BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//MP-IDSA - ECPv6.15.12.2//NONSGML v1.0//EN
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
X-WR-CALNAME:MP-IDSA
X-ORIGINAL-URL:https://idsa.in
X-WR-CALDESC:Events for MP-IDSA
REFRESH-INTERVAL;VALUE=DURATION:PT1H
X-Robots-Tag:noindex
X-PUBLISHED-TTL:PT1H
BEGIN:VTIMEZONE
TZID:Asia/Kolkata
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:+0530
TZOFFSETTO:+0530
TZNAME:IST
DTSTART:20090101T000000
END:STANDARD
END:VTIMEZONE
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101230T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101230T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T022840
CREATED:20231223T221125Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130245Z
UID:63614-1293687000-1293687000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:A case for Increasing FDI CAP up to 100 per cent in India's Defence Industry
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Shri V K MisraDiscussants: Shri Amit Kumar Singh and Shri Rahul Gangal \nThis paper revolved around two key questions: Why does India need higher FDI in defence industry? And how much the FDI limit should be increased? Highlighting the present FDI policy of India\, Mr Behera said that India has allowed FDI up to 26 per cent in its defence industry since 2001. However\, the policy has so far not succeeded in attracting any major financial or technological inflows into the country\, primarily because of the lack of incentivisation of the policy to the foreign investors. He argued in favour of increasing FDI cap up to 100 per cent and pointed out that keeping in view India’s underdeveloped R&D and production base\, and various defence industry-related policies and provisions that are contingent upon liberal flow of FDI\, an increase in foreign investment cap up to 100 per cent would be logical\, instead of adopting a fixed cap-based method\, which may be constrained in allowing some desirable inflows. \nMr Behera argued that the absence of any meaningful FDI inflows into India – both\, financial as well as technological – has led to a strong debate in the country. In response to the Ministry of Commence and Industry’s (MoC&I’s) Discussion Paper of July 2010 which argued in favour of increasing FDI cap up to 74 per cent\, a cross section of industrial stakeholders ranging from industrial associations\, labour union\, law firms\, foreign company and consultancy firm have come out with their own views. He said that the views of these stakeholders are divided along three major lines; i) FDI limit be retained at 26 per cent; ii) FDI could be allowed to a maximum of 49 per cent subject to certain conditions such as minimum financial inflows is US $100 million and compulsory inflow of technology; and iii) FDI should be increased to 74 per cent. He pointed out that the majority of the industry as represented by their big associations\, such as the ASSOCHAM\, CII\, and FICCI\, has not favoured an increase of FDI beyond 49 per cent. Moreover\, the conditions they have proposed for 49 per cent FDI is stringent and highly discouraging for any foreign company to opt for this route to enter the Indian defence industry. \nThe author was of the view that in a globalised world\, FDI has been an important vehicle for external source of finance. However\, the volume and growth of inflows notwithstanding\, FDI inflows are often fraught on political grounds\, as inflow of resources are invariably linked with controlling of assets\, which the receiving countries are often reluctant to shed for variety of reasons\, national security being the critical one. He noted that although many counties have devised detailed mechanism to filter foreign investment into strategic sector\, a very few countries have a blanket ban on inflows after a certain level. Among them\, India and UAE have a blanket ban on FDI after a certain threshold. While India does not allow more than 26 per cent FDI in defence industry\, UAE restricts all foreign investment to 49 per cent\, unless the investment falls in its Free Trade Zones. \nIn response to the question why India needs higher FDI in defence industry\, Mr Behera said that foreign investment in defence industry is a part of India’s broader FDI policy\, intended to “bring attendant advantages of technology transfer\, marketing expertise\, introduction of modern managerial techniques and new possibilities for promotion of exports.”  However\, even after nine years of its being existence\, the defence FDI policy in its present form has not been able to accrue the intended advantages in a meaningful way. Considering India’s poor R&D and production base\, and the country’s desire to enhance domestic defence production\, Mr Behera suggested that an increase in FDI cap beyond the present limit would be desirable for technology transfer and for meaningful ties between Indian and foreign companies. In addition\, an increase in FDI cap would also likely facilitate effective functioning of the offset policy and “Buy and Make (Indian)” procurement provision. He\, however\, argued that given the sensitivity attached to defence industry and national security\, all defence-related FDI could be subject to wider review by the empowered Foreign Investment Promotion Board (FIPB). \nAt the end\, he said that although a higher FDI cap up to 100 per cent would create an enabling environment for technology transfer\, and setting up joint venture companies\, the indigenous industry\, given its size and base\, would continue to play major role in India’s defence industry. He\, therefore\, concluded by emphasising that there is a greater need for energising the indigenous industry\, both private and public sector\, so as to enable them to play a more pro-active role.  \nShri Rahul Gangal: Increasing FDI limit in defence industry is not the only issue. There are other policy dichotomies which also need to be considered while discussing about increasing the FDI limit in defence industry. He focused on some key aspects such as: the foreign investors want ownership in the JVs while making investments in vital sectors. Second\, the present FDI policy is also not generating more interest and motivation among outside investors. Third\, they also want to have insurance of their investments. Fourth\, the investors are interested only investing in those sectors where their interests are protected. They are not interested to create other new JVs if that will not yield interest. Five\, the investors also want to have their position or control over key policy decisions. In addition\, he pointed out the question of what will happen if these JVs start marketing the products to gain profit. He emphasised that these important issues need to be focused while thinking about increasing the FDI limit. \nShri Ashok Kanodia: There is a need to define the national objectives while talking about increasing FDI limit. What actually India wants to achieve by increasing FDI limit in defence industry? The US and other western countries are more concerned about creating jobs. How many jobs and skills have been created in India by FDI? The present FDI policy of India started in 2001 and nine years is a long period to assess the policy. What are the policy initiatives created for the JVs? On purchasing of technologies\, he said that one does not buy defence technologies from a single vendor. He agreed with Mr Behera that many of the policies that he recommended in his paper have already been made to the government case-by-case basis. He pointed out that protecting the Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) and seriousness of the JVs are the two important things which are essential for creating new JVs. Finally\, he said that what nation wants to achieve by increasing FDI limit\, for this\, we need to take a holistic approach while arguing for increasing the FDI limit and for creating new JVs.  \nDr G Balachandran: This is a very current and relevant topic. However\, the presenter needs to be very clear and careful while using some concepts and facts. He pointed out that defence technology is very different from other technologies. So the scholar needs to be clear which kind of technology that he is referring to whether it is high technology\, critical technology\, defence technology or any other technologies and what kind of technologies that India would acquire by increasing the FDI limit since there are different license procedures required for each of these technologies. In addition\, by increasing FDI cap up to 49\, 74 or 100 per cent India will not be able to obtain these technologies from foreign companies\, unless the foreign companies’ government approve them. He pointed out that defence technologies are subject to strict regulations as well as international export control laws. So far as defence trade is concerned\, it’s a government to government cooperation. Moreover\, homogenous items or products can be obtained from many countries\, but critical components cannot be obtained because these are subject to stringent export control laws. And one cannot start industry for each item or product. He suggested that first and foremost\, there is need to understand technologies and then which kind of technologies that India wants to obtain by increasing FDI cap and without knowing this one cannot give 100 per cent FDI.  \nDiscussion: \n\nIn JVs\, government investment means government control. So\, how to maintain the balance between government investment and control? \nSince last two decades\, China is rapidly modernising its defence system. How this will affect India? And\, how China is able to bring more FDI into its country? \nSo far as the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) is concerned\, how does it would work with India? \nHow does India’s offset policy affect the FDI inflow? How it works in technology imports in terms of defence technology?\nIndia also needs to work on other important issues such as labour laws\, centre-state coordination\, better SEZ schemes and proper institutional mechanisms to attract more FDI in future. \nFDI which is vital to India’s growth has lacked a proper policy document and has been administered primarily through a series of press notes over many years.\nIndia is lagging behind China by 20 years in terms of infrastructure development. As India’s economy is rising and able to sustain its economic growth rate despite the global economic crisis\, it needs to pay greater attention to infrastructure development. Otherwise in long term basis\, it cannot compete with other major powers.\nWhile foreign equity participation has increased in most sectors\, there are still sectors where there is huge potential for FDI inflows. Further increases in FDI ceilings in sectors such as banking\, telecom\, power generation\, civil aviation\, food retailing\, insurance\, investing companies and the real estate sector will be required to achieve this potential. \nDo political parties have any stake in FDI? \n\nChairperson’s Remarks: Shri V.K. Mishra said that India’s defence industry has not attained critical mass in R&D and manufacture sectors. Joint venture\, thus\, is an important route to develop India’s R&D and production base as well as critical infrastructures. There are massive deficiencies in these sectors. So far as the FDI limit in defence industry is concerned\, unless we increase the present limit\, we cannot compete with other countries. India’s JVs in defence sector has been lost so far. However\, there is no dearth of opportunities. He cited that India’s joint venture with Russia in Brahmos missile programme is very successful. He hoped that such JVs will open in many other sectors with other countries. Shri Mishra concluded by observing that India’s defence industry is lagging far behind\, and that’s why new JVs need to be created in this sector by following a liberal FDI policy. But he noted that there is need of greater transparency in defence department to make it more effective.  \nReport prepared by Dr Saroj Bishoyi\, Research Assistant\, IDSA
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/a-case-for-increasing-fdi-cap-up-to-100-per-cent-in-indias-defence-industry
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101230T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20101230T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T022840
CREATED:20231224T104020Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T044912Z
UID:64140-1293687000-1293687000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:China’s Defence Diplomacy in Southeast Asia
DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nChairperson: Amb. TCA RagachariDiscussants: Prof. Chintamani Mahapatra and Prof. Manmohini Kaul
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/chinas-defence-diplomacy-in-southeast-asia
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110107T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110107T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T022840
CREATED:20231223T221038Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130245Z
UID:63612-1294378200-1294378200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:International Procedures and Systems of Export Controls of Materials\, Equipments and Technology related to Biological Weapons
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson:   Shri P R ChariDiscussants: Dr B M Gandhi and Dr Moushumi Basu \n \nThe paper describes the existing procedures and systems of international export controls of materials\, equipments and technology related to biological weapons. The author states that Export controls “are tools to ensure that trade flows consistently with treaty obligations embodied in the relevant control regimes\, which is to stay away from states with weapons programs and toward those with commercial\, peaceful interests”. Exports include agents\, equipments and expertise and intangible transfer of knowledge. The major conclusions of the author were that export control of materials and technology related to biological weapons\, in place of being an appropriate response to the advances in biological sciences\, has been a function of security perceptions of states. Secondly\, policy decision regarding export controls must take inputs from the relevant stakeholders; most importantly the biological scientific enterprise and finally export controls remain the most essential element in an overall strategy to limit the spread of biological weapons.  \nThe major points of discussions and suggestions to the author: \n\nStudy the impact of these treaties on other countries\,\nIntroduce the other systems and treaties in the introduction\,\nDiscuss the export controls in India with other developed countries and compare them\,\nFurther discuss dual use of Biological Weapons and their use by state as well as non-state actors\,\nStates are conscious about their commercial interests\,\nVerification is the major problem area\,\nBiological items are inherently dual use in nature and thus there is a need for a more effective control mechanism\,\nNeed to add some discussion on UNSC Resolution 1540\, \nExport controls affect development of R&D in Developing countries\,\nGlobalization will lead to loosening of state controls.\n\nReport prepared by Gunjan Singh\, Research Assistant\, IDSA
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/international-procedures-and-systems-of-export-controls-of-materials-equipments-and-technology-related-to-biological-weapons
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110107T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110107T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T022840
CREATED:20231223T221038Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130245Z
UID:63613-1294378200-1294378200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Sudan in Transition: Implications  for India
