BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//MP-IDSA - ECPv6.15.12.2//NONSGML v1.0//EN CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH X-ORIGINAL-URL:https://idsa.in X-WR-CALDESC:Events for MP-IDSA REFRESH-INTERVAL;VALUE=DURATION:PT1H X-Robots-Tag:noindex X-PUBLISHED-TTL:PT1H BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:Asia/Kolkata BEGIN:STANDARD TZOFFSETFROM:+0530 TZOFFSETTO:+0530 TZNAME:IST DTSTART:20110101T000000 END:STANDARD END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130628T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130628T053000 DTSTAMP:20261027T173437 CREATED:20231224T102729Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T012341Z UID:64068-1372397400-1372397400@idsa.in SUMMARY:ASEAN in Myanmar's Foreign Policy DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/asean-in-myanmars-foreign-policy CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130621T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130621T053000 DTSTAMP:20261027T173437 CREATED:20231223T133750Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130240Z UID:63126-1371792600-1371792600@idsa.in SUMMARY:Factoring RCEP and TPP: China\, India and the Politics of Regional Integration and Coexistence DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Amb (retd) R. RajagopalanDiscussants: Dr. GVC Naidu\, Amb (retd) J.C. Sharma\, S.K. Mohanty\, Durgesh K. Rai \n \nHighlights of the Paper\nDr. Jagannath P. Panda discussed the newly emerging multilateral power politics in Asia in the context of ASEAN initiated Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the United States led Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP). He argued that central to both the RCEP and TPP is the politics and prominence of ASEAN. He highlighted that several aspects of the Sino-US\, Sino-Japanese and US-Japanese dynamics vis-à-vis the RCEP and TPP have been analysed. However\, perceptions of India and China regarding the two groupings have not been adequately studied and the paper aims to discuss this understudied aspect\, noted Dr. Panda. The paper explained the politics\, policy and nuances that India and China attach to RCEP and TPP. Factoring both RCEP and TPP in the ASEAN context\, Dr. Panda argued that China’s tryst with the RCEP under ASEAN+6 is an opportunity for India to maximize its ‘Look East’ policy. He added that RCEP is vital to China politically to address the challenges and concerns it faces from the US ‘pivot to Asia’ policy. \n He also noted that China has opposed inclusion of India under the ASEAN+6 and thus the sprit of ASEAN in unifying the leading economies of the region has remained unfulfilled so far. Maritime disputes in the region have widened the gap among the ASEAN partners and ASEAN’s six dialogue partners. These maritime disputes have brought into question the ASEAN+6 concept\, brining into question if the economic ethos of an East Asian Community would ultimately help reduce the existing political differences. It would be interesting to see how China approaches the politics of RCEP and tries to accommodate India and its interests. \nThe paper was structured in four parts. First part drew a comparative outline of RCEP and TPP and policy preferences of China and the US on RCEP and TPP respectively. The second part explained the centrality of ASEAN in the politics of RCEP and TPP and presented a scenario of how the politics of ASEAN is offering a new opportunity in East Asia\, particularly for two regional players\, India and China. The third part discussed the Chinese and Indian perspective vis-à-vis the RCEP and TPP. The fourth part discussed the emerging contours of the political scope and opportunities for China-India politics in ASEAN context. \nIn conclusion\, Dr. Panda mapped three important structural developments in the East Asian regional order that have taken place during the evolution of RCEP and TPP. First\, a direct Sino-US rivalry seems to be clearly emerging and the ASEAN community is divided between the Chinese and the American worldviews. Second\, the ASEAN-led regional multilateral politics is going to be another important aspect of regional politics\, where engaging with ASEAN and its dialogue partners will be the priority for several countries including India. Third\, China will continue to place most of its foreign policy thrust on ASEAN and South-East Asia. Even as China’s tryst with ASEAN will continue to be the greater deciding factor in the regional politics\, India will continue to emerge as a vital power and RCEP will be a favourable factor for India in this context. \nMajor points of discussion and suggestions to the author: \n\nIt would be incorrect to assume that RCEP is China led. It is still an ASEAN led process. However\, it can be described as China dominated.\nIt is debatable whether the TPP is a byproduct of the US ‘pivot to Asia’ strategy. The TPP was formalized much before the enunciation of ‘pivot to Asia’ strategy.\nLittle bit of restructuring of the paper is needed; the idea behind the TPP and RCEP and its basic objective should be brought out in the beginning of the paper and then other related issues should be discussed for a better clarity of the issue.\nIt would be wrong to draw a conclusion that RCEP will help moderate China’s behaviour towards the regional countries. The cases of China’s approach to Philippines following Scarborough Shoal dispute where China temporarily halted the imports of banana from the Philippines and restrictions on export of rare earths to Japan following Senkaku spat\, suggest that China puts aside all trade agreements.\nIndia is destined to join the RCEP. But it should be opened to join the TPP. India would loose huge market if it does not join the TPP.\n\n(Report Prepared by Dr. Shamshad A. Khan\, Research Assistant\, IDSA.) URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/factoring-rcep-and-tpp-china-india-and-the-politics-of-regional-integration-and-coexistence CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130607T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130607T053000 DTSTAMP:20261027T173437 CREATED:20231224T102729Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T012442Z UID:64069-1370583000-1370583000@idsa.in SUMMARY:Impossible Devolution? The Failure of Power Sharing Attempts to bring Democratic Stability and Peace to Sri Lanka DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/impossible-devolution-the-failure-of-power-sharing-attempts-to-bring-democratic-stability-and-peace-to-sri-lanka CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130531T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130531T053000 DTSTAMP:20261027T173437 CREATED:20231224T102729Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T012535Z UID:64070-1369978200-1369978200@idsa.in SUMMARY:North Korea’s Nuclear Capabilities and Alliance Game with China DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nChairperson: Ambassador Arundhati GhoseExternal Discussants: Professor Madhu Bhalla amd Professor Swaran SinghInternal Discussants: Dr Rajiv Nayan and Ms Pranamita Baruah URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/north-koreas-nuclear-capabilities-and-alliance-game-with-china CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130517T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130517T053000 DTSTAMP:20261027T173437 CREATED:20231224T102729Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130240Z UID:64071-1368768600-1368768600@idsa.in SUMMARY:An Analysis of Real Oil Prices Over a Long Time Horizon (1861-2011) and Implications for Forward Naval Deployments DESCRIPTION:Chair: Shebonti Ray DadwalExternal Discussant: Commodore Sujeet Samaddar and Dr B MohantyInternal Discussant: Cdr S S Parmar URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/an-analysis-of-real-oil-prices-over-a-long-time-horizon-1861-2011-and-implications-for-forward-naval-deployments CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130510T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130510T053000 DTSTAMP:20261027T173437 CREATED:20231224T102814Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130240Z UID:64072-1368163800-1368163800@idsa.in SUMMARY:North Korea's Nuclear Crisis: Strategic Implications DESCRIPTION: URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/north-koreas-nuclear-crisis-strategic-implications CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130503T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130503T053000 DTSTAMP:20261027T173437 CREATED:20231224T102814Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130240Z UID:64073-1367559000-1367559000@idsa.in SUMMARY:Turkey and its Quest for Leadership Role in the Region DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Brig Rumel Dahiya\, SM (Retd)External Discussants: Shri Saeed Naqvi\, Professor Ashwini Mahapatra and Col Ravinder GurungInternal Discussants: Dr Ashok K Behuria and Dr P. K. Pradhan URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/turkey-and-its-quest-for-leadership-role-in-the-region CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130503T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130503T053000 DTSTAMP:20261027T173437 CREATED:20231224T102814Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130240Z UID:64074-1367559000-1367559000@idsa.in SUMMARY:Media and India-China Relationship DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Venu RajamonyExternal Discussants: Srikanth Kondapalli and Indrani BagchiInternal Discussants: Shruti Pandalai amd Bijoy Das URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/media-and-india-china-relationship CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130426T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130426T053000 DTSTAMP:20261027T173437 CREATED:20231223T133807Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250311T070955Z UID:63131-1366954200-1366954200@idsa.in SUMMARY:Malaysia-India Defence Cooperation: A Need for Paradigm Shift before Strategic Partnership DESCRIPTION:Chairman: Lt Gen Y M Bammi (Retd)External Discussants: Ambassador Preet Mohan Singh Malik and Professor Man Mohini KaulInternal Discussants: Shri Vishal Chandra and Dr Rahul Mishra \n \n \nMajor Arguments of the Paper: The core argument of this paper is that a paradigm shift is necessary in order to take the defence relationship between Malaysia and India to a higher plane. The author has approached the subject from the Malaysian perspective\, and her prescription about paradigm shift relates to the Malaysian state. By paradigm shift she means a change in the mindset of Malaysians in general and the government in particular. The change of mindset here implies that Malaysia should stop viewing India from the old prism of a developing or backward nation. \nThe author has traced the genesis of the defence relationship between the two countries to the pre-independence days\, when the British Indian forces made important contributions in Malaya. However\, Cold-War saw a drift in the relationship. End of the Cold War again brought important changes in the way Malaysia saw defence cooperation with India. Changed geopolitical realities made Malaysia cooperate with India. Malaysia regards its defense and security cooperation with India as vital and highest form of cooperation. The MoU on Defense Cooperation signed in 1993 is the most important mechanism to boost the bilateral cooperation in defence sector between the two countries. \nThe author then goes on to explain the depth of the military cooperation by giving details of the cooperation-service wise. The level of interaction is deepest between the navies of the two countries largely because cooperation in Andaman and Malacca Straits maritime area holds vital strategic importance for both Malaysia and India. However\, the author has also attached importance to the contribution of the Indian Air Force in maintenance and tactical training of the RMAF. Moreover\, Malaysia sees India as a stabilizer in the region. \nThe author analysed the discourse on defence cooperation between the two countries under two broad themes:\ni Malaysia-India Defense cooperation is on the right track.\nii The relationships lacks substance and volume. \nThe author subscribes to the latter viewpoint and holds the Malaysian mindset primarily responsible for such a state of affairs. In conclusion she said that Defense MoU signed between the two countries was a major milestone as India was the first country outside the region with which Malaysia signed such an agreement. However\, since then progress has been limited. Many items listed in the MoU have not been implemented. The volume of defence cooperation needs to be increased. Malaysia cannot ignore India’s rise and must utilize its capabilities. And for this\, the author said\, Malaysian perception about India must change. \nMajor Points of Discussion and Suggestions to the Author: \n\nIt will be useful for the author to discuss the military doctrines of both India and Malaysia upfront to set the context for the study. It will also bring out clearly the points of convergence and divergence between the two\, which will help in policy prescription.\nThe Andaman Sea touches Thailand\, Malaysia\, and Singapore. So\, it is one of the potential areas of deeper cooperation between the navies of these countries and Indian Navy.\nOne of the main irritants for India in the relationship is Malaysia’s policy of equating Pakistan with India. Equating India with China is admissible\, but not Pakistan.\nThe paper would be enriched if its takes into account the US rebalancing in Asia-Pacific. Since the rebalancing envisages major role for India\, it will be worthwhile to dwell upon Malaysia’s stand on it and explore meeting grounds to further the defence cooperation.\nIndia’s Look East Policy and interaction with ASEAN led to better appreciation of each other’s position on security issues. For this reason\, the Look East Policy merits some attention in the paper.\nSignificantly\, it was pointed out that cooperation between the two countries in the Andaman Sea and the Straits of Malacca should not become hostage to the apprehension or fear of the Malaysian authorities\, as the need for cooperation on this issue is greater than any apprehension. \nAuthor should analyze the reasons for non-implementation of many of the items in the MoU.\nChina is an unreliable partner of ASEAN. It first signs a code of conduct and then violates it. Its aggressive postures vis-à-vis Vietnam bears testimony to this fact.\nThe defence cooperation between India and Malaysia is mainly in the maritime arena. However\, it is a fact that the land forces dominate the Malaysian military. It is important therefore\, that the cooperation between the two armies intensify. \nMalaysia’s apprehensions of India arise not because of either the Maldives Ops or the IPKF Ops\, but because of the 1998 nuclear tests and the Theatre Command in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. \nThe China factor should be devoted sufficient attention. The asymmetry that exists between the two countries limits Malaysia’s options vis-à-vis China. It has therefore\, adopted the policy of constructive engagement with China\, notwithstanding the fact that China is not a natural choice for them. Malaysia’s engagement is mostly economic. However\, the China factor also inhibits Malaysia in making faster moves in defence cooperation with India. \n\nReport prepared by Amit Kumar\, Research Assistant\, IDSA URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/malaysia-india-defence-cooperation-a-need-for-paradigm-shift-before-strategic-partnership CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130322T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130322T053000 DTSTAMP:20261027T173437 CREATED:20231224T102815Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130240Z UID:64075-1363930200-1363930200@idsa.in SUMMARY:Land Locked and Transit Developing Countries: Nepal’s Transit Trade Negotiations with India DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Lt Gen Y M Bammi (Retd) \nDiscussants: Dr Nisha Taneja and Dr Ram Upendra Das URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/land-locked-and-transit-developing-countries-nepals-transit-trade-negotiations-with-india CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130315T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130315T053000 DTSTAMP:20261027T173437 CREATED:20231223T133906Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130240Z UID:63134-1363325400-1363325400@idsa.in SUMMARY:Mapping the Role of External Players in Pakistan occupied Kashmir DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Amb Phunchok StobdanExternal Discussants: Capt Alok Bansal\, Dr. D. Subachandran and Dr. Mathew JosephInternal Discussants: Dr. Smruti Pattanaik and Shri Vishal Chandra \nIn her paper titled “Mapping the Role of External Players in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir” Dr Priyanka Singh examined the role of external actors in PoK – China\, the US and the UK – post-2005 earthquake. \nDr. Singh identified the following critical drivers for external interest in the PoK\, i.e.\, the strategic location (PoK connects Central Asia with the Indian subcontinent and shares border with China); resources (hydel and minerals)\, expanding Chinese footprints; growing interests of the western countries (presence though international aid agencies\, NGOs\, etc.); developmental initiatives as opportunities for investment; and the emergence of diaspora interest. China in particular is involved in the construction of several hydropower projects in PoK – the Diamer-Bhasha Dam in Gilgit Baltistan\, the Bunji Dam\, the Neelum Jhelum project and raising the height of the Mangla Dam in the so called AJK. \nThe Chinese involvement in PoK\, as the paper highlighted\, is long standing. China is in possession of Aksai Chin and the Trans Karakoram Tract\, both of which are part of the erstwhile princely state of J&K. China also played a critical role in the construction of the Karakoram Highway that was completed in 1978. China also plans to build a railway to enhance connectivity to PoK. Citing sources\, Dr. Singh said that there was a strong possibility that more than 10\,000 PLA (Peoples’ Liberation Army) soldiers were present in PoK. \nClearly\, PoK is of significant strategic interest for China. Hydropower projects aside\, it is opening banks and constructing road networks across PoK. The region also provides China access to Arabian Sea and a strategic communication link through Gwadar port of Balochistan (also built by China) to oil rich regions of west Asia\, through which China can transport energy. Aware of the fact that the region borders its restive Xinjiang province\, Beijing considers POK important to have a credible security presence so as to insulate its borders from the fundamentalist forces operative in Afghanistan-Pakistan region. It fears the percolation of such forces could fan the secessionist challenge in Xinjiang. In addition\, China is also involved in activities like Widening/realignment of the Karakoram Highway\, building a new 17 km stretch of the Karakoram Highway\, a proposed road link between Jaglot in Gilgit and Skardu in Baltistan\, Mangla dam raising project and investment of $300 million in housing and communications sector. \nFocusing on the US interests in the region\, Dr Singh argued that its increasing interest in the region could be partly to monitor the use of funds granted by it for socio-economic development in the region\, and partly to keep a close watch on the Chinese presence especially in Gilgit-Baltistan. This explains the US decision to provide financial assistance for Diamer-Bhasha dam. She also stated that this was well in line with its earlier policy to provide assistance for the Satpara dam near Skardu. \nDwelling on the interest shown by the UK\, she said that it could be due to the presence of PoK Diaspora community in UK. She also mentioned that Mirpuri was second largest spoken language in UK after English. About the involvement of France\, she made the audience aware that France had extended Rs. 9 billion (68 million Euros) as soft loan for the extension of an existing dam in PoK. This project aims at building a new 48 MW run-of-river hydro-power project in the Jaggran valley of PoK. In addition to this\, a French concern is also involved in a two-year capacity-building programme for government agencies in AJK such as the Hydro Electric Board\, which is responsible for implementing the Jagran II project. France\, like other countries\, contributed substantially to the post 2005 earthquake reconstruction and rehabilitation work in PoK. \nDr. Singh stated that the Russian interest in PoK was relatively new and that Russia had recently offered to take the contract for Diamer-Bhasha dam without bidding for it. She also discussed that role played by countries like Japan; even the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED) has also expressed its keenness to participate in the building of the Diamer-Bhasha dam in PoK. Germany and Saudi Arabia were interested in the developmental sector— pertaining to education\, health\, housing etc. — especially after the 2005-earthquake. Even Indonesia\, Like Japan\, has expressed its willingness to offer expertise and extend “maximum co-operation” in the horticulture sector in Gilgit Baltistan. Considering that Gilgit Baltistan\, even after the demographic tampering by Pakistan\, has a substantial Shia population\, Dr. Singh said that Iran had a natural interest in the region. \nThe author then went on to suggest that that PoK could well turn into a geopolitical battleground given the renewed interest of western countries in the region to countervail China. Dr. Singh concluded by saying that the presence of important external players and their growing interest in PoK may provide tacit recognition to Pakistan’s illegal claim over the territory. Though there was not much that India could do about the growing Chinese footprints in PoK\, the presence of countries like the US and Russia\, it was hoped\, could act as a balancer in the region. \nDuring the course of the discussion\, the following points were raised to strengthen the paper: \n\nThe role of Pakistan needed to be analyzed and likewise the implication for India. \nThe presence of international organizations was inadequately covered.\nThe differences in Chinese approach towards GB and PoK needed to be sharpened. Also the presence of Chinese Army required to be studied in detail — whether such presence is offensive/defensive or to provide security to Chinese workers? Further\, Chinese reaction to the presence of other countries in PoK was also felt wanting.\nSome information on the role of Iran and Saudi Arabia in the PoK was essential. \nFrom a geopolitical perspective\, how the US would balance China in PoK would be a good research question to explore.\n\nReport prepared by Anwesha Ray Chaudhuri\, Research Assistant\, IDSA URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/mapping-the-role-of-external-players-in-pakistan-occupied-kashmir CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130308T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130308T053000 DTSTAMP:20261027T173437 CREATED:20231224T102914Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T012843Z UID:64076-1362720600-1362720600@idsa.in SUMMARY:Federalising India’s Neighbourhood Policy: Balancing the State Interest with the National DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nChairperson: Shri Rajiv SikriDiscussants: Dr Suresh K Goel\, Dr Nitya Nanda and Prof. Rekha Saxena URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/federalising-indias-neighbourhood-policy-balancing-the-state-interest-with-the-national CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130301T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130301T053000 DTSTAMP:20261027T173437 CREATED:20231224T102914Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T012740Z UID:64077-1362115800-1362115800@idsa.in SUMMARY:Emerging Powers and Africa DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nChairperson: Ambassador Rajiv BhatiaDiscussants: Shri Ravi Bangar and Shri Manish Chand URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/emerging-powers-and-africa CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130301T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130301T053000 DTSTAMP:20261027T173437 CREATED:20231223T133950Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130241Z UID:63138-1362115800-1362115800@idsa.in SUMMARY:The State of Sri Lankan Tamil Politics in the Post LTTE Period DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Professor S D MuniDiscussant: Shri M R Narayan Swamy and Dr N Manoharan \nDr. Ashok K Behuria began the presentation by stating that this paper was largely based on the field visit to Sri Lanka. The paper studies the perceptions of a wide range of people to understand the Tamil mindset after the war. The Tamil speaking people constitute 24% of the population\, of which the Sri Lankan Tamils comprise 11% while the Tamil Muslims and the Indian Tamils are 9% and 4% respectively. The paper focussed only on the Sri Lankan Tamil perspective and their expectations from India. There have not been many drastic changes in the Tamil demands since independence. The demands of the Tamil political parties ACTC and later ITAK were the following: a) federal Sri Lanka with one or more Tamil States with autonomous powers\, b) parity of Tamil with Sinhala as official languages\, c) repeal law disenfranchising Indian Tamils\, and d) cessation of dryland colonization schemes. \nPresident Bandaranaike came out with the Sinhala Only Act in 1956. Immediately afterwards he made a pact with the Tamils in 1957\, which is known as the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact. There was resistance from the majority community in a big way; UNP\, a centralist party\, staged a march from Colombo to Kandy. In the following years UNP leader Dudley Senanayake and Chelvanayakam had a pact but it could not be implemented due to massive resistance from the SLFP\, which had earlier signed a similar pact with the same Tamil leader. Such competitive maximalist stance characterised the nature of ethnic politics in Sri Lanka. \nThus\, the pacts granting greater autonomy to the Tamils could not be implemented. From the 1950’s onwards there was increasing colonisation by the Sinhalese migrants in the Tamil areas. Further\, the riots in 1958\, 1961 and 1974 led to further alienation of the Tamil community. Ethnic outbidding was prevalent in the Sri Lankan Tamil parties as well and a similar pattern persists even today. Its nature transformed from a passive politics to a militant form in the 1970s. In 1972\, the Tamil parties came together and formed the Tamil United Front (TUF). In1976 TUF renamed itself as Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF). \nThere was the perception that the Tamils became militants because India was backing them. However\, there is no evidence to prove this existed before the 1970s and 80s. In the 1980s India intervened in a big way resulting in the formulation of the 13th Amendment. Dr. Behuria points that Sri Lanka borrowed many things from the Indian federalism to envisage the devolution in Sri Lanka\, but it was a mistake. Sri Lanka is different from the Indian experience and is not as diverse as India. Both the LTTE and Sri Lankan government wanted the Indian forces out of their state. \nNone of the agreements could be implemented because it did not satisfy the maximalist expectations of the LTTE on one hand and the totalitarian aspirations of the Sinhalese chauvinist constituency on the other. In 2001\, LTTE allowed the political front TNA to come up and it was almost a mouth piece of LTTE. From then on\, the TNA began to dominate the North and also had a considerable presence in the East. There were 18 rounds of dialogue between TNA and the Government in 2011\, but they could not reach a political settlement. The demands of the TNA included; \n1. Resettlement and rehabilitation of the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)\, 2. Removal of High Security Zones (HSZs) and disarming of paramilitary forces operating in the North and East\, 3. The issue of political prisoners and detainees being detained at various places under the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) and Emergency regulations\, before May 2009. \nThey agreed on the 13th Amendment as the starting point for the negotiations. Some sections of the Tamil community believe that this is not enough and at the same time parties like TNFP completely reject it. There is an opinion that it is an Act that will further lead to the domination of provinces by the centre. The talks were put on hold by Rajapaksa government and it stressed on seeking a political settlement through multi-party discussions in the Parliamentary Select Committee (PSC) \nPerception on India\nIndia’s insistence for the 13th Amendment and Rajapaksa’s reservations about it is cited as instances of India’s inability to comprehend the changing realities in Sri Lanka. The Sinhalese and the Tamils have moved away from 13th amendment for different reasons. The former considers it as an ‘imposition from outside’\, while the latter regards it as an ‘indecent compromise of Tamil interests.’ In Jaffna\, the Tamils feel that India had used them for its own interest. They urge that India must ensure that they get their due from the Sri Lankan government. However\, some of them also feel India will sooner than later stop due to Rajapaksa’s China blackmail. There is an open recognition of the dangers of militant politics and denunciation of LTTE’s policies vis-à-vis India. \nWhile concluding\, Dr. Behuria opined that this dialogue is unlikely to lead to a solution. There exists a rightwing in the majority community. It was observed that the Sinhalese government delegates were highly unhappy while talking about the devolution of the police power and the land power. In such context\, India must quietly play its role for finding a way for resolving the problem. \nMajor points of discussion and suggestions to the author:\n\nInitially the demand was for 50-50 representation and after independence it developed as language\, autonomy\, independent state and now devolution. These issues have to be analysed with the particular situation at that point of time. These are\, the end of colonialism\, post-colonial pre-LTTE\, during LTTE and post LTTE. Along with situation another variable is strength that is demographic\, political\, economic\, military\, diplomatic\, strength of opposition against the government and the external support.\nWhat the Sri Lankan state has tried to do is to keep the Tamils apart by different legislations and also by trying to cooperate with external forces like the UK\, Israel\, the US\, India and now China. How did this all affect the Sri Lankan politics\, what were the internal conflicts within the Sinhalese community and how groups like JVP used the Tamil issue as a rallying point need to be looked into.\nThere is the need for encouraging and strengthening moderate politics\, unifying the Tamil polity which is divided and the creation of a broad front which includes moderate Sinhalese voices that stand for more devolution.\nThe Sri Lankan government should have accepted that a lot of damage was done during the war and shown the readiness for reconciliation and rehabilitation. In the present scenario\, the people who never supported LTTE have turned against the state. The belief that the LTTE is coming back\, perfectly supports Rajapaksa to pursue his oppressive policies.\nIndia should have a fresh thinking in term of the 13th Amendment and encourage all moderate voices to come together. For this purpose the Indian civil society and think-tanks can play an important role. \nResearch paper of this nature should focus on issues like the way forward\, the dynamics of the Sinhalese and Muslim parties\, the significance of Divineguma Bill etc. In the present scenario the devolution is going to be an impossible task and in such a context the position that TNA would take needs to be looked at closely. \nIndia should not only focus on the Tamil issue but also look at issues like disappearance of the journalists in Colombo\, the impeachment of the Chief Justice etc. hence a broader approach should be evolved.\nThere is a difference in perceptions of the new elite and the old one. The voice of the new elite is more dominant today. Having a broader approach is a very tall work and the dominant voice is not for any solution. A macro-pattern can be discerned that is maximising the demand by both sides.\nSLMC is not fond of Rajapaksa but at the same time\, they are concerned about power and they want to be seen as an equal force with Sri Lankan Tamils. Thus\, this issue is focused in the North and the East. Also delimitation of constituency is carried out in such a manner the Tamil are becoming minorities in all the areas. \nThe Sri Lanka government is not at all sincere in its implementation of 13th Amendment. \n\nReport prepared by Ms Deepa Varughese URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-state-of-sri-lankan-tamil-politics-in-the-post-ltte-period CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130208T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130208T053000 DTSTAMP:20261027T173437 CREATED:20231224T102915Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T013003Z UID:64078-1360301400-1360301400@idsa.in SUMMARY:Equipping UN Forces: Challenges & Remedies DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nChair: Shri Amit Cowshish \nExternal Discussant: Col P Chandok and Col S Bhatia URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/equipping-un-forces-challenges-remedies CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130201T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130201T053000 DTSTAMP:20261027T173437 CREATED:20231223T133951Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130241Z UID:63139-1359696600-1359696600@idsa.in SUMMARY:Before the Cut: The Global Politics of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Air Marshal Anil Chopra (Retd)\, AVSM\, VM\, VSMDiscussants: Shri Gulshan Luthra and Shri Deba R Mohanty \nAbout Presentation: \nThe paper\, titled “Global Politics of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter”\, analyses the ongoing debate on the issue of whether or not to continue with the programme. The author has studied the various political and economic dimensions of issue at hand\, and highlighted the budgetary constrain and exponentially high cost of the project. The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter programme\, which many find lucrative\, has drawn the interest of countries like Iran and Singapore. The fact is that due to budgetary constrain and rising defence labour costs\, the US defence production was pushed towards international collaboration. This deal is often quoted as “Mother” of all defence deals. However\, the author calls it a “Trillion Dollar Baby” citing the fact that deal has so far exceeded $1.45 trillion. He also tries to investigate as to the influence partners have had in the programme so far. The author’s study is based on data sources on defence acquisitions\, in which he aims to analyse the politics of international arms production and arms transfer propaganda. \nOne of the main arguments of the paper is that even though this is a joint programme and many countries especially UK are amongst its investors\, the US has tried to dominate the programme. Synergies of cooperation are lacking\, evident in the fact that US has not shared the source codes. The author notes that the schedule and cost overruns raise the question mark with reference to its affordability\, lethality and stealth-ability in future endeavour. The author was pessimistic about the programme being a viable alternative due to massive costs involved; partner countries do not have the option of dragging their feet. \nThe key points of the discussion and suggestions to the author: \n\nIt’s too early to discuss about F-35 in present scenario when only 30% of this programme has been accomplished until now. In addition\, so far this aircraft has not demonstrated its ability and technological prowess as well.\nF-35 programme will replace the three US aircraft carrier fleet and will be able to perform in all three areas of Army\, Navy and Air force\, but it will be producing more than 2000 aircraft\, so the cost involved will be offset over the period of time.\nIf this aircraft is able to fulfil its goal in future\, utility of the technology involved will override the considerations of politics and economics.\nThe comparative analysis of sophistication of the programme could have involved other fifth generation aircraft such as Indo-Russia FGFA\, Chinese J-20 and the economic and technology hurdles that these programme confront.\nIf it is a niche product; if it is able to demonstrate its ability\, affordability will not matter as countries like Saudi Arabia\, Taiwan and South Korea could be probable customers.\nThe “Cost” has to be clearly defined as to what it involves such as future up- gradation\, repair and spare parts and other such areas.\nThe perspective on international alliance model could have been clearly defined.\nThe US has invested huge capital in its critical time; hence sharing source code is not justifiable. \n\nReport prepared by Parveen Bharadwaj\, Research Intern\, IDSA. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/before-the-cut-the-global-politics-of-the-f-35-joint-strike-fighter CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130201T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130201T053000 DTSTAMP:20261027T173437 CREATED:20231223T133951Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130241Z UID:63140-1359696600-1359696600@idsa.in SUMMARY:The Evolution of Chinese Military Doctrine DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Lt Gen Satish Nambiar\, PVSM\, AVSM\, VrC (Retd)External Discussants: Maj Gen (Retd) B K Sharma\, Cdr Kamlesh Kumar AgnihotriInternal Discussants: Brig Mandeep Singh\, Dr. Jagannath P Panda \nThis paper discusses the factors responsible for the evolution of the Chinese military doctrine and attempts to chalk out its nuances. Its core premise is that a military doctrine is a component of a nation’s grand strategy for security and\, at times\, it may not be stating actual military conditions but is simply a declaration of its strategic intent. The paper finds that Chinese have learned from their and others’ experience. China’s threat perception and relations with the nations of the world has changed with time influencing their military doctrine. Over the years\, the Chinese have evolved four broad military doctrines: \n\nThe Maoist ‘People’s War Doctrine: It prevailed during the “Lean one side phase” of the Chinese foreign policy. Maturing during the CCP’s revolutionary struggle and the Japanese invasion in the 1930s\, this predominant military doctrine lingered up to the late 1970s and its vestiges remained till the 1980s. This essentially guerrilla doctrine is still alive in academic debates. In 1960s\, Mao and Lin Piao interpreted it as Flexible National Defence applicable to conventional war based on the premise of “trading territory for time”. The doctrine envisaged when the enemy launches the first offensive\, the revolutionary forces\, mindful of the enemy’s technological and material superiority\, would quietly follow a subsequent strategic retreat\, strategic stalemate and strategic counter-offensive. The fight would essentially be in the rural areas from where the revolutionary army would draw its strength out of the masses indoctrinated by the communist party. This infantry-centric doctrine relied on the use of staggering man-power aimed at overcoming technological superiority through inferiority. Air-power had just a supporting role and the navy was almost non-existent.\nThe doctrine addressed the worst case scenario of an all-out attack including a nuclear strike. The US was the enemy for this doctrine\, purely on ideological basis\, for about two decades. There is nothing to suggest that any counter-offensive against the US was also planned. However\, according to the author\, terming it defensive would also be inappropriate. The doctrine hugely underappreciated the role of international diplomacy. It was often debated whether the strategy of “luring the enemy in the deep” was a strategy worth pursuing as the ‘modernisers’ in China argued that the enemy should not be allowed to crash the gates. \n\nPeople’s War under Modern Conditions: The US was the doctrinal imperial enemy from the beginning; later the Soviet Union too was declared an enemy. The doctrine emerged in the light of the receding Cultural Revolution and the party’s resentment against politicisation of the PLA entailed the dilution of army’s political role. Industrial and real estate development along the Manchurian border had made “luring enemy” into depth an imponderable tactic. The pragmatic leadership assumed a greater role and a rapprochement started with the US in 1971 with an imperiled relationship with the USSR. Deng Xiaoping felt that a major military conflict was unlikely and there would be no war over the next five to seven years. This doctrine had a limited focus concerned with the conduct of war. The Core issue addressed was how to deal with a major and large-scale Russian invasion with minimum human cost without vacating the territory. It envisaged that the enemy would be taken head on in the initial phase of the conflict\, denying him an entry into the Chinese territory. Regulars and guerrillas would even cross the border to interdict the enemy by hindering the enemy’s mobility or striking at its rear. The professional military would lead the war. The protracted war was no longer a feature of the Chinese military doctrine and a National mobilisation would be in case of a completely illogical possibility of an all-out invasion by USSR. The compulsive filibustering about enemy nuclear strikes\, essential characteristic of the People’s War\, was absent in this doctrine. China reiterated its commitment to no first-use of nuclear weapons and accorded equal attention to various components of military power.\nLocal and Limited War Doctrine: The doctrine was officially promulgated in 1985. The focus shifted from large scale conventional military conflict to local\, small\, and limited wars. It was prompted by a new understanding of the international situation that the world was moving towards multipolarity in which the US would retain its prominence. The premise for the doctrine was the prevailing nuclear stalemate in the world which would not allow large-scale wars\, but the unequal levels of technology would prompt the Great Powers into adventures to test these technologies in battle conditions. It focused on small-scale wars caused by civil-conflicts\, territorial claims and ethnic tensions in a multi-polar world. It seems that the Chinese view these wars as politically-motivated freak incidents which needed fighting accompanied by talking. Border conflicts\, maritime territorial conflicts\, “surprise air attacks”\, fighting off an enemy’s sudden limited thrust into Chinese border and retaliatory punitive attacks by China were the major war exigencies mentioned in the doctrine. Taiwan emerged as a new security scenario and the proliferation of high tech weapons in the neighbourhood were also visualised as security concerns.\nLimited War under High Tech Conditions: Though the disintegration of the USSR in 1991 ended any possibility of large-scale invasion of China\, the American show of military technology in the Gulf War of 1992\, stunned it. Now limited war became the only focus\, and high technology provided a new and complete framework. The doctrine\, for the first time\, accepted the normative superiority of technology over men. It explicitly included the elements of offence and\, for the first time\, took the war beyond Chinese territory. The war would be local; borders are “strategic frontiers” and “victory” would be achieved “through elite troops”. China would not start any war; however\, if it senses any hostile enemy movement\, it will seize the “initiative”\, by “striking first”. The new doctrine would ensure “victory over inferiority through superiority’. Instead of long-drawn wars\, local wars would be “quick battles to force quick resolution”. Instead of luring enemy into the Chinese depth\, an “in-depth strike” would be carried out in enemy territory. The doctrine visualises a battle field scenario; known as war zone campaign (WZC). Preparations should be undertaken by keeping the diversities of military regions in view.\n\nThe paper also refers to two other doctrines which are disputed to be independent military doctrines: \nInfomatised War (RMA): The discourse on revolution in military affairs (RMA) adds another dimension of “infomatised war” to the “limited war under high tech conditions”. Ideally\, RMA is a holistic concept comprising social\, economic\, political and technological components. The Chinese discourse on infomatised warfare is based on the Chinese belief that information determines international relations and the outcome of wars. Chinese believe that digitized governance is the Achilles’ heel of the militarily advanced countries and this is where China can score in their depth. The Chinese assume that gathering precise and complete information in a literal sense is possible; and once there is correct information\, one can bring the enemy to its knees even without fighting. In fact\, information deterrence can prove more effective than nuclear deterrence. Information relating to cyberspace has the highest prominence in the Chinese discourse on infomatised war as well as RMA. The doctrine is quite offensive and the preferred tactics in this warfare are “surgical removal”\, “selective attacks” and “precision raids” by missiles or other superior electronic weapons or computer science. \nAnti-Access-Area Denial (A2/AD): This is essentially an American term. The perceived Chinese A2/AD has a limited objective of holding back American forces in Taiwan contingency till the PLA troops land in Taiwan and build defences. The battle objectives are mainly to harass American troops to delay their access to the centre of action. However\, as of now\, these capabilities have defensive purpose and are still in nascent stage with questionable quality. \nThe author concludes that over the last two decades\, Chinese military doctrine has changed from being inward looking to looking-beyond-its-borders and more importantly seaward doctrine. Chinese military capabilities have persistently moved towards matching doctrinal expositions. However\, the possession of asymmetric warfare capabilities as visualised under infomatised war doctrine by China and its ability to deploy them in conflict is a subject of speculation. \nMajor points of discussion and suggestions to the author: \n\nThere is hardly any literature available on the Chinese military doctrine. Whatever available is mostly western and we are left to our imaginations to chalk out any Chinese military doctrine. \nChina has never fought war the way it was articulated. \nThe Chinese are still grappling with the idea of a war doctrine. \nNowadays\, Navy is used not for territorial gains but political ones. It has an important role in the “strategic guidelines” of China. \nSome western scholars argue that the Chinese military is overstretched. \nChinese are looking for an exosphere umbrella which has not yet come. \nNational army versus political army is an outdated debate and the civil-military relations in China went up to a new level during the Hu Jintao period. \nChina’s economic rise has substantiated its military doctrinal practice. \nPLA’s international exposure has helped develop its doctrine. \nIndia should draw some lessons from the evolution of the Chinese military doctrine. \nThe overall role of a nuclear doctrine in a military doctrine should be examined in detail. \nEscalation dominance control is very important in the Chinese doctrines. \n\n(report prepared by Saurabh Mishra\, Research Assistant IDSA) URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-evolution-of-chinese-military-doctrine CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130118T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20130118T053000 DTSTAMP:20261027T173437 CREATED:20231223T134007Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130241Z UID:63142-1358487000-1358487000@idsa.in SUMMARY:Equipment and Force Structure Requirements to Meet External Threats 2032 DESCRIPTION:Chair: Air Marshal Anil Chopra (Retd)\, AVSMExternal Discussants: Wg Cdr Vikram Munshi\, Wg Cdr Amit GoelInternal Discussants: Wg Cdr Ajey Lele\, Cdr SS Parmar \nMajor Highlights of the Paper\nThis paper addresses the equipment and force structure required to meet external challenges 2032. The current paper is second in the series of four papers that Gp Capt Kapur intends to do on a project “IAF Deep Multidimensional Change 2032: Imperatives and a Roadmap.” The previous paper was “Challenges for IAF 2032.” The next two papers in the series are “Organisational Structure Optimisation\,” and “Organisation and Technology Issues Related to the 2032 IAF.” The critical role of Air Power post World War-II has been well established. Indian Air Force is no exception and hence its battle readiness is of utmost interest to our military planners. The paper therefore discusses a very important element of combat readiness\, i.e. equipment support and force structure. While equipment support and force structure is only one out of many aspects of combat readiness it is perhaps the most important one. \nThe paper makes a comparative study of the Indian Air Force (IAF)\, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) and the Chinese Air Force (PLAAF). Since PAF and PLAAF have posed serious security challenges before the country in the past and are likely to pose the same in the future\, the study makes a comparative assessment of their strength and weaknesses in order to put the IAF’s requirements in perspective. The author’s projection takes into account the likely scenario of a two-front war\, involving both China and Pakistan. The paper forcefully argues that numbers (Squadrons and aircrafts) even in this hi-tech age matter for engaging the enemy. This projection of requirements is also based on the estimated sortie generation capability of the three forces. Significantly\, the paper shows that the Indian Air Force has an edge over the Chinese Air Force in this regard. \nSince the North Eastern border is the most likely theater of war with China\, the paper gives a detailed assessment of the requirements of the IAF to ensure its combat readiness. After taking into account geography\, infrastructure & reach factor\, the combat efficiency comparison of IAF: PLAAF comes to 1.4:1.0. Another important finding of the paper is that the IAF needs 724 (40 Sqn)/ 929(52Sqn) fighter aircrafts in North East and North to counter Chinese threat for a clear victory. \nGiven India’s rising power status\, engaging in Out of Area Contingency Operation (OOAC) is likely and India may be asked to play an increasingly important role in such Ops. The paper therefore looks into this aspect and suggests the need for Special Forces and heavy lift capability. It projects the need for deployment of one Division size force of the army requiring IAF’s provision of airlift through 1 Sqn C-17+1 Sqn C-130J/ MTA for OOAC. Further\, the need for an expeditionary air base capability has been highlighted. \nThe paper ends with a set of specific recommendations. Some of the important recommendations in the paper are: \n\nInfrastructure build-up including roads/ rail/ and Modernisation of Air Field Infrastructure (MAFI) should be accorded highest priority. \nInduction of BMD should be done in phases.\nUpgradation of electronic warfare and information warfare capabilities must be continued as planned with greater vigour.\nSeparate OOAC force under Joint Expeditionary Command should be set up. \nIAF should actively push forward technological development in-house and in collaboration with universities/ labs and similar competent institutions.\nMoD should explore the possibility of developing expeditionary airbase forces. \nIAF must expedite its build up towards the sanctioned 45 squadrons and then look at further force development to be able to meet these external challenges well.\n\nMajor Points of Discussion and Suggestions to the Author:\n\nThe number of fighter planes and Squadron strength recommended in the paper is slightly on the heavier side and it can be rationalized by incorporating inputs from serving and retired military professionals.\nIn nuclear age full fledged war is at best a remote possibility. Similarly\, the advent of long-range missiles has reduced the heavy dependence on aircrafts. These factors should also be kept in mind before arriving on any numbers.\nThe study would benefit by undertaking scenario building exercise about the kind of threats that India will face in the next two decades time. Projection of requirements should be based on the nature of threats. \nThe study could benefit by incorporating a tabular chart of the inventory of the three air forces (IAF\, PAAF\, and PLAAF). It will give the reader a comparative perspective.\nChina’s military modernization plan is time-bound and it sticks to its deadlines\, whereas the Indian modernization plan is not shaping as desired. \nThe increased strength of the IAF both in terms of Squadron strength and availability of aircrafts has to be supported by a commensurate level of infrastructure in order to make them operationally viable.\nTactical and technological aspect is more important than the numerical superiority as far as war fighting goes. In this regard\, the paper would benefit by focusing on cyber capability and information warfare capability of the IAF.\nThe restructuring of MoD is long overdue. One Joint Secretary looks after Army and Air Force. This situation must change for the better.\nIAF needs to focus on the service aspect of aircrafts\, which leaves much to be desired. Better serviceability of aircrafts in effect means more number of aircrafts available for operational jobs. \n\nReport prepared by Amit Kumar RA IDSA URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/equipment-and-force-structure-requirements-to-meet-external-threats-2032 CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20121221T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20121221T053000 DTSTAMP:20261027T173437 CREATED:20231224T102930Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130241Z UID:64079-1356067800-1356067800@idsa.in SUMMARY:Impact of Local State Politics on Indo- Bangladesh Relations DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Ambassador I P KhoslaDiscussants: Shri K Srinivasan\, Shri Anil Kamboj and Dr Joyeeta Bhattacharjee URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/impact-of-local-state-politics-on-indo-bangladesh-relations CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20121214T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20121214T053000 DTSTAMP:20261027T173437 CREATED:20231224T103014Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T013117Z UID:64081-1355463000-1355463000@idsa.in SUMMARY:Equilibrium in Higher Defence Organisation: Lessons for the Future DESCRIPTION:1030 to 1300 hrs \nChairperson: Dr. Manoj K JoshiDiscussant: Shri Amit Cowshish and Maj General B K Sharma (Retd) URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/equilibrium-in-higher-defence-organisation-lessons-for-the-future CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20121214T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20121214T053000 DTSTAMP:20261027T173437 CREATED:20231224T102930Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T013252Z UID:64080-1355463000-1355463000@idsa.in SUMMARY:Defense Offsets: Promises and Problems DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nChairperson: Shri Vinod MisraDiscussant: Shri Deba R Mohanty URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/defense-offsets-promises-and-problems CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20121207T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20121207T053000 DTSTAMP:20261027T173437 CREATED:20231223T134008Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130241Z UID:63145-1354858200-1354858200@idsa.in SUMMARY:Effectiveness of Quality Assurance (QA) in Army Procurements DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Brig Rumel Dahiya (Retd)External Discussants: Lt Col Sanjay Pande\, Lt Col VS Raghuvanshi and Col OP SinghInternal Discussant: Col Venu Gopal \nMajor Highlights of the Paper: \nThis is second paper of a research project entitled “Synergising QA for Speedy Defence Procurement and Ensuring Quality.” The first paper studied various aspects of quality assurance (QA) in army procurements\, from a point of view of efficiency. The current paper critically analyses the effectiveness of the QA in Army procurements and looks at the ways in which the failure data collected from the defects reported on newly acquired equipment during their warranty period can be used to strengthen the Quality of QA. \nThe difficult and inhospitable terrains (from Thar to Siachen\, the variation in temperature is more than 100 degrees) in which the Indian Army has to operate warrants that the soldier and equipment both have to be rugged enough to bear this variation in terrain and climate. One such instance of terrain difficulty was the high failure rates of INSAS (Indian Small Arms System) at Kargil\, where the rifle encountered some reliability problems in the very cold climate. The paper therefore stresses the imperative that the equipment in the hands of soldiers must be of superb quality and ought to have a high in-built reliability\, in addition to being rugged. The QA of the equipment must therefore be focused to ensure these aspects. \nDelving on the effectiveness or lack thereof of QA\, the paper says that an effective QA of equipment will ensure that the equipments perform their intended function under given operating conditions\, repeatedly\, with the optimum maintenance when operated in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions. Effective QA in turn ensures that there are no or negligible complaints against the product that has been quality-assured. An ineffective QA on the other hand is evident from the numerous complaints of product failure\, especially during its warranty period and for reasons attributable to the design\, material and production process\, once the product is put into service. \nThe basic argument in the paper is that the well established system of defect reporting\, which happens to be the most important feedback from the user\, is not being fully exploited to trace back the causes that lead to occurrence of defects in field. A detailed analysis of the contemporary defect reporting practice and what ails it has been carried out. Some of the major findings of the study are: \n\nThough the time lines for defect reporting and investigation are clearly laid down\, they are seldom followed. Investigation and closure of many defects takes more than six months and in quite a few cases more than a year. Keeping defective equipment for such long duration without preservation causes further deterioration and also deprives the user of the services of that equipment. \nThe user feels maximum pinch if only one number of that type of equipment is authorised to them on which the defect report is initiated. For instance\, if only one generating set is authorised to a minor unit deployed in an operational area\, and that remains unavailable to them for want of a defect investigation for a year\, the unit is condemned to live without electricity for that duration\, unless it borrows one from some other unit.\nMany times the officers commanding workshops are under tremendous pressure to improve equipment availability\, which discourages them from reporting certain defects\, and instead carry out repairs of the defective equipment and put them back into service. Thus many defects go unreported\, leading to a distortion in the feedback data on QA through defect reporting.\nIn case of equipment not being under warranty period\, there is a tendency to avoid defect reporting.\nMultiplicity of agencies involved in the QA process makes coordination difficult\, leading to poor QA at times. \nQA of products offered by Ordnance Factories and Defence Public Sector Undertakings need a complete revamp. \n\nTo improve effectiveness of QA in Army procurements\, the paper makes following important recommendations: \n\nDGQA must constantly strive to improve the quality or effectiveness of the QA it does on the equipment procured\, by making corrections in their QA tools on the basis of dual input i.e. feedback from the field Army in the form of Defect Reports (DRs)\, as well as from expert judgement.\nThe Officers and staff of DGQA undergoing various courses at Defence Institute of Quality assurance (DIQA) can be given projects on individual cases as part of their course curriculum. \nIt is imperative to maintain a database of DRs at AsHSP or technical directorates in a suitable form and regularly update them. \nIt is necessary that the users (field Army) report the defects meticulously. \n\nThe paper concludes by saying that in order to ensure that for the Indian Army to perform its operational tasks efficiently and effectively\, it is necessary that only high quality and reliable equipment and weapon system are provisioned. QA organisation responsible for ensuring quality and reliability of these equipment and weapon systems therefore needs to be empowered by the Department of Defence Production. The organisation too\, needs to empower itself internally by continuously improving its ability and upgrading its skills. Creation of a Quality Assurance Information System (QAIS) based on the suggested model\, wherein feedback from users is analysed to identify the root cause of the problems and their application to relevant activity of QA\, coupled with expert judgement in the form of internal and external audit of the quality of QA\, would prevent stagnation of these activities and result in a dynamically improving and evolving effectiveness of the organisation\, which is highly desirable at the moment. \nMajor Points of discussion and Suggestions to the Author:\n\nThere is involvement of multiple agencies in the QA process from DRDO to DGQA. Synergisation of efforts therefore becomes necessary in order to achieve desired results.\nQuality starts from raw material stage\, whereas the quality check commences at a much advanced stage of weapon development. This gap sometimes leads to poor quality weapons getting quality clearance.\nThe failure or defect reporting system has its own problems\, which results in less number of defect reports. Online filling of DRs should be permitted to expedite the reporting process. Moreover\, instead of waiting for the equipment to break down\, advance defects report can be sent based on the performance monitoring of the weapon. It should be ensured that DRs are not confined to manufacturing defect alone; rather it should also incorporate defects arising out of poor maintenance. \nSampling procedure of DGQA and QA of items developed by DRDO can be looked into to suggest measures to plug the gaps in the system.\nThe real test of the equipment is not in its survivability during the warranty period\, but through the life-cycle of the weapon\, as there is less likelihood of the weapon developing problem in its early years.\nIt is not possible to check at design stage weapons that are produces abroad\, because DGQA cannot afford to place its staff for the entire duration of designing\, which is usually very long. \nA comparative study of QA process in some advanced countries should be undertaken to learn the best practices in QA.\nThere are 16 functions of DGQA in its Charter of duties. But there is a question mark whether the DGQA is adequately staffed to perform these duties. \n\nReport prepared by Amit Kumar\, RA\, IDSA URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/effectiveness-of-quality-assurance-qa-in-army-procurements CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20121102T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20121102T053000 DTSTAMP:20261027T173437 CREATED:20231224T103015Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T013348Z UID:64082-1351834200-1351834200@idsa.in SUMMARY:Coping with China in the Asia-Pacific: India’s Calibrated Approach DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nChairperson: Amb. R RajagopalanDiscussant: Dr Pramit Pal Chaudhuri URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/coping-with-china-in-the-asia-pacific-indias-calibrated-approach CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20121019T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20121019T053000 DTSTAMP:20261027T173437 CREATED:20231224T103015Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T013452Z UID:64083-1350624600-1350624600@idsa.in SUMMARY:Politics and Perceptions of Indian Aid to Nepal DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nChairperson: Maj Gen Ashok K Mehta (Retd)Disscussants: Professor Sangeeta Thapliyal\, Mr Bishnu Prasad Lamsal and Dr Rajiv Ranjan Chaturvedy URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/politics-and-perceptions-of-indian-aid-to-nepal CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20121005T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20121005T053000 DTSTAMP:20261027T173437 CREATED:20231223T134152Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T013652Z UID:63155-1349415000-1349415000@idsa.in SUMMARY:The Afghan War Warrants A Paradigmatic Shift for State-Building DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell \nChair: Dr. Ashok K. BehuriaDiscussants: Prof. Riyaz Punjabi and Dr. D Subachandran\, \nMajor Highlights of the Paper: The Afghan state whose security and legitimacy is warred for and which is sought rebuilt has meagre institutional remnants indicating a direction and the case is thus more or less a tabula rasa. The counterinsurgency campaign is effectively a state- (re)building endeavour as well as a military undertaking. Ms. Muska Dastageer’s paper poses two crucial questions; first\, ‘which overarching state construct is NATO\, United States Forces Afghanistan (USFOR-A) and Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) contributing to the building of?’ and second\, ‘will the institutional remnants of corroded\, yet still\, extant systems of societal organisation coalesce favourably with this nascent state?’ She wants to examine whether ‘bringing security back in’ in the area of state-building-in the foundational Hobbesian sense-within conflict-beleaguered environments could mark an optimised understanding of what it takes to engineer a state that is home grown i.e. non-Westphalian. \nMs. Dastageer identified two variables that fundamentally alter the state making equation. The first variable looks at state-as making of war and the second variable\, the colonial tautology and Pakistan. Thus\, she made an attempt to situate state-building in Afghanistan in both its temporal-spatial contingency and a regional realm. \nThe presenter argued that organisations such as NATO and USFOR-A\, their raison d’etre and conduct-underlying vision\, are shaped by the theoretical discourse of the rationalist actor based\, realist paradigm. The initial failures in Afghanistan –traversing the strategic-operation-tactical divides-can arguably be attributed to a slowness\, an inertia\, on the part of NATO to adjust to a different world. \nShe sought to demonstrate the validity of the micro-macro nexus of an intrastate war with interstate tensions attributable to colonial legacies. She argued\, state building as espoused by the Security Primacy Doctrine- an approach interlinking state-building with security setting and the security-setting corpus traversing institutional strategic-operational-tactical divides-warrants the avoidance of rigid template-following and calls for it to be commensurable with the temporal spatial contingencies. It calls for a continuously iterative modus operandi with the onus being on ANSF\, the concrete security-setters in question\, to assure the conferral of legitimacy to the Afghan Government. \nThe presenter argues that the study is not merely pertinent for the Afghan case\, but furthers the argument that Afghanistan figures as a laboratory for future conflicts arising along the intrastate chasms that is the legacy for post-colonial states of a past of Western hegemony. \nMajor point of discussion and suggestions to the author: \n\nWhile the paper was appreciated by the discussants\, they suggested that the paper needed to bring out more Afghan approach to the problem. The paper should also include the non-official perceptions in Afghanistan. In other words paper needs to address the local perception.\nIt was also suggested that incorporation of an explanation of idea of Afghanistan in the paper would help the reader to understand whether Afghanistan has been studied as a nation or a state.\n\nReport prepared by Gulbin Sultana\, IDSA URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-afghan-war-warrants-a-paradigmatic-shift-for-state-building CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120921T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120921T053000 DTSTAMP:20261027T173437 CREATED:20231223T134152Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130241Z UID:63156-1348205400-1348205400@idsa.in SUMMARY:One Hundred Years of Kautilya’s Arthasastra DESCRIPTION:Chair: Dr S KalyanaramanExternal Discussants: Ambassador K P Fabian\, Professor Navnita Chadha Behera and Col VMB KrishnanInternal Discussants: Mr. Saurabh Mishra and Ms. Nupur Brahma \n \nThe central argument of this paper is that Kautilya\, the ancient strategic thinker of India\, has been neglected and not been given his due in the Indian strategic thinking. It seeks to revive the study of Kautilya’s Arthasastra and establish it in the contemporary security studies. The paper examines the discourse that has evolved through the last 100 years\, since the Arthasastra was first discovered and translated. The paper attempts to find out the answers of the questions raised on the strategic culture in India as some academicians even go to the extent of declaring an absence of strategic culture in India. The paper tries to document and deal with almost all the scholarly controversies related to the Arthasastra during this period and relates a whole tradition of political and strategic thinkers (makers of the kingly science) like Manu\, Brihaspati\, Sukra\, Parasara\, Vysas and Chanakya as recognised in the Panchtantra. \nThe difficulty in studying Kautilya and his times are due to the cartographic gaps\, poor state and progression of maps and the controversies about the age and identity of the author. The contemplations about the age of the work vary between 4th century BCE and 3rd Century ACE. There are different views about the authorship of the Arathasastra as well: One holds that Kautilya was a single person who wrote it by himself and the other claims it to be a compiled “work by authors under the rubric of Kautilya.” A few scholars find the traces of all strategies and diplomacy within the Arthasastra while others allege that its importance is magnified and overstated. \nIt is interesting to note that Kautilya’s four upayas (devices)—sama\, dana\, bheda\, danda—to achieve the goals of diplomacy have a remarkable similarity with Morganthau’s sections in his realist theory about divide and rule\, compensation\, armaments\, and alliances. The paper discusses Kautilya’s theories of the seven elements of state (prakritis)\, six measures of foreign policy (sadgunya)\, the circle of states (rajamandala)\, the kinds of conquest (vijaya) and war (yudha). \nCountries of Southeast Asia have also been influenced by the Kautilyan concepts of mandala\, cakra and chakravartin. In 1929\, Herbert H. Gowen traced how in course of time niti or the old Indian rulers as embodied in treatises\, became a system coveted and adopted by foreign potentates. The spread of the Indian ideas took a long route through nitisastra\, panchtantra\, Hitopdeca\, Qalila and Dimnah and Beast Fables to pass into Persia\, Arabia\, North Africa\, Spain and Provence. \nThe paper elucidates nine reasons for the neglect of the study of Kautilya: \n\nA-historic nature of the Indian civilisation and oral tradition\,\nLack of proper battle accounts available from Indian sources and over-reliance on Greek and Graeco-Roman sources\,\nAbsence of holistic teaching and education and domination of a western discourse\,\nKautilya’s suspended status between schools of nationalists and Marxists\,\nLack of policy focus and absence of serious study in think tanks\,\nLack of language skills and preservation of texts\,\nKautilya not being a soldier like Sun Tzu\, Clausewitz\, Jomini or Liddell Hart\,\nInterpretation by antisocial elements and narrow mindedness\,\nMisunderstanding brahmin scholars\, over exaggeration of brahmanism and perception of male chauvinism.\n\nMisconceptions exist about Kautilya and his statecraft. Kautilya is looked upon as Machiavellian which distorts the correct picture. The difference between Machiavelli and Kautilya is regarding the subject matter of their works and methodology. The former was narrower limiting himself to the unification of Italy\, leaving the questions of economy aside\, while the latter had a holistic view of the vijigishu: consolidating the empire in almost the entire Indian subcontinent. \nCondemnation of Kautilya as an unethical teacher is due to the ignorance about his work. The image of Chanakya as a cunning brahmin is stereotypical in nature. Some scholars consider Kautilya’s work as immoral and repudiated by the Indians themselves while Lankavatarasutra refers to Kautilya as rsi and Somadeva refers him as nyayavid. The reasons for such diverse image might be in the imaginations of some playwrights influenced by their contemporary contexts. The paper finds Kautilya too serious a business to be left to linguists or historians alone. Most of the work on Kautilya lies in the category where the scholar does not read the text but keenly quotes from what some commentator had said superficially. \nMisquoting Kautilya does more harm than good. One main reason for him being misunderstood is the use of Kautilyan terms as a simplistic jargon. The paper gives instances of misunderstanding and misrepresentation of Kautilya. Blanket use of the mandala makes it the most misunderstood term as people contemplate and extrapolate it to any extent they want. It is also said that the matsya nyaya and the mandala theory of Kautilya’s Arthasastra are the two evils. \nResearching Kautilya is a level playing field for all as it is not limited to historians only. There are no classified documents or files to be consulted and unearthed. This knowledge lies scattered across the domains of archaeology\, philosophy\, linguistics\, history\, political science and religious texts. Public perception about Kautilya is based mainly on folklore\, mythology and limited on readings and research. \nThis paper suggests that the Kautilya moment has now arrived. The care and preservation of ancient archives is essential. The science\, politics and statecraft of the Arthasastra need to be preserved and practiced in ways in which Indian classical music has survived and thrived. There is a need for state patronage\, sponsorship and financial backing for the study of Arthasastra. Research and training for this purpose must be undertaken and encouraged at all the levels. \nMajor points of discussion and suggestions to the author:\n\nUnder the influence of Gandhian values and Nehru’s\, thought there was no space for Kautilya to make his mark.\nKautilya is also considered a part of the Indian philosophical system. As the Indian ways of knowing the reality has a non-dualistic mode of thinking\, Kautilya goes beyond matsya nyaya. He elucidates how to deal with realpolitik while actually looking at the norms and tries to give ways where anarchy can be overcome. \nIt is difficult to understand Kautilya because military history and historical sociology are not taught in the Indian universities at all. A problem of language exists in the study of Arthasastra as the strategists are disconnected from Sanskrit. We also need to maintain a critical space with regards to the Anglo-American influence while keeping in mind that we generally impose ipso facto the modern jargon and terminology on ancient contexts. \nKautilya’s work should not be taken as the Bible. Reading of original translation is must to avoid distortions and we should read Chanakya not only because we aspire to become a great power but also because the world would be a more peaceful place by understanding him.\nAs we generally restrict ourselves to the Indian heartland while digging into the history of Indian strategic culture\, the outlook (caricature) of Kautilya also inhibits his acceptability.\nWe need to know more about how the Arthasastra was followed in Kautilya’s time. Arthasastra requires a rereading in the context of modern state and democracy.\n\nReport prepared by Saurabh Mishra\, Research Assistant IDSA. URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/one-hundred-years-of-kautilyas-arthasastra CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120907T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120907T053000 DTSTAMP:20261027T173437 CREATED:20231223T134206Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130241Z UID:63157-1346995800-1346995800@idsa.in SUMMARY:Reframing Institutions: A Study of the Relevance of Southern African Customs Union DESCRIPTION:Chair: Amb. HHS ViswanathanExternal Discussants: Dr SK MohantyInternal Discussants: Ms Ruchita Beri\, Ms. Shebonti Ray Dadwal \nMajor Highlights of the Paper: This paper broadly addresses the significance of the African continent in India’s foreign policy with special reference to the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) in India’s engagement in southern and sub Saharan Africa. A study of SACU’s relevance becomes significant in light of the increasing regional and sub-regional integration in Africa. \nThe study traces the development pattern of southern Africa and the underlying components of economic power. It then reviews the SACU Agreement of 2002 and how it deviates from the 1969 agreement. The author also focuses on the nature of inequality among the SACU member states – South Africa\, Botswana\, Lesotho\, Namibia and Swaziland – and its bearing on inter-state relations. The possible roles that SACU can play in the future and how\, if at all\, it could contribute to redefinition of the geopolitical environment of the region are also explored. On policy considerations\, this paper addresses the implications of SACU for Indian foreign policy specifically towards Southern Africa. \nSACU’s role is seen as crucial in addressing the inequality in inter-state relations\, given that South Africa also dominated in its hinterland for decades. Among SACU member states\, inequality between South Africa and the BLNS states exists not only on economic terms but also in their respective views towards international politics. At the regional level\, SACU can represent the interests of its members in other oragnisations such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC). In a region peppered with landlocked countries\, an integrated approach becomes essential; SACU can help members coordinate policies and reconcile sovereign differences. SACU will prove to be a decisive player in formulating the equation of regional power in the years to come\, according to the author. \nSince SACU as an organization is more homogeneous and more open to diplomatic efforts\, its relevance for India becomes imminent. One role it could play is in hedging three primary types of risks associated with engaging in a region such as southern Africa – political\, legal and financial. SACU could also assist in greater Indian engagement in the form of institutional capacity-building at the national\, regional and pan African level. In general\, SACU can help solidify India’s role in South-South cooperation and portray it as an ‘inclusive power’. It could also help facilitate stronger ties with Angola\, Mozambique or Tanzania which could further India’s engagement with the SADC. In addition\, building stronger bilateral ties with Namibia and Botswana can give India strategic access to the Atlantic Ocean and Central Africa. India could also assist Namibia and Botswana in setting up institutions in public governance\, professional banking and other tertiary sector businesses\, in order that it counters exploitative tendencies in the region and enhance its image in the development sector. \nMajor Points of discussion and Suggestions to the Author:\n\nThe mechanism through which resources have been shared in SACU’s common reserve pool could be explored further\, since this could be relevant for other regions in the world such as South Asia where the idea of common reserve pool could be implemented.\nFurther study of SACU’s importance and implications for India could be useful for policy making bodies\, for example how India can gain from integrating with SACU (India currently cooperates with at least eight other regional economic communities in Africa)\, and vice versa. In addition\, SACU cannot be studied in isolation from Africa’s numerous other regional economic communities. Given South Africa’s dominant role in this organisation and the region\, the question of whether SACU has succeeded in addressing inequities among member states needs to be explored further. \nA review of China’s role in Africa relating to this study could be undertaken given the level of China’s engagement on the African continent. \nA comparative study could be undertaken to study the relevance for India of signing a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with SACU versus the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)\, which includes all SACU member states. Also\, if SACU has succeeded as an institution\, the study could explore what lessons India could draw from this (particularly relating to the SAARC). \nWhile the study suggests that South Africa could act as a gateway to sub-Saharan Africa\, given that there is an amount of resentment regarding South Africa’s dominant role in the region\, it would be worth exploring if this is indeed useful. \n\nReport prepared by Princy Marin George\, Research Assistant\, Africa\, Latin America\, Caribbean and UN Centre URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/reframing-institutions-a-study-of-the-relevance-of-southern-african-customs-union CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120830T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120830T053000 DTSTAMP:20261027T173437 CREATED:20231224T103114Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T013804Z UID:64084-1346304600-1346304600@idsa.in SUMMARY:Management of India Pakistan Border DESCRIPTION:Open to all Members; others pl. contact 1030 to 1300 hrs Conference Cell URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/management-of-india-pakistan-border CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120727T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120727T053000 DTSTAMP:20261027T173437 CREATED:20231224T103115Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130241Z UID:64085-1343367000-1343367000@idsa.in SUMMARY:Challenges Expected for IAF till 2030 DESCRIPTION: URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/challenges-expected-for-iaf-till-2030 CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120727T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20120727T053000 DTSTAMP:20261027T173437 CREATED:20231223T134306Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130241Z UID:63162-1343367000-1343367000@idsa.in SUMMARY:Counter-Insurgency Best Practices and their Applicability in the Northeast DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: General Satish Nambiar \nDiscussants: Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain\, Military Secretary\, Integrated Headquarters (Army)\, Ministry of Defence\nProf. Rajesh Rajagopalan\, School of International Studies\, Jawaharlal Nehru University. \nDr. Namrata Goswami’s paper defines insurgencies as violent struggle against the state for legitimacy and influence over relevant populations. In order to win against any insurgency\, the first core insight for any counter-insurgency force is to gain the support of the population. Coupled with population support is the criticality of efficient intelligence though these are not the ultimate required measures. Dr. Goswami’s paper discusses counter-insurgency best practices and the means to operationalize these practices on the ground by identifying nine best practices. \nThe paper selects the best practices based on a literature survey on counter-insurgency theory\, doctrines and manuals of the Indian\, British and US military and also on the field experiences of the author in Northeast India to have a more focused study. The author affirms that insurgency is unique after having conducted work on the ground in the conflict affected states in Northeast India. But\, there are certain common features of counter-insurgency that are valid across time and space as indicated by the literatures on counter-insurgency which is used as the frame of reference by the author in the paper. Based on the works on counter-insurgency which have been utilized in this paper\, the author has identified nine best practices spanning across time and space for detailed study in this paper: Primacy of Political Goals; Centre of Gravity; Population; Counter-Propaganda; Resolute Leadership; Intelligence; Unity of Effort; Appropriate Force Structures; Rule of Law; and Operational Clarity. The paper offers to test the applicability of these counter-insurgency best practices to the Northeast of India. For the purpose of the paper\, counter-insurgency is defined as “those military\, paramilitary\, political\, economic\, psychological\, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency”. \n\nPrimacy of political goals: It involves planning\, preparation and execution of counter-insurgency within political framework. The role of the military in flushing out insurgents from certain areas is considered to be a supportive role. For instance\, British\, U.S. and Indian military forces have signified the importance of military. However\, citing the cases of Mizoram and Assam\, Dr. Goswami emphasises on the importance of political goals. In the paper\, she has pointed out how the Mizo National Front (MNF) became a platform to express against the heavy response of the Indian military. It was during the strong political leadership of Pu Laldenga of MNF that the Mizo conflict was resolved in 1987 through staunch negotiations.\nCentre of gravity-population: Insurgent groups aim to persuade the population by utilizing the strategy of coercion and intimidation to generate support for their political cause. While countering these insurgency groups\, the operation of the armed forces should be carried out in a civilian landscape\, not in military camps\, and the counter-insurgency forces need to know that such operations are people-centric operation. For this\, there are certain practical ways of gaining support of the population\, namely\, having day to day contacts with the population\, organising collective work\, identify local cells of the insurgent\, prevent too much movement\, and finally provide security to the population. Besides this\, there is also a need to gather information on three different types of population in any insurgency-affected areas\, namely\, minority support base for the insurgent; a passive neutral majority; and a minority which is against the insurgency. According to this paper\, insurgency groups such as United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA)\, the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM)\, and MNF have all garnered support from the people. But\, over the period of time\, support for these groups has dwindled down. Insurgency will continue unless security is guaranteed to the population in this region. \nCounter-propaganda: the insurgency groups intend to impose control over the population. These groups aim to win over the people by propagating their political cause\, often by promising them better political empowerment\, better economic status\, better security etc. Such propaganda appears an easy task to the insurgency groups as they do not have to deliver any of those promised goals in the near term. However\, countering such propaganda remains an arduous task for the counter-insurgency forces. For this\, the strategy for counter-propaganda should be focused on exposing the weakness and false promises made by the insurgents. This strategy can only be materialized by ‘by obtaining the neutrality of the population\, visible presence of counter-insurgent forces to provide security\, establishing the authority of the state by providing basic needs\, propaganda directed at insurgent rank and file\, followed by an effective surrender policy’.\nResolute leadership: In order to carry out a successful operation\, the involved leader must possess a clear conceptual understanding of the mission. For this\, he or she should have a thoughtful understanding of the nature of the problem. The leadership should exhibit ‘resoluteness\, act in an ethical manner and always keep the national priorities and goals in clear perspective’. His or her leadership qualities should also be shown at all levels\, and the leader should able to synchronise with various agencies with the aim of protecting the population and instilling in them a sense of security.\nIntelligence: This is one of the most important counter-insurgency measures. The absence of thorough and specific intelligence would only make the counter-insurgency operations ineffective. For this\, the commander needs to form a sound intelligence network with the involvement of intelligent staffs possessing a ‘clear understanding of the operational environment\, physical geography\, the external influence\, role of media and internet’. Means through which intelligence can be gathered are: lines of communication\, belief systems\, values\, identity\, culture\, social norms\, grievances\, insurgent strength and vulnerabilities\, safe havens\, insurgent intelligence network\, etc. Intelligence should be used to understand the root causes of the insurgency.\nUnity of effort: There needs to be an integrated approach in counter-insurgency. This involves ‘showcasing of administrative capacities\, economic resources\, propaganda\, military superiority and the like’. Operations in such cases should be guided by a single strategic narrative that is visible across all lines of operation. This practice involves the coordination of political\, social\, economic and the military aspects of the counter-insurgency. The author specifies the roles of politicians\, bureaucrats\, army\, police\, local leaders\, NGOs and media. A successful unity of effort can be achieved if there is a single command and coordination centre. Furthermore\, civil-military relations are also important in this context. \nAppropriate ‘military’ force structures: It is important that the force is used to its minimum. This is because operations should aim to neutralise insurgents and not eliminate them. Also\, minimum force should be used in order to reduce the fear that civilian population experiences due to the heavy presence of armed forces. The force structure should be able to respond to given context even though it is a small operation team.\nRule of law: The counter-insurgent forces need to act according to certain accepted rule of law. Any operation in a given region should be within the framework of a legal mandate and conduct must meet the highest legal standards. With such rules\, the involved forces can avoid any disproportionate use of force. This will not breed alienation amongst the civilians. Forces have to be briefed about the rules of engagement with regard to arrests\, searches\, warrants\, interrogation techniques\, intelligence gathering by issuing a Standard Operating Procedure. Acts such as Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act of 1958 amended in 1972 are perceived by the common people as neutralising their fundamental rights granted by the Indian Constitution. It is difficult to control population under distress and the state must offer its people ‘a good deal working within the rule of law’ in order to isolate the insurgents. \nOperational clarity: It is important to have clarity of purpose in any counter-insurgency operation. There has to be a unified command structure with only a single direction. The political aims should also be crystal clear. Further\, the armed forces should clearly map the conflict zones. Involved forces must be clear about their allocated tasks\, and short and long term targets. For all these\, the most significant clarity is that the forces should be very clear that these operations must be people friendly ones. Challenges with reference to clarity of operations arise due to prevalence of multiple levels of decision makers in the insurgency-affected states like in the North East.\n\nThe author reemphasises in the conclusion that the aim of the insurgents is not to kill but spread parallel government to establish their own legitimacy. Hence\, the aim of the counter-insurgency forces should be to root out these parallel structures of government. \nMajor Points of Discussion and Suggestions to the Author:\n\nThere are dissimilarities among insurgencies but many general practices can be applied anywhere. There has to be no uniform approach to stages of insurgency rather different approaches to conflict.\nThe success story of Sri Lanka where controlled empowerment of the security forces was utilized has to be referred.\nProper identification of current stakeholders in engagement of counter-insurgency has to be taken into consideration.\nThere has been a role of media and civil society but a larger involvement is required to have major impact on civilian population.\nThe aspect of winning hearts and minds with more emphasis on the physical\, psychological\, social and economical factors has to be utilised for defeating insurgency. Attitude within the military has to change and it has to be reiterated that they are not just for kills. Home and heart battalion has to be engaged.\nCentre of Gravity as one of the best practices consist of both strengths and weaknesses be it physical\, psychological\, philosophical and ideological.\nIt is difficult to define the best practice of resolute leadership where military leadership has been tenure based.\nThere is a need to incorporate more technical intelligence and information operation in counter-insurgency measures.\nThere has to be more operational clarity in the practices and continuity has to be maintained.\nIf the mentioned features are best practices or best principles has to be reflected on again.\nConcession is the key to strategy and the hardcore best practice has to be to wean away support and the ultimate solution has to come from political front.\nSealing of borders will be difficult to achieve instead the borders need to be secured.\n\nReport prepared by Srishti Pukhrem\, Research Assistant\, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi. 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