BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//MP-IDSA - ECPv6.15.12.2//NONSGML v1.0//EN CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH X-WR-CALNAME:MP-IDSA X-ORIGINAL-URL:https://idsa.in X-WR-CALDESC:Events for MP-IDSA REFRESH-INTERVAL;VALUE=DURATION:PT1H X-Robots-Tag:noindex X-PUBLISHED-TTL:PT1H BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:Asia/Kolkata BEGIN:STANDARD TZOFFSETFROM:+0530 TZOFFSETTO:+0530 TZNAME:IST DTSTART:20070101T000000 END:STANDARD END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20080808T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20080808T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T175553 CREATED:20231223T222624Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130251Z UID:63762-1218173400-1218173400@idsa.in SUMMARY:Pakistan's Energy Security: Challenges and Options DESCRIPTION:Chair: Arvind Gupta\nDiscussants: G Balachandran & Savita Pande URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/pakistans-energy-security-challenges-and-options CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20080808T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20080808T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T175553 CREATED:20231223T222624Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130251Z UID:63763-1218173400-1218173400@idsa.in SUMMARY:Special Forces for Anti - Naxal Operations: an Assessment of the Security Environment DESCRIPTION:Chair: Ved Marwah\nDiscussants: J N Roy & D M Mitra URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/special-forces-for-anti-naxal-operations-an-assessment-of-the-security-environment CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20080822T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20080822T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T175553 CREATED:20231223T222619Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130251Z UID:63758-1219383000-1219383000@idsa.in SUMMARY:China's Discourse on Regionalism DESCRIPTION:Chair: V P Dutt\nDiscussants: S K Bhutani & Baladas Ghoshal URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/chinas-discourse-on-regionalism CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20080822T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20080822T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T175553 CREATED:20231223T222624Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130251Z UID:63759-1219383000-1219383000@idsa.in SUMMARY:Talking to the Taliban: Will it Ensure 'Peace' in Afghanistan? DESCRIPTION:Chair: V G Patankar\nDiscussants: Shakti Sinha & Gurmeet Kanwal URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/talking-to-the-taliban-will-it-ensure-peace-in-afghanistan CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20080829T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20080829T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T175553 CREATED:20231223T222619Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130251Z UID:63755-1219987800-1219987800@idsa.in SUMMARY:Confronting the Threat in Cyberspace DESCRIPTION:Chair: Thomas MathewDiscussants: Prem Chand & Subimal Bhattacharjee \nThe central premises of the paper presenter were that governements were neglecting the current threats on the Internet not out negligance but because these threats were too diffuse and inchoate. This prevented a appropriate and timely response from the state to this threat. There was a tendency to approach these threats as law and order problem \, or technology problem\, whereas they are of a much higher order\, and could impact on national security. \nThere were two parts to the equation of securing cyberspace. One was premised on the definition that “Cyberspace is composed of hundreds of thousands of interconnected computers\, servers\, routers\, switches\, and fiber optic cables that allow our critical infrastructures to work.”. Over the years\, ensuring the security and integrity of the networks that connect critical infrastructure has become of paramount importance since crucial sectors such as the financial\, energy\, transportation and telecommunications sectors are connected through cyber networks. This applies to India as well with core areas of the Indian economy\, from the financial markets to the banking sector\, to telecommunications are networked\, and other areas such as energy distribution and transportation are headed in that direction. \nA second part of the equation\, but one that has proved to be problematic when it comes to implementation\, has been securing the Internet\, the vast network of networks\, which has now become synonymous with cyberspace. Users of the Internet\, an estimated 1.5 billion of the world’s population\, vary from individuals to corporations to governments\, all of whom use the same pipes for the transmission of some or all of their data and communications. \nThe rise in the Internet population has meant that while the threats and vulnerabilities inherent to the Internet and Cyberspace might have remained more or less the same as before\, the probability of disruption has grown apace with the rise in the number of users. At the same time\, the nature of the Internet\, with all the characteristics of a “global commons” means that no nation can unilaterally take on the responsibility of defending or policing networks owned variously by nation states\, commercial companies and individuals. In fact\, cyberspace is characterised by blurred boundaries; there are no clear demarcations between civilian and military\, state and non-state\, and foreign and domestic as in other domains. It is those same characteristics that make it an ideal medium for committing malafide activities which can have repercussions for national and international security. \nCharacteristics of the Internet\nIt is akin to a Global Commons where no nation can unilaterally take on the responsibility of defending or policing networks owned variously by nation states\, commercial companies and individuals; it has blurred boundaries where there are no clear demarcations between civilian and military\, state and non-state\, and foreign and domestic and: the architecture of the Internetas it has evolved is that of an open all-inclusive\, decentralised environment. Part of the problem is that the Internet’s organic evolution meant that security was not a consideration and trying to bring ina secure internet environment is like bolting the stable door after the horses have bolted. \nInternet War\nThis has led to Internet War or I-War which can be described as a low-intensity war where actors unkown are exploiting “the ubiquitous low security” internet infrastructure to target users with malware that compromises their systems and networks. These attacks take advantages of the bugs and vulnerabilities in software\, systems and networks and are perpetrated though the machinations of a hacker-criminal network-state nexus. \nThe Hacker-Criminal Network-State nexus\nCriminal networks have\, over the years\, professionalised the business of discovering and exploiting weaknesses in software that allow them to undertake a variety of actions ranging from taking control of those computers\, accessing information on those computers or rendering them unusable. Whilst hackers provide the technical expertise\, existing international criminal networks have learnt how to squeeze the maximum out of these compromised computers\, and have turnovers estimated in the billions of dollars. Whilst this would remain at the level of criminal activity\, it has acquired dangerous proportions and impinges on national security when a state-criminal network-hacker nexus builds up. There is enough circumstantial evidence to show that some states have turned a blind eye to cyber-space centred criminal and illegal activities\, perceiving certain advantages to be had from building up such a capacity. The means\, motivation and objectives and approaches to I-War are examined in greater detail in two case studies. \nInternational Responses to I-War\nWhile I-War might seem to be blown out of proportion when compared to the actual disruption it causes at present\, it provides sufficient indication that the threats of the future are vastly different from that envisioned by national security planners. The blurred boundaries and the anonymity provided by cyber-space make it difficult to pin responsibility for such attacks\, which\, going by current trends\, will be perpetrated by individuals\, networks\, communities and organisations\, with the state acting as facilitator\, and nationalistic fervour providing the motivation. \nGovernments have found it hard put to grapple with the complex issues of I-War\, though some are increasingly cognizant of its implications for national security. Among the possible measures that can be taken are the following: i)international treaties and agreements that clearly spell out what constitutes legal and illegal activities on the Internet should be worked out; ii)states such as Russia and China should be encouraged to ensure that international norms of behaviour are followed and iii) The CERT mechanism that provides a useful interface between government\, private sector and individuals should be implemented in countries where they don’t yet exist\, and there should be better co-ordination and sharing of information among existing CERTs . \nConclusion\nWhilst analysts have been tom-tomming the impending arrival of cyberwar with vivid imagery of the collapse of critical infrastructure\, the ongoing battle in the Internet space is much less noticeable but has equally important ramifications for national security. The means\, the motivation and the actors have come together in a combination that presages ever increasing I-War. It is for those at the receiving end to take urgent remedial action which does not mean responding in kind\, but by addressing the technical and legal lacunae in cyberspace that allows criminal elements to flourish\, and illegal activities to go unpunished. This should be done in consultation with all stake holders including national governments\, private sector companies and information infrastructure providers. While this would not end the problem completely\, it would mitigate it somewhat\, and might prevent other countries from going down the route of I-War. \nDiscussion\nAmong the points that came up in the discussion that followed the presentation were the following: \n\nEnsuring Information Security is a 21st century nightmare.\nFailure of the defences and the increasing profits from such practices has led to an increase in cyber crime.\nNetwork Security id dead. The need is to address Applications security…only 9% of software vulnerabilities are being addressed\nThe need is to divert focus on the question as to what the next level of security should be. More research is required in the domain of information warfare weapons and the issue of leakages in the war room.\nEconomic security is as important as national security.\nIt is premature to link the subject of cyber threat to nationalism.\nAs a country India has a fair lead in the realm of information technology.\nEMP or the electro magnetic pulse is an alternative to nuclear capability.\nThe information structures both at the national and global level should be studied.\nTen years back the American literature dominated the subject of cyber security. Gradually however other countries have also shown interest in the same.\nThere is practically no international mechanism for cooperation in this area except for the World Summit of UN Secretary General.\nIndividual is increasingly getting linked with national security.\nA great deal of academic work needs to be done in the field of cyber security to facilitate better understanding and comprehend the threat.\nCyber threat would be a potent one in the twenty first century be it national security\, education or health.\nIndia’s security domains are attacked by China on an everyday basis.\nTreaties and multinational forums should be fostered to reduce and ultimately eliminate the threat.\nIn this regard the IT Act of the year 2007 had many deficiencies which require attention. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/confronting-the-threat-in-cyberspace CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20080905T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20080905T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T175553 CREATED:20231223T222619Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130251Z UID:63754-1220592600-1220592600@idsa.in SUMMARY:Role of Biotechnology in Defence DESCRIPTION:Chair: B S SacharDiscussants: B M Gandhi & Sachin Chaturvedi \nIn the 21st century\, the science of biology has been found adopting various techniques from other fields of life to improve its effectiveness. Modern-day biotechnology could be regarded as a multidisciplinary field where its utility has grown beyond traditional uses like agriculture and medicine. This draft paper by Ajey Lele\, Research Fellow at IDSA\, looks at the relevance of biotechnology for modern day militaries both from offensive and defensive perspectives. Major applications of biotechnology extending for their militaristic utility mainly fall into categories like sensors; electronics and computing; materials; logistics and therapeutics. This paper is divided into four main parts. Part I looks at the relevance of biotechnology with reference to the debate on ‘germ threats’. The second part deals with the defence related medical and non-medical aspects of this technology and the third part focuses on military investments made by few important states in this field. The last part takes a macro-view of disarmament issues. \nRelevance of biotechnology for bio weapons/ bio terrorism \nIn general\, two main types of groups/individuals could be said to be in a position to apply the advanced techniques of biotechnology for the purposes of bio-terrorism. The first category could be the state sponsored international terrorist organizations undertaking such act with the help of the sponsor state possessing covert BW programme. The second type could be the disgruntled scientists working at clinical microbiology laboratory or academic laboratory involved in some aspect of microbiological research. She/he may do it just to prove a point or as an act of defiance against her/his own organization or because of influence from any terrorist organization. \nCurrent research in biotechnology parallels earlier research in the nuclear field in the 1940s and 1950s. The database developed for nuclear technology was applicable for both military and industrial purposes. Similarly\, the database being developed for commercial genetic engineering in the fields of agriculture\, animal husbandry\, and medicine is potentially convertible to the development of a wide range of novel pathogens that can attack plant\, animal\, and human populations. Because of these advancements in various areas related to biotechnology and genetic engineering there exists a possibility that biological warfare could gain importance as a viable option not only amongst the terrorist organizations but covertly among some state actors too. \nIn the years ahead\, the use of biotechnology to create bioweapons will become far more powerful\, more available and less expensive. Engineering\, computing\, and the capital markets will push biology forward on a rapid trajectory. What used to take a highly skilled team of scientists to accomplish can now be done in rapid fashion with automated kits within few hours. Industrial techniques allow the cheap production of pathogens or toxins to tonnage quantities in places around the world. Historically\, it has been seen that all current inventions have found suitable applicability in the business of warfare. In case of futuristic bioweapons the only dilemma could be will terrorist organizations opt for this technology? \nBiotechnological Weapons\nHow to turn modern biotechnology to make actual weapons is still not known\, but with their capability of attacking targets accurately and producing ultramicro\, non-lethal\, and reversible damage\, such weapons might finally change the methods of “physical annihilation” or “destruction within the killing range” which have characterized war since the invention of gunpowder. Today\, scientists are of the opinion that we can use many modern biotechnologies directly as a means of defence and attack\, and with further development\, they probably will become new weapons systems. \nTechnically speaking war is simply the human behaviour that forces enemies to lose the power of resistance. It could be possible to create biological weapons which could alter the biological features of human bodies. It could be possible to create biotechnological weapons that can cause destruction that is more powerful and more civilized than that caused by conventional killing methods like gunpowder or nuclear weapons. However\, an important thing to note is that the military utility of biotechnology is likely to grow beyond biological weapons and medical protection. It is likely to revel a character of aggression not thought of till date. \nBiotechnology and Biodefence\nVarious techniques exist today within the field of biotechnology which have direct or indirect relevance for biodefence. Processes like the automation of sequencing in genome projects\, bioinformatics\, and advances in combinational chemistry and high throughput screening of compounds are on the forefront in this arena. They are being developed for civilian application in medicine\, pharmaceuticals\, and agriculture\, as well as for purposes that are legitimate under the BTWC\, such as defence\, detection\, protection\, and prophylaxis. Biotechnology has been vital to the development of techniques for identifying and diagnosing diseases and for medical counter-measures. Moreover the recent advances in biotechnology offer a real opportunity for the development of effective counter-measures to biological and toxin weapons agents. From a biosecurity perspective\, vaccine development and production has great strategic value. \nMedical and Non-medical Aspects of BT\nFollowing are the broad areas in various medical and non-medical categories for military where biotechnology can be used in some manner \n\nTherapeutics: Genomics and proteomics; drugs and vaccines; drug delivery systems \nElectronics and Computing: Protein based devices; biocomputing; biomolecular hybrid devices \nMaterials: Tissue engineering; biologically inspired materials and processes; hybrid materials \nLogistics: Miniaturizations of biological devices; functional foods; biological energy sources; renewable resources \n\nMilitary investments made by few important states\nUnderstanding the need for the induction of emerging technologies\, armed forces around the world have started investing in various strategic technologies. However\, in respect of biotechnology\, the interest appears to be still in an embryonic stage. The reasons for this could be many. Today\, biotechnology is still under the process of evolution. The growth of technology offers many promises but it still does not offer substantial solutions to existing military problems. And this could be the reason for the absence of interest in most of the cases. However\, as states have slowly started realizing that juxtaposing this technology with other technologies like nanotechnology could offer many dividends to military they have started investing in it. \nApart from the US\, states like China are looking at the military applicability of this technology. Only few states are showing overt interest in this field. However\, dual-use nature of this technology demand a ‘read between the line’ approach to understand the military intentions of various nation-states in respect of this technology. \nChina’s overall technological capabilities have increased dramatically since its reform programme began in the late 1970s. However\, no direct indications are available about their interests in using biotechnology for military purposes. At the same time China understands that biotechnology has obvious military implications as a means for developing biological weapons and also providing defence against biological weapons. The military biotechnology may found its applicability in areas like non-lethal weapons. Here a possibility exists that microbes capable of destroying the fuel supplies of the enemy could be developed. \nChina’s main sources of biotech growth are expected to be in bio-agriculture\, genomic sequencing\, biochips\, traditional medicines\, bioinformatics\, stem cell research\, and bio-manufacturing. China is also making substantial investments in Agriculture biotechnology which it considers as a strategically significant tool for improving national food security. \nBiotechnology and Disarmament\nThere exists an apparent linkage between the growth of biotechnology and development of biological or agriculture weapons. In future non-lethal biological agents could also be used as incapacitants under certain circumstances. This exponential growth of technology demands focused attention from the disarmament regime. In the present era\, it would be a profound mistake to see genomics as simply a scientific revolution. It could have both positive as well as negative impacts on the survival of the mankind. The entire spectra of biotechnologies could likely have major impact on creation of new biological weapons. \nConclusion\nBiotechnology has shown immense potential for its utility in various facets of life and military is no exception. Scientists and military leadership are increasingly finding its utility for militaristic purposes. At the same time this technology is raising fears because of many of its potential negative consequences. \nBiotechnology and its products have created some amazing possibilities for military particularly in the area of sensor technology\, biocomputing\, protection of C4ISR\, Bioengineered materials\, biofuels\, etc. Induction of biotechnoogy in such areas is expected to bring radical changes to a broad range of military applications and even few military tactics could have to be redefined with the induction of this technology. Looking at the potential of this technology\, there is a need to invest more in military’s biomaterials needs. \nUnfortunately\, the growth of BT has a darker side too and that is its potential to create bioweapons. Today\, due to the competitive nature of technology business houses are also found reluctant to provide information that could compromise their economic edge. Hence\, the biggest challenge exists to allow the growth of technology without letting it into the wrong hands. It is expected that in future\, the science of biotechnology itself may come in handy to tackle the threats posed by advances in biotechnology. \nDiscussion\nWg. Cdr. Lele presented this paper as part of the IDSA Weekly Fellows’ Seminar series. The seminar was chaired by Brig. B. S. Sachar\, Senior Fellow at IDSA. Two external discussants were invited to provide their comments on the paper: Dr. B.M. Gandhi who is a biotechnologist and CEO of NeoMed Services\, and Dr. Sachin Chaturvedi who works at the Research and Information Systems for Developing Countries. In addition\, Dr. Uttam Sinha\, Research Fellow at IDSA\, was also invited to be a discussant. Some of the points raised during the course of the discussion are as below: \n\nBiotechnology industry surpasses the Aerospace industry. \nIndia is at a nascent stage of development in the field of biotechnology. \nOne needs to be more concerned regarding the non-scientific applications of the technology. \nBiotechnology should not be seen in isolation. \nOne the most significant questions today is as to who can use a biological weapon? \nBTWC does not provide enough space to control existing developments in the field of biotechnology. \nSAARC should be used as a forum where these issues should be discussed at the regional level. \nOne needs to highlight the politics involved in biotechnology and also look at the geo-politics of biotechnology. \nBiotechnology is likely to be a lead technology in the 21st Century. \nIt is necessary to highlight how useful or dubious existing international treaties are.