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Ambassador ShashankDiscussants: Ambassador Rajeev Bhatia and Professor S N Malakar \n \nMs. Beri’s paper focuses on the upcoming referendum that brings forth the complexities of energy politics in Sudan. The referendum is important for both North and South Sudan. The deep historical and commercial ties between Sudan and India mean that the developments in Sudan pose India with numerous challenges. India’s strategy of engaging with Southern Sudan in recent years\, however\, may reduce any adverse impacts of events. Within Sudan itself\, North Sudan mainly views the possible secession of the South as a disaster due to the extensive oil production in the South – around 90 percent of oil revenues in Sudan come from the southern region of the country. Ms. Beri’s paper aims to investigate the complexities of Sudan in this transition period and its implications for India.  \nTalks on post-referendum scenarios began in July 2010 between members of the National Congress Party and the Sudan People’s Liberation movement. The discussion agenda includes issues such as security\, citizenship\, economic and natural resources\, international treaties and legal issues. A crucial issue confronting the government is citizenship owing to the unclear status of Southerners living permanently in Northern Sudan and of Northerners settled in South Sudan. There is also the issue of management of natural resources – Sudan’s discovered reserves are estimated at five million barrels with the majority of these being in the South. Although the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the North and South restored peace beginning in 2005\, Sudan’s main oil producing region\, Abyei\, is situated on the North-South border (Abyei accounts for around 13 percent of the country’s total income from oil exports). This has exacerbated the situation to spill into a boundary dispute over Abyei and the presence of other oil fields in these frontier areas.  \nSharing of oil revenue is another area of contention. The CPA mandated equal sharing of oil wealth generated from the oilfields located in the South; however\, here have been doubts about transparency in allocations of generated revenues. The North is heavily dependent on oil revenues generated in the South for the developmental progress of the Northern region. Also\, a large number of Northerners are employed in the Southern oil fields. The failure of both sides to reach an agreement would likely lead to these opportunities vanishing for the North. (Reports indicate that the North has been seeking alternate sources of energy\, particularly hydroelectricity\, to meet this challenge). On the other hand\, the dilemma for the South is about access to oil infrastructure. Facilities such as pipelines\, refineries and storage and export terminals are in the North. A split would mean disruption in the South’s continued usage of this infrastructure. Ms. Beri points out that in the short term\, both the North and South will continue to be dependent on each other for the utilization of oil wealth. Apart from these\, there is also the question of sharing of water resources in the Nile river basin.  \nThere are a number of scenarios predicted for Sudan – complete separation into two independent states\, two independent states with an open border\, the confederalist option\, and a unified Sudan.  \nAlthough India’s relations with Sudan date back to ancient times\, India had established minimal contact with the South until recently. Ms. Beri observes that the Indian government has supported Sudan on many occasions – India’s Election Commission helped organize Sudan’s first general elections in the late 1950s; Indian engineers played a major role in setting up Sudan’s sugar industry and railways. Politically\, there is mutual support – Sudan has supported India’s aspirations for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council; the Indian government agreed to assist Sudan in entering the World Trade Organisation (WTO); India was given observer status at the March 2006 Summit of the League of Arab States in Khartoum; India also extended it support for the sovereignty\, unity ad territorial integrity of Sudan\, and affirmed that Darfur is an internal crisis that should be resolved by the government of Sudan in consultation with the African Union; India has also sent peacekeepers to the UN Peacekeeping Mission in Sudan.  \nThe referendum can also impact India’s substantial investments in Sudan’s energy sector\, largely in the South. Sudan was the first African country that India sought equity assets with. As of January 2010\, Sudan has sought fresh investments by India particularly in the offshore natural gas blocks; India on the other hand has offered its assistance in modernizing Sudan’s oil refineries in addition to providing training for its technicians. One of the biggest challenges for India would be the possibility of a new government in South Sudan undertaking policy changes in the energy sector and canceling standing contracts. The fate of India’s investments in Sudan depends on the outcome of the upcoming referendum in the South. Ms. Beri points out that it is most likely that the South will split and declare itself independent. But taking into account the extent of interdependence between the North and South\, a resumption of hostilities and disruption of oil exports would only cut the cash lifeline that is indispensable to both governments. India’s strategy of engaging with the Government of Southern Sudan beyond oil\, in the recent years\, may reduce the adverse impacts of a split between the North and South. On India’s stance on the issue\, the paper concludes that India should stand with the international community in assisting with a peaceful and stable transition in Sudan. \nDiscussion\nAmbassador Bhatia stressed the importance for India to play a larger political role in this issue\, in addition to having already established a good economic presence in Sudan. The possibility of Ms. Beri’s analysis being shared and discussed with the Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) was also discussed. Professor Malakar laid out the possible impacts of this referendum including on the ethnic\, religious and social compositions of Sudan. India has in common with Sudan the aspects of cultural divisions and a colonial legacy\, and hence holds the hope that the referendum will be successful. Brig. Dahiya suggested that the paper would benefit from being divided into current and likely developments\, the present state of India’s relations with Sudan\, the present and likely state for Sudan\, and the challenges and opportunities for India. He also observed that inter-Sudan dynamics need to be studied further. Another aspect to consider would be the question of which side the African Union and the Arab League would take on the issue; India might want to take a balanced position and not a very proactive approach so as not to act as an irritant to any side. Brig. Dahiya also pointed out that the possible separation of Sudan would have a great deal of impact on the Darfur issue. Ms. Meena Singh Roy noted that the paper can go further than foreseeing a split\, and lay out options for possible policies that the Indian government can adopt on energy security. She also suggested that the role of non-state actors in a post-referendum Sudan be explored.  \nAmbassador Shashank concluded the session by emphasizing that the internal dimension of Sudan (with nine neighboring countries that landlock the country\, each holding its own views on the referendum) has to be brought into the paper\, even though the focus is on the referendum itself and its impact on India. He also suggested that IDSA can follow up on this presentation with a smaller meeting with members working on this issue in the Indian government. \nReport by prepared by Princy Marin George\, Research Assistant\, IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/sudan-in-transition-implications-for-india
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110114T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110114T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T022840
CREATED:20231223T221038Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T044751Z
UID:63609-1294983000-1294983000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:China’s Military Diplomacy: Investigating PLA’s Participation in UN Peace Keeping Operations
DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nChairperson:   Prof. V P DuttDiscussants: Prof Madhu Bhalla  and Prof Swaran Singh \n \nIn sharp contrast to its reticence till the 1990s\, the past few years have witnessed a notable increase in the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) engagement with the international armies. At present\, China has military contacts with more than 150 countries. It has set up military attaché offices in 112 countries; and 102 countries have opened military attaché offices in China. During the 11th Five-Year Plan\, the PLA has dispatched\, on average\, more than 170 military delegations to foreign countries and hosted more than 200 military delegations per year. It is in this background\, China’s peaceful military activism in the global arena has attracted considerable academic attention. \nDr Prashant Kumar Singh\, in his presentation\, tried to explore the issue further. At the outset\, he made it clear that the paper was neither meant to derive any sensation from the term “military diplomacy” nor did it intend to produce any sensational research. Instead\, Dr Singh attempted to demystify and simplify the term “military diplomacy”. He attempted to pick up and discuss with the audience\, one of the many functions performed by the PLA.  \nDr Singh tried to answer nine broad questions in the paper\, including the rationale\, objectives\, and resources consulted\, the meaning of military diplomacy and its relation with China’s foreign policy\, instruments of China’s military diplomacy and the general trends in China’s participation in UN Peace Keeping (UNPK).  \nDr Singh said that China’s actual footprint in UNPK in terms of troop as well as financial contribution is widely considered miniscule. In countering the argument\, he pointed out that China’s participation in UNPK is not an isolated and ignorable feature. It is very much moving in sync with the larger agenda set by the government and its foreign ministry and serving China’s national interests in different ways.  \nIt is also in the institutional interests of the PLA that it asks for stronger mandates in UNPK. In times to come\, it may emerge as leader of the UN-commanded peacekeeping missions.  \nPoints of discussion:  \n\nChina’s position on human rights and humanitarian intervention is in contrast with the ethos of UNPK. How is China addressing the contradiction?\nHow is PLA achieving China’s foreign policy goals through UNPK?\nChina’s is a unique case where three segment; the party\, PLA and the State itself are trying to run their own sets of foreign policy. In that regard\, how is PLA competing with other two segments in promoting its own agenda?\nHow is the world community\, especially the US and India responding to PLAs UNPK operations?\n\nReport prepared by Rahul Mishra\, Research Assistant\, IDSA
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/chinas-military-diplomacy-investigating-plas-participation-in-un-peace-keeping-operations
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110121T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110121T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T022840
CREATED:20231224T103921Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T044429Z
UID:64134-1295587800-1295587800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Public Finance\, Deficit Reduction\, and the American Military in an Era of Diminished Resources
DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nChairperson:   Brig (Retd) Gurmeet KanwalDiscussants: Professor K P Vijay Lakshmi and Brig (Retd) Rahul Bhonsle
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/public-finance-deficit-reduction-and-the-american-military-in-an-era-of-diminished-resources
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110121T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110121T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T022840
CREATED:20231224T104011Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T044257Z
UID:64135-1295587800-1295587800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Changing Dynamics of China’s Relationship with Nepal:  The post-monarchy period
DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nChairperson: Prof. V P DuttDiscussants: Amb. K V Rajan and Amb. T C A Rangachari
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/changing-dynamics-of-chinas-relationship-with-nepal-the-post-monarchy-period
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110125T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110125T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T022840
CREATED:20231224T103921Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T043629Z
UID:64133-1295933400-1295933400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Negotiating with Maoists
DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nModerator: Dr Arpita AnantDiscussants: Shri Prakash Singh and Shri J  N Roy
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/negotiating-with-maoists
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110128T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110128T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T022840
CREATED:20231223T220924Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130245Z
UID:63602-1296192600-1296192600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Managing India’s Borders: Lessons from the US Experience
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Shri Naveen Verma\, National Security CouncilDiscussants: Professor Chintamani Mahapatra and Shri K Srinivasan \n \nThe paper focuses on how United States manages its borders through the concept of “smart borders”\, enhanced cross border cooperation with neighbours and utilisation of technological solutions and how far these measures are relevant to India’s approach to border management. Smart Border concept encompasses safe and secure flow of people and goods and improvement of transit infrastructure and cross border cooperation. According to Dr. Das\, border management entails facilitating cross border flows of people and goods while concurrently preventing the entry of persons or goods which pose threat to home territories or population. In this context\, the paper summarizes the Indian approach to border management and American practices to conclude that India’s “security centric” approach should be replaced by “smart border” principle for more fluid borders and increased trade efficiency.  \nThe major point of discussion and suggestions to the author: \n\nThe paper has given a new perspective on how traditionally borders are managed in India and the challenges posed by the same.\nExcellent comparison of border management in two largest democracies in the world but respective countries have qualitatively/quantitatively different border issues that has to be borne in mind\, for example drug trafficking and large scale illegal migration is a menace to the US while cross border terrorism is an issue for India.  \nIndia’s festering border issues with its neighbours and hostile relations pose security challenge to India’s borders and hence India has to keep “security approach” unlike US that has amiable relations with Canada and Mexico (main countries in focus in the paper). \nPolitical economy of US and South Asia are unique by themselves\, hence the fundamental flaw would be to compare how two countries manage their borders.\nIn Indian Context\, “Smart Border” does not seems to be an ideal concept as long as an unstable region prevails. Basic political dilemmas have to be addressed in the region for further improvement in relations between the countries that will entail better border management in the longer run.\nGreater importance to land border management negates the importance of coastal security\, specially post 26/11 threats that emanate from the coasts. Hence\, a new turf to explore in India’s security ambit.\nRole of individual states in border management needs to be incorporated/ evaluated for a robust border security\nOverall\, a security approach complementary with cooperative approach is in India’s interest\, and not smart border approach. \n\nReport prepared by Anwesha Ray Chaudhuri\, Research Assistant\, IDSA
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/managing-indias-borders-lessons-from-the-us-experience
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110128T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110128T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T022840
CREATED:20231223T220925Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130245Z
UID:63603-1296192600-1296192600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:The Making of Foreign Policy in Bhutan
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Ambassador I P KhoslaDiscussants: Ambassador Dalip Mehta and Professor Mathew Joseph C \n \nDr. Medha Bisht’s paper focused on Bhutan’s Policy shift over a period of time. In the process of explaining this broad aspect\, she tried to answer questions such as: who are the actors in Bhutan driving foreign policy choices? What are the factors that determine Bhutan’s foreign policy choices?  \nThe speaker presented the paper in three broad sections. The first section assessed the basic determinants responsible for influencing or making foreign policy decisions in Bhutan. In this section\, she amplified the role of domestic factors in the making of Bhutan’s foreign policy.  She argues that while\, geo-strategic location\, national security and economic engagement have shaped Bhutan’s foreign policy preferences\, the political institutions in Bhutan\, particularly\, Monarchy\, National Assembly\, Royal Advisory Council and Monastic Order are also important attributes shaping its foreign policy decision making. According to the speaker\, among the four political institutions mentioned above\, Monarchy and National Assembly emerged as important institutions in shaping foreign policy decisions.  \nIn the second section\, the speaker isolated security\, culture and economy as the factors which have predominantly shaped foreign policy preferences of Bhutan. According to her\, while security had played an important role in shaping Bhutan’s relations with China\, cultural factors had played a significant role in determining Bhutan’s position on negotiating the issue of refugees with Nepal. Economic benefits\, on the other hand\, have played an important role in defining Bhutan’s interaction with India. The speaker however argued that these categories were not distinct in relation to the three countries mentioned above. The thrust of the analysis she argued was to highlight the significance of these three factors as the primary determinants in Bhutan’s foreign policy.  \nThe third section identified the possibilities of continuity and change in Bhutan’s foreign policy post 2008.  Despite Bhutan’s shift to constitutional monarchy\, the King still holds an important place in deciding Bhutan’s external engagements. While mapping out the pattern of change and continuity in Bhutan’s foreign policy engagement in terms of the determinants\, speaker argued that economic engagements would govern Bhutan’s future foreign policy choices and interactions with China in near future could increase.  Regarding the role of political institutions in Bhutan\, National Assembly\, National Council\, Gross National Happiness Commission\, Druk and holding Investments\, Royal Service Commission and Anti Corruption Commission would be potential future players.  \nExternal Discussants:\nThe external discussants complimented the presenter for a comprehensive and well researched paper. The first external discussant suggested that the paper would benefit if a background mentioning Bhutan’s opening up to the world through Young Husbands expedition was included. The same discussant also felt that the paper should include a discussion on Bhutan –Britain relationship\, future of Indo-Bhutan relations in the context of China-Bhutan relations\, Bhutan shifting from closed medieval society to a modern society\, opening up of Bhutan to the globalised world\, Bhutan’s relations with P5 and some of the important events such as: Nehru’s visit in 1958. According to the discussant\, the paper gave too much importance on National Assembly\, but during 3rd and 4th King National Assembly was basically a rubber stamp. The same view was also echoed by the second external discussant. According to the second external discussant\, political culture required elaboration. He also suggested the speaker to re-look at her argument that economy determines Indo-Bhutan engagement. \nInternal Discussants:\nThe first internal discussant pointed out that the three determinants isolated by the speaker\, i.e. security\, culture and economy could not be compartmentalized in real sense. Political culture\, mentioned by the speaker was more about citizenship issue than of foreign policy. According to the first internal discussant Bhutan’s Trade relations with Assam needed to be substantiated. The discussant also suggested the presenter to address Bhutan’s reaction to the Chinese presence and recommendation for India. The second internal discussant suggested the speaker to elaborate Bhutan Nepal relations.  \nGeneral discussion focused on the following issues:\n\nIndia’s Development Assistance to Bhutan\nManifesto of the ruling and opposition parties on Bhutan’s policy towards China and India\nPresence of religious puzzle in Bhutan\nIndian Army’s OP Task in Bhutan\nAttitude of local people of Bhutan towards India\nBhutanese Diaspora\nClimate Change\,\nBinding factor that keeps Bhutan together\n\nChair’s Comments\nAccording to the chair\, the speaker had made an excellent effort to put the narratives into analytical framework. However\, he felt that the title and contents of the paper did not match.  He suggested the speaker to incorporate the comments by the discussants and substantiate them with the application of the Small State theory. \nReport prepared by Gulbin Sultana\, Research Assistant\, IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-making-of-foreign-policy-in-bhutan
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110211T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110211T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T022840
CREATED:20231223T220838Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130245Z
UID:63598-1297402200-1297402200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:China’s National Interest
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Amd. R. RajagopalanExternal Discussant: Prof. Swaran Singh and Prof. Abanti Bhattacharya \n \nThe paper argues that China’s national interest\, and the strategies that China follows to achieve these\, are intricately linked to its priorities at the domestic level. What China defines as its core national interests are relatively stable\, while the policies which are adopted to achieve these are fluid in nature. According to the author\, Chinese writings show that when there is an expansion of economic interest it invariably leads to an expansion of national interest. She concludes by adding that the relationship between military power and economic development which was emphasized by Deng Xiaoping continues to be important even today. Economic development also features as a ‘constant’ and ‘vital’ interest in the classification of national interests. The author’s concluding argument was that while writings on China’s national interests state that peace and development cannot be de-linked\, clarity should be maintained on the priority between the two\, and development should not be compromised to maintain peace\, as argued by Yan Xuetong. \nThe main points of discussion were: \n\nThere is a need to define national interest and what is included and excluded from the core national interest should also be discussed.\nThere is also a need to differentiate between ‘need’ driven and ‘ambition’ driven national interest. Chinese scholars have also not done much work on this topic.\nThere is a need to locate evolution and fluctuation. How and when the choice between sovereignty and regime security does fluctuate.\nThere is a need to study the overemphasis on culture in the context of China’s national interest.\nThe paper needs to bring out the debates within China and explore how the Chinese conception of the national interest is different from the western conception.\nOne needs to also discuss the understanding of the new generation of leadership and whether evolution of national interest in China is a stable or an unstable concept.\nOne also needs to discuss whether national interest is a bourgeoisie concept and discuss the changes after the military modernization and the increase in Chinese confidence.\nIt was suggested that the author could discuss the changes within the concept after the rise of China and the difference between present national interest and future national interest.\nThere is a need to examine the connection between domestic issues and developments and the changes in the concept of national interest.\n	One also needs to define peripheral and global interests and the connection between national interest and diplomacy.\n\nReport prepared by Gunjan Singh\, Research Assistant\, IDSA
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/chinas-national-interest
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110211T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110211T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T022840
CREATED:20231223T220924Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130245Z
UID:63599-1297402200-1297402200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:US Aid to Pakistan: Changing Rules of Engagement and Regional Implications
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Dr G BalachandranDiscussants: Capt (IN) Alok Bansal and Dr Harinder Sekhon \n \nDr Priyanka Singh’s present study focuses primarily on the prevailing dynamics and complexities of US aid to Pakistan\, from an Indian perspective. The key issue that she tried to address in her paper was the lack of a synchronised and substantiated Indian perspective on US aid to Pakistan and its implications for the regional security.  \nThe presenter argued that since the inception of US-Pakistan relations\, aid\, both military and non-military\, has been the key instrument of US policy towards Pakistan. However\, the history of US aid to Pakistan shows that the flow and quantum of the aid has been intermittent. Nonetheless\, aid to Pakistan has been subject to geo-strategic challenges which threatened the US interests in the region time and again. After 9/11\, the US has flooded huge aid into Pakistan to meet its objectives\, both in Afghanistan and in Pakistan.  \nShe noted that in the post 9/11 era\, the main objectives of US aid to Pakistan are to strengthen Pakistan’s capacity for counterterrorism operations\, help it to prevent the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction\, support it in the development of a moderate\, democratic and civilian government in Pakistan. However\, the author felt that because of the absence of clearly defined objectives on how to utilize the US aid has led to mismanagement and augmented complacency in Pakistan’s government. Pakistan relentlessly forestalled decisive action against the Taliban and al Qaeda inside its territory despite receiving billions in aid since 2001. Consequently\, the March 2009 Interagency White Paper outlining US future strategy on Afghanistan-Pakistan enunciated a new course for US aid in the region. It stated that assistance to Afghanistan and Pakistan should be aligned with United States core goals and objectives and that assistance would be limited without the achievement of results. It also stressed on capacity building of the governments in these countries as a measure to arrive at preferred goals. In addition\, the US also made fundamental changes in its subsequent aid policies towards Pakistan such as through the PEACE Act which granted $ 7.5 billion to Pakistan by placing more drivers for better usage of its aid.  \nThe author said that the ongoing discourse in the US on Pakistan’s accountability regarding usage of US aid somehow converges with India’s long held view that aid is being pumped into terror infested Pakistan at the cost of regional security environment. The US aid policy towards Pakistan is also known to lack a coherent strategy being too security centric\, with very little proportions of it reaching the masses out there. In this scenario\, US faces the dilemma of having to increase the aid despite knowing that it may not achieve its desired ends.  \nTherefore\, there are fundamental problems in administering US assistance to Pakistan. According to Dr. Singh\, the important problems among them are the constraints within USAID in staff and resources which are vital to timely and just distribution of the funds and constraints in free and safe movement across Pakistan; more aid than what can be effectively absorbed by local institutions; the case of aid failing to reach the deserving sections of Pakistani society leads to anti-Americanism in Pakistan; lack of outreach and failure of US aid to generate goodwill; resistance to various conditions in US aid policy towards Pakistan; lack of visibility and the ratio of success; lack of transparency in US Pakistan dealings and dearth of support systems to conduct monitoring and oversight of aid.  \nImplications for India: The author pointed out two important dimensions: first\, the US military aid comprising conventional weapons which are of little use in counterinsurgency operations and are borne with the possibility of being used against India; and\, second\, the non-military assistance and its role in Pakistan’s nation building in terms of a stable and peaceful neighbourhood has a direct bearing on the region and India in particular. According to her\, another argument on India’s security concerns stems from “asymmetric warfare” noted to be a principal tool of Pakistan’s foreign policy.  \nAssessing the US aid policy in Pakistan\, she said that huge aid and redemption from several debts has helped Pakistan save itself from an economic breakdown and the resistance that Pakistan security forces offer to the Taliban in their territory which avoided a security breakdown. However\, the author was of the view that any US military aid to Pakistan would be self defeating as this would quietly be absorbed by the Pakistan army. Therefore\, she stressed that there is a need to reconfigure and reorient military assistance to Pakistan driving it more towards counterterrorism and counter insurgency. Finally\, she suggested that US policies should direct the process of managing aid judiciously only on long term basis and it needs to make a modest and a coherent start to initiate measures of checks and balances.  \nMajor Points of Discussion and Suggestions:\n\nRelationship between countries based on shared interests and values last long whereas US-Pakistan relations are based on interest which is transient.\nThe US thinks that aid to Pakistan provides leverage. However\, aid to Pakistan has not brought stability in Pakistan and it is now a failed state. \nUS drone attacks in Pakistan\, critical role of Pakistan media\, and various conditions that are attached to aid has led to anti-Americanism. However\, Pakistan still holds centrality in United States global war on terrorism. \nUS aid policy should aim at stopping the radical idea in Pakistan and should encourage moderate forces for forming a democratic and stable government. This could help Pakistan to fight against Taliban and al Qaeda.\nPakistan’s huge procurement of conventional military aid from US like F16s is surely going to be used against India and these are not going to be used against al Qaeda and Taliban.\n\nThe US aid policy has not succeeded in strengthening liberal forces in Pakistan and instead the radical forces are increasing. Moreover\, the crumbling state structures in Pakistan would have serious regional implications. \nThe author needs to provide a historical background of US aid policy towards Pakistan to clearly reflect issues relating to it. During the post-World War II period\, the role of US industrial-military complex should be discussed in the context of US aid policy.\nPakistan became one of the earliest allies of US by joining CEATO and CENTO in early 1950s and received huge military aid from the US. The geo-strategic significance of Pakistan to US during the Cold War period also needs to be dealt with. The US threat perception from the USSR and China also need to be considered in the aid policy. In the past\, however\, US manipulated aid policy to achieve its self interests. \nThe author needs to discuss and highlight about the rationale behind the fundamental changes in recent US aid policy towards Pakistan and new rules of engagement. The author also needs to consult more Pakistan government sources and Pakistani writings. \nThe US aid policy was very successful immediately after the 9/11 war – especially in the war against Taliban and al Qaeda. However\, issues such as changing the mindset of Pakistan extremists\, bringing peace and stability\, and establishing moderate and democratic government in Pakistan came later where it is not successful. \nThe role of US congressional oversight\, especially the role of Department of Defence\, Department of State\, defence committees\, foreign relations committees and various standing committees in the US aid policy need to be discussed and mentioned in the paper for providing a clear and detailed analysis of the US aid policy towards Pakistan.\n\nReport prepared by Dr Saroj Bishoyi\, Research Assistant\, IDSA
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/us-aid-to-pakistan-changing-rules-of-engagement-and-regional-implications
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110225T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110225T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T022840
CREATED:20231223T220838Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130245Z
UID:63594-1298611800-1298611800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:The Salience of Interdependence in India China Economic Relations\, 1992 -2008
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Professor V P DuttDiscussants: Shri Ravi Bhoothalingam & Dr Partha Mukhopadhyay \n \nThe paper attempted to answer 3 key questions: \n\nWhat has been the quality and content of trade and investment (beyond an ostensible focus on nominal values) in the India-China dyad?\nHas high “economic interaction” translated to operationalization of “economic interdependence” in the India-China dyad? \nHow could the economic partnership be steered to create “constraint interdependence”?\n\nThe author organized his argument by re-visiting the scholarship on economic interdependence in International Relations theory\, recounting the “Liberal” versus “Realist” prioritization of trade and its relationship with conflict. He outlined the framework that he employed in his study (Crescenzi’s Exit cost-Exit threshold model)\, which deals more directly with the issue of opertionalization of interdependence\, and applied the same to the India-China dyad (focusing chiefly on India’s chief product export in its trade basket with China – Iron Ore). He went on identify the key impediments to engendering further interdependence from the Indian and Chinese side using case analyses of Chinese investment in India (telecom sector)\, and impediments to India’s export expansion (pharma sector) in China. \nBy examining key phases of the trade and investment patterns\, the author argued that operationalization of interdependence was discernible in this dyad post-2004 i.e. the costs incurred by each state (both China and India) to remove itself from the dyad to have increased post-2004\, while much of the earlier phase represented economic interaction which\, unlike economic interdependence\, was relatively costless to change. In particular\, he drew out a schema which applied the Crescenzian framework for India-China economic interdependence to reflect different equilibria obtained in various phases of economic interaction\, and argued that the relationship had moved away from “escalation” (high-level conflict; 1949-1992)\, and was currently moving towards the second notional form of “bargaining equilibrium (1st notional form 1992-2004; post-2004 moves towards second notional form). The author concluded by outlining five key recommendations\, which could steer the relationship towards some sort of “constraint equilibrium” in the future (when economic interdependence constrains the behavior of “challengers”\, and ultimately induces partners to eschew conflict scenarios)\, and argued that the interim of the next 3-4 decades were crucial for India to shape its economic relationship with China. By employing the framework of exit costs and exit threshold\, the author argued that an increasing focus on core sectors of competence could be obtained\, which becomes instrumental in teasing out a more complex understanding of when economic interdependence constrains states from entering into high levels of political conflict. \nDiscussants’ comments\nEXTERNAL\na) Ravi Bhoothalingam [former President\, The Oberoi Group of Hotels; former Director of ITC Limited\, Calcutta]\nMr Bhoothalingam welcomed the approach in the paper viz analysis at the dyadic level\, and pointed out that such an approach brought into focus similar complexities and patterns that were discernible in other dyads (China-Japan\, China-Korea\, China-Taiwan and even China-US) which made the study of economic interdependence and conflict in the India-China dyad more relevant. He pointed out\, however\, that dyadic relationships also exhibited the mathematical “step-function” phenomena\, wherein the economic relationship and political relationship were interrupted by a plateau (citing India-China relations improving until the 1998 nuclear tests\, then exhibiting a plateau where accusations of Chinese goods harming Indian manufacturing were rife owing to business pressure\, followed again by the rising curve of improved bilateral interaction in 2003 and thereonwards). This according to him was demonstrative of the absence of linearity in the economic and political trajectories in a relationship. He identified institutional support as a key factor missing in the Indian approach to dealing with China (knowledgebase\, language capacity\, Joint-research avenues) even as several complementarities existed (entertainment\, education\, consulting\, Infrastructure\, among others) for both countries to build on the relationship. \nb) Dr Partha Mukhopadhyay [Economist\, currently working as Senior Research Fellow with the Centre for Policy Research in New Delhi]\nDr Mukhopadhyay complimented the organization of the argument employed by the author in his paper by applying a framework on the operationalization of interdependence\, focusing on sectoral evidence to support the claim\, and identifying the problem areas. He\, however\, pointed out that the framework could be expanded further to explain the switch in “bargaining” outcomes\, which was also possible (economic payoffs reflecting the switch in “target” and “challenger”). He wanted the author to incorporate the authors’ personal experiences in China in the introduction segment\, and cited the need to update the segment on the healthcare and pharma sector with primary data\, and summarise individual segments in the paper by reverting to the framework employed in the study for conciseness. He felt that disaggregating the hurdles (for instance Indian entry into the active pharmaceutical ingredients’ space\, use of guanxi by Chinese telecom companies\, China’s employment challenges\, etc) would bring further clarity on the challenges that lie ahead in the relationship. \nINTERNAL\na) Dr R. N. Das  \nDr Das complimented the author on the paper. He suggested the need to restructure the introduction to reflect the dyadic focus and framework at the outset of the study. In its present structure\, the paper outlines the debate in IR\, which\, according to him\, could be preceded by the restructured introduction. He also pointed out the need to update some references and citations.  \nb) Dr. G. Balachandran\nDr Balachandran felt that the two notional forms suggested in the “bargaining equilibrium” status of the Crescenzian framework (original framework) were conflicting\, and that the measurement of “exit cost thresholds” was problematic. According to him\, an entire of set of vectors for goods in the bilateral trade basket should be employed\, to ultimately arrive at a unique scalar. Due to these methodological issues in the original framework\, he found a disconnect between segment 1 of the paper (where the author outlines the framework) and the remaining 4 segments of the paper weak (application of the framework to the India-China dyad). The latter 4 segments\, he clarified\, did stand outstandingly well\, but it was the connection from the 1st to the remaining 4 segments which was problematic\, according to Dr Balachandran. \nThe author clarified that the Crescenzian framework was being applied in the India-China context only with respect to the largest trade category reflected in top export commodity and top import commodity\, and that the paper was not trying to generate a metric of interdependence based on ‘n’- number of goods\, which could be a task of future research. The author acknowledged the need to strengthen the connection between segment 1 and the remaining 4 segments in terms of outlining the Crescenzian framework with the necessary caveats.  \nThis was followed by the Q&A segment saw deliberations from the audience on issues such as the interplay of dyadic analysis and the “globalised” world at the systemic level\, concerns on China’s intentions\, effect of interdependence on “core” political concerns\, among other issues.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-salience-of-interdependence-in-india-china-economic-relations-1992-2008
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110225T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110225T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T022840
CREATED:20231223T220838Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130245Z
UID:63595-1298611800-1298611800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:India and Iran's Nuclear Issue 2002-2010: Strategic Autonomy\, Regional Stability\, National Security
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Ambassador Arundhati GhoseDiscussants: Ambassador K C Singh & Professor P R Kumaraswamy \n \nRajiv began his presentation by delineating the theme of his paper. In the introduction\, he noted that given the fact that Iran is part of India’s extended strategic neighbourhood\, the Iranian nuclear issue has generated a lot of ‘heat and dust’. He pointed out that the aim of his paper is to distil the Indian government’s policy as well as the nature of the debates in India regarding the Iranian nuclear issue. In this regard\, three broad themes can be discerned in the Indian reactions to the Iranian nuclear issue: ‘Strategic autonomy’ as it relates to India’s foreign policy decision making;’ Regional stability’ as it relates to events in its “proximate neighbourhood”\, the term used by India’s Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao; and ‘National security’ implications on account of operative clandestine proliferation networks.  \nRajiv noted that strategic autonomy has been and continues to be a cardinal ordering principle of India’s foreign policy practise\, as Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Sign has called it an ‘article of faith” for India. On the Iran nuclear issue\, India had to take positions at multi-lateral forums like the IAEA and UNSC since the issue was becoming internationalised. While explaining the Government of India’s position on Iran issue\, Rajiv noted that India is walking a tightrope. India voted against Iran at IAEA. However\, India also supported diplomacy and consultations at multilateral forums where initiatives were undertaken to find solutions to the Iranian nuclear impasse. Apart from these efforts\, India did profess its intention to act as a conduit to help in the resolution of the issue. He noted that in August 2005\, for instance\, in reply to a Lok Sabha debate on his visit to the United States\, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh pointed out that India could act as a “bridge reconciling differences between Iran and the other country”.  \nRajiv noted that on the domestic front\, the left parties were against India’s decision to vote against Iran at the IAEA. While BJP was not against the Indian decision per se\, but it was critical of the government for its manner of dealing with the Iranian issue. He noted that the US factor has been crucial in India’s Iran policy. Ahead of the second IAEA vote\, then US Ambassador to India David Mulford had warned that the Indo-US nuclear deal could “die” and US congress would “simply stop considering the matter” if India did not vote against Iran at the IAEA.   \nDiscussing regional strategic stability\, he pointed out that implications on the regional stability of the possible presence of another additional nuclear weapon power in India’s ‘proximate’ neighbourhood have figured prominently in Indian considerations. Citing several statements by Indian officials\, he noted that Indian policy makers were wary or pessimistic about the possibility of another nuclear weapon power in their ‘proximate’ neighbourhood. Mentioning about India’s proliferation pessimism\, Rajiv noted that India’s pessimism does not seem to be embedded in fears about weak Iranian nuclear organisations but due to the impact on regional security of the spread of sensitive technologies and capabilities.  \nWhile discussing about national security imperatives\, Rajiv noted that Iran-Pakistan linkages on nuclear linkages have been revealed by IAEA reports. It stretches as far as back 1987\, with Iran informing the IAEA in October 2003 that it received “drawings of the centrifuge through a foreign intermediary”. These linkages were highlighted again when in Mach 2010\, the Washington Post revealed Pakistani government complicity in giving Iran “bomb-related drawings\, parts for centrifuges to purify uranium and a secret worldwide list of suppliers.” This information has been reportedly found in a 11-page document written by A. Q. Khan.   \nIn conclusion\, Rajiv noted that in the Indian responses to the Iranian nuclear issue\, the most important factor has been the issue of independence in Indian foreign policy decisions making\, specifically as it related to interactions with the United States. He\, however\, noted that despite hiccups on account of the nuclear question\, there has been a steady stream of interactions at the highest levels between India and Iran\, including the conduct of strategic dialogues. He pointed out that the next one or two years could be crucial with regard to Iran’s nuclear weapons programme\, and suggested that India’s diplomatic efforts should be focussed on reducing the range of ‘unsatisfactory strategies’ (NSA Shivshankar Menon’s term describing US options vis-a-vis Iran in a Wikileaks cable) and expand the space for the application of ‘satisfactory strategies”. He noted that Indian diplomacy has its task cut out\, especially as these two years coincide with its non-permanent membership in the UNSC. \nPoints raised during discussion\n\nIt is a very well researched paper. However\, author needs to explore the Indian dilemma while analysing India’s Iran policy.\nIndia came close to Iran when Taliban captured Afghanistan but now situation has changed. Iran has been involved in creeping nuclear proliferation activities. The United States has gone after Iran. Iranians wanted to buy time aimed at tiring out the United States. Since India wants closer cooperation with the United States\, it would be worth looking at whether India could have handled Iran policy differently. Was there any alternate way available? \nEarlier Iran was preachy to India with regard to nuclear non-proliferation since it is a NPT signatory and India is not. But Iran was not satisfied as India got several benefits without being a member of the non-proliferation regime which Iran could not get despite being a signatory. On nuclear issue\, India has never agreed with Iran.    \nIndia’s Iran policy during UPA-I was different from that being followed by the UPA-II government. \nEvery nation calls itself strategically autonomous. In fact strategic autonomy is a very relative concept. No nation is fully autonomous\, not even the United States.\nIndia cannot be a bridge. To be a bridging power\, a nation needs to be between the two sides. Dealing with the Iranians is very difficult. India should not attempt to be a bridge as it could be knocked out by either side while attempting to play that role. To be a bridge\, we must understand the fundamental problems of both sides. There is a need to look whether there is convergence of interest.  \nAuthor needs to explore whether there is any strategic autonomy in India with regards to Iran. He needs to take a step further. He needs to critically examine the statements given by Prime minister and other documents and take his own stand. \nThe LNG deal went through problems after New Delhi signed the energy deal with Tehran. Where did India go wrong?\nChina supported the UN sanctions against Iran. While analysing the domestic debate\, there is need to look at whether this reflected on the positions taken by the left parties in India. \nSouth Asia is a strategic liability for India whereas West Asia is an opportunity. Iran is very important for India because of its energy resources. \nThere are non-parallel interests involved in India-Iran ties. On energy issue\, India wants cooperation with Iran while on nuclear issue India is opposed to Iran’s nuclear programme.\nAuthor has structured the paper very well. However\, paper needs to be more focused with regard to its objectives. \nAuthor needs to look at whether there is any divide between government and influential groups such as media\, think tanks\, etc. Is there any government stand on regional stability? \nIn the paper\, strategic autonomy has been dealt at significant length but regional stability and regional security have been given less coverage. The paper may need some restructuring in order to make it appear even. \nThere is a need to examine what a nuclear Iran would mean for India’s national security interests. \nIt is also necessary to look at the role of minority politics in India while understanding the domestic political debate in India vis-à-vis Iran.  \nThanking the speakers for their useful comments and suggestions\, Rajiv noted that the Iran issue is over shadowed by the US factor. Iran could be a major worrying point in the future of India-United States relations. He noted that keeping in mind the prescribed word limit\, he would incorporate these suggestions as much as possible. \n\nReport is prepared by Sanjeev Kumar Shrivastava\, Researcher at IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/india-and-irans-nuclear-issue-2002-2010-strategic-autonomy-regional-stability-national-security
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110304T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110304T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T022840
CREATED:20231223T220738Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130244Z
UID:63590-1299216600-1299216600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Evolution of Sri Lanka’s Counter Insurgency Strategy 2002-2009
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Maj Gen Dhruv C Katoch\, SM\, VSM (Retd)Discussants: Shri N Manoharan & Shri M R Narayan Swamy \nHemantha Dayaratne’s paper focuses on the Sri Lanka’s counterinsurgency campaign against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). In his view\, the military strategy adopted by the Sri Lankan army offers an example for other countries facing similar internal challenges. He discusses the fragile peace process started in 2002 and critically analyses the role played by Norway in facilitating the process. Dayaratne argues that Norwegian facilitation could not achieve the desired result because: i) of Norway’s inability to inspire the confidence of Sri Lankan Government and its efforts to equate the government with a terrorist organization (LTTE); ii) lack of sincerity on the part of the LTTE\, which used the ceasefire to strengthen itself; iii) differences between then prime minister Ranil Wickramsinghe and then president Chandrika Kumaratunga. Moreover\, Norway was partial towards the LTTE which made the latter even more inflexible. Thus\, the peace process did not succeed.  \nAfter Rajapakse’s election as president\, the LTTE launched several attacks\, which forced the government to undertake military action. For its part\, the Sri Lankan government took advantage of the division within LTTE (Karuna’s defection) and through an innovative strategy pushed the LTTE into a small area created by the army called the “no fire zone”. This strategy helped defeat the LTTE. The US war on terror post 9/11 also provided an opportune moment for all out military action against the terrorist group\, LTTE. Dayaratne also states that in this operation preventive measures were taken by the Sri Lankan government to guard against civilian casualties and human rights abuses. He concludes that the failure of the Norwegian Peace Process\, the use of military force and the overall strategy of the Sri Lankan government was entirely judicious and led to a successful campaign  \nThe major points of discussion and suggestions to the author were: \n\nExcellent account of the COIN strategy applied by the military and of the Norwegian Peace Process\, but could have been more detailed in terms of providing an insider’s view of the whole process that led to the dismantling of the LTTE.\nThough mainly expressing  author’s personal experience \, the paper could have attempted to establish links between the actual evolution of Sri Lanka’s military and COIN Strategy and diplomatic aspects of the process.\nNorway has been singularly blamed for the failure of the peace process without taking into account intrinsic factors like LTTE’s arrogance in the political sphere\, India’s role in neutralizing LTTE camps\, and the fracture in LTTE’s top echelons. \nOne important detail that is missing in the paper is LTTE leader Prabhakaran’s role in the defeat of the outfit\, committing blunders like killing of Indian Prime minister Rajiv Gandhi which led to India’s non-intervention\nThe role of navy and air force both of which had a major contribution in the operations have been overlooked. \nDisparity of information regarding human rights abuses is evident in the paper. \nCOIN campaign can be said to have been successful only if the root causes have been addressed\, which the paper does not mention.\nNot viable to use as a lesson / example of successful COIN strategy for other battlefields like Kashmir\, Afghanistan\, etc. as these cannot be isolated like Sri Lanka.\n\nReport prepared by Anwesha Ray Chaudhuri\, Research Assistant\, IDSA
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/evolution-of-sri-lankas-counter-insurgency-strategy-2002-2009
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110304T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110304T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T022840
CREATED:20231223T220738Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130245Z
UID:63591-1299216600-1299216600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Insider Threat: The New Nuclear Danger
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Ambassador Arundhati GhoseDiscussants:  Dr Sitakanta Mishra and Dr Aditi Malhotra \nDr Reshmi Kazi introduced the paper by saying that the danger of insider threats is emerging as the new nuclear threat and the risk of insider threats is invariably linked with terrorists seeking fissile materials to build a nuclear device. In the present paper\, Dr Kazi aimed to analyse the severity of the danger of insider threats. She also tried to address the motivating factors that are greatly responsible for giving rise to potential insider risk to a nuclear establishment. \nDefining the insider threat\, Dr Kazi said that the risk of insider threat is present in all organisations. The potential of this threat lies in the act of a trusted employee who might betray his allegiances and obligations to his employer and cause damage or espionage against the employer or the organisation. Moreover\, access of all people without adequate identification to an organization’s critical facilities increases the chances of potential insider threat to the infrastructure.  \nShe pointed out three categories of actors from which there is the risk of insider betrayals: a) psychologically-impaired disgruntled or alienated employees; b) ideological or religious radicals; and c) criminals. She indicated that a trusted employee can develop a malicious intent due to various factors such as vengeance for a seeming wrong; radicalisation for advancement or religious or ideological objectives; and simple unlawful financial gain. Individuals are also motivated to malicious actions because of the growing\, exacerbated or unaddressed discontent with their place or value in the organisation; recruitment by hostile outside entities or groups; infiltration of a malicious actor to a trusted position on an infrastructure operator’s staff; and nuclear industry is affected by workplace trends that currently indicate there will be fewer jobs in the future\, and individuals who are employed will be required to have greater technical skills. However\, according to Dr Kazi\, insider betrayals may not necessarily be from individuals who have been directly affected by discontent or perceived injustice from within the organisation. There might also exist within the category of active insiders\, a subset of unwitting or passive insiders. \nBy highlighting the future trends and the danger of insider threats\, the presenter said that the world of nuclear weapons is expected to gradually undergo revolutionary changes in the coming decades since the nuclear world is surrounded with debates relating to nuclear disarmament\, revamp of the nuclear industry\, emergence of new nuclear states\, rising proliferation\, and spread of nuclear energy. She assumed that the world of nuclear weapons will undergo transformation that will impact issues relating to nuclear weapons in the future which might increase the risk of potential insider threats. \nOn Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme and the severity of the danger of insider threats\, the author stated that in Pakistan there is a strong possibility of insider threats. Quoting David Albright\, she said\, “Pakistan tends to leak vital nuclear information. It’s the nature of the system.” She also cited the famous A Q Khan case which bears testimony to the proliferation of sensitive nuclear technology to several countries and also demonstrates the poor security culture of the state. In addition\, the risk of insider threats is further compounded by a rising wave of Islamist and anti-Western sympathies within Pakistan army and the ISI.  \nReferring to some of the recent incidences of insider threats like a group of peace activists’ security breach at Kleine-Brogel Airbase in Belgium in February 2010\, four armed men’s security breach into the Pelindaba nuclear facility in Pretoria in November 2007 etc.\, the presenter said that the case of AQ Khan perhaps posed the greatest insider threat when he was able to proliferate centrifuges\, nuclear technology and blueprints to Iran\, Libya\, and North Korea. She pointed out that the danger of insider threat is a global problem which has to be addressed by all the leading partners of the international community. The presenter felt that it was important for the nuclear institutions and organisations to become wiser to the tactics of potential insiders. While taking adequate steps to secure fissile materials worldwide\, substantial efforts must be made to overhaul the personal reliability programme\, which must transcend beyond merely evaluating the suitability of bodyguards to the management of expanding stockpile of nuclear materials and weapons.  \nAs part of this comprehensive effort\, she also recommended suggestions for more safety and security of nuclear reactors. Some of the important recommendations in managing the insider threats are: stabilise the economic status of the nuclear personnel in order to prevent nuclear scientists\, engineers\, workers and guards from stealing nuclear weapons and materials or selling nuclear knowledge; redirect the aging workforce into civil nuclear programmes and thereby provide them alternative employment; expand capabilities of nuclear forensics\, police force and human intelligence to intercept nuclear thieves; strengthening international nuclear emergency search and response capabilities etc. \nIn conclusion\, she said that the danger of insider threat must be managed with intelligence\, process\, and technology through a defence-in-depth strategy. If the systems are maintained according to the security configurations necessary\, duties are segregated\, accounts and passwords are controlled\, and employees are made aware that their actions are being logged and monitored\, there is less likelihood of a disgruntled employee attempting the unwanted activity.  \nMajor Points of Discussion and Suggestions:\n\nThe other aspects of insider threats could have been mentioned. \nInternational Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) identified insider threats as violent and non-violent insiders. Violent insiders are active insider threats.\nThe paper could have dealt with the case of North Korea in greater detail and linking with security threat as its nuclear programme is not indigenous.\nIslamisation of Pakistan Army and the deeply religious mindset of the nuclear scientists further compound the danger of insider threats.\nAn insider threat who works with outsiders would pose the most dangerous threat. This dander is also emerging as a new nuclear threat linked with terrorism. \nThe various insider threats should have been further researched in a greater detail and explained.\nWhat are the potential threats to nuclear reactors and what are the nuclear protection safeguard measures have been taken to protect from insider threats? \nThere are a number of international treaties which are responsible for safeguarding nuclear reactors but what the domestic laws and measures exist in this regard.\nThe author has mentioned about various insider threats who are working in different countries like Pakistan\, Iran\, North Korea etc but is there any cross connection? Instead of working on larger issues the author could have been focused on specific issues\, for instance\, the case of Pakistan could have been studied in more details. Perhaps\, the author was trying to do exactly that.\nIs there any possibility for Taliban or extremists getting access to nuclear devices? For small terrorist groups getting access to nuclear devices or weapons and exploding them are not possible. \nAn accident is not an insider threat. If one intents to use sensitive nuclear devices for sabotage\, proliferation and terrorist activity can be said as insider threat. \nIt was suggested that the author needed to clearly define insider threat in order to be able to deal with the issue in a comprehensive manner. Before writing the paper\, the author also needs to visit the places to observe and find out how various reactors are operating\, how they are safeguarded and to note where insider threats can come from.\n\nReport prepared by Dr Saroj Bishoyi\, Research Assistant\, IDSA
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/insider-threat-the-new-nuclear-danger
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110318T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110318T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T022840
CREATED:20231223T220723Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250316T233241Z
UID:63586-1300426200-1300426200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Playing ‘catch up’: Japan’s foreign policy towards India – a case of delayed realism
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Dr Rajaram PandaDiscussants: Professor K V Kesavan and Professor Srabani Roy Choudhury \nThe author tried to demonstrate Japan’s approach to India using the three characteristics that she perceived to be the central determinants of policy: 1) the international geopolitical structure\, 2) elite perceptions and dominant norms\, and 3) commercial and economic diplomacy. Through these variables one can see a ‘creeping realism’ in Japan’s India policy\, which the paper demonstrated with two examples\, economic policy and nuclear energy policy. \nNeoclassical realism best explains Japan’s external policy since it allows for a balance between the international structure and domestic variables as against classical realism which is centred on structure alone. Both anarchy as well as domestic considerations of anti-nuclearism have guided Japanese foreign policy. \nPolicy determinants\nThe Role of the US has been central in the post-WW II Japanese policy. Since US-Japan relations were strong in the Cold War days\, India-Japan political relations remained weak. In the recent past\, among other factors\, the US’ endorsement of Indian nuclear policy through the nuclear deal has altered the Japanese policy. The changed Japanese approach to India was a by-product of the post 9/11 US policy in South Asia. \nRise of China is the other important variable in the current Japanese policy. Japan partnered in the Chinese economy because it thought that this will help ameliorate bilateral political relations. However\, recent instances have proved otherwise. Despite security assurances from the US\, the Asian power shift has Japan worried and hence Japan is looking for stronger relations with democratic countries in Asia. Even the hefty increase in the recently announced Chinese defence budget has raised a few eyebrows in Japan. \nJapan’s Policy towards India\na) Economic Interests: Japanese foreign policy has for many years been centred on economic diplomacy. It has served Japanese interests well and is the dominant determinant of Japan’s India policy. However\, economic relations have been weak due to a lot of reasons and there is much scope to improve economic ties. Japan’s economic interest began to accelerate in the mid-2000s\, following the 2003 BRIC report on India’s emerging power status. Sino-Japanese tensions at about the same time provided another impetus. The Japanese private sector for its part looked to diversify by engaging other economies and reducing its dependence on China.\nAmong other factors\, South Korea’s economic success in India following an early initiative might have also prodded Japan. The recently signed CEPA aims to accelerate India-Japan economic ties and pave the way for projects like DMRC. \nb) Nuclear Cooperation: In recent times\, Japan has been forced to play ‘catch up’ so as not to miss out on India’s nuclear energy market. Anti-nuclearism has been an integral part of Japanese policy since it is the only victim of nuclear weapons. Therefore\, Japan’s response to the 1998 tests was among the most severe. Strong domestic public opinion and domestic politics also guided Japanese policy. However\, today\, policymakers do acknowledge that their reaction might have been too harsh. \nNonetheless\, nuclear energy cooperation might be the next major development in India-Japan relations. Increasing crude prices and fears of global warming have revived the nuclear energy debate and thus Japan has been forced to rethink its approach to nuclear cooperation especially given that it has been internationalizing its nuclear industry. Also\, the lucrative energy infrastructure markets abroad might help the revival of Japanese economy. South Korea’s success in this regard might again work as a push factor for Japan. The recent belief in Japan that India’s incorporation into the non-proliferation regime might help control India through further conditions and would allow Japan to monitor Indian policy by participation rather than by abstention might be the ultimate indicator of the policy shift in Japan. There is also an economic component in terms of revenues for participating Japanese companies. Japan was\, however\, likely to draw out negotiations in order to satisfy its domestic audience which is opposed to the deal due to India’s non-membership of NPT. Despite that\, the author felt that the India-Japan nuclear energy deal could be inked as early as in the next two years. But she added the Fukushima crisis could have its impact on the process.  \nIn conclusion\, the author argued that the above mentioned factors have contributed to the increasing realist Japanese stance towards India. CEPA and the civilian nuclear energy deal are the drivers of the new Japanese policy which aims at achieving congruence through the development of ‘shared interests’ if not ‘shared values’. Japan is slowly modifying its idealistic stance on nuclear issues in the wake of geopolitical changes. The rise of China is only one of the factors of the new Japanese policy and certainly not its central feature. \nMajor Points of Discussion and Suggestions:\n\nThere is a mutual appreciation of each other’s role in the new Asian order that brings India and Japan closer.\nThere is a need for some details about the history of India-Japan bilateral relations. Japan has followed an independent policy towards India and it has not necessarily been a consequence of the US policy.\nThe author should also include a discussion on the Declaration on Security Cooperation and the subsequent Action Plan along with CEPA. The former will have a bigger impact on India Japan relations.\nThe arguments can be substantiated using trade data. CEPA will open the door for smaller companies which have been absent in India Japan trade relations. However\, how CEPA unfolds post Tsunami remains to be seen.\nNuclear cooperation and competition for permanent UNSC seat are related\, how they develop will be interesting.\nNeoclassical realism needs to be fully utilized as a framework. Domestic consumption can be considered as one important factor under this framework. Timeframe would validate the argument more succinctly.\nThe author should clarify whether it’s delayed realism or reluctant realism on the part of Japan.\nThere needs to be more focus on Indian writings on the subject.\nIn 1998\, Japan was hurt more because of the Indian tests because it had more expectations from India than from Pakistan.\nBilateral maritime cooperation is equally important as nuclear cooperation\, and the author needs to include some discussion on that.\n\nReport prepared by Avinash Godbole\, RA\, IDSA
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/playing-catch-up-japans-foreign-policy-towards-india-a-case-of-delayed-realism
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110318T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110318T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T022840
CREATED:20231224T103810Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T043244Z
UID:64124-1300426200-1300426200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Bangladesh- Northeast India- Myanmar: the connectivity corridor
DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nChairperson: Professor Partho GhoshDiscussants: Dr Ram Upendra Das and Dr Nitya Nanda
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/bangladesh-northeast-india-myanmar-the-connectivity-corridor
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110325T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110325T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T022840
CREATED:20231223T220638Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250316T235946Z
UID:63582-1301031000-1301031000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:India-Japan Economic Relations: Focus on the DMIC
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Professor V P Dutt\nDiscussant: Professor Mohammad Badrul Alam \n \nThe broad theme of Dr. Rajaram Panda’s presentation was India-Japan economic relations\, while the key focus was on the Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor (DMIC). At the outset\, he made it clear that the paper would not attempt to examine India-Japan economic relations in detail\, but only examine the development of the Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor project since it is “singularly going to dramatically transform the complexion of India-Japan economic ties in the coming two decades.” \nThe DMIC is a hugely ambitious development project on either side of the Dedicated Freight Corridor (DFC) of the Indian Ministry of Railways with a band of 150-200 kms. It was conceptualised as a global investment and manufacturing destination with emphasis on expanding the manufacturing and services base\, and establish DMIC as the global manufacturing and trading hub. The project\, according to Dr. Panda\, “is going to catapult the bilateral relations to a level that will be the envy of other nations in Asia.” \nCalling DMIC “a unique application of the Public Private Partnership approach to infrastructural development in India\,” Dr Panda added that a holistic approach towards the bilateral relationship is required to reap the benefits of the partnership. In that regard\, materialisation of CEPA (Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement) will strengthen the DMIC\, and India-Japan ties as well. \nPoints of discussion\n\nWhile considering the advantages of DMIC\, the government cannot afford to overlook issues such as land acquisition\, adequate safety measures\, and capability to save the project in case of natural disasters.\nA close examination of links between DMIC and CEPA should be included so that it helps to understand Japan’s rationale for extending support for the project.\nExplaining the role of DMIC and its contribution to overall India-Japan economic relations would add value to the paper. More attention\, therefore\, should be given to the tangible benefits the project accrues to the India-Japan economic relationship.\nRecent incidents in Japan have certainly affected the Japanese economy\, and it will be worthwhile to analyse its impact on the ambitious DMIC project.\n\nReport prepared by Rahul Mishra\, Research Assistant\, IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/india-japan-economic-relations-focus-on-the-dmic
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110325T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110325T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T022840
CREATED:20231224T103810Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250311T044045Z
UID:64122-1301031000-1301031000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Does India have a Neighbourhood Policy?
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Ambassador I P KhoslaDiscussants: Shri Kanwal Sibal and Professor Sujit Dutta
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/does-india-have-a-neighbourhood-policy
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110401T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110401T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T022840
CREATED:20231223T220638Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T103810Z
UID:63581-1301635800-1301635800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Nuclear Energy in China & India: A Comparative Study
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Dr G BalachandranDiscussants: Prof Swaran Singh and Dr R Ramachandran \nDr Ch Viyyanna Sastry in his present paper aimed to analyse and compare the nuclear energy development programmes in China and India. The key issues that he tried to address in the paper are: the roadmaps of China and India in securing their energy demands; how both the countries started their nuclear energy programmes; routes through which they are planning to achieve this; and finally to see what are the possible outcomes. \nAt the outset he said that nuclear energy is being viewed by many countries including China and India as one of the potential alternatives to the growing demands on carbon emissions and global warming. The energy deficient countries are also looking for nuclear energy as an alternative source of energy\, because of its steady supply source and the stable and predictability of costs for the full operation of reactors.  \nMoreover\, China and India as the two most populous countries with high economic growth rates for the past several years\, they have to generate more energy to sustain their growth rates. Therefore\, as the global plans on nuclear energy expand\, China and India are poised to play a strong role in this area.  \nOn China’s nuclear energy programme\, Dr. Sastry said that till recently\, the role of nuclear energy in the overall energy production was quite low amounting to just 2 per cent of the total electricity generation. At present\, China has about 13 nuclear power plants of different capacitates in operation generating about 10.8 GWe. During the eleventh economic plan period for the years 2006-2010\, China set an ambitious goal for new nuclear plant construction for developing about 40 GWe by 2020. In addition\, there are various revised plans and projections in China for achieving even more than 40 GWe by 2020. As the State Energy Bureau (SEB) of China set the target of 50 GWe and the State Council claimed of possibility of achieving 70 GWe by 2020. Dr Sastry pointed out that in pursuit of the set targets\, Chinese government approved the construction of an additional 28 nuclear reactors by 2020 of which 20 are already under construction. Several new reactors are also being planned.  \nOn India’s nuclear energy programme\, he explained that Indian civilian nuclear energy programme is based on the three stage programme envisioned by Dr Homi J Bhabha. The first stage of the indigenous nuclear power programme involving setting up of pressurized heavy water reactors is now in industrial domain. With the start of construction of the 500 MWe prototype fast breeder reactors in October 2004\, the second stage has been launched. He opined that it is time for India to accelerate the implementation of the second stage and move towards the development of the third stage of the nuclear power programme. He suggested that in parallel\, India has to continue to work towards development of emerging nuclear energy technologies to address its long term energy requirements which are indeed very large. \nDr Sastry said that despite the criticism based on proliferation\, safety and security of reactors and environmental concerns after the recent Japanese nuclear crisis\, it is possible that India\, along with other Asian countries like China\, Russia and South Korea\, is actively involved in the global resurgence of nuclear power that is being witnessed in the past few years. He held that both China and India are likely to increase their share of nuclear energy significantly in the next decades\, thus\, leading a nuclear renaissance which could revive the nuclear industry. While the Indian target of 20 GWe by 2020 appears achievable\, China too can reach 40 GWe by that time. In addition\, China with its resources\, manpower\, unhindered technology transfers\, the single party governance and not much opposition from the people\, is more likely to reach its desired figures. \nThough nuclear energy is going to play a pivotal role\, he suggested that both the countries have to work on clear technologies to sustain their higher growth rates. The increasing population could be a wild card.  \nSo far as the export of future nuclear reactors are concerned\, he said that with passing indigenisation and development of related nuclear infrastructure\, China is certain to become a nuclear exporter in a big way. On India’s export capability\, however\, he said that till it masters the fast-breeder technology\, India should not hesitate to consider offering soft loans to kick start export of its nuclear reactors i.e. Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors (PHWRs). It is possible that many countries would like to start with medium to small nuclear power plants than say 1000 MWe plants. \nAt the end of his presentation\, Dr Sastry said that India was a victim of international politics because of its principled stand against the nuclear proliferation treaty (NPT) and subsequent nuclear tests which led to the formation of the nuclear suppliers group (NSG). He pointed out that the Indo-US nuclear deal has changed the situation enabling India to import nuclear reactors along with the required fuel from outside.  Finally\, he suggested that India can become a world leader in the production and running of fast breeders if it manages to run successfully the much-awaited Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR) at Kalpakkam. In fact\, that success is likely to turn a new leaf in the development of nuclear energy.  \nMajor Points of Discussion and Suggestions:\n\nAlthough at present the primary emphasis of China’s nuclear programme is on its peaceful uses\, its nuclear programme started for military purposes and in October 1964 it conducted its first nuclear test. However\, India’s nuclear programme was started solely for peaceful purposes and its civil nuclear programme is the oldest among the Asian countries.\n\nThe DAE’s announcement of targetting 10\,000 MWe by the year 2000 and its subsequent failure to achieve it had lessened the image of the department. However\, the main reason for the failure to achieve the stated objective was because of the government’s failure to put equity in this sphere.\nIndia’s civilian nuclear programme would have improved if the Indian government had put more equity in this sector. The situation\, however\, is improving gradually after the successful conclusion of the Indo-US nuclear deal and the follow up measures taken by the Indian government in this regard. \nOn China’s standardisation of nuclear energy reactors\, what are the measures China has taken in this regard and how India can learn this from China?\nSo far as the indigenisation and development of nuclear infrastructures are concerned\, how can India cooperate with China?\nChina has recently taken many safety measures for its nuclear reactors. However\, how it is going to address the issues relating to the safe disposal of nuclear wastes and environmental concerns still remain the major concerns. \nRole of civil society in China is very critical in the Chinese civil nuclear energy programme especially in locating the reactors and addressing the environmental concerns. How civil society in China is going to react in coming years on this needs to be looked into. However\, at present no such major opposition is coming from the civil society. \nVietnam wants to build nuclear energy reactors and China is interested in supporting it\, if this will materialise how it would impact other countries of the region?\nFrom the present Japanese nuclear crisis\, what are the lessons Indian government has learned and what are the safety measures that the government is going to take to face similar situations in the future.\nSo far there is no allegation against India on proliferation concerned activity. It has impeccable track record on nuclear non-proliferation. There is also no case against India of diverting the imported civil nuclear technology or energy for military purposes. \nThe stated objectives of the research paper are not clear enough at present and there are also no clear policy recommendations. The author needs to focus on this and needs to further streamline the paper.\n\nReport prepared by Dr Saroj Bishoyi\, Research Assistant\, IDSA
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/nuclear-energy-in-china-india-a-comparative-study
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110408T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110408T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T022840
CREATED:20231223T220538Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130244Z
UID:63577-1302240600-1302240600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Civil-Military Relations in Post-Suharto Indonesia
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Dr R N DasDiscussants: Professor Baladas Ghoshal and Shri C S Kuppuswamy \n \nThe author analysed the developments in civil-military relations in Indonesia especially in the post Suharto era. He highlighted the fact that Indonesia charted its own civil military relation and almost defied the predetermined path laid out by theoreticians. \nHe also argued that military’s disposition in the civilian sphere had declined in the successive administrations since 1998. The military was unwilling to take on direct political role during the time of B J Habibie. Under the Habibie administration\, military introduce few changes in its doctrine and charted out four principles viz. a) the Military would no longer be in forefront of politics; b) It would influence the political process indirectly; c) It would shift its sociopolitical position from occupier to that of influencer and d) It would concede some of its sociopolitical functions to the nonmilitary partners. In the administration of Adburrahman Wahid\, the civilian government appropriated certain function such as appointments and promotion of senior officers which until now the military had exercised.   \nIn this paper\, the author discussed various theories of civil-military relations including the Separation and Concordance theory. He argued that the Separation theory is inadequate in explaining the relationship between armed forces\, the political elite\, the society and the institutions in post-Suharto Indonesia. The author highlighted that it is Concordance theory (which takes into account a nation’s historical and cultural context in determining the democratization of the country) better explains the developments in the post Suharto period. \nThe author identified various internal variables\, external variables\, and international variables to enquire the nature and developments in civil-military relations in Indonesia and attempted to extrapolate the future trend of civil military relations. \nAs regards internal variables\, he  explained that the internal variable refers to factors internal to the military such as professionalism\, corporate interests\, politicization etc. He highlighted the fact that army with its hierarchic organization and a cohesive characteristic ensures speedy implementation of decisions taken. He stated that it is claimed that armies are agents of modernization\, whether or not they intervene in politics\, since military driven investment has spin-off benefits for the civilian sector as well. He offered the explanation that Indonesian military drew its political strength from the doctrine of “dual function” which assigned it a direct political role beyond its strictly military role. He also enumerated the role of external factors such as political\, social system and governance and the related factors that shaped civil-military relations in Indonesia. \nIn conclusion he emphasised that Indonesia is undergoing societal changes which have their basis in the civil society. Quoting Huntington\, he stated that future problems in civil military relations in new democracies such as Indonesia are likely to come from the failures of democratic governments to promote economic developments and maintain law and order and not necessarily from the military. He speculated that these challenges will be faced with a new interpretation of civil military relations. \nMajor points of discussion and suggestions:\nThe author should highlight the characteristics of Indonesian army and should give more details how it came into existence. \nThe author should give more empirical evidences to the theories discussed in the paper and should test whether these theories are applicable to the Indonesian case. \nThe author should highlight the reason for continued domination of military in Indonesia\, may be in conclusion of the paper. \nThe author should emphasize as to how these three factors (i.e. internal\, external and international) emphasized in the paper interact with each other\, thus influencing the nature of civil military relations. \nA separate paragraph on the socio-political fabric of Indonesia is needed right at the outset\, qualify more explicitly which will help the author’s argument\, the futility of the Separation theory that is discussed in the paper. \nThe author should add a hypothesis\, particularly because the paper discusses about independent variable and dependent variable. The author needs to identify the relationship between the independent variable and dependent variable.  \nReport prepared by Shamshad A. Khan\, Research Assistant\, East Asia cluster.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/civil-military-relations-in-post-suharto-indonesia
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110415T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110415T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T022840
CREATED:20231223T220538Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130244Z
UID:63575-1302845400-1302845400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:The Role and Impact of Supreme Leader (Velayat-e Faqih) on Iranian Foreign Policy
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Ambassador Ishrat AzizDiscussants: Professor Qamar Agha and Professor A K Ramakrishnan \n \n \nDr. Rizvi started his presentation with the concept of velayat-e-faqih and its evolution. Velayat-e-Faqih is the most important institution in the post-revolution political system of Iran. The essence of this theory\, developed and applied by Ayatollah Khomeini\, is that one man with a thorough knowledge of Islamic law is to be designated as vali-e-faqih. Preamble of the Iranian constitution provides for the leadership of a fully qualified faqih whom the people consider as the leader who ensures that no institution deviates from its Islamic mandate. Despite the division of the three branches of government\, the constitution gives the velayat-e-faqih total control over the affairs of the state. Since the religious and political powers rest in one person\, the Imam’s powers are far beyond those of any contemporary head of state. \nGiven this background\, this paper studied the role of the institution of velayat-e-faqih during three phases of Iranian politics. The first phase covered the period 1979-1989\, during which Khomeini was the supreme leader. The second phase dealt with the period 1989-2005. Seyyed Ali Hossein Khamenei became the supreme leader in 1989 and during this period\, there were two presidents\, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989-1997) and Seyyed Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005). The third phase dealt with the post-2005 period\, when the hardliner Ahmadinejad was elected as President of Iran. It also examined how the institution has interacted with an executive presidency with differing ideological orientations and whether it has ensured continuity in the foreign policy of the Islamic republic. \nInitiating the discussion\, Mr. Qamar Agha clarified that there is no rule of clergy in Islam\, though among Shia it is still continuing. He said that it was basically a Christian concept. Conversely\, the holy Quran is a guide and one does not need anybody in between. Though interpretation is traditionally allowed\, the present problem lies in the fact that interpretation has been stopped. Further\, people in general believe that legitimacy of state lies with people\, not with god. Therefore\, government should be elected and hence democracy is considered as the best form of governance.  \nThen\, he talked about Shi’a theology and the concept of jihad and argued that there is no offensive jihad as killing of people is considered as killing of civilisation. Moreover\, Imam is needed to wage an offensive jihad. Rather\, they believe in jihad-e-Akbar\, fight with evil forces all the time; take out everything bad from the society like poverty and illiteracy. On the other hand\, the modern concept of holy war (jihad) is a medieval Christian concept adopted by the Muslims. Applying the principles of jihad\, Mr. Agha supported that if the government is corrupt\, it is the duty of its citizens to wage jihad against it and Iran did the same. The Iranian revolution is also unique as there was large popular participation. In the recent past\, voluntary demonstrations posed a grave threat to dictatorial regimes in many Muslim countries.  \nTaking the talk to the Iran-Iraq war\, Mr. Agha pointed out that Khomeini opposed any compromise. He wanted to introduce liberal Islam but during the war\, lesser clergy took over the reigns and Khomeini had to compromise. Separately\, the Najaf School mentions that clerics have no right to be part of government because it corrupts both religion and politics. But Khamenei\, present ruler\, managed things tactfully and was able to use both conservatives as well as liberals. He followed the policy of rapprochement\, as a result\, relations improved with Persian Gulf. Nevertheless\, Iranians are still fighting for democracy. \nProf. A. K. Ramakrishnan commented that the significance of the institution of faqih is intertwined with the aspects of Khomeini’s personality. In essence\, it is both constitutional and extra-constitutional authority derived from political\, constitutional religious as well as personality factors. He mentioned three important moments in Iranian history after the revolution: \n\nImmediate days when faqih became an institution. It is a constitutional process.\nKhomeini and drafting of constitution and his death led to a crisis as to what would happen to faqih (political crisis).\n2009 presidential elections—the institution of faqih was questioned.\n\nThen\, Prof. Ramakrishnan touched upon some conceptual aspects and asked what Khomeini did to make Islam contemporary? He answered that Khomeini made it a religious as well as political concept after the concepts of Wahabbia and Muqaddama. He believed that religion and politics cannot be separated by any means and hence made it a part of worldly affair. There was also mention about the concept of ummah and the concept of grand struggle\, anti-imperialism\, global solidarity and non-alignment. Further\, Khomeini made faqih a political institution. Again\, the controversy between ummah and nationalism was resolved by Khomeini while invoking reference to Shi’a traditions. There was also debate between Islamic republic as a state and its people as civil society. People beyond clergy are included in political system and ideological difference is clearly different from earlier days. However\, the current period is one where there is crisis of democracy. Added to the trend is a notion of loosening of hegemony with 2009 elections. He ended discussion with a question\, whether there are counter-hegemonic forces? \nDr. Ashok K Behuria raised some important issues like origin of the concept\, faqih as political institution-elite hegemony\, main foreign policy making institutions in Iranian political system and some definitional issues. He also discussed certain issues like relations with West\, the Iranian nuclear issue and the approach of faqih towards the same. Finally\, he touched upon the political process and role of civil society. \nDr. Meena Singh Roy stressed upon the Iranian foreign policy goals and impact of faqih on foreign policy. She also referred to post 2009 changes and its impact. She posed a question of whether Islamic societies can embrace democracy and argued that Islam is not inherently hostile to democracy. Regarding the Iranian reform\, she insisted that it is a broad multiclass reform movement. \nThe discussion was followed by a meticulous Q&A session focused on a range of topics like the concept of faqih and its pan-Islamic impact\, distance between Indian Shi’as and Khomeini regime\, organic interconnection between Islam and politics and the future of faqih under present revolutionary phase in the Middle East. It was noted that the Iranian system is more similar to Saudi Arabian system where democracy and dictatorship are continuing simultaneously. However\, Iranian regime is very strong. Further discussion raised questions on dilution of faqih in 1989 and challenges in 2009\, internal debates within the institution about its role\, people’s perception about faqih especially non-Iranians\, reactions in Arab world\, process of faqih in foreign policy making\, role of Indian government\, and possible conflict between Iranian Shi’a clergy and nationalists. It is to be noted here that the influence of faqih was felt as threatening by other nations. It did not go well with Arabs as it was anti-monarchical revolution in Iran and threatened established monarchies in the Gulf. When Khomeini took over\, Iran was not entirely Islamic (it’s a religious discourse). Khomeini wanted to achieve Islamic unity. But in 1979\, there was division between radicals and liberals and continued till 1985. \nFinally\, Ambassador Ishrat Aziz summarized the discussion with questions like what were goals of Khomeini —political or religious; interpreting Islam or governance; does faqih lead to democracy; whether faqih is elected or selected etc. He explained that many came to power through ideology but few could rule (govern) on ideology and Khomeini was one of them. He was also a pragmatist and successfully made a distinction between final and absolute power.  \nReport prepared by Mr. Babjee Pothuraju\, Research Assistant\, IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-role-and-impact-of-supreme-leader-velayat-e-faqih-on-iranian-foreign-policy
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110415T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110415T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T022840
CREATED:20231224T103722Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T050919Z
UID:64118-1302845400-1302845400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:India’s National Solar Mission – strategic lessons for energy security
DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nChairperson: Dr G BalachandranDiscussants: Shri Pankaj Batra and Shri Ravi Raina
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/indias-national-solar-mission-strategic-lessons-for-energy-security
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110429T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110429T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T022840
CREATED:20231223T220523Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130244Z
UID:63572-1304055000-1304055000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Renaissance of Military History\, War and International Studies in India
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Brigadier R .Dahiya (Retd)\, Advisor\, Military Affairs Cluster\, (IDSA)Discussants: Prof Anirudh Deshpande (University of Delhi) and Sqn Ldr RTS Chhina (Retd)\, Secretary Armed Forces Historical Research\, USI of India. \n \n \nPK Gautam introduced the paper by saying that in India there is a knowledge gap in the pursuit of contemporary military history in the framework of international studies.  He emphasized the need to catch up with international standard practices in this respect. The core argument of the paper is that the military history can no longer be peripheral as it is the root discipline for the development of strategy. Globally\, the study of contemporary military history has already moved leaps ahead of the drums\, bugle and trumpet approach. Unlike in the past\, the trends in warfare have changed from inter state to that of intra state combined with the rapid changes in technology. Military transformations and change is still under inadequate conceptual scrutiny. In the force on force or the high end spectrum\, technology is a vital input. This has now generated new demands on historians to grapple with more of science and technology.   India is emerging as a global power. Yet in this soft academic and policy field it has serious deficiencies. \nThe bottlenecks \nUniversity System   \nIndian University system does not facilitate the study of Military History. In universities like JNU and DU\, there is no course in strategic theory and military history. The Department of Defence and Security Studies (DSS) in universities such as Pune\, Madras\, Allahabad\, Meerut\, Chandigarh\, Patiala\, Gorakhpur etc are also responsible for the neglect. Military history remains an optional paper with absence of professional faculty. This is an ad-hoc and inadequate approach. Although some limited work exists of the pre-independence British period\, there is no serious original work by an Indian author on modern war studies. Rather\, mostly foreign scholars excel here and are widely quoted. \nThe State \nThe state itself has not published official histories of major wars and operations barring that of 1947- 48  in J&K or liberation of Goa in 1961 and an un-official history of 1965 Indo- Pak war just released. Although the Kargil Review Committee and its follow up Group of Ministers Reports have been hailed as the first of its kind in independent India – the war dairies of the army have yet to reach the History Division for even archival safety.  \nMilitary institutions worldwide rarely have been interested in studying their own experiences with any degree of honesty. Major reason military institutions get the next war wrong is because they either deliberately fail to study the last war\, or do so only insofar as it makes leaders feel good. Seeing it from the Utilitarian History perspective\, probably from a theoretical point of view monumental myth making could be a strong driver for officials not to declassify records of the defeat in 1962 at the hands of the Chinese\, but the reason for reluctance to publish   1971 monumental victory is not clear.   \nIndian Military\nThere is no structural teaching of military history at the National Defence Academy (NDA). At the Indian Military Academy (IMA)\, there are no professors of war studies. The three general rules of study of military history- width\, depth and context should be the conceptual bedrock for the study of military history. But these are not well appreciated\, and understood. The fledgling Indian National Defence University (INDU) is expected to have a history section under the wing of its National Institute for Strategic Studies. But in the absence of consciously incorporating the History Division and archival work\, it is likely to fall in the same process of ‘IR centricity’. The Indian military is also weak in the professional art of the mandated record initiation and keeping. One glaring infirmity is the absence of maps and sketches post independence\, in after action reports. Units are the building block originators or sensors. But no scientific training is imparted to regimental or staff officers who need to initiate these primary sources like war diaries and historical records.  \nThe Result Due to Neglect  \nUsing archives not in India but in UK and other places\, a handful of contemporary Indian authors have demonstrated the use of the historian’s craft and methods to interpret military and strategic history post independence. Due to absence of archival work\, academics are discouraged to pursue diplomatic or strategic and war related topics. Historical maps like those of Sino- Indian border in any case are a rarity. On the 1962 war in Arunachal Pradesh we have not recorded oral history of the people. The same could be true for Ladakh. The popular history embedded in public psyche is that Chinese troop strength was overwhelming “waves and waves of hordes”: whereas interaction with people who were old enough to remember events of 1962 would perhaps reveal otherwise.  \nPolicy Suggestions  \nSuggestions were given out at three levels. Level 1 is with the larger question of the Indian university system\, where departments of History\, IR and DSS to include the subject of modern war studies and military history. Military history should be Included in the INDU curriculum. Level 2 is at official/government level. Some suggestions here are; revive Historical Division\, revive the statistical branch of the Armed Forces\, restart the flow of documents from service HQ to History Division for safekeeping and for use by academics and scholars once declassified in future\, incorporate the Indian Coast Guard in the loop\, which has not been done so far. Maps and Sketches must be of a very good standard\, projects to record history of insurgencies with counter insurgencies to be undertaken. Level 3 is about how units\, formations and Headquarters need to gear up to capture and report data for historical work. HQ Integrated Defense Staff should become the nodal agency of the military history dimension. Introduction of the concept of combat historians has also been recommended.    \nConclusion\nWhile declassification on time and in accordance with the Public Record Act and Rules (30 year cycle) is necessary\, it is not sufficient. What is more vital is to capture data in archives of the instruments of power of the state: that is its armed forces and security agencies as per institutional practices. A fresh debate is needed on this key component of the intellectual growth. The case here is just not to declassify (the issue may be that the operation or conflict is still on going) but also to institutionalize the study. This in no case will militarize society\, but would rather make our public in general and armed forces in particular\, more professional in dealing with external threats.  It will also throw new light on various insurgencies and facilitate policy options for counter insurgency in a vibrant democratic India.    \nDiscussion/Comments/Observations\nR.T.S Chhina was very appreciative of the paper. He found the paper to be a “groundbreaking” exercise. He urged upon IDSA to take necessary steps to make the recommendations of the paper see the light of the day. He was critical of the government’s policy of classifying documents.  Under the rubric of “embarrassment to the government”\, which is a very subjective thing\, the government cannot hold the information back from the public. He also suggested to put the Public Record Act and Rules at the centre stage of the study as then the author of the paper can highlight the issue of government’s apathy towards the writing of an objective military history. He cautioned the author not to mix up the key issues of history with the theoretical debates of historians and political scientists when they approach a subject differently. By doing this the clear message will get diluted. \nProf. Deshpande cited the lack of availability of the primary sources on military history in public domain as the main cause of the neglect of the subject. He elaborated how history is given a low priority in universities due to archival absence. “De-classifying” – is the only solution\, he said. He also raised a very sensitive but important question of lack of internal democracy within the armed forces. The issue was raised in the context of military’s reluctance to part with any information and the tendency to mark most of the files as sensitive and secret. He pointed out that in Delhi University he has come across very keen students who may like to pursue the study of post independence counter insurgency as historians\, but the climate is not encouraging. In many ways the armed forces themselves may be responsible for keeping all such matters under a security blanket.  \nDr Kalyanaraman suggested that the paper must clearly establish and explain the link of military history to that of strategic and security studies. One reason for the lack of interest in initial stages could be debate between guns vs. butter. His suggestion was to take up the study of military history at IDSA\, which is aptly suited for the purpose.  \nAnit Mukherjee\, like other panelists\, was very critical of the lack of primary sources for research and government’s apathy towards the problem. He suggested a slight change to the title of the study by prefixing “The Need” to the existing title. This he felt would obliterate any misconception about the study being only of academic value and would make it more policy relevant. \nChairperson’s Remarks\nBrig (retd) R. Dahiya complimented PK Gautam and said that the issue of writing military history is of utmost importance. He said that history is important as it guides us in our future ventures as each and every event of the past has a lesson ingrained in it for the future. The importance of history is more pronounced in the case of military strategy. He concluded by thanking the panelists and the gathering for a constructive engagement. \nReport prepared by Amit Kumar\, Research Assistant\, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/renaissance-of-military-history-war-and-international-studies-in-india
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110429T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110429T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T022840
CREATED:20231224T103722Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T042833Z
UID:64116-1304055000-1304055000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:The Balochistan Insurgency: A Political Analysis
DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nChairperson: Professor Partho GhoshDiscussants: Professor Kalim Bahadur & Professor Savita Pande
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-balochistan-insurgency-a-political-analysis
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110513T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110513T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T022840
CREATED:20231223T220522Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250316T235758Z
UID:63569-1305264600-1305264600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:The Absent Dialogue: Civil-Military Relations and Military Effectiveness in India
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Narendra Sisodia (DG\, IDSA)Discussants: P.S. Das\, Vice Admiral (retd.)\, Dhirendra Singh (IAS)\, Prof. Rajesh Rajgopalan (JNU) \nThis paper examines civil-military relations in India and argues that it has an adverse impact on the country’s military effectiveness. Anit Mukherjee introduced the paper by trying to situate Indian civil-military relations in the theoretical construct and argued that it most closely resembles Huntington’s “objective control”. However\, he argued\, that contrary to Huntington’s claim\, objective control does not maximize military effectiveness\, thus questioning the Huntingtonian paradigm. The author argued that the unique characteristics of Indian civil-military relations qualify it to be best described as an “absent dialogue.” In making this argument\, the paper examines four processes that shape military effectiveness – weapons procurement\, defense planning\, integration and officer education\, and promotion policies. The paper starts by posing some questions; “what are the causes and consequences of the form of civilian control in contemporary India\, in response to internal and external challenges\, how have civil-military relations evolved and what have been the major areas of contestation\, and finally why has the government undertaken episodic reforms aimed at streamlining the military and to what extent are these reforms successful?”     \nThe paper is composed of three sections. Section one\, begins by discussing the theory of civil-military relations. Next it describes the three unique characteristics of civil-military relations in India. (Lack of civilian expertise\, strong but competing bureaucratic control over the military and considerable autonomy granted to the military to compensate for the previous two factors.) According to K. Subrahmanyam the “absent dialogue” directly translates into a system where “politicians enjoy power without any responsibility\, bureaucrats wield power without any accountability and the military assumes responsibility without any direction.”  \nSection two describes the study of military effectiveness and the problems associated with defining it. It then analyzes Indian military effectiveness by examining four crucial determinants – weapons procurement\, defence planning\, integration and officer education\, and promotion policies. In doing so\, it examines how each of these determinants is influenced by civil-military relations. \nSection three argues that the Indian state has acknowledged these problems and has made some attempts at defence reforms; however\, a more forceful political intervention is required\, if the reforms have to be meaningful. The paper ends by noting that “in the absence of a crisis such sort of an intervention is unlikely”. The paper concludes that in the absence of a strong political will and leadership defense reforms have had “sub-optimal results”. \nExternal Discussants\nMr. Dhirendra Singh suggested that the paper should be restructured in a manner so as to effectively use the historical facts given in the paper about how the civil-military relationship has evolved over a period of time in the Indian context\, to buttress claims about the problem areas in civil-military relations. He also suggested that the author should come up with solutions to the problem of the bureaucracy’s control over the military. He said that the author’s approach is ambivalent on the issue of lack of expertise in the bureaucracy: if we have adopted a generalist cadre system\, then how can we blame the bureaucracy for not ‘expertly’ guiding the military\, particularly on issues where there is a lack of consensus in the armed forces themselves. Singh also made the pertinent point that the question of civil-military integration should be looked into within the constitutional arrangement of the country and here the understanding of the Articles 74 and 77 becomes very important.  \nVice-Admiral PS Das’s remarks were not so much on the paper as on the existing realities which he experienced during his various key postings. Significantly\, he said that publishing the Henderson-Brook report (on the 1962 India-China war) will not expose politicians or bureaucrats since their failure has already been established. It will\, however\, help the military in course-correction. Yet\, the political establishment is reluctant to publish the report\, much to the disillusionment of many. He cautioned against nurturing the belief that all politicians and bureaucrats are inept and cited the examples of Jagjivan Ram\, Yashwant Rao Chavan\, Arun Singh\, Ajai Vikram Singh\, and others. Das said that we need to take some corrective measures and not aim at radical changes. He made some valuable suggestions including\, the need for complete control of defence forces over their revenue matters and the expediency of higher education for the officers.  \nProf. Rajesh Rajgopalan said that Grand Strategy has two components – force and diplomacy. We never paid enough attention to the force component and hence a lot is left to be desired on this count. He pointed out that India has a huge “margin of error” in the military sphere vis-à-vis its neighbours. Prof. Rajgopalan said that what India has is “ineffective” civilian control over the military because of the former’s lack of expertise.  \nInternal Discussants\nCol. Ali Ahmed pointed out that Huntington never said that objective control will lead to military effectiveness. In fact\, Huntington has not used the term “effectiveness” anywhere in his seminal work\, The Soldier and the State. So Anit Mukherjee’s criticism of Huntington on the ground that contrary to Huntington’s claim “objective control” does not maximize India’s military effectiveness is not justified since what Huntington meant was objective control will lead to military “professionalism”\, and that has happened in India.  \nThis issue was taken further by Anit who opined that although it is true that Huntington did not use the term effectiveness\, yet he never differed with later scholars who followed his work and treated “effectiveness” as a benchmark of the professionalism of the armed forces\, since the concept of effectiveness was not developed at that point in time when Huntington wrote his book. Moreover\, the study of civil-military relations assumes that objective control would lead to professionalism and automatically an effective military.  \nCdr. SS Parmar said that any scheme of higher education for the armed forces must include the JCOs\, the backbone of the Indian Armed Forces. \nGeneral Discussion\nSeveral comments and suggestions were made in terms of the paper being a framework analysis of Civil-military relations in India. \n\nWg Cdr. V. Krishnappa – “Dialogue” part of the title should be made more pronounced. The paper will then become more policy-relevant.\nAmit Cowshish (IDAS) – differences of opinion and attitude between the civil and military is primarily due to the different sets of ethos that they adhere to. He also clarified the stance of the Ministry of Finance on revenue matters and said that substantial delegation of revenue matters of defence has already been done to it. \nBrig. Dahiya said that victories in wars should not be the final judgment on the efficacy of the military\, a point aptly made by Anit in his paper. Suggestion was to prepare the list of military failures and the reason for the failures to assess the problem areas facing the armed forces vis-à-vis the civil administration. \n\nChairperson’s Remarks\nThe Director General said that the paper will definitely bring to the centre stage the debate on “civil-military relations” in India. He\, however\, lamented that in India this debate deteriorates into a “tussle between bureaucracy and military”. Defending the bureaucracy\, he said that the Secretaries are the staff of ministers. So it logically follows that the voice of the secretary is not his own\, rather it is the wish of the minister echoed by him. He provided an insight into the functioning of civil-military relations based on his experience as a rapporteur for Cabinet meetings. His observation was that whenever there was a consensus in the military over a certain issue\, the cabinet invariably gave its nod for it. The problem arose only when there was no consensus on the issue among the armed forces themselves. He said that the political leadership agreed with the military leadership more frequently than it did so with the civilian bureaucracy\, underlining the point that the armed forces have enjoyed considerable autonomy in their functioning. He stressed the need for democratization of the educational system of the military. He concluded by saying that the generalist system which has come under scrutiny by the author is all right\, but specialization in some areas should also be encouraged to facilitate smooth functioning of the MoD. \nFurther Reading\n\n“The Absent Dialogue”\, Seminar\, July 2009. \n“Failing to Deliver: Post-Crises Defence Reforms in India\, 1998-2010″\, IDSA Occasional Paper\, March 2011.\n\nReport prepared by Amit Kumar\, Research Assistant\, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-absent-dialogue-civil-military-relations-and-military-effectiveness-in-india
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110513T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110513T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T022840
CREATED:20231224T103710Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T042638Z
UID:64113-1305264600-1305264600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Indian cyber security: Principles and Practice
DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/indian-cyber-security-principles-and-practice
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110520T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110520T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T022840
CREATED:20231223T134806Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130244Z
UID:63202-1305869400-1305869400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Offensive Defence: Managing deterrence and arms race in a ballistic missile defence environment
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Lt. Gen. Satish NambiarDiscussant: Admiral Raja Menon and Sheelkant Sharma  \nThe paper presented was of a conceptual nature which adopted the offence-defence theory to analyze the character of missile defences\, its impact on nuclear deterrence equations and its potential to cause security dilemma. “The paper makes two arguments: (a) Missile defences are instruments of security maximization that could accentuate offense dominance by adding to the net offensive capability of strategic forces. (b) A (mutual) defensive deterrence arrangement can emerge between BMD–possessing nuclear weapon states as a means to deterrence stability and encouraging arms control.”  \nIt was identified that mutual vulnerability was a key variable in the development of the concept of nuclear deterrence and remains the norm of strategic stability\, and ballistic missile defence (BMD) would prove to be a ‘game changer’. The traditional discourse on nuclear deterrence and second strike capabilities were discussed and the issue that was later debated was – how would BMD change the dynamics of the concept of deterrence\, if at all it does? The paper also suggests that “security dilemmas are dynamic\, uncontrollable processes being caused by offensive and even defensive postures. Competitions will\, hence continue to define strategic equations and potentially heighten arms races\, which though could progressively lead to new stability arrangements\, driven by the fact that nuclear wars are sought to be avoided by all nations.” This point was taken up during the Q&A where it was suggested that no BMD system could be 100 per cent foolproof\, and countries would try and increase their nuclear arsenal to increase the probability of a higher number of warheads penetrating the BMD systems of the opponent. \nIt was suggested that this will in turn lead to a nuclear arms race. To this end\, it was also mentioned that an arms race was not possible in the India–Pakistan context as the amount of Uranium and Plutonium produced by India was many times more than that produced by Pakistan. Therefore\, it was inferred that unless Pakistan procured highly enriched uranium (HEU) illegally\, it was not possible for Pakistan to catch up with India. This aspect was debated as some in the audience believed that an arms race between India and Pakistan was a factor that could not be discounted. To this end\, it was argued that BMD and arms reduction were on opposite ends of the spectrum as BMD would require a state to increase the number of warheads it possesses. Therefore\, it was noted that the BMD could be a destabilizing factor in South Asia. \nIt was suggested that it would be appropriate to add the specifics of each phase of missile defence evolution in the past fifty years. Such as — the early and rather desperate foray into ABM\, then the turbulent sixties and the first flush of detente and ABM treaty\, then the Reagan years when a weakening USSR was blustered into submission by MX and SDI and the humbug about Krasnoyarsk radars. Why and how Clinton came to it in late nineties and the scenario since 9/11. \nIt was highlighted that the crucial issue is whether BMD can push the threshold of a conflict below nuclear exchange higher than before\, and emphasis should not be on how many incoming nuclear missiles can be blocked by the BMD. That being said\, it was also noted that some of the defence systems that India is purchasing or considering\, are many times costlier than the attack platforms of Pakistan. It was argued by some in the audience that the cost of BMD was too high compared to the benefits it could provide. Furthermore\, it was argued that BMD is not a proven technology and thus could not be relied upon. To further develop this point\, it was argued that there already exists a threshold (for conflict without nuclear exchange) which is reasonably higher.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/offensive-defence-managing-deterrence-and-arms-race-in-a-ballistic-missile-defence-environment
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110520T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20110520T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T022840
CREATED:20231223T134806Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130244Z
UID:63203-1305869400-1305869400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:China’s Territorial Claim on the Indian State of Arunachal Pradesh: Alternative Scenarios 2031
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Dr. Arvind GuptaDiscussants: Brig. (Retd.) Rahul Bhonsle\, Col. Navneet Kumar\, Dr. Rajiv Anantaram\, Dr. Jabin Jacob \nNamrata Goswami’s paper focused on four alternative scenarios in 2031 with regard to China’s territorial claim on the Indian State of Arunachal Pradesh. At the outset\, the author discussed the three drivers of uncertainty\, which could influence the Chinese claim on Arunachal Pradesh\, namely\, Chinese regime stability\, Chinese perception of India and internal developments in Arunachal Pradesh. Based on the interactive interplay of these three independent variables\, Goswami crafted four alternative scenarios based on two futures methodology: the ‘Alternative Scenarios Axis’ and the ‘Implication Wheel’.  \nThe paper sought to answer four research questions:\n(1)	What are the four alternative scenarios in 2031 with regard to China’s territorial claim on the Indian State of Arunachal Pradesh?\n(2)	What are the policy implications of each scenario?\n(3)	Which scenario is most preferred and why? What are the policy interventions necessary to be put in place between now and 2031 to ensure the unfolding of this scenario?\n(4)	Which scenario is least preferred? What are the policy interventions necessary to be put in place between now and 2031 in order to avoid this scenario? \nThe paper assessed the three drivers of uncertainty in detail. The author included several sub-drivers within the three main drivers to explain the significance of certain issues that had a direct bearing on how the future will unfold.  \nThe first driver\, Chinese regime stability\, was analyzed using five criteria which the author called ‘sub-drivers’\, namely\, principles\, norms\, rules\, decision making procedures and institutions. These sub-drivers were drawn from Stephen Krasner and Hedley Bull’s definition of regimes. With regard to principles\, the prevalence of economic reforms which was mainly visible during the Deng Xiaoping period was pointed out. In terms of norms\, the historical and civilizational past of China and also the standards of behaviour based on rights\, obligations\, and social ethnics were brought into context. With regard to decision-making\, the author highlighted the role of the State Council and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in taking most of the important foreign policy decisions. The lack of an independent judiciary in China made institutionalised accountability almost impossible. She also enumerated the role of the institutions\, mainly that of the PLA\, and how economic growth has modernized the PLA. \nThe author identified the uncertainties with regard to regime stability primarily stemming from internal fears of dissent which might impact on Chinese claim on Arunachal Pradesh. As the author argued\, if regime stability runs low\, China could get aggressive on Arunachal Pradesh.  \nThe next driver is the Chinese perception of India. Chinese view the Indian state as mainly aping the West. Moreover\, the Dalai Lama’s presence in India creates anxieties in China and is perceived as questioning China’s legitimacy over Tibet. While neither country is likely to go to war\, much would however depend on how India behaves towards China over the years and on whether the border issue can be resolved.  \nThe last driver is internal developments in Arunachal Pradesh in terms of governance\, riparian rights and border security. Here\, one interesting factor in particular regard to riparian rights is the existence of differences of opinion between young and old over the construction of dams. \nDr. Goswami offered four alternative scenarios along with the implications wheel crafted for each scenario based on the interaction of the three drivers of uncertainty. The first scenario is ‘backwaters’\, in which Chinese regime stability is low\, the perception of India is that of a weak actor and adverse internal developments in Arunachal Pradesh are also low. The second scenario is ‘heavy weights’ where Chinese regime stability and internal developments in Arunachal Pradesh run high and the Chinese perception of India is that of a strong power. The third scenario is “Ascendant India’ where the first driver of Chinese regime stability is low\, Chinese perception of India is that of a strong power and internal developments in Arunachal Pradesh run high. The fourth scenario is ‘Yellow Emperor’ which is the least favourite. In this scenario Chinese regime stability runs low\, India is perceived as a weak power and internal developments in Arunachal Pradesh run low.  \nIn conclusion\, Dr. Namrata Goswami stated that she was in favour of the second scenario\, “heavyweights”\, and its positive wheel since it focuses more on interest-based bargaining. She speculated that India needs to seriously consider this scenario.  \nMajor points of discussions and suggestions: \nScenario techniques and selection of drivers should be analysed carefully. The important part is to select the right drivers. More sub-drivers can actually be introduced and a multidisciplinary technique should be adopted as a base of support. Scenarios should connect more to the drivers and the selection of the period till 2031 must be made more significant. The importance of the 3Ts i.e. Taiwan\, Tibet and Turkistan in China’s White paper is significant\, and how these play out in its strategic assessment portfolio cannot be ignored; hence\, this should be analysed. \nHow to handle Tibet in terms of policy prescription and how to link the Arunachal Pradesh boundary question to the Indian western sector with China are also important. Political conditions in the Tibet Autonomous Region can be considered as one of the drivers. Tibet is the chief concern in the India-China boundary question. \nThe Chinese perception of India in the context of differentiation between decentralization and lack of continuity were also discussed. How is India different from China in the approach to the resolution of the boundary? Both the Chinese and the Indian intentions can be looked into\, and also the involvement of external actors like the US and Pakistan could be studied. Certain sub-drivers can be selected like the Chinese polity\, economy\, military\, internal situation and Chinese comprehensive national security strategies. With regard to why 2031 is important and how international norms affect China: for the Chinese 2031 is not important; rather 2049 is more important because it will mark the 100th anniversary of the People’s Republic.  \nThe paper is informative but a more rigorous exercise based on Chinese primary sources is required including language sources. In the alternative scenarios axis and the implications wheel\, the independent variables are not to be correlated but a choice should exist between the two. The author needs to polish and strengthen the drivers through inputs from and discussions with other experts.  \nReport prepared by Shristi Pukhrem\, Research Assistant at Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/chinas-territorial-claim-on-the-indian-state-of-arunachal-pradesh-alternative-scenarios-2031
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR