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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110325T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110325T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T004701
CREATED:20231223T220638Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250316T235946Z
UID:63582-1301031000-1301031000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:India-Japan Economic Relations: Focus on the DMIC
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Professor V P Dutt\nDiscussant: Professor Mohammad Badrul Alam \n \nThe broad theme of Dr. Rajaram Panda’s presentation was India-Japan economic relations\, while the key focus was on the Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor (DMIC). At the outset\, he made it clear that the paper would not attempt to examine India-Japan economic relations in detail\, but only examine the development of the Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor project since it is “singularly going to dramatically transform the complexion of India-Japan economic ties in the coming two decades.” \nThe DMIC is a hugely ambitious development project on either side of the Dedicated Freight Corridor (DFC) of the Indian Ministry of Railways with a band of 150-200 kms. It was conceptualised as a global investment and manufacturing destination with emphasis on expanding the manufacturing and services base\, and establish DMIC as the global manufacturing and trading hub. The project\, according to Dr. Panda\, “is going to catapult the bilateral relations to a level that will be the envy of other nations in Asia.” \nCalling DMIC “a unique application of the Public Private Partnership approach to infrastructural development in India\,” Dr Panda added that a holistic approach towards the bilateral relationship is required to reap the benefits of the partnership. In that regard\, materialisation of CEPA (Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement) will strengthen the DMIC\, and India-Japan ties as well. \nPoints of discussion\n\nWhile considering the advantages of DMIC\, the government cannot afford to overlook issues such as land acquisition\, adequate safety measures\, and capability to save the project in case of natural disasters.\nA close examination of links between DMIC and CEPA should be included so that it helps to understand Japan’s rationale for extending support for the project.\nExplaining the role of DMIC and its contribution to overall India-Japan economic relations would add value to the paper. More attention\, therefore\, should be given to the tangible benefits the project accrues to the India-Japan economic relationship.\nRecent incidents in Japan have certainly affected the Japanese economy\, and it will be worthwhile to analyse its impact on the ambitious DMIC project.\n\nReport prepared by Rahul Mishra\, Research Assistant\, IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/india-japan-economic-relations-focus-on-the-dmic
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110325T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110325T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T004701
CREATED:20231224T103810Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250311T044045Z
UID:64122-1301031000-1301031000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Does India have a Neighbourhood Policy?
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Ambassador I P KhoslaDiscussants: Shri Kanwal Sibal and Professor Sujit Dutta
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/does-india-have-a-neighbourhood-policy
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110401T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110401T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T004701
CREATED:20231223T220638Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T103810Z
UID:63581-1301635800-1301635800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Nuclear Energy in China & India: A Comparative Study
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Dr G BalachandranDiscussants: Prof Swaran Singh and Dr R Ramachandran \nDr Ch Viyyanna Sastry in his present paper aimed to analyse and compare the nuclear energy development programmes in China and India. The key issues that he tried to address in the paper are: the roadmaps of China and India in securing their energy demands; how both the countries started their nuclear energy programmes; routes through which they are planning to achieve this; and finally to see what are the possible outcomes. \nAt the outset he said that nuclear energy is being viewed by many countries including China and India as one of the potential alternatives to the growing demands on carbon emissions and global warming. The energy deficient countries are also looking for nuclear energy as an alternative source of energy\, because of its steady supply source and the stable and predictability of costs for the full operation of reactors.  \nMoreover\, China and India as the two most populous countries with high economic growth rates for the past several years\, they have to generate more energy to sustain their growth rates. Therefore\, as the global plans on nuclear energy expand\, China and India are poised to play a strong role in this area.  \nOn China’s nuclear energy programme\, Dr. Sastry said that till recently\, the role of nuclear energy in the overall energy production was quite low amounting to just 2 per cent of the total electricity generation. At present\, China has about 13 nuclear power plants of different capacitates in operation generating about 10.8 GWe. During the eleventh economic plan period for the years 2006-2010\, China set an ambitious goal for new nuclear plant construction for developing about 40 GWe by 2020. In addition\, there are various revised plans and projections in China for achieving even more than 40 GWe by 2020. As the State Energy Bureau (SEB) of China set the target of 50 GWe and the State Council claimed of possibility of achieving 70 GWe by 2020. Dr Sastry pointed out that in pursuit of the set targets\, Chinese government approved the construction of an additional 28 nuclear reactors by 2020 of which 20 are already under construction. Several new reactors are also being planned.  \nOn India’s nuclear energy programme\, he explained that Indian civilian nuclear energy programme is based on the three stage programme envisioned by Dr Homi J Bhabha. The first stage of the indigenous nuclear power programme involving setting up of pressurized heavy water reactors is now in industrial domain. With the start of construction of the 500 MWe prototype fast breeder reactors in October 2004\, the second stage has been launched. He opined that it is time for India to accelerate the implementation of the second stage and move towards the development of the third stage of the nuclear power programme. He suggested that in parallel\, India has to continue to work towards development of emerging nuclear energy technologies to address its long term energy requirements which are indeed very large. \nDr Sastry said that despite the criticism based on proliferation\, safety and security of reactors and environmental concerns after the recent Japanese nuclear crisis\, it is possible that India\, along with other Asian countries like China\, Russia and South Korea\, is actively involved in the global resurgence of nuclear power that is being witnessed in the past few years. He held that both China and India are likely to increase their share of nuclear energy significantly in the next decades\, thus\, leading a nuclear renaissance which could revive the nuclear industry. While the Indian target of 20 GWe by 2020 appears achievable\, China too can reach 40 GWe by that time. In addition\, China with its resources\, manpower\, unhindered technology transfers\, the single party governance and not much opposition from the people\, is more likely to reach its desired figures. \nThough nuclear energy is going to play a pivotal role\, he suggested that both the countries have to work on clear technologies to sustain their higher growth rates. The increasing population could be a wild card.  \nSo far as the export of future nuclear reactors are concerned\, he said that with passing indigenisation and development of related nuclear infrastructure\, China is certain to become a nuclear exporter in a big way. On India’s export capability\, however\, he said that till it masters the fast-breeder technology\, India should not hesitate to consider offering soft loans to kick start export of its nuclear reactors i.e. Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors (PHWRs). It is possible that many countries would like to start with medium to small nuclear power plants than say 1000 MWe plants. \nAt the end of his presentation\, Dr Sastry said that India was a victim of international politics because of its principled stand against the nuclear proliferation treaty (NPT) and subsequent nuclear tests which led to the formation of the nuclear suppliers group (NSG). He pointed out that the Indo-US nuclear deal has changed the situation enabling India to import nuclear reactors along with the required fuel from outside.  Finally\, he suggested that India can become a world leader in the production and running of fast breeders if it manages to run successfully the much-awaited Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR) at Kalpakkam. In fact\, that success is likely to turn a new leaf in the development of nuclear energy.  \nMajor Points of Discussion and Suggestions:\n\nAlthough at present the primary emphasis of China’s nuclear programme is on its peaceful uses\, its nuclear programme started for military purposes and in October 1964 it conducted its first nuclear test. However\, India’s nuclear programme was started solely for peaceful purposes and its civil nuclear programme is the oldest among the Asian countries.\n\nThe DAE’s announcement of targetting 10\,000 MWe by the year 2000 and its subsequent failure to achieve it had lessened the image of the department. However\, the main reason for the failure to achieve the stated objective was because of the government’s failure to put equity in this sphere.\nIndia’s civilian nuclear programme would have improved if the Indian government had put more equity in this sector. The situation\, however\, is improving gradually after the successful conclusion of the Indo-US nuclear deal and the follow up measures taken by the Indian government in this regard. \nOn China’s standardisation of nuclear energy reactors\, what are the measures China has taken in this regard and how India can learn this from China?\nSo far as the indigenisation and development of nuclear infrastructures are concerned\, how can India cooperate with China?\nChina has recently taken many safety measures for its nuclear reactors. However\, how it is going to address the issues relating to the safe disposal of nuclear wastes and environmental concerns still remain the major concerns. \nRole of civil society in China is very critical in the Chinese civil nuclear energy programme especially in locating the reactors and addressing the environmental concerns. How civil society in China is going to react in coming years on this needs to be looked into. However\, at present no such major opposition is coming from the civil society. \nVietnam wants to build nuclear energy reactors and China is interested in supporting it\, if this will materialise how it would impact other countries of the region?\nFrom the present Japanese nuclear crisis\, what are the lessons Indian government has learned and what are the safety measures that the government is going to take to face similar situations in the future.\nSo far there is no allegation against India on proliferation concerned activity. It has impeccable track record on nuclear non-proliferation. There is also no case against India of diverting the imported civil nuclear technology or energy for military purposes. \nThe stated objectives of the research paper are not clear enough at present and there are also no clear policy recommendations. The author needs to focus on this and needs to further streamline the paper.\n\nReport prepared by Dr Saroj Bishoyi\, Research Assistant\, IDSA
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/nuclear-energy-in-china-india-a-comparative-study
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110408T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110408T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T004701
CREATED:20231223T220538Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130244Z
UID:63577-1302240600-1302240600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Civil-Military Relations in Post-Suharto Indonesia
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Dr R N DasDiscussants: Professor Baladas Ghoshal and Shri C S Kuppuswamy \n \nThe author analysed the developments in civil-military relations in Indonesia especially in the post Suharto era. He highlighted the fact that Indonesia charted its own civil military relation and almost defied the predetermined path laid out by theoreticians. \nHe also argued that military’s disposition in the civilian sphere had declined in the successive administrations since 1998. The military was unwilling to take on direct political role during the time of B J Habibie. Under the Habibie administration\, military introduce few changes in its doctrine and charted out four principles viz. a) the Military would no longer be in forefront of politics; b) It would influence the political process indirectly; c) It would shift its sociopolitical position from occupier to that of influencer and d) It would concede some of its sociopolitical functions to the nonmilitary partners. In the administration of Adburrahman Wahid\, the civilian government appropriated certain function such as appointments and promotion of senior officers which until now the military had exercised.   \nIn this paper\, the author discussed various theories of civil-military relations including the Separation and Concordance theory. He argued that the Separation theory is inadequate in explaining the relationship between armed forces\, the political elite\, the society and the institutions in post-Suharto Indonesia. The author highlighted that it is Concordance theory (which takes into account a nation’s historical and cultural context in determining the democratization of the country) better explains the developments in the post Suharto period. \nThe author identified various internal variables\, external variables\, and international variables to enquire the nature and developments in civil-military relations in Indonesia and attempted to extrapolate the future trend of civil military relations. \nAs regards internal variables\, he  explained that the internal variable refers to factors internal to the military such as professionalism\, corporate interests\, politicization etc. He highlighted the fact that army with its hierarchic organization and a cohesive characteristic ensures speedy implementation of decisions taken. He stated that it is claimed that armies are agents of modernization\, whether or not they intervene in politics\, since military driven investment has spin-off benefits for the civilian sector as well. He offered the explanation that Indonesian military drew its political strength from the doctrine of “dual function” which assigned it a direct political role beyond its strictly military role. He also enumerated the role of external factors such as political\, social system and governance and the related factors that shaped civil-military relations in Indonesia. \nIn conclusion he emphasised that Indonesia is undergoing societal changes which have their basis in the civil society. Quoting Huntington\, he stated that future problems in civil military relations in new democracies such as Indonesia are likely to come from the failures of democratic governments to promote economic developments and maintain law and order and not necessarily from the military. He speculated that these challenges will be faced with a new interpretation of civil military relations. \nMajor points of discussion and suggestions:\nThe author should highlight the characteristics of Indonesian army and should give more details how it came into existence. \nThe author should give more empirical evidences to the theories discussed in the paper and should test whether these theories are applicable to the Indonesian case. \nThe author should highlight the reason for continued domination of military in Indonesia\, may be in conclusion of the paper. \nThe author should emphasize as to how these three factors (i.e. internal\, external and international) emphasized in the paper interact with each other\, thus influencing the nature of civil military relations. \nA separate paragraph on the socio-political fabric of Indonesia is needed right at the outset\, qualify more explicitly which will help the author’s argument\, the futility of the Separation theory that is discussed in the paper. \nThe author should add a hypothesis\, particularly because the paper discusses about independent variable and dependent variable. The author needs to identify the relationship between the independent variable and dependent variable.  \nReport prepared by Shamshad A. Khan\, Research Assistant\, East Asia cluster.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/civil-military-relations-in-post-suharto-indonesia
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110415T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110415T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T004701
CREATED:20231223T220538Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130244Z
UID:63575-1302845400-1302845400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:The Role and Impact of Supreme Leader (Velayat-e Faqih) on Iranian Foreign Policy
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Ambassador Ishrat AzizDiscussants: Professor Qamar Agha and Professor A K Ramakrishnan \n \n \nDr. Rizvi started his presentation with the concept of velayat-e-faqih and its evolution. Velayat-e-Faqih is the most important institution in the post-revolution political system of Iran. The essence of this theory\, developed and applied by Ayatollah Khomeini\, is that one man with a thorough knowledge of Islamic law is to be designated as vali-e-faqih. Preamble of the Iranian constitution provides for the leadership of a fully qualified faqih whom the people consider as the leader who ensures that no institution deviates from its Islamic mandate. Despite the division of the three branches of government\, the constitution gives the velayat-e-faqih total control over the affairs of the state. Since the religious and political powers rest in one person\, the Imam’s powers are far beyond those of any contemporary head of state. \nGiven this background\, this paper studied the role of the institution of velayat-e-faqih during three phases of Iranian politics. The first phase covered the period 1979-1989\, during which Khomeini was the supreme leader. The second phase dealt with the period 1989-2005. Seyyed Ali Hossein Khamenei became the supreme leader in 1989 and during this period\, there were two presidents\, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989-1997) and Seyyed Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005). The third phase dealt with the post-2005 period\, when the hardliner Ahmadinejad was elected as President of Iran. It also examined how the institution has interacted with an executive presidency with differing ideological orientations and whether it has ensured continuity in the foreign policy of the Islamic republic. \nInitiating the discussion\, Mr. Qamar Agha clarified that there is no rule of clergy in Islam\, though among Shia it is still continuing. He said that it was basically a Christian concept. Conversely\, the holy Quran is a guide and one does not need anybody in between. Though interpretation is traditionally allowed\, the present problem lies in the fact that interpretation has been stopped. Further\, people in general believe that legitimacy of state lies with people\, not with god. Therefore\, government should be elected and hence democracy is considered as the best form of governance.  \nThen\, he talked about Shi’a theology and the concept of jihad and argued that there is no offensive jihad as killing of people is considered as killing of civilisation. Moreover\, Imam is needed to wage an offensive jihad. Rather\, they believe in jihad-e-Akbar\, fight with evil forces all the time; take out everything bad from the society like poverty and illiteracy. On the other hand\, the modern concept of holy war (jihad) is a medieval Christian concept adopted by the Muslims. Applying the principles of jihad\, Mr. Agha supported that if the government is corrupt\, it is the duty of its citizens to wage jihad against it and Iran did the same. The Iranian revolution is also unique as there was large popular participation. In the recent past\, voluntary demonstrations posed a grave threat to dictatorial regimes in many Muslim countries.  \nTaking the talk to the Iran-Iraq war\, Mr. Agha pointed out that Khomeini opposed any compromise. He wanted to introduce liberal Islam but during the war\, lesser clergy took over the reigns and Khomeini had to compromise. Separately\, the Najaf School mentions that clerics have no right to be part of government because it corrupts both religion and politics. But Khamenei\, present ruler\, managed things tactfully and was able to use both conservatives as well as liberals. He followed the policy of rapprochement\, as a result\, relations improved with Persian Gulf. Nevertheless\, Iranians are still fighting for democracy. \nProf. A. K. Ramakrishnan commented that the significance of the institution of faqih is intertwined with the aspects of Khomeini’s personality. In essence\, it is both constitutional and extra-constitutional authority derived from political\, constitutional religious as well as personality factors. He mentioned three important moments in Iranian history after the revolution: \n\nImmediate days when faqih became an institution. It is a constitutional process.\nKhomeini and drafting of constitution and his death led to a crisis as to what would happen to faqih (political crisis).\n2009 presidential elections—the institution of faqih was questioned.\n\nThen\, Prof. Ramakrishnan touched upon some conceptual aspects and asked what Khomeini did to make Islam contemporary? He answered that Khomeini made it a religious as well as political concept after the concepts of Wahabbia and Muqaddama. He believed that religion and politics cannot be separated by any means and hence made it a part of worldly affair. There was also mention about the concept of ummah and the concept of grand struggle\, anti-imperialism\, global solidarity and non-alignment. Further\, Khomeini made faqih a political institution. Again\, the controversy between ummah and nationalism was resolved by Khomeini while invoking reference to Shi’a traditions. There was also debate between Islamic republic as a state and its people as civil society. People beyond clergy are included in political system and ideological difference is clearly different from earlier days. However\, the current period is one where there is crisis of democracy. Added to the trend is a notion of loosening of hegemony with 2009 elections. He ended discussion with a question\, whether there are counter-hegemonic forces? \nDr. Ashok K Behuria raised some important issues like origin of the concept\, faqih as political institution-elite hegemony\, main foreign policy making institutions in Iranian political system and some definitional issues. He also discussed certain issues like relations with West\, the Iranian nuclear issue and the approach of faqih towards the same. Finally\, he touched upon the political process and role of civil society. \nDr. Meena Singh Roy stressed upon the Iranian foreign policy goals and impact of faqih on foreign policy. She also referred to post 2009 changes and its impact. She posed a question of whether Islamic societies can embrace democracy and argued that Islam is not inherently hostile to democracy. Regarding the Iranian reform\, she insisted that it is a broad multiclass reform movement. \nThe discussion was followed by a meticulous Q&A session focused on a range of topics like the concept of faqih and its pan-Islamic impact\, distance between Indian Shi’as and Khomeini regime\, organic interconnection between Islam and politics and the future of faqih under present revolutionary phase in the Middle East. It was noted that the Iranian system is more similar to Saudi Arabian system where democracy and dictatorship are continuing simultaneously. However\, Iranian regime is very strong. Further discussion raised questions on dilution of faqih in 1989 and challenges in 2009\, internal debates within the institution about its role\, people’s perception about faqih especially non-Iranians\, reactions in Arab world\, process of faqih in foreign policy making\, role of Indian government\, and possible conflict between Iranian Shi’a clergy and nationalists. It is to be noted here that the influence of faqih was felt as threatening by other nations. It did not go well with Arabs as it was anti-monarchical revolution in Iran and threatened established monarchies in the Gulf. When Khomeini took over\, Iran was not entirely Islamic (it’s a religious discourse). Khomeini wanted to achieve Islamic unity. But in 1979\, there was division between radicals and liberals and continued till 1985. \nFinally\, Ambassador Ishrat Aziz summarized the discussion with questions like what were goals of Khomeini —political or religious; interpreting Islam or governance; does faqih lead to democracy; whether faqih is elected or selected etc. He explained that many came to power through ideology but few could rule (govern) on ideology and Khomeini was one of them. He was also a pragmatist and successfully made a distinction between final and absolute power.  \nReport prepared by Mr. Babjee Pothuraju\, Research Assistant\, IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-role-and-impact-of-supreme-leader-velayat-e-faqih-on-iranian-foreign-policy
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110415T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110415T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T004701
CREATED:20231224T103722Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T050919Z
UID:64118-1302845400-1302845400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:India’s National Solar Mission – strategic lessons for energy security
DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nChairperson: Dr G BalachandranDiscussants: Shri Pankaj Batra and Shri Ravi Raina
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/indias-national-solar-mission-strategic-lessons-for-energy-security
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110429T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110429T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T004701
CREATED:20231223T220523Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130244Z
UID:63572-1304055000-1304055000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Renaissance of Military History\, War and International Studies in India
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Brigadier R .Dahiya (Retd)\, Advisor\, Military Affairs Cluster\, (IDSA)Discussants: Prof Anirudh Deshpande (University of Delhi) and Sqn Ldr RTS Chhina (Retd)\, Secretary Armed Forces Historical Research\, USI of India. \n \n \nPK Gautam introduced the paper by saying that in India there is a knowledge gap in the pursuit of contemporary military history in the framework of international studies.  He emphasized the need to catch up with international standard practices in this respect. The core argument of the paper is that the military history can no longer be peripheral as it is the root discipline for the development of strategy. Globally\, the study of contemporary military history has already moved leaps ahead of the drums\, bugle and trumpet approach. Unlike in the past\, the trends in warfare have changed from inter state to that of intra state combined with the rapid changes in technology. Military transformations and change is still under inadequate conceptual scrutiny. In the force on force or the high end spectrum\, technology is a vital input. This has now generated new demands on historians to grapple with more of science and technology.   India is emerging as a global power. Yet in this soft academic and policy field it has serious deficiencies. \nThe bottlenecks \nUniversity System   \nIndian University system does not facilitate the study of Military History. In universities like JNU and DU\, there is no course in strategic theory and military history. The Department of Defence and Security Studies (DSS) in universities such as Pune\, Madras\, Allahabad\, Meerut\, Chandigarh\, Patiala\, Gorakhpur etc are also responsible for the neglect. Military history remains an optional paper with absence of professional faculty. This is an ad-hoc and inadequate approach. Although some limited work exists of the pre-independence British period\, there is no serious original work by an Indian author on modern war studies. Rather\, mostly foreign scholars excel here and are widely quoted. \nThe State \nThe state itself has not published official histories of major wars and operations barring that of 1947- 48  in J&K or liberation of Goa in 1961 and an un-official history of 1965 Indo- Pak war just released. Although the Kargil Review Committee and its follow up Group of Ministers Reports have been hailed as the first of its kind in independent India – the war dairies of the army have yet to reach the History Division for even archival safety.  \nMilitary institutions worldwide rarely have been interested in studying their own experiences with any degree of honesty. Major reason military institutions get the next war wrong is because they either deliberately fail to study the last war\, or do so only insofar as it makes leaders feel good. Seeing it from the Utilitarian History perspective\, probably from a theoretical point of view monumental myth making could be a strong driver for officials not to declassify records of the defeat in 1962 at the hands of the Chinese\, but the reason for reluctance to publish   1971 monumental victory is not clear.   \nIndian Military\nThere is no structural teaching of military history at the National Defence Academy (NDA). At the Indian Military Academy (IMA)\, there are no professors of war studies. The three general rules of study of military history- width\, depth and context should be the conceptual bedrock for the study of military history. But these are not well appreciated\, and understood. The fledgling Indian National Defence University (INDU) is expected to have a history section under the wing of its National Institute for Strategic Studies. But in the absence of consciously incorporating the History Division and archival work\, it is likely to fall in the same process of ‘IR centricity’. The Indian military is also weak in the professional art of the mandated record initiation and keeping. One glaring infirmity is the absence of maps and sketches post independence\, in after action reports. Units are the building block originators or sensors. But no scientific training is imparted to regimental or staff officers who need to initiate these primary sources like war diaries and historical records.  \nThe Result Due to Neglect  \nUsing archives not in India but in UK and other places\, a handful of contemporary Indian authors have demonstrated the use of the historian’s craft and methods to interpret military and strategic history post independence. Due to absence of archival work\, academics are discouraged to pursue diplomatic or strategic and war related topics. Historical maps like those of Sino- Indian border in any case are a rarity. On the 1962 war in Arunachal Pradesh we have not recorded oral history of the people. The same could be true for Ladakh. The popular history embedded in public psyche is that Chinese troop strength was overwhelming “waves and waves of hordes”: whereas interaction with people who were old enough to remember events of 1962 would perhaps reveal otherwise.  \nPolicy Suggestions  \nSuggestions were given out at three levels. Level 1 is with the larger question of the Indian university system\, where departments of History\, IR and DSS to include the subject of modern war studies and military history. Military history should be Included in the INDU curriculum. Level 2 is at official/government level. Some suggestions here are; revive Historical Division\, revive the statistical branch of the Armed Forces\, restart the flow of documents from service HQ to History Division for safekeeping and for use by academics and scholars once declassified in future\, incorporate the Indian Coast Guard in the loop\, which has not been done so far. Maps and Sketches must be of a very good standard\, projects to record history of insurgencies with counter insurgencies to be undertaken. Level 3 is about how units\, formations and Headquarters need to gear up to capture and report data for historical work. HQ Integrated Defense Staff should become the nodal agency of the military history dimension. Introduction of the concept of combat historians has also been recommended.    \nConclusion\nWhile declassification on time and in accordance with the Public Record Act and Rules (30 year cycle) is necessary\, it is not sufficient. What is more vital is to capture data in archives of the instruments of power of the state: that is its armed forces and security agencies as per institutional practices. A fresh debate is needed on this key component of the intellectual growth. The case here is just not to declassify (the issue may be that the operation or conflict is still on going) but also to institutionalize the study. This in no case will militarize society\, but would rather make our public in general and armed forces in particular\, more professional in dealing with external threats.  It will also throw new light on various insurgencies and facilitate policy options for counter insurgency in a vibrant democratic India.    \nDiscussion/Comments/Observations\nR.T.S Chhina was very appreciative of the paper. He found the paper to be a “groundbreaking” exercise. He urged upon IDSA to take necessary steps to make the recommendations of the paper see the light of the day. He was critical of the government’s policy of classifying documents.  Under the rubric of “embarrassment to the government”\, which is a very subjective thing\, the government cannot hold the information back from the public. He also suggested to put the Public Record Act and Rules at the centre stage of the study as then the author of the paper can highlight the issue of government’s apathy towards the writing of an objective military history. He cautioned the author not to mix up the key issues of history with the theoretical debates of historians and political scientists when they approach a subject differently. By doing this the clear message will get diluted. \nProf. Deshpande cited the lack of availability of the primary sources on military history in public domain as the main cause of the neglect of the subject. He elaborated how history is given a low priority in universities due to archival absence. “De-classifying” – is the only solution\, he said. He also raised a very sensitive but important question of lack of internal democracy within the armed forces. The issue was raised in the context of military’s reluctance to part with any information and the tendency to mark most of the files as sensitive and secret. He pointed out that in Delhi University he has come across very keen students who may like to pursue the study of post independence counter insurgency as historians\, but the climate is not encouraging. In many ways the armed forces themselves may be responsible for keeping all such matters under a security blanket.  \nDr Kalyanaraman suggested that the paper must clearly establish and explain the link of military history to that of strategic and security studies. One reason for the lack of interest in initial stages could be debate between guns vs. butter. His suggestion was to take up the study of military history at IDSA\, which is aptly suited for the purpose.  \nAnit Mukherjee\, like other panelists\, was very critical of the lack of primary sources for research and government’s apathy towards the problem. He suggested a slight change to the title of the study by prefixing “The Need” to the existing title. This he felt would obliterate any misconception about the study being only of academic value and would make it more policy relevant. \nChairperson’s Remarks\nBrig (retd) R. Dahiya complimented PK Gautam and said that the issue of writing military history is of utmost importance. He said that history is important as it guides us in our future ventures as each and every event of the past has a lesson ingrained in it for the future. The importance of history is more pronounced in the case of military strategy. He concluded by thanking the panelists and the gathering for a constructive engagement. \nReport prepared by Amit Kumar\, Research Assistant\, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/renaissance-of-military-history-war-and-international-studies-in-india
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110429T053000
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CREATED:20231224T103722Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T042833Z
UID:64116-1304055000-1304055000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:The Balochistan Insurgency: A Political Analysis
DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nChairperson: Professor Partho GhoshDiscussants: Professor Kalim Bahadur & Professor Savita Pande
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-balochistan-insurgency-a-political-analysis
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110513T053000
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CREATED:20231223T220522Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250316T235758Z
UID:63569-1305264600-1305264600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:The Absent Dialogue: Civil-Military Relations and Military Effectiveness in India
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Narendra Sisodia (DG\, IDSA)Discussants: P.S. Das\, Vice Admiral (retd.)\, Dhirendra Singh (IAS)\, Prof. Rajesh Rajgopalan (JNU) \nThis paper examines civil-military relations in India and argues that it has an adverse impact on the country’s military effectiveness. Anit Mukherjee introduced the paper by trying to situate Indian civil-military relations in the theoretical construct and argued that it most closely resembles Huntington’s “objective control”. However\, he argued\, that contrary to Huntington’s claim\, objective control does not maximize military effectiveness\, thus questioning the Huntingtonian paradigm. The author argued that the unique characteristics of Indian civil-military relations qualify it to be best described as an “absent dialogue.” In making this argument\, the paper examines four processes that shape military effectiveness – weapons procurement\, defense planning\, integration and officer education\, and promotion policies. The paper starts by posing some questions; “what are the causes and consequences of the form of civilian control in contemporary India\, in response to internal and external challenges\, how have civil-military relations evolved and what have been the major areas of contestation\, and finally why has the government undertaken episodic reforms aimed at streamlining the military and to what extent are these reforms successful?”     \nThe paper is composed of three sections. Section one\, begins by discussing the theory of civil-military relations. Next it describes the three unique characteristics of civil-military relations in India. (Lack of civilian expertise\, strong but competing bureaucratic control over the military and considerable autonomy granted to the military to compensate for the previous two factors.) According to K. Subrahmanyam the “absent dialogue” directly translates into a system where “politicians enjoy power without any responsibility\, bureaucrats wield power without any accountability and the military assumes responsibility without any direction.”  \nSection two describes the study of military effectiveness and the problems associated with defining it. It then analyzes Indian military effectiveness by examining four crucial determinants – weapons procurement\, defence planning\, integration and officer education\, and promotion policies. In doing so\, it examines how each of these determinants is influenced by civil-military relations. \nSection three argues that the Indian state has acknowledged these problems and has made some attempts at defence reforms; however\, a more forceful political intervention is required\, if the reforms have to be meaningful. The paper ends by noting that “in the absence of a crisis such sort of an intervention is unlikely”. The paper concludes that in the absence of a strong political will and leadership defense reforms have had “sub-optimal results”. \nExternal Discussants\nMr. Dhirendra Singh suggested that the paper should be restructured in a manner so as to effectively use the historical facts given in the paper about how the civil-military relationship has evolved over a period of time in the Indian context\, to buttress claims about the problem areas in civil-military relations. He also suggested that the author should come up with solutions to the problem of the bureaucracy’s control over the military. He said that the author’s approach is ambivalent on the issue of lack of expertise in the bureaucracy: if we have adopted a generalist cadre system\, then how can we blame the bureaucracy for not ‘expertly’ guiding the military\, particularly on issues where there is a lack of consensus in the armed forces themselves. Singh also made the pertinent point that the question of civil-military integration should be looked into within the constitutional arrangement of the country and here the understanding of the Articles 74 and 77 becomes very important.  \nVice-Admiral PS Das’s remarks were not so much on the paper as on the existing realities which he experienced during his various key postings. Significantly\, he said that publishing the Henderson-Brook report (on the 1962 India-China war) will not expose politicians or bureaucrats since their failure has already been established. It will\, however\, help the military in course-correction. Yet\, the political establishment is reluctant to publish the report\, much to the disillusionment of many. He cautioned against nurturing the belief that all politicians and bureaucrats are inept and cited the examples of Jagjivan Ram\, Yashwant Rao Chavan\, Arun Singh\, Ajai Vikram Singh\, and others. Das said that we need to take some corrective measures and not aim at radical changes. He made some valuable suggestions including\, the need for complete control of defence forces over their revenue matters and the expediency of higher education for the officers.  \nProf. Rajesh Rajgopalan said that Grand Strategy has two components – force and diplomacy. We never paid enough attention to the force component and hence a lot is left to be desired on this count. He pointed out that India has a huge “margin of error” in the military sphere vis-à-vis its neighbours. Prof. Rajgopalan said that what India has is “ineffective” civilian control over the military because of the former’s lack of expertise.  \nInternal Discussants\nCol. Ali Ahmed pointed out that Huntington never said that objective control will lead to military effectiveness. In fact\, Huntington has not used the term “effectiveness” anywhere in his seminal work\, The Soldier and the State. So Anit Mukherjee’s criticism of Huntington on the ground that contrary to Huntington’s claim “objective control” does not maximize India’s military effectiveness is not justified since what Huntington meant was objective control will lead to military “professionalism”\, and that has happened in India.  \nThis issue was taken further by Anit who opined that although it is true that Huntington did not use the term effectiveness\, yet he never differed with later scholars who followed his work and treated “effectiveness” as a benchmark of the professionalism of the armed forces\, since the concept of effectiveness was not developed at that point in time when Huntington wrote his book. Moreover\, the study of civil-military relations assumes that objective control would lead to professionalism and automatically an effective military.  \nCdr. SS Parmar said that any scheme of higher education for the armed forces must include the JCOs\, the backbone of the Indian Armed Forces. \nGeneral Discussion\nSeveral comments and suggestions were made in terms of the paper being a framework analysis of Civil-military relations in India. \n\nWg Cdr. V. Krishnappa – “Dialogue” part of the title should be made more pronounced. The paper will then become more policy-relevant.\nAmit Cowshish (IDAS) – differences of opinion and attitude between the civil and military is primarily due to the different sets of ethos that they adhere to. He also clarified the stance of the Ministry of Finance on revenue matters and said that substantial delegation of revenue matters of defence has already been done to it. \nBrig. Dahiya said that victories in wars should not be the final judgment on the efficacy of the military\, a point aptly made by Anit in his paper. Suggestion was to prepare the list of military failures and the reason for the failures to assess the problem areas facing the armed forces vis-à-vis the civil administration. \n\nChairperson’s Remarks\nThe Director General said that the paper will definitely bring to the centre stage the debate on “civil-military relations” in India. He\, however\, lamented that in India this debate deteriorates into a “tussle between bureaucracy and military”. Defending the bureaucracy\, he said that the Secretaries are the staff of ministers. So it logically follows that the voice of the secretary is not his own\, rather it is the wish of the minister echoed by him. He provided an insight into the functioning of civil-military relations based on his experience as a rapporteur for Cabinet meetings. His observation was that whenever there was a consensus in the military over a certain issue\, the cabinet invariably gave its nod for it. The problem arose only when there was no consensus on the issue among the armed forces themselves. He said that the political leadership agreed with the military leadership more frequently than it did so with the civilian bureaucracy\, underlining the point that the armed forces have enjoyed considerable autonomy in their functioning. He stressed the need for democratization of the educational system of the military. He concluded by saying that the generalist system which has come under scrutiny by the author is all right\, but specialization in some areas should also be encouraged to facilitate smooth functioning of the MoD. \nFurther Reading\n\n“The Absent Dialogue”\, Seminar\, July 2009. \n“Failing to Deliver: Post-Crises Defence Reforms in India\, 1998-2010″\, IDSA Occasional Paper\, March 2011.\n\nReport prepared by Amit Kumar\, Research Assistant\, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-absent-dialogue-civil-military-relations-and-military-effectiveness-in-india
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110513T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110513T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T004701
CREATED:20231224T103710Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T042638Z
UID:64113-1305264600-1305264600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Indian cyber security: Principles and Practice
DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/indian-cyber-security-principles-and-practice
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110520T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110520T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T004701
CREATED:20231223T134806Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130244Z
UID:63202-1305869400-1305869400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Offensive Defence: Managing deterrence and arms race in a ballistic missile defence environment
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Lt. Gen. Satish NambiarDiscussant: Admiral Raja Menon and Sheelkant Sharma  \nThe paper presented was of a conceptual nature which adopted the offence-defence theory to analyze the character of missile defences\, its impact on nuclear deterrence equations and its potential to cause security dilemma. “The paper makes two arguments: (a) Missile defences are instruments of security maximization that could accentuate offense dominance by adding to the net offensive capability of strategic forces. (b) A (mutual) defensive deterrence arrangement can emerge between BMD–possessing nuclear weapon states as a means to deterrence stability and encouraging arms control.”  \nIt was identified that mutual vulnerability was a key variable in the development of the concept of nuclear deterrence and remains the norm of strategic stability\, and ballistic missile defence (BMD) would prove to be a ‘game changer’. The traditional discourse on nuclear deterrence and second strike capabilities were discussed and the issue that was later debated was – how would BMD change the dynamics of the concept of deterrence\, if at all it does? The paper also suggests that “security dilemmas are dynamic\, uncontrollable processes being caused by offensive and even defensive postures. Competitions will\, hence continue to define strategic equations and potentially heighten arms races\, which though could progressively lead to new stability arrangements\, driven by the fact that nuclear wars are sought to be avoided by all nations.” This point was taken up during the Q&A where it was suggested that no BMD system could be 100 per cent foolproof\, and countries would try and increase their nuclear arsenal to increase the probability of a higher number of warheads penetrating the BMD systems of the opponent. \nIt was suggested that this will in turn lead to a nuclear arms race. To this end\, it was also mentioned that an arms race was not possible in the India–Pakistan context as the amount of Uranium and Plutonium produced by India was many times more than that produced by Pakistan. Therefore\, it was inferred that unless Pakistan procured highly enriched uranium (HEU) illegally\, it was not possible for Pakistan to catch up with India. This aspect was debated as some in the audience believed that an arms race between India and Pakistan was a factor that could not be discounted. To this end\, it was argued that BMD and arms reduction were on opposite ends of the spectrum as BMD would require a state to increase the number of warheads it possesses. Therefore\, it was noted that the BMD could be a destabilizing factor in South Asia. \nIt was suggested that it would be appropriate to add the specifics of each phase of missile defence evolution in the past fifty years. Such as — the early and rather desperate foray into ABM\, then the turbulent sixties and the first flush of detente and ABM treaty\, then the Reagan years when a weakening USSR was blustered into submission by MX and SDI and the humbug about Krasnoyarsk radars. Why and how Clinton came to it in late nineties and the scenario since 9/11. \nIt was highlighted that the crucial issue is whether BMD can push the threshold of a conflict below nuclear exchange higher than before\, and emphasis should not be on how many incoming nuclear missiles can be blocked by the BMD. That being said\, it was also noted that some of the defence systems that India is purchasing or considering\, are many times costlier than the attack platforms of Pakistan. It was argued by some in the audience that the cost of BMD was too high compared to the benefits it could provide. Furthermore\, it was argued that BMD is not a proven technology and thus could not be relied upon. To further develop this point\, it was argued that there already exists a threshold (for conflict without nuclear exchange) which is reasonably higher.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/offensive-defence-managing-deterrence-and-arms-race-in-a-ballistic-missile-defence-environment
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110520T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110520T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T004701
CREATED:20231223T134806Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130244Z
UID:63203-1305869400-1305869400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:China’s Territorial Claim on the Indian State of Arunachal Pradesh: Alternative Scenarios 2031
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Dr. Arvind GuptaDiscussants: Brig. (Retd.) Rahul Bhonsle\, Col. Navneet Kumar\, Dr. Rajiv Anantaram\, Dr. Jabin Jacob \nNamrata Goswami’s paper focused on four alternative scenarios in 2031 with regard to China’s territorial claim on the Indian State of Arunachal Pradesh. At the outset\, the author discussed the three drivers of uncertainty\, which could influence the Chinese claim on Arunachal Pradesh\, namely\, Chinese regime stability\, Chinese perception of India and internal developments in Arunachal Pradesh. Based on the interactive interplay of these three independent variables\, Goswami crafted four alternative scenarios based on two futures methodology: the ‘Alternative Scenarios Axis’ and the ‘Implication Wheel’.  \nThe paper sought to answer four research questions:\n(1)	What are the four alternative scenarios in 2031 with regard to China’s territorial claim on the Indian State of Arunachal Pradesh?\n(2)	What are the policy implications of each scenario?\n(3)	Which scenario is most preferred and why? What are the policy interventions necessary to be put in place between now and 2031 to ensure the unfolding of this scenario?\n(4)	Which scenario is least preferred? What are the policy interventions necessary to be put in place between now and 2031 in order to avoid this scenario? \nThe paper assessed the three drivers of uncertainty in detail. The author included several sub-drivers within the three main drivers to explain the significance of certain issues that had a direct bearing on how the future will unfold.  \nThe first driver\, Chinese regime stability\, was analyzed using five criteria which the author called ‘sub-drivers’\, namely\, principles\, norms\, rules\, decision making procedures and institutions. These sub-drivers were drawn from Stephen Krasner and Hedley Bull’s definition of regimes. With regard to principles\, the prevalence of economic reforms which was mainly visible during the Deng Xiaoping period was pointed out. In terms of norms\, the historical and civilizational past of China and also the standards of behaviour based on rights\, obligations\, and social ethnics were brought into context. With regard to decision-making\, the author highlighted the role of the State Council and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in taking most of the important foreign policy decisions. The lack of an independent judiciary in China made institutionalised accountability almost impossible. She also enumerated the role of the institutions\, mainly that of the PLA\, and how economic growth has modernized the PLA. \nThe author identified the uncertainties with regard to regime stability primarily stemming from internal fears of dissent which might impact on Chinese claim on Arunachal Pradesh. As the author argued\, if regime stability runs low\, China could get aggressive on Arunachal Pradesh.  \nThe next driver is the Chinese perception of India. Chinese view the Indian state as mainly aping the West. Moreover\, the Dalai Lama’s presence in India creates anxieties in China and is perceived as questioning China’s legitimacy over Tibet. While neither country is likely to go to war\, much would however depend on how India behaves towards China over the years and on whether the border issue can be resolved.  \nThe last driver is internal developments in Arunachal Pradesh in terms of governance\, riparian rights and border security. Here\, one interesting factor in particular regard to riparian rights is the existence of differences of opinion between young and old over the construction of dams. \nDr. Goswami offered four alternative scenarios along with the implications wheel crafted for each scenario based on the interaction of the three drivers of uncertainty. The first scenario is ‘backwaters’\, in which Chinese regime stability is low\, the perception of India is that of a weak actor and adverse internal developments in Arunachal Pradesh are also low. The second scenario is ‘heavy weights’ where Chinese regime stability and internal developments in Arunachal Pradesh run high and the Chinese perception of India is that of a strong power. The third scenario is “Ascendant India’ where the first driver of Chinese regime stability is low\, Chinese perception of India is that of a strong power and internal developments in Arunachal Pradesh run high. The fourth scenario is ‘Yellow Emperor’ which is the least favourite. In this scenario Chinese regime stability runs low\, India is perceived as a weak power and internal developments in Arunachal Pradesh run low.  \nIn conclusion\, Dr. Namrata Goswami stated that she was in favour of the second scenario\, “heavyweights”\, and its positive wheel since it focuses more on interest-based bargaining. She speculated that India needs to seriously consider this scenario.  \nMajor points of discussions and suggestions: \nScenario techniques and selection of drivers should be analysed carefully. The important part is to select the right drivers. More sub-drivers can actually be introduced and a multidisciplinary technique should be adopted as a base of support. Scenarios should connect more to the drivers and the selection of the period till 2031 must be made more significant. The importance of the 3Ts i.e. Taiwan\, Tibet and Turkistan in China’s White paper is significant\, and how these play out in its strategic assessment portfolio cannot be ignored; hence\, this should be analysed. \nHow to handle Tibet in terms of policy prescription and how to link the Arunachal Pradesh boundary question to the Indian western sector with China are also important. Political conditions in the Tibet Autonomous Region can be considered as one of the drivers. Tibet is the chief concern in the India-China boundary question. \nThe Chinese perception of India in the context of differentiation between decentralization and lack of continuity were also discussed. How is India different from China in the approach to the resolution of the boundary? Both the Chinese and the Indian intentions can be looked into\, and also the involvement of external actors like the US and Pakistan could be studied. Certain sub-drivers can be selected like the Chinese polity\, economy\, military\, internal situation and Chinese comprehensive national security strategies. With regard to why 2031 is important and how international norms affect China: for the Chinese 2031 is not important; rather 2049 is more important because it will mark the 100th anniversary of the People’s Republic.  \nThe paper is informative but a more rigorous exercise based on Chinese primary sources is required including language sources. In the alternative scenarios axis and the implications wheel\, the independent variables are not to be correlated but a choice should exist between the two. The author needs to polish and strengthen the drivers through inputs from and discussions with other experts.  \nReport prepared by Shristi Pukhrem\, Research Assistant at Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/chinas-territorial-claim-on-the-indian-state-of-arunachal-pradesh-alternative-scenarios-2031
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110527T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110527T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T004701
CREATED:20231223T134755Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130244Z
UID:63200-1306474200-1306474200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:India's Defence Diplomacy in the Gulf
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Lt Gen Satish Nambiar (Retd)Discussants: Commodore M R Khan (Retd) and Shri Gulshan Luthra	  \nDr. P.K. Pradhan’s paper focused on the topic of India’s defence diplomacy in the Gulf\, with existing relations between India and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries as the basis for the study. Pradhan has illustrated in this study that although India’s defence diplomacy with the Gulf region has a long history\, it was consolidated by recent events including the September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States\, the November 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai\, and piracy activity in the Arabian Sea. India has numerous commonalities with the GCC countries\, with both being connected by the Arabian Sea\, rendering the security of the sea and the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) significant areas for mutual cooperation. Other areas of cooperation include countering illegal activities such as smuggling of arms\, supply of narcotics and drugs\, and movement of criminal elements in the sea. Defence diplomacy initiatives have included high-level defence-related visits and dialogue on security challenges\, port calls\, and defence cooperation in the form of training exchanges\, combined exercises\, and sourcing\, development\, production and marketing of defence equipment.  \nThe Gulf region\, Pradhan argues\, is also of strategic importance for India for other reasons: \n\nIndia-GCC trade amounts to over USD 84 billion. The GCC countries are a lucrative market for Indian goods such as textiles\, spices\, other food products\, electrical goods and machineries\, and IT products.\nThe Gulf region supplies around two-thirds of India’s total energy requirements.\nThe Indian diaspora comprising around 5 million people: protecting the interests of Indian workers in the region has been an important area of focus in bilateral relations.\nIndia’s long-term energy security could be dependent on Iranian oil and gas reserves (Iran has the second and third largest proven gas and oil reserves respectively in the world). India’s trade with Iran amounted to USD 13.39 billion in 2009-2010. Possible future sectors of mutual investment include oil and gas\, steel\, fertilizers\, infrastructure and railways. Iran is also significant in terms of providing India with an access route to Afghanistan and Central Asia\, and for cooperation on maritime security.\nThe GCC countries see India as an important partner in tackling terrorism in their respective regions; defence cooperation agreements have been signed with the UAE\, Oman and Qatar.\n\nPradhan points out that India has established defence ties with several GCC states: \n\nOman: India and Oman signed a military protocol in 1972\, which led to a three- year deputation of Indian Navy personnel to man Oman’s Navy in 1973. A MoU on defence cooperation was signed between India and Oman in 2005. Areas of cooperation include joint military exercises\, military training and IT\, educational courses and programmes\, exchange of observers and formal visits. Currently\, a two-tier arrangement for defence cooperation – Joint Military Cooperation Committee (JMCC) and Air Force-to-Air Force Staff Talks (AFST) – exists with Oman.\nUAE: India signed a defence cooperation agreement with the UAE in 2003 that will focus bilateral cooperation on military training\, cooperation in military medical services and jointly combating pollution caused by the military at sea. Regular naval exercises take place between India and the UAE.   \nSaudi Arabia: India and Saudi Arabia have not yet signed any agreement on defence cooperation\, though the Delhi Declaration signed in 2006 forms the basis for security cooperation. Joint naval exercises in addition to joint exercises between the Indian Army and Royal Saudi Land Force are also being planned. \nIran: India-Iran relations have been shaped by political relations between the two countries as well as by the role of the United States in the region. India signed a MoU on defence cooperation with Iran in 2001. The New Delhi Declaration signed in 2003 laid further emphasis on defence cooperation in areas including training and mutual visits. The Declaration also laid focus on cooperation on sea-lane control and security\, joint naval exercises\, Indian assistance in upgrading Iran’s Russian-made defence systems and establishment of joint working groups on counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics.  India’s vote against Iran at the IAEA in 2005 has hindered further strengthening of defence cooperation. \nQatar: India signed defence cooperation and security and law enforcement agreements with Qatar in 2008. These agreements focus on cooperation on issues including terrorism\, piracy\, maritime security\, money laundering\, narcotics and transnational crimes. These agreements are significant also because it gives the Indian Navy access to operate in the region to ensure security of sea lanes. Qatar has also participated in courses at the National Defence College (NDC) in India\, and has expressed interest in participating in additional training courses.\n\nOn initiatives in strengthening cooperation between India and the Gulf countries\, Pradhan notes that the Indian Navy has played a significant role in the form of “Naval Diplomacy”. As defined by the Indian Ministry of Defence\, “Naval Diplomacy entails the use of naval forces in support of foreign policy objectives to build ‘bridges of friendship’ and strengthen international cooperation on one hand\, and to signal capability and intent to deter potential adversaries on the other. The larger purpose of the Navy’s diplomatic role is to favorably shape the maritime environment in the furtherance of national interests\, in consonance of the foreign policy and national security objectives.” Pradhan points out that naval cooperation is also a significant area of military-to-military cooperation in its capacity to secure SLOCs and build ties through maritime bonding. India has been very proactive in engaging with navies of the GCC countries in the form of joint exercises\, port calls\, goodwill visits to ports\, and training programmes.  \nIn his view\, specific defence diplomacy initiatives taken to achieve Indian foreign policy objectives have included: \n\nCollaborating against piracy\nSafety of SLOC\nSecuring choke points in the western Indian Ocean \nDealing with China in the Indian Ocean\nCurtailing Pakistan’s influence in the Gulf\nBuilding security cooperation with GCC countries\nStrengthening India’s strategic interests in the Gulf region\n\nPradhan concludes that India’s engagement with the Gulf countries has been driven by its security and strategic needs in the region\, including furthering its economic and political objectives. He notes that there is a need to build on existing defence ties and forge new ties with other countries in the region. Growing insecurity in India\, the Gulf region and the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea demand greater levels of engagement on crucial issues such as piracy\, terrorism\, maritime terrorism\, and safety of the SLOC.  \nThe discussion that followed focused on several different aspects of this topic.  \n\nA participant pointed out that there are limitations on the extent of India’s defence cooperation with the Gulf countries\, owing mainly to the United States’ wariness in supporting any deep and wide-ranging agreements between any other countries and the GCC states\, and the low likelihood that Gulf countries such as the UAE will buy Indian defence equipment. \nIran remains an important partner for India\, despite irritants such as gas prices and the 2005 IAEA vote; India must balance its relationship with Iran and the United States. Another country that India should initiate defence cooperation with is Iraq\, especially now that the country is focused on reconstruction following the 2003 invasion\, and with its increasing reengagement with the rest of the Gulf region. \nIt was emphasized that India has recognized the need for stronger defence cooperation with the region; it is important to note that the GCC countries have been very receptive to initiatives taken in the past to advance mutual engagement\, though Indian diplomacy in the Gulf region might be in need of more “warmth” in bilateral interactions.\nAnother participant pointed out that the study did not touch upon the crucial issue of the Indian diaspora in the Gulf region. It is important for the Indian government to establish agreements on\, for instance\, access to ports\, for evacuation purposes in the event of developments such as the recent uprisings in the region. \nOne of the questions posed was how the Gulf countries would react to a conflict between India and China – would they balance between the two\, or which side would they take? \nOne recommendation made was for the need to explore why India’s Look West policy has not been as successful as its Look East policy.    \nThe maritime dimension has to be the main factor in defence diplomacy between India and the GCC countries.\nA participant recommended that more emphasis should be placed on China’s involvement in the Gulf region and its cooperation with countries such as Saudi Arabia\, and the effects of this involvement on India’s ties with these countries. It was observed that there has been no Indian strategy to counter China’s increasing outreach in the diplomatic and military arenas in the Gulf region. \n\nReport prepared by Princy George\, Research Assistant\, IDSA
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/indias-defence-diplomacy-in-the-gulf
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110527T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110527T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T004701
CREATED:20231224T103615Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T042431Z
UID:64112-1306474200-1306474200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Chinese Engagements with Maldives: Impact on Security Environment in the Indian Ocean Region
DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nDiscussants: Ambassador Arun Banerjee and Dr P K Ghosh
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/chinese-engagements-with-maldives-impact-on-security-environment-in-the-indian-ocean-region
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110603T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110603T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T004701
CREATED:20231223T134754Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130244Z
UID:63198-1307079000-1307079000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:India’s Afghan Policy: Beyond Bilateralism
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Dr Arvind GuptaDiscussants: Lt Gen Ravi Sawhney (Retd) and Prof Kalim Bahadur \nDr Pattanaik’s paper critiqued India’s existing policy towards Afghanistan and offered some recommendations for Indian policy makers on how best to engage Afghanistan in the coming days\, especially in the event of the much-anticipated troop withdrawal by the United States from July this year. She dwelt on India’s objectives\, factors influencing its policy\, the challenges it is confronted with and the measures it must take to achieve its objectives. \nDr Pattanaik outlined India’s policy objectives in Afghanistan and held that India was wedded to the idea of rebuilding Afghanistan as a stable democracy. This would preclude the possibility of Afghanistan re-emerging as a hotbed of terrorism. So far India’s engagement with the conflict-ridden country had been primarily economic and development-oriented. This had earned India the goodwill of the people of Afghanistan. However\, Afghanistan is far from stable and India has to adopt the right strategy. She argued that India would need to keep investing in reconstruction work\, and find some way of working with the regionalpowers\, especially Iran\, to fulfill its strategic goals in Afghanistan.     \nShe emphasized India’s historical and cultural ties with Afghanistan and said that exceptfor the years when the Taliban ruled\, India had excellent relations with this country.  Afghan territory was used against India’s interests by Pakistan during the Taliban period and therefore a major objective of India has been to preclude the possibility of return of such fundamentalist forces in Afghanistan. This is in line with India’s policy of opposing radical Islamist forces\, even during the period of Soviet intervention. India’s objective has also been to prevent Afghanistan from becoming too dependent on Pakistan which would revive forces inimical to Indian interests in Afghanistan.  \nIndia’s policies during the post-Taliban period have been prompted by its awareness of geographical constraints and the limited role it could play in military and political spheres. Hence\, India has chosen to build infrastructure like roads\, hospitals and educational centres and engage itself in capacity-building like training the civil bureaucracy and security forces\, providing scholarship for Afghan students etc.  \nAll these have been undertaken keeping in mind India’s traditional ties with Afghanistan and it has been a prudent way of making India’s presence felt without ruffling any feathers. India has also extended its support to the reconciliation process post-London conference even if it has genuine apprehensions that such process is either likely to fail or legitimise the hold of radical elements on the Afghan State.  \nShe also held that a critical study of Indo-Pak relations was necessary to understand India’s position on Afghanistan. Pakistan suffers from Indophobia and regards the Indian presence as detrimental to its national interests. It suspects an Indian role in the Baloch insurgency and alleges that India is using Afghan territory against its interests\, despite Indian assurances to the contrary. To address the issue\, India has resumed dialogue with Pakistan and agreed to the TAPI gas line not just for energy security but also because it could contribute to a stable Afghanistan. But\, Pakistan has not been amenable to India’s offers of cooperative action and its primary objective has been to keep India away from Afghanistan.  \nDr Pattanaik argued forcefully that regional players were important in the changed circumstances and Iran was particularly important for its historical connection with Afghanistan. It shares its eastern border with Afghanistan and has links with the Hazara Shia population there. India and Afghnaistan share  concerns about the return of the Taliban to Kabul and spread of radicalism in the region.  \nTaking into consideration all the above\, the paper concludes that India’s role in Afghanistan has to be of minimal political engagement and expansion of the existing relationship. Hence\, the best deal for India is to maintain its presence through economic means and capacity building with relations going beyond state-to-state relations and promotion of goodwill amongst the population for a more stable region.  \nMajor points of discussion and suggestions:\n\nIndia’s engagement should be strategic and not apologetic as it has always been.\nToo much focus on Iran as a vital partner leaves out other regional actors like Russia and China.\nThere should have been a more robust focus on the upcoming Afghan national security forces for a better account of strategy in the longer run.\nSome mention of Russia’ growing engagement in Afghanistan through bilateral and multilateral means needs to be made as part of India’s overall strategy as many initiatives are afoot leaving India out of the picture. These are Russia’s growing engagement with NATO and the US in Afghanistan\, the Quadrilateral Tajik-Russia-Afghan-Pakistan format\, the SCO and CSTO contact/ working groups on Afghanistan\, the bilateral Russian-Afghan forum\, etc.. India enjoyes good relations with both the US and Russia and should leverage this relationship.\nChina as an important factor has been completely glossed.\nWithdrawal of western forces should have been dealt with more care and the nature of withdrawal\, whether it is going to be token or ceremonial in nature should have been discussed.\n\nAny kind of engagement with Taliban has to be evaluated critically\, as Taliban are not going to change their basic ideology and mere reconciliation will not do.\nDanger of increased Talibanisation of Pakistan and Afghanistan\, post-withdrawal has to be studied as a serious threat to India. \nAnalysis of non-Pashtun sentiments and views has to be incorporated in the paper.\nSuccess and failure of regional strategy and bilateralism does not come out well in the paper and has to be dealt with its nuances in details.\n\nReport prepared by Anwesha Ray Chaudhuri\, Research Assistant\, IDSA
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/indias-afghan-policy-beyond-bilateralism
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110610T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110610T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T004701
CREATED:20231223T134707Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130244Z
UID:63196-1307683800-1307683800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Pakistan as a Factor in Sino –Indian Relations
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Amb (retd) R. RajagopalanDiscussants: Prof. K. R. Sharma and Mr. M. V. Rappai \n \n\nThe core argument of Dr. Das’s paper was that the Sino-Pakistani strategic axis has gained salience in the context of the geo-politics of the cold war. It should be perceived as a marriage of convenience\, contrary to what both China and Pakistan claim. This relationship is based on the convergence of their mutual interests. China wants to balance India and Pakistan has always wanted to have a political shield. The Sino-Pak axis can be partially explained on the grounds of trust deficit and security dilemma between India and China. However\, the increasing Sino-Indian interaction has produced increased sensitivity on the Chinese side regarding the India concerns. Secondly\, the strengthening of the Sino-US rapprochement and strategic engagement has also produced corresponding resonance on Sino-Indian relations. Thirdly\, Chinese support to Pakistan also needs to be understood keeping in view the China’s domestic and external compulsions. \nThe major points of discussion and suggestions: \n\nPakistan can be stated as a classic example of a failed state. However\, China will not be comfortable with the idea of a failed state in Pakistan due to the fear of nuclear terrorism.\nAs India grows\, Pakistan’s fear and insecurity will also grow.\nThere is no clear perception regarding who actually controls power in Pakistan. However\, it is apparent that it is the army which is in real control and is dictating the course of action.\nPakistan should be regarded as both as a factor and a non-factor in India-China relations.\nGeography plays a very important role in defining the relationship between India\, China and Pakistan. It is geopolitics which is actually dictating the terms of this relationship.\nThere is a need to understand and revisit the nuclear collaboration between China and Pakistan. The Conference on Disarmament debates were stopped by Pakistan at the behest of China.\nIndia China economic relations are growing. On the other hand there is no development in the India Pakistan trade relations. Pakistan China trade relations are also not that huge.\nPakistan is a democratic country\, but it is owned by the military.\nThere is a need to study the nexus between the Chinese army and the Pakistani army. Consequently\, India has to be prepared to deal with both the neighbours.\nThere is need to provide a brief background of the historical relations between China and Pakistan.\nIt would not be wrong to argue that if India was in China’s position\, India would have been playing the same geopolitical game.\nBetween 1995 and 2005 China attempted to de-hyphenate its relationship between India and Pakistan.\nThere is need to understand why Pakistan has shifted its focus from the United States to China. At the same time\, China was also worried about the alliance between United States\, Australia\, Japan and India.\nChina has been blocking the Indian claim to the UNSC permanent seat because both India and Japan have been clubbed together. And China has always been against the Japanese entry.\nChina is now facing a dilemma as to how to manage its relationship both with India and Pakistan. It is difficult for China to leave Pakistan but for China\, India is also very important.\nPresident Jiang Zemin had said that there is a need for a balanced approach towards both India and Pakistan.\nThe debate around the Gwadar port has been ongoing. There is need to wait and watch as to who takes over the port after the Singaporean authority moves out. There are speculations that Gwadar port may become a naval base.\nThere is need to highlight the role which China plays in the domestic politics of Pakistan\, especially after the Lal Masjid incident. In the long run\, Operation Geronimo can prove to be a turning point in the China Pakistan relations.\nThere is need to focus on a research question and focus more on ideas of a two-front war. The debates around stapled visas should be left out of the paper.\nThere is need to also highlight the understanding of the new leadership in China and their understanding of the China Pakistan relations.\nIndia should work towards building more military to military level interaction with Pakistan.\nIndia needs to learn to manage the relationship with China and Pakistan keeping in perspective the close ties between the two. \n\nReport prepared by Gunjan Singh\, Research Assistant\, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/pakistan-as-a-factor-in-sino-indian-relations
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110610T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110610T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T004701
CREATED:20231223T134754Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130244Z
UID:63197-1307683800-1307683800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Sea Piracy and India's Future Role
DESCRIPTION:Commander SS Parmar started his presentation by delineating the scope of the study\, which was to study the menace of piracy off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden\, areas that are severely affected by the incidents of piracy in the recent past. He argued that initially pirates were more of a nuisance than a threat\, but in the absence of organised resistance\, piracy flourished. Parmar then talked about the four pillars on which piracy thrives- geography\, political instability\, safe havens\, and economics. His paper attempted to identify the stages and reasons for the advent of modern day piracy\, examined the economic and legal factors\, the international response including India’s response and future role. It also attempted “to answer a few questions that have arisen – mainly – Why was piracy allowed to rise to the extent it has? Why was there a delayed response to combat piracy? And finally – Is land operations the only solution to stem piracy?” \nBuilding further on his “four pillars” argument\, the author said that Somalia is a classic case of instability driven piracy. Somalia is a failed state since the government collapsed in 2001. This failure led to a lack of governance and subsequent high incidence of poverty which in tandem with two activities that could be viewed as the catalysts opened the doors for the advent and rise in piracy The first activity was fishing by outsiders in Somalian waters that destroyed the livelihood of the Somalian fishermen; a community that was considered a richer sect in the nation. The second issue was the dumping of toxic waste in Somalian waters. \nCdr Parmar then discussed the three stages of piracy. The first stage was between 1995 and 2000 when the local fishermen decided to take the law into their own hands and started boarding foreign fishing vessels accusing them of fishing illegally and sought compensation. This stage could be summed up as the unorganized stage of piracy. Instability in Somalia\, following the fall of Siad Barre government in 1991\, resulted in the formation of various groups that organised themselves into pirate groups and this led to the second stage of piracy characterised by the emergence of several organised pirate groups\, out of which four main “gangs” are in the ‘business’ of piracy. The author further argued that the third stage\, when piracy would reach the status of an independent state\, has commenced as pirates in Somalia could be viewed as a state within a state having links with other non state actors\, especially terrorist groups. Linkages with state actors\, however\, cannot be ruled out. These linkages could be largely attributed to the economic factors. The economics of piracy is a complex study which is restricted by the little information available in the public domain. He said that some of the pirate groups are better armed and funded than regional authorities. Million dollar ransoms combined with a lack of accountability have encouraged this growth. He viewed this as a clear interpretation that the third stage of piracy has commenced. \nCommander Parmar then delved on the legal framework for combating piracy and the practical problems nations face in arresting\, prosecuting and incarcerating convicted pirates. “The legal issues today have become more complex as the world has more independent nations and companies with enormous investments in the maritime domain. These issues are not insolvable and require a political will and an international understanding of the magnitude of the problem of piracy. Nations require bringing anti-piracy laws into effect\, setting up fast track courts and adopting a more cogent approach towards combating piracy”. He went on to advocate equating piracy to terrorism for a variety of reasons although the objectives of the two were different. “Elevating piracy at par with terrorism could obviate the requirement to pass new laws and higher levels of cooperation and only require amendments in the existing international order. Piracy could be viewed as Economic Terrorism”\, he said. \nThe international response to piracy could\, at best\, be described as “sluggish and reactionary”. “It was only when the magnitude of the threat breached the threshold of ‘acceptability’ that action was initiated”. Parmar said that “there is a growing consensus that land operations are the solution to piracy. If the four pillars of piracy are considered as geography\, political instability\, safe havens and economics\, then land operations would eliminate political instability and safe havens and aid in addressing the economic factor”. But\, despite the mandate of the UNSC Resolutions\, very little has been done to tackle the problem from landward due to several constraints. \nThe final section of Commander Parmar’s presentation examined the effect of piracy on India\, and the steps taken by the state to counter this threat. He pointed out that “piracy is occurring in the waters in the immediate vicinity of India and whilst transit through piracy infested waters can be avoided by other nations by rerouting\, the same cannot be done by India as India’s maritime trade routes originate and terminate in the waters surrounding it. Secondly\, the maritime route through the Gulf of Aden is important for India as the Indian imports through the Gulf have been valued at $50 billion while the exports have been valued at $60 billion”. These factors have made the government realize the need to tackle the problem since piracy is affecting the maritime interests of India and is growing in magnitude. “Cognisance of this development has been reflected in the Ministry of Defence Annual Report 2010 – 2011. It proposes a proactive role under the UN Flag to tackle the maritime threat of piracy. Actions taken by agencies including the Indian Navy\, Coast Guard and Police have resulted in apprehension of a number of pirates the largest being 61 in March 2011.” Subsequent to this operation against piracy\, government has asked the Indian Navy not to arrest any more pirates and bring them to India. This would restrict the navy to a ‘hold\, disarm and leave’ policy. Indian government seems to be reeling under the pressure of the pirates who are not shying away from playing the hostage card. Parmar said\, “At a time when India is pushing the UN for more action against piracy\, this policy shift will not only dilute the progress made in the Indian fight against piracy but also reduce India’s standing as a proactive anti piracy nation”. Therefore\, he suggested two staged action plan for India– the short and immediate term and the long term. “The short term would be to firstly\, introduce effective national anti piracy laws. Secondly\, formulate a regional anti piracy cooperative group that would operate in mid ocean areas and cover the SLOCs not patrolled as of now. Thirdly and most importantly not take a soft stand against piracy by means of appeasement”. Some of the long term measures would be; revision of UNCLOS articles on piracy\, pursue and assist agendas of the working groups formulated under CGPCS\, setting up of a working group on the economic factor\, etc. Parmar concluded by saying that the world could no longer afford to ignore the threat of piracy. If the issues raised above were not addressed\, then the third stage of piracy which has already commenced\, would take hold and that would increase the stakes manifold. \nMajor Points of Discussion and Suggestions\n\nThe section on India’s role should be more detailed.\nSovereignty issues limit the scope of hot pursuit against the pirates.\nThe Asian approach to counter the menace is not collective\, but individualistic and it is not helping their cause.\nOne of the discussants cautioned the author about the usage of the terms and suggested that the terms should be defined wherever used.\nIt was pointed out that economic factor is more than a driver; an enterprise in itself –rai-son d’etre for the act of piracy.\nIt was suggested that the title could be changed to reflect the emphasis on Somalia in the study. \nIt was suggested that the author could including developments at sea as a driver alongside developments at land since the dynamics of maritime development is fast changing and has impacted the rise and growth of piracy.\nThe various dimensions of ransom money were discussed and it was noticed that the insurance companies are the biggest beneficiaries of the ransom business as they are getting very high premium from the shipping companies. One implication of this whole ransom business is that none of the stakeholders are serious about the threat as they feel it to be a win-win situation.\nGenerally\, it was felt that there is a need for unearthing the business of piracy and the big stakeholders running the whole business\, apart from the pirates who are just the tip of the iceberg.\nIt was also pointed out that UNCLOS should be reviewed and reframed to include the non-state actors within its ambit.\nIt was suggested that the author should study successful models of counter-piracy operations and then seek their applicability in other cases of piracy.\n\nChairperson’s Remarks\nVice Admiral (Retd) Pradeep Kaushiva complimented Commander Parmar and said that as India’s seafarers are targeted by the pirates\, action on the part of the government is inevitable. The recent policy of ‘hold\, disarm and leave’ is a temporary and transitional one. He also informed the gathering that the panellists of this event also constitute one of the government’s initiatives on piracy – “Oceans beyond Piracy – India Working Group”.  He pointed out that the international trade was well organized but human security was the least taken care of and most vulnerable. He also said that AL-Qaeda was well entrenched in the Gulf of Aden and it was only a matter of time before they gained complete control over the issue of piracy. Drawing attention to the practical difficulties of the victims of piracy\, he said that lack of evidence was the main cause for the pirates not being prosecuted. In response to the queries of many participants he threw light on the ransom business and said that governments do not directly get themselves involved in the ransom issues. They however\, put pressure on the parties involved for the safe release of the hostages.  Finally\, he said that we need to address Piracy and not pirates that is to look into the “agencies and institutional actors across the ‘Piracy Value Chain”\, as Parmar has suggested. He concluded by thanking the panellists and the gathering for a constructive engagement\, and the IDSA for addressing the issue of piracy.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/sea-piracy-and-indias-future-role
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110617T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110617T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T004701
CREATED:20231224T103610Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T042106Z
UID:64110-1308288600-1308288600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:China's Infrastructure in Southeast Asia
DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nChairperson: Professor Charan D WadhvaDiscussants: Brig Vinod Anand (Retd)\, Cdr Kamlesh Agnihotri and Shri C S Kuupuswamy
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/chinas-infrastructure-in-southeast-asia
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110617T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110617T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T004701
CREATED:20231224T103615Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T042222Z
UID:64111-1308288600-1308288600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Governance in the Strategic State of Jammu and Kashmir: The Case for Securitization
DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nChairperson: Lt Gen (retd) V G Patankar\, PVSM\, YSMDiscussants: Shri Iftikhar Gilani and Dr Amit Prakash
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/governance-in-the-strategic-state-of-jammu-and-kashmir-the-case-for-securitization
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110624T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110624T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T004701
CREATED:20231224T103610Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T041946Z
UID:64108-1308893400-1308893400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:China's stance on SCO Expansion: The India Factor
DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/chinas-stance-on-sco-expansion-the-india-factor
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110624T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110624T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T004701
CREATED:20231224T103610Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T041821Z
UID:64109-1308893400-1308893400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Unconventional Gas - Can it be a Game changer for India?
DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/unconventional-gas-can-it-be-a-game-changer-for-india
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110701T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110701T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T004701
CREATED:20231224T103610Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T041659Z
UID:64107-1309498200-1309498200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:The Interactive Scenario of U.S.-India-China Triangular Relationship in Indian Ocean Region under New Circumstances
DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-interactive-scenario-of-u-s-india-china-triangular-relationship-in-indian-ocean-region-under-new-circumstances
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110708T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110708T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T004701
CREATED:20231224T103609Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T041555Z
UID:64106-1310103000-1310103000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Global Nuclear Governance and India
DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/global-nuclear-governance-and-india
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110722T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110722T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T004701
CREATED:20231224T103605Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130243Z
UID:64105-1311312600-1311312600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Reforming India’s Defence Acquisition  Structure and Procedures
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Shri N S SisodiaDiscussants: Shri V K Misra\, Shri Amit Cowshish and Shri Ranjan Kumar Ghose \nLaxman Kumar Behera’s paper examines the structural and procedural weaknesses afflicting India’s defence acquisition system. In particular the paper focuses on three issues: acquisition planning\, ii) accountability in acquisition\, and iii) formulation of features of weapons system. According to Behera these three crucial factors have received least or half-hearted reforms. In the paper\, he argues that for expeditious acquisition\, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) needs to overcome these weaknesses.  \nIn his presentation\, he began with the Bofors controversy that according to him set the foundation of India’s defence acquisition system which was again got the boost by the recommendations of the Group of Ministers (GoM) and subsequent procedural reforms. He was of the view that the Bofors controversy was a watershed in the India’s procurement history not because it had significant political cost to the then Central government\, but because it stimulated a massive public debate on defence acquisition issues. The Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC)\, which was instituted by the government under the Chairmanship of B Shankaranand\, did an extensive inquiry into the then Army’s existing procedures for procurement and key decisions involved in Bofors purchase. Behera said that although the JPC did not point out any serious deviations from then existing procedures followed by the Army and other stake-holders\, it nonetheless brought into open several practices which were prone to subjective interpretations\, and subsequent charges and counter charges. One such practice was the non-requirement of formulation of General Staff Qualitative Requirements (GSQRs) for the weapons procured from abroad. \nMr Behera noted that following the recommendations of the GoM\, which was set up to review the national security in its entirety and the recommendations of the Kargil Review Committee (KRC) in particular\, the government initiated the process which led to the creation of present procurement organisation\, consisting of five main bodies such as i) Defence Acquisition Council (DAC)\, ii) Defence Procurement Board (DPB)\, iii) Defence Production Board\, iv) Defence Research and Development Board\, and v) Acquisition Wing. With the setting up of defence procurement organisation\, the MoD has also undertaken periodic review of the procurement procedures. Till now the MoD has carried out six rounds of major revisions\, with the Defence Procurement Procedures DPP-2011(DPP-2011) being the latest in the series. He held that the changes in the DPPs have created a streamlined system that is now much more methodical\, objective and process-oriented. \nBehera argued that despite MoD’s reform measures undertaken so far\, the acquisition process has not moved at the desired pace. This is evident from repeated surrender of funds under the capital head of defence budget\, much of which is accounted for under the modernisation/acquisition head meant for procurement of ‘big-ticket’ items such as tanks\, fighter\, submarines\, frigates\, radars and missiles among others. Moreover\, the delays and cost-over run is also a matter of concern to national security\, especially when India’s adversaries are acquiring capability at a faster pace. \nIn the presence dispensation\, Mr Behera pointed out that the acquisition planning is a major handicap. The GoM’s idea behind creation of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) for a strong planning mechanism has been diluted in the set up of HQ IDS\, which is constrained to force itself in articulating a truly integrated perspective plan for the three services\, with due diligence towards capability development through inter-and intra-Service prioritisation\, matching defence plan with available resources and hand-holding of domestic defence industry. Because of its lack of authority vis-à-vis COSC and due to the superiority of services chiefs over the CISC\, the defence planning is constrained. The long term plan is also constrained in the absence of the resource commitment by the government. He said that in order to move towards a truly integrated perspective plan the creation of CDS is vital. \nThe paper argued that Qualitative Requirement (QR) formulation is concerned\, which is the most vital part of the acquisition cycle\, has not given required attention through out DPP’s nearly two-decades of operational history. The vital element is continues to be performed by Services personnel who are not trained to so such a specialised job..Moreover\, the oversight of the vital part of acquisition is not so strong enough. Given the vitality of a QR in choosing the most cost-efficient selection in a time-bound manner\, it is necessary that the job be performed by specialised body\, preferably by an external agency. Given that the HQ IDS is tri-service body it would seem most logical that the function is transferred to it. However\, the efficacy of HQ IDS would comeby its strong positioning vis-à-vis Services\, which would come by putting a CDS as head its head.  \nBehera noted that contrary to the GoM’s recommendation for creation of “a separate and dedicated institutional structure to undertake the entire gamut of procurement function” what has been created is an Acquisition Wing which performs a part of acquisition functions. Several crucial functions having a strong bearing upon the cost and timeliness of procurement are being carried out beyond its command and control\, thereby robbing the system of benefits of the single point of accountability. He pointed out that the organisational shortcoming in accountability has also not been compensated by the procedural means\, both because of the professional shortcomings of acquisition functionaries and the lack of courage of the system to own up responsibility in cases which run into oversight problems. He stressed that given the importance of single-point accountability in the vital aspects of weapon procurement\, it would be logical\, as pointed out by GoM\, to move towards an integrated procurement organisation. \nMajor Points of Discussion and Suggestions: \n\nCabinet Committee on Security (CCS) should be the principal authority for approval of acquisition plan of the services. \nThe paper needs to define acquisition and differentiate it from procurement. \nThere is misconception that the MoD is not utilising the money allocated to it. However\, in recently years\, the inability to spend money has changed. Now\, it has even over-spent money allocated to it. \nSo far as the 11th defence plan is concerned\, there has been a marked improvements compared to previous plans. It is wrong not to cite in the paper the improvements in this regard. \nThe level of infrastructure development in the country\, R&D\, and capacity building also need greater attention. In addition\, there is need of a Defence Planning Board for the defence acquisition. \nThe institutional structures further needs to be strengthened for better defence acquisition. \nIt is not fair to compare India’s system with Pakistan’s acquisition system. \nThe scholar rather needs to focus on how to strengthen the present structure and procedure of defence acquisition system. \nIndia is more dependent on Russian even for the maintenance of defence equipments. This should be changed in its present defence acquisition system. \nThe present acquisition system is good but it needs further to be strengthened by way of more manpower. \nThe Bofors case needs to be put in the right perspective; otherwise a wrong conclusion would be drawn. \nIf one takes a comprehensive view of the defence acquisition system in recent years\, things have improved very much. \n\nReport prepared by Dr Saroj Bishoyi\, Research Assistant\, IDSA
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/reforming-indias-defence-acquisition-structure-and-procedures
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110729T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110729T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T004701
CREATED:20231224T103605Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T041435Z
UID:64104-1311917400-1311917400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Oil Factor in India - Nigeria Relations
DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/oil-factor-in-india-nigeria-relations
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110826T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110826T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T004701
CREATED:20231224T103605Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130243Z
UID:64103-1314336600-1314336600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:US Nuclear Weapons Policy and Practice in the Shadow of 9/11
DESCRIPTION:Event: Fellows Seminar \nChairperson: Ambassador Arundhati GhoseDiscussants: Professor Jeffrey Legro and Dr. Manpreet Sethi \nThe paper is an attempt to explore US nuclear weapons policy and practice in the shadow of 9/11. In the first part of his presentation\, Rajiv provided an examination of the major US national strategy and nuclear policy documents after 9/11 and their policy prescriptions regarding the ‘twin threats’ of proliferation and terrorism. Among the documents he examined included 2002 National Security Strategy\, 2002 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)\, 2006 US National Strategy for Combating Terrorism\, 2006 National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction\, 2008 National Security and Nuclear Weapons in 21st Century\, QDR 2010\, and NPR 2010. Citing pertinent portions of these documents\, he stated that they reinforce the importance of nuclear deterrence in US grand strategy and the imperative need to fine-tune its defence capabilities to face the twin threats. He noted that new type of weaponry was sought be developed such as conventional-cum-nuclear ‘bunker-busters’ to tackle the challenges posed by underground facilities (UGF’s). Other strategic innovations included transforming nuclear weapon platforms like the 4 Ohio-class SSBN’s to perform conventional roles and Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) which envisages the use of ICBM’s tipped with conventional warheads to strike high-value “time-sensitive targets” as incoming Defence Secretary Panetta noted.  \nRajiv then points out that while the initial policy response to the twin challenges of proliferation and terrorism by US was to strengthen/fine-tune its deterrence postures\, there has been a reduction in its arms control/disarmament obligations. In this context\, Rajiv provided relevant details about BMD\, FMCT and CTBT across US administrations since 9/11. The latter two have however been put on the front-burner as it were by the Obama administration but it remains to be seen what progress can be achieved. Subsequently\, Rajiv provided an assessment of the reductions in US nuclear arsenals – including in warheads and strategic delivery vehicles (SDV’s). He pointed out the analyses by Hans Christensen and others about the role of negative security assurances (NSA’s) and nuclear targeting war plans on the size of the arsenal. In this context\, he pointed out that the US for the first time in NPR 2010 pledged that it will “continue to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attack.” The document however states that “there remains a narrow range of contingencies in which US nuclear weapons may still play a role in deterring a conventional or CBW attack against the United States or its allies and partners.”  \nIn the last part of his presentation\, Rajiv discussed pertinent aspects relating to US policy initiatives at the bilateral and multi-lateral levels to deal with the ‘twin threats’\, such as PSI\, 2006 Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT)\, G8 Global Partnership Initiative\, Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI)\, Obama’s chairing of the Special Session of the UN Security Council in September 2009 – the first by any American president that resulted in UNSC Resolution 1887\, April 2010 Global Summit on Nuclear Security\, and the entry into force of New START. \nRajiv concluded his presentation by noting that despite significant reductions in the numbers of US nuclear warheads during the decade after 9/11\, coupled with continuing successful bilateral and multilateral efforts to secure vulnerable material and prevent terrorists from acquiring WMD material/know-how\, there has not been a concomitant reduction in the ‘role’ of nuclear weapons in US grand strategy and that there are limited prospects of any change in the foreseeable future.  \nPoints of discussion and suggestions \n\nThe paper is a sharp-edged critique of US nuclear weapons policy but could be improved with beefed up analyses and assessment of some of the issues involved. Aspects relating to ‘role’ can be further delineated into ‘centrality’ and ‘dimensions’ of nuclear use for greater clarity. \nThe author can more closely look at whether there has been an evolution/change in US nuclear weapons policy as a result of 9/11 and examine specifically those aspects where these changes have/have not occurred. The author’s own assessment of his reading of US nuclear weapons policy can be expanded. \nA distinction could be drawn between ‘nuclear weapons policy’ and ‘nuclear policy’. If the former\, aspects relating to FMCT\, CTBT\, and US policy activism at bilateral and multi-lateral fora may not be included. \nIt would appear that Obama has succumbed to the nuclear weapons establishment with regards to arms control and disarmament. \nThe increasing linkages of conventional weapons policy on nuclear weapons policy needs to be highlighted\, especially in the light of the fact that US has superior conventional power/assets at its disposal. \nThe author can look more closely at the debates on US nuclear weapons policy in the aftermath of 9/11 to provide a better context and set the tone for the rest of the paper. \nAn examination of the alternative explanations regarding role of nuclear weapons in US grand strategy\, the challenges that US has faced in implementing some of its policies\, could be better highlighted. \nThe mismatch between US policy objectives and practice can be highlighted. This is especially visible in the context of US relationship with Pakistan and in US efforts to secure vulnerable material worldwide\, most recently highlighted by the case of Belarus refusing to honour its commitments to return material to the US in the face of economic sanctions.\nIn his response\, Rajiv thanked the Chairperson and the Discussants and participation from the floor for the valuable comments and suggestions and promised to incorporate them as much as feasible while finalising the paper.\n\nReport prepared by Sanjeev Kumar Shrivatsav\, Researcher at IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/us-nuclear-weapons-policy-and-practice-in-the-shadow-of-9-11
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20111118T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20111118T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T004701
CREATED:20231223T134706Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130243Z
UID:63194-1321594200-1321594200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:China’s Planning on Border Infrastructure: Post 1996 CBM Period
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Shri Sheo Nandan PandeyDiscussants: Shri Anil Kumar Gautam and Cdr Kamlesh Agnihotri \n1996 was a watershed year when agreements specifying the military CBMs were signed between India and China. The author argues that despite 14 rounds of talks held since then\, India and China have achieved little in terms of common understanding on border settlement\, as there is no mechanism yet on how to solve the border question. In addition\, instances of border intrusions and incursions coupled with the military build-up on both sides suggest that the possibility of military conflict cannot be ruled out. Therefore\, it is important for India to focus on understanding the objectives behind China’s infrastructure build-up in the border regions. \nThe focus of the paper was on the following recent developments in the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR): \n\nPlatforms for developing TAR\nStages of TAR’s development\nSalient features of the development\nRecent developments in defence\, roads\, aviation\, hydropower\, trade\, tourism\nChina’s objectives: stated and unstated.\n\nPlatforms for decision-making on Tibet include the Party Congress which decides on the broad frameworks followed by the Tibet Work Forums\, Five Year Plans (FYP) and the Great Western Development Strategy (GWDS). So far 5 Tibet Work Forums (TWF) have taken place where important decisions relating to Tibet’s infrastructure were taken. The first decided on Tibet’s special status on taxes and development strategy. The second focussed on energy\, communication and transportation development. The third forum has been the most crucial wherein infrastructure got more serious focus\, the aid Tibet programme was launched and 62 projects including roads\, communication\, energy\, water conservancy\, urban infrastructure were undertaken. A total of 716 projects under Aid Tibet program were launched at the total investment of 8 billion RMB. The fourth forum aimed at “leapfrog development”\, as TAR was included in the GWDS. This time around total investment was at 31.2 bn RMB as showcase infrastructure projects like QTR were undertaken. It was followed by the 11th FYP that also stressed on Tibet’s infrastructure; noteworthy projects such as the Galong La Tunnel and Motuo Highway were completed during this period. However\, the author mentioned that there is lack of detailed information about this tunnel in the Chinese language literature. The Fifth TWF of January 2010 set ambitious growth targets for 2015. Some of these focus on social issues like income inequality and others on specific infrastructure projects. At the same time\, it has long term targets of harmonious development in the TAR. Similar targets are part of the 12th FYP. \nAmong the other issues highlighted by the paper are important developments in the defence infrastructure sector in the TAR and the objectives behind these. The author concludes that these activities undertaken by the Chinese reveal their objectives as being defence consolidation\, strengthening administrative control\, changing Tibetan lifestyle\, controlling separatism and using trade as means to prosperity. \nA section of the paper also dwelt on the challenges faced in infrastructure development. These included climatic and topographic conditions\, lack of basic facilities\, all of which lead to higher costs of deployment of troops in addition to the problems of acclimatisation. The Chinese authorities are also unclear about how best to preserve Tibet’s fragile ecology.   \nThe paper provided some suggestions on how India should approach and respond to these developments. \nThe main points of discussion and suggestions were as follows: \n\nSome of the showcase defence technologies are much hyped about. J-20 is still a prototype and at least 12-15 years away from induction. Automated border sensor is also not possible technologically as yet. Therefore monitoring has to be physical.\nIt was suggested that more maps marking specific locations would make the argument more clear as far as major infrastructure projects like airports are concerned.\nIt was suggested that the author could focus on some specific border infrastructure instead of focussing on everything happening in Tibet for a more comprehensive analysis. Road-building must be studied further to know their sustainability under harsh weather conditions and capacity for withstanding tonnage to know how it helps militarily.\nProjects should be categorised by size within FYPs and not mere numbers\, so that their effectiveness can be assessed better. This would help bring clearer focus on distinguishing trade and security infrastructure.\nThere is a need to showcase if and why TAR infrastructure projects are unique and different from development work happening elsewhere in China. This can strengthen the argument from security perspective of India. Otherwise\, its just economic development strategy.\nMore groundwork is needed on why 1996 is the watershed year. Otherwise 1981 and others also look as equally convincing landmarks in India China relations.\n\nReport prepared by Avinash Godbole\, Research Assistant\, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/chinas-planning-on-border-infrastructure-post-1996-cbm-period
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20111118T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20111118T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T004701
CREATED:20231224T103604Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T041143Z
UID:64102-1321594200-1321594200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:A Partnership on Autopilot:  Explaining the Consolidation of Indo-Israeli Ties in the Last Decade
DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/a-partnership-on-autopilot-explaining-the-consolidation-of-indo-israeli-ties-in-the-last-decade
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20111202T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20111202T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T004701
CREATED:20231224T103558Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T041024Z
UID:64101-1322803800-1322803800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:The ‘Tamil Question’ in India-Sri Lanka Relations in the Post LTTE Phase
DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nChairperson: Ambassador I P KhoslaDiscussants: Maj Gen Ashok Mehta (Retd) and Dr N Manoharan
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-tamil-question-in-india-sri-lanka-relations-in-the-post-ltte-phase
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20111209T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20111209T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T004701
CREATED:20231223T134606Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130243Z
UID:63187-1323408600-1323408600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:The Concept of Autonomy in French Strategic Thought
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Bharat WariavwallaDiscussants: Philippe Laurent\, Nicolas Blarel\, Krishnappa Venkatshamy and Lion Koenig \n \nThis paper focuses on the concept of strategic autonomy as a defining element of the French strategic culture while demonstrating how throughout history France has shaped a bi-dimensional concept of autonomy. It emphasizes that the concept of strategic autonomy is key to gaining a deeper understanding of all underlying elements of France’s attitude as a contemporary global actor. By focusing on three specific historical periods spanning the last two centuries\, the author examines the origins of the French definition of autonomy and goes on to highlight the main challenge of contemporary French strategy: to reconcile its limited material power with its global ambitions and its Universalist model. The author notes that the paper is the first stage of analysis of a larger comparative study between Indian and French strategic cultures. \nThe paper argues that the French concept of autonomy\, with its particularities\, is the central ideational element of France’s strategy. It defines the way France perceives the world as well as itself. Though the concept of autonomy all by itself cannot entirely explain French foreign policy or predict France’s positions\, the paper suggests that it gives meaning to France’s past and potentially helps anticipate the French perspective in future. In other words\, even though the concept of autonomy doesn’t explain everything on its own\, it remains significant as far as French strategic culture is concerned.  \nThe paper follows Johnson and Larsen’s definition of strategic culture. It argues that the overarching goal of the study of strategic cultures is to understand strategic behaviour at the global scale. This approach does not reject the idea that states try to achieve their interests rationally\, but considers these interests as not only circumstantial and resulting from the distribution of resources and power in the world\, but also influenced by norms and values and shaped in a certain ideational framework. The paper tries to find elements of consensus\, values\, and ideas which have defined French strategy for a certain period of time. \nIn analysing the historical construction of France’s focus on the concept of autonomy\, the paper focuses on three core historical episodes which it considers to have strong dialectic values: \n\nThe Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars give the philosophical foundation and theoretical base to the concept.\nThe French colonisation process under the Third Republic (1871-1939) illustrates the main paradox in this concept when put into practice. \nThe example of Gaullist policies during the Cold War enables the author to illustrate the greatest challenge of French foreign policy in the 21st century.\n\nThe author prefers the term ‘autonomy’ over ‘independence’\, although both are often used interchangeably\, because of the semantic difference between the two: whereas the latter stresses on the negation of dependence\, the former has a more affirmative nuance. Moreover\, the French concept of autonomy implies a responsibility towards the world. Thus\, in the context of France\, the original concept of autonomy is active and strongly positive. \nThe meaning French autonomy bears today is the result of a tension between two attitudes:  \n\nFirstly\, protective autonomy or a defensive posture marked by fear of imperial expansionism that threatens France’s safety; \nSecondly\, active/affirmative autonomy or imperialist dreams based on France’s glorified past and the urge for spreading its values. \n\nAs a kingdom and then as a nation-state\, France has historically constructed itself in opposition to an empire as well as with the great memory of an empire\, thus constantly oscillating between the two extremes like a pendulum. The French concept of autonomy is therefore essentially bi-dimensional\, the active dimension historically emerging after the defensive element.  \nThe idea of French autonomy contains the paradox of French imperialism. The paper attempts to reconcile the French concept of autonomy with French imperialism by bringing in a Universalist dimension and suggesting that the French model can be viewed as a universal model\, thus\, the notion that what is good for the Frenchmen is good for everyone. Moreover\, identity is a key element in the construction of a strategy according to the French bi-dimensional notion of autonomy. The paper argues that the defence of the national identity is singularly more prominent in the case of France. This is justified by the idea of French exceptionalism\, a nationalist notion that France is granted with a unique role in world history and has the responsibility to offer a certain model to humanity.  \nA specific facet of this responsibility and the memory of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars translate into a self-perceived notion of France as the ‘liberator of nations’. This perception of uniqueness\, stressed by French historiographical frame which designated the French Revolution as the commencement of the Modern Times\, is very close to American exceptionalism and the role it perceives for itself in the world. Although both consider themselves to be carriers of the heritage of the Enlightenment\, the US notion is partially based on religious considerations whereas the French model is more political and is derived from the perceived grandeur of French history. \nIn conclusion\, the paper engages with France’s main challenges and attempts to answer the question: in the aftermath of the Second World War\, how can France continue to exist as a global actor without the material capacities to compete with the greater powers? After the ‘war of twenty years’ that constituted the decolonisation process\, France’s limited material capacities were well-admitted by the French government and the foreign policy was designed accordingly. French autonomy was preserved by framing an ambiguous geopolitical situation whereby independence from all powers would be constantly affirmed\, but alliance with the Western bloc would be presupposed. France’s withdrawal from NATO’s command in 1959 and the Gaullist policy towards the US is a perfect example of this ambiguity. The strength of French foreign policy lies in the geopolitical ambivalence of the French position and not in its material capacities. The French concept of autonomy leads France to transform all technical and economic matters into political decisions (politicization) and refuses to see its foreign policy dictated by its limited material capacities. \nDiscussion and Comments\nMr. Laurent commented on the ability of the paper to successfully assess and summarise the diverse French character. The author received many suggestions for his bigger project of a comparative study. Mr. Blarel pointed out the need to look at a series of case studies and test alternative hypotheses. A suggestion was made to study different phases of colonisation and take into account factors other than strategic culture that marked the enterprise and examine different incarnations of French strategic culture based on different leaders and circumstances. The notion of French strategic culture was further problematised by questioning whether actions are governed by an overarching rhetoric or are they for domestic consumption. \nGp Capt Venkatshamy pointed out the long historical period the paper is trying to engage with and suggested picking up a more specific issue and operationalizing it for a more focused argument. He further raised the issue of convergences and divergences between French and Indian strategic culture and noted a need for the paper to provide a well-fleshed out answer to the question: how are India and France comparable? Towards this end\, he provided a specific pointer to attempt a comparative study between Nehru and De Gaulle.  \nMr. Koenig commented on the merit of the project to theorise an undertheorised concept and suggested some points in connection with paper structure and flow. He suggested disentangling the concept of strategic culture and first exploring the broader concepts of strategy and culture and explaining why they should be studied\, before moving on to the study of strategic culture and examining whether the concept is tautological\, oxymoronic or more than the sum of its parts. He commented on the singular voice/consensus used in the paper and suggested that ruptures in the concept be taken into account. He suggested a more elaborate analysis of the three core historical examples the paper deals with in order to capture a clearer genealogy of the concept.  \nMr. Blarel and Mr. Koenig jointly suggested that the paper should attempt to address the question of homogeneity of strategic culture: can we talk of ‘a’ French strategic culture? \nDiscussion from the floor revolved around:  \n\nthe question of continuity and ruptures in French Strategic culture after and before the colonial era; \nthe element of uniqueness in the French desire for autonomy\, and\, \nsuggestions to clearly define means and goals and frame strategic culture as the ideational base that leads to autonomy. \n\nThe Chair concluded by keenly engaging with the cultural dimension of France’s distinct idea of civilization and its notion that it should give this idea to the colonised nations. He stressed on the impact of civilizations in the Indian context and commented on the importance of French thinking. \nReport prepared by Bhavna Tripathy\, Research Intern at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-concept-of-autonomy-in-french-strategic-thought
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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