\nIndia today is facing a number of problems related to biotechnology. \nThere is a need to dwell upon Agro-terrorism. \nPharmaceutical companies can also indulge in the spread of a biological agent for this can help them attain high levels of profits. \nThe biotechnology threat is increasing exponentially and there is a need to analyze the threat and also to get solutions and preventions. \nPrepared by Gunjan Singh\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/role-of-biotechnology-in-defence CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20080912T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20080912T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T175553 CREATED:20231223T222539Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130251Z UID:63752-1221197400-1221197400@idsa.in SUMMARY:India and the Non-Proliferation Regime: Looking Beyond the Nuclear Deal DESCRIPTION:Chair: G BalachandranDiscussants: K C Singh & R R Subramanian \nThe India-United States civil nuclear cooperation agreement\, announced through the July 18\, 2005 joint statement\, besides opening the doors for global nuclear commerce\, is seen as a means to facilitate India’s greater integration with the global non-proliferation regime. India was always credited to be an adherent of the regime’s norms\, but was deemed an outsider owing to its non-membership in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)\, which is seen as the cornerstone of the regime. Through the nuclear agreement\, the U.S. had volunteered to assist this assimilation process\, the latest development being the India-specific exemption at the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). \nThe emergent global nuclear order and the NPT\nAs a Cold War arrangement\, the NPT sustained one of the most established international bargains whereby states without nuclear weapons pledged not to acquire them\, while existing nuclear weapon states committed to eventually give them up. However\, in the past four decades\, the Treaty had attained the tag of being a system with unfulfilled objectives outnumbering its achieved goals\, and failures accumulating as each of its articles were being violated with impunity. The Treaty was no longer seen to have the capability to address newer security threats arising out of a post 9/11 world\, influenced by non-state actors and an increasing number of threshold states. What looked more portentous was the imbalance a non-state actor would inflict on the non-proliferation regime and the NPT\, which were equipped only to handle the proliferation problem arising from states. Forty years later\, the Treaty might pride on its record of restricting new weapons states to three or four. But as of today\, the instances of non-compliance and likelihood of more threshold states emerging on the scene have increased\, partly due to the security deficit created by current geo-politics. \nIndia’s rendezvous with the non-proliferation regime\nFrom its early days of disarmament activism\, India had envisioned a third world leadership role for itself in the evolving non-proliferation regime\, and vociferously advocated the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons technology. In the early 1960s\, as a member of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC)\, India influenced the debate for a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and argued for a credible bargain whereby weapon powers would give up their arsenals while ensuring that others refrained from developing or acquiring such weapons. But when the grand bargain became discriminatory\, India decided to stay away from the NPT. India’s decision to conduct a Peaceful Nuclear Explosion experiment was seen as the first challenge to the non-proliferation regime\, which invoked new mechanisms like the NSG to add to what the Zangger Committee had already initiated. \nIndia and the NPT: Towards Convergence or Drifting Apart?\nThe genesis of India’s confrontation with the NPT can be traced to the political power play enacted during the negotiations for the Treaty. Even before Ireland submitted a draft resolution to the General Assembly\, India had launched its campaign calling for steps to stop the spread of nuclear weapons and exhorted weapon states to take the initiative\, failing which non-nuclear nations would be tempted to acquire nuclear weapons. India was upset that the Irish draft talked of prohibiting acquisition of nuclear weapons\, but imposed no restriction on its continued manufacture and maintenance. Later\, India joined seven nations in the ENDC to submit a resolution (GA 2028 [XX]) with five principles of which the key ones were: \n– The Treaty should be void of any loopholes for countries to proliferate; \n– It should embody an acceptable balance of responsibilities and obligations; \n– It should be a step towards complete disarmament. \nThe Other Challenges \nThough India could be prodded to think of campaigning for reforms in the NPT\, there are other areas like the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)\, on which India would have serious reservations in its current form. \nCTBT: India had vociferously argued for a test-ban\, along with a fissile production cut-off\, as part of its campaign to stop the production and development of nuclear weapons during the initial NPT debate. This was in consonance with its 1954 proposal calling for end to nuclear weapons testing. At the 1996 Conference on Disarmament\, India\, along with members of G-21\, proposed a Programme of Action for the phased elimination of nuclear weapons by 2020. However\, during the CTBT negotiations\, weapon states refused to agree to any commitment on disarmament and pushed for a test ban while insisting on the Entry into Force clause (XIV)\, which required India along with specified countries to join the Treaty before it became operational. \nFMCT: A key element of the July 2005 joint statement was India’s cooperation in negotiations for concluding a Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT). India had strongly advocated a fissile production cut off in the NPT debate\, but later on resisted an FMCT owing to its potential impact on its own nuclear weapons programme. Differences over issues like time-bound disarmament had led to stalemate in negotiations. After initial opposition arguing that an FMCT would curtail its nuclear weapons programme\, India announced in 1998 its willingness to participate in the negotiations. There are some issues to be factored in India’s policy towards FMCT: (a) Does India have sufficient fissile material for its credible deterrent? (2) If not\, can it be mobilised before the Treaty is ratified? (3) Would the Treaty benefit disarmament or would it be used to curtail the strategic capability of countries like India? \nMTCR: Another commitment of similar character was compliance with the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Though India has updated its national controls lists with that of MTCR Annex\, it is still treated as an outsider by the MTCR community for its defiance in pursuing its guided missile development programme. However\, the merit in India’s case is that it had managed to develop its missile systems indigenously and also resisted transfer of missile systems to another country. \nConclusion\nWith the nuclear deal and NSG waiver\, India is moving towards greater integration with the non-proliferation regime. By doing so\, it would join ranks with the United States in evolving a new nuclear security order. However\, the more India’s proximity with global non-proliferation objectives\, the more would be the policy challenges on crucial issues connected with anti-proliferation. Irrespective of the success and acceptability of a new order\, the instruments of the old order would continue to hold significance in nuclear politics. As an active member of the non-proliferation regime\, India would have to initiate a dialogue with these instruments to ensure that its bonding with the regime is sustained. \nThe NPT continues to be the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime\, despite its many shortcomings. Being a near-universal mechanism\, the Treaty would continue to hold its primacy in global nuclear affairs. Though India managed to resist calls for membership all these years\, its stakes and responsibilities would increase with its weapon power status and greater access to nuclear commerce. On the other hand\, India has to realise that the driving spirit that motivated it to advocate the NPT and CTBT are still relevant. For decades\, Indians have seen NPT as discriminatory so much so that even a rethink is now seen as blasphemous. \nDiscussion\nA. Vinod Kumar presented this paper as part of the IDSA Weekly Fellows’ Seminar series. The seminar was chaired by Dr. G. Balachandran\, Visiting Fellow at IDSA. Discussants in this seminar were Dr. R. R. Subramanian\, former Senior Research Associate at IDSA and a renowned strategic analyst and Mr. K. C. Singh\, IFS (Retd.). Mr. Sujit Dutta\, Senior Fellow at IDSA and Dr. Rajiv Nayan\, Research Officer at IDSA\, also offered special comments as Discussants. Important points flagged during the discussion were: \n\nA favourable balance has to be struck between pragmatism and idealism on issues related to non-proliferation. \nIdeological and practical aspects are an important dimension of the debate on NPT. \nThere should be a degree of caution in the way the nuclear deal is looked at. US posturing may be different from action and the idea might be to target India’s strategic programme. US is no longer a superpower but a hyper power; and it has no friends but only allies. Therefore there should be an element of scepticism in the way the nuclear agreement is perceived. One has to keep in mid the ‘trade offs’ in such arrangements. \nThere is a debate on moralism versus pragmatism as India has been an over-moralising country in the past due to the Gandhian and Nehruvian legacy. Moralising kept India away from realpolitik for a long time. However\, the moral strategy also helped in some ways and India introduced the concept of ‘Atomic Apartheid.’ There is a dichotomy between moralism and practicality. India is shedding its moralistic stand and taking a more holistic view of the nuclear agreement. \nThe best thing about the deal is that India can trade with France and Russia\nIndia is the largest supplier of thorium (almost 60% of the total supplies).\nIndia is already a Nuclear Weapon State. There is no need therefore for enshrining this by India joining the NPT as a weapon state which is not likely in the near term.\nIndia is closer to signing CTBT than before. \nThe signing of an FMCT will take time. \nThe India-US nuclear deal is part of an American attempt to balance the strategic interest of making India a stakeholder to strengthen the international order and the American commitment to non-proliferation goals. \n\nPrepared by Dr. Priyanka Singh\, Research Assistant at IDSA. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/india-and-the-non-proliferation-regime-looking-beyond-the-nuclear-deal CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20080919T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20080919T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T175553 CREATED:20231223T222539Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130251Z UID:63750-1221802200-1221802200@idsa.in SUMMARY:Geopolitics of Climate Change and India’s Position DESCRIPTION:Chair: R RajagopalanDiscussants: Ashutosh Varshney & Sunil Chauhan \nClimate change and security as a subject of enquiry is now being pursued by the IDSA in a comprehensive manner. Scholars from the non-traditional security cluster\, since 2008\, have been presenting papers and delivering talks on the topic. In April 2008 a run-up workshop was held on the security implications of climate change for India. A national workshop on security implications of climate change for India is planned on October 30\, 2008. A working group under Dr Arvind Gupta\, Lal Bahadur Shastri Chair\, IDSA comprising nine IDSA scholars and three outside members (a climatologist\, a disaster expert and an economist) has been formed for the purpose. It is intended that the draft report will be presented in the roundtable discussion. There has also been interaction with MEA officials on the various aspects of climate change. \nUttam Kumar Sinha who is working on the bilateral aspects of the climate change and also on international negotiations has recently authored a chapter in the re-launched IDSA Asian Strategic Review 2008 titled “Asia and Climate Change”. His paper “Geopolitics of Climate Change and India’s Position” in the fellows’ seminar was a logical movement from regional analysis to a global one. \nThe seminar was chaired by Ambassador R. Rajagopalan\, who is a member of the IDSA Executive Council. The two external discussants were Prof C.K. Varshney\, former Dean of School of Environmental Science\, JNU\, and former Chairman Environmental Research and Wetland Research Committee\, Ministry of Environment and Forests\, and Commander Sunil Chauhan\, from the Centre for Strategic Studies and Simulation\, United Service Institution of India. The internal discussants were Vinod Kumar and Medha Bisht. The participant-level was high reflecting the interest in the topic and the growing concern over climate change. Over 20 scholars and members of IDSA attended the proceedings. \nThe paper by referring to the debate in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in April 2007 explained how the issue of climate change is being “securitised” and how a counter argument is being built up to “desecuritise” it. India strongly criticized the “catastrophic scenarios” posited by the Stern Report and articulated a more “immediate and quantifiable threat from possible conflicts arising out of inadequate resources for development and poverty eradication as well as competition for energy.” The author identified loosely structured blocks of states with their own mix of concerns and actions on climate change. The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) with concerns and fears of rising sea levels and large submergence of the coastlines think from an “ecological effectiveness” and finds a willing partner in EU. The second group is of OPEC and various industrialized countries that look at climate change from an economic angle. Such groups are seeking “economic effectiveness”. The third group is the developing countries echoing the north-south divide and articulating concerns from a “social justice and equity”. There is also the G5 (Brazil\, China\, India\, Mexico and South Africa) which in the recently concluded G-8 summit challenged the economic dominance of the West and pivoted mostly around south-south cooperation. \nAt the heart of India’s position on climate change is the notion that it must be allowed to pollute on a per capita basis equally with the West. India has thus been propounding the “per capita emission” line. It is a strong unconditional position that immediately shifts the responsibility on to the shoulder of the developed countries to drastically cut emissions. It also allows India the space and time to grow at a sustained pace and strengthen its poverty alleviation and developmental programmes. But even more significant is the assurance that its per capita emissions will never exceed that of developing countries. It is a position of confidence and self belief in its economic policies\, a challenge and a message to the developed world that it will not be pressurized in the negotiation process. While the per capita argument is quite justified for India\, it also suggests a dogged resistance in its approach\, a grandstanding of its newly acquired international status. But to be a serious player in global politics requires finely balancing self interest with certain global responsibilities and commitment (at least to be seen doing). This is not a moralistic position that India so pitifully pursued in the 1960s and suffered so seriously. \nWhile the ‘per capita emission’ is being largely accepted including the UN\, there is a certain perception that India’s position is one of extreme rigidity with no allowance for even a self determined gradual carbon emission reduction quota. India here is missing out on a positive leadership role. Another critical element of this leadership is to dehyphenate itself from China. India’s approach to climate change is based on energy security and sustainable development while the Chinese plan focused on emission reduction. China has overtaken the US in total emission\, though its per capita pollution is lower than that of the US. \nIndia’s other position on climate change is that it does not considers it a “threat” and particularly not in the sense of considering military options as a response. India’s stress on “collaborative action at the global level both through mitigation and adaptation in accordance with the common and differentiated responsibilities of the different countries” points to its faith in the UNFCCC as the agency for carrying out negotiations. So clearly for India an effective climate regime with equitable burden sharing can help tackle the adverse impacts and linking climate change with security is far-fetched and unnecessarily alarmist. Climate change is a concern but India would rather be worried about freer and fairer trade particularly of agricultural products and correcting the distorted trade practices of powerful countries. \nThe geopolitics and domestic political considerations will remain critical determinants to the negotiation process leading to 2012. The changing power equation and a predominant shift towards Asia will see new groupings and alignments that will impact the existing climate change regimes. In the coming years\, the spotlight will increasingly fall on India\, China and also the US\, the chief protagonists in the emission targets. Since the new agreement needs to be concluded by the end of 2009 (Copenhagen Summit) so as to give countries adequate time for ratification\, the politics will intensify. For India\, however much it digs to its position\, pressures will come from different directions on different interlinked issues. Before the G8 summit\, India braced itself from the US on imposition of tariff barriers against exported goods from India that are seen as products with large carbon footprints\, such as iron and steel. The Japanese at the recently concluded Accra Climate Change Summit took the issue of “sectoral approaches” with India\, in order to establish “international energy efficiency standards” for polluting industries across the world. Has India given itself limited space for negotiations thereby constricting its ability to manoeuvre? If India is interested in world emissions\, its own emissions are important. There lies the challenge and the dilemma. India has long experience in negotiation on climate change and has been at the forefront of the debate ever since Mahatma Gandhi made the ‘greed and need’ connection. India will have to reconfigure its position. ‘Greed’ and ‘poverty’ are powerful arguments in the climate change debate but will not help clinch the emission issue. It has to be seen whether India will reconfigure its position. Of equal interest will be to observe whether other regimes\, groupings and alliances will challenge the Kyoto Protocol. At the end it is not about the sacrosanct nature of the Kyoto Protocol or which other regime should come into existence. The challenge is to be proactive\, innovative and find solutions to the problems. \nProfessor C.K. Varshney commented the real issue was that of the extra carbon in the natural cycle due to fossil fuel use. Much more scientific work needs to be done. As far as India’s position\, he felt that it only served the purpose of short- term. In the long- term we need to focus more on issues of energy intensity and efficiency. He reminded that we often are too much human centric and neglect loss of biodiversity\, which in any case will not permit the current lifestyles. There was a discussion on the geopolitics and security aspect. Some members from the audience felt that it is the “politics” and not “geopolitics”. Cdr Sunil Chauhan mentioned that in a globalised world contiguous borders are not relevant any longer and thus the term “geopolitics” is in order. Medha Bisht mentioned that we need to take into account the environmental\, human and social costs of big infrastructure projects such as dams as they can be counter productive. \nThere was also an exciting discussion on the referent object. While the author had taken it as climate\, Vinod Kumar felt that it should be survival. While others felt that the nation-state is the ultimate referent even from the human security perspective. \nProfessor C.K. Varshney also elaborated on the uncertainties and dangers of geological sequestration of carbon. He mentioned that land-to-plant forests are also limited and too much reliance on aforestation thus has its own limits. Elaborating on Gandhian thought\, he mentioned that it in no way\, means to go backward in the past\, but instead to find alternative solution\, which necessarily may not be technology driven. What economic model India is following was also discussed. Some felt that we are blindly aping the West and we need to see how vulnerable we are internally due to the weather beaten economic path we are opting for. Enormous ecological challenges and social stresses are evident in the future. \nThe paper generated considerable discussion and well overshot the defined time. Importantly it did not drift from the core feature of the paper. The chairman in agreement with the speaker summed up the proceedings by mentioning how important the topic is and how critically important it is for India to be proactive and not only posturing and grandstanding. \nPrepared by P.K. Gautam\, Research Fellow at IDSA and Co-ordinator of Non-Traditional Security cluster. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/geopolitics-of-climate-change-and-indias-position CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20080919T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20080919T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T175553 CREATED:20231223T222539Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130251Z UID:63751-1221802200-1221802200@idsa.in SUMMARY:The United National Front in Afghan Politics: An Explorative Study DESCRIPTION:Chair: P StobdanDiscussant: Kalim Bahadur \nThere remains an element of ambiguity as to when the United National Front formally came into being. It is generally believed to have been formed either in March or early April (April 3?) 2007. According to Pajhwok Afghan News\, the UNF was formed in Kabul on March 12\, 2007. Interestingly\, according to the Strategic Forecasting Inc.\, better known as Stratfor\, a well-known Texas-based private intelligence agency\, it was founded a year earlier on April 3\, 2006. Whatever might have been the exact date of its formation\, the conditions that led to its creation continues to haunt the Afghan polity. \nThe roots of the pronounced tribal-ethnic character of the present Afghan politics can be traced back to the formation of the modern Afghan state during 18th and 19th centuries. It is important to bear in mind the way ethnic and tribal dynamics played out in the face of externalization of the Afghan civil war through the 1980s and 1990s. Until the overthrow of the monarchy in 1973 and the 1978 coup by the Afghan communists\, the modern Afghan state was strongly dominated by the Pashtuns belonging to a certain tribe/clan considered as one of royal origin or high in the Pashtun social hierarchy. The minority ethnic groups from the north and parts of western and central Afghanistan – especially Tajiks\, Hazaras\, Uzbeks and Turkmen – had very limited participation in the Afghan national/state politics which remained a Pashtun bastion. Historically\, the ruling elites of the minority ethnic groups were allowed to retain their autonomous or semi-independent status provided they accepted the suzerainty\, often nominal\, of the Pashtun dynasties ruling from Kabul and agreed to pay revenue to the state treasury or provide with men and resources in times of war. The above political understanding not only defined/institutionalised the relationship between the power structure in Kabul and the ruling elites in the far-flung provinces\, but also between Pashtuns and the non-Pashtuns. Such traditional mechanisms of power-distribution and resource-sharing\, however asymmetric\, ensured peace and stability in the country for decades until the beginning of the civil war in the late 1970s. The traditional balance of power in the Afghan politics finally withered away as the ideologically adversarial proxy politics of the Cold War era militarized and internationalized the Afghan civil war. Soviet Union’s armed intervention in Afghanistan beginning December 1979 in support of the communist government in Kabul\, led to a further polarization between the state and the people. As part of its strategy to counter the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan\, the United States (US) along with China\, Pakistan\, Iran and a host of West Asian and West European countries began sponsoring and arming the fragmented but popular anti-Soviet resistance building up in the Afghan countryside. This led to intense weaponisation and subsequent jihadisation of the civil war. Interestingly\, it also led to the empowerment of the hitherto marginalised Tajik\, Uzbek and Hazara anti-Soviet resistance groups who later came to have stakes in the national politics of Afghanistan. After the Soviet withdrawal by early 1989\, they were among the key players in the struggle for control over Kabul. \nEnd of Taliban Interregnum\nThe emergence of a Taliban movement with full backing from the Pakistan state in mid-1990s had a strong Pashtun dimension to it. The minority ethnic factions responded to the rapidly expanding Pashtun Taliban by forming a loose anti-Taliban alliance called the United Front (better known as the Northern Alliance\, NA) in late 1990s which in turn was backed by Russia\, Central Asian republics\, Iran and India. Being new and relatively well-organised\, the Taliban movement was often viewed by the Pashtuns as the return of Pashtun rule over Kabul; and an effective counter force to the Tajik militia. \nHowever\, the events of 9-11 and the subsequent US invasion of Afghanistan on October 7\, 2001 proved to be a yet another turning point in the Afghan civil war. It led to the ouster of a Pashtun force from power\, re-establishment of Tajik dominance in Kabul\, re-emergence of factional politics\, and West’s return to Afghanistan. Interestingly\, it had also led to the US re-engagement with the former anti-Soviet mujahideen factions\, especially with the NA. \nReturn of Factional Politics\nSoon confronted with the huge challenge of raising a non-Taliban multi-ethnic Afghan leadership\, a conference involving diverse Afghan factions (minus Taliban and Hezb-e Islami) was held at Bonn\, Germany. The dramatic Bonn Conference (November 27-December 5\, 2001) was a prelude to a new round of factional politics. The nine-day long gruelling negotiations had all the trappings of the factional politics of the early 1990s. It can be best summed up in the words of former US Secretary of State Colin Powell who while reacting to the possible collapse of the Bonn Conference had stated\, “Do not let them break up. Keep them there. Lock them up if you have to. We do not want this to go anywhere else. We’re almost there\, and this is the time to grind it out on this line. If they go off\, I don’t know when I’ll get them all back together.” The signing of the Bonn Agreement (December 5\, 2001) which laid out a road map for stabilizing and rebuilding Afghanistan thus facilitated and legitimized the role of mujahideen factions in the new political process. \nHardening of Pashtun-NA Divide\nThe hardening ethno-political divides and competing agendas of the diverse constituents of the Karzai-led provisional governments was best reflected during the proceedings of the Constitutional Loya Jirga (December 14\, 2003 – January 4\, 2004) and the presidential election (October 9\, 2004). The 502-member Jirga\, which was called for the approval of the new draft constitution\, was marred by severe differences among delegates from diverse factions on issues concerning nature of the Afghan state\, the form of government\, status and role of Islam\, centre-province relations\, double citizenship\, status of minorities\, human rights and the linguistic rights. The idea of a highly centralised presidential form of government with overriding powers over the bicameral legislature came to be strongly contested by the non-Pashtun delegates. \nMarginalising NA\nIt is noteworthy that since the Emergency Loya Jirga in June 2002 and the subsequent formation of the Afghan transitional administration\, Karzai had been trying to deal with the strong influence of the NA leaders and commanders in his government. Karzai’s assertive tone against the NA reached a new pitch in July 2004 when he declared that the private militia of the warlords constituted a bigger threat to Afghanistan than the Taliban insurgency. Karzai’s frustration over lack of direct control in areas outside Kabul has since been a constant feature. Despite all rhetoric and attempts to marginalise NA\, Karzai at the same time kept the option of dealing with them open. It is noteworthy that prior to the presidential election\, at a time when Karzai was easing out powerful Tajik ministers from his transitional government\, he was also trying to woo the Taliban and the Hezb-e Islami cadres to join the electoral process. \nThe National Understanding Front\nThough much of the NA leadership was out or on the margins of the governing structure in Kabul by end of 2005\, it failed to augment the position of Karzai in the Afghan politics in any substantive manner. With their presence in the government diminished\, Tajik leader Yunus Qanuni on March 31\, 2005 announced the formation of National Understanding Front or Jabha-ye Tafahom-e Melli (JTM) as the main opposition group to the central government\, which was welcomed by President Hamid Karzai. The Front\, comprising about 12-14 political parties\, was also formed in view of the September 2005 parliamentary elections. \nThe UNF: Composition and Agenda\nThe UNF is said to be an agglomeration of about 15-18 political parties. Though there is not much information available on its exact size in terms of membership\, the Front claims to have the backing of 40 per cent of Afghanistan’s Parliament. It reportedly has two governing councils with Mohammad Naim Farahi\, a parliamentarian from Farah\, currently leading the executive council. Many of the members of the UNF are either parliamentarians or former ministers from the Karzai-led interim and transitional governments. Few of them are still occupying senior positions in the central government which lends certain legitimacy to their “government-cum- opposition” status. Interestingly\, the UNF argues against being an opposition coalition or bloc though its members constantly refer to the weaknesses in Karzai’s leadership. In view of the strong presence of the former NA members\, the Pashtuns are by and large suspicious of the political agenda of the UNF\, especially over the idea of strengthening the powers of the provincial governors. \nReactions to the Emergence of ‘Rainbow Alliance’\nThe emergence of the UNF had elicited reactions from the entire political spectrum of Afghanistan. Most of the Afghan political observers and analysts believe that the UNF would not survive long due to the extreme diversity of its constituents (jihadis\, ex-khalqis\, ex-parchamites\, royalists\, Tajiks\, Hazaras\, Uzbeks\, shias and sunnis) and the ideological contradictions flowing from it. The Front is said to lack in common ideology and that its members have conflicting interests. The UNF is often believed to have been formed by former NA along with some ex-communists to legitimize their political existence in view of alleged war crimes and gross human rights violations committed by them in the past. Though they are covered under general amnesty made from time to time\, nevertheless\, the fear of Kabul coming under international pressure to conduct war trials in future remains. Otherwise\, the only factor which is said to unite such diverse constituents of the Front is their shared opposition to Karzai’s leadership. \nUNF Woos the Taliban\nIn March 2008\, the UNF announced that it had been secretly talking to the Taliban at least since last five months as part of its efforts for national reconciliation. UNF spokesperson had revealed to the Associated Press that Chairman Burhanuddin Rabbani and Mohammad Qasim Fahim had been meeting “important people” from Taliban and other anti-government groups to seek reconciliation. It is interesting to note here that within days of the launching of UNF\, Karzai for the first time admitted on April 6\, 2007 (according to some sources April 7) that he had been talking to the Taliban. With UNF trying to woo the Taliban\, a new dimension has been added to the ongoing politics of national reconciliation in Afghanistan. Taliban are more likely to use divisions between Karzai and UNF to their advantage. It would strengthen their bargaining capacity in case of any serious negotiations with Kabul or the UNF. It is also indicative of the growing fragmentation of reconciliation process in the country. Interestingly\, purported Taliban spokespersons have constantly denied talking to either the Afghan government or the UNF. \nPerspectives\nThe UNF is a typical Afghan political experiment. It has all the trappings of Afghanistan’s ethno-regional dynamics and factional power politics\, obviously interspersed with the interests of external powers. The UNF may be a recent entity\, but it is also a manifestation of tendencies with a long and a varied past to it. Like any other grouping it draws its characteristics from both historical and prevailing socio-political tendencies in the space in which it originated and is fighting for survival. At a more nuanced level\, it may be said that the UNF is struggling to legitimize and mainstream itself in the Afghan politics. It is striving to raise its profile both at the regional and international level by being an effective and a relevant force in the domestic politics. The key objective seems to be to evolve as a viable alternative to the faltering political structure in Kabul. The outcome of the 2009 elections\, provided it is held\, would be a major challenge to its growth and survival. As regards its alleged foreign backers\, they would be far more interested in its peace initiatives for national reconciliation. Since the limitations of the military option against the Taliban have come to be realized\, some of the neighbouring or even Western countries might be backing UNF’s efforts to engage the Taliban. The UNF may have also been formed in response to growing Taliban challenge. The impetus might have come from the weak position of Kabul and the growing divide in the trans-Atlantic coalition. As political discontentment and insecurity grows\, the UNF is likely to gain ground despite its limitations and contradictions. It is also likely to be challenged by other mini-fronts that might be sponsored by groups inimical to its existence. As for its future prospects\, the UNF is not meant to be a long-term venture. \n*** \nThe seminar was chaired by Dr. Arvind Gupta\, Lal Bahadur Shastri Chair\, IDSA. Amb. Ugendra Kumar\, Joint Secretary\, and currently with NDC\, and Professor Kalim Bahadur were the two external discussants. Comments on the paper were also provided by the two internal discussants – Dr. Ashok Behuria\, Research Fellow IDSA and Dr. Shanthie Mariet D’Souza\, Associate Fellow IDSA. \nMajor points that were highlighted in the discussion were: \n\nThe UNF is limited to ethnic politics and did not put forward economic and social policy. \nLike elsewhere\, as in Iraq for example\, it is the minority community that rules over the larger society. \nPashtuns have been dominant only for a short time in Afghan politics. \nTwo contrasting views were expressed about the UNF. One view was that the UNF has no social power and mandate and therefore the possibility of its coming into power is less. The other view was that the UNF has a multi-ethnic forum which may enable it to gain power and provide stability.\nThe future political structure in Afghanistan will essentially depend on the America-Taliban-Pakistan triangle.\nUNF has not taken political shape. \nPakistan is now alienated in the process and India’s future role is far too delicate. \nIt was suggested that the paper should include a debate on the movement from Presidential to Parliamentary type of government in Afghan politics. \n\nPrepared by Gunjan Singh\, Research Assistant at IDSA. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-united-national-front-in-afghan-politics-an-explorative-study CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20080926T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20080926T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T175553 CREATED:20231223T222539Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130251Z UID:63749-1222407000-1222407000@idsa.in SUMMARY:Storming of Lal Masjid in Pakistan: An Analysis DESCRIPTION:Chair: S K BhutaniDiscussants: Ved Marwah & Sudhir Sharma \nConversion of a religious place by terrorists into a heavily fortified safe sanctuary over a protracted period of time is a tactic largely restricted to Asia. Entrenched in this meticulously defended complex\, terrorists challenge the might of the state. \nThis terrorist fortress is characterized by the presence of a large number of their followers. Such a situation is distinct from other scenarios where terrorists use religious places to take refuge while being chased by security forces\, forcibly take innocent pilgrims as hostages or launch an attack on the assembled devotees. \nLal Masjid\, a mosque complex\, located in Islamabad\, was being used by radical Islamist clerics and their supporters\, to defy the Pakistani government and impose Islamist edicts. When the situation deteriorated\, a siege was established around the Lal Masjid for over a week and finally on July 10\, 2007\, Pakistani army stormed it\, after talks with the clergy failed. The operation was marked by fierce fighting and heavy loss of life\, during which militants responded with rockets\, machine gun fire and petrol bombs. \nWhile militants occupying such hallowed precincts are in violation of international humanitarian law\, security forces tasked to clear them out need to exercise utmost restraint\, use minimum force\, avoid collateral damage and uphold religious sentiments. Military operations launched to flush out terrorists from places of worship have far reaching political\, social and religious ramifications. \nWhile the Lal Masjid attracted its share of media coverage during the crisis\, inexplicably a detailed analytical study of the episode is still awaited. This paper attempts to identify lessons at the macro level to deal with similar situations by using the storming of Lal Masjid as a case study. \nEvents Leading to the Siege \nFollowing the September 11 attacks in the United States\, Pakistan’s support to the US-led Global War on Terror (GWOT) was strongly opposed by the leadership of the Lal Masjid. In July 2005\, Pakistani authorities attempted to raid the mosque in connection with the investigation into the London bombings\, but the police were blocked by baton-wielding female students. Subsequently\, the authorities apologized for the behaviour of the police. During 2006 and the first half of 2007\, the mosque’s increasingly aggressive students and leadership\, supported by militants continued to challenge the authority of the government in Islamabad. They also launched an anti-vice campaign and instigated incidents such as kidnappings of alleged prostitutes\, including Chinese\, and burning films\, following the example of the Taliban in Afghanistan. By early April 2007\, the mosque had set up a sharia court. \nTalks reportedly broke down on the morning of July 10\, 2007 over the militants’ demand for an amnesty\, leading to orders being issued to the army to flush them out. What pushed the government to undertake precipitous action was China’s angry response to the killing of three Chinese workers on July 8 in Peshawar. Military intelligence reported that the militants who had carried out the killings were linked to the group in the Islamabad mosque. This coupled with the break-down of direct negotiations led to the final assault on July 10. \nAnalysis of Lal Masjid Episode\nReportedly\, on July 8 Musharraf was presented with three options: launch an air strike\, gas the compound to render the inmates unconscious or launch ground assault. The decision whether to assault a place of worship or continue with its siege\, forcing the inmates into surrender is always a difficult one. Protagonists of the offensive option argue that such a siege may last a long time\, even several months\, as terrorists would have stocked adequate quantities of food material\, water and other items of sustenance\, inflaming religious passions and resulting in a mass uprising across the country. An assault on a religious place may be a relatively quicker alternative\, but invariably leads to heavy loss of life and public alienation with attendant ramifications. \nThe Pakistan government was criticised for allowing the situation to deteriorate and being a mute spectator to the excesses committed by the Lal Masjid vigilantes. Each new episode was met with feeble government response or appeasement. There were also differences within the government about the approach to be followed in dealing with the issue. \nUsually such a situation is misjudged in the initial stages due to an overwhelming desire to avoid taking firm action for fear of inflaming religious passions. Militarily\, the best chances of success with minimum damage are right at the beginning\, before the terrorists have had time to prepare extensive bunkers and stock up weapons and supplies. With operations of this kind\, the battle is as much in the mind as on the ground. The more the operation drags on\, the worse it is\, as the initiative passes to the terrorists. \nFears of a public backlash kept the Pakistani government from acting earlier against the radicals within Lal Masjid. Reportedly\, intelligence agencies indicated that it could get help from Taliban in Waziristan and other madrassas in the vicinity\, leading to large scale turbulence. While the siege of the mosque led to anti-government sentiment to fester in militant and fundamentalist communities throughout Pakistan\, the response of other terrorist groups was subdued. Overall\, there was widespread opinion within Pakistan that firm action should have been taken against Lal Masjid extremists at an early stage. \nThe assault on the Lal Masjid by the army was launched within 72 hours of the situation being handed over to it. Once the army has been requisitioned to deal with the situation\, there is a tendency to expect it to launch the operation at the earliest\, largely premised on the assumption that any further delay will be indicative of a weak response. Deployment of the army is an escalatory step\, bringing additional pressure on terrorists and should be given time to influence the negotiations’ process. Moreover\, such an operation not only requires detailed and meticulous military planning but also extensive coordination with a host of agencies\, including paramilitary forces\, civil police and local administrative machinery. Since the situation has already been allowed to deteriorate to such an extent that the army has to be called out\, it is imperative that adequate time is allowed for planning and preparation to the army. \nOfficials hastily revised their assessment of clearing the Lal Masjid which they initially predicted would take just four hours. The militants continued to resist for over 30 hours and inflicted heavy casualties on the security forces. It has been experienced that the army always complains about lack of information to plan operations against such targets. The situation was no different in the case of Lal Masjid. \nUse of Minimum Force \nAfter the Lal Masjid military action\, concerns have been expressed that the army did not comply with the principle of use of minimum force. The number of casualties suffered by the Pakistani SSG is indicative of their intent to ensure compliance with the principles of use of minimum force and avoiding collateral damage. More the number of civilian casualties during military action on a religious place\, more vehement is the criticism. While Lal Masjid operation was a fairly successful operation from the military’s perspective\, there was muted appreciation of the military’s role\, fearing a backlash in glorifying the army after assault on a mosque. \nIn such situations\, totally different from normal law and order problems of mob control or violent demonstrations\, it needs to be appreciated that the army is called out to act against highly motivated\, lethally armed and well entrenched group of terrorists who have made elaborate preparations to ward off entry by the security forces into the complex. Minimum force has to be related to the terrorists’ numbers\, weaponry and strength/layout of field fortifications. However\, the army has to prevent or limit damage to the religious and historically important buildings by strictly controlling the application of fire power. Fire fighting teams need to be standby in case of fire incidents occurring due to exchange of fire or attempted arson by terrorists. It requires a very high degree of discipline\, leadership\, motivation and moral courage on the part of troops involved in the operation to exercise restraint in the face of danger and extreme provocation\, with their colleagues dying around them. \nConclusion\nIt is apparent that terrorists are increasingly focusing on religious places to carry out their nefarious activities and will continue to do so. Therefore\, it is imperative that rather than knee jerk reactions after a terrorist incident\, long term measures are taken to deter the terrorists. The Indian security establishment could study the French system of keeping the places of worship under surveillance. \nIn situations where fundamentalists and terrorists take control of a religious place and challenge the authority of the state\, the government needs to act decisively before the pot boils over. From the military perspective\, tiring out terrorists to make them surrender by besieging the place of worship is a preferred option than direct assault in certain circumstances. Storming of religious places by the security forces invariably leads to collateral damage and loss of life\, despite adhering to the principle of minimum use of force. This provides an opportunity to the terrorists to exploit the situation further\, which can have grave religious and political ramifications. \nThe seminar was chaired by Ambassador S.K. Bhutani. Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Sudhir Sharma and Ved Marwah were the two external discussants. Comments on the paper were also provided by the two internal discussants – Colonel Arvind Dutta and Dr. Pankaj Kumar Jha. \nMajor points highlighted in the discussion were: \n\nAir strike is unthinkable in such a situation. However\, air power can be used to provide real time information to the security forces. \nTimely action is required in dealing with such situations\, as storming religious places normally hurt the sentiments of the locals. \nThe Pakistan government was fully aware of the situation\, but it failed to take timely action. \nRather than using the army in such operations\, the police force trained to handle such situations should be employed. \nAssessment of public opinion is needed before carrying out such massive military operations against religious places. \nTheory of the relation between state and religion needs to be thoroughly analysed. \n\nPrepared by M. Amarjeet Singh\, Research Assistant at IDSA. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/storming-of-lal-masjid-in-pakistan-an-analysis CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20081031T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20081031T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T175553 CREATED:20231224T104900Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130251Z UID:64245-1225431000-1225431000@idsa.in SUMMARY:Quo Vadis\, NATO? : A Reality Check DESCRIPTION:Chair: P StobdanDiscussants: Ali Adil Mahmood & Indranil Banerjie URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/quo-vadis-nato-a-reality-check CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20081107T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20081107T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T175553 CREATED:20231223T222532Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130251Z UID:63742-1226035800-1226035800@idsa.in SUMMARY:Looking “East” through India’s North East: Identifying Policy “Challenges” and Outlining the “Responses” DESCRIPTION:Chair: Sujit DuttaDiscussants: Bhagat Oinam and Archana Upadhyay \nThe “Look East” policy was envisioned by the Narasimha Rao government in 1991 to outline a focused foreign policy approach towards South East Asia\, a region of high economic prosperity at that time. It was also propelled during a period of economic liberalization within India itself. Further\, in the present context\, the “Look East” policy is being utilized to forge deeper ties with China\, Japan\, South Korea\, Australia\, New Zealand\, Papua New Guinea\, and Pacific Island states. \nUnlike nearer home initiatives like South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)\, heavily influenced by an India-Pakistan historical distrust coupled with the insecurities of smaller neighbours\, India enjoys an advantage with the South East Asian countries with regard to greater regional cooperation. Most of these countries view India as upholding a strong democratic ethos and a benign foreign policy of mutual co-existence based on the ideas of Gandhi and Nehru. As a result\, India has benefited from the Look East policy as it has boosted defence cooperation with Myanmar\, Indonesia\, Vietnam and Thailand. \nIt is but inevitable that India’s North Eastern region would be drawn into the overall “Look East” policy given its geographic proximity to South East Asia. Indeed\, the North East shares borders with China\, Nepal\, Bhutan\, Myanmar\, and Bangladesh. According to Pranab Mukherjee\, India’s External Affairs Minister\, North East India is poised to benefit from India’s growing relations with South East Asia as the process of globalization has shown how cross-border market access can uplift people from poverty\, economic backwardness and bring in prosperity. \nThe idea of “cross border markets” put forth by Mukherjee in bringing about upliftment of people suffering from poverty\, armed conflict\, lack of employment opportunities\, and insecurity is interesting. Indeed\, it is all the more likely that statements such as these from top Indian policy makers indicates that the “Look East” market driven policy has been crafted within the framework of neo-liberalism wherein it is proposed that “human well being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights\, free markets\, and free trade”. In this approach\, the role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework attuned to such practices. \nThe Look East policy presupposes that heightened trade relations and free markets with South East Asia will uplift the North East out of the shackles of insurgency\, poverty\, and economic backwardness as maximizing the reach and frequency of market economies will result in political\, economic and social freedom. But is it really so? \nThis paper is primarily geared towards filling this critical policy gap: to identify and list out the challenges as well as outline the plausibly best policy response. \nThe paper is divided into three sections. The first section highlights the measures undertaken under the Look East policy for the North East. The second section highlights the policy challenges with regard to the implementation process of the “Look East” policy. The third section offers certain policy responses to these challenges. \nAt present\, the impediments to increased relations between South East Asia and North Eastern states are:- \n\nIssues of Infrastructure and Lack of Local Support \nThe Crisis of Insurgency \nElite Consensus and the Social Disjuncture \nThe States’ Incapacities \nThe easy availability of arms and weapons from across the international border to utilze in armed movements and criminal activities. \n\nPolicy suggestions to better prepare the North Eastern region for a smooth opening towards South East Asia include: \n\nBuild up the population skill base. \nThe literacy rate of most North Eastern states except Mizoram is below the national average of 65 per cent. In order to increase the literacy rate and ensure that the rate of college drop outs decrease\, the education system must be made vocation centric. The level of English education must also be improved. \nThe roadways suffer due to precarious weather conditions. Given the nature of the terrain\, roads are also hard to maintain on a monthly basis. What could be done is to set up small village level bodies\, which utilize local labour to keep roads functioning. \nState authorities need to crack down on parallel governments run by the insurgent groups by activating state institutions and ensuring basic security. \nBorder areas have to be made safe from violence\, extortion\, smuggling rackets\, drugs and arms transfers. \nThe present trade between South East Asia and North East is on the decline. The Union government needs to do a realistic assessment of the goods to be traded\, especially those that are required across the border like locally made textiles and woven tribal items. \nIn order to facilitate easy movement of people\, the Inner Line Regulation of 1873 and the Restricted Area Permit (RAP) required for foreigners to gain entry to states like Arunachal Pradesh\, Manipur\, Nagaland\, etc\, must be revoked. \n\nPoints raised in the Discussion: \n\nThe North East region needs to be politically stabilised. The issue of migration from across the borders has become a cause of considerable concern.\nEconomic interests and security concerns are the drivers of the Look East Policy. Just becoming a gateway to South East Asia will not help the North East region. \nThe Ministry of Development of North Eastern Region (DONER) has a limited role in Look East Policy. \nThere is need for developing the region with dignity. \nSmall-time investments will be beneficial for the region; and hence development model must cater to the need of the region. \nInner Line Permit system applicable to some states of the region is becoming a barrier to local development.\nThe region’s problems need separate solutions. \nBorders states must be encouraged to open trade with Myanmar\, Bangladesh\, China\, Bhutan and Myanmar. \n\nPrepared by Dr. M. Amarjeet Singh\, Research Assistant at IDSA. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/looking-east-through-indias-north-east-identifying-policy-challenges-and-outlining-the-responses CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20081128T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20081128T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T175553 CREATED:20231223T222532Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130251Z UID:63741-1227850200-1227850200@idsa.in SUMMARY:Securing the Northern Coast of Gujarat: Challenges and Responses DESCRIPTION:Chair: Nalin DewanDiscussants: K. C. Pandey\, M. L. Batham and J. S. Bhalla \nThe Northern coast of Gujarat (the Kutch and Saurashtra coast adjoining the Gulf of Kutch) is fast emerging as an industrial and energy hub of the country. This process of industrialisation has been further boosted by the proximity of the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Kutch\, which has emerged as a major corridor for importing crude oil. Nearly 70 per cent of India’s crude oil is imported through this corridor. \nHowever\, there are growing worries about non-conventional threats as well as terrorist attacks and sabotage\, which could potentially inflict massive damage. This paper seeks to highlight issues which could pose a potential security threat to the Gujarat coast. The paper also evaluates the measures undertaken by the government to address them\, and suggest steps to improve coastal security. \nSecuring the Creek Area\nThe Northern coast of Gujarat is indented with several creeks. These creeks are all inter-connected by smaller water bodies and together they create an intricate maze of shallow and deep channels. The creek area has remained vulnerable to cross-border infiltration\, smuggling\, and arms and drugs trafficking. Interconnectivity of the creeks has made the border porous for infiltrators\, smugglers\, and militants\, who have been using these routes to sneak into India. Mangroves and sand bars in the creeks also provide hideaways during low tide. The situation is made worse by the non-availability of any approach channels from Indian side to many of these smaller channels. \nTo secure the creek area\, besides the deployment of Border Security Force (BSF)\, floating Border Out Posts (BOPs) have been set up. Aerial reconnaissance by unmanned aerial vehicles is also undertaken every fortnight for tracking infiltrators. \nDespite all these measures\, the creek area remains susceptible to cross-border infiltration and other illegal activities. This is primarily due to two reasons: firstly\, patrolling in the creek areas is dependent on the timings of the tide as well as on weather conditions\, and secondly\, during the monsoon when the sea becomes rough\, the BOPs are withdrawn from the creek area. They return to the creeks after nearly six months when the weather becomes better. During this intervening period\, there is no means of keeping a strict vigil over the creek area. \nCoastal Security Scheme\nDotted by numerous inlets\, rivulets\, small creeks and uninhabited islands\, the coastline along the Gulf of Kutch remains vulnerable to infiltration and other illegal activities. While the small creeks and inlets facilitate clandestine landings\, the islands are ideal hideaways for infiltrators\, and criminals. The vulnerability is further accentuated by the lack of effective patrolling and surveillance. \nThe misuse of the coast by anti-national elements had compelled the government to take counter measures. Following the 1993 Mumbai bombings\, ‘Operation Swan’ was launched to check infiltration and arms trafficking. The operation has been ongoing for more than fifteen years now and is hailed by the government as a success. However\, there are no reports of any seizure of contraband or arrest of any infiltrator or criminal. The primary reason for such a dismal performance is the lack of interest shown by the central and state governments. The joint patrolling unit does not possess either proper equipment or the necessary manpower to carry out its duty effectively. For many years\, trawlers hired by the state governments were used for patrolling. But it proved ineffective for several reasons. Firstly\, the state government did not release adequate funds for hiring sufficient numbers of trawlers or for buying fuel. Secondly\, the trawlers were no match to the speed boats used by the criminals. \nDespite the coasts remaining highly vulnerable\, very little attention has been paid to tighten coastal security all these years. It was only in the year 2006 that the government embarked upon a plan to secure the country’s coasts under the Coastal Security Scheme. The aim was to strengthen infrastructure for patrolling and surveillance of the country’s coastal areas\, particularly the shallow areas close to coast. Sine then\, the Coast Guard was entrusted with the responsibility of patrolling the entire coastline of the State. \nUnfortunately\, the coastal police stations lack proper infrastructure\, equipment and manpower. Apart from these problems\, coastal security is also contingent upon other factors such as: (a) the security of the ports\, (b) the effective management of the maritime traffic; and (c) the movement of fishermen in the territorial waters. \nOne of the major draw backs of the coastal security scheme is the absence of any plan to strengthen port security. Given that these ports together handle a great bulk of India’s cargo coming into the country and are located close to the international border\, the security of these ports cannot be neglected. There is a need to promptly review the security arrangement of these ports and formulate a plan to deploy a mix of Central industrial Security Force (CISF) as well as trained private security guards to secure and protect the ports. \nOne of the major issues in the management of the India-Pakistan maritime boundary is the crossing over of fishermen in to each other’s waters. This has not only led to tensions in bilateral relations with Pakistan\, but also raised security concerns. Due to the non-resolution of the Sir Creek dispute\, the international maritime boundary between the two countries is not delineated. Absence of a well demarcated boundary has not only made the task of guarding it difficult but has also created confusion in the minds of many fishermen regarding the extent of India’s territorial waters. Numerous cases of both Indian and Pakistani fishermen straying into each others territories are routinely reported. \nWhile the government has initiated a number of schemes to safeguard the creek and coastal areas\, many areas of concern still remain. A major challenge for the border guarding forces is the widening gap between the sanctioned and existing infrastructure and manpower. Delays in the release of funds by the government hinder their efforts to strengthen their capabilities. The lack of interest shown by the state police in pursuing cases of offenders at sea or in the border areas is another issue that is hampering the prevention of crimes in a major way. There is also laxity in the security arrangement of the ports. And finally the issue of Indian and Pakistani fishermen straying into each other’s territorial waters raises concerns about the possibility of Pakistan sending operatives into India. \nThe paper contains several recommendations\, some of which are listed below: \n\n\nTo make patrolling along the coast more effective\, both the BSF and the Coast Guard should be provided with adequate infrastructure. \nAdditional hovercraft and patrol boats with well protected mooring grounds should be provided to enable the BSF to better patrol and guard the creeks. \nA separate recruitment scheme for the CSPF should be formulated to attract young and agile persons. \nBorder guarding forces along with the Coast Guard should be given powers of investigation and prosecution to more effectively curtail criminal activities along the borders and coasts. \nMore costal police stations need to be established. \nAll ports along the Gulf of Kutch should be made ISPS compliant\, and should be guarded by a mix of government and private security personnel. \n\nPoints raised during the Discussion were: \n\n\nUnresolved boundary in the Creek areas is the core security concern.\nPakistan has put up a large number of security posts along the Creek areas. \nThere is increase in the activities of Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) and Pakistani Marine in these areas to push infiltrators. \nBangladeshi nationals always attempt to sneak into Pakistan through the northern coast of Gujarat. \nThere is no centralised agency in India to look after the coastal security. And\, too many agencies lead to coordination problem. A United Headquarters may be created. \nThe topography is very difficult\, and is advantageous for the Pakistani.\nBSF is not mandated to guard the coastal areas\, but the land borders. \nMore BOPs need to be established in these areas.\nIntelligence need to be strengthened. \nPakistani and Indian fisherman should be allowed to fish in both the waters. \n\nPrepared by Dr. M. Amarjeet Singh\, Research Assistant at IDSA. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/securing-the-northern-coast-of-gujarat-challenges-and-responses CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20081205T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20081205T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T175553 CREATED:20231223T222532Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130251Z UID:63740-1228455000-1228455000@idsa.in SUMMARY:India – Iran relations: Converging Interests or Drifting Equations DESCRIPTION:Chair: Ranjit GuptaDiscussants: Ishrat Aziz and Anwar Alam \nThe West Asian region is currently in a state of flux. Iraq is far from being stabilized and questions are being raised over the continued US military presence in Iraq. However\, Iraq and the US have signed a security pact known as Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) which requires US to withdraw its forces by the end of 2011. But there has been protest against the provisions of the pact within Iraq and in its neighbouring countries particularly in Iran. Tension between Iran and the US over Iran’s nuclear programme continues. \nStrong historical and cultural relations between India and Iran have always played a significant role in bringing the two countries closer to each other. Religious affinity has also played an important role. Islam has been a bridge between India and Iran. India has the world’s second largest Shia population. These factors would continue to dominate relations between the two in the future as well. \nThe importance of Iran for India lies in its geographical position\, size\, energy resources and provision of access to Central Asia. Despite their different perceptions\, the Indian leadership has underlined the strategic importance of Iran for India. Earlier\, during the Shah regime\, the Iran-China-Pakistan alliance\, Western hostility and Iran’s closeness to the US and its desire to play an active role in Gulf region did not allow India-Iran relations to grow beyond a point. Iran was the first country to diplomatically recognise Pakistan. After the Islamic revolution\, India’s relations with Iran remained minimal. Iran’s stand on the Kashmir issue and the Babri Masjid led to new constraints in their relations. \nHowever\, in the post-Cold War era\, similar security threat perceptions brought about a phase of renewed engagement with a number of high level visits from both sides. The turning point was the visit of former Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao to Tehran in 1993. These ties were further strengthened by Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s visit to Tehran in 2001 when he signed the ‘Tehran Declaration’ and several other economic and trade cooperation agreements. The strategic cooperation between the two got a further boost during Mohammad Khatami’s visit in January 2003 culminating in the signing of the ‘New Delhi Declaration.’ \nRecently\, steps have been taken to enhance cooperation in economic\, energy\, political and security arenas and there have been high-level visits on both sides. The most recent one being by President Ahmadinjad to New Delhi in April 2008 and External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee’s visit to Tehran in November 2008. During these visit\, several documents were signed to strengthen and cement existing ties. \nEnergy is the common meeting point for India and Iran. At present\, the thrust of India’s energy cooperation with Iran is on the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline project and the $20 billion LNG deal. However\, both projects are yet to be finalised due to pricing and security-related differences that continue to hamper any forward movement. Analysts believe that Iran backed out of the LNG deal because of India’s vote against Iran in IAEA in September 2005 and again in 2006 to refer Iran to the UN Security Council regarding its nuclear programme. It is also argued that the US has been against any deal with Iran. \nDespite converging interests and problems between India and Iran it can be said that in the changing geopolitical environment both at the regional and international levels\, the two countries will not be able to neglect each other’s concerns. \nPoints raised during the Discussion\nEconomic factors are more important in Indo-Iran relations. \nProblem between Iran and Israel is not ideological but strategic. \nIran denied Indian flights during 1990-1991 Kuwait crisis. \nIran has not yet decided on the type of relationship it wishes to maintain with India. \nConvergence of interest between India and Iran should be taken seriously. \nShia population could help to maintain good relations between the two countries. \nPrepared by Dr. M.Mahtab Alam Rizvi\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/india-iran-relations-converging-interests-or-drifting-equations CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20081212T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20081212T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T175553 CREATED:20231223T222442Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T104826Z UID:63737-1229059800-1229059800@idsa.in SUMMARY:China in Asia: Strategic Goals & Emerging Patterns in its Periphery Policy DESCRIPTION:Chair: V. P. DuttDiscussants: Madhu Bhalla and G. V. C. Naidu \nThe paper broadly argued that the extraordinary growth of the Chinese economy is generating political and economic waves across Asia. The peaceful rise and integration of China into the international system necessitates that it pursues a long-term peace strategy that does not fundamentally clash with the interests of the major Asian powers. The pursuit of an aggressive nationalist course would not only be highly destabilizing but would also seriously jeopardize the economic and security prospects for Asia. However\, China’s pursuit of a peace strategy is domestically challenged – by segments of its military and Party that are steeped in old style nationalism and seek territorial gains against India\, Japan and Southeast Asia; unify Taiwan and utilize its growing influence to manage the influence of the major powers – US\, India\, Japan and Russia. The tensions at the heart of China’s foreign policy and strategic establishment over both national goals and appropriate strategy has nor been resolved. Biding time indicates a tactical adjustment while the statement of harmony and peaceful rise underlines a long term peace strategy. Both domestic and external political realignments are to be expected in such a political context. India’s strategic environment and role in emerging Asia would be significantly shaped by what happens in China and what politics it pursues towards Asia’s regions. \nMajor points raised during the discussion were: \n\n\nThe things which categorize China’s regional policy are driven by its security concerns. \nThe ideology of nationalism may lead to sub-nationalism and can be problematic. \nThere is a modern dimension to the periphery engagement pursued by China. \nChina is only trying to re-evolve its earlier periphery policy. What one needs to do is look at history if it can tell us where China will go. \nThe current debate within the community of Chinese historians as to what are the real boundaries has relevance to the question of Tibet as well as India. \nChina’s rise came about at a time when the Cold war was declining. \nThere has been a relative decline in the influence of the United States and Japan in South East Asia. Today China is the largest aid provider to Myanmar and Laos and the second largest to Vietnam. \nIn South East Asia no country wants to appear to be antagonistic to China. \nChina has to learn to deal with the emergence of India as an East Asian power. \nNorth Korea and Pakistan may appear to be a liability for China in the long run. \nOne cannot draw a pattern in the Chinese regional understanding. \nThere needs to be more focus on issues of military technology and military modernization of China. \nChina’s focus remains hard power. \nChina’s behaviour is guided by its nationalist goals and it makes no compromises. \nChina is gradually moving away form multilateralism to regionalism. \nChina has always projected its economic power and has not been seen to be making any compromises. \nChina’s main strategic rival is the United States even today and its major focus is the quest for resources. \nThere has been an increase in the Chinese presence in South Asia and also an increase in the efforts made by China to exclude India from the East Asian region. \nChina has gained from the decline of the USSR and will definitely take advantage of the decline of the United States. \nA number of scenarios were proposed that could have been included in the paper as future predictions. \nChina’s thinking on the periphery needs to be looked at in detail. \nCan the idea of periphery be discussed as an extended neighbourhood? \nIt needs to be highlighted that China has made compromises with Myanmar\, Russia and Japan on the territorial issues. \nChina does not have an Asia policy and a loss of territory is considered as a loss of prestige. \n\nPrepared by Gunjan Singh\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/china-in-asia-strategic-goals-emerging-patterns-in-its-periphery-policy CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20081219T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20081219T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T175553 CREATED:20231223T222441Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130250Z UID:63734-1229664600-1229664600@idsa.in SUMMARY:A Critical Evaluation of Andhra Pradesh’s Response to the Naxal Challenge DESCRIPTION:Chair: G. D BakshiDiscussants: D. K. Karthikeyan and J. N. Roy \nAndhra Pradesh has been dealing with the Naxalite challenge for a long time and the way in which it has dealt with this challenge has evolved over this time. The Union Government has been suggesting to other Naxal-affected States that they should adopt the Andhra Model in responding to the Naxalite challenge. The objective of this paper is to discern the constituents of what is popularly referred to as the Andhra Model – in other words Andhra Pradesh’s experience in addressing the Naxalite challenge. \nIn sum\, what is popularly referred to as the Andhra Model comprises of Security Response\, Political Response and Development Response. \nSecurity Response: Some of the core elements of the Security Response are: Surrender and Rehabilitation\, Intelligence-based Operations\, Victim Reassurance Policy such as civilian rehabilitation\, and police rehabilitation\, and Development Works and Mass Mobilisation. \nPolitical Response: There exists\, now\, a consensus among the major political formations in the State on the approach to dealing with the Naxalites. They understand that the challenge is\, indeed\, real and has to be addressed. It is this realisation that has manifested in a response which comprises three essential elements\, viz. tough security response\, development response\, and conducting limited periods of peace process. \nDevelopment Response: Twice\, development programmes have been launched in the State with the particular objective of bringing in rapid socio-economic development in Naxalite-affected areas. The first initiative was known as Remote Areas Development Programme; and the second is known as Remote and Interior Areas Development Programme. Other development programmes such as Jalayagnam and Indiramma were also initiated. \nThe political leadership was initially not sensitive enough to the impending Naxalite challenge. This changed and a consensus had emerged among the political formations by about 1996-97 that the rebels had to be taken headlong\, in all possible ways. Thus\, the political will and commitment displayed by the leadership played a significant role in crafting Andhra Pradesh’s response to the challenge posed by the Naxalites. The other affected States have with them the advantage of the experience of the Andhra Pradesh in dealing with the Naxalite issue. They would have to clearly recognise that the Andhra Pradesh model is much more than deploying the elite Greyhounds. It involves years of painstakingly building-up the fighting capabilities of the State police\, their training\, logistics and intelligence. \nTo sum up\, it might not be appropriate to suggest a near total replication of the experiences of Andhra Pradesh in dealing with the rebels. At best\, it could serve as a relevant reference point for the other Naxalite-affected States to craft their respective strategies. \nMajor points raised during the discussion were: \n\n\nDevelopment funds are often diverted to the Naxalites. The political parties/ political leaderships too pay ‘protection money’ to the Naxalites. \nPoor governance has led to increase in Naxalites subversive activities. \nTo counter Naxalite challenge\, the root cause will have to be attended to. And\, the state’s delivery mechanism has to be revamped. The state has to penetrate into remote tribal areas. \nTalks with Naxalite should be initiated. \nAndhra Pradesh’s experience in addressing the Naxalite challenge is a unique example\, and is successful. It is important to understand the model by other Naxal -affected States. \nAndhra Pradesh Model is successful because of the ‘accessibility’\, and it evolved over a long period of time. \nAndhra Pradesh Model\, however\, has failed to implement Land Reforms. \n\nPrepared by Dr. Amarjeet Singh\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/a-critical-evaluation-of-andhra-pradeshs-response-to-the-naxal-challenge CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090102T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090102T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T175553 CREATED:20231223T222432Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130250Z UID:63733-1230874200-1230874200@idsa.in SUMMARY:India’s Economic Engagement of Africa: Partnering Africa DESCRIPTION:Chair: Arvind GuptaDiscussants: Dilip Lahiri and Shipra Tripathi \nHistorically\, the principal tenet of India’s policy towards Africa has been support for the struggle for decolonization and racial discrimination in South Africa. Economic engagement between India and Africa is increasing like never before though it is not new. During the colonial period\, India played a significant role in terms of supplying personnel for middle level services such as duka. At present the scale and swiftness of India’s economic engagement with Africa is expanding. This has been facilitated by the changing African outlook in recent years. On the political side there has been an end in sight for some of the debilitating conflicts that have ravaged the continent. At the same time there is a move by Africans to take charge of their own destiny. For its part\, the Indian government laid out its broad economic cooperation frame work during the India-Africa Forum Summit in April 2008. This conference gained significance because of an attempt to forge a closer partnership between India and African countries and address the common goals and challenges they face. An important element of India’s approach towards Africa is the growing presence of the private sector in African countries. \nIndia does not have the financial capacity to match the grants in aid by China and the West to Africa. However\, India recognizes the African countries’ focus on capacity building and human resources development. As a result\, Africa today is the largest recipient of India’s technical cooperation programme. India’s growing synergy with Africa is quite visible in the recent trade trends. Bilateral trade has increased from US $967 million in 1990-91 to $25 billion in 2006-07. India has institutionalized its relationship with African countries by launching the India-Africa Forum in April 2008. During the summit\, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announced a number of initiatives including a duty-free trade preference scheme for 34 African countries. India has also enhanced its relations with African countries in the energy sector. Currently around 24 per cent of India’s crude oil imports are sourced from Africa. Indian national oil companies like the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Videsh Limited (OVL) has invested in equity assets in African countries. \nHowever\, China’s booming investment in Africa has provoked a heated debate on the continent and around the world. One of the challenges that India faces is the penchant among the Western media and intellectual to mention in the same breath both the Indian model of engagement with Africa and the very different Chinese economic approach to Africa. African countries have acknowledged the growth of Indian economy and have expressed a desire to emulate the Indian model. \nPoints raised during the Discussion \n\n\nThe India-Africa economic engagement needs to be examined carefully with specific data. \nThere is a need to create a centre or an institution to study India-Africa engagement. \nThere is a need to check where India should be focused and to know what when and where Africans really want to engage us. \nPrivate sector involvement in Africa is very important. \nPeople to people contact should be enhanced. \nNon-Alignment is important for maintaining good relations between India and Africa.\nThere isn’t much Indian scholarship on Africa and this needs to be rectified. \nIndia’s engagement in Africa’s social domain must be looked into. \nIndia should identify areas in which more positive relations with African countries can be developed such as health\, medicine\, etc. \nIndia should understand the sensibility of Africans. \nIn terms of investment competition between India and China\, Africa welcomes both of them. \nAfrican countries believe that their problems can be better understood by Asian countries than others. \nThere is a need to promulgate a new policy towards Africa along the lines of the ‘look east policy’. \nThere is no need to compare China’s influence in Africa with that of India. \n\nPrepared by Dr. M.Mahtab Alam Rizvi\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/indias-economic-engagement-of-africa-partnering-africa CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090109T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090109T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T175553 CREATED:20231223T222432Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130250Z UID:63731-1231479000-1231479000@idsa.in SUMMARY:Spreading Tentacles of Left-Wing Extremism: Are we Failing in Police Training: A case study of Chhattisgarh DESCRIPTION:Chair: Ved MarwahDiscussants: G. D. Bakshi and K. M. Madhusudhanan \nVarious case studies of Naxalite-related incidents have revealed that one of the prime reasons for recurring security forces casualties has been the inadequacy in training imparted to them. While the Central Paramilitary Forces (CPMF) have well developed integral infrastructure and resources for training\, the police forces in most of the States are generally lagging behind. Police forces are generally capacity-deficient to fight the Naxalites effectively and need to be transformed into a combat-oriented force in Naxal-affected States. However\, police training has been less than satisfactory. An adequate and efficient police training system\, infrastructure and resources are required to be built up in the States to meet current training requirements. \nThe vital question is whether the present police training facilities\, resources and infrastructure available in the States are adequate to train personnel\, including new recruits\, within a short span of time. This paper attempts to assess the present police training system\, infrastructure and resources in Naxal-affected States\, discusses the role of the Central Government in general\, and examines Chhattisgarh in particular. The paper also identifies corrective measures and makes relevant policy recommendations. \nLaw and order being a state subject\, the primary responsibility of building police training system\, infrastructure and resources lies with State governments. However\, the Central Government has been rendering support to States in the formulation of training policy\, research\, improving law enforcement\, standardisation and modernisation through exchange of knowledge\, coordination and budgetary allocation. The Centre as part of the Seventh Plan has recently taken the initiative and decided to set up 20 Counter insurgency and Anti-Terrorism training Centres in Bihar\, Jharkhand\, Assam\, Orissa and Chhattisgarh. Also adequate funds have been allocated to Bureau of Police Research and Development (BPR&D) in the 7th plan for development of the police training system throughout the country. Modernisation of police forces has not brought about any visible improvement in the police training system so far in most of the States. A few States like Andhra Pradesh have however taken the lead. \nPresently\, a huge gap exists between requirements and availability of police training infrastructure and resources in most of the States. Select numbers of police personnel are being trained in Army and CPMF training establishments. However\, these establishments have their own commitments and cannot afford to regularly train State police personnel unless their infrastructure and resources are enhanced. \nChhattisgarh State police personnel lack adequate training to effectively fight the Naxalites. The police training infrastructure and resources in this State are not commensurate with ground requirements. Also\, the lack of coordination between CPMF and state police forces is evident given the absence of an operational ethos and gap in training. \nChhattisgarh inherited a depleted police force and infrastructure when it was formed in the year 2001. A large number of reluctant officers and men from Madhya Pradesh were allotted Chhattisgarh State. Besides\, many personnel\, trained in instructional duties\, managed to remain in Madhya Pradesh. The state inherited the worst Naxalite-hit areas\, and the Chhattisgarh Police\, at its inception\, was capacity deficient. Given the state’s limited infrastructure\, it also suffers from deficiency in training. Finances are a major constraint faced by the State police and are far below what is necessary to meet the requirements of manpower\, mobility\, infrastructure\, communication\, land\, residential accommodation\, etc. \nThe state police has identified some key areas and steps are being taken to improve police training. These include: commando training; intelligence training; basic induction training; specialist training; improvement of training infrastructure and facilities; joint training with CPMF; joint/collective training with CPMF; and redressing resource deficiency. Also\, the State has taken an initiative to establish a Counter Insurgency and Jungle warfare Training College which can train 3\,600 police personnel each year. With limited training infrastructure\, Chattisgarh will take at least 10 years to train its entire police manpower in counter-insurgency and jungle warfare. \nA positive environment and culture is lacking in the police set up in most of the States. Posting to a training institution is considered as punishment. Also there is little interest in undergoing training. There is no motivation and incentive for the trainers. Hence police forces lack good quality of instructors. Training is also not strictly linked with promotion. Training is therefore a neglected activity in the police. Excess commitment of police personnel is another reason for training to be neglected. \nHolistic development of the training system is required in the police set-up. The essence of police human resource development lies in training\, and it cannot be neglected any longer. There is an urgent need to prioritise training at all levels including special pilot projects like dedicated allocation of budget for development of training infrastructure and resources to States. The Army and the CPMF have a large number of well-trained instructors whose services can be utilised in the police training academies of naxal-affected States. \nThe paper’s recommendations were: \n\nPrioritising police training at all levels especially in Naxalism- affected States. \nAddressing budgetary constraints. \nAddressing manpower and leadership problems. \nDevelopment of instructional staff. \nDeveloping training infrastructure. \nDeveloping a healthy training culture. \nImproving operational understanding between State Police Forces and CPMF through joint training and inducting CPMF instructors and leadership in armed police battalions and police training institutions. Also utilisation of retired army personnel and officers in police training can be explored. \n\nPoints raised during the Discussion: \n\nThe menace of Left Wing Extremism constitutes a considerable security threat for India’s internal peace and development. \nLeft Wing Extremism has socioeconomic roots. \nLeft Wing Extremism is a heartland insurgency; so the government relies on police and paramilitary forces. \nThe Andhra Pradesh model of tackling Left Wing Extremism has worked\, and should be replicated elsewhere with adequate modifications to suit local conditions. \nLeft-wing extremism ultimately requires a political solution. \nPolice leadership have to change their attitude especially towards training\, which needs to be prioritised. \nThe Army’s short-service officers may be reemployed for police training. \nArmy/paramilitary forces personnel may be deputed to the training Institutes and armed police battalions of States affected by Left Wing Extremism. \nHuman rights must be included in the police training curricula. \n\nPrepared by Dr. Amarjeet Singh\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/spreading-tentacles-of-left-wing-extremism-are-we-failing-in-police-training-a-case-study-of-chhattisgarh CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090109T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090109T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T175553 CREATED:20231223T222432Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130250Z UID:63732-1231479000-1231479000@idsa.in SUMMARY:Tibet: Connectivity\, Capabilities and Consequences DESCRIPTION:Chair: Arvind GuptaDiscussants: Ravi Sawhney and Rahul K Bhonsle \nSince 1951\, China had fueled massive economic investment in Tibet. In recent decades\, infrastructure assumed the salience in China’s Tibet strategy\, especially under its ‘Go West’ policy\, launched by Jiang Zemin in 2000. The stated goal was to usher Tibet into an era of modernity and prosperity. The policy gained more urgent priority since 2003 when Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao showed greater commitment to make Tibet a part of China’s economic miracle. The 1\,100 kilometer railway to Lhasa that cost $4.2 billion has symbolized China’s success in Tibet. Even the Indian Defence Minister Mr. A K Antony accepted the fact that there was no comparison of such development on the Indian side\, when he visited a forward location in December 2007. \nIn 2007\, China’s State Council had approved 180 projects for Tibet that would cost over 770 billion yuan ($10.2) during the Eleventh Five Year Plan. Reports suggest that more than 77 percent projects have already commenced. According to the Tibet Autonomous Regional Development and Reform Commission\, over 200 billion Yuan were spent during the year 2008. \nOn October 14\, 2008\, Chinese military engineers and workers began digging a tunnel in Tibet’s Galung La Mountain in Nyingchi Prefecture to build the most difficult highway to China’s last road-less Medog County that borders Arunachal Pradesh. China’s state media prominently highlighted the significance of the 141 km long road connecting Medog with Tibet’s main East-West highway. The project will be completed by 2010. \nThe great concern for India is the South-North Water Transfer Project (SNWTP)\, also known as the ‘Great Western Line’. The project is worth China’s $60 billion that aims to divert more than 40 billion cubic meters of water annually from China’s longest river\, the Yangtze\, and its tributaries through a tunnel under the Yellow River to northern China. The initial phase is expected to be ready by 2010. But a section of the route has already been used for meeting the water requirements during the Beijing Olympics. The initial two routes of the project will take water from the middle and lower reaches of the Yangtze basin through the Yellow River to Beijing\, Tianjin\, and other booming cities in the north. The third route plans to divert waters from Tibet’s Yalong\, Dadu and Jinsha rivers to the northern plains. The Brahmaputra project forms the second phase of the third route. The project was envisaged on the assumption that by 2030 the Yangtze basin will not have sufficient water for transfer to the north. The major concern here is: why is China going ahead with the SNWTP if there is inadequate water available for rerouting? \nThe project’s aim is to divert the Tsangpo at the Shoumatan Point (the ‘Big U-turn’) for constructing the world’s largest hydroelectric plant at the knick-zone to generate 40\,000 Megawatts of electricity\, and for diverting 200 billion cubic meters of water annually to the arid north. The project will involve enormous engineering complexity on the scale of the Tibet railway system and the Three Gorges dam. Media reports also suggest China’s proposal to use nuclear explosives to blast a 15 kilometer tunnel at the U-turn. \nThe great challenge for India regarding the project is that India has no water sharing treaty with China. China has rarely bothered to share information prior to flood situations. As a result India often becomes vulnerable to environmental threats. Also\, there is no record of China consulting the lower riparian states before undertaking construction of dams upstream. \nAs the economies of India and China grow\, both are going to compete not only for oil and gas but also for water resources. One can conclude that China as the upstream state would treat water as a strategic commodity. \nPoints raised during the Discussion \n\nChina is unwilling to discuss the issue with India at the bilateral level. \nThere is a need to discuss water diversion by China at the United Nations and the issue also needs to be brought before the International Court of Justice. \nThe potential impact on India of China blocking the Brahmaputra river needs to be examined. \n\nPrepared by Dr. M.Mahtab Alam Rizvi\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/tibet-connectivity-capabilities-and-consequences CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090116T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090116T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T175553 CREATED:20231223T222431Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130250Z UID:63729-1232083800-1232083800@idsa.in SUMMARY:An Exploratory Framework for India’s relationship with ‘New Nepal’ DESCRIPTION:Chair: P. StobdanDiscussants: Ashok Mehta and Sangeeta Thapliyal \nThe paper\, An Exploratory Framework for India’s Relationship with New Nepal\, was presented by Dr. Nihar Nayak. Professor P. Stobdan was the Chair. Maj. Gen. (Retd.) Ashok Mehta and Prof. Sangeeta Thapliyal were the external discussants; and Dr Smruti Pattanaik and Dr. Pushpita Das were the internal discussants. \nThe paper brought out the complexities associated with the Indo-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship signed on July 31\, 1950. It identified some key elements which should be incorporated to make the Treaty more acceptable to both sides. At the outset\, the presentation briefly focused on the important Articles of the Treaty\, highlighting that the key objective of the agreement was to promote peace and friendship between the two states. Mutual politico-economic\, socio-cultural linkages and security requirements were underlined as common concerns. Highlighting the element of reciprocity\, the paper argued that one key element of the treaty was that it offered economic opportunities in India for Nepalese nationals against Nepalese assurances that India’s security concerns would be respected. The external political environment in the form of the shadow of the Cold War was one of the overwhelming factors shaping concerns and perceptions on both sides. Chinese adventurism in Tibet and apprehensions over Communist influence in Nepal were some of the factors that drove the two countries towards a settlement of issues. \nDr. Nayak argued that over the years\, the treaty has emerged as a nationalistic issue and is considered a major constraint on Nepal’s independent foreign policy. In fact\, during his official visit to India in 2008\, the Nepalese Premier emphasized that there should be a “clear revision” of the treaty. Highlighting the Nepalese and Indian perspectives\, the paper brought out the key irritants associated with the treaty. While Nepal was overwhelmingly concerned with issues relating to security and the unilateral imposition of restrictions on the free movement of people across the border; India was conversely concerned with the number of Nepali immigrants and the presence of ISI in Nepal\, who could be working in tandem with Chinese intelligence. \nDr. Nihar Nayak pointed out that despite irritants and opposition from both sides\, especially Nepal\, the treaty has not been abrogated by either side\, an issue which he considered curiously serious\, because Clause 10 provides for abrogation as a viable option. The paper also highlighted the mutually beneficial relationship between the two countries. On trade\, Dr. Nayak argued that India is Nepal’s largest trading partner. Seventy per cent of total Nepalese trade is with India. Also\, bilateral trade and investments have greatly improved between the two countries. India’s share in Nepal’s total trade made a quantum jump form 26 per cent in 1996-97 to almost 41 per cent in 2000-01. In fact amongst the SAARC countries\, India’s trade growth has been the fastest with Nepal and total trade stands at half a billion dollars accounting for around 25 per cent of total India-SAARC trade. However\, hydro-projects\, transit and employment benefits to Nepalese migrants in India are possible areas of cooperation between the two countries. Notwithstanding the mutual benefits\, the relationship between the two countries remains strained. New Nepal\, Dr. Nayak argued\, provides an opportunity towards strengthening bilateral ties between the two countries. He suggested that the treaty needs adjustment\, review and updating\, keeping in view changing security and economic realities. Both governments\, he emphasized\, also need to agree not to allow the use of their respective territories for activities harmful to the national security interests of the other. Also\, both countries should not enter into any kind of military alliance with third countries. \nMaj. Gen. Ashok Mehta argued that the concept of New Nepal is questionable\, as it is an ongoing process. He pointed out that the fact that there was no earlier call for abrogation of the treaty was incorrect as the call for change had come from Manmohan Adhikari. He noted that the main problem with the 1950 treaty was that all provisions of the treaty were in breach in themselves and none of them were operational. He also pointed out that one of the main problems with the 1950 treaty was that the implications of the treaty had not been studied in detail\, engendering parochial politics for vested interests. Gen. Mehta underlined the importance of identifying new concerns in Nepal\, pointing out that Nepal and Pakistan were two factors which ought to be taken into account while discussing India-Nepal relations. \nProf. Sangeeta Thapliyal noted that the paper needs to revisit the underlying context of its title. She argued that it was important to identify the groups and political actors in Nepal opposed to the treaty. She also noted that Nepal’s fears need to be taken into account and consequent ramifications for the treaty. It was also important to discuss what kind of a relationship India wanted with Nepal. \nDr. Smruti Pattanaik pointed out that the issue of abrogation is directly linked with political posturing. The 1950 treaty needed to be seen in the context of identity politics. She pointed out that domestic politics in Nepal was primarily responsible for the failure of the 1950 treaty and that there was a need to bring out the Indian perspective on the treaty more clearly. Dr Pushpita Das pointed out that it was important to argue why India should opt for a revision of the treaty. \nSome of the points raised during the discussion were: \n\n\nThe issue of remittances going to Nepal was important. \nIssue of perceptional factors regarding the image of Nepali workers in India should be considered. Also\, identification cards and certificates need to be issued to Nepali migrants in India. \nIt was important to outline the status of Indian business interests in Nepal. \nDomestic concerns are far more important to Maoists in Nepal than the 1950 treaty. \nThe 1950 treaty could offer a broader framework for a better Indo-Nepal bilateral relationship. \n\nPrepared by Medha Bisht\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/an-exploratory-framework-for-indias-relationship-with-new-nepal CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090213T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090213T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T175553 CREATED:20231223T222327Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130250Z UID:63723-1234503000-1234503000@idsa.in SUMMARY:Terror Financing in Bangladesh DESCRIPTION:Chair: Arvind GuptaDiscussants: Bhaskar Roy and Sanjay Bharadwaj \n“Terror Financing in Bangladesh” by Dr. Anand Kumar outlined key factors that contribute to terror financing in Bangladesh. Dr. Kumar’s primary argument was that sustenance and maintenance of terror organizations is often built on the edifice of a strong financial base and that terror cannot make much headway without finance. \nThe author at the outset drew attention to the issue of state accountability in dealing with terrorism as terrorist activities often emanated from domestic territorial space. He emphasized that intelligence gathering\, law enforcement\, and imposition of new financial controls were important levers to curb the functioning of terrorist groups. In this context\, he argued that the Government of Bangladesh has made only half hearted attempts to contain terrorist activities in its soil. \nThe presentation focused on three aspects: the Beneficiary Groups and Institutions involved in terrorism; the sources of terror finance in Bangladesh; and\, the responses of the Bangladesh Government and international institutions. Finally\, the paper briefly touched upon the policy relevance of the findings. \nMain Beneficiary Groups and Institutions\nDr. Kumar argued that the main beneficiaries of terror finance in Bangladesh have been Jamaat-e-Islami and Ahle Hadith Andolon Bangladesh (AHAB). Both organizations have maintained links with Islamic groups like Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh\, Jamaatul Mujahideen Bangladesh\, Alhikma\, Harkat ul Jihad etc. Money is used for recruitment and training purposes. Funding is also being channelled to build a large number of mosques and madarsas\, which are playing an instrumental role in radicalizing society at the district and village levels. \nSources of Terror Financing \nSome sources listed as potential feeders for financing terrorist activities\, as argued by Dr. Kumar\, were Islamic NGOs\, Saudi charities\, individuals\, money laundering\, fake currency\, drugs and underworld. Dr. Kumar asserted that post 9/11\, Islamic NGOs have increasingly become important in the fight against terrorism. In order to support the argument\, he cited the steps taken by United States to halt the flow of funds to terrorist organizations through Executive Order 13224 and related elements of the USA Patriot act. He argued that as oversight mechanisms were absent\, no financial scrutiny of the Islamic charities is undertaken\, which further complicates the problem of tackling terror financing. The Saudi Government’s patronage of charities such as International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) and the World Association of Muslim Youth (WAMY) was also brought to attention. He cited the example of Al Haramain\, a Riyadh based Muslim Charity\, which was opened in Cox Bazar in 1992 to help Rohingya refugees but continued to operate in Bangladesh uninterrupted despite it being banned by the United Sates and Saudi Arabia. The connection between Al Haramain and terrorism was revealed in 2002\, when linkages were made between Al Haramain and its suspected links to terror funding and trafficking of women and children under the garb of providing Islamic education. As far as individual support is concerned\, links to Bin Laden were cited. Dr. Kumar argued that funds were flowing into Bangladesh in the form of Hundi through Jessore\, Chittagong and Dhaka. He added that Bangladesh in recent years has also become a major source of fake currency. Fake currency was being printed in Chapai Nawabgunj and then being dumped into India. The nexus between drugs and terror finance also became evident when in 2005\, the National board of Revenue found that business companies in Bangladesh were smuggling heroine to U.K. and that profits accrued form trafficking in narcotics often went for funding Islamist groups. \nResponses of Bangladesh Government and International Institutions \nPolicy to tackle terror financing was expedited after the series of bomb blasts in 2005. The BNP enacted the Foreign Donations (Voluntary Activities) Regulation (Amendment Act\, 2004). However\, political motivations have often been an impediment for sustained political action and an overt emphasis on NGOs let the real culprits go scot-free. The enactment of Money Laundering Prevention Act\, 2002 also proved ineffective as it was full of operational loopholes. Similarly the dismal record of Bangladeshi Banks in checking terror finance was also brought to attention. The author argued that Bangladeshi banks have received approximately 236 suspicious transitions since the MLPA was enacted in 2002\, but till date there has been no progress on the issue due to procedural problems. \nThe author further argued that pressure from the United States has proved ineffective in triggering a behavioural change within Bangladesh. However\, he also noted the renewed interest of the United Nations in dealing with the problem of terror financing in Bangladesh since 2001. In 2005\, Government of Bangladesh became a party to the UN International Convention for the suppression for the financing of terrorism. The Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering is another key forum where Bangladesh is engaging to get transparency into the system of terror finance. \nThe author concluded by stating that the issue of terror finance was a daunting challenge facing the government and political will needed to be strengthened in order to tackle the issue in a holistic manner. \nSome of the points raised during the discussion were: \n\n\nOne should be careful of classifying all charities as sources for terror finance. Classification of Madarsas is also needed. \nDomestic\, regional and international issues responsible for terror financing should also be analysed. \nCauses of terrorism are generally found in the lack of development in Bangladesh\, which is perhaps becoming an important catalyst for recruiting people. \nOne needs to revisit pre 1971 years of undivided Pakistan to seek linkages between Pakistan and terrorism in Bangladesh. ISI links to terror financing should also be explored. \nSources on linkages between terror financing and their sources should be more diversified. \n\nThe seminar was chaired by Dr. Arvind Gupta\, LBSC Chair\, IDSA. Mr. Bhaskar Roy and Prof. Sanjay Bharadwaj were the external discussants; and Dr. Uttam Sinha and Capt. Alok Bansal were internal discussants \nPrepared by Medha Bisht\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/terror-financing-in-bangladesh CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090220T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090220T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T175553 CREATED:20231223T222326Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130250Z UID:63720-1235107800-1235107800@idsa.in SUMMARY:Religious Assertion in Malaysia DESCRIPTION:Chair: Sudhir DevareDiscussants: Baladas Ghoshal and C. S. Kuppuswamy \nThe major argument of the paper was that the government’s stance with regard to constraining religious assertion in Malaysia has been biased against non-Muslims. The government and society are carefully balancing their economic and religious interests\, so that the situation does not get worse. The internal security act has helped in constraining the influx of rigid religious assertion\, but the subdued disposition of civil courts and predominance of Shariah courts has created dissent among Christians\, Buddhists and Hindus. Economic development has led to the projection of Malaysia as one of the model states of development\, but religious assertion by the majority has created rifts within society. The emergence of a strong opposition and the probable change in leadership of the ruling coalition would mean that religion would become a more important factor in the coming years. Within Malaysian Society there has been awareness that increasing Islamisation or religious assertion threatening social religious harmony would not augur well for the future\, but religious issues have not been adequately addressed so far and neither has inter-faith dialogue been promoted. While the current situation is not alarming\, the future role of religious groups as well as political parties would determine whether Malaysia would stay on course as an economic power in the region or be derailed by religious polarisation. The constraints imposed by the state are working but there are strong indications of religious assertion having proliferated in society. \nAmbassador Sudhir Devare chaired the seminar. Prof. Baladas Ghoshala and Shri S.C.S. Kuppuswamy were the external discussants; and Alok R. Mukhopadhyay and Udai Bhanu Singh were the internal discussants. The following points were raised during the discussion: \n\nAs the lower income Malay Muslim is not economically strong\, he is worried about the political rights of the Chinese who are the economically stronger section of the population. \nModernization is perceived as an attack on Islam. \nThe question of Malaysians demanding the status of ‘Bhumiputras’ was raised and it was stated that they are an ethnically mixed race. Malaysia is the only country in Asia where ethnicity is synonymous with religion. Malay means Muslim. \nDoubts were also raised regarding the figures which state that Malay Muslims constitute 60 per cent of the country’s population. \nThe influence of the Deobandi sect reaches Malaysia from Bangladesh. \nThe Iranian Revolution presented a utopian world to the Muslim mindset; a Muslim country under Muslim laws could be established. \nMigration of rural Malays to urban areas and the consequent social dislocation has led to people leaning on Islam as a crutch\, thus facilitating the emergence of Islam as a factor in politics. \nIslamic schools are no longer under the control of the government but under the control of the Ulema. \nThere is also a heightened sense of insecurity among Malay women and a lot of social pressure. \nThe younger generation is becoming more religiously inclined and radicalized. \nOngoing changes in Malaysia might affect bilateral ties with India. Though Hindraf is seen as an internal issue\, India has raised this issue during bilateral talks.\n\nPrepared by Gunjan Singh\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/religious-assertion-in-malaysia CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090220T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090220T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T175553 CREATED:20231223T222326Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130250Z UID:63722-1235107800-1235107800@idsa.in SUMMARY:Rethinking Strategic Doctrine in the Indo-Pak Context DESCRIPTION:Chair: Hari PrasadDiscussants: Arun Sahgal and Manpreet Sethi \nStrategic doctrine is taken here to be implemented by a combine of war fighting land\, air\, naval and joint doctrines in conjunction with nuclear doctrine. While with respect to China\, India has a doctrine of ‘dissuasive deterrence’\, it is contended in this paper that with respect to Pakistan it has moved from a deterrent doctrine to a more proactive and offensive doctrine that potentially countenances compellence. This paper looks at India’s strategic doctrine with respect to Pakistan. The hypothesis of this paper is that there has been a movement in India’s war fighting doctrine from deterrence to also countenance compellence. The paper attempts to assess this by first establishing the nature of the change and then analyzing its implications with respect to Indian grand strategy\, prospective political aims in conflict and likely effectiveness. The proposed direction of change forms its concluding recommendations. \nFrom a defensive and reactive mindset of the earlier years that gave rise to criticism that India lacks a strategic culture\, change in a compressed time period has been witnessed of late. These changes in nuclear and conventional doctrines are contrary to the logical expectation of the Nuclear Age necessitating deterrent doctrines. India is the status quo and stronger power in the regional India-Pakistan dyad. This should have logically led to a deterrent doctrine with a defensive bias\, since India\, not seeking any territorial gains at the expense of others\, could be expected to be more interested in preserving its interests and position. This has not been entirely borne out and instead India has apparently acquired a more offensive strategic doctrine in relation to its western front. \nAt the structural level\, the strategic cul de sac forced on India by Pakistan’s continuing proxy war is a reason for this change. Pakistan’s venturesome strategy has been attributed to the advent of the Nuclear Age dating to the covert acquisition of nuclear capability by Pakistan by the late eighties. In order to get Pakistan to forego its doctrine of sub conventional provocation\, deterrence has its limitations. Instead\, compellence\, going beyond the coercive diplomacy of the Operation Parakram kind\, may be necessary. \nIndia’s straitened defence budgets through the nineties – brought on by liberalization – lead to a drawdown of the conventional deterrent. The ‘stability-instability paradox’ made its appearance with Pakistan choosing to engage India at the sub-conventional level. Stability at the upper nuclear and conventional level\, led to instability at the sub conventional level. This climaxed in Pakistani incursion across the Line of Control in Kargil in 1999. It has been posited that there is space for conventional operations between sub conventional and nuclear war. India has therefore moved towards an offensive doctrine that can be characterized as one of ‘compellence’\, when the land\, sea\, air and joint doctrines are taken conjointly with nuclear doctrine. \nThe prognosis of future Limited War is that it would be short duration\, high intensity and from a ‘cold start’. It is expected that international pressures and need to limit costs would entail a short duration. To offset international pressures in the crisis management stage and for getting enemy defence under prepared\, a ‘cold start’ has been deemed necessary. This would enable India to make military gains through surprise\, by undercutting the mobilization differential that was earlier in favour of Pakistan. \nIndia’s land warfare doctrine is essentially to create the conditions of launch of the major offensive by the strike corps. A salient ‘fire break’ between the pivot corps offensives in the first phase and the following strike corps deep offensives in the next phase can be discerned\, even though these offensive operations are likely to be in a seamless sequence\, not lending itself to breakdown in ‘phases’. This ‘fire break’ constitutes the crucial decision point in which India’s strategic\, political and diplomatic might needs to be combined with the impending application of military force to ensure Pakistan complies with Indian aims. The launch of the strike corps would be equivalent of a failure of grand strategy for it would bring the nuclear factor unmistakably into the reckoning. Since offensive operations would have to reckon with the nuclear reaction threshold of Pakistan\, a nuclear doctrine of ‘massive’ punitive retaliation comes under question. There is a case for move of nuclear doctrine to ‘flexible’ punitive retaliation. \nThere is need for maximizing synergy between the politico-diplomatic and military prongs of strategy to coincide with the ‘firebreak’ between launch of pivot and strike corps offensives. To keep these a seamless continuum is to unleash a ‘doomsday machine’. Launch of strike corps offensives\, unless it is as a counter offensive to Pakistani corps offensives as part of their ‘offensive defence’ doctrine\, would be to enter an uncertain strategic realm. Therefore\, a public shift from ‘massive’ punitive retaliation to ‘flexible’ punitive retaliation is in order at the nuclear level. At the conventional level must be taken into cognizance the ‘firebreak’ between the offensives of the pivot and strike corps as the key exit point with war termination pressures being maximized by an orchestration of Indian war grand strategy to culminate at this juncture\, if not prior to launch of cold start forces. \nThe following points were raised during the discussion: \n\nIt is difficult to make a sharp distinction between compellence and deterrence as the former is subsumed in the latter.\nIndia’s doctrine is not an offensive one\, but is reactive and therefore lends itself to deterrence as against compellence.\nBetter integration and jointness among the services is required to achieve war aims in future wars.\n\nPrepared by by Dr. Amarjeet Singh\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/rethinking-strategic-doctrine-in-the-indo-pak-context CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090227T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090227T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T175553 CREATED:20231223T222326Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130250Z UID:63719-1235712600-1235712600@idsa.in SUMMARY:Pakistan’s Strategic Thinking DESCRIPTION:Chair: V.G PatankarDiscussants: Kalim Bahadur and Ajay D Behera \nPakistan’s self image\, geographical location and history have influenced the country’s strategic thinking. In the initial years\, Pakistan perceived itself to be a weak state and believed that India posed an existential threat to its security. However\, Islamabad’s thinking evolved over a period of time through its experience in various wars with India\, tension on the western borders\, developments in communications\, military doctrines\, military technology and weapons systems. For instance\, after its defeat in the 1971 war with India\, Pakistan decided to develop nuclear weapons. Following the acquisition of a nuclear capability was acquired in 1987\, nuclear deterrence became an important element of Pakistan’s strategic thinking. Similarly\, Islamic jihad based on young recruits from Pakistan mosques and madrassas played an important role in the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989. \nDrivers for Pakistan’s Strategic Outlook\nPakistan has suffered from a small state syndrome ever since its inception. It feels a strong sense of disadvantage vis-à-vis India. Being one-fourth its territory and one-eighth of its population\, Pakistan feels pressured by being in the vicinity of a much larger Hindu dominated India. \nPakistan was conscious of the fact that any attack from its perceived adversaries\, India to its East and Afghanistan/erstwhile Soviet Union in the West would leave it with very little strategic depth. This led Islamabad to adopt a strategy of “offensive defence” vis-à-vis India\, and on the other hand to develop relations with Iran and make vigorous attempts to establish its influence in Afghanistan. \nThe 1893 Durand Line created by the British profoundly embittered the relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan. In fact in 1947\, Afghanistan voted against Pakistan’s admission to the United Nations because it laid claim to the Pashtun territories on Pakistan’s side of the Durand Line. In 1949\, a loya jirga (grand tribal assembly) convened by the Afghan government declared support for “Pushtunistan”. The jirga which affirmed the position of the Afghan government was not willing to accept the validity of agreements like the 1893 Durand Agreement\, as it considered Pakistan a new state rather than a successor state to British India\, and considered past treaties with the British pertaining to the status of the border as null and void. Afghanistan’s support for Pushtunistan found expression due to Pashtun nationalism\, the pride stemming from Pashtun political domination of Afghanistan historically and the implicit vulnerability that characterizes Afghanistan’s landlocked geographic situation. \nPakistan’s inability to establish a stable democratic system in the early years of its independence resulted in the repeated intervention of the army. Given its interest in remaining the dominant power centre it has not tolerated interference by civilian governments in matters it considers sacrosanct. \nPakistan’s internal ethnic contradictions and the dominance of the Punjabis in the power structure resulted in the movement for secession in East Pakistan. At the time of independence\, it was hoped that a “common faith” would help overcome any ethno-linguistic contradictions \nThe excessive importance given by the Pakistani leadership to the views of the Ulema resulted in the gradual ascendancy of religious extremists. The Ulema have had significant influence over the Pakistani leadership \nPakistan has always used its Islamic identity and therefore its links to Islamic countries as an important factor in promoting its strategic objectives. Right from the beginning Pakistan’s leadership adopted a pan-Islamic approach\, became a member of the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) and later of the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC). \nThe strategic location of Pakistan during the Cold War led to Pakistan’s alliance with the United States which determined its strategic outlook for a substantial period of history. Regime survival\, Pakistan’s traditional policy paradigm of seeking leadership in the Muslim world\, securing national unity through Islam and obtaining Western economic and military assistance were some of the imperatives guiding Pakistan’s behaviour. \nElements of Pakistan’s Strategic Thinking\nFirst\, it would be pertinent to emphasize that Pakistan’s strategic thinking has been dominated by the Army because of the Army’s continuous role in government\, whether direct or indirect. \nSecond\, it was therefore natural that Pakistan’s strategic thinking should have been characterised by a highly aggressive posture towards India. A number of assumptions on the part of the Pakistani leadership led it to attack India in 1965. It was believed that after Nehru’s death the potential for disintegration of India was higher\, and Lal Bahadur Shastri was considered to be a weak leader. The flawed concept of “The defence of East Pakistan lies in the West” remained the basis of Pakistan’s military strategy till the surrender at Dhaka in 1971. Pakistan’s aggressive attitude was also evident from its strategy to destabilise India through covert means as in the state support for Sikh separatists through the 1980s. Since the late 1980s Pakistan has actively sponsored terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir with the help of the highly trained mujahideen who had returned from the Afghan war. The Kargil operations in 1999 were launched by the Pakistan Army with the aim of acquiring territory at Kargil in a bid to force India to solve the Kashmir problem on terms favourable to Pakistan. \nThird\, such aggressive behaviour was also reflected in Pakistan’s dealings with Afghanistan. Concepts like strategic depth provided legitimacy for military expansionism into Afghanistan\, initially by giving support to the anti-Soviet Mujahideen\, and later by training and supporting the Taliban \nFourth\, Pakistan’s strategists have followed a doctrine of “offensive defence” given Pakistan’s size\, location\, and terrain along its eastern border with India. In times of crisis\, Pakistan has not hesitated to be the first to resort to use of force to gain initial advantage. \nFifth\, though Pakistan’s belief in jihad as a weapon to achieve political goals is well known\, it is interesting to note that in the late 1970’s\, efforts were made to interpret the Holy Quran and its relevance to war. The Quranic concept of Jihad seems to be the basis of Islamic strategic doctrine. \nSixth\, Pakistan has relied extensively on irregulars to help it achieve its military objectives. \nSeventh\, Pakistan believed that it would be able to snatch Kashmir from India and “inflict a thousand wounds” on India\, destabilise it or weaken it\, through subconventional warfare. Taking advantage of its nuclear capability acquired in 1987\, Pakistan started implementing its plan of achieving strategic goals first in Kashmir and then in the rest of India through a low-intensity conflict or proxy war. \nEight\, nuclear weapons constitute the most important and advanced element in Pakistan’s strategic thinking. The essential logic of Pakistan’s nuclear programme is Indo-centric. Pakistan acquired a nuclear weapons capability in 1987\, as has been admitted by General Mirza Aslam Beg himself. \nIt can be concluded that\, Pakistan can claim only partial success in achieving its strategic objectives. Even recently\, western leaders like David Miliband and Richard Holbrooke have been harping on Kashmir resolution as a pre-condition for peace in the region. Again\, by relying on non-state jihadi organisations to fulfil their strategic objectives against India\, and by reinforcing the Taliban to carry out Pakistan’s goals against Afghanistan\, Pakistan has legitimised these terrorist groups to such an extent that they have become a threat to Pakistan’s own existence. \nSome of the issues raised in the discussion were: \n\n\nWhen Pakistan was formed as an independent state\, there was no understanding of security problems that it would face. As the country was divided into two wings separated by a 1000 miles of landmass\, the factors shaping strategic thinking were potentially lacking since the outset.\nThe 1947 Kashmir operation planned by Pakistan was not a part of its strategy. In fact this was the first time the word Jihad was used by the Pakistani establishment to give a symbolic connotation to the Kashmir issue.\nThe paper seems to be episodically analytical and needs some form of conceptualization and framework of explanation. The derivatives and meaning of strategy and strategic thinking need to be elucidated.\nThere is a need to focus on the nation building process in Pakistan\, before outlining components of its strategic thinking. The fact that Pakistan is not a homogenous entity has to be reckoned with. The domestic aspect and the questions related to survivability of the state has to be underlined in order arrive at a comprehensive picture. \nThere is a need to underline the strategic objectives in Pakistan. In this context it is important to comprehend Pakistani understanding of India. \nThe paper needs to focus on 1971 as the turning point as there was a perceptible shift of Pakistan’s strategy.\nGiven the economic dependence of Pakistan on the United States and the I.M.F\, is it feasible to discuss the possibility of independent strategic thinking in Pakistan. \n\nThe seminar was chaired by Lt Gen (Retd.) V.G Patankar. External discussants were Prof. Kalim Bahadur and Dr Ajay. D. Behera. Internal discussants were Dr. Smruti Pattanaik and Col. Ali Ahmed. \nPrepared by Medha Bisht\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/pakistans-strategic-thinking CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090306T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090306T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T175553 CREATED:20231223T222322Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130250Z UID:63715-1236317400-1236317400@idsa.in SUMMARY:Benefits of India’s Defence Cooperation Initiatives towards the Foreign Policy Goals DESCRIPTION:Chair: Arvind GuptaDiscussants: Anuradha Reddy and Sunil Kumar \nAfter the Cold War\, India’s foreign relations have become multi-directional and diversified. Growing realisation that international defence cooperation can supplement diplomatic initiatives towards issues of common interests is increasingly being acknowledged the world over. New geo-strategic realities necessitate improvement of relations with the major powers\, such as the US\, EU\, Russia\, Japan and China and pursuance of an active ‘Look East’ policy in the extended neighbourhood\, especially ASEAN countries. \nAn important part of ‘Defence Diplomacy’ is defence cooperation. Defence cooperation\, as an important tool of foreign policy\, can be gainfully utilized to build bridges of friendship\, prevent conflict\, build capacity of friendly foreign nations\, strengthen mutual trust and enhance security and stability in the region. \nConsidering the intensive range of defence cooperation activities\, it is considered prudent to analyse the role being played by defence cooperation activities\, especially military related\, towards pursuance of our overall foreign policy goals. The paper is an attempt to do this and is laid out in three parts as follows:- \n\n\nPerspective on Defence Cooperation. \nBenefits of Defence Cooperation. \nRecommendations for the future.\n\nIndia is now engaged in a wide range of activities with other friendly countries\, ranging from Chile and Brazil in the Far-West to Japan and Korea in the Far-East and has concluded suitable defence cooperation agreements with over 30 countries. Defence cooperation activities are not structured and conducted in isolation but as part of a larger process. The range of defence cooperation activities comprise of strategic security dialogues that enable understanding of the participant concerns and establishing areas of common interest. Also included are goodwill visits at the level of the Service Chiefs\, professional defence and military expert exchanges\, military training\, combined exercises\, reciprocal visits of warships\, observers for exercises\, sports and adventure activities\, disaster management and humanitarian assistance; and cooperation in UN Peace Keeping Operations. \nThe recent period has seen increased instability and turbulence in India’s neighbourhood. With growing assertion of ‘non-state’ actors\, Pakistan is passing through yet another defining phase in its history. India’s other neighbours\, specifically Nepal\, Bangladesh\, Myanmar and Sri Lanka\, appear to be going through periods of instability\, which could have spillover effects on our security. Radicalisation of domestic environment in Bangladesh\, continuous inflow of illegal immigrants to North East India\, cross border movement of Indian insurgent groups from Bangladesh and Myanmar\, escalation of violence in Sri Lanka and effects of actions against LTTE in southern India are issues having ramifications on India’s security. While Nepal may be on the path to normalcy\, possibility of collusion between the Nepal Maoists and the Indian Naxalites has serious implications on India’s security. \nTo ensure a peaceful periphery\, India has remained focused on security of sea lanes in the IOR\, responding to natural disasters\, stability in neighbourhood and\, where feasible\, capacity building of neighbouring countries to meet their internal challenges as also to contribute towards meeting common security challenges in the region. Towards this end\, defence cooperation activities are facilitating regional security (through material assistance\, training\, building ability to operate alongside and maritime bonding); building bridges of friendship with countries in the extended neighbourhood\, building bridges of friendship with key powers\, projection of India as a responsible player in the global security architecture\, Disaster Management and Humanitarian Relief\, Peacekeeping Operations\, combating sea piracy\, capacity building of own armed forces\, extending dividends to Defence Industry\, joint R&D projects\, confidence building and deterrence \nSome of the recommendations to make it more effective and valuable are: Formulation of Policy Guidelines\, Integrated Planning\, Requirement of Specialists\, Improvement of Relations with West Asian Countries\, Military Interaction with Pakistan \nPoints in the Discussion\n\nDefence cooperation is one part of India’s foreign policy. It is increasingly becoming an important component of India’s foreign policy. \nDefence cooperation is a component of our national security strategy. India needs to have clear national security strategy.\nDefence cooperation provides supporting role in building partnership with other countries. It also helps ensure regional security.\nIndia’s defence cooperation must also looks at meeting the needs of the friendly countries. \n\nPrepared by Dr. Amarjeet Singh\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/benefits-of-indias-defence-cooperation-initiatives-towards-the-foreign-policy-goals CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090306T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090306T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T175553 CREATED:20231223T222322Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130250Z UID:63716-1236317400-1236317400@idsa.in SUMMARY:US Counter Insurgency Approach in Afghanistan Under Obama Administration: Does It Portend 'Change'? DESCRIPTION:Chair: G. BalachandranDiscussants: Shakti Sinha\, K. C. Singh and Rahul Bhonsle \nAfghanistan today appears to be teetering on the brink of failure and unending chaos. Despite the military endeavour by the United States (US) and its allies\, under Operation Enduring Freedom for the last eight years\, violence in 2008 increased by 40 per cent over 2007 and almost 543 percent over 2005. The Taliban-led insurgency has spread and according to an estimate almost 70 per cent of the country have become “no-go areas for security forces\, government officials and aid workers” depicting a rapidly shrinking political and humanitarian space. In this context\, the paper reviewed the past US counter-insurgency approaches in Afghanistan and analysed the possible impact of a new Afghan strategy. Given India’s interest in long-term stabilization of Afghanistan\, this policy analysis is relevant in terms of preparing responses to the evolving scenario in that country. The central thesis of the paper was that the present initiatives in designing a new COIN (Counter Insurgency) approach for Afghanistan to usher in ‘change’ are inadequate to turn the tide. \nUS COIN Approach under Bush administration \nThe inability of the international community to stabilise Afghanistan is clearly an outcome of the inadequate and short sighted policies of George W. Bush\, who embarked on the military campaign in Afghanistan with the objective of dislodging the Taliban and winning the war. The resurgence of Taliban in Afghanistan depicts that the US policy under President Bush of establishing security with a ‘light footprint’ and lack of focus on ‘nation-building’ has proved to be counter productive. Moreover\, at a critical juncture of Afghan stabilization efforts\, the already limited resources and manpower devoted to Afghanistan were shifted to Iraq. Despite the successful completion of the Bonn process and conducting successful presidential and parliamentary elections\, the political structures and the Parliament in Afghanistan are wracked by disruptive forces. \nInitiatives of the Obama administration: Break from the past\nWill they work?\nObama’s promise of ‘change’ from the previous administration’s unilateral policies\, his preference to replace blunt force with ‘diplomacy’ and ‘smart power’ is projected to have ramifications not only on Afghanistan but also for the entire South Asia. \n(i) Establishing Security – The debate in the present administration on the need to establish security in Afghanistan has revolved around three policy options: (a) Troop Surge (b) Arming the tribal militia (c) Talks/Negotiations with the Taliban. \n(ii) Diplomacy and ‘Smart Power’ approach – Obama has promised a change by ending the war on terror. One of the first Presidential actions after taking office was ordering the closure of the controversial detention centre at Guantanomo Bay. This has been viewed positively at home and abroad. \n(iii) Pakistan- Issue of Sanctuary– Obama has maintained that the future US efforts “must refocus” on “Afghanistan and Pakistan — the central front in our war against Al Qaeda”. Sanctuaries on the Pakistan side of the Afghan-Pakistan border supply and train the assault on Afghanistan and the allied forces there. Moreover\, the Pakistani Taliban\, have expanded their sweep over a vast area of the country. \n(iv) Pressure tactics on Karzai – Members of the Obama administration have provided enough indications of backing an alternative candidate in the upcoming Afghan national elections. The decision is just not based on the fact that Karzai was a choice of the Bush administration\, but because of his inability to rein in rampant corruption\, the flourishing drug trade\, and the inability of his government to deliver basic services. \n(v) Regional Strategy – The Obama administration has favoured a ‘comprehensive strategy’ that looks at the problem of Afghanistan regionally\, and that goes even beyond Pakistan and India but in some way takes into consideration the interests of Russia\, Iran\, and even China. \nThe paper assessed that there is not much change with the ushering of the new administration and most likely it would be a continuation of earlier policy. There are no bench marks and timeline for the ‘Exit strategy’ either. \nPolicy options for India\nIndia’s interests in Afghanistan are long term stability and building a ‘land bridge\,’ mentoring-ANA\, ANP\, COIN grid and fostering Capacity building-community projects. Obama administration’s policy of ‘troop surge’ or ‘negotiating with the Taliban’ would be viewed with greater interest by Indian policy makers in the post 26/11 Mumbai scenario. Unless troop surge is accompanied by ‘civilian surge’ the Afghans would resent the foreign troop presence. India needs to emphasise on an Afghan-led process of long-term institution building both in the security and governance sectors. India could contribute to capacity building and training of personnel (Afghan Army and police) but needs to steer clear from any direct military involvement in that country. The post 26/11 scenario calls for a better regional strategy to address the threat emanating from non-state actors operating from the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region. \nIssues raised in the discussion: \n\nThere are two dimensions to the problem in Afghanistan- strategic depth and nation building. The situation is grim in that country but as far as nation building is concerned\, Afghans would themselves have to work towards it as no outsider would do it.\nMilitarism was dominant in George Bush’s policy and it was not a comprehensive approach.\nPresident Obama’s policy talks about a regional approach and India and China are important parts of this regional concept.\nThe primary reason for the unpopularity of the government in Afghanistan is lack of social development activities.\nVery often despondency is the tone when we talk about Afghanistan. The strategy of winning hearts and minds needs to be pursued. \nAfghanistan has become a competing space for great powers. There is lack of understanding of local cultures and absence of a social code.\nNATO’s presence in Afghanistan is in body and not in soul. The member countries of NATO come with a set of caveats and therefore there is lack of fruitful coordination.\nAs far as India’s role is concerned\, the larger question is how India would fit within the NATO framework.\nIndia should in fact adopt a more forward looking and proactive posture. However\, any decision by India to send troops to Afghanistan as part of a more proactive role should be properly assessed and its ramifications should be studied carefully. \nAs Afghanistan is also a member of SAARC\, India could offer it a larger bouquet of choices.\nPakistan is both a part of the Afghanistan problem and a solution to the problem.\nAfghanistan needs to have a force which is sustainable in its own budget.\nGreat nations and narrow minds do not work.\nAfghanistan problem cannot be solved in isolation and there is need for comprehensive engagement.\nThe role of SCO in the context of Afghanistan should also be considered while studying this problem.\nThe proposal regarding implementation of the Panchayati Raj system in Afghanistan may not be a feasible option.\n\nThe session was chaired by Dr. G. Balachandran. There were three external discussants: Shri K.C. Singh\, Shri Shakti Sinha and Brigadier (Retd.) Rahul Bhonsle. Dr. Rajiv Nayan and Captain Alok Bansal were the internal discussants. \nPrepared by Dr. Priyanka Singh\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/us-counter-insurgency-approach-in-afghanistan-under-obama-administration-does-it-portend-change CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090320T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090320T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T175553 CREATED:20231223T222241Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130250Z UID:63712-1237527000-1237527000@idsa.in SUMMARY:India’s Strategic Autonomy Dilemma and the Rapprochement with the United States DESCRIPTION:Chair: Rajiv SikriDiscussants: Arun Sahgal and K. P. Vijayalakshmi \nThe debate on strategic autonomy makes a conceptual contribution about how India as an emerging power seeks to forge a partnership with the United States. The Indian imperative is to keep a sufficient degree of autonomy in its security and military relationship with the United States. Within the framework of India-US rapprochement the dynamics of power acquisition by India clash with its effort to maintain a reasonable degree of autonomy. Consequently\, the concept of strategic autonomy\, which is a mutation of realism and India’s traditional non-aligned posture\, can be described as a dependence control strategy aimed at safeguarding its independence in both foreign policy decision making and protecting strategic assets against American pressure. For India strategic autonomy necessitates the association between an autonomous foreign policy/security decision making capability and the preservation of material assets (both technical and economic). Strategic autonomy can only be a relative principle. \nPragmatists and maximalists among India’s strategic elites agree that the concept must accept some compromises to advance larger foreign policy goals. Some pragmatists have argued that India’s deeply held notions of autonomy must move towards responsibility. If India is to rise as a great power there must be a greater emphasis on responsibility in its foreign policy. Others have contested this\, noting that while autonomy is malleable so is the principle of responsibility. Maximalists argue that other great powers are unwilling and incapable of advancing India’s great power aspirations. Both maximalists and pragmatists agree that the 1998 nuclear tests by India reinforced its strategic autonomy. In this respect deterrence and autonomy are intimately linked. This was most evident during the debates about the civil nuclear deal between the United States and India. The pacifists\, Indian Leftists and Nehruvians use the concept of strategic autonomy within a discursive framework characterized by an ideological anti-Americanism antagonistic to any kind of rapprochement with Washington. \nA strategic partnership necessarily depends on the broad convergence of interest of the two partners. The potential for a strategic partnership encompassing all security and defence issues needs a convergence of interests which is lacking given both partners’ different international status in the global power hierarchy\, the security context of South Asia and the importance for India to retain its strategic autonomy. Thus despite the discourse within the United States on the transformation of the relationship\, India seems to favour and negotiate a selective partnership. The necessity for a relationship with the US is understood by all decision-makers and commentators in India who prefer an ‘issue based’ partnership configured for two countries which have ‘not permanent but temporary identity of interests’. Practically\, apart from avoiding any kind of alliance in the strictest sense\, for New Delhi it means not to be linked with any US sponsored collective or bilateral security structure constraining India to intervene in support of its own interests. \nFrom an Indian perspective\, divergent agendas with the US suggest a double necessity: to identify those divergences and exclude them from the partnership while resisting US pressure to reintegrate them. The necessity to pursue a multifaceted foreign policy and engage all major power centres is recognized by all Indian analysts. This is the surest and best way to maintain strategic autonomy. The Indian dilemma pertains to balance: the rapprochement with the US is improving faster than the partnerships with other countries such as China and Russia. The intensity and the ‘global’ ambition of the Indo-US relations are not balanced by India’s relations with other great or medium powers. A second of asymmetry insists on parallel engagements. Given the complexity and diversity of its international and security agendas\, India needs to pursue multifaceted diplomacy especially vis-à-vis Russia\, China and Iran. Energy supply\, membership to the UN Security Council and quest to become a major player in Central Asia are among the agendas which potentially collide with US interests and require relations with alternative powers. \nSome scholars argue that India’s emphasis on strategic autonomy will decrease with its accession to great power status and that ‘great powers don’t speak of autonomy’. This vision seems to conceive autonomy only as a power-transition imperative and sets aside the emphasis on autonomy which manifests itself when an emerging power becomes a great power. Great powers tend to strive for maximization of their influence. For instance\, the EU is today struggling to create new autonomous strategic capabilities in order to reduce its dependence on the United States. Will India become an ‘Asian France’\, as one US expert asked? The major lesson of the French experience for India is that autonomy works efficiently when combined with power. France’s autonomous posture has been built as a way to keep power\, not to create it. In the past India tried to pursue autonomy without sufficient power\, but the growth of its power gives it more latitude. \nPoints raised during Discussion: \n\nHistorically non-alignment enshrined a pragmatic approach; India wished to avoid entanglements.\nIndia’s policy in the 21st century will have to cater for the rise of China and the shift in the locus of power and international politics towards Asia.\nNon-alignment under such a circumstance when great power rivalry will rage all around India is an unviable option. Neither is the prospects for a China-India-Russia arrangement likely given deep Indian and Russian ambivalence towards China.\nIndia could follow Bismarck’s diplomatic strategy and spin a web of alliances with India holding all the strands in its hands\, though this would prove difficult given that it is not geopolitically central to Asia. An alternative is to forge partnerships with US\, Japan\, and possibly Russia to countervail the growth of Chinese power. \nOver time asymmetry between the US and India is bound to decline\, and so would fears about loss of ‘independence’.\nIndia too defensive and excessively prickly.\nTendency on the part of Indian officials to literally read/interpret every US document and policy statement.\nIndia’s involvement in the UN institutionalizes India’s participation in global institutions and thereby advances Indian and American common objectives.\nIt is important for India to create a peaceful periphery and ensure regional stability necessary before it goes on to become a major player.\nIndia cannot become aligned with the US.\nIt is too early to decide on the extent of alignment with the US.\nStrategic autonomy must be premised on national interest.\n\nRemarks made by the Chairperson Ambassador Rajiv Sikri: \n\n\nThere is a need to look into the other dimensions of the India-US relationship.\nStrategic Community in India wields little influence; politicians call the shots.\nThe US is too meddlesome in India’s relations with third countries eg.\, Iran. It does not know how to deal with Pakistan and must pay greater heed to the United Nations. \n\nPrepared by Kartik Bommakanti\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/indias-strategic-autonomy-dilemma-and-the-rapprochement-with-the-united-states CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090320T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090320T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T175553 CREATED:20231223T222241Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130250Z UID:63713-1237527000-1237527000@idsa.in SUMMARY:Rationale for Performance Oriented Defence Budgeting DESCRIPTION:Chair: V. K. MisraDiscussants: Amit Cowshish and Sujeet Samaddar \nIndia’s security comes with a huge price tag. In 2009-10\, the defence budget reached Rs. 1\,41\,703 crores\, representing nearly one-seventh of total central government expenditure and 2.35 per cent of the gross domestic product. Such a huge financial outlay raises questions as to how funds are allocated and what outcomes are being achieved. Does the defence budget provide the answers? \nThe budgeting system\, in the form of Defence Services Estimates (DSE)\, follows ‘line-item’ budgeting. Total resources are provided in six demands for grants (catering to both the revenue and capital expenditures of the Defence Services)\, which in turn are subdivided into various revenue and capital items such a ‘pay and allowances’\, ‘stores’\, ‘works’\, ‘aircraft and aero engines’\, ‘naval fleet’\, ‘heavy and medium vehicles’\, among others. So the budget in essence does not provide information on expenditure on various capabilities or programmes that the country is acquiring to meet its security threats. Neither does the budget reflect the physical progress of various programmes on which massive investment is incurred. In other words\, the intended outcome of the budget vis-à-vis security threats or the defence policy cannot be deduced from the existing system of budgeting. \nTo move towards a visible and outcome-oriented budget\, the Ministry of Finance (MoF) since 2005 has issued guidelines emphasizing the link between financial budgets and actual and targeted performance of outlays. The guidelines task the central Ministries/Departments to articulate\, among others\, a list of major programmes/schemes and the goals and policy framework guiding them. The main objective of the exercise is to “establish one-to-one correspondence between the (financial) budget … and Outcome Budget…” However\, the Ministry of Defence (MoD)\, along with 30 Ministries/Departments has been ‘exempted’ from preparing outcome budget. The exempted Ministries/Departments are however ‘requested’ to prepare outcome budget for ‘internal use’ and voluntarily decide the extent to which the general public can have access to it. \nIn the above context\, the MoD has taken the initiative of formulating Defence Services Estimates\, Vol. II (DSE\, Vol. II)\, and making it mandatory for some of its institutions to prepare the outcome budget. The DSE\, Vol. II\, which currently is meant for “internal use” falls short of the parameters laid down by the MoF for preparing the outcome budget. It merely expands the item- or head-wise allocations made in DSE and\, in addition\, provides “Budget holder-wise summary sheets.” In no way does it relate the financial outlays with the intended outcomes. The major problem with the institutions that prepare outcome budgets are that their ‘outcomes’ are organisation specific and have ‘weak linkage’ with the overall plan of the MoD. \nArvind Kadyan highlights a number of gaps plaguing the implementation of outcome budgeting in defence. Foremost is the lack of programme-orientation in defence budget. He argues that the identification of major programmes by “High Level Budget Holders and Top Level Budget Holders in Service Headquarters\, responsible for planning of budget” would go a long way in preparing outcome budget. The programme orientation however needs suitable changes in classification of heads of expenditure\, reflecting all the inputs that go into specific programmes or sub-programmes. Among others\, he argues that increased use of information technology can facilitate real-time “information required for monitoring\, evaluation” and for “decision-making purposes.” He suggests that considering the “extra work” that would be generated in the initial phase of the implementation of the outcome budget there is a need for a professional body with the necessary wherewithal to carry out the job. \nKadyan strongly argues that Outcome budgeting is quite possible for the defence establishment\, contrary to some perceptions that outcome of defence expenditure is not measurable and even if measurable its documentation may not be in the interest of the country’s security. These issues can be tracked by what he terms “attitudinal change” of concerned authorities. He says that all the information may not be placed in the public domain\, as clearly articulated by the MoF. He suggests that “introduction of outcome budget is likely to be seen by the Services as an attempt to introduce a new mechanism to control budget utilisation.” \nFor effective implementation of outcome budgeting in defence\, Kadyan argues that the MoD needs to follow a ‘comprehensive approach’ covering the entire defence budget. He suggests that a tri-service institution like the College of Defence Managements (CDM)\, Hyderabad should ideally be entrusted with the task of developing “an overall structure” for the purpose of implementation. The ‘Budget Holders’ in the Service Headquarters (SHQs) are then required to identify outcomes against the outlays\, and prepare the outcome budget\, keeping in view the overall defence policy of India. While executing the outcome budget\, the Programme/sub-programme Directors under the Budget Holder would need enhanced delegation of financial powers. Once the outcome budgets at the stage of Budget Holders are prepared\, their consolidation could be done by the Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff (HQ IDS). Further\, an independent organisation needs to be created for monitoring and evaluation of various ongoing programmes. \nPoints raised in the discussion: \n\n\nThe experience of civil ministries in outcome budgeting is insubstantial\, and is of little use for mid-course correction.\nOutcome budgeting in defence in some countries like Australia is of “little help” to the services.\nTransparency in outcome budgeting needs to be viewed simultaneously with the security aspects.\nInformation and Communication Technology (ICT) has immense potential for preparing outcome budget in defence.\nPlanning\, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) is increasingly being adopted by many counties.\n\nPrepared by Laxman Kumar Behera\, Associate Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/rationale-for-performance-oriented-defence-budgeting CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090327T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090327T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T175553 CREATED:20231223T222240Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130250Z UID:63710-1238131800-1238131800@idsa.in SUMMARY:A Scenario-Building Method on India’s North East: Time Horizon 2015 DESCRIPTION:Chair: Prakash SinghDiscussants: G. D. Bakshi and Arun Sahgal \nIn her presentation titled ‘A Scenario-Building Method on India’s North East’\, Dr. Namrata Goswami projected the vision of a peaceful and prosperous North East India by 2015. Identifying terrorism\, left-wing extremism and insurgencies as the three great internal security threats of India\, she repeated Manmohan Singh’s earlier statement that growing insurgencies in the North East are caused by lack of development and externally funded terrorism. Dr. Goswami has utilized the scenario building method pioneered by Herman Kahn of RAND. She identifies the key factors/drivers which can be utilized to perceive and describe\, if not predict\, four future scenarios in the Northeast by 2015. Before explaining the four scenarios\, Dr Goswami points out the advantages as well as disadvantages of the scenario building method. According to her\, despite the fact that scenario-building is one of the most widely accepted method of bringing about some true sense of a possible future\, the future based on such method still remains imagined and fictitious. \nWhile explaining the future scenario of North East India on the basis of scenario building method\, Dr. Goswami offers a list of positive and negative drivers which can either lead the region on the path of prosperity or can prove as impediments in its progress. On the positive side\, she points to factors like the region’s richness in natural resources\, cultural heritage\, the growing number of youthful population\, higher level of education\, influence of local communities and music in life\, governance\, etc. Factors like backward condition of transportation and communication\, perceived feelings of neglect by New Delhi\, cultural differences\, rising ethnic violence\, negative political culture\, militarization of political culture\, rampant extortion network\, economic backwardness\, porous international border\, etc.\, are pointed out as negative drivers. \nOn the basis of the above mentioned drivers\, Dr. Goswami has put forward four possible scenarios of North East India by 2015. They are: Destination North East: A Touristic Paradise (a scenario based on tourism development); Island North East: Beware imagined ‘others’ (a scenario based on fear of domination and ethnic violence); Multi-Cultural North East: Liberal and Progressive (a scenario based on the success of democracy); Global North East: Looking ‘East’ with Hope (a scenario based on the success of India’s ‘Look East’ policy). Among the four\, Dr. Goswami considers the first\, third and the fourth scenarios as ‘ideal’ to improve the conflict ridden states of the Northeast. \nPoints raised during the discussion of the Paper: \n\n\nThe paper should be based more on certain pattern based prediction rather than single event prediction. \nIn scenario construction\, more than eight possible scenarios should be taken up. After discarding some of those scenarios due to their consistent inconsistency\, four to five scenarios should be finally taken up for scenario building. \nInstead of making the scenario building method so much RAND centric\, the scenarios should be based on the method adopted by certain private companies.\nAn explanation of the process of scenario building in the paper will be helpful.\nAs a choice of tool for scenario building method\, net assessment technique is ideal\, as it helps crystallize the scenario.\nAlong with internal factors\, geo-political factors too should be taken into account. As part of the geo-political factors\, Chinese arms supply to insurgent groups in the Northeast\, growing security threat from HUJI\, etc. should be incorporated.\nIt is necessary to have an in depth study of growing Islamic fundamentalism as part of insurgency situation within Northeast.\nSince many of the positive drivers mentioned in the paper can be negative drivers in other contexts (e.g.\, governance)\, a clear stance on the matter is necessary. \nThe status quo will probably persist for some time in the Northeast.\nAs long as extortion in Northeast India continues\, achieving the desirable goal of disarmament\, demobilization and rehabilitation (DDR) will not be possible. As a result\, trade and tourism\, the two sectors which constitute a significant part of the paper\, will suffer.\nPolitical resolutions\, so far\, have not been very successful in bringing down the insurgency problem in the North East region. Under the circumstance\, if armed forces are pulled out from the region\, insurgency will\, once again\, increase.\nGreater academic emphasis should be put on the strong historical linkages between the Northeast and the rest of India. \nFocus on factors like what exactly is the subject for whom the scenario is built; identification of key decisive factors; identification of drivers and their classification\, will make the paper all the more interesting.\nBoth actors as well as issues can be treated as drivers. \nAs far as Northeast India is concerned\, factors like scale of insurgency\, cross border support for insurgency\, cross border migration\, transport and communication\, state of economy\, etc.\, can be treated as potential drivers. \nLocal cottage industry\, progress of Northeastern youths in sports and positive governance in Sikkim should be incorporated as positive drivers.\nProgressive change in politics\, such as through bringing about changes in labour laws\, opening for outside work force\, enhancement of education\, increase in resource base\, etc.\, can be quite helpful in improving the situation of the Northeast. \nIndian government’s future approach to its so called ‘Look East policy’ will depend on factors like degree of economic and social integration through communication revolution and softening of borders\, lack of infrastructural developments coupled with political and economic concerns. \nThe possibility of a peaceful and prosperous Northeast within the short timeframe of five years is unrealistic. Instead\, the timeframe should be extended to 2050. \nThe possibility of enduring peace in the region will depend upon the insurgency situation. The level of insurgency has already reduced in the region. Influence of Naga insurgency\, which used to be considered as mother of all other insurgencies in the Northeast is no longer evident. Insurgent groups seem to be still working in this region\, particularly for monetary benefits rather than demand for autonomy. \nWith good governance\, backed by insistence on accountability\, peace can be brought to Northeast region. \n\nPrepared by Pranamita Baruah\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/a-scenario-building-method-on-indias-north-east-time-horizon-2015 CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090327T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20090327T053000 DTSTAMP:20261105T175553 CREATED:20231223T222241Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130250Z UID:63711-1238131800-1238131800@idsa.in SUMMARY:The Indo-US Relationship: Is Diplomatic Style Important? DESCRIPTION:Chair: Kanwal SibalDiscussants: K. C. Singh and Christopher S Raj \nThe presentation of Professor Steven Hoffman began by examining the question “Is diplomatic style important and what impact does it have as far as Indo-US diplomatic negotiations are concerned? Professor Hoffman began by noting that diplomatic style is important enough to deserve careful attention. During the period between 1997 and 2007\, he interviewed diplomats on both sides. According to him\, some practitioners pointed out that tone or style naturally ranks below substance in importance\, but not always. An experienced Indian diplomat called style a “force multiplier” in Indo-US relations. When the two sides engage\, they do deal with the matter of ‘how do we talk to each other?’ A former American diplomat said that diplomatic style and substance intertwine. To separate style from substance for the purpose of analysis can prove useful\, but is not easy and real care must be taken in doing so. His presentation puts forward some results produced by such an effort. Professor Hoffman adopts a historical narrative that analyses change and convergence in Indian and American diplomatic practices. Change in style accordingly began in June 1998\, and is still taking place today. \nProfessor Hoffman divided his presentation into five parts. First\, he described problematic practices on both sides. For instance\, Americans could be overbearing\, demanding\, arrogant and deadline imposing\, etc. and similarly the Indian side could be self-righteous and arrogant as well. Professor Hoffman got this sense after examining published sources and interviews. \nSecondly\, he provides two historical illustrations on diplomatic style. The first being Indian foreign secretary J.N. Dixit’s diplomatic negotiations with George Bush Sr’s. administration in 1992\, and second the dialogue between Jaswant Singh and Strobe Talbott during the period 1998 to 2000. Professor Hoffman says that in diplomatic style\, there is a learning process underway. In every negotiation\, substance comes first and when basic parameters set in well then style matters. In the last ten years\, India and the United States sustained a momentum but episodically there were problems during the negotiations on the Indo-US nuclear deal. He noted that the Obama administration is sending the right signals to carry forward the momentum built by the Bush Administration. \nThirdly\, Professor Hoffman describes US diplomatic practices during the George W. Bush administration and refers to US ambassador India Robert Blackwill’s statement about the adoption of a radically new diplomatic style. Blackwill had said that “America will not be a nagging nanny” and that the Bush administration does not intend to lecture India on its national interests. According to Professor Hoffman\, the Ambassador’s public comments and phraseology did reflect a real ideological and policy change in Washington. \nFourthly\, Professor Hoffman points out that in fact India and the United States were developing a set of mutually accepted practices that may also be called rules that came into existence in the mid-2000s. Professor Hoffman pointed out the developing shared rules of engagement in Indo-US relations: No Naggy Nanny\, India to be treated with respect\, recognition of India’s major power status\, avoidance of vitriol\, and developing rules to maintain momentum in the US-India relationship\, avoiding surprises from either side\, shaping issues jointly\, deepening and broadening the range of interaction\, establishing personal relationships and institutionalizing the relationship. \nIn the last part\, Professor Hoffman puts forward his interim conclusions. Shared or common diplomatic practices make communication of substance easier\, increases mutual understanding\, allows each side to educate the other\, enhances trust\, acts as a force multiplier\, and helps ease if not eliminate historical resentments paving the way for substantive mutual gains. He emphasizes that no matter how bilateral ties between India and the United States evolve during the next few years\, this study makes a case that diplomatic style is important\, in this particular relationship. What has been learned and gained should be maintained\, and even built upon further. One may hope that a reasonably common set of guiding diplomatic practices will characterize the full range of US-India ties in the future. \nPoints raised during the discussion \n\n\nIt is important to understand whether style reflects substance. If practitioners are frank and enjoy a level of trust and also do not question the other’s fundamentals\, then style matters.\nOne cannot have different style while dealing with different countries. It is substance and issues which make the difference\, not style. If the United States and China can develop without changing their diplomatic style\, then why should India change its diplomatic style. The substantive nature of India-United States relations began with the Indian nuclear tests in 1998. It was not change of style but in substance. \nSystemic differences between India and the United States also lead to differences in negotiating style. \nDifferences in negotiating style between India and the United States is also the result of systemic differences; an Indian Foreign Minister is invariably a politician whereas in the United States Secretaries of State are frequently drawn from academia\, business\, armed forces\, etc.\nIn the United States behavioral sciences have taken a major lead in shaping policies. Style reflects behaviour and in this process selection of words used during negotiations plays an important role.\nDiplomacy carries historical baggage. Personalities like Henry Kissinger played a crucial role. Their personality and diplomatic style prove influential as Kissinger was successful in United States-China rapprochement process in 1971.\nDiplomatic style matters and works so long as diplomats are sensitive to substance. \nDiplomats respond to the leaders. Leaders set the substance and diplomatic style works accordingly.\nFor success in negotiations\, parties need to understand the bottomline well.\nWhile understanding the change in Indo-US relations\, it is important to note that India’s economic progress and new found prosperity have played a major role in this process.\nIndia is a major power and it is interesting to analyse where the United States places India in its ‘Grand Strategy’.\nSometimes diplomatic behaviour or style only works as a lubricant.\nFactors like culture\, personalities and national identity should be kept in mind and engagement should be in terms of principles.\nStyle certainly matters in Indo-US Relations as in any relationship. But it has been observed that when core issues are discussed\, style takes a back seat. Style becomes different when contentious issues are discussed. \nDiplomatic style works in negotiations if it is carried out with a certain degree of caution and care.\nIt is important for Indian diplomats to have a good knowledge about the United States\, and a good way is to gain exposure in American universities. \nCharisma of personalities involved in diplomatic negotiations works because it builds trust and enhances confidence\, as happened in the case of the Jaswant Singh-Strobe Talbott dialogue. \n\nPrepared by Sanjeev Kumar Shrivastav\, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-indo-us-relationship-is-diplomatic-style-important CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR