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DTSTAMP:20261105T104742
CREATED:20231223T222327Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130250Z
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SUMMARY:Terror Financing in Bangladesh
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Arvind GuptaDiscussants: Bhaskar Roy and Sanjay Bharadwaj \n“Terror Financing in Bangladesh” by Dr. Anand Kumar outlined key factors that contribute to terror financing in Bangladesh. Dr. Kumar’s primary argument was that sustenance and maintenance of terror organizations is often built on the edifice of a strong financial base and that terror cannot make much headway without finance.  \nThe author at the outset drew attention to the issue of state accountability in dealing with terrorism as terrorist activities often emanated from domestic territorial space. He emphasized that intelligence gathering\, law enforcement\, and imposition of new financial controls were important levers to curb the functioning of terrorist groups. In this context\, he argued that the Government of Bangladesh has made only half hearted attempts to contain terrorist activities in its soil.  \nThe presentation focused on three aspects: the Beneficiary Groups and Institutions involved in terrorism; the sources of terror finance in Bangladesh; and\, the responses of the Bangladesh Government and international institutions. Finally\, the paper briefly touched upon the policy relevance of the findings.  \nMain Beneficiary Groups and Institutions\nDr. Kumar argued that the main beneficiaries of terror finance in Bangladesh have been Jamaat-e-Islami and Ahle Hadith Andolon Bangladesh (AHAB). Both organizations have maintained links with Islamic groups like Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh\, Jamaatul Mujahideen Bangladesh\, Alhikma\, Harkat ul Jihad etc. Money is used for recruitment and training purposes. Funding is also being channelled to build a large number of mosques and madarsas\, which are playing an instrumental role in radicalizing society at the district and village levels.  \nSources of Terror Financing \nSome sources listed as potential feeders for financing terrorist activities\, as argued by Dr. Kumar\, were Islamic NGOs\, Saudi charities\, individuals\, money laundering\, fake currency\, drugs and underworld. Dr. Kumar asserted that post 9/11\, Islamic NGOs have increasingly become important in the fight against terrorism. In order to support the argument\, he cited the steps taken by United States to halt the flow of funds to terrorist organizations through Executive Order 13224 and related elements of the USA Patriot act. He argued that as oversight mechanisms were absent\, no financial scrutiny of the Islamic charities is undertaken\, which further complicates the problem of tackling terror financing. The Saudi Government’s patronage of charities such as International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) and the World Association of Muslim Youth (WAMY) was also brought to attention. He cited the example of Al Haramain\, a Riyadh based Muslim Charity\, which was opened in Cox Bazar in 1992 to help Rohingya refugees but continued to operate in Bangladesh uninterrupted despite it being banned by the United Sates and Saudi Arabia. The connection between Al Haramain and terrorism was revealed in 2002\, when linkages were made between Al Haramain and its suspected links to terror funding and trafficking of women and children under the garb of providing Islamic education. As far as individual support is concerned\, links to Bin Laden were cited. Dr. Kumar argued that funds were flowing into Bangladesh in the form of Hundi through Jessore\, Chittagong and Dhaka. He added that Bangladesh in recent years has also become a major source of fake currency. Fake currency was being printed in Chapai Nawabgunj and then being dumped into India. The nexus between drugs and terror finance also became evident when in 2005\, the National board of Revenue found that business companies in Bangladesh were smuggling heroine to U.K. and that profits accrued form trafficking in narcotics often went for funding Islamist groups.  \nResponses of Bangladesh Government and International Institutions \nPolicy to tackle terror financing was expedited after the series of bomb blasts in 2005. The BNP enacted the Foreign Donations (Voluntary Activities) Regulation (Amendment Act\, 2004). However\, political motivations have often been an impediment for sustained political action and an overt emphasis on NGOs let the real culprits go scot-free. The enactment of Money Laundering Prevention Act\, 2002 also proved ineffective as it was full of operational loopholes. Similarly the dismal record of Bangladeshi Banks in checking terror finance was also brought to attention. The author argued that Bangladeshi banks have received approximately 236 suspicious transitions since the MLPA was enacted in 2002\, but till date there has been no progress on the issue due to procedural problems.  \nThe author further argued that pressure from the United States has proved ineffective in triggering a behavioural change within Bangladesh. However\, he also noted the renewed interest of the United Nations in dealing with the problem of terror financing in Bangladesh since 2001. In 2005\, Government of Bangladesh became a party to the UN International Convention for the suppression for the financing of terrorism. The Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering is another key forum where Bangladesh is engaging to get transparency into the system of terror finance.  \nThe author concluded by stating that the issue of terror finance was a daunting challenge facing the government and political will needed to be strengthened in order to tackle the issue in a holistic manner.  \nSome of the points raised during the discussion were: \n\n\nOne should be careful of classifying all charities as sources for terror finance. Classification of Madarsas is also needed. \nDomestic\, regional and international issues responsible for terror financing should also be analysed. \nCauses of terrorism are generally found in the lack of development in Bangladesh\, which is perhaps becoming an important catalyst for recruiting people. \nOne needs to revisit pre 1971 years of undivided Pakistan to seek linkages between Pakistan and terrorism in Bangladesh. ISI links to terror financing should also be explored. \nSources on linkages between terror financing and their sources should be more diversified. \n\nThe seminar was chaired by Dr. Arvind Gupta\, LBSC Chair\, IDSA. Mr. Bhaskar Roy and Prof. Sanjay Bharadwaj were the external discussants; and Dr. Uttam Sinha and Capt. Alok Bansal were internal discussants  \nPrepared by Medha Bisht\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/terror-financing-in-bangladesh
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090220T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090220T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T104742
CREATED:20231223T222326Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130250Z
UID:63720-1235107800-1235107800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Religious Assertion in Malaysia
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Sudhir DevareDiscussants: Baladas Ghoshal and C. S. Kuppuswamy \nThe major argument of the paper was that the government’s stance with regard to constraining religious assertion in Malaysia has been biased against non-Muslims. The government and society are carefully balancing their economic and religious interests\, so that the situation does not get worse. The internal security act has helped in constraining the influx of rigid religious assertion\, but the subdued disposition of civil courts and predominance of Shariah courts has created dissent among Christians\, Buddhists and Hindus. Economic development has led to the projection of Malaysia as one of the model states of development\, but religious assertion by the majority has created rifts within society. The emergence of a strong opposition and the probable change in leadership of the ruling coalition would mean that religion would become a more important factor in the coming years. Within Malaysian Society there has been awareness that increasing Islamisation or religious assertion threatening social religious harmony would not augur well for the future\, but religious issues have not been adequately addressed so far and neither has inter-faith dialogue been promoted. While the current situation is not alarming\, the future role of religious groups as well as political parties would determine whether Malaysia would stay on course as an economic power in the region or be derailed by religious polarisation. The constraints imposed by the state are working but there are strong indications of religious assertion having proliferated in society. \nAmbassador Sudhir Devare chaired the seminar. Prof. Baladas Ghoshala and Shri S.C.S. Kuppuswamy were the external discussants; and Alok R. Mukhopadhyay and Udai Bhanu Singh were the internal discussants. The following points were raised during the discussion: \n\nAs the lower income Malay Muslim is not economically strong\, he is worried about the political rights of the Chinese who are the economically stronger section of the population. \nModernization is perceived as an attack on Islam. \nThe question of Malaysians demanding the status of ‘Bhumiputras’ was raised and it was stated that they are an ethnically mixed race. Malaysia is the only country in Asia where ethnicity is synonymous with religion. Malay means Muslim. \nDoubts were also raised regarding the figures which state that Malay Muslims constitute 60 per cent of the country’s population. \nThe influence of the Deobandi sect reaches Malaysia from Bangladesh. \nThe Iranian Revolution presented a utopian world to the Muslim mindset; a Muslim country under Muslim laws could be established. \nMigration of rural Malays to urban areas and the consequent social dislocation has led to people leaning on Islam as a crutch\, thus facilitating the emergence of Islam as a factor in politics. \nIslamic schools are no longer under the control of the government but under the control of the Ulema. \nThere is also a heightened sense of insecurity among Malay women and a lot of social pressure. \nThe younger generation is becoming more religiously inclined and radicalized. \nOngoing changes in Malaysia might affect bilateral ties with India. Though Hindraf is seen as an internal issue\, India has raised this issue during bilateral talks.\n\nPrepared by Gunjan Singh\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/religious-assertion-in-malaysia
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090220T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090220T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T104742
CREATED:20231223T222326Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130250Z
UID:63722-1235107800-1235107800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Rethinking Strategic Doctrine in the Indo-Pak Context
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Hari PrasadDiscussants: Arun Sahgal and Manpreet Sethi \nStrategic doctrine is taken here to be implemented by a combine of war fighting land\, air\, naval and joint doctrines in conjunction with nuclear doctrine. While with respect to China\, India has a doctrine of ‘dissuasive deterrence’\, it is contended in this paper that with respect to Pakistan it has moved from a deterrent doctrine to a more proactive and offensive doctrine that potentially countenances compellence. This paper looks at India’s strategic doctrine with respect to Pakistan. The hypothesis of this paper is that there has been a movement in India’s war fighting doctrine from deterrence to also countenance compellence. The paper attempts to assess this by first establishing the nature of the change and then analyzing its implications with respect to Indian grand strategy\, prospective political aims in conflict and likely effectiveness. The proposed direction of change forms its concluding recommendations. \nFrom a defensive and reactive mindset of the earlier years that gave rise to criticism that India lacks a strategic culture\, change in a compressed time period has been witnessed of late. These changes in nuclear and conventional doctrines are contrary to the logical expectation of the Nuclear Age necessitating deterrent doctrines. India is the status quo and stronger power in the regional India-Pakistan dyad. This should have logically led to a deterrent doctrine with a defensive bias\, since India\, not seeking any territorial gains at the expense of others\, could be expected to be more interested in preserving its interests and position. This has not been entirely borne out and instead India has apparently acquired a more offensive strategic doctrine in relation to its western front. \nAt the structural level\, the strategic cul de sac forced on India by Pakistan’s continuing proxy war is a reason for this change. Pakistan’s venturesome strategy has been attributed to the advent of the Nuclear Age dating to the covert acquisition of nuclear capability by Pakistan by the late eighties. In order to get Pakistan to forego its doctrine of sub conventional provocation\, deterrence has its limitations. Instead\, compellence\, going beyond the coercive diplomacy of the Operation Parakram kind\, may be necessary.  \nIndia’s straitened defence budgets through the nineties – brought on by liberalization – lead to a drawdown of the conventional deterrent. The ‘stability-instability paradox’ made its appearance with Pakistan choosing to engage India at the sub-conventional level. Stability at the upper nuclear and conventional level\, led to instability at the sub conventional level. This climaxed in Pakistani incursion across the Line of Control in Kargil in 1999. It has been posited that there is space for conventional operations between sub conventional and nuclear war. India has therefore moved towards an offensive doctrine that can be characterized as one of ‘compellence’\, when the land\, sea\, air and joint doctrines are taken conjointly with nuclear doctrine.  \nThe prognosis of future Limited War is that it would be short duration\, high intensity and from a ‘cold start’. It is expected that international pressures and need to limit costs would entail a short duration. To offset international pressures in the crisis management stage and for getting enemy defence under prepared\, a ‘cold start’ has been deemed necessary. This would enable India to make military gains through surprise\, by undercutting the mobilization differential that was earlier in favour of Pakistan.  \nIndia’s land warfare doctrine is essentially to create the conditions of launch of the major offensive by the strike corps. A salient ‘fire break’ between the pivot corps offensives in the first phase and the following strike corps deep offensives in the next phase can be discerned\, even though these offensive operations are likely to be in a seamless sequence\, not lending itself to breakdown in ‘phases’. This ‘fire break’ constitutes the crucial decision point in which India’s strategic\, political and diplomatic might needs to be combined with the impending application of military force to ensure Pakistan complies with Indian aims. The launch of the strike corps would be equivalent of a failure of grand strategy for it would bring the nuclear factor unmistakably into the reckoning. Since offensive operations would have to reckon with the nuclear reaction threshold of Pakistan\, a nuclear doctrine of ‘massive’ punitive retaliation comes under question. There is a case for move of nuclear doctrine to ‘flexible’ punitive retaliation. \nThere is need for maximizing synergy between the politico-diplomatic and military prongs of strategy to coincide with the ‘firebreak’ between launch of pivot and strike corps offensives. To keep these a seamless continuum is to unleash a ‘doomsday machine’. Launch of strike corps offensives\, unless it is as a counter offensive to Pakistani corps offensives as part of their ‘offensive defence’ doctrine\, would be to enter an uncertain strategic realm. Therefore\, a public shift from ‘massive’ punitive retaliation to ‘flexible’ punitive retaliation is in order at the nuclear level. At the conventional level must be taken into cognizance the ‘firebreak’ between the offensives of the pivot and strike corps as the key exit point with war termination pressures being maximized by an orchestration of Indian war grand strategy to culminate at this juncture\, if not prior to launch of cold start forces.  \nThe following points were raised during the discussion:  \n\nIt is difficult to make a sharp distinction between compellence and deterrence as the former is subsumed in the latter.\nIndia’s doctrine is not an offensive one\, but is reactive and therefore lends itself to deterrence as against compellence.\nBetter integration and jointness among the services is required to achieve war aims in future wars.\n\nPrepared by by Dr. Amarjeet Singh\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/rethinking-strategic-doctrine-in-the-indo-pak-context
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090227T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090227T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T104742
CREATED:20231223T222326Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130250Z
UID:63719-1235712600-1235712600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Pakistan’s Strategic Thinking
DESCRIPTION:Chair: V.G PatankarDiscussants: Kalim Bahadur and Ajay D Behera \nPakistan’s self image\, geographical location and history have influenced the country’s strategic thinking. In the initial years\, Pakistan perceived itself to be a weak state and believed that India posed an existential threat to its security. However\, Islamabad’s thinking evolved over a period of time through its experience in various wars with India\, tension on the western borders\, developments in communications\, military doctrines\, military technology and weapons systems. For instance\, after its defeat in the 1971 war with India\, Pakistan decided to develop nuclear weapons. Following the acquisition of a nuclear capability was acquired in 1987\, nuclear deterrence became an important element of Pakistan’s strategic thinking. Similarly\, Islamic jihad based on young recruits from Pakistan mosques and madrassas played an important role in the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989.  \nDrivers for Pakistan’s Strategic Outlook\nPakistan has suffered from a small state syndrome ever since its inception. It feels a strong sense of disadvantage vis-à-vis India. Being one-fourth its territory and one-eighth of its population\, Pakistan feels pressured by being in the vicinity of a much larger Hindu dominated India.  \nPakistan was conscious of the fact that any attack from its perceived adversaries\, India to its East and Afghanistan/erstwhile Soviet Union in the West would leave it with very little strategic depth. This led Islamabad to adopt a strategy of “offensive defence” vis-à-vis India\, and on the other hand to develop relations with Iran and make vigorous attempts to establish its influence in Afghanistan.  \nThe 1893 Durand Line created by the British profoundly embittered the relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan. In fact in 1947\, Afghanistan voted against Pakistan’s admission to the United Nations because it laid claim to the Pashtun territories on Pakistan’s side of the Durand Line. In 1949\, a loya jirga (grand tribal assembly) convened by the Afghan government declared support for “Pushtunistan”. The jirga which affirmed the position of the Afghan government was not willing to accept the validity of agreements like the 1893 Durand Agreement\, as it considered Pakistan a new state rather than a successor state to British India\, and considered past treaties with the British pertaining to the status of the border as null and void. Afghanistan’s support for Pushtunistan found expression due to Pashtun nationalism\, the pride stemming from Pashtun political domination of Afghanistan historically and the implicit vulnerability that characterizes Afghanistan’s landlocked geographic situation.  \nPakistan’s inability to establish a stable democratic system in the early years of its independence resulted in the repeated intervention of the army. Given its interest in remaining the dominant power centre it has not tolerated interference by civilian governments in matters it considers sacrosanct.  \nPakistan’s internal ethnic contradictions and the dominance of the Punjabis in the power structure resulted in the movement for secession in East Pakistan. At the time of independence\, it was hoped that a “common faith” would help overcome any ethno-linguistic contradictions \nThe excessive importance given by the Pakistani leadership to the views of the Ulema resulted in the gradual ascendancy of religious extremists. The Ulema have had significant influence over the Pakistani leadership \nPakistan has always used its Islamic identity and therefore its links to Islamic countries as an important factor in promoting its strategic objectives. Right from the beginning Pakistan’s leadership adopted a pan-Islamic approach\, became a member of the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) and later of the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC).  \nThe strategic location of Pakistan during the Cold War led to Pakistan’s alliance with the United States which determined its strategic outlook for a substantial period of history. Regime survival\, Pakistan’s traditional policy paradigm of seeking leadership in the Muslim world\, securing national unity through Islam and obtaining Western economic and military assistance were some of the imperatives guiding Pakistan’s behaviour. \nElements of Pakistan’s Strategic Thinking\nFirst\, it would be pertinent to emphasize that Pakistan’s strategic thinking has been dominated by the Army because of the Army’s continuous role in government\, whether direct or indirect.  \nSecond\, it was therefore natural that Pakistan’s strategic thinking should have been characterised by a highly aggressive posture towards India. A number of assumptions on the part of the Pakistani leadership led it to attack India in 1965. It was believed that after Nehru’s death the potential for disintegration of India was higher\, and Lal Bahadur Shastri was considered to be a weak leader. The flawed concept of “The defence of East Pakistan lies in the West” remained the basis of Pakistan’s military strategy till the surrender at Dhaka in 1971. Pakistan’s aggressive attitude was also evident from its strategy to destabilise India through covert means as in the state support for Sikh separatists through the 1980s. Since the late 1980s Pakistan has actively sponsored terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir with the help of the highly trained mujahideen who had returned from the Afghan war. The Kargil operations in 1999 were launched by the Pakistan Army with the aim of acquiring territory at Kargil in a bid to force India to solve the Kashmir problem on terms favourable to Pakistan.  \nThird\, such aggressive behaviour was also reflected in Pakistan’s dealings with Afghanistan. Concepts like strategic depth provided legitimacy for military expansionism into Afghanistan\, initially by giving support to the anti-Soviet Mujahideen\, and later by training and supporting the Taliban \nFourth\, Pakistan’s strategists have followed a doctrine of “offensive defence” given Pakistan’s size\, location\, and terrain along its eastern border with India. In times of crisis\, Pakistan has not hesitated to be the first to resort to use of force to gain initial advantage.  \nFifth\, though Pakistan’s belief in jihad as a weapon to achieve political goals is well known\, it is interesting to note that in the late 1970’s\, efforts were made to interpret the Holy Quran and its relevance to war. The Quranic concept of Jihad seems to be the basis of Islamic strategic doctrine. \nSixth\, Pakistan has relied extensively on irregulars to help it achieve its military objectives.  \nSeventh\, Pakistan believed that it would be able to snatch Kashmir from India and “inflict a thousand wounds” on India\, destabilise it or weaken it\, through subconventional warfare. Taking advantage of its nuclear capability acquired in 1987\, Pakistan started implementing its plan of achieving strategic goals first in Kashmir and then in the rest of India through a low-intensity conflict or proxy war.  \nEight\, nuclear weapons constitute the most important and advanced element in Pakistan’s strategic thinking. The essential logic of Pakistan’s nuclear programme is Indo-centric. Pakistan acquired a nuclear weapons capability in 1987\, as has been admitted by General Mirza Aslam Beg himself.  \nIt can be concluded that\, Pakistan can claim only partial success in achieving its strategic objectives. Even recently\, western leaders like David Miliband and Richard Holbrooke have been harping on Kashmir resolution as a pre-condition for peace in the region. Again\, by relying on non-state jihadi organisations to fulfil their strategic objectives against India\, and by reinforcing the Taliban to carry out Pakistan’s goals against Afghanistan\, Pakistan has legitimised these terrorist groups to such an extent that they have become a threat to Pakistan’s own existence. \nSome of the issues raised in the discussion were: \n\n\nWhen Pakistan was formed as an independent state\, there was no understanding of security problems that it would face. As the country was divided into two wings separated by a 1000 miles of landmass\, the factors shaping strategic thinking were potentially lacking since the outset.\nThe 1947 Kashmir operation planned by Pakistan was not a part of its strategy. In fact this was the first time the word Jihad was used by the Pakistani establishment to give a symbolic connotation to the Kashmir issue.\nThe paper seems to be episodically analytical and needs some form of conceptualization and framework of explanation. The derivatives and meaning of strategy and strategic thinking need to be elucidated.\nThere is a need to focus on the nation building process in Pakistan\, before outlining components of its strategic thinking. The fact that Pakistan is not a homogenous entity has to be reckoned with. The domestic aspect and the questions related to survivability of the state has to be underlined in order arrive at a comprehensive picture. \nThere is a need to underline the strategic objectives in Pakistan. In this context it is important to comprehend Pakistani understanding of India. \nThe paper needs to focus on 1971 as the turning point as there was a perceptible shift of Pakistan’s strategy.\nGiven the economic dependence of Pakistan on the United States and the I.M.F\, is it feasible to discuss the possibility of independent strategic thinking in Pakistan. \n\nThe seminar was chaired by Lt Gen (Retd.) V.G Patankar. External discussants were Prof. Kalim Bahadur and Dr Ajay. D. Behera. Internal discussants were Dr. Smruti Pattanaik and Col. Ali Ahmed.  \nPrepared by Medha Bisht\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/pakistans-strategic-thinking
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090306T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090306T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T104742
CREATED:20231223T222322Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130250Z
UID:63715-1236317400-1236317400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Benefits of India’s Defence Cooperation Initiatives towards the Foreign Policy Goals
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Arvind GuptaDiscussants: Anuradha Reddy and Sunil Kumar \nAfter the Cold War\, India’s foreign relations have become multi-directional and diversified. Growing realisation that international defence cooperation can supplement diplomatic initiatives towards issues of common interests is increasingly being acknowledged the world over. New geo-strategic realities necessitate improvement of relations with the major powers\, such as the US\, EU\, Russia\, Japan and China and pursuance of an active ‘Look East’ policy in the extended neighbourhood\, especially ASEAN countries.  \nAn important part of ‘Defence Diplomacy’ is defence cooperation. Defence cooperation\, as an important tool of foreign policy\, can be gainfully utilized to build bridges of friendship\, prevent conflict\, build capacity of friendly foreign nations\, strengthen mutual trust and enhance security and stability in the region.  \nConsidering the intensive range of defence cooperation activities\, it is considered prudent to analyse the role being played by defence cooperation activities\, especially military related\, towards pursuance of our overall foreign policy goals. The paper is an attempt to do this and is laid out in three parts as follows:- \n\n\nPerspective on Defence Cooperation. \nBenefits of Defence Cooperation. \nRecommendations for the future.\n\nIndia is now engaged in a wide range of activities with other friendly countries\, ranging from Chile and Brazil in the Far-West to Japan and Korea in the Far-East and has concluded suitable defence cooperation agreements with over 30 countries. Defence cooperation activities are not structured and conducted in isolation but as part of a larger process. The range of defence cooperation activities comprise of strategic security dialogues that enable understanding of the participant concerns and establishing areas of common interest. Also included are goodwill visits at the level of the Service Chiefs\, professional defence and military expert exchanges\, military training\, combined exercises\, reciprocal visits of warships\, observers for exercises\, sports and adventure activities\, disaster management and humanitarian assistance; and cooperation in UN Peace Keeping Operations.  \nThe recent period has seen increased instability and turbulence in India’s neighbourhood. With growing assertion of ‘non-state’ actors\, Pakistan is passing through yet another defining phase in its history. India’s other neighbours\, specifically Nepal\, Bangladesh\, Myanmar and Sri Lanka\, appear to be going through periods of instability\, which could have spillover effects on our security. Radicalisation of domestic environment in Bangladesh\, continuous inflow of illegal immigrants to North East India\, cross border movement of Indian insurgent groups from Bangladesh and Myanmar\, escalation of violence in Sri Lanka and effects of actions against LTTE in southern India are issues having ramifications on India’s security. While Nepal may be on the path to normalcy\, possibility of collusion between the Nepal Maoists and the Indian Naxalites has serious implications on India’s security.  \nTo ensure a peaceful periphery\, India has remained focused on security of sea lanes in the IOR\, responding to natural disasters\, stability in neighbourhood and\, where feasible\, capacity building of neighbouring countries to meet their internal challenges as also to contribute towards meeting common security challenges in the region. Towards this end\, defence cooperation activities are facilitating regional security (through material assistance\, training\, building ability to operate alongside and maritime bonding); building bridges of friendship with countries in the extended neighbourhood\, building bridges of friendship with key powers\, projection of India as a responsible player in the global security architecture\, Disaster Management and Humanitarian Relief\, Peacekeeping Operations\, combating sea piracy\, capacity building of own armed forces\, extending dividends to Defence Industry\, joint R&D projects\, confidence building and deterrence  \nSome of the recommendations to make it more effective and valuable are: Formulation of Policy Guidelines\, Integrated Planning\, Requirement of Specialists\, Improvement of Relations with West Asian Countries\, Military Interaction with Pakistan  \nPoints in the Discussion\n\nDefence cooperation is one part of India’s foreign policy. It is increasingly becoming an important component of India’s foreign policy. \nDefence cooperation is a component of our national security strategy. India needs to have clear national security strategy.\nDefence cooperation provides supporting role in building partnership with other countries. It also helps ensure regional security.\nIndia’s defence cooperation must also looks at meeting the needs of the friendly countries. \n\nPrepared by Dr. Amarjeet Singh\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/benefits-of-indias-defence-cooperation-initiatives-towards-the-foreign-policy-goals
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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CREATED:20231223T222322Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130250Z
UID:63716-1236317400-1236317400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:US Counter Insurgency Approach in Afghanistan Under Obama Administration: Does It Portend 'Change'?
DESCRIPTION:Chair: G. BalachandranDiscussants: Shakti Sinha\, K. C. Singh and Rahul Bhonsle \nAfghanistan today appears to be teetering on the brink of failure and unending chaos. Despite the military endeavour by the United States (US) and its allies\, under Operation Enduring Freedom for the last eight years\, violence in 2008 increased by 40 per cent over 2007 and almost 543 percent over 2005. The Taliban-led insurgency has spread and according to an estimate almost 70 per cent of the country have become “no-go areas for security forces\, government officials and aid workers” depicting a rapidly shrinking political and humanitarian space. In this context\, the paper reviewed the past US counter-insurgency approaches in Afghanistan and analysed the possible impact of a new Afghan strategy. Given India’s interest in long-term stabilization of Afghanistan\, this policy analysis is relevant in terms of preparing responses to the evolving scenario in that country. The central thesis of the paper was that the present initiatives in designing a new COIN (Counter Insurgency) approach for Afghanistan to usher in ‘change’ are inadequate to turn the tide.  \nUS COIN Approach under Bush administration \nThe inability of the international community to stabilise Afghanistan is clearly an outcome of the inadequate and short sighted policies of George W. Bush\, who embarked on the military campaign in Afghanistan with the objective of dislodging the Taliban and winning the war. The resurgence of Taliban in Afghanistan depicts that the US policy under President Bush of establishing security with a ‘light footprint’ and lack of focus on ‘nation-building’ has proved to be counter productive. Moreover\, at a critical juncture of Afghan stabilization efforts\, the already limited resources and manpower devoted to Afghanistan were shifted to Iraq. Despite the successful completion of the Bonn process and conducting successful presidential and parliamentary elections\, the political structures and the Parliament in Afghanistan are wracked by disruptive forces. \nInitiatives of the Obama administration: Break from the past\nWill they work?\nObama’s promise of ‘change’ from the previous administration’s unilateral policies\, his preference to replace blunt force with ‘diplomacy’ and ‘smart power’ is projected to have ramifications not only on Afghanistan but also for the entire South Asia.  \n(i) Establishing Security – The debate in the present administration on the need to establish security in Afghanistan has revolved around three policy options: (a) Troop Surge (b) Arming the tribal militia (c) Talks/Negotiations with the Taliban. \n(ii) Diplomacy and ‘Smart Power’ approach – Obama has promised a change by ending the war on terror. One of the first Presidential actions after taking office was ordering the closure of the controversial detention centre at Guantanomo Bay. This has been viewed positively at home and abroad. \n(iii) Pakistan- Issue of Sanctuary– Obama has maintained that the future US efforts “must refocus” on “Afghanistan and Pakistan — the central front in our war against Al Qaeda”. Sanctuaries on the Pakistan side of the Afghan-Pakistan border supply and train the assault on Afghanistan and the allied forces there. Moreover\, the Pakistani Taliban\, have expanded their sweep over a vast area of the country. \n(iv) Pressure tactics on Karzai – Members of the Obama administration have provided enough indications of backing an alternative candidate in the upcoming Afghan national elections. The decision is just not based on the fact that Karzai was a choice of the Bush administration\, but because of his inability to rein in rampant corruption\, the flourishing drug trade\, and the inability of his government to deliver basic services.  \n(v) Regional Strategy – The Obama administration has favoured a ‘comprehensive strategy’ that looks at the problem of Afghanistan regionally\, and that goes even beyond Pakistan and India but in some way takes into consideration the interests of Russia\, Iran\, and even China. \nThe paper assessed that there is not much change with the ushering of the new administration and most likely it would be a continuation of earlier policy. There are no bench marks and timeline for the ‘Exit strategy’ either. \nPolicy options for India\nIndia’s interests in Afghanistan are long term stability and building a ‘land bridge\,’ mentoring-ANA\, ANP\, COIN grid and fostering Capacity building-community projects. Obama administration’s policy of ‘troop surge’ or ‘negotiating with the Taliban’ would be viewed with greater interest by Indian policy makers in the post 26/11 Mumbai scenario. Unless troop surge is accompanied by ‘civilian surge’ the Afghans would resent the foreign troop presence. India needs to emphasise on an Afghan-led process of long-term institution building both in the security and governance sectors. India could contribute to capacity building and training of personnel (Afghan Army and police) but needs to steer clear from any direct military involvement in that country. The post 26/11 scenario calls for a better regional strategy to address the threat emanating from non-state actors operating from the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region. \nIssues raised in the discussion:  \n\nThere are two dimensions to the problem in Afghanistan- strategic depth and nation building. The situation is grim in that country but as far as nation building is concerned\, Afghans would themselves have to work towards it as no outsider would do it.\nMilitarism was dominant in George Bush’s policy and it was not a comprehensive approach.\nPresident Obama’s policy talks about a regional approach and India and China are important parts of this regional concept.\nThe primary reason for the unpopularity of the government in Afghanistan is lack of social development activities.\nVery often despondency is the tone when we talk about Afghanistan. The strategy of winning hearts and minds needs to be pursued. \nAfghanistan has become a competing space for great powers. There is lack of understanding of local cultures and absence of a social code.\nNATO’s presence in Afghanistan is in body and not in soul. The member countries of NATO come with a set of caveats and therefore there is lack of fruitful coordination.\nAs far as India’s role is concerned\, the larger question is how India would fit within the NATO framework.\nIndia should in fact adopt a more forward looking and proactive posture. However\, any decision by India to send troops to Afghanistan as part of a more proactive role should be properly assessed and its ramifications should be studied carefully. \nAs Afghanistan is also a member of SAARC\, India could offer it a larger bouquet of choices.\nPakistan is both a part of the Afghanistan problem and a solution to the problem.\nAfghanistan needs to have a force which is sustainable in its own budget.\nGreat nations and narrow minds do not work.\nAfghanistan problem cannot be solved in isolation and there is need for comprehensive engagement.\nThe role of SCO in the context of Afghanistan should also be considered while studying this problem.\nThe proposal regarding implementation of the Panchayati Raj system in Afghanistan may not be a feasible option.\n\nThe session was chaired by Dr. G. Balachandran. There were three external discussants: Shri K.C. Singh\, Shri Shakti Sinha and Brigadier (Retd.) Rahul Bhonsle. Dr. Rajiv Nayan and Captain Alok Bansal were the internal discussants.  \nPrepared by Dr. Priyanka Singh\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/us-counter-insurgency-approach-in-afghanistan-under-obama-administration-does-it-portend-change
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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UID:63712-1237527000-1237527000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:India’s Strategic Autonomy Dilemma and the Rapprochement with the United States
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Rajiv SikriDiscussants: Arun Sahgal and K. P. Vijayalakshmi \nThe debate on strategic autonomy makes a conceptual contribution about how India as an emerging power seeks to forge a partnership with the United States. The Indian imperative is to keep a sufficient degree of autonomy in its security and military relationship with the United States. Within the framework of India-US rapprochement the dynamics of power acquisition by India clash with its effort to maintain a reasonable degree of autonomy. Consequently\, the concept of strategic autonomy\, which is a mutation of realism and India’s traditional non-aligned posture\, can be described as a dependence control strategy aimed at safeguarding its independence in both foreign policy decision making and protecting strategic assets against American pressure. For India strategic autonomy necessitates the association between an autonomous foreign policy/security decision making capability and the preservation of material assets (both technical and economic). Strategic autonomy can only be a relative principle.  \nPragmatists and maximalists among India’s strategic elites agree that the concept must accept some compromises to advance larger foreign policy goals. Some pragmatists have argued that India’s deeply held notions of autonomy must move towards responsibility. If India is to rise as a great power there must be a greater emphasis on responsibility in its foreign policy. Others have contested this\, noting that while autonomy is malleable so is the principle of responsibility. Maximalists argue that other great powers are unwilling and incapable of advancing India’s great power aspirations. Both maximalists and pragmatists agree that the 1998 nuclear tests by India reinforced its strategic autonomy. In this respect deterrence and autonomy are intimately linked. This was most evident during the debates about the civil nuclear deal between the United States and India. The pacifists\, Indian Leftists and Nehruvians use the concept of strategic autonomy within a discursive framework characterized by an ideological anti-Americanism antagonistic to any kind of rapprochement with Washington.  \nA strategic partnership necessarily depends on the broad convergence of interest of the two partners. The potential for a strategic partnership encompassing all security and defence issues needs a convergence of interests which is lacking given both partners’ different international status in the global power hierarchy\, the security context of South Asia and the importance for India to retain its strategic autonomy. Thus despite the discourse within the United States on the transformation of the relationship\, India seems to favour and negotiate a selective partnership. The necessity for a relationship with the US is understood by all decision-makers and commentators in India who prefer an ‘issue based’ partnership configured for two countries which have ‘not permanent but temporary identity of interests’. Practically\, apart from avoiding any kind of alliance in the strictest sense\, for New Delhi it means not to be linked with any US sponsored collective or bilateral security structure constraining India to intervene in support of its own interests.  \nFrom an Indian perspective\, divergent agendas with the US suggest a double necessity: to identify those divergences and exclude them from the partnership while resisting US pressure to reintegrate them. The necessity to pursue a multifaceted foreign policy and engage all major power centres is recognized by all Indian analysts. This is the surest and best way to maintain strategic autonomy. The Indian dilemma pertains to balance: the rapprochement with the US is improving faster than the partnerships with other countries such as China and Russia. The intensity and the ‘global’ ambition of the Indo-US relations are not balanced by India’s relations with other great or medium powers. A second of asymmetry insists on parallel engagements. Given the complexity and diversity of its international and security agendas\, India needs to pursue multifaceted diplomacy especially vis-à-vis Russia\, China and Iran. Energy supply\, membership to the UN Security Council and quest to become a major player in Central Asia are among the agendas which potentially collide with US interests and require relations with alternative powers.  \nSome scholars argue that India’s emphasis on strategic autonomy will decrease with its accession to great power status and that ‘great powers don’t speak of autonomy’. This vision seems to conceive autonomy only as a power-transition imperative and sets aside the emphasis on autonomy which manifests itself when an emerging power becomes a great power. Great powers tend to strive for maximization of their influence. For instance\, the EU is today struggling to create new autonomous strategic capabilities in order to reduce its dependence on the United States. Will India become an ‘Asian France’\, as one US expert asked? The major lesson of the French experience for India is that autonomy works efficiently when combined with power. France’s autonomous posture has been built as a way to keep power\, not to create it. In the past India tried to pursue autonomy without sufficient power\, but the growth of its power gives it more latitude. \nPoints raised during Discussion: \n\nHistorically non-alignment enshrined a pragmatic approach; India wished to avoid entanglements.\nIndia’s policy in the 21st century will have to cater for the rise of China and the shift in the locus of power and international politics towards Asia.\nNon-alignment under such a circumstance when great power rivalry will rage all around India is an unviable option. Neither is the prospects for a China-India-Russia arrangement likely given deep Indian and Russian ambivalence towards China.\nIndia could follow Bismarck’s diplomatic strategy and spin a web of alliances with India holding all the strands in its hands\, though this would prove difficult given that it is not geopolitically central to Asia. An alternative is to forge partnerships with US\, Japan\, and possibly Russia to countervail the growth of Chinese power. \nOver time asymmetry between the US and India is bound to decline\, and so would fears about loss of ‘independence’.\nIndia too defensive and excessively prickly.\nTendency on the part of Indian officials to literally read/interpret every US document and policy statement.\nIndia’s involvement in the UN institutionalizes India’s participation in global institutions and thereby advances Indian and American common objectives.\nIt is important for India to create a peaceful periphery and ensure regional stability necessary before it goes on to become a major player.\nIndia cannot become aligned with the US.\nIt is too early to decide on the extent of alignment with the US.\nStrategic autonomy must be premised on national interest.\n\nRemarks made by the Chairperson Ambassador Rajiv Sikri: \n\n\nThere is a need to look into the other dimensions of the India-US relationship.\nStrategic Community in India wields little influence; politicians call the shots.\nThe US is too meddlesome in India’s relations with third countries eg.\, Iran. It does not know how to deal with Pakistan and must pay greater heed to the United Nations. \n\nPrepared by Kartik Bommakanti\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/indias-strategic-autonomy-dilemma-and-the-rapprochement-with-the-united-states
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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SUMMARY:Rationale for Performance Oriented Defence Budgeting
DESCRIPTION:Chair: V. K. MisraDiscussants: Amit Cowshish and Sujeet Samaddar \nIndia’s security comes with a huge price tag. In 2009-10\, the defence budget reached Rs. 1\,41\,703 crores\, representing nearly one-seventh of total central government expenditure and 2.35 per cent of the gross domestic product. Such a huge financial outlay raises questions as to how funds are allocated and what outcomes are being achieved. Does the defence budget provide the answers? \nThe budgeting system\, in the form of Defence Services Estimates (DSE)\, follows ‘line-item’ budgeting. Total resources are provided in six demands for grants (catering to both the revenue and capital expenditures of the Defence Services)\, which in turn are subdivided into various revenue and capital items such a ‘pay and allowances’\, ‘stores’\, ‘works’\, ‘aircraft and aero engines’\, ‘naval fleet’\, ‘heavy and medium vehicles’\, among others. So the budget in essence does not provide information on expenditure on various capabilities or programmes that the country is acquiring to meet its security threats. Neither does the budget reflect the physical progress of various programmes on which massive investment is incurred. In other words\, the intended outcome of the budget vis-à-vis security threats or the defence policy cannot be deduced from the existing system of budgeting. \nTo move towards a visible and outcome-oriented budget\, the Ministry of Finance (MoF) since 2005 has issued guidelines emphasizing the link between financial budgets and actual and targeted performance of outlays. The guidelines task the central Ministries/Departments to articulate\, among others\, a list of major programmes/schemes and the goals and policy framework guiding them. The main objective of the exercise is to “establish one-to-one correspondence between the (financial) budget … and Outcome Budget…” However\, the Ministry of Defence (MoD)\, along with 30 Ministries/Departments has been ‘exempted’ from preparing outcome budget. The exempted Ministries/Departments are however ‘requested’ to prepare outcome budget for ‘internal use’ and voluntarily decide the extent to which the general public can have access to it.  \nIn the above context\, the MoD has taken the initiative of formulating Defence Services Estimates\, Vol. II (DSE\, Vol. II)\, and making it mandatory for some of its institutions to prepare the outcome budget. The DSE\, Vol. II\, which currently is meant for “internal use” falls short of the parameters laid down by the MoF for preparing the outcome budget. It merely expands the item- or head-wise allocations made in DSE and\, in addition\, provides “Budget holder-wise summary sheets.” In no way does it relate the financial outlays with the intended outcomes. The major problem with the institutions that prepare outcome budgets are that their ‘outcomes’ are organisation specific and have ‘weak linkage’ with the overall plan of the MoD. \nArvind Kadyan highlights a number of gaps plaguing the implementation of outcome budgeting in defence. Foremost is the lack of programme-orientation in defence budget. He argues that the identification of major programmes by “High Level Budget Holders and Top Level Budget Holders in Service Headquarters\, responsible for planning of budget” would go a long way in preparing outcome budget. The programme orientation however needs suitable changes in classification of heads of expenditure\, reflecting all the inputs that go into specific programmes or sub-programmes. Among others\, he argues that increased use of information technology can facilitate real-time “information required for monitoring\, evaluation” and for “decision-making purposes.” He suggests that considering the “extra work” that would be generated in the initial phase of the implementation of the outcome budget there is a need for a professional body with the necessary wherewithal to carry out the job.  \nKadyan strongly argues that Outcome budgeting is quite possible for the defence establishment\, contrary to some perceptions that outcome of defence expenditure is not measurable and even if measurable its documentation may not be in the interest of the country’s security. These issues can be tracked by what he terms “attitudinal change” of concerned authorities. He says that all the information may not be placed in the public domain\, as clearly articulated by the MoF. He suggests that “introduction of outcome budget is likely to be seen by the Services as an attempt to introduce a new mechanism to control budget utilisation.” \nFor effective implementation of outcome budgeting in defence\, Kadyan argues that the MoD needs to follow a ‘comprehensive approach’ covering the entire defence budget. He suggests that a tri-service institution like the College of Defence Managements (CDM)\, Hyderabad should ideally be entrusted with the task of developing “an overall structure” for the purpose of implementation. The ‘Budget Holders’ in the Service Headquarters (SHQs) are then required to identify outcomes against the outlays\, and prepare the outcome budget\, keeping in view the overall defence policy of India. While executing the outcome budget\, the Programme/sub-programme Directors under the Budget Holder would need enhanced delegation of financial powers. Once the outcome budgets at the stage of Budget Holders are prepared\, their consolidation could be done by the Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff (HQ IDS). Further\, an independent organisation needs to be created for monitoring and evaluation of various ongoing programmes. \nPoints raised in the discussion: \n\n\nThe experience of civil ministries in outcome budgeting is insubstantial\, and is of little use for mid-course correction.\nOutcome budgeting in defence in some countries like Australia is of “little help” to the services.\nTransparency in outcome budgeting needs to be viewed simultaneously with the security aspects.\nInformation and Communication Technology (ICT) has immense potential for preparing outcome budget in defence.\nPlanning\, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) is increasingly being adopted by many counties.\n\nPrepared by Laxman Kumar Behera\, Associate Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/rationale-for-performance-oriented-defence-budgeting
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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UID:63710-1238131800-1238131800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:A Scenario-Building Method on India’s North East: Time Horizon 2015
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Prakash SinghDiscussants: G. D. Bakshi and Arun Sahgal \nIn her presentation titled ‘A Scenario-Building Method on India’s North East’\, Dr. Namrata Goswami projected the vision of a peaceful and prosperous North East India by 2015. Identifying terrorism\, left-wing extremism and insurgencies as the three great internal security threats of India\, she repeated Manmohan Singh’s earlier statement that growing insurgencies in the North East are caused by lack of development and externally funded terrorism. Dr. Goswami has utilized the scenario building method pioneered by Herman Kahn of RAND. She identifies the key factors/drivers which can be utilized to perceive and describe\, if not predict\, four future scenarios in the Northeast by 2015. Before explaining the four scenarios\, Dr Goswami points out the advantages as well as disadvantages of the scenario building method. According to her\, despite the fact that scenario-building is one of the most widely accepted method of bringing about some true sense of a possible future\, the future based on such method still remains imagined and fictitious.  \nWhile explaining the future scenario of North East India on the basis of scenario building method\, Dr. Goswami offers a list of positive and negative drivers which can either lead the region on the path of prosperity or can prove as impediments in its progress. On the positive side\, she points to factors like the region’s richness in natural resources\, cultural heritage\, the growing number of youthful population\, higher level of education\, influence of local communities and music in life\, governance\, etc. Factors like backward condition of transportation and communication\, perceived feelings of neglect by New Delhi\, cultural differences\, rising ethnic violence\, negative political culture\, militarization of political culture\, rampant extortion network\, economic backwardness\, porous international border\, etc.\, are pointed out as negative drivers.  \nOn the basis of the above mentioned drivers\, Dr. Goswami has put forward four possible scenarios of North East India by 2015. They are: Destination North East: A Touristic Paradise (a scenario based on tourism development); Island North East: Beware imagined ‘others’ (a scenario based on fear of domination and ethnic violence); Multi-Cultural North East: Liberal and Progressive (a scenario based on the success of democracy); Global North East: Looking ‘East’ with Hope (a scenario based on the success of India’s ‘Look East’ policy). Among the four\, Dr. Goswami considers the first\, third and the fourth scenarios as ‘ideal’ to improve the conflict ridden states of the Northeast.  \nPoints raised during the discussion of the Paper: \n\n\nThe paper should be based more on certain pattern based prediction rather than single event prediction. \nIn scenario construction\, more than eight possible scenarios should be taken up. After discarding some of those scenarios due to their consistent inconsistency\, four to five scenarios should be finally taken up for scenario building. \nInstead of making the scenario building method so much RAND centric\, the scenarios should be based on the method adopted by certain private companies.\nAn explanation of the process of scenario building in the paper will be helpful.\nAs a choice of tool for scenario building method\, net assessment technique is ideal\, as it helps crystallize the scenario.\nAlong with internal factors\, geo-political factors too should be taken into account. As part of the geo-political factors\, Chinese arms supply to insurgent groups in the Northeast\, growing security threat from HUJI\, etc. should be incorporated.\nIt is necessary to have an in depth study of growing Islamic fundamentalism as part of insurgency situation within Northeast.\nSince many of the positive drivers mentioned in the paper can be negative drivers in other contexts (e.g.\, governance)\, a clear stance on the matter is necessary. \nThe status quo will probably persist for some time in the Northeast.\nAs long as extortion in Northeast India continues\, achieving the desirable goal of disarmament\, demobilization and rehabilitation (DDR) will not be possible. As a result\, trade and tourism\, the two sectors which constitute a significant part of the paper\, will suffer.\nPolitical resolutions\, so far\, have not been very successful in bringing down the insurgency problem in the North East region. Under the circumstance\, if armed forces are pulled out from the region\, insurgency will\, once again\, increase.\nGreater academic emphasis should be put on the strong historical linkages between the Northeast and the rest of India. \nFocus on factors like what exactly is the subject for whom the scenario is built; identification of key decisive factors; identification of drivers and their classification\, will make the paper all the more interesting.\nBoth actors as well as issues can be treated as drivers. \nAs far as Northeast India is concerned\, factors like scale of insurgency\, cross border support for insurgency\, cross border migration\, transport and communication\, state of economy\, etc.\, can be treated as potential drivers. \nLocal cottage industry\, progress of Northeastern youths in sports and positive governance in Sikkim should be incorporated as positive drivers.\nProgressive change in politics\, such as through bringing about changes in labour laws\, opening for outside work force\, enhancement of education\, increase in resource base\, etc.\, can be quite helpful in improving the situation of the Northeast. \nIndian government’s future approach to its so called ‘Look East policy’ will depend on factors like degree of economic and social integration through communication revolution and softening of borders\, lack of infrastructural developments coupled with political and economic concerns. \nThe possibility of a peaceful and prosperous Northeast within the short timeframe of five years is unrealistic. Instead\, the timeframe should be extended to 2050. \nThe possibility of enduring peace in the region will depend upon the insurgency situation. The level of insurgency has already reduced in the region. Influence of Naga insurgency\, which used to be considered as mother of all other insurgencies in the Northeast is no longer evident. Insurgent groups seem to be still working in this region\, particularly for monetary benefits rather than demand for autonomy. \nWith good governance\, backed by insistence on accountability\, peace can be brought to Northeast region. \n\nPrepared by Pranamita Baruah\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/a-scenario-building-method-on-indias-north-east-time-horizon-2015
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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UID:63711-1238131800-1238131800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:The Indo-US Relationship: Is Diplomatic Style Important?
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Kanwal SibalDiscussants: K. C. Singh and Christopher S Raj \nThe presentation of Professor Steven Hoffman began by examining the question “Is diplomatic style important and what impact does it have as far as Indo-US diplomatic negotiations are concerned? Professor Hoffman began by noting that diplomatic style is important enough to deserve careful attention. During the period between 1997 and 2007\, he interviewed diplomats on both sides. According to him\, some practitioners pointed out that tone or style naturally ranks below substance in importance\, but not always. An experienced Indian diplomat called style a “force multiplier” in Indo-US relations. When the two sides engage\, they do deal with the matter of ‘how do we talk to each other?’ A former American diplomat said that diplomatic style and substance intertwine. To separate style from substance for the purpose of analysis can prove useful\, but is not easy and real care must be taken in doing so. His presentation puts forward some results produced by such an effort. Professor Hoffman adopts a historical narrative that analyses change and convergence in Indian and American diplomatic practices. Change in style accordingly began in June 1998\, and is still taking place today.  \nProfessor Hoffman divided his presentation into five parts. First\, he described problematic practices on both sides. For instance\, Americans could be overbearing\, demanding\, arrogant and deadline imposing\, etc. and similarly the Indian side could be self-righteous and arrogant as well. Professor Hoffman got this sense after examining published sources and interviews. \nSecondly\, he provides two historical illustrations on diplomatic style. The first being Indian foreign secretary J.N. Dixit’s diplomatic negotiations with George Bush Sr’s. administration in 1992\, and second the dialogue between Jaswant Singh and Strobe Talbott during the period 1998 to 2000. Professor Hoffman says that in diplomatic style\, there is a learning process underway. In every negotiation\, substance comes first and when basic parameters set in well then style matters. In the last ten years\, India and the United States sustained a momentum but episodically there were problems during the negotiations on the Indo-US nuclear deal. He noted that the Obama administration is sending the right signals to carry forward the momentum built by the Bush Administration.  \nThirdly\, Professor Hoffman describes US diplomatic practices during the George W. Bush administration and refers to US ambassador India Robert Blackwill’s statement about the adoption of a radically new diplomatic style. Blackwill had said that “America will not be a nagging nanny” and that the Bush administration does not intend to lecture India on its national interests. According to Professor Hoffman\, the Ambassador’s public comments and phraseology did reflect a real ideological and policy change in Washington.  \nFourthly\, Professor Hoffman points out that in fact India and the United States were developing a set of mutually accepted practices that may also be called rules that came into existence in the mid-2000s. Professor Hoffman pointed out the developing shared rules of engagement in Indo-US relations: No Naggy Nanny\, India to be treated with respect\, recognition of India’s major power status\, avoidance of vitriol\, and developing rules to maintain momentum in the US-India relationship\, avoiding surprises from either side\, shaping issues jointly\, deepening and broadening the range of interaction\, establishing personal relationships and institutionalizing the relationship.  \nIn the last part\, Professor Hoffman puts forward his interim conclusions. Shared or common diplomatic practices make communication of substance easier\, increases mutual understanding\, allows each side to educate the other\, enhances trust\, acts as a force multiplier\, and helps ease if not eliminate historical resentments paving the way for substantive mutual gains. He emphasizes that no matter how bilateral ties between India and the United States evolve during the next few years\, this study makes a case that diplomatic style is important\, in this particular relationship. What has been learned and gained should be maintained\, and even built upon further. One may hope that a reasonably common set of guiding diplomatic practices will characterize the full range of US-India ties in the future. \nPoints raised during the discussion \n\n\nIt is important to understand whether style reflects substance. If practitioners are frank and enjoy a level of trust and also do not question the other’s fundamentals\, then style matters.\nOne cannot have different style while dealing with different countries. It is substance and issues which make the difference\, not style. If the United States and China can develop without changing their diplomatic style\, then why should India change its diplomatic style. The substantive nature of India-United States relations began with the Indian nuclear tests in 1998. It was not change of style but in substance. \nSystemic differences between India and the United States also lead to differences in negotiating style. \nDifferences in negotiating style between India and the United States is also the result of systemic differences; an Indian Foreign Minister is invariably a politician whereas in the United States Secretaries of State are frequently drawn from academia\, business\, armed forces\, etc.\nIn the United States behavioral sciences have taken a major lead in shaping policies. Style reflects behaviour and in this process selection of words used during negotiations plays an important role.\nDiplomacy carries historical baggage. Personalities like Henry Kissinger played a crucial role. Their personality and diplomatic style prove influential as Kissinger was successful in United States-China rapprochement process in 1971.\nDiplomatic style matters and works so long as diplomats are sensitive to substance. \nDiplomats respond to the leaders. Leaders set the substance and diplomatic style works accordingly.\nFor success in negotiations\, parties need to understand the bottomline well.\nWhile understanding the change in Indo-US relations\, it is important to note that India’s economic progress and new found prosperity have played a major role in this process.\nIndia is a major power and it is interesting to analyse where the United States places India in its ‘Grand Strategy’.\nSometimes diplomatic behaviour or style only works as a lubricant.\nFactors like culture\, personalities and national identity should be kept in mind and engagement should be in terms of principles.\nStyle certainly matters in Indo-US Relations as in any relationship. But it has been observed that when core issues are discussed\, style takes a back seat. Style becomes different when contentious issues are discussed. \nDiplomatic style works in negotiations if it is carried out with a certain degree of caution and care.\nIt is important for Indian diplomats to have a good knowledge about the United States\, and a good way is to gain exposure in American universities. \nCharisma of personalities involved in diplomatic negotiations works because it builds trust and enhances confidence\, as happened in the case of the Jaswant Singh-Strobe Talbott dialogue. \n\nPrepared by Sanjeev Kumar Shrivastav\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-indo-us-relationship-is-diplomatic-style-important
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090417T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090417T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T104742
CREATED:20231223T222222Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130250Z
UID:63708-1239946200-1239946200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Military Robots
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Vinod PatneyDiscussants: R. K. Pruthi and Rahul K Bhonsle \nThe paper argued that the futuristic battlefield is going to depend substantially on deployment of standoff weapons and virtual technology. Robotic technology is likely to play a major role. Presently\, military robots are essentially used as UAVs or for landmine and explosive search. A few developed armies are using them for counter terrorism purposes. However\, robots are not autonomous entities with positron brains. Their performance still depends on human control.  \nRobotic animals could be of use to states like India which depend on mules for supporting their mountain divisions. The mules with the Indian army have significant utility for carrying logistic supplies to higher mountain ridges. Robots could help in this regard and over a period of time if found useful could replace animals.  \nRobots have a great future because militaries are interested in utilizing them beyond their existing role as aerial drones or explosive identification/disposal devices. The growth of technology in this arena also shows promise for future development. The juxtaposition of Artificial Intelligence and robotic technology makes the future more exciting from a military point of view. By incorporating new synchronization and control methods and increasing levels of automation\, military robots are expected to reduce the burden and risk for future warriors. Developments in cognitive technologies which essentially deal with man machine interaction are likely to develop the science of robotics further.  \nIncreasing militarization of robotics technology is expected to be a reality tomorrow. Naturally\, the Defence Industry is expected to invest much more in this field in the coming years. As it happens with any other form of military technology\, counter technologies are expected to be developed. Few forward looking thinkers/businessmen are already toying with the idea of finding ways to defend against enemy robots. According to a few unconfirmed reports efforts are underway to develop weaponry against robotic creatures. It is premature to comment on these developments with conviction but it may be possible that states could develop high energy microwave device or jamming devices to block the march of robotic armies.  \nIn the years to come as robots are going to become more autonomous the issue of morality is likely to emerge in a big way. This is because questions may arise as to who should be held morally responsible for actions taken by an autonomous robot for actions such as killing a human. Logically\, armies should restrain themselves from giving this authority to autonomous robots. Isaac Asimov’s view holds the key. He noted the philosophical relationship between human and robot and the limitations of machines should be clearly explored. Asimov’s laws of robotics should not be allowed to fail.  \nAir Marshal (Retd.)Vinod Patney chaired the seminar. The external discussants were Brig. Rahul Bhosle and Mr. R.K. Pruthi. Col. Ali Ahmed was the internal discussant. \nThe major points made in the ensuing discussion were: \n\n\nUnmanned capability is exciting our imagination but there is a need do a progress audit of technology.\nThere are definite limitations to existing machines and technologies. And one also needs to remember that machines required for the task cost money. Resource constraint will always be an issue. However the increase in demand and usage of robots will reduce costs and they will become more affordable.\nThere is an urgent need to incorporate the technology and a debate in synergy is required.\nThere might be resurgence of Just War theory once Robots start fighting humans or among them.\nToday the major challenge India faces is in using robots for training its soldiers to be more compatible with the machines.\nToday UAVs are being used very successfully in a surveillance role and there is a need for greater investment in this technology.\nOne also needs to keep in mind that further development in the technology could trigger a war easily.\nIt might become more complicated once Robotics and Nanotics get more developed. One should remember that Robots are fine if they are used as slaves for humans. They should not be left to operate on their own.\n\nPrepared by Gunjan Singh\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/military-robots
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090424T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090424T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T104742
CREATED:20231223T222222Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130250Z
UID:63706-1240551000-1240551000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Climate Change and Foreign Policy: The UK Approach
DESCRIPTION:Chair: R RajagopalanDiscussants: Luther Rangreji and Purnamita Dasgupta \nClimate change has the potential to create conditions for changing foreign policy in a globalised world. It dares to test whether the established tenets of foreign policy are still valid. Climate change has entered the realm of negotiations. National action plans\, globally binding commitments\, leadership and historical responsibilities are determining countries positions and defining their foreign policy agenda. However\, the mainstreaming of climate change in foreign policy due to domestic and international imperatives reflects a shift in strategic thinking. It creates possibilities for the international community to look for solutions and bring together varied policy initiatives and differing positions.  \nUK’s foreign policy has clearly adorned a green drape whether in helping create cross-cutting coalitions or strengthening institutions. The objective is to balance trade with climate change and climate change with development thereby enhancing its competitive position in the global economy. Climate change equally bolsters the image of Britain to take on a challenging role as it has on such critical issues like terrorism\, nuclear proliferation and reducing global poverty. The UK has accepted and committed to the Kyoto Protocol and correspondingly reoriented its energy policies. Under the Kyoto Protocol\, it is committed to reducing emission of six greenhouse gases by 12.5 per cent below 1990 levels and within the period of 2008-2012. However\, what makes it interesting is the self-imposed pledge to cut carbon dioxide emissions by 20 per cent by 2012 \nUK’s approach vis-à-vis the EU is not divergent but seeks to act ‘beyond the defined’ framework. Such an approach towards a low carbon economy outlines a broad outlook towards the EU and inclines towards the ‘practical’ rather than ‘integrationist’. The EU catch figure of ‘2020 by 2020’ suggesting a 20 per cent reduction in emission targets as well as an increase of renewable energy by 20 per cent by the year 2020 as been greatly determined by UK’s own initiatives. Today\, climate change is a dominant theme in the UK’s foreign policy\, particularly under the current government. \nCurrent British policy has been founded on some farsighted thinking and initiated by Margaret Thatcher. In fact\, there are three striking aspects that one can draw from the speech and as the article argues remains a guide to framing current UK policies on climate change. The first is the importance of research or knowledge capability. The second feature of climate change relates to the interplay between people and policies and the approach needed. The third pillar is effective environmental diplomacy and strengthening international regimes. Under foreign secretary Margaret Beckett\, the UK\, which held the presidency of the UN Security Council for the month of April 2007\, was instrumental in bringing\, for the first time\, the issue of climate change to the UNSC in April 2007.  \nIn 2006\, the G8 held one of the most interesting summits\, with participation from emerging economies and agreed to hold a Ministerial Dialogue on Climate Change. Thus helping create an alternative path from formal negotiations at the UN to discuss new ideas\, identify common ground and practical actions for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The defining feature was to bring the G5 to the table and develop a way for cooperation; a strategy that is not imposed\, but develops through consultation and dialogue. This will remain a critical guidepost to the north-south divide on the issue of climate change. \nIn the UK\, global warming and climate change have been prominent in public debates and greatly impacted policy making. The integrated approach has also been consistently backed by the leadership. For both Blair and Brown\, climate change has been a priority issue. Whenever the UK has assumed a leadership role in the case of G8\, or in the EU or in the Security Council\, it has effectively raised the debate on climate change and gave it a forward momentum. \nPoints in the Discussion  \n\nEU mandates and its directives are playing an important role to control climate change. In the eyes of EU there is split in terms of Iraq and EU trying to find space in this area.\nNeed to deal with the challenges of climate change and it should not be ignored. The international community is worried about but needs to take specific steps to deal with it.\nIn terms of Foreign Policy\, UK is in the right direction and leading the way in areas of economics and trade.\nNeed to discuss diverging views between Western and Asian countries in general and India and China in particular.\nIn the UK\, traditionally energy has never been an important issue. Suddenly with these ambitious targets for greenhouse reductions\, it has had to do a rethink in its energy choices.\nThe role of politicians in the Labour Party and their proactive approach to climate change should be highlighted.\nThe UK has taken a leadership role in climate change and other countries should equally take a lead.\nEconomic compulsions are vital in evaluating climate change and a precautionary approach should be taken.\nCriticism of the British approach should be further strengthened.\nNeed to take into account critical issues of climate change related to technology. \nWhy has Britain decided not to become a member of IRENA?\nWhat is the impact of the economic recession on climate change?\nTo what extent does domestic politics affect climate change issue?\n\nPrepared by M. Mahtab Alam Rizvi\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/climate-change-and-foreign-policy-the-uk-approach
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090424T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090424T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T104742
CREATED:20231223T222222Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130250Z
UID:63707-1240551000-1240551000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Accomodation with Militants in Swat: Implications For Regional Security
DESCRIPTION:Chair: C Uday BhaskarDiscussants: Kalim Bahadur and Siddharth Varadarajan \nIn 1947 Swat was a princely state that was ruled by Miangul Abdul Haq Jehanzeb\, the Wali of Swat\, who was a progressive ruler and built a number of educational institutions\, hospitals\, roads and infrastructure. The state acceded to Pakistan in 1947\, but retained its identity till 1969\, when Wali relinquished power and the state of Swat was merged with the province of NWFP as the Provincially Administered Tribal Area (PATA). Until 1969 the Wali of Swat exercised absolute authority\, and even after the merger continued to be the ruler in an honorary capacity till 1987.  \nWith the merger of the state in 1969\, there was some tumult as many of the employees of the state were forcibly retired and there were large-scale protests\, leading to confusion and anarchy. Swat became a haven for lawlessness and uncertainty. All the developmental projects were mired in red tape and there was all round deterioration. The public discontent was used by the religious fundamentalists to further their cause. Sufi Mohammad Khan\, who was earlier a member of Jamaat-e-Islami\, founded TNSM after leaving Jamaat-e-Islami in 1992\, with the aim of establishing an Islamic order. In the ensuing clash with security forces Sufi Mohammad and 20 of his senior followers were arrested. But the provincial government of NWFP led by Sherpao for some strange reason withdrew the charges. After the US missile attack on Afghanistan in August 1998\, TNSM threatened to attack American property and abduct American citizens unless USA apologised to the Islamic world for the missile attack. Many of his followers died in the misadventure and he was arrested on his return to Pakistan.  \nIn October 2007\, after a few altercations with the security forces\, his followers virtually took over the entire Swat Valley. As Sufi Mohammad began showing a willingness to negotiate a settlement\, Fazalullah distanced himself from his erstwhile mentor. When Sufi Mohammad negotiated the deal with the government\, the hard-line faction led by Fazalullah refused to abide by it.  \nSubsequent to the US attack on Afghanistan in October 2001\, the Taliban and Al Qaeda elements from Afghanistan fled to the inaccessible and mountainous regions of the FATA. Initially Pakistani forces largely avoided interfering with them\, intending to use them in Afghanistan after the US withdrawal. However\, this policy had to change under sustained US pressure and the Pakistani troops were forced to enter South Waziristan Agency in FATA and directed the local Taliban to surrender foreign militants. The aim was to create a distinction between the local Taliban and al Qaeda led foreign militants.  \nDespite the failure of peace deals in South Waziristan\, the Pakistani government subsequently attempted the same policy of accommodation with the militants in North Waziristan. Islamabad accordingly signed another peace deal with the militants\, with Maulana Fazlur Rehman’s assistance\, called the Miramshah Agreement on September 5\, 2006. But like previous such attempts in South Waziristan it failed to bring peace.  \nIn the run up to the February 2008 elections\, the caretaker provincial government of NWFP\, in a desperate bid to buy peace\, had proposed implementation of Shariat regulations in the entire Malakand Division comprising seven districts\, Dir Upper\, Dir Lower\, Swat\, Shangla\, Buner\, Malakand and Chitral in the NWFP. The proposal intended to take away from people\, their right to submit a writ in the High Court and the Supreme Court\, instead a Shariat court at the division level was to be set up as the final arbiter of justice.  \nThis deal was followed by another deal on May 21\, 2008 with Maulana Fazalullah. In the peace deal signed with Fazalullah\, the militants agreed that they would accept and honour the writ of the federal and provincial government and would not malign the religion of other citizens. However\, the deal was unilaterally discarded just a few weeks later under directives from TTP chief\, Baitullah Mehsud who was unhappy with the ongoing military operations in Waziristan. As a result\, Swat was a fierce battleground by the end of 2008 and by January 2009\, the militants were controlling most of Swat valley.  \nSoon the ANP government in NWFP realised that the army was not able to overcome the Taliban led by Fazlullah and the Taliban rather than being defeated\, had consolidated their grip on Swat. It accordingly signed a fresh peace deal with Sufi Mohammad on February 16\, 2009. As part of the deal\, Shariat laws have been enforced in seven districts of Malakand Division and Kohistan district of Hazara Division. The deal purports to abolish all “un-Islamic” laws and halt all operations by the security forces\, as well as sets time limits for various trials\, a maximum of six months for civil cases and four months for criminal cases. It also proposes setting up a divisional Shariat court or Darul Quza\, which will be the final arbiter of all cases from the region. It would remove the need for local cases to be appealed through the normal court system followed in the rest of Pakistan.  \nMany in the government perceive the peace deal as a split between the Baitullah Mehsud led TTP based in Waziristan and the Swat Taliban led by Fazalullah\, but neither of the two has given any indication of a rift. On the other hand the deal saw consolidation of Taliban forces in Waziristan\, as immediately after the deal\, three Taliban commanders in South and North Waziristan including two who were perceived to be pro-government\, joined hands. Although the Nizam-e-Adl Regulation was formally promulgated in the region only after the Presidential ascent on April 13\, 2009\, the Qazi courts had started functioning in Swat Valley from March 17\, 2009. The supporters of the deal say that the laws being implemented are a relatively mild form of Shariat\, and meant to erode popular support for the militants demand for expeditious Islamic justice. Under the proposed law\, qazi (religious judge)\, will sit in the court\, along with a regular judge\, to ensure that the judgments conform to Islamic teachings. The deal draws its support not only from the ANP led provincial government but also from the army\, which sees it as a face saving device after it failed to evict Taliban from this region. The opponents of the deal believe that it will facilitate a parallel legal system and lead to a demand by the Taliban to impose a harsher version of Shariat and for its implementation in other parts of Pakistan as well. The US has also criticised the deal as it believes this deal only provides time and space for the militants to rearm\, as well as give up secular traditions for Islamic law. \nIssues Raised in the Discussion  \n\nDevelopments in Swat should not be linked to Sufi Mohammad\, as it is not related to the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan. \nIt is unimportant whether the Taliban takes Buner or any other district\, what is significant is to understand their plan and the reasons behind their success.\nIt needs to be pointed out that Pakistan is not as much against the Taliban as it is against the United States.\nArmy in Pakistan is totally convinced that the Taliban are allies and India is a greater threat than the Taliban.\nThe situation could become grave if the Taliban enters the urban areas in Pakistan. There are also possibilities of the Army joining hands with the Taliban.\nAn anthropological background on Swat needs to be highlighted.\nThere is a need to consider the impact of developments in Pakistan on India\, Russia\, China and Iran.\nThe interface between state and society in Pakistan should be taken into account.\nRadicalisation is a serious problem in Pakistani society as 59.43 per cent of the population consist of youth.\nThere is a need to highlight the novel features introduced by the recently signed deals\, given that such deals have been signed in the past as well. \nIt is important to understand how to contain the conflict.\nIs the erosion of state authority in Pakistan a result of United States policy towards Pakistan?\n\n\n\nThere is a need to highlight how the various groups have looked at the peace deal. \nThere is a need to analyse how India could influence the situation and what could be the implications on militant groups in India.\nDoes recruitment to terror outfits emanate from socio-economic grievances? One needs to go to the root causes. Negotiating with terrorists is not wrong as it could provide a meaningful way to engage them.\nPeace deals have not been successful as they are signed from a position of weakness. \n\nPrepared by Medha Bisht\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/accomodation-with-militants-in-swat-implications-for-regional-security
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090501T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090501T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T104742
CREATED:20231223T222222Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130250Z
UID:63705-1241155800-1241155800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Can Renewables Enhance Energy Security?
DESCRIPTION:Chair: B S MalikDiscussants: V Raghuraman and Sanjay Verma \nThough the case for incorporating renewable energy into national energy policies has been around for decades\, the growing debate on climate change has enhanced the profile and brought the issue of renewable energy to the forefront as a means of tackling global warming. However\, more than climate change issues\, it is energy security and the access to and control of fossil fuel sources that are the main drivers of the West’s policy. Given the critical place energy holds for economic growth\, retaining their positions in the global economic order is a major factor for the traditional powers\, particularly in the event of a scramble for non-renewable energy resources taking place. \nWhile it is true that the current global financial crisis and economic recession have seen the demand for energy falling substantially across the world\, it is generally believed that once the recession is over and demand picks up the price of oil and gas could once again become prohibitive. There are several reasons why this may occur\, including production cuts by OPEC\, but mainly due to depleting reserves from mature oil and gas fields. According to the US Department of Energy’s Energy Information Administration\, 80 out of 84 oil and gas exporting countries have reached a point where their field reserves have reached a plateau and production is decreasing. \nHence\, the Europeans took the lead in raising the issue of climate change as the most crucial national security issue\, with the European Commission publishing what is termed as the “2020 by 2020” package\, which includes proposals for not only reducing the EU’s greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 20 per cent by 2020\, but also to ensure that 20 per cent of their energy is obtained from renewable energy resources. \nWith Barack Obama’s election to the US Presidency\, it is generally believed that the climate change issue has received a fillip. However\, the US’ underlying concern is clearly about the country’s reliance\, indeed\, growing dependence\, on imported energy resources. As President Obama stated in his presidential memorandum on January 26\, 2009\, “America’s dependence on oil is one of the most serious threats that our nation has faced.” Yet when one looks at the future plans for energy in the US as well as other developed countries\, it is interesting to note that all of them are based on fossil fuels\, as well as nuclear power\, with renewable energy comprising only a small proportion of the energy mix.  \nDespite the hype about renewable energy\, developed countries will continue to rely on fossil fuels. It is a fact that major international oil companies such as BP\, Royal Dutch Shell and ExxonMobil are freezing their research and investments in renewable energy\, while continuing to invest in the petroleum sector\, including carbon-intensive energy sources like tar sands and natural gas from shale.  \nAs the momentum for the negotiations on working out a successor agreement to the Kyoto Protocol in 2012 picks up\, countries like India and China are coming under increasing pressure from the rich countries to commit to binding emissions cuts. Some of the developed countries are also raising the bogey of employing “retaliatory mechanisms” through the WTO forum against China and India if they don’t adhere to binding emission cuts.  \nHowever\, though India is not giving in to such pressures and has adopted the position that since it is the developed countries that are responsible for most of the current levels of carbon emissions they should make the requisite technology and funding available for mitigating emissions\, it is taking necessary action by putting in place projects that will allow it to further improve its energy efficiency and decrease the rate of emission increase.  \nThere is no doubt that renewable energy resources are required to deal with climate change and global warming. However\, to increase the share of renewables in national energy mixes\, particularly in the poor and developing countries\, cooperative methods will have to be employed\, not threats and trade-related pressures. Moreover\, the developed countries have to acknowledge the responsibility for the current increase in emission levels and take steps to mitigate the same. Yet\, the rich countries demand that developing countries take measures to accept binding cuts on emissions by cutting down on their fossil fuel consumption and employ renewable energy systems that are either inaccessible or too capital intensive for most poor countries to adopt without funding. However\, the developed countries are not agreeable to technology transfers or adequate funding required to deploy such technology.  \nPoints in the Discussion: \n\n\nIndia needs to develop technology for energy security and has to adopt a new approach to deal with the problem.\nNeed to look at the issue of climate change and global warming within the context of energy security.\nThe debate on climate change is only a political instrument used by developed countries.\nWhen discussing energy security\, climate change and global warming issues\, there is a need to move towards an independent global process.\nNeed to analyze the impact that the financial crisis and China’s growing energy use have on climate change.\nNeed to expand on the impact of trade issues on the climate change debate\,\nIndia’s economic policy in next five years needs to taken into account the aspect of how to preserve our resources according to the country’s necessities.\n\nPrepared by M. Mahtab Alam Rizvi\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/can-renewables-enhance-energy-security
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090508T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090508T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T104742
CREATED:20231223T222217Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130249Z
UID:63703-1241760600-1241760600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Low Intensity Conflict under Nuclear Conditions: Analysing the India-Pakistan Theatre
DESCRIPTION:India and Pakistan were again on the verge of a military confrontation following revelation of Pakistan’s complicity in the Mumbai terror attacks of November 2008. Pakistan reluctance to act against its perpetrators had forced India to plan punitive responses against terror camps\, prompting Pakistan to project a capability to repulse an Indian attack. After weeks of underdone posturing\, both realised the possibility of a stalemate and de-escalated the conflict. Such responses have been the template of the India-Pakistan dynamics\, especially after the May 1998 nuclear tests. Of all characteristics\, the most discernable element is what is perceived to be an asymmetric nuclear deterrence equation that seems skewed against India\, restricting its pro-active responses. The paper reviewed a problematic element in the India-Pakistan strategic competition – the scope for low intensity conflict under nuclear conditions. It examined whether the execution of a protracted low-intensity conflict by Pakistan is a negation of the nuclear deterrence equation between the two countries\, and the reasons why India has failed to suitably respond to this strategy. \nThe concept of Low Intensity Conflict has constantly evolved along with the transformations in the nature of warfare. When quantified by intensity and nature of conflict\, all confrontations remaining below the level of high- or mid-level conventional war could be classified as low-intensity conflicts. Generally\, LIC is a genre embracing many types of sub-conventional and asymmetric warfare including insurgency\, counter-insurgency\, and even terrorism and counter-terrorism \nThe chunk of debate on nuclear South Asia is centred on two issues: (a) has nuclear weapons caused instability\, raising potential for escalation; (b) is it a stability-instability paradox\, whereby Pakistan used the assumed stability at the nuclear level to create instability at the lower level. In this dialectical spectrum\, both schools converge on the stability-instability paradox\, which states that the stability created by nuclear weapons at the top would cause or facilitate instability at the sub or conventional levels. \nPakistan seeks to deter at all levels – nuclear\, conventional\, sub-conventional and does not want India to share the same equation. It fears Indian pre-emptive attack against nuke capability. In this regard it has two objectives (i) gain parity against India’s conventional superiority (b) existential deterrence against India’s nuclear capability. Pakistan fears the asymmetry with India in force levels and believes space for conventional war exists\, which India would exploit. India could crush insurgency at limited conventional levels and threaten second strike if Pakistan contemplates nuclear response. \nLinked with this thinking is the utility of nuclear weapons in achieving Pakistan’s strategic objectives in Kashmir. Pakistanis had always believed that its nuclear capability could neutralise the Indian conventional as well as nuclear forces while providing the umbrella to reopen the Kashmir issue. Through every opportunity of brinkmanship\, Pakistan seeks to internationalise the Kashmir dispute\, project it as a nuclear flashpoint and pressure India to initiate a dialogue. The Indo-Pakistan peace process could have in some ways validated this strategy. However\, it had mixed results as India managed to repulse the insurgency through successful counter-insurgency\, forcing Pakistan to push in foreign mercenaries to hype the theatre. \nThe paper concluded with the assertion that Pakistan is an irrational actor. It is a hub of terrorism and proliferation and a theological nuclear weapon state primarily controlled by military. It exploits global paranoia to its advantage. However it is equally apprehensive about being bombed back to Stone Age. It realizes that tactical first-strike is unfeasible and would invite massive Indian retaliation. As for India’s limited responses\, despite repeated breaches\, India never expanded theatre and instead used economic and military might. Also\, it never allowed space to internationalise Kashmir. India has yielded political gains through responsible behaviour. The moot question is- Has this approach been fruitful – political timidity and reluctance to use military power? India believes in the scope for Limited War under Nuclear Conditions. Pakistan found space for LIC without hitting Indian threshold and Pakistan’s first-use posture restricted Indian response. \nFinally\, these options will materialise only if the Indian political leadership mandates the security establishment to execute such radical responses to the three-decade old proxy war\, which has cost thousands of lives and destruction of national resources. There is need for political will and audacity to exploit the turbulence in Pakistan and signal to Pakistan the futility and failure of its LIC strategy. Pakistan should be reminded of the fact that its survival should not be at the cost of promoting subversion and instability in South Asia. This would also mean a change of mindsets in Indian security establishment and the willingness to transcend traditional security approaches to explore radical solutions to this perennial security challenge. \nThe important points raised during the discussion were \n\nWe need to now re examine our existing doctrines and get rid of prevailing flaws. IDSA could assist in the process by pro active documentation.\nSecurity of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons is a big issue and Pakistan exploits this insecurity to its advantage.\nCrushing insurgency through low intensity tactics is not a feasible option. Insurgency is a socio-economic-political problem and requires a more comprehensive and sensitive approach.\nThere is no need to worry too much about the nuclear rhetoric. LIC is something which is here to stay.\nThere is need to look at the definitional aspects of LIC and distinction needs to be made between proxy war and LIC.\nDismemberment of Pakistan is not beneficial for India as it would be exposed directly to troubled areas of Afghanistan and Central Asia.\nAnti India stand and Kashmir is the single biggest adhesive for Pakistanis.\nIndia and Pakistan have to think beyond military solutions. Sabre rattling would not help in the long run. They have to look for alternatives such as political resolutions and packages.\nIn war Asymmetry is something you hope to achieve.\nIndia shouldn’t be bothered too much about Pakistan’s nuclear threshold.\nPakistan has always used Kashmir as leverage to shy away from the real issues of concern- supporting cross border terrorism and facilitating terrorist attacks on Indian Territory.\nNobody can take Kashmir away from India unless we wish to give it out. According to the Instrument of Accession\, the whole of Kashmir including Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) is integral part of Indian Territory.\nIndia’s No first use policy is good even today and is a part and parcel of our diplomatic approach.\nThere is need to launch quick reaction forces similar to the Chinese strategy.\n\nThe session was chaired by Air Marshall (retd) Vinod Patney. The two external discussants were Brig Arun Sahgal and Maroof Raza. \nPrepared by Priyanka Singh\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/low-intensity-conflict-under-nuclear-conditions-analysing-the-india-pakistan-theatre
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090508T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090508T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T104742
CREATED:20231223T222221Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T062540Z
UID:63704-1241760600-1241760600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Trends in Thinking about Warfare
DESCRIPTION:Only by Invitation 1030 to 1300 hrs\nChair: M. S Chowdhury\nDiscussants: Rahul Bhonsle and Chandar S Sundaram \n“Trends in thinking about warfare” presented at the IDSA Fellow Seminar on 08 May\, 2009 at IDSA New Delhi by Col. PK Gautam( Retd) was well received and critically reviewed by external discussant and internal peer discussants. The proceedings were chaired by Brigadier MS Chowdhuri\, VSM ( Retd) Chief Instructor United Service Institute (USI) of India. External discussants were Brigadier Rahul Bhonsle\, SM (Retired)\, author and analyst\, and Dr Chandar Sundaram from the Centre for Armed Forces Historical Research\, USI of India. Internal discussant were Wg Cdr Ajey Lele and S. Rajsimman. \nThe paper identifies the following areas as unexplored or absent from Indian strategic community. The paper further argues that absence of these factors from Indian discourse may have its repercussion at both the level of research and policy making. \n\nUnderstanding the various “ways” of warfare and status of the debate on strategic culture.\nInvention of Fourth Generation War (4GW) and lessons from recent military operations including how the Chinese view it.\nNeglect and trends in military history.\n\nThe protracted nature of insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan compels one to think about the nature and character of war. While the nature of war continues to be enduring\, the character has changed to that of a counterinsurgency campaign. \nThe paper recommends strategic thinkers concerned with the military “use of force” in resolving “inter-state” and “intra-state” be sensitive to the available literature on the subject which debates whether modern war fighting capabilities enabled by hi-tech weaponry based on science and technology have ensured “victory”. The paper argues the importance for certain constructivist approaches to help research in this area. It begins its argument by stating that military operations in Iraq\, Afghanistan\, and Lebanon have overemphasized modern military operations while ignoring other factors that may eventually decide the result of operations. The paper also stresses the “way of fighting” and highlights the “Maratha way” to underline this point. \n\nChanging character of depth/ deep battle with hard and soft weapons (firepower and cyber power including EMP bombs). Overlap of force on force and spread of irregular warfare\nCentral role of contact battle( eye ball to eye ball) in India’s border deployment against China and Pakistan and also in counter insurgency war ( Chinese also claim : “China is strong in close warfare ; the enemy is strong in distant warfare” – Maj Gen Wang Pufeng )\nIn embryonic phases\, partially due to ignorance\, most Generals were against computerisation. Some warned against the perils of getting attracted to virtual reality at the cost of real world battle experience. Now most are for it and all know word processing and net use. Younger generation transmits culture of absorption of ICT to seniors. Wisdom of seniors under attack due to market forces and diminishing inter state wars and battle experience. Need for matching adult education.\n\nObservations by Discussants  \nBrig Bhonsle recommended more references to Indian literature. He mentioned that the US has now achieved asymmetry in Iraq. Counter insurgency is always difficult in foreign lands and he recalled the Indian experience in Sri Lanka in the 1980s. As regards 4GW\, he traced its origins to 1980s through the work of William Lind and others. Foreign literature he agreed was mostly about marketing products. As regards civil- military relations\, he mentioned that one has to introspect within the services and noted that the Chief of Defence Staff was stymied by the Air Force. Blame thus is shared by all in lack of synergy in system. \nDr Sundaram desired greater focus and suggested the replacement of warfare with warfighting. He traced how the British who were familiar with “guilds” where the concept of class had originated improvised to cement the regimental system in India based on its society\, which rather cemented the units. One new and challenging area of research over the century was via content analysis of the USI journal which needs to be done for further research by scholars. The journal has been published since 1870- being the oldest surviving journal on defence issues in India – it would give a good idea on ways of thinking on warfare in the Indian context. Observing a tendency not to look at history\, he also explained how political scientists have got the better of the topic than historians in general.. It is evident that historic lessons have been ignored – such as those of Vietnam\, or of Iraq. Societies can not be treated as water\, but as cultures. On the Chinese sources\, they need to be treated with caution as they have very strict censorship laws. He lamented that in Indian democracy\, there is excessive delay to get hold of even non classified historic papers which is counter productive. It is time that official war histories of 1962\, 1965 and 1971 are made public \nWg Cdr Lele suggested that ways of warfare are contextual – theater based\, or guerrilla war or present state of asymmetric warfare. He opined that there is nothing Western or Eastern as regards RMA. In shock and awe and effect based operations he mentioned that winning war is not enough\, but winning the peace is important . Subject is not only military\, but involves policy makers\, think tanks and academia. He noted that nanotechnology will usher in fifth generation warfare and we need to prepare. \nMr. S.Rajasimman exemplifies on this aspect by arguing that the paper captures this phenomenon at two important levels. These are at 1) operational level 2) doctrinal level. Conceptualization at these two levels differs. The paper for instance does not assume a clear distinction between the both. Both “Iraq War” and “Afghan War” have been claimed and argued to be unsuccessful. The paper argues that the “protracted-insurgency based operations” in Iraq and Afghan has proven that Shock and Awe lost its sting. Here distinction needs to be made how the concept of “shock and awe” functions at operational level and doctrinal level. Operational success need not necessarily mean doctrinal success. In other words the overwhelming fire power and high-tech weapon systems used may have been successful at the operational or tactical level by achieving the “military objectives” against “political-social objectives” as part of the next phase in the war. \nDiscussion  \nComments by E mail: Disagreeing on some issue such as 4GW\, US performance and high end warfare capability\, Colonel Peter Garretson\, USAF concluded that the paper also manifests what is the central debates in the US which is : \nWhat is the future of warfare\, and what should be our organizational emphasis \nRight now the forces to reform in favor of irregular prevail in power and noise \nBut they are strongly checked by the services and existing budget \nOther concerns of Col. Garretson were about long-range conventional missiles\, and cruise missiles\, which he thought will change high-end warfare. Trends which he thought need to be highlighted since World War II were: \nAn increase in examination of the future\, at least organizational\, from individual theorists\, to VonKarman’s New Horizons\, to AF2025… \nThe increase in capability of airpower\, and the counters by those who don’t have it \nThe de-civilization of warfare by the disadvantaged \nNamrata Goswami wrote : “that unlike what George Tanham or Ashley Tellis would have us believe\, Indian military is rather good at attrition warfare\, if you take its long drawn engagement in the North East and Jammu and Kashmir as a success story – then the rather valid question would arise: why are they still there? . Therefore\, I beg to differ with you on this aspect. I strongly argue that the growing militant violence in the North East especially Assam and Manipur is sign enough about the failure of countering insurgency effectively with devastating effect on overall way of life in these areas. Just managing violence between the security forces and the militants while turning a blind eye to extortion networks\, social violence\, and political instability tells badly on our military’s way of warfare\, if there is any at all”. \nComments by Participants  \nCommander Ranjit Rai (Retd) wanted more emphasis on strategic thinking. Dr Arvind Gupta\, from his experience noted that much more coordination and work is needed including original Indian work on the Indian way of warfare including text books. Dr Uttam Sinha felt the need to pull out military writings of Indian authors which must include culture\, history and trend analysis. Brigadier SP Sinha ( Retd) explained from his 1965 war experience on EBO as to how raw troops who were initially paralysed by artillery fire\, got used to or inoculated to it after few days of shelling. Lesson was effect based must be understood in context and for time period. It does not last permanently. . \nConcluding Remarks of Chairman  \nChair highlighted the following \n\nMore work on India and other literature is needed.\nStudy of history is important to see how only use of air power as propounded by Douhet never succeeded.\nOn the point made by Dr Namrata Goswami via e mail\, the chair said that he does not agree with her. In Nagaland the military has done an excellent job\, but other organs of the state also have a role to perform which was found lacking.\nThe situation in Iraq is due to incorrect strategic thinking. Indian policy makers have done well to resist the temptation to send Indian troops to Iraq.\nThe implementation of the Kargil Review Committee Report is held up and must be speeded up.\n\nOver all observations \nAll policy recommendations pertaining to study of war\, theory building\, nature of force employment study\, more focus on conduct of war rather than just IR\, not getting over awed by foreign literature\, doctrines based on combat experience need to retain cultural values and renew debate on civil military relations. It was generally opined that the paper in terms of its idea was important in itself and also as a guide to future research in this area. Future research could benefit from the discourse analysis that this paper has attempted to highlight. \nPrepared by S.Rajasimman\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/trends-in-thinking-about-warfare
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090515T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090515T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T104742
CREATED:20231223T222217Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T062403Z
UID:63702-1242365400-1242365400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Coastal Security Arrangement in Maharashtra: An Assessment
DESCRIPTION:Only by Invitation 1030 to 1300 hrs \nChair: Rajaram PandaDiscussants: Vijay Sakhuja \nThe paper discusses the overall coastal security arrangement in Maharashtra. The first part of the paper deals with the evolution of the coastal security mechanism in the state. Section two evaluates the deficiencies\, inadequacies and shortcomings in this mechanism. An assessment of the security measures that were announced by the central and state governments in response to the Mumbai attack is also highlighted in the paper. \nThe paper argues that awareness about the vulnerability of the country’s coasts first arose in the wake of the 1993 Mumbai serial blasts\, when it was established that the explosives used were smuggled in through the coast at Raigad in Maharashtra. This led to the launch of ‘Operation Swan’ with the aim of preventing the landing of contraband and infiltration along the Maharashtra and Gujarat coasts. Further attention to coastal security was given after the Kargil Review Committee’s recommendations for a comprehensive reform of the security set-up. It came in the form of a Task Force on Border Management\, with coastal security being a part and parcel of it. The Task Force recommended\, inter alia\, the setting up of a specialised marine police in the form of coastal police stations\, augmentation of the strength of the Coast Guard in terms of personnel and material\, the formation of fishermen watch groups\, and the establishment of an apex body for management of maritime affairs. On the recommendation of the Task Force\, the central government launched the Coastal Security Scheme in 2005-06.  \nA three-layered patrolling system is operational to secure the Maharashtra coast. At the outermost layer\, the Indian Navy patrols the high seas and carries out aerial reconnaissance with ship-based aircraft. The intermediate layer comprising of the Exclusive Economic Zone (between 12 and 200 nautical miles) is patrolled by the Coast Guard. And the territorial waters are patrolled by joint coastal patrolling teams comprising personnel drawn from the Customs\, the State Police and\, till 2006 from the Indian Navy. \n26/11 happened in spite of this multi-layered coastal security mechanism. Lack of ‘actionable’ intelligence has been widely attributed as the main reason for this failure. But there are certain inherent inadequacies in the coastal security mechanism\, making it incapable of preventing infiltration through the coast. These deficiencies are:  \n\n\nInsufficient Manpower \nPoor Training \nInadequate Infrastructure and Equipment \nInsufficient Resources \nSystemic Flaws\n\nTo address these issues\, the paper put forward some policy recommendations to the Maharashtra government. Some of these are:  \n\n\nManpower shortage could be addressed by recruiting retired Coast Guard and Navy personnel.\nPeople from the coastal villages could be enlisted in the coastal police force.\nIncentives such as special allowance and insurance could be considered for police personnel engaged in coastal security.\nSpecialised training is needed for the Coastal Police. \nFurther\, the central government needs to clearly spell out areas of jurisdiction of different agencies engaged in coastal security and ensure coordination among all agencies by establishing a central command system. \nIssues Raised in the Discussion: \n\n\nLack of governmental sensitivity to the importance of the coastal security.\nLack of coordination between state agencies and central agencies. There are too many agencies dealing with security\, and there is complete lack of coordination. There is turf war between these agencies. There is no command centre.\nThe overall responsibility of coastal security should be given to the Indian Navy.\nGreater use of technology for surveillance in sea and coast is required.\nLegislation authorizing the Indian Coast Guard and Indian Navy to arrest criminals at sea needs to be formulated.\nThe proposal for a Maritime Advisor is a welcome development.\nThere is need for improving police infrastructure.\nCorruption in the implementation of security schemes is rampant\, and their implementation needs to be closely monitored. \n\nPrepared by M. Amarjeet Singh\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/coastal-security-arrangement-in-maharashtra-an-assessment
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090515T053000
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DTSTAMP:20261105T104742
CREATED:20231224T104606Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130249Z
UID:64219-1242365400-1242365400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Myanmar’s Relations with Bangladesh since 1988
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Ranjit GuptaDiscussants: Y. M. Bammi and C. S. Kuppuswamy \nDuring the 1980s\, when Myanmar was the largest opium producer in the world\, the basic goal behind Myanmar-Bangladesh bilateral relationship was to cooperate in anti-drugs cooperation. But\, over the years\, the relationship started facing a lot of complications with the emergence of issues like maritime border demarcation\, Rohingya refugees and drug trafficking.  \nAs far as economic aspect of Myanmar-Bangladesh relationship is concerned\, the signing of the border trade agreement of May 1994 legalizing the informal border trade between the two states; the inauguration of Teknaf-Maungdaw trade in September 1995; Bangladeshi trade delegation’s visit to Myanmar in 1998; Sr. Gen Than Shwe’s visit to Bangladesh in December 2002 and consequent agreement between the parties to cooperate in road and water transportation; can be pointed out as significant developments. However\, on strategic issues\, a lot remains to be done. The very fact that Myanmar-Bangladesh border offers a safe haven to terrorist organizations in the region makes it necessary for both countries to cooperate in counter insurgency activities. But ironically\, not much has been initiated by either side in this respect. The refugee problem in Myanmar is another significant aspect which needs to be addressed adequately by both Myanmar and Bangladesh. According to a recent estimate\, even today\, around 19\,200 remain in Bangladesh. Smuggling of arms and ammunitions is considered another area in which both Myanmar and Bangladesh need to cooperate. Factors like recovering of arms and ammunition of the insurgent group Arakan Rohingya Solidarity Organization (ARSO) by the Bangladeshi Army and Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) in September 2005 and the recovering of a large amount of heavy weapons from the Naikhangchari sub-district in Bangladesh in the last eleven months clearly indicate lack of cooperation between Myanmar and Bangladesh in tackling smuggling issue.  \nDespite lack of cooperation on certain strategic issues\, both Myanmar and Bangladesh have been trying to improve bilateral ties through certain regional and sub-regional forums\, such as the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMST-EC)\, the ARF\, the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Forum (BCIM).  \nOver the years\, besides Rohingya and smuggling\, issues like land border demarcation and maritime order demarcation have emerged as two major areas of friction. Tensions have arisen particularly over Myanmar’s planned construction of a 40 kilometre fence along the border\, ostensibly to check cross-border smuggling. Recently in October 2008\, a standoff between Myanmar and Bangladesh occurred when Myanmar not only permitted a South Korean ship to explore natural gas in the disputed area between the two countries\, but also sent its naval vessel. Claims and counterclaims of the two neighbours in the Bay of Bengal continue to occur regularly.  \nIt is quite interesting to note that in case of Myanmar-Bangladesh relations\, the demographic factor plays quite a different role. Over the years\, while flow of refugees from Bangladesh has been a source of trouble for its neighbours\, in case of its relations with Myanmar\, Bangladesh is the affected party. The burden of refugees seems to be particularly high in case of Bangladesh due to its poor economic condition and limited resources. In addition\, there are constant assessments that some of the refugees may be associated with terror groups.  \nFor India\, both Bangladesh and Myanmar have their own special significance from geopolitical as well as strategic points of view. On the Indian side\, terrorism prone states like Arunachal\, Nagaland\, Manipur and Mizoram shares border with Myanmar. The problem of insurgency and economic underdevelopment in this region cannot be addressed adequately without India’s cooperation with Myanmar on these issues. Indo-Myanmar relationship is also significant due to India’s emphasis on Look East policy. Growing Myanmar-China relations may affect India’s interest in the region until and unless we too start improving our relations with Myanmar. Besides\, an amicable relationship with resource rich Myanmar will also help India to improve its energy security in the long run. However\, it remains undeniably true that the success of New Delhi’s policy toward Myanmar would be incomplete if its objectives with regard to Bangladesh were undermined. Whether to tackle the growing insurgency problem in the region or to deal with rise of China\, India needs to have a region wide comprehensive policy\, including positive policies toward its immediate neighbours.  \nImportant points raised in the discussion: \n\n\nIt is necessary to analyze if the bilateral relationship between Myanmar and Bangladesh has undergone any tremendous change after the end of the Cold War. In this context\, China’s role\, in particular\, should be taken into account. \nEmphasis should be given on how China has been trying to develop its relationship with both Bangladesh and Myanmar on economic and strategic issues.\nThere is a need to highlight the role of China as a decision maker as well as middleman over the years in the context of both Myanmar and Bangladesh. At the same time\, the possible role of China in those two countries in the future also should be analyzed.\nThe paper needs to analyze how having China with veto power in the UN has helped in furthering Myanmar’s cause in the world affairs. \nThe paper also needs to analyze how China is playing the role of a stabilizer in the bilateral relations between Myanmar and Bangladesh.\nIt is necessary to highlight the constraints in improving the bilateral relationship between India and Myanmar.\nThe paper discusses Myanmar-Bangladesh relations from both regional as well as bilateral standpoints. However\, it has not talked much on growing Indo-Myanmar relations on various aspects\, especially on military issues. \nAs Myanmar is quite a resource rich country while Bangladesh imports most of such resources\, the paper needs to analyze how both Myanmar and Bangladesh can take advantage of that aspect in improving their bilateral relationship. \nThe paper needs to discuss China’s role in the improvement of Myanmar-Bangladesh relations\n\nRohingya refugee problem is a significant issue in Myanmar-Bangladesh relations and so\, an elaborate discussion on the issue is necessary. Indian perspective to this issue needs to be discussed as Rohingya problem offers breeding ground for Islamic terrorism.\nWhile elaborating Rohingya issue\, the paper needs to take into account Myanmar’s ruling junta’s refusal to recognize Rohingya people as an ethnic group of Myanmar. In this context\, strong hatred of most people in Myanmar toward Muslim community should be discussed. \nThe paper needs to dwell upon the obstacles in improving Bangladesh-Myanmar trade relations. This will help in studying constraints on Indo-Myanmar trade relations as well. In this context\, issues like weak working banking system\, restrictions on visas to Bangladeshis as well as Indians\, artificial exchange rate\, etc.\, should be taken into consideration.\nThe paper needs to mention the recent evolution of an idea known as the ‘growth triangle’ incorporating Myanmar\, Bangladesh and India\, which\, if implemented\, will definitely help in improving the relations among the three countries. \nThe border dispute between Myanmar and Bangladesh should be addressed as a border management problem. At the same time\, an analysis should be made on why border demarcation has not proved to be that much of a problem between India and Myanmar while the issue of border demarcation between Myanmar and Bangladesh remains a highly disputed issue.\n\nPrepared by Pranamita Baruah\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/myanmars-relations-with-bangladesh-since-1988
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090529T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090529T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T104742
CREATED:20231223T222217Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250311T232719Z
UID:63700-1243575000-1243575000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and Afghanistan
DESCRIPTION:Only by Invitation 1030 to 1300 hrs \nChair: K Raghunath\nDiscussants: Divyabh Manchanda\, Arun Sahgal and Arun Mohanty \nThe Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) represents a major development in the strategic landscape of the Central Asian region. The inclusion of India\, Iran and Pakistan as observer states in the SCO mechanism suggests that it is gradually expanding into the wider South Asian region. In the next SCO summit meeting in Russia it is expected that Sri Lanka and Belarus will become dialogue partners of the SCO. \nThe changed attitude of the Central Asian regimes created a situation\, which provided an opportunity to the SCO for a new geopolitical role. In July 2005 (during Astana Summit) the SCO member states called the US to set a deadline for withdrawing its military presence in the region. As a result\, the US had to close down its air base in Uzbekistan in November 2005. In June 2006\, the SCO summit took place against the backdrop of the crisis over Iran’s nuclear programme and both Iran and Pakistan sought full membership in the organisation. The Bishkek Summit in 2007 was important\, where leaders from China\, Kazakhstan\, Kyrgyzstan\, Russia\, Tajikistan\, and Uzbekistan pledged to work more closely to develop energy resources and boost security efforts within the SCO framework. The Dushanbe summit in 2008 was held against the backdrop of Georgian crisis and speculations about the start of a ‘new cold war’ between Russia and the US. \nAfghanistan has always drawn special attention during the SCO summit meetings. The SCO Secretary – General Bolat Nurgaliev pointed out that cooperation among the member states should not only cover economy and trade but also anti-terrorism and other fields. The SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group was formed in November 2005 for the purpose of building cooperation between the SCO and Afghanistan on issues of mutual interest. The special conference on Afghanistan under the auspices of the SCO to discuss the issues of joint counteraction against terrorism\, illegal circulation of narcotics and organized crime was proposed by the member states. \nIran\, which has an observer status and has been seeking full membership in the SCO has major interest in Afghanistan. Tehran views outside powers to be the cause of problems. Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi argued that Pakistan has a central role in facilitating the stabilization process in Afghanistan and was committed to provide all needed help to reconstruct Afghanistan. \nIt can be evaluated that the SCO as an organisation will focus its activities mainly on problems of terrorism and narcotic control. At the same time\, Afghanistan directly influences security of the Central Asian states. Experts believe that hopefully the Obama administration with their newly declared desire of “engagement” would be more receptive in coordinating their efforts with the SCO or at least with member countries on a bilateral basis. Hopefully\, there will be a stabilization program jointly developed and implemented by Afghanistan and Dialogue member countries. \nThe current situation in Afghanistan is worrisome for India. Regional countries have greater stakes in Afghanistan because of their vested security interests. Today\, India’s strong economy has the potential to contribute to the reconstruction of Afghanistan. It has contributed in a major way in the past few years but its activities have been hampered due to the deteriorating security situation within Afghanistan and constant efforts of extremist groups backed by Pakistan to sabotage India’s reconstruction work. New Delhi has emphasized the importance of regional cooperation because this can help in addressing trans-border issues\, developing commercial and economic opportunity and ending cross-border infiltration and terrorism. India has contributed to the reconstruction process in Afghanistan at the bilateral level. Under the SCO mechanism India remains an observer state and thus doesn’t wield the same influence as Russia or China. \nWith the SCO’s increasing influence in the past five years within the Eurasian region\, it is likely to play an important role in the future as well. The SCO’s geographical proximity to Afghanistan particularly\, with the Central Asian countries\, will necessitate that neighboring countries engage Afghanistan bilaterally as well as through the SCO in specific areas like controlling drugs and terrorism. However\, the Russia –US and Russia-NATO and the US-Iran relations will determine future developments of the SCO. \nPoints in the Discussion: \nThe main focus of SCO in Afghanistan is in three areas: counter terrorism\, drug trafficking and provision of infrastructure to rebuild Afghanistan. \nSCO is used as a tool by big member states to maintain their geo-political status. \nChina is worried about the influence of other member states in the region particularly in the area of energy. \nChina and Russia do not want to accept the American presence in the Central Asian region because both countries have great influence and they are not ready to curtail their influence in the region. \nAt the bilateral level Russia and the Central Asian Republics try to engage more with Afghanistan. \nSCO is focusing regional countries such as India\, Iran and Pakistan to engage more on Afghanistan issues. \nRussian believes that America is not keen to resolve Afghan issues swiftly because America and NATO have military bases only in Afghanistan to protect their interest in the South Asian region. \nThe SCO is a China dominated organisation. Moreover\, China may try to limit and balance India’s influence by supporting Pakistan. \nIndia needs to take a collective approach to resolve Afghanistan’s problem\, because India is also observer state of the SCO. \nPeace and stability in Afghanistan is a crucial issue for India\, and India must be taken seriously. \nNeed to examine China’s dominance in the region and is really protecting its interest in CARs through SCO. \nNeed to examine if the SCO is really formed to counter NATO. \nWhy SCO did not offer Afghanistan observer status? \nPrepared by M. Mahtab Alam Rizvi\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-shanghai-cooperation-organisation-and-afghanistan
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090605T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090605T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T104742
CREATED:20231223T222210Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T062048Z
UID:63698-1244179800-1244179800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Dragon’s Digital Eyes beyond the Himalayas: Online Chinese Nationalism towards Pakistan And India
DESCRIPTION:Only by Invitation 1030 to 1300 hrs \nChair: S K BhutaniDiscussants: Arun Sahgal and M. V. Rappai  \nSince China underwent a series of reforms back in the 1970s\, the world has been witnessing sporadic symptoms of its widening presence in South Asia\, particularly in the contexts of India and Pakistan. It is more so in the post-Cold War period after the ‘People’s Daily Online’ connected to the Internet on January 1\, 1997\, utilizing cyberspace as a means to involve national sentiments and general responses on international issues in a big way. Since then\, the primary focus of Chinese cyber nationalists has been to retain China’s historical status as a respected power. Today\, Chinese cyberspace is often considered by many as a responsible factor in influencing Chinese policy making in relation to these two South Asian states. In this paper\, the author makes an attempt to review issues like evolution of online Chinese nationalism towards Pakistan and India; the central views in online Chinese nationalism towards the two states; the influence\, if any\, of the nationalist expression toward India and Pakistan on the actual foreign policy-making in China.  \nThe structural change in the international system at the end of the Cold War compelled the Chinese leadership to review and reshape its foreign as well as domestic policies. Since then\, while on the one hand\, China has been trying to improve its relations with neighboring states to deal with the US’ rising power in the region and quell the growing fear of encirclement by a coalition led by Washington\, there have also been consistent efforts by the Chinese people to revitalize China’s splendid civilization on the other. In recent years\, with China having the largest netizens in the world\, a certain section of Chinese nationalists have been able to intensify the offline nationalistic rhetoric within the state through online Chinese nationalism. In fact\, according to Stephan Halper and Jonathan Clarke\, “the internet has emerged as possibly the most important influence on public opinion\, not only accelerating the communications of news and information within China but also relaying news of unfolding events from the worldwide Chinese diaspora.” The Chinese\, particularly the young generation who have much greater access to the cyber world than the elderly\, have come to realize that they no longer need to secure direct or indirect interpretations from leaders\, journalists and Chinese officials (all members of the CCP)\, when they can analyze the truth by accessing the internet.  \nHowever\, Chinese youths’ access to the internet has created a sort of cyber-nationalism within the state which may prove quite a challenge in the long run for India’s security and strategic interests. It is evident from the anti-India sentiments overwhelmingly pouring out of a number of Chinese cyber sites. According to surveys conducted so far\, most Chinese netizens attach their preference to Pakistan as a more friendly state while considering India as less friendly. In the debates within Chinese cyberspace\, strong statements like how China can use Pakistan’s ‘fatal grudge’ with India for its own national interest clearly indicate how such ‘India bashing’ can create anti-India sentiments among Chinese public.  \nIt is believed that cyberspace in China has been able to bring about critical changes in its one-party dominated society. In fact\, “the unique characteristics of the internet such as instantaneousness\, anonymity\, and lacking borders have made it a convenient and powerful vehicle for citizens to assert themselves and have their voice heard in an institutionally less liberal and democratic environment”\, as rightly put by Bo Li and Yang Zhong in the book titled “The Internet and Political Participation in China.”  \nAlthough it is argued that popular online nationalism has been able to set a standard of what may be called ‘true patriotism’ in contrast to ‘state nationalism’\, it remains undeniably true that no alternative leaders or movements are emerging from the internet and the CCP continues to be sole political power. As regards to the size of cyberspace\, although China’s internet seems to be quite open to the world\, in reality\, it still offers a tactfully closed cyberspace. What is all the more interesting to note here is that most of the leading commercial websites are based on China\, where they continue to face a lot of pressure from the CCP. Above all\, despite growing popularity of cyberspace within China\, the credibility of the news on the website still remains in question. That is why\, the impact of cyber nationalism in China on the decision-making process is very limited\, even with the state’s foreign policy formulations in relation to India and Pakistan. \nPoints raised during the discussion:\n\nWhy and how Beijing has been able to use the media\, particularly cyberspace\, to meet its national interest by promoting Chinese nationalism?\nHow has the Chinese leadership creatively managed the freedom of internet users\n\nHas there been state support to galvanize internet usage in China?\nWhat is the penetration rate of anti-India sentiments through Chinese cyberspace? \nIs the US-India strategic partnership responsible for growing anti-India sentiments in Chinese websites?\nThe author mentions that Sino-Pak relation is a by-product of the Indo-US strategic partnership. However\, while Indo-US strategic relationship is quite a recent phenomenon\, Sino-Pak relations began decades ago. \nThe paper needs to analyze the impact of cyber nationalism on the larger population\, since as a proportion of the overall population\, netizens in India\, China and Pakistan still remain quite small.\nAt present\, Chinese hacking seems to pose a much greater threat to India than cyber nationalism. \nWhat has been the methodology adopted in selecting comments from the websites?\nDigital nationalism in China is a kind of proxy war against India.\nA brief overview of the evolution of Chinese digital nationalism is necessary.\nChinese Diaspora has a great impact on Chinese nationalism\, whether online or offline. Thus\, there is a need to analyze the extent of online communication between the Chinese in mainland China and those residing in other democratic countries.\n\nAn analysis should also be made on the influence of the internet on the process of Chinese policy making. \nIn the paper\, the author elaborates on how over the years\, Sino-Indian relations have undergone three specific changes: ‘Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai’ of 1950s to ‘Hindi-Chini Bye-Bye’ of post 1962 war\, and then\, to ‘Hindi-Chini Buy Buy’ of post 1988. These three stages seem irrelevant as far as this paper is concerned. \nThe author mentions the forty-five minute long handshake between Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Chinese President Deng Xiaoping in Beijing in 1988. This is not quite correct. \nDespite its booming IT sector\, India has not been able to master the intricate details of cyberspace system. To counter the growing anti-India sentiments pouring out of Chinese websites\, India needs to develop mastery over the functioning of internet network system at a rapid pace. We also need a systematic policy in computer technology to deal with the growing threats from Chinese cyberspace.\n\nPrepared by Pranamita Baruah\, Research Assistant at Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/dragons-digital-eyes-beyond-the-himalayas-online-chinese-nationalism-towards-pakistan-and-india
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090605T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090605T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T104742
CREATED:20231223T222216Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T061940Z
UID:63699-1244179800-1244179800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:A new wave of Terrorism in India
DESCRIPTION:Only by Invitation 1030 to 1300 hrs \nChair: Arun BhagatDiscussants: S Y Thapliyal and Bibhu Prasad Routray \nIn India\, the word terrorism came to be officially used for the first time in 1984 to characterise the violence in Punjab. This followed the enactment of the Terrorist Affected Areas (Special Courts) Act of 1984\, the impulse for which was the assassination of Indira Gandhi in October that year. Before this\, all armed action by the various groups in the North East or by the Naxals were referred to as extremism or militancy or Naxalism. Subsequently\, the violence unleashed by domestic as well as foreign armed groups in Jammu and Kashmir came to be characterised as cross-border terrorism. \nThe 2007-2008 Annual Report of the Ministry of Home Affairs lists 32 different armed groups as banned terrorist organisations. Among others\, these include several armed groups in the North East as well as the two Maoist groups. Yet\, in the pages devoted to detailing what the report refers to as the “Current Status of Militancy in the North East” and in the section dealing with the “Naxal Situation\,” the words terrorism and terrorist are not mentioned even once! The report also characterises the violence in Jammu and Kashmir as “terrorism/militancy”\, in a bow towards the fact that all violence in that state does not constitute terrorism. \nTo avoid confusion about the phenomenon being confronted\, it is imperative to understand what terrorism is. Moreover\, a series of events in the last few years – the November 2008 terrorist attack on Mumbai\, the various bombings carried out by the Indian Mujahideen\, and the involvement of Hindu radical groups in bomb-throwing – points to a new wave of terrorism focused on the Indian hinterland. This necessitates a change in India’s approach towards counter-terrorism from one focused purely on cross-border aspects to domestic issues as well. \nThis paper explores what terrorism is. It analyses the new wave of terrorism buffeting the Indian hinterland\, and excludes discussion of the Maoist insurgency\, the armed activities of the various armed groups in the North East\, and “militant” violence within Jammu and Kashmir. The paper also highlights some principles that should inform India’s approach to counter terrorism. \nWhile cross-border terrorism sponsored and supported by Pakistan has been a security challenge since the late 1980s\, a new wave of terror has begun to batter the Indian hinterland in recent years. Three distinct sets of players are involved in this new phenomenon. The first set comprises of Pakistani terrorist groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM)\, which have since the late 1990s begun to expand their ‘jihad’ in Kashmir into the Indian hinterland. The second set is composed of a network of rage-driven Indian Muslim youth and Indian criminal outfits\, who\, with the support of the first set\, seek vengeance for the ‘sufferings’ inflicted upon their community. And the third set is formed by radical Hindu youth\, bent on retaliating against Muslims for the terrorist attacks carried out by the other two sets of players. \nTwo events triggered this new wave. The first was the demolition of the Babri Masjid in 1992 and the communal riots that followed in parts of the country. The second event was the stalling of the separatist struggle in Jammu and Kashmir in the mid-1990s. Muslim youth and criminal networks were spurred by the Babri demolition and the ensuing communal riots to seek vengeance through terrorist attacks. Ten years later\, the tragedy in Gujarat provided further fuel to their anger. \nPakistan has been providing material support to them in this enterprise. And when the Hizbul Mujahideen’s separatist struggle in Jammu and Kashmir began to wane\, Pakistan began to funnel its own citizens and other “graduates of the Afghan war” into the state\, thus transforming a local insurgency into a transnational jihad. When neither this change in actors nor the Kargil misadventure could shake the Indian hold over Jammu and Kashmir\, the jihad was extended to the Indian hinterland in the late 1990s. This in turn incensed Hindu radicals who began to plan and unleash terror against innocent Muslims. \nIndia thus has to contend with three sets of terrorist actors – one purely foreign\, the second\, domestic groups with linkages to these foreign players\, and the third wholly domestic. \nThe approach to counter each of these players has to be distinct\, though there are bound to be commonalities in measures adopted. In the case of Pakistani terrorist groups like the Lashkar-e-Taiba\, domestic counter-terror measures have to be accompanied by diplomatic efforts to force Pakistan into taking stringent action against these groups and even covert intelligence campaigns to disrupt the terror infrastructure in that country. \nIndia also needs to focus on domestic counter terror measures\, which have indeed received a fillip in the wake of the Mumbai attack. States have responded to terrorism by adopting a combination of several responses\, each of course specifically crafted to suit their particular circumstances. Though it might sound pusillanimous\, “appeasement” is a most pragmatic response. Not appeasement in terms of conceding terrorist demands\, but addressing the underlying causes that triggered the resort to violence in the first place. \nA second set of responses is in the domain of intelligence and the legal framework to deal with terrorism. The development and maintenance of databases about terrorist groups is essential. This is in turn contingent upon enhanced intelligence work and capabilities\, both human and technical. Related to this are greater intelligence and surveillance efforts through a network of closed-circuit television cameras\, psychological profiling\, infiltration of terrorist groups\, etc. \nThirdly\, it is crucial to identify and harden actual and potential targets like government buildings\, corporate houses\, vital installations like airports\, power plants\, and the like through security measures like x-ray baggage screeners\, metal detectors\, more security personnel\, etc. The idea is to make it as difficult as possible for terrorists to carry out attacks\, thus increasing the chances of mistakes and consequent reduction in the actual number of attacks. \nThe creation of special counter-terrorist forces and providing them with specialised training to deal with hostage negotiations is the fourth response. This needs to go hand in hand with the modernisation of the police force. \nImportant points raised in the discussion: \n\nIndia is the biggest victim of terrorism.\nThe biggest act of Hindu terrorism was the destruction of Babri Masjid.\nMajority community needs to change its mindset towards the Muslim community.\nRevamping the intelligence structure is the need of the hour.\nThere is complete lack of coordination among various security agencies. This has to be addressed.\nThere is urgent need for police reform.\nIs Indian Mujahideen an independent terror group?\nPakistan remains a security threat to India. India’s inability to deal with Pakistan has further compounded the situation.\nIndia should not expect much from the United States in dealing with Pakistan. However\, India may consider something like the US Department of Homeland Security.\nThere is an urgent need for political consensus on terrorism.\nAbove all\, there is need for security consciousness among the people.\n\nPrepared by Dr. M. Amarjeet Singh\, Research Assistant at Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/a-new-wave-of-terrorism-in-india
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090612T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090612T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T104742
CREATED:20231224T104529Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T061831Z
UID:64214-1244784600-1244784600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Evaluating the "Hybrid" Character of China's Communist Regime
DESCRIPTION:Only by Invitation 1030 to 1300 hrs \nChair: V P DuttDiscussants: Sreemati Chakravarti and Srikant Kondapalli \nThe presentation began on the assertive note that the Communist regime in China is now hybrid in nature. According to Dr. Panda\, the current ongoing transformation in China is clearly visible. The paper begins with conceptual formulations of ‘Hybrid regime’\, ‘democracy’ and ‘authoritarianism’ and then proposes a typology for the current Chinese communist regime and concludes with attempts to highlight the progressive trends in China’s state-society transformational politics. The paper attempts to analyse the nature of the present Chinese Communist regime and outlines the quantitative measurement of democratisation in China. \nConceptually categorizing various regimes\, the paper utilises the regime typology presented by Larry Diamond which was published in ‘Journal of Democracy’ as a research paper titled as “Election without Democracy: Thinking about Hybrid Regimes” in 2002. While applying the Diamond’s regime categorisation to China\, Dr. Panda has placed the Communist regime in China close to the ‘hybrid category of hegemonic electoral authoritarianism’ than placing it in the politically closed authoritarian regime category. He however pointed out that the concept of hybrid regime is not a new one and it got popularised gradually. \nChanges in socio-political and legal conditions in China provide tangible evidence that the incumbent communist regime is no more authoritarian than it used to be earlier. It is a noticeable development in China that state-civil society relationship has been rationalised. Change has taken place because of reforms and electoral politics. 7\, 30\,000 villages elect their local leaders\, though the nature of elections is semi-competitive. With increased trend of semi competitive elections since the 1980s\, public participation level has been going upward. However beyond the village level\, elections are not at all competitive. \nAnalysing the democratic reforms in China\, Dr. Panda applied ‘Demand and Supply Model’ and noted that in a society where public demand for democratic reforms is low\, the system of governance turns into an authoritarian one. He pointed out that though doubts prevail over China’s future path to democracy\, the Communist Party’s urge to nurture the ‘sprouts of democracy’ indicates its future intention of more democratic reforms. The present Chinese Communist system is facing inherent contradictions. ‘Ideological-Institutional’ progress in China remains the deciding factor in the structure of one party democracy. However Dr. Panda pointed out that new ideas such as ‘people centered principle\, (yi ren wei ben)\, human rights (renquan)\, private property (siyou caichan) and harmonious society (hexie shehui) etc. have emerged in political ideology of Chinese Communist regime\, which indicates the ideological-institutional progress in China. He stated that democracy in China will be very much Chinese in nature. \nPoints raised during the discussions:\n\nIt is true that during the 1960’s and 1970’s\, American scholars viewed that economic liberalization leads to political liberalization then it leads to democracy. But this has not happened in many countries.\nElections do take place in China but how fair it is\, is the question. A research done by Sun Yat-sen University shows that people vote for only personal qualities of candidates.\nElection results in China are often pre-decided. With the elections taking place under the party’s guidance\, it is questionable whether the Chinese Communist party accepts any challenge to its authority? What evidence do we have for increased accountability?\nSemi-competitive elections in China do not seem to be leading Chinese society towards democracy. Democratic parties in China exist only on paper.\nThough the public participation level in elections in China has gone up over the years but question is how much it is voluntary and how much mobilized.\nThere are thousands of people in China who have been displaced and their lives have been severely affected because of Special Economic Zones (SEZs). There are no avenues for them to express themselves.\nThe term ‘Democracy’ is not alien to China. Mao talked about ‘New Democracy’ and differentiated it from ‘Old Democracy’. He described the period of 1949-59 as the period of ‘New Democracy’.\nCivil society organizations such as NGO’s cannot question the Communist party. All these mass organizations are appended to Chinese Communist party.\nCivil Society organizations\, with their activities\, do the groundwork for shaping the future members of the Chinese Communist party. All the political returns from their actions are designed to help the communist party and not to promote democracy.\nFor a successful democracy\, besides multiparty democracy\, it is also required to have freedom of press; independent judiciary; and freedom of dissent. These elements are still lacking.\nChinese regime fears democratic reforms. Internet is state controlled in China.\nThere is a need to study the discourse on democracy in China and how the Communist party is adjusting to the change in China.\nA comparison could have been apt on what distinguishes Chinese democracy from Mao’s ‘New Democracy’ and from ‘Hundred Flowers Movement’?\nChinese politics is in transition. Economic reforms have taken place. Freedoms other than the political are being enjoyed by the people. Internet is booming in China.\nIn fact sprouts of democracy came up in the form of sprouts of capitalism in the 1950s.\nThere is a transition even in the discourse of Chinese political system. How would you allow market reforms with Communist party system? How do you continue the legitimacy of Communist party? These are widely debated questions.\nSocial welfare measures are being withdrawn and pensions are being cut. These are negative declining trends of economic reforms.\nFocus on just one scholar\, Larry Diamond to analyse the democratic reforms in China is not appropriate.\nThe paper should have focused on Chinese society particularly its ethnic communities and their role in the democratization process.\nApart from civil society organizations\, this paper should have focused on independent media and pressure groups as well.\nAnalysing democracy in terms of demand and supply is not adequate. Democracy is not a commodity. Democratic states do adopt coercive measures when their authority is challenged. Supply-demand model does explain this phenomenon.\nThere should also be deliberations on role of local bodies in China as Panchayats in India.\nA democratic China may be more nationalistic than what it is today and this will lead to more friction with India.\nWe have to look at where China might go. There is a need to explore a theoretical model to understand the future.\nThere is a difference between formulation and reality. Reality could be very different. Even legislations and intents could be very different. Pronouncements can hide actual realities.\nChinese regime has become flexible and open to debate and discussion. China will not adopt the same measures if another Tiananmen takes place.\n\nPrepared by Sanjeev Kumar Shrivastav\, Research Assistant at Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/evaluating-the-hybrid-character-of-chinas-communist-regime
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090619T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090619T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T104742
CREATED:20231223T222210Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T061728Z
UID:63696-1245389400-1245389400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Locating Priorities in India-US Strategic Economic Engagement
DESCRIPTION:Only by Invitation 1030 to 1300 hrs \nChair: Santosh KumarDiscussants: G Balachandran and Jayshree Sengupta \nThe objective of this paper is to analyse the economic relations between India and United States. Dr. Samuel advocates taking a strategic approach to current economic relations between the two countries. This approach is necessary because of somewhat unique nature of India-US economic relations which is increasingly being built on synergies in knowledge based industries and services. The paper attempts to analyse the various components that make up overall India-US economic relations and locate priorities that can be taken up for dialogue under the bilateral engagement process. \nAccording to Dr. Samuel currently both countries are going through a transition process to emerge as knowledge based economies. The ongoing transition process results into trade in goods and services based on intellectual property. Therefore it necessitates the governments to take more pro-active role since the rules of a global economy based on transaction in services are still being worked out. The new economy industries need support in terms of infrastructure\, government policies and availability of capital to enable a viable ecosystem to develop. \nHighlighting India’s emergence as a global economic player\, Dr. Samuel pointed out that trade with the US\, both export and imports\, have been on an upward trajectory since 2002. The United States remained India’s largest trading partner on combined trade in goods and services\, totaling $61 billion in 2007. While imports came to $27 billion\, exports totaled $34 billion. The good and services trade deficit was $7 billion in India’s favour in 2007. While exports to the US stood at $12 billion in 2002\, it had doubled to $26 billion (12.7 per cent of India’s total exports) by 2008. Against this\, imports from the US went up by four times from $4 billion in 2002 to $18 billion (8.4 per cent of total imports) in 2008. \nDr. Samuel identifies future growth areas which includes defence equipment and technologies\, and nuclear equipment and technologies. However\, trade in both these areas is contingent on the easing of restraints on high technology and dual-use items which were imposed during the cold war era. Despite the existing restrictions on the export of dual use technologies and items to India\, imports of high technology goods from the US rose from $1.2 billion in 2002 to $8 billion (45.8 per cent of total imports from the US) in 2007. Similarly exports of high technology goods from India also rose from $198 million to $708 million in 2007 before crossing the billion dollar-marks in 2008.  \nDr. Samuel points out that mechanisms such as the High Technology Cooperation Group (HTCG) have met with only little success and the promised boost to bilateral trade is yet to materialize even after the civil nuclear agreement. Now there are clouds of suspicion over Obama administration’s continued commitment to the nuclear agreement. However as expected\, defence trade between the two countries has gone up. Two defence deals have been concluded that for six Lockheed Martin Corp C-130J Super Hercules military transport planes and eight Boeing P-8I maritime patrol aircraft\, worth in excess of $3 billion. Lockheed Martin and Boeing are also vying for the contract for multi-role fighter aircraft\, estimated at $11 billion. India estimates that its military modernisation plans will entail the purchase of over $120 billion worth of defence equipment. Dr. Samuel points out a major obstacle that is the restraints imposed on technology transfer. It is in the interest of both India and United States to remove the obstacles inhibiting strategic trade. \nTrade in services has the most potential for growth. Imports of services from the US totalled $9.3 billion in 2007 while exports totalled $9 billion. Of this\, exports of software services from India were in the region of $4 billion while imports of software services from the US stood at $193 million. However there are hindrances such as severe criticism of the provision of software services to US companies by Indian companies and complaints about rampant misuse of the H1B specialty visas. According to Dr. Samuel legislations such as Grassley and Durbin proposal in the Senate on visa reforms and American Recovery and Reinvestment Act signed by President Obama soon after assuming the presidency\, effectively bar companies from recruiting workers through the H1B programme unless they fulfill stringent conditions. The recent bills have been construed as protectionist measures\, which might lead to counter-measures. Even at a time of economic recession\, Indian economy is expected to continue growing at a minimum of 5%. Markets such as India and China have provided as much as 75% of growth even if that translates only into 25% of sales at the moment. US companies have been major beneficiaries of the opening up of the Indian markets and the liberalization of the economy. At this juncture tit-for-tat approach would hurt both countries immeasurably. He opines the misuse of H1B visas can be countered through closer supervision. Outsourcing is an integral part of globalisation and denial of it may have harmful effects on mutual as well as global economic growth.  \nWhile discussing investment positions in the two countries\, Dr. Samuel pointed out that cumulative US investment in various sectors in India stood in the region of $13 billion at the end of 2007 of which 30% was in information technology services\, and 21% in manufacturing. Finance and depository institutions together made up 24 % of the investment. However\, Indian investment in the US has been more through the mechanism of mergers and acquisitions\, with Indian companies acquiring over 83 companies in the US with a cumulative value of over $10 billion. The major deals of 2007 were Hindalco’s acquisition of Novelis for $6 billion\, Rain Calcining’s acquisition of CII Carbon for $595 million\, Wipro’s acquisition of Infocrossing for $568 million and FirstSource’s acquisition of MedAssist for $330 million.  \nDr. Samuel opines that the US and Indian economies are poised to help each other through the creation of an eco-system that transcends geographical boundaries through available technological means and promotes innovation and creativity\, ultimately leading to wealth creation. The promotion of a culture of enterprise and innovation must be encouraged in India which would lead to the creation of intellectual property rather than merely using the IP created by others.  \nDr. Samuel suggested that to deal with the lack of venture capital investment currently\, the two governments can adopt BIRD Foundation model of encouraging innovation as between Israel and the US where a bi-national fund has invested over $245 million in 740 projects\, which have produced sales of over $8 billion. According to him this model can be replicated in other areas as well \nDr. Samuel concluded that the unfolding strategic environment would play a large part in deciding the direction of India-US strategic trade despite insufficient strategic underpinnings to provide it a fillip. Policy actions are required to provide the conditions necessary for the creation of an eco-system conducive for the growth of an innovation-led economy.  \nIt would be a good strategy on the part of India to focus on removing the impediments to its services trade with the United States\, which is relatively neglected despite its sizeable contribution to the bilateral trade pie. It should be impressed upon the US that the current moves towards protectionism are a detrimental step. There should be greater dialogue on easing the difficulties faced by entrepreneurs and service providers in travelling between the two countries as well as starting and sustaining businesses. A part of stimulus package in both the countries can be used to create public private venture capital funds to provide seed capital to start-ups in the new economy. In India returning professionals from the United States should be considered a resource\, and a publicly accessible database should be created to enable greater networking. Government schemes to encourage entrepreneurship should be given greater publicity and lesser bureaucratic formalities. Dr. Samuel stated that the present time provides opportunity to turn the liberal-humanist rhetoric in the relationship into reality\, given the similar ethos of the two ruling parties in both these democracies.  \nPoints raised during discussions \n\nDespite much talk about the India-US strategic partnership\, why are there so many hurdles in India-United States economic relations?\nIndia ranks 17th among US trading partners with trade amount only US $ 44 billion.\nUS is closely watching India’s economic reforms. Reforms are required in other sectors as well. For example there are many obstacles in the labor sector. United States wants India to open its agriculture market. India is not ready to open it.\nThere is talk of free trade between the two countries but this idea is politically charged.\nIndia-US Knowledge Initiative on Agriculture (AKI)\, which was signed by the Bush administration\, is based on public-private partnership. Since India has population surge so Bio technology revolution is needed to enhance production. It is essential and helpful for India. It faced a lot of opposition in India because of the issues such as Bt cotton which was seen as the corporatisation of agriculture.\nCompanies in India and United States need to identify areas where they can invest. India has internal security requirements and US needs reforms in energy and health care sectors. It would be helpful if private sector companies focus on these identified areas.\nThere is cross-cultural communication gap between India and United States. India should focus on strategies to attract more businesses from United States.\nStates in India should open trade promotion offices. \nOn the H1B Visa issue\, actually numbers do not mean much. What is more important is principles and what goes beyond it. The issue of H1B Visa should be looked in the broader context. The new bill introduced by Obama administration on H1B does not violate earlier rules but only tightens existing rules.\nIndian companies need to be proactive. There are a lot of companies in the United States either looking for help or filing for bankruptcy. Indian companies should go for mergers and acquisitions in the United States. An information database should be created for failing US companies as research institutes such as Institute for Business and Finance (IBFR) do carry out such studies.\nIn high technology trade\, there has been one way traffic. Indian companies are not in high technology development sector. It will take some time. Americans are very much methodological in their approach especially while dealing with high technology trade.\nIn service sector\, India can play important role in R&D. Signing MoU between the two countries is easy but the important question is how it will be converted in to reality.\nUS is the biggest buyer of defence equipments. There are opportunities for Indian companies to invest in the US defence sector.\nThe contribution made by Indian diaspora in the United States should not be ignored. The role of Indian migrants should also be factored in while studying India-US economic engagement.\nIt is useful to create a common market in climate change and healthcare sectors if India wants to create a favorable environment to attract more companies.\nWhen companies go for investment\, they want to ensure IP protection.\nThere are problems in getting Indian Visas for US citizens as well.\nService sector covers 53% of the Indian business and 81% in the United States.\nH1B Visa is important for the software sector. 45% professionals aspire for this Visa.\nHigh Technology Cooperation Group (HTCG) is a very important mechanism for high technology trade. It is matter of analysis whether it has contributed for enhancing India-US trade relations.\nThe paper needs to clearly distinguish between what the government should be doing and what the corporate sector should be doing.\nThe importance of the Indo-US relationship can only be properly understood if it is considered in the context of the future\, as well as in terms of comparative growth\, market size\, and market potential\, which forms a fundamental motivation for US interest.\nThe United States has security interest in investing in a vibrant Indian economy. \nIndia has the potential to balance economic order in Asia.\n\nPrepared by Sanjeev Kumar Shrivastav\, Research Assistant at Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/locating-priorities-in-india-us-strategic-economic-engagement
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090626T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090626T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T104742
CREATED:20231223T222210Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T061104Z
UID:63695-1245994200-1245994200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:‘New’ Radicals and ‘Old’ Islamists: Understanding the Politics of Religious Radicalization in Pakistan and its Implications
DESCRIPTION:Only by Invitation 1030 to 1300 hrs \nChair: Kalim BahadurDiscussants: Ashok Behuria and Anwar Alam \nPakistan has witnessed a significant shift in the politics of religion. Islam in the initial years after the creation of Pakistan was confined to constructing a national identity by defining the role of the state on religious grounds. However\, the politics of religion now permeates society and shapes mass opinion. The religious political parties who portrayed themselves as harbingers of Islam now appear sidelined. The new radicals are trying to define the nature of the state and society. They have coerced the state to implement Sharia in some parts of the tribal areas\, something the Islamic parties could not achieve in six decades. In the past few years radical groups have started questioning the legitimacy of Islamic political parties and their methods to usher in an Islamic revolution. It appears that the old Islamists represented mainly by the Jamaat-i-Islami and Jamiat’ul Ulema Islami Pakistan\, which were perceived as major political fronts for the Islamists in Pakistan\, are gradually showing signs of political decline in terms of their influence and hold on the new generation of Islamists.  \nBoth these political parties were earlier at the vanguard of the Islamic movement in Pakistan. Whether it is the discourse on the place of religion in Pakistan’s polity or the methods to achieve an Islamic state\, these two old Islamic political parties have played a major role. They have also colluded with the Pakistani political and military establishment to implement Pakistan’s policies in Kashmir and Afghanistan. These ‘old’ Islamists consider the State and its Western style democratic institutions as important instruments in achieving their objective to impose Islam. They have acted within the parameters of the state to consolidate the Islamic character of Pakistan. Despite their success in the 2002 elections\, their subsequent electoral decline has given way to a new breed of radicals who are trying to occupy the political space. This new breed of Islamists initially functioned with the blessing of the religious political parties and the Pakistani establishment. Currently\, the old Islamists have distanced themselves from the new radicals; however links between their cadres exist. Political Islam has become more contested between the new radicals and ‘old’ Islamists.  \nPoints raised by External Discussants\n\nThere is no real distinction between Old and New Islamists; means have changed and not ends. The paper has not been able to bring out sharply such a distinction.\n\nJihad is not just a 20th century phenomenon\, but served as an instrument against colonialism as well. \nTechnology is influencing Jihadi terror – means have become more lethal.\nFrom an Islamic perspective there is nothing wrong with Jihad. \nConflict is more within Islam than between non-Muslims and Muslims \nConnection between poverty and terrorism is incorrect. \nDeoband and Jamaat-i-Islami are instruments to Islamize society. \nBarelvis and Deobandis have been involved in bargaining. \nThe paper needs to contextualize the phenomenon of the new radical and the internal processes in Pakistan that have led to the emergence of new radicalism. Islam in India is subsumed within a plural culture. \nLashkar and Ahl-e-Hadees are more Salafist than Deobandi. \nAhl-e-Hadees also tried to win Saudi Arabia’s support. \nThe ideological base of Islamists is splitting. If Jamaat was once radical why is it moderate now? \nBulk of Sunni Muslims in FATA are landless as opposed to the Shias. \nThe rise of sectarian violence also coincided with the anti-Soviet Jihad in the 1980s. \nThe paper needs to better capture the fractionation of the ideological base of Islamists. \nThe paper raises too many issues. It is insufficiently focused and becomes a discourse on the Pakistani state. \nPaper fails to capture the fact that JuI also opposed democracy. \nDid the ‘new’ radicalism emerge due to the vacuum left behind at the end of the Cold War? Or is it a development indigenous to Pakistan? \nHow have global debates on Jihadi violence influenced Islamists in Pakistan? \nThe paper needs to explain how class differences generate radicalism.\nThere are different forms of new radicalism. Radicals are not a monolithic entity.\nThere are ideological differences among them. \nLack of democracy is also propelling Islamic radicalism. Greater emphasis is needed in capturing how the Pakistani state has used one radical group against another. \nIn the past Islam was used as an instrument to subsume diverse ethnic identities. \nShias had a dominant role in Pakistan until the 1970s. \nThe paper needs to capture better the role of groups such as TTP and TSNM. \nWhat is the role of minorities in Muslim dominated countries? \n\nQ&A\n\nNo timelines given on the emergence of new groups. \nAll funding is agenda driven for Madrasas. \nOld and new Islamists unify against a common enemy. New Islamists are not prepared to participate in the democratic process. \nAll revivalist movements subscribe to apostasy. \nIslamic movements are challenging the state. \nDeobandi groups are more binary than the Barelvis. \nReligious minorities were protected under the Ottomans. \nThe Taliban are trained by the JuI. \nNew radical groups such as the Deobandis have tried to capture state power. \nWithdrawal of the US is unlikely to change much within Pakistan. \nPakistani state is not going to abandon fundamentalist Islam. Sufi Mohammad does not believe in state authority. \n\nChair’s Remarks \nIn Punjab Barelvis are seeing a decline in numbers. Deobandis and Madrasas are growing. Deobandis and Barelvis continue to dispute mosque ownership. All Muslims need to be good to be Islamic. The Taliban want to kill everyone. Secularism means atheism for Pakistani Islamists. They are against women’s freedom. Ideologically they are cohesive. Islamists such as Khomeini\, Qutb and Maududi used elections to gain power\, but refused to hold them again. \nPrepared by Kartik Bommakanti\, Research Assistant at Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/new-radicals-and-old-islamists-understanding-the-politics-of-religious-radicalization-in-pakistan-and-its-implications
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090626T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090626T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T104742
CREATED:20231224T104529Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T061603Z
UID:64212-1245994200-1245994200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Impact of Modernisation of Police Forces Scheme on Combat Capability of the Police Forces in Naxalism-Affected States
DESCRIPTION:Only by Invitation 1030 to 1300 hrs \nChair: Kalyan K MitraDiscussants: J N Roy and G D Bakshi \nThe menace of Left Wing Extremism (LWE)\, commonly termed as Naxalism and Maoist insurgency has been a major challenge to India’s internal security. As part of its multi-pronged strategy to deal with the menace\, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) has taken special steps on the security front. Emphasis is also being laid on employing local State Police Forces (SPF) with assistance from Central Paramilitary Forces (CPMF) for improving the security environment. However\, the security responses of various States to Naxal violence have not been effective\, barring limited success in a few States. The failure of security forces to respond rapidly is often attributed to a lack of police combat capability in Naxalism- affected States. \nIn order to address the long felt need for police capability building\, the Centre as well as State Governments have initiated numerous measures in naxalism-affected States\, like raising of special anti-Naxal forces\, specialised training to SPFs in counter-insurgency and jungle warfare\, providing better arms\, ammunition\, equipment\, communication gadgets\, bullet proof vehicles\, land-mine proof vehicles\, intelligence support\, improved infrastructural and resource supports\, etc. The Centre has also been implementing the ongoing modernisation of police forces scheme since 2000-01. The scheme has an annual budgetary allocation of Rs.1000 Crores for ten years. Almost eight financial years have passed since this scheme was launched. However\, the SPF in most of the Naxal-affected States are still deficient in combat capabilities and unable to take on the Naxalites\, as the Naxalite violence and the casualty figure of SPF are still on the rise. Accordingly this paper attempts to answer the following questions: \n\nWhat has been the essence of the ongoing MPF scheme and its impact on police capability building since 2000 in Naxal-affected States?\nWhat difficulties are being faced by State police forces while implementing this scheme?\nHas the provision/allocation under the scheme been adequate to address all the aspects of police combat capacity\, so as to make them capable enough to counter Naxalism effectively? If not\, what are the deficiencies in the existing scheme\, including in implementation?\nWhat measures could be undertaken to make the scheme more effective?\n\nThis paper attempts to assess and analyse the impact of present MPF scheme on building police combat capability in Naxal-affected States. In order to realistically assess the impact of the MPF scheme\, the paper is focuses on the ongoing MPF scheme in various Naxal-affected states in general and the States of Bihar and Jharkhand in particular which are considered to have the least developed police capability including manpower\, resources and training. \nObjective of the MPF Scheme \n\nTo meet the identified deficiencies in various aspects of police administration worked out by the BPR&D.\nTo reduce the dependence of State Governments on the Army and CPMF.\nTo control internal security and maintain law and order by equipping the State Police Forces adequately and imparting the required training.\nBalanced development of State Police Forces.\n\nThe focus of the scheme is on strengthening police infrastructure at the cutting edge level by way of construction of secure police stations\, equipping police stations with required mobility\, modern weaponry\, communication equipment\, forensic set-up and housing. \nSpecial Provisions for Naxal-Affected States through MPF \n\nStrengthening of Special Branches\nStrengthening of the police infrastructure in 76 worst-affected Naxal districts\nImproving Police Training Capability\nDeployment of CPMF\, Raising of India Reserve Battalions (IRBs) and Sanctioning of a Commando Company in each of the 44 IRBs\nEngagement of SPOs to Augment Policing\nSecurity Related Expenditure (SRE) Scheme; and\nPilot Project for Development of Infrastructure in Naxal-Affected States\n\nMHA claims that MPF Scheme has made a perceptible impact in all the States and provided much needed assistance and impetus to policing in the country. It has provided proper building for police station/out posts. Construction of houses for police personnel has boosted their morale. Availability of vehicles has improved police mobility and reduced response time. Modern weapons have boosted police power and morale particularly in Naxal affected areas thereby enhancing the performance and the satisfaction level of the State Police Forces. \nThe “Police” and “law and order” are State subjects under Schedule VII of the Constitution of India. It is the prime responsibility of the State Governments to improve the functioning of their police force and to equip them adequately with the latest technology for meeting the emerging challenges to public order and internal security in the form of terrorism\, Naxalism\, insurgency\, increase in crimes. The Central Government is supplementing the efforts of the State/Union Territory Governments in this regard. The MPF scheme is a significant initiative of the Central Government towards capacity building of SPF since 1969-70. The MPF scheme has been welcomed by police officers and men in all the States. It is especially helpful in resuscitating acutely deficient policing machinery in economically backward States. The regular police budget has been meagre due to a fiscal crunch in such states. \nBut the scheme has suffered from undue delay in implementation in some of the States. Senior police officers of Bihar praise the scheme but feel that it has not been implemented properly and the State has not been able to reap the benefits of the scheme. The State still lacks basic policing infrastructure like housing\, buildings\, and vehicles since these have been neglected for long. Senior police officers of Jharkhand have however opined that the MPF scheme has enabled the State police in terms of arms/ammunition\, equipment\, communication\, mobility and special equipment like bullet proof vehicles. Chhattisgarh police officers also feel that there little noticeable impact in the satisfaction level especially in residential buildings\, family accommodation and mobility. \nDespite various problems the MPF scheme has achieved its objectives to some extent in terms of improving physical infrastructure\, but a huge gap still exists between what is available and what is optimally required. MPF needs to be more user oriented rather than being thrust upon States. It should meet State Police’s aspirations based on their specific needs. Undue secretarial procedures and bureaucratic interference is proving burdensome to smooth implementation. Hence\, the scheme needs to be given a fresh look for better implementation. \nPoints raised during the discussions: \n\nIndia’s internal security challenge is also the Army’s responsibility.\nThere is need for close coordination between the State governments and the central government in dealing with LWE.\nPolice Modernisation in Naxalism-affected States may be given priority\, or a separate MPF scheme could be launched.\nNaxalism- affected States may be given 100% central assistance.\nImplementation procedure needs to be simplified.\nThere are severe governance challenges in most naxalites-affected States.\nPolice leadership should introspect and must eliminate corruption which is the biggest challenge to effective policing.\nThere are various organisational constraints. There is need for transforming the police forces\, in terms of leadership\, structure\, recruitment\, incentives\, logistics support\, equipment and training. The Police leadership is ineffective on the ground. Attractive welfare schemes for the dependents of police personnel are needed.\n\nPrepared by Dr. M. Amarjeet Singh\, Research Assistant at Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/impact-of-modernisation-of-police-forces-scheme-on-combat-capability-of-the-police-forces-in-naxalism-affected-states
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090703T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090703T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T104742
CREATED:20231224T104528Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T060916Z
UID:64210-1246599000-1246599000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Politics of Assurances of Supply of Nuclear Fuel
DESCRIPTION:Only by Invitation 1030 to 1300 hrs \nChair: R RajagopalanDiscussants: G Balachandran and R R Subramanian
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/politics-of-assurances-of-supply-of-nuclear-fuel
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090710T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090710T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T104742
CREATED:20231223T222110Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T055654Z
UID:63693-1247203800-1247203800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Maoists' Tactical United Front (TUF) and Urban Movement
DESCRIPTION:Only by Invitation 1030 to 1300 hrs \nChair: A K DovalDiscussants: J N Roy and G D Bakshi \nA Communist party\, according to classical understanding\, requires ‘three magic weapons’ to achieve its goal of capturing political power. These are: Party\, i.e. a strong organisation; Army\, i.e. a body of fighters; and United Front\, i.e. alliances or linkages with groups that would facilitate its ultimate goal. United Front is of two types –– ‘tactical’ and ‘strategic’. The Strategic United Front (SUF) is formed with various underground organisations of the CPI (Maoist)\, which are engaged in waging New Democratic Revolution (NDR). In the Tactical United Front (TUF)\, through forming coalitions with persons and groups that are opposed to the state and its policies\, on one issue or the other\, the Maoists seek to fight the state through ‘peaceful’\, political means\, as well as broaden their support base.  \nThis paper seeks to understand the United Front tactics of the CPI (Maoist). According to the CPI (Maoist)\, “it is essential that we unite with such struggling organisations and build up broad struggles against the ruling classes”. In this light\, this paper also seeks to examine the ‘urban activities’ of the CPI (Maoist).  \nThe TUF is a secret committee. It functions directly under the guidance of the Sub Committee on Mass Organisations (SUCOMO)\, which itself is a sub-set of the all-powerful and apex Central Committee of the CPI (Maoist). In 2002\, the TUF activity took a firm shape with the formation of an outfit known as Forum against Imperialism and Globalisation (FAIG)\, which is a conglomerate of various revolutionary and mass organisations.  \nThe TUF serves the agenda of the Maoists in the following ways: \n\nTo consolidate various ‘anti-imperialist’ struggles and bring them on to one platform on the basis of a common working understanding;\nTo expand the reach of the Maoists to various sections of the society by building contacts with them;\nTo expand over-ground cadre strength\, thoroughly indoctrinate them\, and then completely incorporate them into organisational work\, especially in urban areas;\nPoach partners for potential leaders and ideologues;\nServes as a good cover from the long arm of the state;\nEssentially being a political activity\, it reinforces the military activities\, i.e. armed struggle. \n\nThe activities of the CPI (Maoist) in urban areas –– cities and towns –– need to be understood because of the implications they hold. These activities should be understood together with TUF activities\, because urban presence would give a fillip to TUF activities. The Maoists have also prepared an Urban Perspective Plan\, which is a road map to the type of activities they would undertake in towns in order to enhance their support base. The Urban Movement has a defined role in the political strategy and military strategy of the CPI (Maoist). \nThe Maoists contend that the urban movement should be conducted through various types of mass organisations; the wider the organisations\, the better. These organisations are of different types –– secret revolutionary mass organisations\, open and semi-open revolutionary mass organisations\, open legal mass organisations which are not directly linked to the CPI (Maoist). The last of these would include Maoist-inspired cover organisations and legal\, democratic organisations. \nThus\, the Tactical United Front and Urban Movement are extremely important elements of the CPI (Maoist). These are just about taking shape over the past three to four years. Being political and peaceful in nature\, it is not surprising that TUF activities have not received adequate attention in the media. At the same time\, because they are legitimate\, over-ground\, democratic activities\, the state’s hands are tied-down. At best\, it can keep a close watch on these organisations but cannot halt their activities. However\, if it was possible on the part of the state to prove that outfits that are part of the Maoist-led TUF are\, indeed\, Maoist fronts or have direct linkages with them\, it is then feasible to proscribe such organisations. Because these organisations mobilise\, organise\, propagate and indoctrinate the people to attract them towards over-ground activities (i.e. create a sympathiser base)\, and\, perhaps\, subsequently as part of the underground\, the state should make every effort to expose these organisations and ban them. Moreover\, if and when the Urban Movement catches on among the industrial workers\, the state will have to deal with possible sabotage activities and industrial unrest. Besides\, when the Urban Movement becomes strong\, the state will then have to deal with urban terrorism.  \nPoints raised during the discussion\n\nTactical United Front and Urban Movement require immediate attention at the policy making level.\nThe Maoists’ ideology appealed a lot during Charu Majumdar’s days\, but at the organisational level the group was weak.\nFront organisations are a platform to express dissent in a democracy.\nThickly forested areas are the ideal guerrilla zone.\nMaoists are targeting the unorganised sector.\nThere is need for strengthening intelligence.\nMoving towards urban centres is an indication of the failure of the Maoist movement.\nThere is lack of political will in dealing with the Maoist insurgency.\nState police do not have the capacity to deal with Maoist violence; time might come for the Army to intervene.\nNaxalism is a rural phenomenon.\nUrban areas will become major sources of finance for the Maoists. \n\nPrepared by M. Amarjeet Singh\, Research Assistant at Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/maoists-tactical-united-front-tuf-and-urban-movement
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090710T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090710T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T104742
CREATED:20231223T222210Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T055818Z
UID:63694-1247203800-1247203800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Piracy\, Maritime Terror and Policy Response
DESCRIPTION:Only by Invitation 1030 to 1300 hrs \nChair: Amb. Arjun AsraniDiscussants: Dr. Vijay Sakhuja and Dr. Chintamani Mahapatra \nIn recent years\, piracy and terrorism on high seas are posing serious threats to international security and economic development. With increasing interdependence\, the use of sea route for transportation has become vital. In this paper\, Dr. Panda addresses three main issues: piracy with focus on Somalia and the Gulf of Eden; terrorism impacting trade through Malacca Straits; and policy response of the countries whose trade is adversely affected by sea piracy and terrorism. \nAccording to Dr. Panda\, there exists a very thin line between an act of terrorism and piracy\, primarily because both acts are undertaken to achieve private ends. Still\, there are certain factors which distinguish piracy from terrorism. In terms of ends\, while piracy is usually driven by financial gains\, terrorism is politically motivated. The line between the two\, however\, is still blurred because terrorists could acquire funding for their political ends through piracy – tactically piractical\, but strategically terrorist. In terms of means\, while pirates are usually associated with basic tactics (e.g\, boarding\, theft\, use of force or violence)\, terrorists usually aim at achieving a strategic effect. Today\, piracy and maritime terrorism are no longer considered discrete. In fact\, there is a complex piracy-terrorism continuum.  \nDr. Panda states that both piracy and terrorism have made the Indian Ocean and Malacca Strait region highly insecure. The Indian Ocean is home to many choke points\, such as the Straits of Hormuz\, Straits of Malacca\, Lombok and the Sunda Straits. Any disruption in traffic flow through these points can result in grave and disastrous consequences. As far as the Straits of Malacca is concerned – the sea route transiting it and Singapore is the busiest in the world – 25 percent of world trade passes through this route every year. The criticality of the Malacca Strait is further reinforced by the increase in global economic interdependence and the consequent increase in the volume of mercantile traffic transiting the Strait.  \nTerrorism and piracy have begun to engage the global community\, especially due to the rise in fundamentalist forces after 9/11 and 26/11 attacks in the US and Mumbai\, respectively. The importance of container security to maritime terrorism was particularly felt after the US Navy’s discovery of a group of al-Qaeda terrorists hiding inside a well equipped shipping container in January 2002. While the US is engaged in its search for terrorists and their personification in al-Qaeda on land\, the prospect of a terror ship used by the al-Qaeda terrorizing the maritime arena continues to threaten tranquility at sea. After the recent 26/11 terrorist attack on Mumbai\, guarding sea lanes and territorial waters has become new priorities of naval forces of many countries. \nPiracy in the Malacca Straits has historically been an unresolved threat to ship owners and mariners who ply the 900 kilometer long sea lane. The geography of the Strait makes the region very susceptible to piracy. During 1991-2001\, nearly 2375 incidents of piracy were registered across the world\, with South and Southeast Asia registering the highest number of incidents. The Indian Ocean area too has been invaded with merchant vessels that are suspected to belong to terrorist organizations such as the LTTE and al-Qaeda. In fact\, the LTTE is suspected to own an entire flotilla engaged in dubious maritime trade. As the checking mechanism in place is flawed and entangled in legal matters\, such ships are considered safe for engaging in terrorist-related activities. The Indian Ocean region is notorious for narco-terrorism as well. It is also widely believed that oil leakage at sea might create havoc with the ecology in the maritime environment which would ultimately affect maritime security.  \nThe recent spike in pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia has generated a great deal of international media attention. Somalia’s modern pirates represent not only a very real menace to maritime security\, but also a growing threat to international commerce. The sensational nature of their crimes\, while drawing the ire of the international community\, has also ensured that the Somali pirates remain shrouded in mystery.  \nAccording to Dr. Panda\, instances of piracy around the Gulf of Aden by Somali pirates have increased in recent years basically because of the absence of an effective government in Somalia. In 2008\, piracy off the Somalian coast has more than doubled. So far\, over 60 ships have been attacked. Hijacking ships for ransom is a new model. By most estimates\, the pirates took in around $30 million in 2008\, although actual figures may be many times this amount. Kenya in fact claims that the pirates collected over $150 million in ransom in 2008 alone. The increased threat of maritime piracy has heightened the shipping industry’s financial concerns in the context of the current global economic recession.  \nThere is consensus in the international community that maritime terrorism and piracy ought to be addressed with urgency. The misuse of sophisticated technology by pirates and non-state actors calls for continuous up-gradation of technology to counter those engaged in terrorist activities. However\, despite increased naval presence by major powers\, patrolling one million square kilometres of open sea has so far proved to be a major challenge. The existing international law governing territorial waters also place legal constraints on countries capable of checking maritime terrorism.  \nThough the UN has intervened to check the piracy menace\, it has not been very effective. Still a number of unilateral\, bilateral and multilateral security initiatives pursued so far have been able to become regionally successful in tackling maritime threats. Malaysia has embarked upon several regional maritime security initiatives\, including the establishment of SEARCCT (Southeast Asia Regional Center for Counter-Terrorism) and hosting the IBM’s regional piracy centre. Singapore\, being the most vulnerable state to any major piracy attack or maritime terrorist act\, gives utmost priority in securing the sea lanes of communication (SLOC) for navigation in regional waterways. There are other regional powers as well\, like the US\, Japan\, China and India whose interests are intrinsically embedded with littoral states like Malaysia and Singapore. In view of the overreaching security and economic interests of all trading nations\, a collective security mechanism involving littorals and extra-regional players to share the burden of policing the Malacca Straits through capacity-building\, intelligence and sharing of financial resources\, and technology transfers seems to be the sine qua non for any attempt to securing the SLOCs.  \nIt transpires that regional actors have their own agendas and compulsions to deal with issues of piracy and maritime terrorism. For example\, Japan’s economic interests are so huge that bolstering SLOC security is of top most foreign policy priority at the moment. Elsewhere\, domestic political interests may be a factor in determining a country’s approach towards regional maritime security cooperation. There may be countries like China with great power ambition which might propel them to enhance their maritime profile. Unless a coordinated approach among countries in the region is adopted\, the coming decades might see a fierce battle in the maritime security ‘chess game’ that seems to be pregnant with unpredictable consequences in shaping the geopolitics of the region.  \n \nPoint raised during the discussion:\n \n\nThe issues of piracy and terrorism should be dealt with separately. At the same time\, a clear distinction between the two terms should also be made. \n \nThe author needs to update some of the data he has provided in the paper.\n \nAlthough in case of policy response\, the author basically concentrated on the Japanese government’s policy\, the title of the paper does not indicate a case study of that country.\n \nWhile the paper gives a lot of information on piracy\, maritime terrorism does not seem to be given so much importance.\n \nIt is necessary to take into account how state failure led to poor governance in Somalia.\n \nThe paper needs to address extensively the issue of capacity building to deal with piracy and maritime terrorism.\n \nThe author needs to take into account the following differences between piracy and terrorism: i)While terrorism has a political goal\, piracy does not; ii) Terrorism is basically land based while piracy is sea based; iii) Terrorists basically target state apparatus\, but pirates do not involve in such activities.\n \nThe author has mentioned that terrorists may use piracy as a means to acquire money. This point needs to be elaborated. \n \nWhether piracy leads to statelessness in Somalia or vice versa needs to be analyzed.\n \nThe author also needs to analyze why the Malacca Strait is less prone to piracy than Gulf of Aden. \n \nAnalysis needs to be made on the legal constraints in resolving piracy and maritime issues. \n \nThe author needs to take into account the military solution to piracy.\n \nThe author talked about the linkage between the Al-Shabab\, a Muslim terrorist group and Somali pirates. But such a linkage is yet to be confirmed.\n \nAlthough it has been mentioned that pirates do not usually have a political agenda\, some pirates in Nigeria do have political goals\, i.e.\, to bring about reforms in Nigeria.\n \nThe author needs to elaborate the policy difference between various agencies and governments in dealing with piracy.\n \nSince the author has extensively talked about piracy in Somalia\, he should consider making it a case study in the paper.\n \nThe LTTE case is dominant in the paper. So much emphasis on that terrorist group is not necessary as it can no longer be considered a significant terrorist group.\n \nChina’s growing naval presence needs to be taken into account. The author should extensively deal with the steps China has taken in response to piracy.\n \nThe author needs to elaborate upon how money gets transferred from pirates to terrorists\, and if there actually exists a linkage between piracy and terrorism. \n\nPrepared by Pranamita Baruah\, Research Assistant at Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/piracy-maritime-terror-and-policy-response
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090717T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090717T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T104742
CREATED:20231223T222110Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T055529Z
UID:63691-1247808600-1247808600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Piracy in Somalia: Need to Address the Root Cause
DESCRIPTION:Only by Invitation 1030 to 1300 hrs \nChair: Arvind GuptaDiscussants: Subodh Malakar and Patrick Hoenig \nDuring the last one year Somalia has captured global attention\, due to the surge in piracy off the Somali coast. Piracy off the Somali coast has had a severe commercial\, global and regional impact. The piracy and the resultant dangers posed to international shipping has brought an array of naval deployments from various external actors\, including\, the United States\, EU\, Japan\, China\, South Africa and India. The pirate attacks have disrupted the delivery of humanitarian aid to thousands of Somalis and have had a negative impact on the economies of states neighbouring Somalia. \nThough piracy off the Somali coast is not a new phenomenon and has been going on since the beginning of the Somali civil war in the early 1990’s. The collapse of Said Barre’s government in 1991 ushered in a wave of illegal fishing and waste dumping in Somali waters. However\, few years ago the incidence of piracy was quite limited. The statistics suggest that the incidence of piracy grew from less than five to thirty-five in 2005. In 2006 it declined to a mere ten incidents only to grow in 2007 to thirty-one pirate attacks. In 2008 the problem intensified with the International Maritime Organization (IMO) reporting 134 acts of piracy. The pirates have been operating in small fast crafts and have used an array of firearms mainly from Yemen while attacking ships. \nPirates are making full use of modern technologies such as mobile phones and Global Positioning System (GPS) devices and in some cases they have used mother ships to allow them a longer range. Currently\, there are two main networks of pirates: one based in Puntland (north-eastern Somalia) comprising mainly members of the Majerteen clan\, and others based in central Somalia\, consisting primarily of members of the Habar Gidir clan. However\, to an extent the two networks overlap and cooperate. \nVarious factors have contributed to the rise of piracy off the Somali coast. These factors include: illegal fishing and dumping of toxic waste\, existence of busy sea lanes high rewards and ineffective security structure\, Eritrea’s hostile relationship with Ethiopia and instability within Somalia. \nSeveral measures have been taken by the international community to prevent piracy. Since the beginning of 2008\, the United Nations has issued several resolutions regarding piracy in Somali waters. The US is primarily involved through the deployment of its Naval and aerial units as part of the Combined Task Force CTF-151 under the command of US Navy Rear Admiral Terence Mcknight. In December 2008\, France along with other states initiated Operation Atlanta – a joint naval and aerial operation to protect shipping off the Somali coast and the Gulf of Aden. This year long operation involves 20 ships from Belgium\, France\, Britain\, Germany\, Greece\, the Netherlands\, Spain and Sweden.  \nRegional countries like Oman\, Saudi Arabia and Yemen have been extensively involved in naval efforts. Apart from escorting the ships\, Yemen is constructing\, Global Maritime Distress Service Stations (GMDSS) in Hodeida and Aden. Similarly in a joint project with Italy Yemen is setting up a Vessel Tracking System (VTS) on a chain of bases along the coast that will considerably improve surveillance capabilities. Many Asian countries such as India\, Japan\, China\, Malaysia\, Singapore\, Russia and Pakistan have dispatched their navies to the Gulf of Aden. However\, Yemen remains the most consistent source of arms and military material to Somalia. Though the Yemeni government has introduced some curbs for arms sales in 2008.  \nThus\, in finding a solution to the conflict in Somalia and consequently the piracy issue is for working towards reduction in tensions between Eritrea and Ethiopia. The African Union (AU) and a panel of African elder statesmen in particular should gently push the two countries towards a dialogue. The international community should intensify its efforts in securing the AU’s early deployment of the African Standby force. \n \nPoints in the Discussion:\nNeed to develop a frame work of cooperation at the regional level to prevent piracy\, because regional cooperation is important to strengthening anti-piracy efforts in Somalia. \nEfforts should be made to stem financial flows. Unfortunately most non- state actors supporting the pirates and the Islamists have followed the informal route of Hawala\, creating logistical problems. \nNeed to examine cultural linkages between pirates and Islamist groups. Report suggests more than 70 percent of Somalis support pirates. \nConflicts between Ethiopia and Eritrea are also contributing to emergence of piracy in Somalia as well as in the region. \nNeed to focus Yemeni people’s role in supplying arms and extending cooperation to Somali pirates. What isn’t the Yemeni government curbing support to Somali pirates? There is a need to set up central authority to resolve the problems of piracy. \nNeed to focus UN resolution regarding piracy \nNeed to examine Somali concerns regarding India’s support to prevent piracy in the African region. \nEmphasis should be given on China’s involvement in the region.  \nWhy does Eritrea support Islamist groups in Somalia? \nPrepared by M. Mahtab Alam Rizvi\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/piracy-in-somalia-need-to-address-the-root-cause
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090717T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090717T053000
DTSTAMP:20261105T104742
CREATED:20231223T222110Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130249Z
UID:63692-1247808600-1247808600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Thinking about Pakistan's Nuclear Security in Peacetime\, Crisis and War
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Brahma ChellaneyDiscussants: R R Subramanian and Sitakanta Mishra \nThe main focus of this paper is the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal and for this purpose the secrecy of nuclear weapons is the most important aspect. However Clary presumes that even the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan may not have knowledge about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and its placement plans. The paper seeks to collate\, sort through\, and organize the reams of publicly available information to provide a systematic assessment of Pakistan’s nuclear security apparatus. It also attempts to examine the scenarios which are associated with various types of nuclear risks. After reviewing available evidence\, the author concludes that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is reasonably secure. He examines three elements of Pakistan’s nuclear posture – that is peacetime\, crisis and war and under these scenarios he probes the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. The paper concludes by examining the policy implications that emerge from this analysis.  \nThe author examines in detail the scale and general disposition of Pakistan’s nuclear force\, Pakistan’s nuclear command and control as well as role and importance of the Strategic Plans Division (SPD). He elaborates how SPD sought to operationalize the deterrent after the 1998 nuclear tests and come to grips with the A. Q. Khan nuclear supplier network even as it sought to ameliorate international concerns about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. He also analyses the threats to the civilian nuclear apparatus in Pakistan. The author establishes a baseline that during peacetime\, the system is reasonably secure\, though the risk of “insider threats” is perhaps more pronounced than in other established nuclear weapons states. \nDescribing the war time posture\, the author discusses changes in nuclear risk factors in Pakistan. There is a corresponding increase in nuclear risk in the event of India-Pakistan crises. He points out three dangers associated with Pakistan nuclear arsenal during war time. First\, there is a modest increase in the risk of an accident since Pakistan’s road infrastructure is poor and the traffic system is terrible. For the liquid-fueled missiles\, the mobile platform would have to be accompanied by a highly flammable fuel. It appears likely that mobile launchers would be sent away from the forward edge of battle that means they would most likely be sharing the road with internally displaced people also moving away from combat. All of this contributes to the potential for accident in transport. Second\, maintaining a communications link between the mobile launcher and the National Command Authority may prove difficult during an attack on command and control nodes. Third\, there has been some concern about the security of mobile nuclear units\, when they are away from the static and reinforced security provided at a fixed storage sites. Though Clary points out that this concern is overblown since any mobile launcher is likely to be accompanied by a large security team. He points out that a risky situation which is not completely under the control of central policymakers raises the most critical question\, whether commanders of individual nuclear units either have the authority or the technical ability to launch weapons if they believe Pakistan’s nuclear redlines have been crossed. According to the author there is insufficient information today to definitively conclude one way or the other on this matter.  \nIn the last section\, Clary examines how such a system would likely respond under the stresses of large-scale domestic instability or internal crisis. Distinguishing between different types of instability can assist with thinking about associated nuclear risks. He describes five different types of instability which can lead to associated nuclear risks. First\, the most extreme form of risk would be the take over of Pakistan by radical Islamists\, a scenario that Bruce Riedel has documented at length. Second\, an internal coup within the Pakistani Army would result in Islamist officers overthrowing the more moderate current Army leadership. This is one route by which it can be imagined an Islamist Pakistan despite the fact there is no majority support for such a regime. Third\, there might be an internal coup attempt or some sort of lower-level fracturing within the Pakistani officer corps. Lower-level officers of an Islamist bent\, perhaps together or separately with ethnic Pashtuns\, angered by support to the United States or Pakistan’s operations along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border might be able to launch a successful\, localized mutiny. Fourth\, Pakistan faces a sudden loss of territory to Islamic or separatist insurgents. Fifth\, this is related to some sort of sudden\, multifaceted state collapse. After describing these scenarios\, Clary concludes that the current Pakistan command and control arrangement appears to be designed to confront the most plausible scenarios with regards to domestic instability in Pakistan. He suggests that the international community should continue efforts to stabilize Pakistan\, in part so that scenarios that currently seem implausible\, do not become more likely. \nClary concludes his presentation by putting forward two recommendations\, one to India and second to the United States. His recommendations appear to be guided by the concerns related to Pakistan’s reactions to Indian and American actions. He suggests Indian policy makers have a clear strategic vision on their broader strategic equations while making efforts to improve the accuracy of nuclear-capable missiles and programs to develop missile defenses. India must take into greater account Pakistan’s reactions to its technical developments and decisions. Clary also suggests to the United States that its officials must take into account Pakistan’s reactions to U.S. discussions about Islamabad’s nuclear stewardship. While acknowledging that US officials have taken the right tone\, he points out that discussion about whether or not\, there are U.S. plans to secure Pakistani nuclear weapons in a worst-case scenario are remarkably unhelpful. Clary concludes his presentations on a cautious note that nuclear risks are shared risks and awareness of this interrelationship is one of the important consequences of the nuclear revolution.  \nPoints Raised during the discussion: \n\nIt is difficult to conclude that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenals are in safe hands. Intent\, motivation and capability of nuclear weapons are crucial factors which must be taken into consideration while discussing Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and its security.\nSabotaging the nuclear installations in Pakistan may be possible. This danger cannot be ignored. Similarly dangers posed by a dirty bomb also exist.\nIt is worth examining how Pakistan’s emergency response mechanism works. However the threat level should not be exaggerated. \nThere is a need to identify grey areas in Pakistan’s nuclear security apparatus.\nThere should not be too much attention on Pakistan’s heavy water and natural uranium research reactor\, Khushab.\nThere could be a comparison between North Korea and Pakistan but Pakistan’s nuclear programme cannot be compared with Iran’s.\nPakistan nuclear arsenal is India specific. \nThe question remains how safe and secure is Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. Pakistan has developed a code system which runs the risk of being decodified.\nIt is important to understand that all is not well within the Strategic Plans Division (SPD) in Pakistan. SPD is facing a lot of pressure to be staffed by politicians. The New establishment in Pakistan is planning to put its own people inside SPD. There is a power tussle within SPD.\nThere is a poor security culture in Pakistan which is evident by the release of nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan. The situation in Pakistan cannot be brought under control.\nChina factor has not been taken into consideration. \nThe author should use interviews within Pakistan to obtain more data on the subject. \nIt is very difficult to stop nuclear black marketing with laws and regulations.\nThe paper should have mentioned the Special Forces Programme as well. \nThe paper should highlight what are the fundamental problems in Pakistan. Pakistan is not a normal state\, rather it is an abnormal state. There are fundamental challenges to Pakistan’s security\, including radicalization both of society and even more importantly the military \nPeople implementing the Personal Reliability Programme in Pakistan seem to have a Jihadi mindset. In such a scenario personal reliability cannot work.\n\nPrepared by Sanjeev Kumar Shrivastav\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/thinking-about-pakistans-nuclear-security-in-peacetime-crisis-and-war
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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