BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//MP-IDSA - ECPv6.15.12.2//NONSGML v1.0//EN CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH X-WR-CALNAME:MP-IDSA X-ORIGINAL-URL:https://idsa.in X-WR-CALDESC:Events for MP-IDSA REFRESH-INTERVAL;VALUE=DURATION:PT1H X-Robots-Tag:noindex X-PUBLISHED-TTL:PT1H BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:Asia/Kolkata BEGIN:STANDARD TZOFFSETFROM:+0530 TZOFFSETTO:+0530 TZNAME:IST DTSTART:20100101T000000 END:STANDARD END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110610T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110610T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T225912 CREATED:20231223T134707Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130244Z UID:63196-1307683800-1307683800@idsa.in SUMMARY:Pakistan as a Factor in Sino –Indian Relations DESCRIPTION:Chair: Amb (retd) R. RajagopalanDiscussants: Prof. K. R. Sharma and Mr. M. V. Rappai \n \n\nThe core argument of Dr. Das’s paper was that the Sino-Pakistani strategic axis has gained salience in the context of the geo-politics of the cold war. It should be perceived as a marriage of convenience\, contrary to what both China and Pakistan claim. This relationship is based on the convergence of their mutual interests. China wants to balance India and Pakistan has always wanted to have a political shield. The Sino-Pak axis can be partially explained on the grounds of trust deficit and security dilemma between India and China. However\, the increasing Sino-Indian interaction has produced increased sensitivity on the Chinese side regarding the India concerns. Secondly\, the strengthening of the Sino-US rapprochement and strategic engagement has also produced corresponding resonance on Sino-Indian relations. Thirdly\, Chinese support to Pakistan also needs to be understood keeping in view the China’s domestic and external compulsions. \nThe major points of discussion and suggestions: \n\nPakistan can be stated as a classic example of a failed state. However\, China will not be comfortable with the idea of a failed state in Pakistan due to the fear of nuclear terrorism.\nAs India grows\, Pakistan’s fear and insecurity will also grow.\nThere is no clear perception regarding who actually controls power in Pakistan. However\, it is apparent that it is the army which is in real control and is dictating the course of action.\nPakistan should be regarded as both as a factor and a non-factor in India-China relations.\nGeography plays a very important role in defining the relationship between India\, China and Pakistan. It is geopolitics which is actually dictating the terms of this relationship.\nThere is a need to understand and revisit the nuclear collaboration between China and Pakistan. The Conference on Disarmament debates were stopped by Pakistan at the behest of China.\nIndia China economic relations are growing. On the other hand there is no development in the India Pakistan trade relations. Pakistan China trade relations are also not that huge.\nPakistan is a democratic country\, but it is owned by the military.\nThere is a need to study the nexus between the Chinese army and the Pakistani army. Consequently\, India has to be prepared to deal with both the neighbours.\nThere is need to provide a brief background of the historical relations between China and Pakistan.\nIt would not be wrong to argue that if India was in China’s position\, India would have been playing the same geopolitical game.\nBetween 1995 and 2005 China attempted to de-hyphenate its relationship between India and Pakistan.\nThere is need to understand why Pakistan has shifted its focus from the United States to China. At the same time\, China was also worried about the alliance between United States\, Australia\, Japan and India.\nChina has been blocking the Indian claim to the UNSC permanent seat because both India and Japan have been clubbed together. And China has always been against the Japanese entry.\nChina is now facing a dilemma as to how to manage its relationship both with India and Pakistan. It is difficult for China to leave Pakistan but for China\, India is also very important.\nPresident Jiang Zemin had said that there is a need for a balanced approach towards both India and Pakistan.\nThe debate around the Gwadar port has been ongoing. There is need to wait and watch as to who takes over the port after the Singaporean authority moves out. There are speculations that Gwadar port may become a naval base.\nThere is need to highlight the role which China plays in the domestic politics of Pakistan\, especially after the Lal Masjid incident. In the long run\, Operation Geronimo can prove to be a turning point in the China Pakistan relations.\nThere is need to focus on a research question and focus more on ideas of a two-front war. The debates around stapled visas should be left out of the paper.\nThere is need to also highlight the understanding of the new leadership in China and their understanding of the China Pakistan relations.\nIndia should work towards building more military to military level interaction with Pakistan.\nIndia needs to learn to manage the relationship with China and Pakistan keeping in perspective the close ties between the two. \n\nReport prepared by Gunjan Singh\, Research Assistant\, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/pakistan-as-a-factor-in-sino-indian-relations CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110610T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110610T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T225912 CREATED:20231223T134754Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130244Z UID:63197-1307683800-1307683800@idsa.in SUMMARY:Sea Piracy and India's Future Role DESCRIPTION:Commander SS Parmar started his presentation by delineating the scope of the study\, which was to study the menace of piracy off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden\, areas that are severely affected by the incidents of piracy in the recent past. He argued that initially pirates were more of a nuisance than a threat\, but in the absence of organised resistance\, piracy flourished. Parmar then talked about the four pillars on which piracy thrives- geography\, political instability\, safe havens\, and economics. His paper attempted to identify the stages and reasons for the advent of modern day piracy\, examined the economic and legal factors\, the international response including India’s response and future role. It also attempted “to answer a few questions that have arisen – mainly – Why was piracy allowed to rise to the extent it has? Why was there a delayed response to combat piracy? And finally – Is land operations the only solution to stem piracy?” \nBuilding further on his “four pillars” argument\, the author said that Somalia is a classic case of instability driven piracy. Somalia is a failed state since the government collapsed in 2001. This failure led to a lack of governance and subsequent high incidence of poverty which in tandem with two activities that could be viewed as the catalysts opened the doors for the advent and rise in piracy The first activity was fishing by outsiders in Somalian waters that destroyed the livelihood of the Somalian fishermen; a community that was considered a richer sect in the nation. The second issue was the dumping of toxic waste in Somalian waters. \nCdr Parmar then discussed the three stages of piracy. The first stage was between 1995 and 2000 when the local fishermen decided to take the law into their own hands and started boarding foreign fishing vessels accusing them of fishing illegally and sought compensation. This stage could be summed up as the unorganized stage of piracy. Instability in Somalia\, following the fall of Siad Barre government in 1991\, resulted in the formation of various groups that organised themselves into pirate groups and this led to the second stage of piracy characterised by the emergence of several organised pirate groups\, out of which four main “gangs” are in the ‘business’ of piracy. The author further argued that the third stage\, when piracy would reach the status of an independent state\, has commenced as pirates in Somalia could be viewed as a state within a state having links with other non state actors\, especially terrorist groups. Linkages with state actors\, however\, cannot be ruled out. These linkages could be largely attributed to the economic factors. The economics of piracy is a complex study which is restricted by the little information available in the public domain. He said that some of the pirate groups are better armed and funded than regional authorities. Million dollar ransoms combined with a lack of accountability have encouraged this growth. He viewed this as a clear interpretation that the third stage of piracy has commenced. \nCommander Parmar then delved on the legal framework for combating piracy and the practical problems nations face in arresting\, prosecuting and incarcerating convicted pirates. “The legal issues today have become more complex as the world has more independent nations and companies with enormous investments in the maritime domain. These issues are not insolvable and require a political will and an international understanding of the magnitude of the problem of piracy. Nations require bringing anti-piracy laws into effect\, setting up fast track courts and adopting a more cogent approach towards combating piracy”. He went on to advocate equating piracy to terrorism for a variety of reasons although the objectives of the two were different. “Elevating piracy at par with terrorism could obviate the requirement to pass new laws and higher levels of cooperation and only require amendments in the existing international order. Piracy could be viewed as Economic Terrorism”\, he said. \nThe international response to piracy could\, at best\, be described as “sluggish and reactionary”. “It was only when the magnitude of the threat breached the threshold of ‘acceptability’ that action was initiated”. Parmar said that “there is a growing consensus that land operations are the solution to piracy. If the four pillars of piracy are considered as geography\, political instability\, safe havens and economics\, then land operations would eliminate political instability and safe havens and aid in addressing the economic factor”. But\, despite the mandate of the UNSC Resolutions\, very little has been done to tackle the problem from landward due to several constraints. \nThe final section of Commander Parmar’s presentation examined the effect of piracy on India\, and the steps taken by the state to counter this threat. He pointed out that “piracy is occurring in the waters in the immediate vicinity of India and whilst transit through piracy infested waters can be avoided by other nations by rerouting\, the same cannot be done by India as India’s maritime trade routes originate and terminate in the waters surrounding it. Secondly\, the maritime route through the Gulf of Aden is important for India as the Indian imports through the Gulf have been valued at $50 billion while the exports have been valued at $60 billion”. These factors have made the government realize the need to tackle the problem since piracy is affecting the maritime interests of India and is growing in magnitude. “Cognisance of this development has been reflected in the Ministry of Defence Annual Report 2010 – 2011. It proposes a proactive role under the UN Flag to tackle the maritime threat of piracy. Actions taken by agencies including the Indian Navy\, Coast Guard and Police have resulted in apprehension of a number of pirates the largest being 61 in March 2011.” Subsequent to this operation against piracy\, government has asked the Indian Navy not to arrest any more pirates and bring them to India. This would restrict the navy to a ‘hold\, disarm and leave’ policy. Indian government seems to be reeling under the pressure of the pirates who are not shying away from playing the hostage card. Parmar said\, “At a time when India is pushing the UN for more action against piracy\, this policy shift will not only dilute the progress made in the Indian fight against piracy but also reduce India’s standing as a proactive anti piracy nation”. Therefore\, he suggested two staged action plan for India– the short and immediate term and the long term. “The short term would be to firstly\, introduce effective national anti piracy laws. Secondly\, formulate a regional anti piracy cooperative group that would operate in mid ocean areas and cover the SLOCs not patrolled as of now. Thirdly and most importantly not take a soft stand against piracy by means of appeasement”. Some of the long term measures would be; revision of UNCLOS articles on piracy\, pursue and assist agendas of the working groups formulated under CGPCS\, setting up of a working group on the economic factor\, etc. Parmar concluded by saying that the world could no longer afford to ignore the threat of piracy. If the issues raised above were not addressed\, then the third stage of piracy which has already commenced\, would take hold and that would increase the stakes manifold. \nMajor Points of Discussion and Suggestions\n\nThe section on India’s role should be more detailed.\nSovereignty issues limit the scope of hot pursuit against the pirates.\nThe Asian approach to counter the menace is not collective\, but individualistic and it is not helping their cause.\nOne of the discussants cautioned the author about the usage of the terms and suggested that the terms should be defined wherever used.\nIt was pointed out that economic factor is more than a driver; an enterprise in itself –rai-son d’etre for the act of piracy.\nIt was suggested that the title could be changed to reflect the emphasis on Somalia in the study. \nIt was suggested that the author could including developments at sea as a driver alongside developments at land since the dynamics of maritime development is fast changing and has impacted the rise and growth of piracy.\nThe various dimensions of ransom money were discussed and it was noticed that the insurance companies are the biggest beneficiaries of the ransom business as they are getting very high premium from the shipping companies. One implication of this whole ransom business is that none of the stakeholders are serious about the threat as they feel it to be a win-win situation.\nGenerally\, it was felt that there is a need for unearthing the business of piracy and the big stakeholders running the whole business\, apart from the pirates who are just the tip of the iceberg.\nIt was also pointed out that UNCLOS should be reviewed and reframed to include the non-state actors within its ambit.\nIt was suggested that the author should study successful models of counter-piracy operations and then seek their applicability in other cases of piracy.\n\nChairperson’s Remarks\nVice Admiral (Retd) Pradeep Kaushiva complimented Commander Parmar and said that as India’s seafarers are targeted by the pirates\, action on the part of the government is inevitable. The recent policy of ‘hold\, disarm and leave’ is a temporary and transitional one. He also informed the gathering that the panellists of this event also constitute one of the government’s initiatives on piracy – “Oceans beyond Piracy – India Working Group”. He pointed out that the international trade was well organized but human security was the least taken care of and most vulnerable. He also said that AL-Qaeda was well entrenched in the Gulf of Aden and it was only a matter of time before they gained complete control over the issue of piracy. Drawing attention to the practical difficulties of the victims of piracy\, he said that lack of evidence was the main cause for the pirates not being prosecuted. In response to the queries of many participants he threw light on the ransom business and said that governments do not directly get themselves involved in the ransom issues. They however\, put pressure on the parties involved for the safe release of the hostages. Finally\, he said that we need to address Piracy and not pirates that is to look into the “agencies and institutional actors across the ‘Piracy Value Chain”\, as Parmar has suggested. He concluded by thanking the panellists and the gathering for a constructive engagement\, and the IDSA for addressing the issue of piracy. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/sea-piracy-and-indias-future-role CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110617T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110617T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T225912 CREATED:20231224T103610Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T042106Z UID:64110-1308288600-1308288600@idsa.in SUMMARY:China's Infrastructure in Southeast Asia DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nChairperson: Professor Charan D WadhvaDiscussants: Brig Vinod Anand (Retd)\, Cdr Kamlesh Agnihotri and Shri C S Kuupuswamy URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/chinas-infrastructure-in-southeast-asia CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110617T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110617T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T225912 CREATED:20231224T103615Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T042222Z UID:64111-1308288600-1308288600@idsa.in SUMMARY:Governance in the Strategic State of Jammu and Kashmir: The Case for Securitization DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nChairperson: Lt Gen (retd) V G Patankar\, PVSM\, YSMDiscussants: Shri Iftikhar Gilani and Dr Amit Prakash URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/governance-in-the-strategic-state-of-jammu-and-kashmir-the-case-for-securitization CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110624T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110624T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T225912 CREATED:20231224T103610Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T041946Z UID:64108-1308893400-1308893400@idsa.in SUMMARY:China's stance on SCO Expansion: The India Factor DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/chinas-stance-on-sco-expansion-the-india-factor CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110624T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110624T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T225912 CREATED:20231224T103610Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T041821Z UID:64109-1308893400-1308893400@idsa.in SUMMARY:Unconventional Gas - Can it be a Game changer for India? DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/unconventional-gas-can-it-be-a-game-changer-for-india CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110701T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110701T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T225912 CREATED:20231224T103610Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T041659Z UID:64107-1309498200-1309498200@idsa.in SUMMARY:The Interactive Scenario of U.S.-India-China Triangular Relationship in Indian Ocean Region under New Circumstances DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-interactive-scenario-of-u-s-india-china-triangular-relationship-in-indian-ocean-region-under-new-circumstances CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110708T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110708T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T225912 CREATED:20231224T103609Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T041555Z UID:64106-1310103000-1310103000@idsa.in SUMMARY:Global Nuclear Governance and India DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/global-nuclear-governance-and-india CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110722T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110722T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T225912 CREATED:20231224T103605Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130243Z UID:64105-1311312600-1311312600@idsa.in SUMMARY:Reforming India’s Defence Acquisition Structure and Procedures DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Shri N S SisodiaDiscussants: Shri V K Misra\, Shri Amit Cowshish and Shri Ranjan Kumar Ghose \nLaxman Kumar Behera’s paper examines the structural and procedural weaknesses afflicting India’s defence acquisition system. In particular the paper focuses on three issues: acquisition planning\, ii) accountability in acquisition\, and iii) formulation of features of weapons system. According to Behera these three crucial factors have received least or half-hearted reforms. In the paper\, he argues that for expeditious acquisition\, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) needs to overcome these weaknesses. \nIn his presentation\, he began with the Bofors controversy that according to him set the foundation of India’s defence acquisition system which was again got the boost by the recommendations of the Group of Ministers (GoM) and subsequent procedural reforms. He was of the view that the Bofors controversy was a watershed in the India’s procurement history not because it had significant political cost to the then Central government\, but because it stimulated a massive public debate on defence acquisition issues. The Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC)\, which was instituted by the government under the Chairmanship of B Shankaranand\, did an extensive inquiry into the then Army’s existing procedures for procurement and key decisions involved in Bofors purchase. Behera said that although the JPC did not point out any serious deviations from then existing procedures followed by the Army and other stake-holders\, it nonetheless brought into open several practices which were prone to subjective interpretations\, and subsequent charges and counter charges. One such practice was the non-requirement of formulation of General Staff Qualitative Requirements (GSQRs) for the weapons procured from abroad. \nMr Behera noted that following the recommendations of the GoM\, which was set up to review the national security in its entirety and the recommendations of the Kargil Review Committee (KRC) in particular\, the government initiated the process which led to the creation of present procurement organisation\, consisting of five main bodies such as i) Defence Acquisition Council (DAC)\, ii) Defence Procurement Board (DPB)\, iii) Defence Production Board\, iv) Defence Research and Development Board\, and v) Acquisition Wing. With the setting up of defence procurement organisation\, the MoD has also undertaken periodic review of the procurement procedures. Till now the MoD has carried out six rounds of major revisions\, with the Defence Procurement Procedures DPP-2011(DPP-2011) being the latest in the series. He held that the changes in the DPPs have created a streamlined system that is now much more methodical\, objective and process-oriented. \nBehera argued that despite MoD’s reform measures undertaken so far\, the acquisition process has not moved at the desired pace. This is evident from repeated surrender of funds under the capital head of defence budget\, much of which is accounted for under the modernisation/acquisition head meant for procurement of ‘big-ticket’ items such as tanks\, fighter\, submarines\, frigates\, radars and missiles among others. Moreover\, the delays and cost-over run is also a matter of concern to national security\, especially when India’s adversaries are acquiring capability at a faster pace. \nIn the presence dispensation\, Mr Behera pointed out that the acquisition planning is a major handicap. The GoM’s idea behind creation of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) for a strong planning mechanism has been diluted in the set up of HQ IDS\, which is constrained to force itself in articulating a truly integrated perspective plan for the three services\, with due diligence towards capability development through inter-and intra-Service prioritisation\, matching defence plan with available resources and hand-holding of domestic defence industry. Because of its lack of authority vis-à-vis COSC and due to the superiority of services chiefs over the CISC\, the defence planning is constrained. The long term plan is also constrained in the absence of the resource commitment by the government. He said that in order to move towards a truly integrated perspective plan the creation of CDS is vital. \nThe paper argued that Qualitative Requirement (QR) formulation is concerned\, which is the most vital part of the acquisition cycle\, has not given required attention through out DPP’s nearly two-decades of operational history. The vital element is continues to be performed by Services personnel who are not trained to so such a specialised job..Moreover\, the oversight of the vital part of acquisition is not so strong enough. Given the vitality of a QR in choosing the most cost-efficient selection in a time-bound manner\, it is necessary that the job be performed by specialised body\, preferably by an external agency. Given that the HQ IDS is tri-service body it would seem most logical that the function is transferred to it. However\, the efficacy of HQ IDS would comeby its strong positioning vis-à-vis Services\, which would come by putting a CDS as head its head. \nBehera noted that contrary to the GoM’s recommendation for creation of “a separate and dedicated institutional structure to undertake the entire gamut of procurement function” what has been created is an Acquisition Wing which performs a part of acquisition functions. Several crucial functions having a strong bearing upon the cost and timeliness of procurement are being carried out beyond its command and control\, thereby robbing the system of benefits of the single point of accountability. He pointed out that the organisational shortcoming in accountability has also not been compensated by the procedural means\, both because of the professional shortcomings of acquisition functionaries and the lack of courage of the system to own up responsibility in cases which run into oversight problems. He stressed that given the importance of single-point accountability in the vital aspects of weapon procurement\, it would be logical\, as pointed out by GoM\, to move towards an integrated procurement organisation. \nMajor Points of Discussion and Suggestions: \n\nCabinet Committee on Security (CCS) should be the principal authority for approval of acquisition plan of the services. \nThe paper needs to define acquisition and differentiate it from procurement. \nThere is misconception that the MoD is not utilising the money allocated to it. However\, in recently years\, the inability to spend money has changed. Now\, it has even over-spent money allocated to it. \nSo far as the 11th defence plan is concerned\, there has been a marked improvements compared to previous plans. It is wrong not to cite in the paper the improvements in this regard. \nThe level of infrastructure development in the country\, R&D\, and capacity building also need greater attention. In addition\, there is need of a Defence Planning Board for the defence acquisition. \nThe institutional structures further needs to be strengthened for better defence acquisition. \nIt is not fair to compare India’s system with Pakistan’s acquisition system. \nThe scholar rather needs to focus on how to strengthen the present structure and procedure of defence acquisition system. \nIndia is more dependent on Russian even for the maintenance of defence equipments. This should be changed in its present defence acquisition system. \nThe present acquisition system is good but it needs further to be strengthened by way of more manpower. \nThe Bofors case needs to be put in the right perspective; otherwise a wrong conclusion would be drawn. \nIf one takes a comprehensive view of the defence acquisition system in recent years\, things have improved very much. \n\nReport prepared by Dr Saroj Bishoyi\, Research Assistant\, IDSA URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/reforming-indias-defence-acquisition-structure-and-procedures CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110729T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110729T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T225912 CREATED:20231224T103605Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T041435Z UID:64104-1311917400-1311917400@idsa.in SUMMARY:Oil Factor in India - Nigeria Relations DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/oil-factor-in-india-nigeria-relations CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110826T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110826T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T225912 CREATED:20231224T103605Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130243Z UID:64103-1314336600-1314336600@idsa.in SUMMARY:US Nuclear Weapons Policy and Practice in the Shadow of 9/11 DESCRIPTION:Event: Fellows Seminar \nChairperson: Ambassador Arundhati GhoseDiscussants: Professor Jeffrey Legro and Dr. Manpreet Sethi \nThe paper is an attempt to explore US nuclear weapons policy and practice in the shadow of 9/11. In the first part of his presentation\, Rajiv provided an examination of the major US national strategy and nuclear policy documents after 9/11 and their policy prescriptions regarding the ‘twin threats’ of proliferation and terrorism. Among the documents he examined included 2002 National Security Strategy\, 2002 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)\, 2006 US National Strategy for Combating Terrorism\, 2006 National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction\, 2008 National Security and Nuclear Weapons in 21st Century\, QDR 2010\, and NPR 2010. Citing pertinent portions of these documents\, he stated that they reinforce the importance of nuclear deterrence in US grand strategy and the imperative need to fine-tune its defence capabilities to face the twin threats. He noted that new type of weaponry was sought be developed such as conventional-cum-nuclear ‘bunker-busters’ to tackle the challenges posed by underground facilities (UGF’s). Other strategic innovations included transforming nuclear weapon platforms like the 4 Ohio-class SSBN’s to perform conventional roles and Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) which envisages the use of ICBM’s tipped with conventional warheads to strike high-value “time-sensitive targets” as incoming Defence Secretary Panetta noted. \nRajiv then points out that while the initial policy response to the twin challenges of proliferation and terrorism by US was to strengthen/fine-tune its deterrence postures\, there has been a reduction in its arms control/disarmament obligations. In this context\, Rajiv provided relevant details about BMD\, FMCT and CTBT across US administrations since 9/11. The latter two have however been put on the front-burner as it were by the Obama administration but it remains to be seen what progress can be achieved. Subsequently\, Rajiv provided an assessment of the reductions in US nuclear arsenals – including in warheads and strategic delivery vehicles (SDV’s). He pointed out the analyses by Hans Christensen and others about the role of negative security assurances (NSA’s) and nuclear targeting war plans on the size of the arsenal. In this context\, he pointed out that the US for the first time in NPR 2010 pledged that it will “continue to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attack.” The document however states that “there remains a narrow range of contingencies in which US nuclear weapons may still play a role in deterring a conventional or CBW attack against the United States or its allies and partners.” \nIn the last part of his presentation\, Rajiv discussed pertinent aspects relating to US policy initiatives at the bilateral and multi-lateral levels to deal with the ‘twin threats’\, such as PSI\, 2006 Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT)\, G8 Global Partnership Initiative\, Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI)\, Obama’s chairing of the Special Session of the UN Security Council in September 2009 – the first by any American president that resulted in UNSC Resolution 1887\, April 2010 Global Summit on Nuclear Security\, and the entry into force of New START. \nRajiv concluded his presentation by noting that despite significant reductions in the numbers of US nuclear warheads during the decade after 9/11\, coupled with continuing successful bilateral and multilateral efforts to secure vulnerable material and prevent terrorists from acquiring WMD material/know-how\, there has not been a concomitant reduction in the ‘role’ of nuclear weapons in US grand strategy and that there are limited prospects of any change in the foreseeable future. \nPoints of discussion and suggestions \n\nThe paper is a sharp-edged critique of US nuclear weapons policy but could be improved with beefed up analyses and assessment of some of the issues involved. Aspects relating to ‘role’ can be further delineated into ‘centrality’ and ‘dimensions’ of nuclear use for greater clarity. \nThe author can more closely look at whether there has been an evolution/change in US nuclear weapons policy as a result of 9/11 and examine specifically those aspects where these changes have/have not occurred. The author’s own assessment of his reading of US nuclear weapons policy can be expanded. \nA distinction could be drawn between ‘nuclear weapons policy’ and ‘nuclear policy’. If the former\, aspects relating to FMCT\, CTBT\, and US policy activism at bilateral and multi-lateral fora may not be included. \nIt would appear that Obama has succumbed to the nuclear weapons establishment with regards to arms control and disarmament. \nThe increasing linkages of conventional weapons policy on nuclear weapons policy needs to be highlighted\, especially in the light of the fact that US has superior conventional power/assets at its disposal. \nThe author can look more closely at the debates on US nuclear weapons policy in the aftermath of 9/11 to provide a better context and set the tone for the rest of the paper. \nAn examination of the alternative explanations regarding role of nuclear weapons in US grand strategy\, the challenges that US has faced in implementing some of its policies\, could be better highlighted. \nThe mismatch between US policy objectives and practice can be highlighted. This is especially visible in the context of US relationship with Pakistan and in US efforts to secure vulnerable material worldwide\, most recently highlighted by the case of Belarus refusing to honour its commitments to return material to the US in the face of economic sanctions.\nIn his response\, Rajiv thanked the Chairperson and the Discussants and participation from the floor for the valuable comments and suggestions and promised to incorporate them as much as feasible while finalising the paper.\n\nReport prepared by Sanjeev Kumar Shrivatsav\, Researcher at IDSA. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/us-nuclear-weapons-policy-and-practice-in-the-shadow-of-9-11 CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20111118T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20111118T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T225912 CREATED:20231223T134706Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130243Z UID:63194-1321594200-1321594200@idsa.in SUMMARY:China’s Planning on Border Infrastructure: Post 1996 CBM Period DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Shri Sheo Nandan PandeyDiscussants: Shri Anil Kumar Gautam and Cdr Kamlesh Agnihotri \n1996 was a watershed year when agreements specifying the military CBMs were signed between India and China. The author argues that despite 14 rounds of talks held since then\, India and China have achieved little in terms of common understanding on border settlement\, as there is no mechanism yet on how to solve the border question. In addition\, instances of border intrusions and incursions coupled with the military build-up on both sides suggest that the possibility of military conflict cannot be ruled out. Therefore\, it is important for India to focus on understanding the objectives behind China’s infrastructure build-up in the border regions. \nThe focus of the paper was on the following recent developments in the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR): \n\nPlatforms for developing TAR\nStages of TAR’s development\nSalient features of the development\nRecent developments in defence\, roads\, aviation\, hydropower\, trade\, tourism\nChina’s objectives: stated and unstated.\n\nPlatforms for decision-making on Tibet include the Party Congress which decides on the broad frameworks followed by the Tibet Work Forums\, Five Year Plans (FYP) and the Great Western Development Strategy (GWDS). So far 5 Tibet Work Forums (TWF) have taken place where important decisions relating to Tibet’s infrastructure were taken. The first decided on Tibet’s special status on taxes and development strategy. The second focussed on energy\, communication and transportation development. The third forum has been the most crucial wherein infrastructure got more serious focus\, the aid Tibet programme was launched and 62 projects including roads\, communication\, energy\, water conservancy\, urban infrastructure were undertaken. A total of 716 projects under Aid Tibet program were launched at the total investment of 8 billion RMB. The fourth forum aimed at “leapfrog development”\, as TAR was included in the GWDS. This time around total investment was at 31.2 bn RMB as showcase infrastructure projects like QTR were undertaken. It was followed by the 11th FYP that also stressed on Tibet’s infrastructure; noteworthy projects such as the Galong La Tunnel and Motuo Highway were completed during this period. However\, the author mentioned that there is lack of detailed information about this tunnel in the Chinese language literature. The Fifth TWF of January 2010 set ambitious growth targets for 2015. Some of these focus on social issues like income inequality and others on specific infrastructure projects. At the same time\, it has long term targets of harmonious development in the TAR. Similar targets are part of the 12th FYP. \nAmong the other issues highlighted by the paper are important developments in the defence infrastructure sector in the TAR and the objectives behind these. The author concludes that these activities undertaken by the Chinese reveal their objectives as being defence consolidation\, strengthening administrative control\, changing Tibetan lifestyle\, controlling separatism and using trade as means to prosperity. \nA section of the paper also dwelt on the challenges faced in infrastructure development. These included climatic and topographic conditions\, lack of basic facilities\, all of which lead to higher costs of deployment of troops in addition to the problems of acclimatisation. The Chinese authorities are also unclear about how best to preserve Tibet’s fragile ecology. \nThe paper provided some suggestions on how India should approach and respond to these developments. \nThe main points of discussion and suggestions were as follows: \n\nSome of the showcase defence technologies are much hyped about. J-20 is still a prototype and at least 12-15 years away from induction. Automated border sensor is also not possible technologically as yet. Therefore monitoring has to be physical.\nIt was suggested that more maps marking specific locations would make the argument more clear as far as major infrastructure projects like airports are concerned.\nIt was suggested that the author could focus on some specific border infrastructure instead of focussing on everything happening in Tibet for a more comprehensive analysis. Road-building must be studied further to know their sustainability under harsh weather conditions and capacity for withstanding tonnage to know how it helps militarily.\nProjects should be categorised by size within FYPs and not mere numbers\, so that their effectiveness can be assessed better. This would help bring clearer focus on distinguishing trade and security infrastructure.\nThere is a need to showcase if and why TAR infrastructure projects are unique and different from development work happening elsewhere in China. This can strengthen the argument from security perspective of India. Otherwise\, its just economic development strategy.\nMore groundwork is needed on why 1996 is the watershed year. Otherwise 1981 and others also look as equally convincing landmarks in India China relations.\n\nReport prepared by Avinash Godbole\, Research Assistant\, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/chinas-planning-on-border-infrastructure-post-1996-cbm-period CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20111118T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20111118T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T225912 CREATED:20231224T103604Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T041143Z UID:64102-1321594200-1321594200@idsa.in SUMMARY:A Partnership on Autopilot: Explaining the Consolidation of Indo-Israeli Ties in the Last Decade DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/a-partnership-on-autopilot-explaining-the-consolidation-of-indo-israeli-ties-in-the-last-decade CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20111202T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20111202T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T225912 CREATED:20231224T103558Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T041024Z UID:64101-1322803800-1322803800@idsa.in SUMMARY:The ‘Tamil Question’ in India-Sri Lanka Relations in the Post LTTE Phase DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nChairperson: Ambassador I P KhoslaDiscussants: Maj Gen Ashok Mehta (Retd) and Dr N Manoharan URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-tamil-question-in-india-sri-lanka-relations-in-the-post-ltte-phase CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20111209T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20111209T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T225912 CREATED:20231223T134606Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130243Z UID:63187-1323408600-1323408600@idsa.in SUMMARY:The Concept of Autonomy in French Strategic Thought DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Bharat WariavwallaDiscussants: Philippe Laurent\, Nicolas Blarel\, Krishnappa Venkatshamy and Lion Koenig \n \nThis paper focuses on the concept of strategic autonomy as a defining element of the French strategic culture while demonstrating how throughout history France has shaped a bi-dimensional concept of autonomy. It emphasizes that the concept of strategic autonomy is key to gaining a deeper understanding of all underlying elements of France’s attitude as a contemporary global actor. By focusing on three specific historical periods spanning the last two centuries\, the author examines the origins of the French definition of autonomy and goes on to highlight the main challenge of contemporary French strategy: to reconcile its limited material power with its global ambitions and its Universalist model. The author notes that the paper is the first stage of analysis of a larger comparative study between Indian and French strategic cultures. \nThe paper argues that the French concept of autonomy\, with its particularities\, is the central ideational element of France’s strategy. It defines the way France perceives the world as well as itself. Though the concept of autonomy all by itself cannot entirely explain French foreign policy or predict France’s positions\, the paper suggests that it gives meaning to France’s past and potentially helps anticipate the French perspective in future. In other words\, even though the concept of autonomy doesn’t explain everything on its own\, it remains significant as far as French strategic culture is concerned. \nThe paper follows Johnson and Larsen’s definition of strategic culture. It argues that the overarching goal of the study of strategic cultures is to understand strategic behaviour at the global scale. This approach does not reject the idea that states try to achieve their interests rationally\, but considers these interests as not only circumstantial and resulting from the distribution of resources and power in the world\, but also influenced by norms and values and shaped in a certain ideational framework. The paper tries to find elements of consensus\, values\, and ideas which have defined French strategy for a certain period of time. \nIn analysing the historical construction of France’s focus on the concept of autonomy\, the paper focuses on three core historical episodes which it considers to have strong dialectic values: \n\nThe Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars give the philosophical foundation and theoretical base to the concept.\nThe French colonisation process under the Third Republic (1871-1939) illustrates the main paradox in this concept when put into practice. \nThe example of Gaullist policies during the Cold War enables the author to illustrate the greatest challenge of French foreign policy in the 21st century.\n\nThe author prefers the term ‘autonomy’ over ‘independence’\, although both are often used interchangeably\, because of the semantic difference between the two: whereas the latter stresses on the negation of dependence\, the former has a more affirmative nuance. Moreover\, the French concept of autonomy implies a responsibility towards the world. Thus\, in the context of France\, the original concept of autonomy is active and strongly positive. \nThe meaning French autonomy bears today is the result of a tension between two attitudes: \n\nFirstly\, protective autonomy or a defensive posture marked by fear of imperial expansionism that threatens France’s safety; \nSecondly\, active/affirmative autonomy or imperialist dreams based on France’s glorified past and the urge for spreading its values. \n\nAs a kingdom and then as a nation-state\, France has historically constructed itself in opposition to an empire as well as with the great memory of an empire\, thus constantly oscillating between the two extremes like a pendulum. The French concept of autonomy is therefore essentially bi-dimensional\, the active dimension historically emerging after the defensive element. \nThe idea of French autonomy contains the paradox of French imperialism. The paper attempts to reconcile the French concept of autonomy with French imperialism by bringing in a Universalist dimension and suggesting that the French model can be viewed as a universal model\, thus\, the notion that what is good for the Frenchmen is good for everyone. Moreover\, identity is a key element in the construction of a strategy according to the French bi-dimensional notion of autonomy. The paper argues that the defence of the national identity is singularly more prominent in the case of France. This is justified by the idea of French exceptionalism\, a nationalist notion that France is granted with a unique role in world history and has the responsibility to offer a certain model to humanity. \nA specific facet of this responsibility and the memory of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars translate into a self-perceived notion of France as the ‘liberator of nations’. This perception of uniqueness\, stressed by French historiographical frame which designated the French Revolution as the commencement of the Modern Times\, is very close to American exceptionalism and the role it perceives for itself in the world. Although both consider themselves to be carriers of the heritage of the Enlightenment\, the US notion is partially based on religious considerations whereas the French model is more political and is derived from the perceived grandeur of French history. \nIn conclusion\, the paper engages with France’s main challenges and attempts to answer the question: in the aftermath of the Second World War\, how can France continue to exist as a global actor without the material capacities to compete with the greater powers? After the ‘war of twenty years’ that constituted the decolonisation process\, France’s limited material capacities were well-admitted by the French government and the foreign policy was designed accordingly. French autonomy was preserved by framing an ambiguous geopolitical situation whereby independence from all powers would be constantly affirmed\, but alliance with the Western bloc would be presupposed. France’s withdrawal from NATO’s command in 1959 and the Gaullist policy towards the US is a perfect example of this ambiguity. The strength of French foreign policy lies in the geopolitical ambivalence of the French position and not in its material capacities. The French concept of autonomy leads France to transform all technical and economic matters into political decisions (politicization) and refuses to see its foreign policy dictated by its limited material capacities. \nDiscussion and Comments\nMr. Laurent commented on the ability of the paper to successfully assess and summarise the diverse French character. The author received many suggestions for his bigger project of a comparative study. Mr. Blarel pointed out the need to look at a series of case studies and test alternative hypotheses. A suggestion was made to study different phases of colonisation and take into account factors other than strategic culture that marked the enterprise and examine different incarnations of French strategic culture based on different leaders and circumstances. The notion of French strategic culture was further problematised by questioning whether actions are governed by an overarching rhetoric or are they for domestic consumption. \nGp Capt Venkatshamy pointed out the long historical period the paper is trying to engage with and suggested picking up a more specific issue and operationalizing it for a more focused argument. He further raised the issue of convergences and divergences between French and Indian strategic culture and noted a need for the paper to provide a well-fleshed out answer to the question: how are India and France comparable? Towards this end\, he provided a specific pointer to attempt a comparative study between Nehru and De Gaulle. \nMr. Koenig commented on the merit of the project to theorise an undertheorised concept and suggested some points in connection with paper structure and flow. He suggested disentangling the concept of strategic culture and first exploring the broader concepts of strategy and culture and explaining why they should be studied\, before moving on to the study of strategic culture and examining whether the concept is tautological\, oxymoronic or more than the sum of its parts. He commented on the singular voice/consensus used in the paper and suggested that ruptures in the concept be taken into account. He suggested a more elaborate analysis of the three core historical examples the paper deals with in order to capture a clearer genealogy of the concept. \nMr. Blarel and Mr. Koenig jointly suggested that the paper should attempt to address the question of homogeneity of strategic culture: can we talk of ‘a’ French strategic culture? \nDiscussion from the floor revolved around: \n\nthe question of continuity and ruptures in French Strategic culture after and before the colonial era; \nthe element of uniqueness in the French desire for autonomy\, and\, \nsuggestions to clearly define means and goals and frame strategic culture as the ideational base that leads to autonomy. \n\nThe Chair concluded by keenly engaging with the cultural dimension of France’s distinct idea of civilization and its notion that it should give this idea to the colonised nations. He stressed on the impact of civilizations in the Indian context and commented on the importance of French thinking. \nReport prepared by Bhavna Tripathy\, Research Intern at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-concept-of-autonomy-in-french-strategic-thought CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20111209T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20111209T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T225912 CREATED:20231224T103558Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130243Z UID:64100-1323408600-1323408600@idsa.in SUMMARY:Integration/Jointness in the Indian Military: The Role of Civil-Military Relations DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Dr Manoj JoshiDiscussants: Air Marshal (Retd) S G Inamdar\, Lt Gen (Retd) Satish Nambiar and Vice Admiral (retd) PS Das \n \nThe event began with the welcome address of Dr. Arvind Gupta\, Acting Director general\, IDSA. He welcomed the former home secretary GK Pillai\, who recently superannuated from his post and joined IDSA as a Distinguished Scholar and other distinguished guests. \nAnit Mukherjee’s Presentation\nAnit Mukherjee presented his paper on the topic “Integration/Jointness in the Indian Military: The Coordination Model and the Role of Civil-Military Relations.” This paper was third in the series of seminars examining civil-military relations and military effectiveness in India. As such this event report should be read in conjunction with the following: \n\nThe Absent Dialogue: Civil-Military Relations and Military Effectiveness in India\nFailing to Deliver: Post Crises Defence Reforms in India\, 1998-2010\n\nIn this paper Anit Mukherjee examines jointness or integration between the three services and the role of civil-military relations. Like his previous presentations he began by arguing that all too often studies of jointness have turned into a “blame game” and as a departure from that norm this paper argues that the structure of the system is at fault. \nAnit divided his presentation in four sections. In the first section he made a descriptive analysis of jointness in India’s post-independence wars. While doing so he concentrated on inter-services operations\, higher command of war and the role of the civilian policy-makers. He argued that the 1965 India-Pakistan war was our first real experience with joint operations and in this we were found wanting. Inadequate sharing of information led to an absence of joint planning which was compounded by inter-services rivalry. However after this operation considerable efforts were made by the Indian Air Force\, Army and civilian bureaucrats in emphasizing joint operations\, the results of which was evident in the 1971 Bangladesh war. At the same time victory was an awful teacher as problems in jointness were glossed over. The period after that witnessed considerable inter-services tension usually over turf\, like maritime reconnaissance and ownership of helicopters. In the Indian Peacekeeping Keeping Force operations in the late 1980s\, jointness was notable by its absence. Due to the absence of a joint command the services operated in their own silos. Lack of interoperability also proved to be a handicap during these operations. The Kargil war of 1999 saw considerable army-air force tension and the lack of interoperability was again glaring. The lack of joint planning and training was also self-evident. Unfortunately in all these episodes the role of the Ministry of Defence has been minimal. \nIn the next section he described four main problems with jointness: the single-service approach\, turf wars\, lack of interoperability and poor training for conduct of joint operations. In the third section\, he explained how each of these problems can be attributed in part to the unique characteristics of civil-military relations. In the final section he discussed some recent developments like the creation of integrated defence staff (IDS)\, Joint commands and so on but also argued that these will not suffice until there are structural changes both in the Service Headquarters and in the MoD. While conceding that there is no perfect model of jointness\, Anit also argued that “perfect should not be the enemy of good.” He concluded by advocating for the “integrated model” instead of the existing “coordination model of jointness.” \nDiscussion Points\n\nThere is an urgent need to create awareness about national security and generate a healthy and informed discussion on various dimensions of it. For this to happen however declassification of files is of paramount importance. Service Headquarters must take the lead in this process as it has fallen through the cracks between Service Headquarters and the Ministry of Defence. \nIt was observed by many participants that change off mindset is most essential in order to make any headway in the direction of jointness as equipment\, resource issues\, etc. come only next. Jointness can be managed by adjusting attitudes. Personality-cult has been the bane of India in all walks of life and military is no exception. \nThe problems in civil-military relations are more cultural than bureaucratic\, a point strongly brought out by many participants. Thus\, the human side of the problem came out prominently during the discussion. \nThe importance of communication devices for interoperability – an important aspect of jointness was emphasized\, since the devices used by the three services are not at par or matching each other. It was pointed out by some of the participants that integration should start at the functional level instead of just focusing at the Service Headquarter level. Hence\, for instance\, theater commands should be established with joint staff. However it was also appreciated that this idea will face considerable opposition especially from the respective Service Headquarters. \nThe need for promoting domain expertise in the MoD was strongly advocated by many participants. It was pointed out by one of the participants that CDS could have come up in 2003-2004\, but for a latent fear among the political class of an empowered military.\n\nReport prepared by Amit Kumar\, Research Assistant\, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/integration-jointness-in-the-indian-military-the-role-of-civil-military-relations CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20111216T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20111216T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T225912 CREATED:20231224T103558Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T040844Z UID:64099-1324013400-1324013400@idsa.in SUMMARY:‘Cultural Citizenship'\, the Media and Identity in India DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nChairperson: Professor T K OommenDiscussants: Mr Bharat Wariavwalla and Professor Biswajit Das URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/cultural-citizenship-the-media-and-identity-in-india CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20111223T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20111223T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T225912 CREATED:20231224T103553Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130243Z UID:64097-1324618200-1324618200@idsa.in SUMMARY:Competing Realities in China-India Multilateral Discourse: Regional\, Cross-Regional and Global Underpinnings DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Ambassador R RajagopalanDiscussants: Ambassador J C Sharma & Professor Sreemati Chakrabarti \n \nDr. JP Panda’s fellow paper titled\, ‘Competing Realities in China-India Multilateral Discourse: Regional\, Cross-Regional and Global Underpinnings’ focused on China and India’s discourse on multilateral forums at regional\, cross-regional and global levels. The paper dispelled the conformist view that in the China-India multilateral context\, associating in various regional and global bodies is mainly a medium of establishing cooperation and maximizing mutual interests. It argued that their increasing multilateral engagement is a potential medium for denying space and holding an edge over each other by acquiring global resources\, forming regional and global identity\, and notably in securing their respective national strategic objectives. \nThe main points made were:\nThe multilateral discourse in the China-India context is underpinned by competitive rather than collaborative engagement. At the regional level\, it is characterized by ‘resources\, rivalry and supremacy in Asia’; at the cross-regional setting\, ‘checking Western influence and aiming for a multi-polar world’ characterize the discourse; while the global scenario is defined by the idea of ‘living as ‘developing country\, aiming to become global powers’. \nChina and India’s contemporary bilateral approach is quite different from the past because of: a) Multi-polarity in world politics; and\, b) Rise of economic and global political processes. \nMultilateral engagement for China and India is not necessarily a fitting medium for collaboration\, but it is a medium of denying space and holding an edge over each other. In that regard\, three spaces narrate the phenomena: a) Resources; b) National security objectives; and\, c) Identity politics.\nDr. Panda further argued that there are certain basic strategic premises that define the Indian and Chinese discourse: \n\nBoth see each other as part of the ‘non-western’ world structure.\nThey are both large societies.\nThey are the fastest rising economies.\nGeo-strategic conditions are more in China’s favour. \n\nHighlighting the importance of energy resources\, Dr Panda argued that getting access to major sources of resources – oil\, gas\, water and land – has always been a central factor in global power politics. He asserted that the politics over resources and the evolving politics of China and India in multilateral organizations are the two most vital determinants of the current global politics; still one barely connects these two to understand the full spectrum of power relations. \nHe opined that the politics of China-India polygonal dialogue is an apt example in that regard\, which establishes a link between identity power politics and resource politics at different spatial levels. According to him\, apart from territorial integrity\, the quest for strategic resources and forming their respective global identity as superpowers have received the highest priority in domestic as well as foreign policy stratagem of both Asian powers. \nIn conclusion\, Dr. Panda pointed out that rise of India’s influence at three levels need not result in reciprocal decline in China’s influence and rise. He further added that not only the south-south formulation is temporary\, but also the win-win China-India nexus is rhetorical. \nPoints of Discussion \n\nIndia-China rivalry is reflected in almost all multilateral forums. \nA more comprehensive study of Myanmar’s engagement with both China and India is needed to understand the dynamics of this equation.\nThe paper demands a more detailed study of regional institutions such as WTO\, BOA\, Mekong- Ganga Cooperation\, Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) and the UN. \nA detailed account of the importance of the organisations\, mentioned in the paper\, and how they are being used by China and India is also required. \n\nReport prepared by Rahul Mishra\, Research Assistant\, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/competing-realities-in-china-india-multilateral-discourse-regional-cross-regional-and-global-underpinnings CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20111223T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20111223T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T225912 CREATED:20231224T103558Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T024504Z UID:64098-1324618200-1324618200@idsa.in SUMMARY:UCPN-Maoist’s Two Line Struggle: A Critical Analysis DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nChairperson: Lt Gen (Retd) Satish NambiarDiscussants: Maj Gen (Retd) Ashok Mehta & Professor Sangeeta Thapliyal URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/ucpn-maoists-two-line-struggle-a-critical-analysis CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120106T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120106T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T225912 CREATED:20231223T134553Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130243Z UID:63183-1325827800-1325827800@idsa.in SUMMARY:India's Naval Shipbuilding Industry: Key Gaps and Policy Options DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Shri V K MisraDiscussants: Commodore (Dr) R K Rana and Commodore (Retd) Sujeet Samaddar \nDeliberations on Mr. Laxman Behera’s paper commenced with Chairperson V K Mishra’s opening remarks. Highlighting the performance of Indian naval shipbuilding industry in the past several years\, he argued that shipbuilding industry has to acquire more strength. This is important given the kind of order book existing at the moment; as of now there is a yearning gap between the requirements and capabilities acquired by India’s shipbuilding industry. He further argued that time had come for India to go beyond the Indian Ocean; it has to acquire more naval capabilities to emerge as a superpower. \nLaxman Behera started his presentation with the point that ever since the first major shipbuilding programme- the Leander Class frigate INS Nilgiri was launched at Mazgaon Dock Ltd in late 1960s\, this industry has grown significantly\, contributing much of the warship requirements of the Indian navy. For Indian naval shipbuilding industry\, self- sufficiency has been a goal for a long-time. However\, for a number of years\, it has been a matter of compulsion rather than choice. Nevertheless\, over the years the Indigenous ship building industry has emerged as the ‘builder’s navy’. \nMr. Behera opined that notwithstanding the establishment of defence shipyards and key procedural framework\, the naval shipbuilding industry has not been able to meet the growing requirement of the naval forces\, resulting in a huge gap in force level. Listing out the details of naval shipbuilding industrial units\, Mr Behera mentioned that India’s overall shipbuilding industry comprises of twenty-seven shipyards\, of which six are under Central Public Sector\, two under State Government and nineteen in the Private Sector domain. However\, not all of these shipyards are involved in naval shipbuilding. Of the six shipyards under the Central Public Sector\, four are under the administration control of Ministry of Defence (MoD) and known as Defence Public Sector Undertaking (PSU) shipyards. Although these four shipyards are primarily responsible for constructive naval ships\, some others\, both in the public and private sector are also involved in the naval shipbuilding. \nMr. Behera further pointed out that public and private sector shipyards enjoy a unique set of advantages and disadvantages. For the MoD owned shipyards\, their biggest advantage lies in long exposure to shipbuilding\, enabling them to acquire certain construction skills\, design capability and technology. These aspects are crucial for naval shipbuilding\, which unlike the commercial shipbuilding is a difficult task given the complex nature of marrying a vast amount of weapons and sensors into warships\, which are increasingly required to be stealthier and more durable. \nBecause of their lack of experience in building major warships\, the private sector is way behind in these aspects and needs exposure along with technological and design assistance in order to be at par with their public sector counterparts. The biggest disadvantage the public sector shipyards face is the decision-making constraints. The operational and financial autonomy of the PSU shipyards is limited. It depends on the government for approval of key decisions\, which are often taken at a slower pace. Compared to this\, the private sector has complete autonomy in decision making which facilitates them to meet necessary infrastructural needs at a faster pace. The stark contrast in autonomy of decision-making is evident from the efforts by both private and public sector shipyards in forming strategic partnership. While the former has been able to tie up with major global companies\, the public sector is yet to take off. Examples in this regard are Pipavav and GRSE. \nKey gaps in Indian naval shipbuilding industry\, according to Mr. Behera\, are as under: \n\nInefficiency and constraints of the Public Sector Shipyards.\nLack of level- playing field to private shipyards.\nLack of design capability of shipyards.\nLack of a strong commercial shipbuilding industry.\nAbsence of a strong ancillary industry.\nLack of synergy between public and private yards.\n\nMr. Behera suggested a number of measures to tackle the prevailing problems. These include; \n\nIncreasing competitiveness- bring in competition within the PSU shipyards by promoting them to compete with the private sector for all kinds of warship projects.\nEmpowering shipyards to take their own decisions\, including design etc\, and allowing them to function in a competitive environment.\nBringing in a transparent policy to facilitate partnership between public and the private sector.\n\nPoints of Discussion: \n\nOther countries of the world including the US\, UK\, Italy etc also have faced similar problems. So\, it would do well for India to learn from those countries.\nPoor R&D is the biggest challenge facing the Indian shipbuilding industry. India has to take the R&D head-on\, in order to overcome the problems faced by the industry. \nSynergy amongst private sector participants is as important as between private and the public sector.\nAbsence of a comprehensive policy or understanding on defence exports is hurting India’s defence industry. \nIt is beyond debate that without the entry of private sector at all levels\, Indian naval shipbuilding industry will not thrive. \n\nReport prepared by Rahul Mishra\, Research Assistant\, IDSA URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/indias-naval-shipbuilding-industry-key-gaps-and-policy-options CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120106T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120106T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T225912 CREATED:20231223T134554Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130242Z UID:63184-1325827800-1325827800@idsa.in SUMMARY:India-Saudi Arabia Relations DESCRIPTION:Chair: Ambassador (Retd) Ishrat AzizExternal Discussants: Professor Gulshan Dietl\, Professor Qamar AghaInternal Discussants: Dr Shebonti Ray Dadwal\, Dr Meena Singh Roy \nDr Pradhan’s paper addresses India’s relations with Saudi Arabia\, arguing that India must look beyond oil and trade in order to engage Saudi Arabia in a strategic partnership. This study also explores Indian interests in cultivating strategic ties with Saudi Arabia and explores the obstacles to building a partnership of this nature. In the past\, India’s relations with Saudi Arabia have been impacted by the Cold War\, regional political dynamics and divergent interests of both countries. India’s relations with Israel\, the Kashmir issue and Indian support for Arab nationalist regimes in Egypt\, Iraq and Syria are other aspects that have created misunderstandings between the two countries. The author sees a shift in Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy following the September 11\, 2011 attacks as since then\, it has been marked by an attempt to look beyond its traditional allies and to build closer relations with other countries\, especially with major Asian powers such as India. \nAn important characteristic of the India-Saudi Arabia relationship is the dominance of trade and business. Saudi Arabia ranks as India’s fourth largest trading partner with a bilateral trade amounting to US$ 25.6 billion in 2010-11\, dominated by crude oil imports. Joint ventures and investments form an important part of commercial relations. The Indian labour force in the Kingdom and Saudi Arabia’s petroleum reserves have constituted the most important part of the bilateral relationship. \nOfficial visits by leaders of both countries have built on the existing partnership. The Delhi Declaration signed in 2006 aimed to strengthen ties in areas of energy\, trade\, science and technology\, education\, health\, and political cooperation on regional and international issues. The 2010 Riyadh Declaration furthered on this agreement and focuses on enhancing cooperation on counterterrorism\, money laundering\, narcotics\, arms and human trafficking\, and defence and economic cooperation. \nIn forging strategic ties with Saudi Arabia\, the author points out several advantages: \n\nSaudi Arabia’s growing regional profile: Saudi Arabia has been an important regional player in the Gulf and West Asia region owing to its huge petroleum reserves\, the presence of the two holy mosques\, and its growing military power among other factors. It has substantial influence on the regional politics\, especially on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process\, and has cultivated ties with major powers such as the US\, Russia\, China and the EU. Saudi Arabia has also emerged as an influential player in the ongoing Arab Spring. This increasing profile of the country is a call for India to engage further with Saudi Arabia in areas beyond bilateral trade an energy supply.\nSaudi Arabia as a gateway to the Arab and Islamic world: Saudi Arabia enjoys considerable clout in the Arab and Islamic worlds owing to the presence of the two holy mosques in Mecca and Medina. It also enjoys influence in organisations such as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)\, the Arab League and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). The author notes that strengthening ties with Saudi Arabia will provide a unique platform for India to promote its interest and to enable greater access to other countries in the region.\nDefence cooperation: Although India and Saudi Arabia have not signed a defence cooperation agreement\, both countries have conducted joint military exercises and are exploring enhanced military cooperation that includes training to Saudi Arabian forces on tackling terrorism in the mountainous areas bordering Yemen. \nIndia’s stakes in the security of the Gulf region: India sees the Gulf region as falling within its security parameter and has shown readiness to contribute to the security and stability of the region through sharing its own experiences in the areas of counter-terrorism\, maritime security and military training.\nCooperation against terrorism: Although both countries have been victims of terrorism in the past\, Saudi Arabia has faced questions over its alleged funding of religious extremists and the spread of the Sunni Wahhabi brand of Islam. India has indicated its concern on this issue. Following the 9/11 attacks\, Saudi Arabia has taken steps to check the flow of money and disrupting terrorist networks. It has condemned extremism and has been preaching moderation including through religious leaders. Strengthening India’s relations with Saudi Arabia will allow new avenues for India to manage relations within its own neighbourhood and also contribute to the security of the Gulf region.\nFighting piracy: Piracy in the Gulf of Aden and surrounding regions remains a threat to Sea Lines of Communication and thus to the security of the transshipment of goods. Deepening the Indian Navy’s cooperation with its Saudi counterpart will contribute significantly to the fight against piracy.\nEnergy security: India ranks as the fourth largest oil consuming country in the world after the US\, China and Japan. Securing long term energy supplies has been a dominant objective for India in the Gulf region. Saudi Arabia is currently the largest supplier of crude oil to India. With particular reference to the ‘Strategic Petroleum Reserve’\, India needs to move beyond mere commodity trade and engage with Saudi Arabia through energy interdependence. \nSoft power diplomacy: The author notes that the approximately two million strong Indian diaspora in Saudi Arabia have acted as a medium through which the Saudis have shaped their perception of India and its people. The Delhi Declaration of 2006 has aimed to promote exchange of faculty\, students and delegations\, and encourage direct scientific and educational communications between institutions. India has also recently pledged to assist Saudi Arabia in setting up an ICT Centre of Excellence\, as well as institutions of higher learning. India needs to build on portraying itself as a major education hub in Asia that can provide quality education. \n\nIn building his study\, the author looks at both sides of the coin. Saudi Arabia’s perceptions of India have undergone changes following the end of the Cold War and the emergence of India as a stable democracy. Its shift in focus to major Asian countries following 9/11 has aimed at broadening its engagement particularly with India\, China and Japan. The author notes that Saudi Arabia’s ‘Look East’ policy would give it the two distinct advantages of exploring new markets for oil and trade\, and diversifying its diplomatic engagement with the world. However\, Saudi Arabia does harbor certain concerns with respect to India’s engagements in the West Asian region\, particularly with reference to India’s defence cooperation with Iran\, and the supply of arms to India from Israel. These two concerns also pose challenges to furthering India’s interests in the region. \nThe Pakistan factor has also been an important element of the India-Saudi Arabia relationship. The author observes that India’s undue emphasis on the religious factor (that it attributed to close Saudi-Pakistani ties) made it view Saudi Arabia as a ‘lost cause’ for a long period of time. In spite of this\, India’s deepening engagements with Saudi Arabia over the recent past has resulted in building a stronger bilateral relationship. The author also points out that Pakistan’s influence over Saudi Arabia in hindering a stronger Indo-Saudi relationship will have more diminished impact than in the past. \nThe study concludes by saying that it is imperative for both countries to move beyond ‘buyer-seller relations’. The recent high level visits and agreements are an indication of deepened trust building that will be essential for a long term strategic partnership. The author emphasises the need for both countries to engage with mutual cooperation in multiple fronts of engagement\, with India taking the lead in engaging with Saudi Arabia\, especially in this opportune time when India is looking west and Saudi Arabia is looking east. This will help translate the existing economic ties into a strong strategic partnership. \nMajor Points of Discussion and Suggestions to the author: \n\nThere is a need to explore the use of the term ‘strategic partnership’ to define India-Saudi Arabia relations as they currently exist. A number of panelists disagreed on the assumption that such a partnership already exists between the two countries. Also\, it was observed that this may not be the right time to deepen ties with countries in the region\, taking into account the unforeseen consequences of the ongoing Arab Spring. \nA discussant suggested deeper exploration of the benefits of a strengthened strategic partnership for both India and Saudi Arabia and the impacts of this on regional actors in India’s neighbourhood\, such as China and Pakistan; the balancing acts that both countries have to manage (for the Saudis\, between India and Pakistan\, and for the Indians\, between Saudi Arabia and Iran). \nIt was suggested that the study also explore the problems relating to succession in the Kingdom. King Abdullah has played a fine balancing act between the Islamists and the liberals in the country and it is uncertain if another future ruler will be able to do the same. \nIt was noted that India must strive to engage with countries in the region in such a manner that developments such as the Arab Spring do not impact the fundamental basis of its relations with those countries. People-to-people relations need to be consolidated so that bilateral relations are not overly influenced by regime changes. \nThe discussion also focused on Saudi Arabia’s strong military and religious ties with Pakistan\, and its varied and continuing engagement with the Taliban in Afghanistan. One of the panelists stressed the significance of self-interests in the forging of bilateral relations. In the context of India-Saudi Arabia relations\, both sides have much to gain from economic and defence cooperation. \nPanelists affirmed that despite recent shifts\, the bilateral relationship would remain dominated by economic factors\, with energy trade being the most important element of this. \n\nReport prepared by Princy Marin George\, Research Assistant\, West Asia and Africa Cluster\, IDSA URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/india-saudi-arabia-relations CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120113T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120113T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T225912 CREATED:20231223T134507Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130242Z UID:63181-1326432600-1326432600@idsa.in SUMMARY:Escalation and De-escalation of Violence in Insurgencies: Insights from Northeast India DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Shri G K PillaiDiscussants: Maj Gen Dhruv Katoch and Shri Sanjoy Hazarika \n \nDr. Namrata Goswami’s paper defines insurgencies as irregular warfare which engages in non-frontal attacks against the adversary with small groups of fighters and which is marked by the absence of fixed battlefields. Insurgencies\, therefore\, involve a complex mix of political legitimisation\, support base\, emotional category\, symbolic gestures and historical narratives buttressed by the elements of time and space. Escalation of violence\, as defined in Dr. Goswami’s paper\, implies increases in the level of conflict over a period of time and de-escalation signifies decreases in the level of conflict over a period of time. \nThe paper\, however\, analyses the escalation and de-escalation process in insurgencies with regard to the National Socialist Council of Nagalim Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM)\, the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA)\, and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and its political front\, the Revolutionary People’s Front (RPF) of Manipur. While the first two insurgency movements have witnessed stages of escalation and de-escalation of violence spreading across decades\, the PLA offers an intriguing example of an insurgent group that continues to remain hostile to peace negotiations. \nThe paper further offers an analysis of the factors leading to the escalation of violence taking into account the three cases mentioned above. Political motivation plays a vital role through which the insurgents garner support from the people for their violent activities. Hence\, political mobilisation is the first vital step in any armed movement in order to acquire critical mass and to create space for conflict escalation. In case of NSCN-IM\, political objective of Naga territorial unification and sovereignty based on the historical narrative of Naga independent status before the British occupation plays a vital role. The ULFA also utilises the politics of Assamese exploitation at the hands of New Delhi in order to vindicate its demand for a separate Assamese homeland. \nThe availability of arms is one of the important factors leading to the escalation of violence level in an insurgency. The easy availability of arms in Northeast India enables the NSCN-IM\, the ULFA and the PLA to sustain their armed movements. Of the United Nation’s estimated 640 million illegal arms in the world\, 40 million small arms are in India alone\, with Manipur accounting 32 percent of small arms. \nState response plays an important role in deciding the escalation or de-escalation of violence in an insurgency. For example\, the state of India responded with massive use of force in response to the insurgent groups in Northeast at their initial stage. As a consequence\, militant groups escalated their violence which resulted in non-combatant deaths. \nPopular support base is one of the important factors which help escalating the violence level of an insurgency. The local support for the insurgent groups of the Northeast of India mentioned above depends on their ability to reflect the grievances of the people in the affected areas like alienation and deprivation\, political marginalisation\, etc. Similarly\, the insurgent groups use violence as a tool to get support from their target population. For example\, ULFA is known for its violence tactics of killing non-Assamese Hindi-speaking people. \nLegitimacy of a particular insurgency movement escalates the violence level. Insurgents use various methods to enjoy legitimacy from a targeted population. These groups engage in violence in order to provoke the regular army to escalate its use of force\, thereby creating enormous hardship for the local population. Disproportionate counter-measures by the state forces only provide these groups an opportunity to act as the security provider for the people. \nExternal support also helps escalating the violence level in a conflict. In the case of Northeast of India\, it shares a 4500 Kilometer highly porous border with China\, Bhutan\, Myanmar and Bangladesh. Both the NSCN-IM and ULFA have/had their training camps in Myanmar and Bangladesh. Moreover\, both the armed groups had strong connections with the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) of Myanmar. There are lots of instances on how these groups used the bordering countries as their safe heavens. \nTime and space are important factors for the escalation of violence. Time enables irregular groups to wage a protracted war aiming to gradually reduce the political and psychological will of the stronger power. Taking advantage of the strategic dimension of time\, the NSCN-IM has established constituencies for the purposes of recruitment and resource generation. Similarly\, ULFA has taken advantage of time to generate resources for their fight\, recruit new cadres\, establish base areas\, create support networks amongst the local population and spread their ideas. \nThe geography and terrain of a particular place is critical for the continuation of insurgent movements. Without supportive terrain\, lightly armed\, highly mobile insurgents stand little chance to offset the technological superiority of the stronger power. \nThe organisational structure of an insurgent group plays a very vital role in the escalation of conflict level. A cohesive organization with a strong leadership helps an insurgent group act better. For example the NSCN-IM has a highly centralized political structure known as Government of the People’s Republic of Nagaland (GPRN). Similarly\, both the PLA and the ULFA are highly centralized outfits with radical sense of loyalty. Intra-group conflicts or factionalism with on a group escalates the violence level. This happens because the rival factions adopt an escalated violence means in order to establish social and political dominance. The leadership differences between Muivah and Khaplang in 1988 and the escalated violence level can be a case in point. \nDe-escalation in violence\, according to Dr. Goswami\, is dependant upon the state response to insurgencies\, political motivation\, and absence of popular support\, lack of legitimacy and loss of external support. De-escalation can occur also when the insurgent group identifies an opportunity to resolve the conflict in a positive sum manner if it believes that the state is willing to concede to most of its demands. \nState response to the insurgency movements plays an important role in de-escalating the violence level. The state of India’s response to the insurgency movements can be located with in three conceptual parameters. The proportionate use of force has been the key determining factor of a responsive state in the post 1970s. The significance of proportionality of means and non-combatant immunity are absolutely critical for the Indian state’s response to the insurgencies in the Northeast. Because\, since ULFA\, NSCN-IM and PLA project a certain degree of society support\, the disproportionate use of force by the Indian state can be counter-productive. \nUse of dialogue and negotiation is one of the important responses of the state of India in bringing down the violence level in the Northeast. The ongoing peace talks between the Government of India and the ULFA and NSCN-IM can be a case in point. Similarly\, the grant of greater autonomy and the statehood to some of the areas where the insurgent groups are active can bring down the conflict level. \nLack of legitimacy of an insurgent group may bring down the conflict level. The NSCN-IM is under constant pressure from the civil societies to bring down the violence level. For example\, in 2007 the Naga Hoho (Apex Council) in a strongly worded statement demanded that all Naga factions abstain from violence and give peace a chance. Similarly\, in recent years ULFA’s claim of legitimate representation of Assamese aspiration for political sovereignty has also come under deep critical scrutiny since the outfit is seen as non-transparent and run by a handful of men and women. \nLack of external support is a major factor in de-escalating the violence level of an insurgency movement. Nearly 30 under-ground ULFA camps were destroyed in Bhutan in 2003 which forced the ULFA to shift its base to Bangladesh. After the crackdown on the militant outfits in Bangladesh by Sheikh Hasina Government in 2009 many of the ULFA leaders were arrested and handed over to India. \nDr. Goswami’s paper concludes that when the insurgent groups are fighting for the establishment of separate independent statehood\, violent responses by the state is counter-productive and leads to a vicious cycle of violence and counter-violence. The paper finds three key variables with regard to escalation and de-escalation i.e. popular support\, loss of legitimacy and state response. \nMajor points of Discussion and Suggestions\n\nThere is a need to understand the background of all insurgency movements. There is also a need to study various insurgent groups in the northeast separately.\nThere has been abrogation of the constitutional norms by the political party in power in Assam. Hence\, ULFA is a created problem.\nThe deployment of Security Forces as a state response has to be changed. There is a need to find out the sources of funding for these groups since the local funding for them is not sufficient for them to sustain.\nThe time factor has always been with the Government. The time has come not to see the insurgency as simply a military problem. There is a need to take governance issues into consideration.\nThe role of political parties in escalating the violence level should have been discussed.\nThere has been a shift of Insurgents activities i.e. from legitimate demands to criminal activities.\nIt is difficult to decide as when is the perfect situation for conflict resolution.\nThere is a need to address the governance issues because more people have died in governance failure than because of insurgencies.\nInsurgencies in Northeast will be difficult to resolve since there are many stakeholders. It can only be controlled to a point.\nGiving statehood to Nagaland was an end of the bargaining power of state of India\n\nReport prepared by Dr. Anshuman Behera\, Research Assistant\, Internal Security Centre\, Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/escalation-and-de-escalation-of-violence-in-insurgencies-insights-from-northeast-india CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120113T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120113T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T225912 CREATED:20231223T134553Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130242Z UID:63182-1326432600-1326432600@idsa.in SUMMARY:The CBMs in Sino-Indian Relations: Need for Revamping and Enlarging the Structural and Institutional Mechanisms DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Shri Gautam H BambewalaDiscussants: Professor Sreeram Sunder Chaulia and Professor Alka Acharya \nThe fellow paper of Dr. R. N. Das focussed on how the Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) play a critical role in India-China relations. According to him their importance is due to the persistence of ‘security dilemma’ in the India- China context. Factors that have led to security dilemma include among others baggage of the 1962 War\, differences in the system of governance\, competition in acquiring greater space at the international arena and the scramble for resources. \nDr Das opined that India’s threat perception of China is not baseless and\, therefore\, the need for India to establish CBMs with China arises. After the 1962 India- China war\, the bilateral relationship was restored in 1976. The 1979 visit by the then minister of external affairs\, A. B. Vajpayee was a good gesture but it failed to bring warmth in the relationship. During his visit\, China attacked Vietnam\, India considered it undiplomatic and Vajpayee prematurely ended his visit to return to New Delhi in protest. \nThe turning point in the India- China relationship was former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s visit of 1988\, which led to the formation of important CBMs in India- China relations. Prime Minister Narasimha Rao’s landmark visit in 1993 gave a real boost to the CBMs\, which materialised\, according to Dr Das\, due to the visionary leadership of Rao. India and China signed the agreement on troop reduction along the border\, which was followed by arms reduction agreement in 1996. Avoidance of large-scale military exercise and air intrusions was also agreed upon\, among other things. Since 2003\, a number of bilateral visits have taken place; these include the 2003 Vajpayee visit\, 2005 Wen Jiabao visit\, and Pranab Mukherjee’s 2006 visit. \nIn the context of military CBMs one of the biggest steps taken was to cnduct the ‘Hand in hand 2008’ India- China joint military exercise. The two sides have been taking numerous slow yet steady moves on that count. \nSince 2006\, India- US relationship started strengthening and that\, according to Dr. Das\, led to rise in Chinese suspicions of India’s intentions to some extent. On the other hand\, India has been wary of Chinese intentions\, as China has been issuing stapled visa to Indian citizens hailing from Jammu & Kashmir\, and Arunanchal Pradesh on several occasions since 2006. \nDr. Das made several recommendations for strengthening the India- China relations. Checking border transgression and bringing the relationship on an equal footing and on reciprocal basis are prominent among his recommendations. He also recommended that India take its diplomatic steps carefully to avoid any miscommunication with China. \nThe Chairperson\, Gautam Bambawale\, concurred with Dr. Das that border transgression by Chinese troops and stapled visa are concerns for India. In order to improve relations with India\, China must understand and handle Indian sensitivities carefully. \nPoints of Discussion: \n\nSino- Indian boundary question cannot be seen as a purely boundary issue. It is far bigger and complicated. \nChina’s vision of a uni-polar Asia and its position on India’s candidature for UNSC are at cross-purposes with India. \nChina does not want to discuss the nuclear CBMs with India\, as that would automatically approve India’s nuclear power status\, which China doesn’t want. \nResponses from the Chinese side on India’s rise have not been very positive in the past. However\, one must keep in mind that China does have its own insecurities and China’s responses to India’s relations with the US and Japan indication these. \nChina’s cooperation with India on the UNSC issue will help strengthening the relationship. \nThus far\, CBMs have not been able to remove the persistent security dilemma in the India- China context. They have been effective only in managing the relationship. Nevertheless\, contribution of CBMs in maintaining India- China relations has been significant. \nIt is important to assess the effectiveness of CBMs in India- China context\, as that would help in planning further CBMs that could be put in place. \n\nReport prepared by Rahul Mishra. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-cbms-in-sino-indian-relations-need-for-revamping-and-enlarging-the-structural-and-institutional-mechanisms CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120203T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120203T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T225912 CREATED:20231224T103532Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T024155Z UID:64096-1328247000-1328247000@idsa.in SUMMARY:Nepal-China Relations and its Implications for India DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nChair: Ambassador K V RajanDiscussant: Ms Akanshaya Shah URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/nepal-china-relations-and-its-implications-for-india CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120217T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120217T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T225912 CREATED:20231224T103532Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T020206Z UID:64095-1329456600-1329456600@idsa.in SUMMARY:The European Union and its main Asian Partners: Perspectives on the Dynamics of the EU-India and EU-China Strategic Partnerships DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-european-union-and-its-main-asian-partners-perspectives-on-the-dynamics-of-the-eu-india-and-eu-china-strategic-partnerships CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120224T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120224T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T225912 CREATED:20231223T134506Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130242Z UID:63177-1330061400-1330061400@idsa.in SUMMARY:Mahinda Rajapaksa’s India Policy DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Ambassador R RajagopalanDiscussants: Maj Gen (Retd) Ashok Mehta and Dr N Manoharan \nThe paper focused on Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s policy towards India and on how it has been different from that of his predecessors. In evaluating the above\, the scholars posed several questions like in what way his India policy has been different from that of other leaders\, how far has he succeeded in counter-balancing Indian influence? What are the reasons for his success or failure? The paper is broadly divided into three parts beginning with broad trends in Sri Lanka’s India Policy from cold war period to 2005\, post-cold war period and post-2005 period ever since Rajapaksa took over as the President. \nDuring the Cold War period\, India was perceived as a potential threat and there was an effort in Sri Lanka to balance/offset India’s influence in the island country. Hence\, several Sri Lankan leaders sought to engage regional and extra-regional powers like the USA\, the UK\, Pakistan and China to countervail India through civil-military cooperation. But there was also an attempt to engage India given the perception that India had a decisive influence on the Tamil population. Indian involvement in the Tamil question towards the end of the cold war— sending of Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to fight the Tamil militants\, its ultimate withdrawal before accomplishment of the mission and assassination of former prime minister Rajiv Gandhi— proved counter-productive for India and led to a policy of willful inaction in Sri Lankan affairs ever since. India maintained a distance from the issue and backed a non-military solution— “a negotiated political settlement acceptable to all sections of Sri Lankan society”. However\, even if India adopted a hands-off policy\, the perception of India playing a negative role in the ethnic issue continued in Sri Lanka. \nThe authors argued that immediately after Mahinda Rajapaksa took over as the President of the country in 2005\, he adopted a proactive policy of engagement with India and evolved an innovative way of establishing a line of communication with Indian leadership. A three-member delegation comprising two of his brothers and one of his trusted lieutenants\, regularly discussed with India the issues relating to the ethnic situation in Sri Lanka and especially the inflexible and aggressive posture adopted by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Thus Rajapaksa ensured that his government’s military campaign would have the blessings of India. It is because of such regular interaction that India understood the compulsions of his government and the campaign ended with complete decimation of the LTTE. Rajapaksa could also obtain Indian consent for the import of military weapons from China and Pakistan which sparked off Indian concerns on some occasions. Through regular and effective communication he sought to dispel the Indian concerns in this regard. \nThe authors argued that after the conclusive victory over the LTTE\, Rajapaksa’s handling of the ethnic issue has clearly sidestepped Indian concerns. Indian proposals of developing a solution on the basis of the 13th amendment have not been taken seriously by Rajapaksa as he has chosen to deny that he had ever assured India on a 13th amendment-plus solution and instead insisted that he would favour a homegrown solution rather than an imported one. His approach towards Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) also signifies his apathy towards India\, even if he continues to emphasise on betterment of relationship with India. Despite all this\, India has resigned itself to Sri Lanka’s attempt to strengthen its relationship with India’s traditional rivals\, China and Pakistan\, and has felt compelled to work with Rajapaksa. All this while\, India has hoped to persuade him to evolve a decent solution to the ethnic issue and further strengthen Sri Lanka’s relationship with India. In light of the arguments provided above\, the authors concluded by saying that Rajapaksa had succeeded in both engaging and countervailing India. \nThe main points of the discussion and suggestions to the authors: \n\nThe paper needs more in-depth work regarding the main eight questions it has tried to explore.\nGotabaya Rajapaksa’s role in Rajapaksa’s rise needs to be highlighted further.\nThe question of why military was used although a non military solution has been sought throughout needs to be revaluated.\nMore emphasis needs to be put on devolution and 13th amendment for better understanding of policies.\nThe title of the paper needs to be changed\, whether it was about Rajapaksa’s policy or Sri Lanka’s policy under Rajapaksa needs to come out better. \nA comparative study of the leadership nexus in both countries when studying from personality oriented approach can be undertaken within the paper.\nMaritime issues need a mention in the paper as it could be a future irritant in India-Sri Lanka relations. Also economic issues need more mention in the paper.\nRajapaksa’s idea of nation building could be put in the paper for a better overview of his personality.\n\nReport prepared by Anwesha Ray Chaudhuri\, Research Assistant\, IDSA URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/mahinda-rajapaksas-india-policy CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120224T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120224T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T225912 CREATED:20231224T103532Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T014610Z UID:64094-1330061400-1330061400@idsa.in SUMMARY:Revenue Procurement in the Army DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nChair: Shri Amit CowshishDiscussants: Brig Ashok Sharma and Col P Chandok URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/revenue-procurement-in-the-army CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120302T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120302T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T225912 CREATED:20231224T103527Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T014506Z UID:64093-1330666200-1330666200@idsa.in SUMMARY:India's 'Asymmetric Responsibility': SAARC as an instrument of Neighbourhood Policy DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nChair: Ambassador I P KhoslaDiscussants: Ambassador Veena Sikri and Dr Nitya Nanda URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/indias-asymmetric-responsibility-saarc-as-an-instrument-of-neighbourhood-policy CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120309T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120309T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T225912 CREATED:20231224T103527Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130242Z UID:64091-1331271000-1331271000@idsa.in SUMMARY:Internal Security Threats to Pakistan DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Dr Ashok BehuriaDiscussants: Shri Rana Banerji and Professor Kalim Bahadur \nTopic:Internal security threats to PakistanDiscussants: Prof. Kalim Bahadur\, Mr Rana BanerjiChair: Dr. Ashok Behuria\n The paper focused on the myriad threats that are challenging the internal security situation within Pakistan and the implications of the threats for the region. In discussing the above\, the author widely classified the threats under the following heads: militancy in Pakistan\, radicalisation in Pakistan\, ethnic dissent\, sectarian strife\, energy shortage\, paucity of water and economic downslide to be the causal factors of instability within the country. \n Beginning with militancy in Pakistan\, the author stated that Pakistan was witnessing a massive spurt in violence by militant groups due to its self-defeating policy of using jihadis in War in Afghanistan during 1979-1989 and its romance with the Taliban later. The Taliban connection has radicalised Pakistani society in an irreversible manner. In recent times\, Pakistan is facing an insurgency waged by a network of militants under the banner of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) or Pakistani Taliban. It seeks to undermine the writ of Pakistani law and establish Sharia all over. The TTP has perpetrated hundreds of suicide attacks and justified their action as jihad against the enemies of Islam. Even investigations into recent spate of attacks like Mehran Naval Base have established TTP’s links with the Al Qaeda. That apart\, suicide bombings and kidnappings have become common and preferred option for the militants as major source of funding. Most of the groups involved in such activities emanate from the tribal areas of Pakistan like Jandola\, Waziristan and so on. Pakistan Army’s operations and well-coordinated drone attacks by the US agencies have not been effective. They have only led to regrouping of the militants and further radicalisation and violence. It has also led to a huge population of internally displaced people who suffer hardships that create dissent against the government. \n Next threat that the author discussed was that of radicalisation of the state. The forces of radical Islam\, she held\, have managed to infect the social and political fabric of Pakistan. The onward march towards extremist politics in Pakistan can be termed as Talibanisation. The type of education imparted in the Madrassas is not the only reason for rise of militancy in Pakistan. Exploitation of popular grievances against unequal social\, political and economic systems by the extremists has also fueled such a marked rise in militancy. The excessive importance given by the Pakistani leadership to religious elements\, especially during Zia ul Haq’s regime\, has also given a fillip to such extremism where the clergy was allowed to participate in political activities. Such links nourished over time have emboldened these elements to make demands for Islamisation of the Pakistan state. \n The killings of Salman Taseer and Shahbaaz Bhatti for advocating amendments to blasphemy law are indicators of the extent of radicalistaion in the Pakistani Society and state today. The process of radicalisation has crept into the army as well although the extent of such penetration remains a matter of debate. Some of the officers supposedly have links with religious groups like Tabhlighi Jamat\, even as its activities are banned in the garrisons. The author concluded that the political parties and civil society groups have failed to take on these radical elements because they are either sympathetic towards them or afraid of raising their voice\, and thus militancy in the name of religion will have broader support base in the country in times to come. \n Another issue that impinges on internal situation in Pakistan is that of the rise of nationalist movements demanding autonomy or independence on the basis of their ethnic identities. Insurgency in Balochistan is the most important example here. Balochistan has been wrecked by insurgency for more than six decades. The grievances of Baloch population have been that they were made to forcibly accede to Pakistan and subjected to colonisation by the Pakistani state\, which has exploited all their natural resources and treated them as second class citizens. The Baloch insurgents have routinely carried out attacks on gas pipelines\, railway lines\, other critical infrastructure and military establishments. The government in Islamabad has always used heavy force to quell the movement over the year leading to total alienation of the people there. However\, the recent US congressional hearing on Balochistan has stirred up unease in Pakistan over the issue. That apart\, dissent has been reported over renaming of the erstwhile North Western Frontier Province (NWFP) as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa by the non-Pashtuns of the region like the Hazaras who want a separate province for themselves. Similar instances of demand for separate province have been reported from Karachi\, FATA\, and Sindh etc. Also demand for creation of a separate Seraiki province within Punjab has made its way into parliamentary debates. Seraiki activists have been demanding creation of new province for themselves comprising 17distritcs in south western Punjab. However\, these demands are proving a continuous challenge for the government and a major hindrance to development and resource distribution. All these unrests have the potential to turn into secessionist movements\, unless they are addressed well. \nOn the other hand\, sectarian strife has also engulfed the country. There is a major strife between the Shias and the Sunnis. Pakistan being s Sunni majority country\, minority sects have been at the receiving end for a long time. In the 1950s\, there was a nationwide movement against the Ahmadiyas\, by both the Sunnis and the Shias\, which resulted in their being declared as non-Muslims in 1974. Since the Shi’ite revolution in Iran in 1979\, the Sunnis of Pakistan have trained their guns on the Shias. Zia’s Islamisation drive also accentuated the divide between these groups during this period. The Talibanisation process has now resulted in violence between different Sunni groups like the Deobandis and the Barelvis. Suicide bombings in Barelvi places of worship are quite regular these days. The growing sectarian violence in Pakistan casts a dark shadow on the future of Pakistan. \nThe last three of threats mentioned by the author centred on energy\, water and economic downslide which have the potential to become bigger threats if they are not tackled with care. All of them are interlinked in many ways. Energy crisis for last few years has had its impact on Pakistani economy and triggered mass unrest throughout the country. \nWater has also become another source of concern in Pakistan. Pakistan\, being a water stressed country\, is going to face water scarcity due to high growth in population. Since large amount of water has been diverted upstream to Punjab\, the rivers have dried up in downstream Sindh. This in turn has affected the agricultural sector. The thinning of Himalayan glaciers due to global warming has affected water flow in the Indus basin. Division of river water on an ad hoc basis to favour the requirements of Punjab has also resulted in smaller provinces of Pakistan accusing it of monopolizing a crucial resource. Water related issues\, like floods and poor availability\, are increasingly being discussed in Pakistan as instances of Indian insensitivity towards Pakistani needs. There is a conscious effort in Pakistan to brand India as a country determined to turn Pakistan into a desert. This is likely to have repercussions for India-Pakistan relations. \nLastly economic downslide has hit Pakistan in a major way since the GDP has declined to 2.4 per cent. There has been significant growth in the service sector compared to the agricultural sector which proves the rural-urban divide in Pakistan. Insurgency and terrorism have also taken its toll on the economy with general investment climate in the country going down. Even recent floods have affected Pakistani economy massively. \nThe scholar concluded the paper by stating implications of all the above for Pakistan and India\, which were: \nRate of radicalization amongst the youth will go up if not provided access to better and modern education system. Pakistan’s relations with India will acquire a new dimension with Pakistan accusing India of water scarcity in the country. Several sections in Pakistan hold that India has denied Pakistan its legitimate share of water under the Indus Water Treaty. This has become a fresh irritant in Indo-Pak relations. Presently\, India and Pakistan are agreeing to better trade relations\, however\, this could be affected by the anti-India rhetoric being peddled by right wing elements in Pakistan who are raising the water bogey and arguing against any rapprochement with India. Also elements within the Pakistani establishment committed to destabilize India and take Kashmir away by force could ratchet up tensions with India. \nThat author argued that despite pressures from the US to desist from Iran gas pipeline\, Pakistan is likely to follow an independent policy on the issue and go ahead with the deal. \nThe major points that emerged from the discussion were; \n\nApart from the madrassa system of education\, the secular system of education in Pakistan is equally to be blamed for the rising radicalization and this needs to be studied. \nThe failure of the government in handling the extremist elements needs to be studied more. \nRole of Islam should have been in an entirely different section. \nCentrality of India as the primary enemy needs to be factored in the discussion along with relations with US and the endgame in Afghanistan. \nImplications needed more in-depth analysis and study. \nIssue of sectarian strife is an important issue which needs to be mentioned in more detail. \n\nReport prepared by Anwesha Ray Chaudhuri\, Research Assistant. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/internal-security-threats-to-pakistan CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120309T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120309T053000 DTSTAMP:20261104T225912 CREATED:20231224T103527Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T014416Z UID:64092-1331271000-1331271000@idsa.in SUMMARY:Theaterised Joint Logistics: A Calliberated Approach Towards Initiation DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nChairperson: Ambassador I P KhoslaDiscussants: Rear Admiral Sushil Ramsay\, Maj Gen Sheru Thapliyal\,SM (Retd) and Wing Cdr Deepak Sharma URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/theaterised-joint-logistics-a-calliberated-approach-towards-initiation CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR