tamil militants\, its ultimate withdrawal before accomplishment of the mission and assassination of former prime minister Rajiv Gandhi— proved counter-productive for India and led to a policy of willful inaction in Sri Lankan affairs ever since. India maintained a distance from the issue and backed a non-military solution— “a negotiated political settlement acceptable to all sections of Sri Lankan society”. However\, even if India adopted a hands-off policy\, the perception of India playing a negative role in the ethnic issue continued in Sri Lanka. \nThe authors argued that immediately after Mahinda Rajapaksa took over as the President of the country in 2005\, he adopted a proactive policy of engagement with India and evolved an innovative way of establishing a line of communication with Indian leadership. A three-member delegation comprising two of his brothers and one of his trusted lieutenants\, regularly discussed with India the issues relating to the ethnic situation in Sri Lanka and especially the inflexible and aggressive posture adopted by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Thus Rajapaksa ensured that his government’s military campaign would have the blessings of India. It is because of such regular interaction that India understood the compulsions of his government and the campaign ended with complete decimation of the LTTE. Rajapaksa could also obtain Indian consent for the import of military weapons from China and Pakistan which sparked off Indian concerns on some occasions. Through regular and effective communication he sought to dispel the Indian concerns in this regard. \nThe authors argued that after the conclusive victory over the LTTE\, Rajapaksa’s handling of the ethnic issue has clearly sidestepped Indian concerns. Indian proposals of developing a solution on the basis of the 13th amendment have not been taken seriously by Rajapaksa as he has chosen to deny that he had ever assured India on a 13th amendment-plus solution and instead insisted that he would favour a homegrown solution rather than an imported one. His approach towards Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) also signifies his apathy towards India\, even if he continues to emphasise on betterment of relationship with India. Despite all this\, India has resigned itself to Sri Lanka’s attempt to strengthen its relationship with India’s traditional rivals\, China and Pakistan\, and has felt compelled to work with Rajapaksa. All this while\, India has hoped to persuade him to evolve a decent solution to the ethnic issue and further strengthen Sri Lanka’s relationship with India. In light of the arguments provided above\, the authors concluded by saying that Rajapaksa had succeeded in both engaging and countervailing India. \nThe main points of the discussion and suggestions to the authors: \n\nThe paper needs more in-depth work regarding the main eight questions it has tried to explore.\nGotabaya Rajapaksa’s role in Rajapaksa’s rise needs to be highlighted further.\nThe question of why military was used although a non military solution has been sought throughout needs to be revaluated.\nMore emphasis needs to be put on devolution and 13th amendment for better understanding of policies.\nThe title of the paper needs to be changed\, whether it was about Rajapaksa’s policy or Sri Lanka’s policy under Rajapaksa needs to come out better. \nA comparative study of the leadership nexus in both countries when studying from personality oriented approach can be undertaken within the paper.\nMaritime issues need a mention in the paper as it could be a future irritant in India-Sri Lanka relations. Also economic issues need more mention in the paper.\nRajapaksa’s idea of nation building could be put in the paper for a better overview of his personality.\n\nReport prepared by Anwesha Ray Chaudhuri\, Research Assistant\, IDSA
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/mahinda-rajapaksas-india-policy
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120224T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120224T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T000623
CREATED:20231224T103532Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T014610Z
UID:64094-1330061400-1330061400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Revenue Procurement in the Army
DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nChair: Shri Amit CowshishDiscussants: Brig Ashok Sharma and Col P Chandok
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/revenue-procurement-in-the-army
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120302T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120302T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T000623
CREATED:20231224T103527Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T014506Z
UID:64093-1330666200-1330666200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:India's 'Asymmetric Responsibility': SAARC as an instrument of Neighbourhood Policy
DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nChair: Ambassador I P KhoslaDiscussants: Ambassador Veena Sikri and Dr Nitya Nanda
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/indias-asymmetric-responsibility-saarc-as-an-instrument-of-neighbourhood-policy
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120309T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120309T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T000623
CREATED:20231224T103527Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130242Z
UID:64091-1331271000-1331271000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Internal Security Threats to Pakistan
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Dr Ashok BehuriaDiscussants: Shri Rana Banerji and Professor Kalim Bahadur \nTopic:Internal security threats to PakistanDiscussants: Prof. Kalim Bahadur\, Mr Rana BanerjiChair: Dr. Ashok Behuria\n	The paper focused on the myriad threats that are challenging the internal security situation within Pakistan and the implications of the threats for the region. In discussing the above\, the author widely classified the threats under the following heads: militancy in Pakistan\, radicalisation in Pakistan\, ethnic dissent\, sectarian strife\, energy shortage\, paucity of water and economic downslide to be the causal factors of instability within the country.  \n	Beginning with militancy in Pakistan\, the author stated that Pakistan was witnessing a massive spurt in violence by militant groups due to its self-defeating policy of using jihadis in War in Afghanistan during 1979-1989 and its romance with the Taliban later. The Taliban connection has radicalised Pakistani society in an irreversible manner. In recent times\, Pakistan is facing an insurgency waged by a network of militants under the banner of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) or Pakistani Taliban. It seeks to undermine the writ of Pakistani law and establish Sharia all over. The TTP has perpetrated hundreds of suicide attacks and justified their action as jihad against the enemies of Islam. Even investigations into recent spate of attacks like Mehran Naval Base have established TTP’s links with the Al Qaeda. That apart\, suicide bombings and kidnappings have become common and preferred option for the militants as major source of funding. Most of the groups involved in such activities emanate from the tribal areas of Pakistan like Jandola\, Waziristan and so on. Pakistan Army’s operations and well-coordinated drone attacks by the US agencies have not been effective. They have only led to regrouping of the militants and further radicalisation and violence. It has also led to a huge population of internally displaced people who suffer hardships that create dissent against the government.  \n	Next threat that the author discussed was that of radicalisation of the state. The forces of radical Islam\, she held\, have managed to infect the social and political fabric of Pakistan. The onward march towards extremist politics in Pakistan can be termed as Talibanisation. The type of education imparted in the Madrassas is not the only reason for rise of militancy in Pakistan. Exploitation of popular grievances against unequal social\, political and economic systems by the extremists has also fueled such a marked rise in militancy. The excessive importance given by the Pakistani leadership to religious elements\, especially during Zia ul Haq’s regime\, has also given a fillip to such extremism where the clergy was allowed to participate in political activities. Such links nourished over time have emboldened these elements to make demands for Islamisation of the Pakistan state.  \n	The killings of Salman Taseer and Shahbaaz Bhatti for advocating amendments to blasphemy law are indicators of the extent of radicalistaion in the Pakistani Society and state today. The process of radicalisation has crept into the army as well although the extent of such penetration remains a matter of debate. Some of the officers supposedly have links with religious groups like Tabhlighi Jamat\, even as its activities are banned in the garrisons. The author concluded that the political parties and civil society groups have failed to take on these radical elements because they are either sympathetic towards them or afraid of raising their voice\, and thus militancy in the name of religion will have broader support base in the country in times to come.  \n	Another issue that impinges on internal situation in Pakistan is that of the rise of nationalist movements demanding autonomy or independence on the basis of their ethnic identities. Insurgency in Balochistan is the most important example here. Balochistan has been wrecked by insurgency for more than six decades. The grievances of Baloch population have been that they were made to forcibly accede to Pakistan and subjected to colonisation by the Pakistani state\, which has exploited all their natural resources and treated them as second class citizens. The Baloch insurgents have routinely carried out attacks on gas pipelines\, railway lines\, other critical infrastructure and military establishments. The government in Islamabad has always used heavy force to quell the movement over the year leading to total alienation of the people there. However\, the recent US congressional hearing on Balochistan has stirred up unease in Pakistan over the issue. That apart\, dissent has been reported over renaming of the erstwhile North Western Frontier Province (NWFP) as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa by the non-Pashtuns of the region like the Hazaras who want a separate province for themselves. Similar instances of demand for separate province have been reported from Karachi\, FATA\, and Sindh etc. Also demand for creation of a separate Seraiki province within Punjab has made its way into parliamentary debates. Seraiki activists have been demanding creation of new province for themselves comprising 17distritcs in south western Punjab. However\, these demands are proving a continuous challenge for the government and a major hindrance to development and resource distribution. All these unrests have the potential to turn into secessionist movements\, unless they are addressed well. \nOn the other hand\, sectarian strife has also engulfed the country. There is a major strife between the Shias and the Sunnis. Pakistan being s Sunni majority country\, minority sects have been at the receiving end for a long time. In the 1950s\, there was a nationwide movement against the Ahmadiyas\, by both the Sunnis and the Shias\, which resulted in their being declared as non-Muslims in 1974. Since the Shi’ite revolution in Iran in 1979\, the Sunnis of Pakistan have trained their guns on the Shias. Zia’s Islamisation drive also accentuated the divide between these groups during this period. The Talibanisation process has now resulted in violence between different Sunni groups like the Deobandis and the Barelvis. Suicide bombings in Barelvi places of worship are quite regular these days. The growing sectarian violence in Pakistan casts a dark shadow on the future of Pakistan. \nThe last three of threats mentioned by the author centred on energy\, water and economic downslide which have the potential to become bigger threats if they are not tackled with care. All of them are interlinked in many ways. Energy crisis for last few years has had its impact on Pakistani economy and triggered mass unrest throughout the country.  \nWater has also become another source of concern in Pakistan. Pakistan\, being a water stressed country\, is going to face water scarcity due to high growth in population. Since large amount of water has been diverted upstream to Punjab\, the rivers have dried up in downstream Sindh. This in turn has affected the agricultural sector. The thinning of Himalayan glaciers due to global warming has affected water flow in the Indus basin. Division of river water on an ad hoc basis to favour the requirements of Punjab has also resulted in smaller provinces of Pakistan accusing it of monopolizing a crucial resource. Water related issues\, like floods and poor availability\, are increasingly being discussed in Pakistan as instances of Indian insensitivity towards Pakistani needs. There is a conscious effort in Pakistan to brand India as a country determined to turn Pakistan into a desert. This is likely to have repercussions for India-Pakistan relations. \nLastly economic downslide has hit Pakistan in a major way since the GDP has declined to 2.4 per cent. There has been significant growth in the service sector compared to the agricultural sector which proves the rural-urban divide in Pakistan. Insurgency and terrorism have also taken its toll on the economy with general investment climate in the country going down. Even recent floods have affected Pakistani economy massively.  \nThe scholar concluded the paper by stating implications of all the above for Pakistan and India\, which were: \nRate of radicalization amongst the youth will go up if not provided access to better and modern education system. Pakistan’s relations with India will acquire a new dimension with Pakistan accusing India of water scarcity in the country. Several sections in Pakistan hold that India has denied Pakistan its legitimate share of water under the Indus Water Treaty. This has become a fresh irritant in Indo-Pak relations. Presently\, India and Pakistan are agreeing to better trade relations\, however\, this could be affected by the anti-India rhetoric being peddled by right wing elements in Pakistan who are raising the water bogey and arguing against any rapprochement with India. Also elements within the Pakistani establishment committed to destabilize India and take Kashmir away by force could ratchet up tensions with India.  \nThat author argued that despite pressures from the US to desist from Iran gas pipeline\, Pakistan is likely to follow an independent policy on the issue and go ahead with the deal.  \nThe major points that emerged from the discussion were;  \n\nApart from the madrassa system of education\, the secular system of education in Pakistan is equally to be blamed for the rising radicalization and this needs to be studied. \nThe failure of the government in handling the extremist elements needs to be studied more. \nRole of Islam should have been in an entirely different section. \nCentrality of India as the primary enemy needs to be factored in the discussion along with relations with US and the endgame in Afghanistan. \nImplications needed more in-depth analysis and study. \nIssue of sectarian strife is an important issue which needs to be mentioned in more detail. \n\nReport prepared by Anwesha Ray Chaudhuri\, Research Assistant.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/internal-security-threats-to-pakistan
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120309T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120309T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T000623
CREATED:20231224T103527Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T014416Z
UID:64092-1331271000-1331271000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Theaterised Joint Logistics: A Calliberated Approach Towards Initiation
DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nChairperson: Ambassador I P KhoslaDiscussants: Rear Admiral Sushil Ramsay\, Maj Gen Sheru Thapliyal\,SM (Retd) and Wing Cdr Deepak Sharma
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/theaterised-joint-logistics-a-calliberated-approach-towards-initiation
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120316T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120316T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T000623
CREATED:20231223T134407Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130242Z
UID:63175-1331875800-1331875800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:External Threats and the Formulation of China’s Foreign Policy
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Amb. R RajagopalanDiscussants: Amb. Nalin Suri and Prof. MV Rappai \nChina’s foreign policy is geared towards securing its ‘core interests’ such as maintaining territorial integrity\, the preservation of its system of government and continued economic and social stability. Perceived threats to these core interest shape China’s external behaviour. The paper analyses important external threats as perceived by Chinese strategic thinkers.  \nChinese perceived external threats are: \n\nJapan\nKorean Peninsula\nSouth China Sea\nIndia\nThe US.\n\nChinese scholars view Japan as an emerging military threat. They believe that China’s economic growth has encouraged a sense of envy within Japan regarding China. Japan will seek to strengthen its military and political clout to balance China’s growing political and economic clout. Japan’s territorial disputes with Russia and China are seen by many Chinese scholars as providing impetus to revise the role of Japan’s Self Defense Forces. A close examination of Chinese threat perception regarding Japan suggests that they believe that Japan can be a threat for China as a key ally in the event of a conflict in the Taiwan straits\, as a facilitator of regional cooperation (among India\, Japan\, Australia and the US) that may exclude China and as a contender for political leadership of the region by increasing its stature at the international forums including the UN. Japan’s pursuit to gain a permanent seat at the UN Security Council is viewed by the Chinese scholars as being aimed at gaining political clout to countervail China. \nAs regards Korean peninsula\, the Chinese scholars perceive that an exacerbation of tensions on the Korean peninsula would have implications for China’s domestic and foreign policy. China’s failure to prevent conflict from breaking out on the Korean peninsula would adversely affect the political influence Beijing has gained in the region. In case that happens\, smaller states in the region would look at the US as the net provider of the security. Chinese scholars also believe that instability in the Korean peninsula has given an opportunity to Japan and South Korea to strengthen their military ties with the US. In case the situation aggravates further\, it will help them deepen their military relationship. \nThe issue of South China Sea and Chinese territorial and maritime claims over its sovereignty has become an issue of much concern for China in recent years. According to the Chinese scholars\, the bilateral disputes that China has with some ASEAN member states such as Vietnam\, Philippines\, Malaysia\, Brunei and Indonesia now have the potential to strain and stall the relationship with the ASEAN as a whole. American courtship of these countries neighbouring China is viewed by the Chinese scholars as an opportunistic exploitation aimed at containing China. According to the Chinese scholars\, instability in the South China Sea provides an excuse to the US and Japan to increase their military footprint in China’s immediate neighbourhood. They also fear that in the event of an escalation of dispute on South China Sea\, the US and its allies would take the opportunity to interdict Sea Lanes of Communications thereby jeopardizing China’s economy.  \nIndia has been recognized as an important regional actor by Chinese scholars because of two main factors: economic development and a proactive foreign policy following the 2005 Indo-US nuclear deal. Unlike the Indian perception of an imminent military challenge from China\, India is seen as a direct threat to China. It is Tibet\, which China defines among its core interest\, that makes India a potential threat in Chinese thinking. Despite India’s adherence to the “one China policy” and repeated assurances that the Indian government will not permit dissident Tibetan to undertake anti-China activity\, Chinese scholars remain wary of India’s stand on the Tibet issue. They believe that Dalai Lama can be used by India to destabilize the Tibetan Autonomous Region. \nIndia’s look east policy and growing military relationship with the regional countries are seen by Chinese scholars as aimed at seeking strategic balance with China. New Delhi’s efforts to develop bilateral relationship with central Asian countries and prospects of greater involvement in the region are seen as enabling the encirclement of China. Growing Indo-US relationship is also seen as a strategy to contain China in the near future. China is deemed as an important factor in the close bilateral relationship that developed between the two countries following the Indo-US nuclear deal. \nIn the Chinese strategic thinking the US is viewed as the fundamental obstacle to China’s continued assent in global politics. The US arms transfer to Taiwan and the seeming centrality of the Taiwan question in the Asia calculus of the US continues to be an important threat for China. Apart from Taiwan issue\, China sees the US as a threat for many reasons. It is seen as a facilitator for the creation of China containment policy in Asia. American relations with Japan and South Korea\, its military engagement with Southeast Asia and its growing relationship with India are all seen as part of a greater strategy to reduce China’s strategic space. The US has been raising the human rights issue of China. This has been viewed in Beijing as interference in China’s internal matters and an effort to destabilize the country domestically.   \nChina has taken three important foreign policy initiatives- support for multilateralism\, promoting military diplomacy and active pursuit of economic diplomacy- to tackle various external threats mentioned above. By promoting multilateralism\, China is trying to project itself as a responsible power and a cooperative partner. Chinese participation in multilateralism is also geared towards diluting the influence of one particular power.  \nFollowing the repeated criticism of its military modernization\, China has tried to allay the “China threat thesis.” It has established defence and security consultation with 22 countries including the US\, India\, Japan\, Vietnam and Philippines. With an aim to project a more open and transparent image of the Chinese military\, it has also sought to increase military exchanges with countries across the world.  \nEconomic diplomacy has become a central theme in China’s foreign policy. In terms of management of external threats\, China has actively sought to reassure its smaller neighbours that they have a stake in China’s growth. Keeping that in mind\, China has signed various FTAs with Southeast Asian countries. China has consistently sought to deepen economic engagement while putting contentious issues on the backburner. The rational is that greater economic ties will help instill mutual trust.   \nMajor points from the discussion and suggestions to the author; \n\nThe title should be revised to reflect that the paper studies Chinese perception of external threat.\nCurrent assessment of security environment and Chinese world view may be added as a background to the paper.\nThe paper must include a section on Taiwan and an assessment on recent elections.\nThe paper should also look at Chinese threat perception with reference to Central Asia and Russia. Resource competition among the regional powers should also be factored in.\nChina’s historical grievances-the century of humiliation-should also be factored in the paper.\nThe Chinese threat perceptions mentioned in the paper should be reordered and should begin with the US.\nThe paper should lay emphasis on Chinese threat perception in Hu Jintao era.\nChina’s response to these threats may also be added if possible.\nThe scholar should undertake a field trip to further asses the Chinese perception on these threats.\nThe paper notes that some of the perceptions mentioned in the paper are based on personal interviews with the Chinese scholars. The scholar should footnote the interviews.\n\nReport prepared by Shamshad A. Khan\, Research Assistant\, East Asia Centre.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/external-threats-and-the-formulation-of-chinas-foreign-policy
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120316T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120316T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T000623
CREATED:20231224T103527Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T014311Z
UID:64090-1331875800-1331875800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Bhutan and Climate Change: Identifying Strategic Implications
DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nChairperson: Ambassador I P KhoslaDiscussants: Shri Aditya Batra and Professor A C Sinha
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/bhutan-and-climate-change-identifying-strategic-implications
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120323T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120323T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T000623
CREATED:20231224T103523Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T014156Z
UID:64089-1332480600-1332480600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Situating Gilgit Baltistan in the Kashmir Discourse
DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nChair: Cmde (Retd) C Uday BhaskarDiscussant : Shri Rana Banerji and Dr D Suba Chandran
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/situating-gilgit-baltistan-in-the-kashmir-discourse
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120413T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120413T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T000623
CREATED:20231223T134406Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130242Z
UID:63172-1334295000-1334295000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Understanding Africa’s position on UN Security Council Reforms
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Lt Gen Satish Nambiar (Retd)Discussants: Ambassador Rajiv Bhatia and Ambassador H H S Viswanathan \nReform and democratisation of the United Nations\, particularly the Security Council\, has been the focus of global attention in recent years. However\, progress on UNSC reforms has proven to be quite elusive\, mainly due to multiple and competing proposals by various groups like G-4\, Uniting for Consensus\, L-69 and S-5. Separately\, within the UN process\, through the Africa Group the African countries have tried to project their common position for permanent representation from the African continent at the Security Council.   \nIn this context\, Ms. Ruchita Beri analysed the African position on UNSC reforms and provided some historical and political context necessary to situate the Africa’s debate over Security Council reforms. She argued that the continent’s inflexibility and failure to reach a compromise on the common position while negotiating with other like-minded groups is the single most significant roadblock in the African countries’ plans to acquire permanent position on the high table. Further\, while India’s quest for African support for its UNSC candidature may have been one of the factors fuelling India’s engagement of African countries in recent years\, doubts remain on India and Africa convergence at the negotiations on UNSC reforms in future.     \nHighlighting the anachronistic structure of the UNSC\, Ms. Beri mentioned that there has been an engaging debate on the need for UNSC reforms since the end of the Cold War. Many countries\, especially from the developing world\, have expressed their dissatisfaction with the unrepresentative character of the UNSC and presented various formulae and proposals addressing three issues: \n\nThe size of the reformed Security Council\,\nLimitations on the scope and use of veto rights\, and\,\nThe UNSC’s working methods. \n\nHowever\, the new permanent membership has proven to be the most contentious issue in the debate on Security Council reforms. \nAmong different groups formed across the world to put forward the cases for permanent membership to the Security Council\, the Africa group remains the only geographical group to have reached a common position when\, after considerable deliberations\, the African countries agreed to a common position on the UNSC reforms called the Ezulwini Consensus (2005). Further\, the Sirte Summit of the African Union in July 2005 set up a follow up mechanism on the reform process and mandated to negotiate with other regions of the world and stakeholders to attain Africa’s aspiration with reference to the UNSC. However\, there was a lot of criticism of the African common position: \n\nThe Ezulwini consensus was based on the idea of regional representation\, while the current UN system focused on representation of countries on the basis of their individual merit.\nThe Ezulwini consensus was an inflexible negotiating position that was doomed to fail at the onset.\n\nOn their part\, the G-4 and the Africa group opened negotiations in London in 2005 in order to reach a consensus as they would be unable to muster the required support independently. Nevertheless\, negotiations revealed fissures in the unity of the Africa group and the leading African countries failed to convince other member states that it was practically impossible for Africa to attain a permanent representation at the UNSC without support from other players. Several factors influenced these events:  \n\nFailure to name the possible African representatives in the African common position because of intense rivalry amongst them and severe criticism of their candidature within Africa. \nOnly 36 of the 53 African countries voted in favour of the Sirte Declaration\, meaning that even if the Africa group had managed to join in a coalition with G-4\, it would still not have got the votes of all members of AU.\nIt appears some of the P-5 countries also fuelled these differences among the African countries.\n\nOn India-Africa convergence\, Ms. Beri mentioned that in recent years\, India has been engaging African countries in a big way\, at bilateral\, regional as well as pan-African levels. The need for a new paradigm encompassing diverse areas such as political\, economic\, science and technology\, human resource development\, social\, cultural and strategic was highlighted during the India-Africa Summit held in April 2008. Also\, India’s increasing engagement of Africa coupled with its involvement in UN peacekeeping in Africa can be viewed as a strategy to win support of the African countries for its candidature to the UNSC. In turn\, on various occasions\, individually or as part of a regional grouping\, African countries have gone on record to support India’s candidature to the reformed UNSC.  \nIn conclusion\, she opined that currently it seems the Africa group cannot agree on suitable candidates to fill the permanent seats allocated to the region. It is also doubtful whether other groups will negotiate with African countries without identification of the possible African candidates. At the same time\, without African support it is inconceivable that any proposal or reform package could succeed in the General Assembly. Therefore\, at the moment\, Africa seems to be holding the key to further progress on the UNSC reforms debate. \nMajor Points from Discussion and Suggestions to the Author: \n\nThe world is putting unnecessary faith in Africa and its role in the expansion of Security Council. At the same time\, amongst the P-5 only UK and France are inclined for expansion and the other three are not in favour of the same. Therefore\, Africa becomes a minor bloc in any such expansions.\nSome consider arriving at the Ezulwini Consensus was the mistake committed by Africa as it could not move freely beyond the set position. At the same time\, the question is whether Africa has the power to go back on the consensus. Hence\, Ezulwini Consensus should be considered as the starting point of the process. It is the opening position of Africa wherein it has expressed its opinion on a major issue as Africa does not have such diplomatic leverage with the world.\nUnlike Asia and Latin America\, but like Europe\, Africa does not have probable candidates as the continent is too divided. Therefore\, it is very difficult to get consensus among African countries. Of late\, there have been new cases of Kenya and Ethiopia to be considered for membership of the UNSC. \nThere is no clear strategy of Africa and India as to how to proceed on the subject of UNSC reform. The current approach fails to deliver desired results. In this situation\, the only solution is the transitional solution between permanent and non-permanent category\, i.e. creating a rotational membership.\nThere is no clear support from Africa for India’s position. They only note India’s candidature. Their position could come out clearly when there are few contenders from the continent.\nIt is also important to look at the position taken in groupings like BRICS and IBSA by its member states.\nFor some time\, the issue of reforming the UNSC is has moved to the backburner in the world dominated by economic issues and it is time to pursue the same along with other impending issues.\nPermanent seats in the Security Council are not decided on the basis of regional representation. Therefore\, it is a non-starter and this practice has to be discarded. At the same time\, deciding criteria for new members is like deciding a country’s candidature well in advance.\nThe question of veto power for new members is a non-starter for negotiations as the current P-5 is in no mood to offer it to new members. There should be some compromise on this contentious issue and final push has to come from the P-5 in this regard. Separately\, there is a debate on the use of veto power\, conditions under which it was introduced\, and the current need to retain it.\nSome critics are of the opinion that it is time India starts its candidature campaign as an individual country\, leaving behind the G-4 because the G-4 is not getting full support because of opposition to the candidature for some of its members like Japan and Germany.\nThere are doubts over Africa’s ability to reach consensus ever because of mutual suspicion and jealousy among African countries. Recently\, Senegal put forward its candidature for the UNSC membership as the only francophone African country.\nIt is natural for African countries to think that the UNSC lacks credibility and legitimacy as there is no permanent representation for Africa which is home to 54 countries.\n\nReport prepared by Babjee Pothuraju\, Research Assistant\, IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/understanding-africas-position-on-un-security-council-reforms
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120413T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120413T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T000623
CREATED:20231223T134406Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130242Z
UID:63173-1334295000-1334295000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:The Growing Chinese Maritime Influence: Implications for Regional Security
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Vice Admiral P S Das (Retd)Discussants: Cdr Kamlesh Agnihotri and Dr Krishnendra Meena \nIn  order to understand the strategy adopted by China in spreading its maritime  influence and implications for regional security\, the tenets espoused by Alfred Thayer Mahan and Julian Corbett have been studied in this paper. \nThe  two great strategists differed from each other; whereas Mahan emphasised  establishing Command of Sea\, Corbett focused more on denial of command of sea. Mahan  advocated the Big Battle theory (requiring big Ships and Weapons); but Corbett  believed in advance indicators before big battles will occur. Whilst Mahan  looked at the sea as means to an end\, Corbett looked at a skilful combination  of maritime and continental strategies.  \nOn  comparing the two strategists it was observed that the Chinese maritime thought  process was heavily influenced by Mahan\, but there are also shades of Corbett’s  ideas. \nChina\, in order to gain power\, has consolidated the strategies of Mahan and Corbett in the present era and  its strategy is now based on three conjoined aspects—economics\, diplomacy and  military expansion. \nThe  importance of maritime strategy for China  emerges in three ways: first\,  breakaway from the coastal defence syndrome; second\, consolidation in the immediate area in the face  of the Soviet threat and the presence of the US  in Japan;  and thirdly\, break  away from the immediate area and enter into the outer areas.  \nComparisons  were drawn between China’s  wish to absorb Taiwan and the  US annexation of Hawaii Islands  and expansion in US maritime  influence post the world wars\, as these aspects hold important geostrategic indicators  for China. \nIt  was brought out that in order to expand its influence China must first gain the  advantage of sea denial tactics through Submarines and Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBM)\, second\, gain sea control through establishment of working  control and control in dispute\, third\, China’s naval operations outside the  first and second island chains would fall more into the category of presence  and trade protection and finally\, the strategy of overseas bases which is  followed by China in a subtle way in Myanmar\, Maldives\, Sri Lanka\, eastern  coast of Africa\, etc.\nAs  far as the future is concerned\, it was observed that with the steady increase  in China’s  defence budget\, a US-China conflict cannot be ruled out. Whereas the US will spread its assets all over the world\, China will  concentrate only in areas of interest.  \nConclusion: \n\nThe Mahan and Corbett views       could have not foreseen subsequent technological advancements.\nLaws of the sea are interpreted       by China       according to its interest.\nChina is following more of       Mahanian intent\, however capability gap still exist as compared to the US—in       terms of technology the latter has an advantage. And till this gap is not       bridged China       will follow sea denial.\nConcept of Chinese navy is moving       ahead in modernisation of manpower/capabilities\, building a professional       navy. The idea of “removing the rust” is being followed in China. Anti       Piracy law is used as a disguise for spreading its influence in the sea.\nChina was an       inward looking civilization and the maritime outlook is a recent       development\, hence Chinese naval expansion is infantile and it’s just a       beginning. According to Selby Cohen\, ”geostrategically China       since Post Cold War time has broken away from land oriented strategy to       maritime.“ \nChina is       not a sea faring society and therefore it is not re-emerging as a naval       power as it was never a sea power earlier.\nChina is       facing an expert naval force in the form of the US Navy therefore       technology should be its priority rather than numbers. China is       engaging with a vast number of nations (mostly economically weak) and       investing in their land\, so that in future they can be used during war.\nThe national strategy and       maritime strategy keep changing as capabilities increase.\nThere will be an arms race in       future and the number of assets will be important; further instability in       the maritime world will continue to exist.\n\nSuggestions for the Paper: \n\nThe title of the paper should be       revisited/ revised in order to describe the actual study undertaken in the       paper. \nThe paper should consult Chinese       writings like the 1993 ‘Military Strategic Guidelines’\, which discuss the       role of the PLA Navy\, the guidelines provided by Hu Jintao in 2004\, and       Gorshkov’s four roles for the Soviet navy must be studied.  \nHistoric missions and strategic       guidelines should be amalgamated in the paper.\nComparison between the US\, UK       and China could be       avoided as the US       perspective is more alarmist than is the actual reality.\nImplications for India and       other regions must be discussed.\nSome mention of the South China Sea       and China’s       influence in the region must be discussed.\nElaboration on the regions       involved in maritime issues is required. \n\nReport Prepared  by Soumya Tiwari\, Research Intern\, Centre for  Military Affairs
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-growing-chinese-maritime-influence-implications-for-regional-security
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120420T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120420T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T000623
CREATED:20231223T134353Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130242Z
UID:63170-1334899800-1334899800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:In Pursuit of a Shield:US\, Missile Defence and the Iran Imperative
DESCRIPTION:Chairman: Professor Satish KumarDiscussants: Dr. Probal K. Ghosh\, Cdr. Abhijit Singh \nThe paper dealt with US efforts to counter Iran’s missile ‘threat’ and ensure security of its allies like Israel and Turkey and safeguard its interests and the regional repercussions of such measures. The paper began by discussing the Iran threat as flagged in key US policy documents including the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)\, 2006 National Military Strategy to Combat WMD and the February 2010 Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) Review and the solution articulated (missile defence) to deal/hedge against such a threat. Pertinent among these measures being erected in consort with allies like the NATO and GCC countries at sea as well as on land across the Bush and the Obama administration were examined. The next section examined Iran’s missile inventory and its developing capabilities.  \nThe pursuit of such ‘defensive’ measures has led to complications in US-Russia arms control efforts\, uncertainties in Iran’s relations with its neighbours like Turkey and has generated regional strategic tensions (NATO-Russia) as well. Russian contentions that the real focus of such measures is to constrain its strategic capabilities despite US officials insisting that it was directed against Iran were pointed out. NATO’s November 2010 Lisbon Summit explicitly avoided naming Iran as the intended target of Obama’s Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) at the instance of Turkey\, which agreed to host a X-band radar at Kurecik 700 kms from the Iranian border in September 2011 on the condition that data would not be shared with Israel. The strong US-Israel missile defence cooperation was noted\, with Arrow Block 4 version tested in February 2012. It was pointed out that the Arrow – first inducted into the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) in 2000 – was the first operational theatre missile defence system in the world. The paper noted that there was the distinct possibility of Obama’s PAA being extended to the Gulf region\, with senior US policy makers expressing such a desire publicly in recent times. The UAE became the first international partner to buy the THAAD missiles from the US in December 2011. \nThe paper ended by flagging possible implications for Indian security given that these efforts relate to developments in what Indian policy makers have called its ‘proximate neighbourhood’. Among these included greater regional strategic uncertainties coupled with rising military expenditures\, energy security complications as a result of a possible incident at sea\, and possible deterrence complications given that American BMD systems provides the justification for both Russia and China to continue their nuclear modernization efforts.   \nProf. Kumar noted that the issues examined in the paper have a fundamental bearing on regional and global security. He added that the ‘reset’ in US-Russia relations has been affected by the US missile defence policy with regard to Iran.  \nDr. Ghosh began his comments by noting that the paper was ‘well-crafted’ but with certain loopholes which can be plugged to make it better. His comments dealt with the BMD architecture\, Russia-US imbroglio and Iran’s capabilities. He wanted the author to examine some of the US programmes that had been mothballed as well as programmes like the Hypersonic Glide Kill Vehicle\, which could be the future of BMD. Dr. Ghosh reminded the audience that Obama’s PAA was in many ways similar to the 1996 document Capstone Requirements Document (CRD) specifying NMD operational requirements which was scrapped because the capabilities could not mature. Dr. Ghosh noted that the Bush-era system did not cover Turkey\, Greece\, Bulgaria\, and parts of Romania. He also noted that the US had rejected the Russian suggestion to host US radars at Gabaladarya\, Azerbaijan directly overlooking Iran instead of in Poland and Czech Republic. On Russian contentions specifically\, Dr. Ghosh stated that they were a bit overblown given that Russia could potentially overwhelm US interceptors by sheer numbers at its disposal. He concluded his remarks by noting that an Iranian ICBM capability ‘was still some distance away’. \nCdr. Singh commended the effort to bring out a coherent paper by the author despite not having a military background. He gave a geo-strategic context to the issue in the light of declining Russian influence over ‘buffer’ states after the break-up of the Soviet Union\, and the genuine apprehensions of countries like Poland and Georgia over the resurgent Russia. He pointed to intra-NATO divisions over the issue\, which are being played up by Russia. In his opinion\, the technological basis of the US system was sound. He however termed the ‘threat’ from Iran as ‘over-stated’ given that Iranian IRBM capabilities have prominent North Korean/Chinese links and an Iranian ICBM capability was far away. Iranian cruise missile capabilities though are potent and are being still further developed. Cdr. Singh pointed out that Iranian threats to close the Straits of Hormuz were real\, even though it could be for a limited period. He stated that as a concept\, BMD was a ‘brilliant\, strategic idea’ equivalent to a ‘strategic tent’ rather than a ‘strategic fortress’.       \nInternal Discussant Cdr. S.S. Parmar noted that in the event of clashes\, it will not involve missile defences per se but conventional capabilities. He also noted that Iran could swarm US ships with shore-based batteries making defences against short-range missiles ineffective. Cdr. Parmar pointed to the importance of maps and tables to more clearly convey information. The other Discussant Kapil Dharaj Patil pointed out that Iranian perceptions of the US missile defence system was absent in the paper. He added that it was important to note the ‘threat construction’ by US and NATO vis-à-vis Iran’s capabilities.   \nDG\, IDSA Dr. Arvind Gupta noted that though the paper is an important update\, it could do with more analysis. He pointed out that implications for Indian security if any have to be more clearly brought out and the author’s own assessment of the US efforts has to be included in the concluding section. The paper could also benefit by incorporating maps/tables. Chinese reactions to the issue could also be pointed out. On issues like budgetary pressures being faced by the Obama administration that the paper flags\, a more focussed effort can be made to go into the pertinent details.      \nOther points of discussion that were flagged from the floor included regional responses to US BMD efforts\, specifically from countries like Saudi Arabia and the GCC\, assessment of Iranian capabilities or lack of it\, and the efficacy of the BMD systems being pursued by the US\, among others.  \nReport prepared by Shri Kiran Jai Prakash\, Research Intern\, Nuclear and Arms Control Centre\, and Sam Rajiv.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/in-pursuit-of-a-shieldus-missile-defence-and-the-iran-imperative
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120420T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120420T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T000623
CREATED:20231224T103522Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T014044Z
UID:64088-1334899800-1334899800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Indian Economic Miracle: A Model for Nepal
DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/indian-economic-miracle-a-model-for-nepal
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120525T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120525T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T000623
CREATED:20231224T103515Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130242Z
UID:64087-1337923800-1337923800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Analysis of Terrorist Financing - Funding Pattern and Sources of Contributions
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Brig Rumel Dahiya\, SM (Retd)Discussants: Shri Balesh Kumar\, Special Director\, Enforcement Directorate\, Maj-General Umong Sethi (Retd) and Shri Raghuraman\, CEO\, NATGRID
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/analysis-of-terrorist-financing-funding-pattern-and-sources-of-contributions
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120608T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120608T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T000623
CREATED:20231223T134352Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130242Z
UID:63167-1339133400-1339133400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Does India need a grand strategy?
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Ambassador Satish ChandraDiscussants: Maj General B K Sharma and Dr Happymon Jacob \n \n\nInterrogating the concept of grand strategy and whether India needs a centrally articulated design for the conduct of its statecraft constitutes the core thinking put forward by the paper. In contrast to other major states in the world\, the Government of India has so far shied away from publicly articulating a grand strategy\, thereby attracting comments that this is an anomaly that needs to be remedied. Proponents of grand strategy argue that the absence of a publicly articulated and coherent grand strategy gives rise to various concerns: armed forces acquire technologies without a strategy; government departments pursue their specific interests without reference to overarching national goals; and\, diplomats have a hard time explaining India’s behaviour to foreign interlocutors.   \nThe author identifies several benefits which flow out of formulation of a grand strategy: \n\nFirst\, it will help departments to develop short and medium term plans in accordance with the overall national intent. \nSecond\, it will help policy makers view their policy initiatives holistically and highlight crosscutting issues. \nThird\, it can provide a basis for prioritising resource allocations. \nFourth\, it will improve coordination among agencies\, increase synergies and provide direction to individual and collective actions.\n\nFifth\, it can enhance communication and cooperation with other states. \nSixth\, it will encourage policy makers to think systematically about the long term consequences of their actions. \nSeventh\, it will be useful to test the robustness of current organisational structures\, processes and resources. \nEighth\, it will help citizens to evaluate whether particular actions of the state are aligned with the nation’s core values and interests. \nNinth\, it will be useful to promote structured and focused research on core issues and areas that are identified as national priorities.\nTenth\, it would be useful for educating the strategic leadership.\n\nBesides these functional uses\, proponents also emphasise that grand strategy is a key great power status symbol\, thus making a strong case in public imagination for a centrally articulated design. While the author acknowledges the benefits and obvious usefulness which seem to be associated with a grand strategy\, he argues that there are several barriers to formulation of such a strategy.  \nThe first barrier to the making of a grand strategy is the absence of conceptual clarity. The term has come to mean different things to different thinkers depending on their vision of the world\, their conceptions about the nature of power\, their institutional affiliations\, and the interests they seek to pursue. Moreover\, in the absence of a universally accepted definition and shared meaning\, the term ‘grand strategy’ has come to exist as an ambiguous concept and as differing images\, ranging from a fully developed plan of action to subtler aspects such as individual visions and world views. The author lists out seven such images: \n\nAs a Plan: grand strategy is viewed as a plan of action articulated by the nation’s top leadership who gathers an expert group to conduct wide ranging consultations with important stake holders both within and outside the government and bring out a draft grand strategy for top leadership sanction.\nAs a Vision: grand strategy as a vision\, a representation of strategy created in the mind of the leader. Grand Strategy as a guiding idea offers flexibility to bureaucratic agents to adapt their actions according to needs of the circumstances\, however\, this image of grand strategy captures only a part of the strategy process and needs to be supplemented by institutional competence.\nAs Politics: Unlike the prescriptive nature of the previous images\, according to this image\, a grand strategy emerges out of bargaining and compromise among various stake holders within the state. This image of grand strategy runs the risk of being distorted to suit interests of particular coalitions and interest groups. Furthermore\, enduring differences among key stake holders in terms of values\, beliefs\, and interests might severely impact the success of a neatly formulated strategy by expert planners.\nAs a Paradigm: Grand strategy imagined as a paradigm is a simplified version of reality\, a general perspective of the world view widely shared among the elite. This image of grand strategy lays out the map and provides a certain conception about the nature of the world\, but fails to meaningfully capture the complexity of current realities. Realism and liberalism are two such paradigms which provide a short hand guide for interpreting specific events and developments but cannot be substituted for strategy making.\nAs Thought: According to this image\, strategic competence of a state is judged not by its material achievements but by the quality of its thought\, presented and preserved in the written form. In overemphasizing the ideational dimension of strategy\, the role of verbally articulated ideas\, and the utility of force in the international system\, this image of strategy underplays the tacit dimension of strategic cultures.\nAs Harmonisation of Ends and Means: Grand strategy in this image is all about ensuring that ends do not over step available means\, and resources are not wasted\, with the former leading to failure of strategy and the latter involving opportunity costs.  However\, matching ends and means is not a neutral process and involves more optimal employment of national resources placing a premium on ethical and political judgment. \nAs a Pattern: According to this image\, grand strategy is a pattern of the past.  The process of looking back to look ahead is seen as useful in explaining past behaviour and providing clues to future strategies.\n\nThe second barrier to the making of a grand strategy is the associated costs and risks of its benefits. Firstly\, articulation of a clear set of goals to set the nation on the right course in a turbulent internal and external environment is a self contradictory objective as it is difficult to predetermine opportunities and risks in a turbulent strategic environment. Secondly\, though grand strategy is useful in promoting coordination among agencies within the government\, tight regulation of behaviour may diminish the capacity for peripheral vision. Thirdly\, in attempting to reduce ambiguity by formulating a grand strategy\, the scope for strategic action\, which thrives in the domain of inconsistency\, could be curtailed. Fourth\, efforts to define a state and underline its uniqueness through its grand strategy might generate narrow stereotyping and runs the risk of obscuring complexity. Lastly\, a publicly articulated grand strategy may lead to further fragmentations in a politically fraught public space. \nExistence of divergent views on what constitutes India’s core interests and how best to promote them is identified as the third barrier to the formulation of a grand strategy. The paper observes that in the absence of a clear consensus on critical issues of national significance (such as settlement of border disputes\, response to terrorism\, strategy on Pakistan\, China\, etc.) among political parties\, government institutions\, and civil society groups\, a grand strategy that articulates a particular approach on any of these issues will be politically contested. Finally\, lack of resourceful and competent institutional arrangements which foster wide ranging dialogues and promote synthesis of different points of view is cited by the paper as another barrier to the making of a grand strategy. In addition to this point\, the author stressed on the necessity to undertake interdisciplinary forward looking studies and dialogues to open up critical dimensions that will bear upon long term prospects of the country. In conclusion\, the author remarked that he has attempted to problematise the concept of grand strategy in the paper and comments on the skewed and unbalanced nature of the contemporary discourse on grand strategy. \nKey Discussion Points:\n\nThe bottom-line of the images is that the leadership and the entire political elite should take ownership of the grand strategy if it is to be sustained for a long time.\nGrand strategy should be goal-oriented. At the nub of it is the question: “What’s your goal for the country?” \nNational leadership wants to operate in a state of ambiguity. Putting out a grand strategy document in the public domain would attract questions about accountability.\nThe National Security Council should be at the driving seat of any such initiative. An objective and scenario building approach should be employed.\nSuggestions for the paper included: contextualizing the discussion to focus on India; engaging with existing debates (Luttwak\, Busan\, Liddell Hart\, etc.); including illustrations to describe various typologies of grand strategy; bringing out the role of culture\, history\, and the linkage between ideology and vision in the formulation of grand strategy; indicating revisions and new pathways to the makers of grand strategy; including a working definition of grand strategy; and\, some exploration of whether elite and social consensus lead to grand strategy or vice versa?\n\nReport prepared by Bhavna Tripathy\, Project Assistant (IDSA-DRDO ST2050 Project) at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/does-india-need-a-grand-strategy
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120622T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120622T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T000623
CREATED:20231223T134307Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130241Z
UID:63166-1340343000-1340343000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Quality Assurance (QA) in Army Procurements
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: S KalyanramanDiscussants: Manoj Shrivastava and VS Raghuvanshi \nMahendra Prasad began his presentation by focusing on his ongoing research project which attempts to unfurl various aspects of quality assurance (QA) in army procurements\, an area understudied so far. He mentioned that “Quality Assurance (QA) in Army Procurements\,” was the first paper in a series of papers encompassing the Project Work entitled “Synergising QA for Speedy Defence Procurement and Ensuring Quality.” In the next paper\, effectiveness of the QA in Army procurements plan to be critically analysed using the failure data which would be collected from the defects reported on newly acquired equipment during their warranty period. In the third paper\, case studies of few selected procurement cases would be carried out. The final paper will explore the best QA practices and how these can be applied in our context to evolve a better QA system. \nIntroducing the paper\, the author said that defence procurements are done primarily under two heads – capital and revenue. The former is guided by DPP\, and include: fifteen years Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan (LTIPP)\, five years Services Acquisition Plan (SCAP)\, and Annual Acquisition Plan (AAP)\, which is a subset of SCAP and is a two year Roll On plan. The latter is guided by DPM and includes mainly replacement equipment and assemblies\, spares\, components for maintenance and operation of already sanctioned assets. QA checks of all the hardware procured by Army are carried out by DGQA. Further\, he elaborated upon the various stages of the evolution of DGQA. In its course of evolution\, in 1968\, Directorate of R&D (General) was bifurcated into Directorate of Inspection (General Stores) and Directorate of R&D (General Stores). Directorate General of Inspection was re-designated as Directorate General of Quality Assurance (DGQA) on 04 Jul 1987. At present\, DGQA Organisation is under the overall control of Department of Defence Production and Supplies in the Ministry of Defence. Further\, Lt Col Prasad delved on the functions of DGQA which provides QA cover to the entire range of Arms\, Ammunitions\, Equipments and Stores on procurement. He then talked about functions which are specific to procurement\, like\, vetting of response of vendors to Request for Information (RFI)\, assist in formulation of General staff Qualitative Requirements (GSQRs)\, assist in preparation of Requests For Proposals (RFPs) etc. \nSubsequently\, Prasad talked about Procedure of Acceptance of Capital and Revenue Procurements which is similar if not the same for both capital and revenue procurements. The first and foremost step here is that after placement of supply order an Acceptance Test Procedure (ATP) incorporating all the tests and certification for acceptance of the product ordered is prepared. In his analysis Prasad observed that the conditions laid down for acceptance are extremely stringent and capital intensive for vendors participating in the bidding process. The stakes are very high as finally only one vendor is likely to get the contract. Expenditure incurred by all other vendors not winning the bid therefore becomes wasteful expenditure and discourages them from fielding their equipment. It has been observed that many vendors withdraw at this stage. Moreover\, lack of multi-skilled engineering staff with DGQA is invariably evident from the fact that the number of DGQA staff attending a meeting (especially pre-bid meetings with vendors and technical evaluation committee meetings) exceeds those from other departments/ branches/ directorates. On the draft ATP he said that it is prepared by the vendor on whom the supply order is placed. Since a vendor has a vested interest\, it may not mention some very important tests for which he does not have the facility and/or certifications\,. To improve QA in Army procurements\, Mahendra Prasad made following important recommendations:\n \n\nIn order to cut costs and time required for technical and environmental evaluation it was recommended that only those tests should be undertaken by DGQA\, which are not possible to be carried out anywhere else at various laboratories accredited by National Accreditation Board for Testing and Calibration Laboratories (NABL) in the country.\nReputed vendors may be permitted self-certification on case to case basis taking into account their past performance.\nTo address the interaction problems of user and WE directorate with DGQA\, it is felt that a single window system for interaction with DGQA will go a long way to obviate this long-standing sore point.\nFor creation of a pool of staff possessing multiple skills\, bifurcation of staff into broad streams as mechanical\, electronics and computer science and inter directorate postings may help. \nRegarding ATP it is felt that a well-researched and stringent ATP can minimise occurrence of a number of defects due to material and manufacturing inadequacies\, after the equipment is put into service. \nThe selection process of the officer cadre needs a complete revamp. \n\nLt Col Prasad concluded by saying that for the success of any military mission\, right equipment\, at the right time\, in the hands of soldiers is as important a factor as the training and physical fitness of soldier himself. Thus\, factors causing delay in procurement of Army hardware need to be identified\, analysed and eliminated. Two most important features that equipment in the hands of soldiers must possess are high reliability and military ruggedisation. \nDiscussion Points \n\nSince the DGQA is overburdened\, the agency should divest itself of the task of promoting small scale industries.\nMany discussants shared Prasad’s point that the expenditure incurred by all other vendors not winning the bid becomes wasteful expenditure and discourages them from fielding their equipment. It was suggested that those vendors whose bid were rejected must be compensated in a suitable manner. For this suitable provisions in DPP need to be included.\nIt was argued that authorising regulatories of foreign governments to certify their countries’ product is a tricky proposition\, since in these days of cut-throat competition\, many countries would not mind promoting their own companies\, even if it compromises the quality. Moreover\, the advanced countries may give the certification with the belief that India does not have the requisite testing facilities to check the veracity of the foreign certification.\nIt was pointed out that Customer Service Directorate for single window interaction is in the anvil. It will reduce the time lag considerably.  \nSince many agencies are involved in the process of procurement\, an empowered central authority is desirable. Increasing the autonomy of the DGQA would be a welcome step.\nIt was suggested that the DPP should be elaborately dealt with in the paper to see how different agencies’ roles have been incorporated in it.  \nSignificantly\, one discussant argued that quality assurance done by DGQA merely involves checking specifications and parameters given in GSQR. It would be better to grade the product in some order of quality level to enable selection of best product within budgetary allocation.\nIt was argued by one participant that QA is an unending process and specific to particular environment. What is quality for US may not find acceptance in the Indian conditions. \nMany participants agreed with the author’s observation that the two most important benchmarks of QA are high reliability and military ruggedisation. Soviet equipments were very good on these criteria and were widely regarded as soldier-friendly.\nConsumer-interface\, which is very strong in many countries\, lacks attention in India. It remains to be seen whether the DGQA is evolving towards TQM (total quality management) or not\, since in TQM consumer is the focal point. \nAssurance level is a standard statistical tool across the world for quality analysis\, but DGQA does not have its assurance level defined. \nRegarding the lack of qualified technical officers to oversee the process of procurement\, it was pointed out that mere recruitment of technically qualified persons for QA job will not yield much\, unless periodic training aiming at updating their technical knowledge is ensured\, since technology is fast changing. Moreover\, while selecting officers for the QA job more emphasis should be on aptitude than knowledge; the later can be imparted at the time of training. High integrity and passion for the job should be the benchmark for selection of officers. \nIt was argued that Ordnance Factory’s services can be better utilized in production of defence materials\, since they have very good infrastructure facilities at their disposal.\nIt was pointed out that a product failed to meet specifications at the trial stage is accepted later subject to “rectification” without any further trial. \n\nChairperson’s Remarks\nDr. S. Kalyanaraman complimented Lt Col Prasad for a very comprehensive and detailed presentation on a topical issue concerning the Indian Army. He suggested a slight tinkering with the title to bring it in sync with the content of the paper and his research design. \n(Report prepared by Amit Kumar\, Research Assistant IDSA)
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/quality-assurance-qa-in-army-procurements
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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