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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20251024T080000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20251024T170000
DTSTAMP:20261027T163656
CREATED:20260707T043558Z
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SUMMARY:Fellow Seminar by Gp. Capt. (Dr.) R.K. Narang (Retd.)\, Senior Fellow\, MP-IDSA
DESCRIPTION:Gp. Capt. (Dr.) R.K. Narang (Retd.)\, Senior Fellow\, MP-IDSA\, made a presentation for his Fellow Seminar on “Atmanirbharta in Naval Fighter Aircraft” on 24 October 2025. The Seminar was chaired by Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General\, MP-IDSA. It was attended by serving and retired naval officers\, scientists\, and scholars of MP-IDSA. The External Discussants were Vice Admiral Shekhar Sinha (Retd.)\, Member\, Governing Council\, Indian Council for World Affairs\, Professor Hari Babu Srivastava\, former DG DRDO\, currently Professor of Practice at IIT Delhi & Distinguished Fellow at Vivekananda International Foundation\, and Cmde. Jaideep Maolankar (Retd.)\, Executive Vice President for Technology Development (Aerospace & Defence)\, Newspace Research & Technologies Pvt. Ltd. \nExecutive Summary\nThe session evaluated India’s naval aviation trajectory and indigenous fighter development. Key concerns included inconsistent programme continuity and loss of hard-won technological expertise. Gp. Capt. Narang emphasised that NLCA Mk-I must be inducted in limited numbers for data generation and naval technology validation\, assessed Twin Engine Deck Based Fighter (TEDBF) as obsolete\, and recommended prioritising Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) for long-term capability. He cautioned that shutting Naval Light Combat Aircraft (NLCA) would erode institutional knowledge and that India must choose an “India variant” aligned with national requirements. The discussion underscored the need for continuity\, coordinated development and decisive high-level direction. \n  \nAmb. Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General\, MP-IDSA\nAmb. Sujan R. Chinoy opened the Session by framing the pressures on India’s military aviation to match global standards in both scale and capability\, noting that the pace of technological development and absorption ultimately depends on funding. He traced the Navy’s trajectory in carrier aviation: after committing to the naval LCA Mk-I in 2003\, the service took a step back in 2016\, leaving the aircraft at the stage of a technology demonstrator rather than advancing it toward induction. The Navy has also not committed to the LCA Mk-II or the developing AMCA\, while exploring options such as import of the Rafale Marine and the development of TEDBF. Amb. Chinoy emphasised that TEDBF and AMCA are interlinked\, as their designs and engine requirements cannot be treated separately\, and future progress will hinge on co-development of ~120 kN-class engines with France as well as indigenous development of Kaveri engine. Another point to consider regarding the LCA is that production capacity comprises 8×2 in Bengaluru; 8×1 in Pune\, totalling 24  aircraft per year\, which is constrained by dependence on US G-404/G-414 engines. Given the 30–50 year lifespan of fighter aircraft and India’s challenges in the development of Kaveri engine\, such long-term reliance on external suppliers remains a concern. \n  \nGp. Capt. (Dr.) R.K. Narang (Retd.)\, Senior Fellow\, MP-IDSA\nGp. Capt. Narang began by stating that his paper is built upon three hypotheses: First\, limited induction of Naval LCA Mk-1 (fighter) is essential for data generation\, development & validation of navy specific technologies\, and it will be useful for developing advanced indigenous naval fighters since there is a difference between naval and land based LCA performance. Second\, TEDBF has become obsolete. Third\, the Indian Navy joining AMCA will be better for meeting future threats and self-reliance. With these hypotheses as his organising frame\, Gp. Capt. Narang proceeded to set out the technical lineage\, programme milestones\, platform specifications and the programmatic choices that inform India’s carrier-borne aviation options. \nHe began with the LCA family and the NLCA programme. The LCA Mk-I is a single-engine aircraft with a weight of 13\,500 and up to 3 tons in payload capacity. Gp. Capt. Narang traced the programme chronology precisely as recorded in the transcript. The Indian Air Force issued its requirement in 1983; the Navy submitted requirements in 1985. In 1986 the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) was asked to conduct a feasibility study on NLCA; that study was carried out between 1989 and 1992\, and the resultant report was approved in 1985. The IAF recorded the type’s first flight in 2001; NLCA Mk-1 approval came in 2003; and the naval prototype’s first flight occurred in 2012\, a development Gp. Capt. Narang noted occurred within a relatively short eight-year to nine-year window from formal approval. He recorded the Navy’s withdrawal of consent from the naval LCA programme in 2016\, and yet underlined subsequent operational milestones: NLCA completed landings on INS Vikramaditya (2020) and on INS Vikrant (2023). He stated the sanctioned cost of LCA Mk-1 at INR1\,714 Cr and noted the comparative per-aircraft figure for a single Rafale as roughly INR 2\,000 Cr.+ to illustrate the fiscal implications of import. \nTurning to navalisation features\, Gp. Capt. Narang drew on Cmde Jaideep Maolankar’s assessments to set out what distinguishes NLCA Mk-I for carrier use. Leading Edge Vortex Control (LEVCON) enhances controllability at low speeds; an arrestor hook enables carrier recovery; landing gear has been strengthened to withstand high axle loads during deck landings; and components and Line Replaceable Units have been re-certified from IAF to naval specifications. He acknowledged the known challenges the programme encountered — delays\, technology denial\, structural complexity and component supply delays — but emphasised that indigenous innovation and pragmatic engineering at multiple stages mitigated many of these hurdles. He warned that closure of the NLCA programme would set industry capability back by decades because the scientists and engineers holding project knowledge would eventually retire\, compelling a return to the drawing board rather than building on accumulated experience. \nTo reinforce the operational dimension\, Gp. Capt. Narang screened a demonstration video of NLCA to anchor discussion in flight-test experience and the incremental accumulation of naval-aviation know-how. \nGp. Capt. Narang then introduced LCA Mk-II. LCA Mk-II is a single-engine aircraft of 17.5 tons Maximum All up Weight (AUW) and was developed to meet naval requirements by increasing payload and range. In practice\, the Indian Air Force found the Mk-II particularly useful because reduced drag and increased payload capacity made it effective for replacing Mirage-2000 class aircraft and for boosting squadron strength. Two naval prototypes (NP-3 and NP-4) were approved\, but the Navy redirected sanctioned funds toward the Twin-Engine Deck-Based Fighter (TEDBF). Gp. Capt. Narang recorded that\, notwithstanding earlier setbacks\, the LCA Mk-II project received approval for a prototype in 2023. \nTEDBF is a 4.5-generation twin-engine aircraft weighing around 26 tons. Its higher payload and extended range were conceived to meet carrier requirements and to counter regional threats. Proponents argued TEDBF would require less development time than AMCA. The initial requirement for TEDBF had been forecasted for three carriers; which was not approved. The Navy subsequently acquired the Rafale  through a global RFP for the  Multi Role Carrier Based Fighter (MRCBF). Gp. Capt. Narang stressed that the Navy withdrew consent for N-LCA and for naval LCA Mk-II in 2016 and that in 2017 it issued an RFI for 57 MRCBF\, reflecting a change in procurement preference away from the indigenous naval LCA path. \nOn AMCA\, Gp. Capt. Narang stated that AMCA is twin-engine\, 25-ton weight and incorporates a stealth airframe. He emphasised the Navy’s operational question about whether stealth modules can be reliably maintained in a saline environment\, and he noted that experience with other similar stealth platforms indicates viability\, though the issue remains operationally salient for naval adoption. He compared AMCA’s ambitions with contemporary foreign designs\, observing that China has inducted fifth generation such as the J-35 carrier based fighter and fielded the J-20  land variants\, and has demonstrated J-36 and J-50\, which he characterised as 5+ generation designs with potential to evolve further. Against this regional context\, Gp. Capt. Narang highlighted resource constraints — funding\, manpower and institutional capacity — that affect LCA Mk-II\, TEDBF and AMCA alike. \nOne of the bottlenecks in his account is institutional constraints due to limited design and test resources. ADA is responsible for designing LCA Mk-II\, TEDBF and AMCA; the programmes share test pilots\, production facilities\, certification agencies and supply chains. This commonality\, combined with a limited pool of skilled personnel for design and development\, creates competition for resources and contributes to significant schedule delays. \nGp. Capt. Narang characterised India’s indigenous Kaveri engine experience as ambiguous and mixed\, and he set out unit costs to illustrate procurement pressures: LCA Mk-II costs INR 643 Cr. per aircraft\, while the Rafale-M figure he cited is INR 2\,453 Cr. per aircraft. These numbers\, he argued\, directly condition choices when budgets are constrained and timelines are tight. \nGp. Capt. Narang summarised practitioner inputs to emphasise operational imperatives. He relayed the perspective  of Adm Arun Prakash (Retd.) that a carrier-borne Tejas flight or squadron could perform fleet air-defence duties while generating valuable operational data for follow-on indigenous designs\, tempered by concerns about HAL’s ability to ramp production. He also summarised counsel by Cmde. CD Balaji (Retd.) that maintaining a couple of NLCA squadrons would prudently preserve lessons learned from deck-based fighter development pending a successor design\, thereby avoiding loss of institutional memory. \nIn his concluding assessment\, Gp. Capt. Narang called for systemic reforms: an honest audit and analytical culture to diagnose delays and cancellations; stronger operator-developer feedback loops to generate mission data and validate naval technologies; explicit attention to saline-environment certification for sensitive modules; clearer ownership\, leadership in decision-making and accountability to prevent inaction; adoption of spiral development to permit incremental capability growth; and a higher decision body to ensure roadmaps\, reliable timelines and funding for course corrections. His specific prescription for the Navy aligned with his opening hypotheses: limited induction of LCA Mk-I to generate operational data; rejection of TEDBF as the principal path; and a concentrated effort to modify and operationalise AMCA for naval purposes. He closed by invoking Dr. Abdul Kalam’s words about the broader national imperative that India moves from being a low-cost assembly base to original research\, design and manufacture if true Atmanirbharta in defence is to be realised. \nCmde. Jaideep Maolankar (Retd.)\nCmde. Jaideep Maolankar began by warning that naval carrier aviation does not have a bright future on its current trajectory. Drawing from his experience in the LCA programme as Chief Test Pilot of the LCA Mk-1 (Navy) Fighter\, he said the project suffered deep neglect\, particularly in allocation of resources. The programme functioned on a shoestring budget and was structurally dependent on Air Force designs and resources. Even so\, he argued\, the central lesson is that a naval aircraft can be built indigenously\, since despite resource scarcity the programme delivered results. However\, he cautioned that this success has created a degree of technical arrogance that is unwarranted. \nCmde. Maolankar then outlined his first major point: the Navy’s understanding of aviation fundamentals needs a review . The organisation simultaneously inducts STOBAR carriers and dismisses their relevance\, asserting that naval aviation will benefit with induction of 65\,000-ton plus  carriers for using catapults and EMALS. According to him\, the belief that catapults are indispensable is a myth. There is a strong case for lighter carriers\, and it is better to have two smaller carriers that the Navy is willing to risk than one large carrier considered too precious to expose. In this sense\, he argued\, the Navy must return to basics in its thinking on aircraft and carrier requirements. \nCmde. Maolankar’s second concern was the handling of technology and human resource. “Technology is HR\,” he stated\, noting that lessons from NLCA Mk-I are being lost as those who worked on the programme depart\, due to absence of an indigenous program or retirement. These insights cannot be captured fully through documentation. For example\, during NLCA Mk-I development\, non-critical LRUs underwent recertification and shop testing while critical LRUs—in some instances—were not tested and were allowed to pass based on analysis and risk acceptance. Such judgement calls reflect expertise that cannot simply be recorded; they must be experienced and retained. \nCmde. Maolankar criticised the fact that while the Navy is proud of its ships\, it lacks an indigenous aircraft and has opted instead for Rafale\, which he observed that is likely to become as outdated as TEDBF. He recalled that certain design changes once deemed too risky for Navy LCA Mk-II were later accepted without objection for Rafale\, raising questions about whether such decisions were based on engineering logic or institutional decisions \nCmde. Maolankar also noted that India currently retains only one sanctions-proof technology gained from the United States—carrier suitability design and testing—acquired through paid training of U.S. personnel. However\, the experts who absorbed that knowledge are retiring\, putting even that singular capability at risk. \nShifting to structural concerns\, Cmde. Maolankar said the three pillars of carrier aviation—ship\, aircraft and weapons—should be designed concurrently\, whereas in India they are developed separately. According to him\, the ship should accommodate compromises so that the aircraft remains least compromised\, and weapons must be customised specifically for the aircraft. The lack of such integration is likely to face fundamental challenges. \nCmde. Maolankar pointed out that there is inadequate appreciation of nuances of naval aviation and highlighted inherent flaws in giving priority to land based aircraft at the expense of carrier aviation. Unless the Navy fielded a carrier-aircraft-weapon ecosystem that delivered demonstrable capability\, support would not materialise\, and naval aviation would continue to be undermined. He added that foreign aircraft are obsolete the moment they are inducted and carrier aviation has not attracted due attention\, which contradicts the broader logic of national air power. He noted that TEDBF appears in DRDO posters and Aero India displays yet has no sanction. \nDiscussing the prospect of merging TEDBF and AMCA\, he described the first lesson from Mk-I as the error of adapting a land-based aircraft for naval use\, necessitating Mk-II. The second lesson from the IAF Mk-I programme is that India lacks proper understanding of specifications; certification agencies enforce specifications rigidly instead of using them as guidelines. For AMCA\, the IAF prioritises precision bombing\, whereas the Navy needs anti-ship missiles\, which are heavier and longer. Whether these requirements will be integrated remains uncertain\, and the Navy may end up carrying weapons externally in non-stealth mode as with TEDBF. A merger is only viable\, if Navy takes the lead in developing navy specific fighter. \nHe reiterated the importance of comprehensive data generation\, noting that data from Mk-I should be leveraged for naval aircraft development\, which requires design intuition\, human judgement and data across varied scenarios. \nIn conclusion\, he asserted that both TEDBF and Rafale are likely to become obsolete\, and that AMCA risks obsolescence by the time it is ready. India must take timely decisions if naval aviation is to survive. \nAdm. Shekhar Sinha (Retd.)\nAdm. Shekhar Sinha began by stating that delays in decisions on aircraft carriers stem from the fact that such decisions are taken at much higher levels. He stressed that ships\, especially aircraft carriers\, must not be developed independently of the aircraft intended to operate from them. According to him\, the absence of concurrent development has directly led to problems of weight\, lift and wing fold in naval aircraft\, and the same applies to weapons integration\, which must also occur alongside aircraft development. \nReflecting on past practices\, Adm. Sinha recalled that in the case of the Harrier\, the engine was designed first and the airframe afterwards. Though considered the best approach at the time\, this contributed to the Harrier’s limitations. He contrasted this with the F-35\, whose configuration does not rely on a lift engine. While Harriers use maximum power during take-off and landing\, the F-35 uses maximum power during cruise. \nAdm. Sinha argued that adapting an Indian Air Force platform into a naval aircraft is a fundamentally flawed starting point. Naval fighters should not be derivative variants of Air Force platforms because their operational environments and mechanisms are different. As an example\, he referred to the MiG-29K\, which originated from the MiG-29B airframe and was not suited to naval demands\, resulting in failures during testing. He described this as a continuation of the “jugaad” mentality—forcing a platform into a role for which it was not designed. \nAt this point\, Amb. Chinoy briefly intervened to say that there are rare circumstances in which “jugaad” may be justified\, citing the case of the Mirage-2000 in Kargil\, but agreed that such logic cannot guide complex\, high-end systems. Returning to his point\, Adm. Sinha stressed that while the Navy can propose requirements based on threat perception\, delays occur because decisions pass through several forums and ultimately rest with higher authorities who may not be technical experts. Even so\, he expressed cautious optimism that good decisions will eventually be made. He noted India’s longstanding dependence on imported aircraft and emphasised the need for self-reliance . \nAdm\, Sinha added that future capability will depend on compatibility with emerging weapons. Electrically driven components may be explored\, but each must be certified to withstand landing-induced shocks on carriers. This reinforces the need for trials and data generation. He mentioned that the United States had earlier approached India and that France remains a friend\, suggesting that collaboration could lead to carriers tailored to national requirements. \nAdm. Sinha said that throughout India’s defence research and development history\, the air element has not been taken seriously enough. Import dependence has been persistent\, and only recently has some transfer of technology been insisted upon. Scientists will need to have a bigger role\, since pure science is an intrinsic part of aviation development and engineers alone are insufficient. \nOn the possible merger of TEDBF and AMCA\, he cautioned that there are technical complications. In his view\, ship\, aircraft and weapons development must run concurrently\, and the priority must be futuristic capability. Systems development must take into account shifts in the Indian Ocean Region. He described how Chinese systems are being tested in Pakistan and\, by extension\, against India. He pointed to China’s Beidou satellite network with more than 600 satellites over the Indian Ocean\, enabling tracking that no aircraft or ship can evade. Combined with ISR satellite launches and optical fibre linkage between China’s Western Theatre Command and Rawalpindi\, he argued that India now faces a single front dominated by China rather than a two-front problem. \nAdm. Sinha said that if India wants to reset aviation development without losing gains already made\, programmes must be continued rather than terminated midway. LCA\, he argued\, can preserve and advance carrier-aircraft know-how\, and even a small number of aircraft can serve as development demonstrators. He compared this logic to the Bofors case\, where rather than discarding available technology\, it should be used to support future developments. \nAdm. Sinha concluded by stating that aircraft carriers\, aircraft and weapons must be developed as a composite whole rather than separate efforts. \nContinuing the discussion\, Amb. Chinoy said that both Cmde. Maolankar and Adm. Sinha had highlighted an important point—that TEDBF and AMCA merger should take into consideration  specific naval requirements. Stealth requirements and naval weapon systems may not be compatible and integrating them could compromise stealth itself. If those compromises become unavoidable\, the merger would defeat its purpose. \nAdm. Sinha added that an aircraft carrier\, the fighter designed to operate from it and the weapon systems cannot be developed in isolation. To ensure unified development\, he proposed the establishment of an apex-level coordinating body—potentially a Defence Science and Technology Council—headed at the highest political level and including key national security stakeholders. Such a body would assign responsibility\, set timelines and ensure accountability. \nAmb. Chinoy cited private-sector participation in AMCA as an example of the structural gaps that require such oversight. He noted that the programme is focusing on engines but lacks clarity on scale of requirement and responsibility. He mentioned that the Prime Minister recently called for a fighter engine programme in mission mode. He also noted international trends\, remarking that the J-10 has been viewed favourably in countries such as Indonesia\, which appears to prefer it over Rafale based on perceptions of performance during Operation Sindoor. \nDr. Haribabu Shrivastava\nProf. Haribabu Shrivastava noted at the outset that India has witnessed more programme closures than inductions across the services\, and regardless of the explanations\, the outcome represents a failure for the country. He emphasised the need for a national-level debate on LCA\, TEDBF and AMCA\, with participation from all three services and senior authorities\, and stressed that the decision emerging from such a process should be binding on every stakeholder involved. \nProf. Shrivastava observed that one structural problem in India’s defence ecosystem is the “problem of plenty\,” in which organisations or individuals claim capabilities they cannot practically deliver. This\, he said\, consumes limited resources and time that the country cannot afford to lose. Constraints span funding\, manpower\, manufacturing capacity and available facilities. According to him\, progress will not come from data-sharing alone; there must be reflection on why advancement has stalled. He proposed a comparative study between the IAF and the Navy\, accompanied by an assessment of current assets\, future needs and collaborative avenues. \nWhile India often benchmarks itself against China\, Prof. Shrivastava stated that the financial and manpower bases are not comparable. He pointed out that DRDO employs approximately 7\,000 scientists and only a few thousand work on relevant technologies in the private sector\, illustrating the scale difference with the United States\, China and Russia. Until India reaches that level\, he said\, the country must manage its limitations strategically\, by accepting shortcomings in some areas while securing gains in others. \nProf. Shrivastava also addressed persistent concerns regarding the treatment of engineers as scientists. DRDO\, he explained\, includes its own research corps\, the extra-mural research corps and the DRDO–Industry–Academia Centres of Excellence (DIACoEs). Earlier\, a single proposal would be sequentially forwarded from one DRDO department to another until one eventually granted clearance\, creating prolonged ambiguity and delays within approval chain. However\, national research culture remains risk-averse. Most defence-related academic projects are concentrated in IITs\, where large numbers of schemes leave limited time for direct faculty oversight. M.Tech and PhD scholars develop technology during their studies\, but once they graduate\, the technology effectively disappears with them\, and supervising professors may not know the detailed technical work. The absence of mechanisms to integrate such scholars into defence organisations results in the loss of specialised manpower. He illustrated this with the example of scholars who developed a bulletproof jacket but\, lacking continuity in the system\, later took employment in a pipe manufacturing company. \nProf. Shrivastava concluded that a national debate is essential and that the final decision must be taken at a level that cannot be bypassed—by development agencies\, procurement agencies or any service. \nAmb. Chinoy expanded the discussion by noting that the issue is not limited to the large number of DRDO projects with IITs. As with MTech and PhD research\, when senior directors and professors retire or relocate\, the technologies they worked on move with them\, sometimes even abroad. There is no legacy system\, corporate databank or shared platform to retain and provide access to this accumulated knowledge\, and Amb. Chinoy stressed the need to address this gap\, even by superimposing decisions if voluntary agreement is not achieved. He recalled the Prime Minister’s call for such reforms before the next DRDO Foundation Day and expressed optimism. Adm. Shekhar Sinha differed with Prof. Haribabu’s earlier suggestion of a national debate\, arguing it would create a “too many cooks spoil the broth” scenario and amount to going back to basics. \nQ/A session\nThe Q&A began with a comment noting that the 1986 feasibility study lacked ship motion data and relevant publications\, relying solely on experience from INS Vikrant. Within the LCA programme\, the airframe had not been marinised apart from the engine—already in service on the F-18 Hornet—and faced issues such as delayed thrust recovery after touchdown\, wing loading\, rollers and angle of attack. The comment detailed the structural modifications required for marinisation: strengthening to withstand catapult forces\, increasing undercarriage and nosewheel weight to prevent slamming\, redesigning the cockpit to improve visibility and protect against humidity and salt ingress\, and removing magnesium alloy to reduce corrosion. Persistent procrastination was also highlighted and that outcomes depend on human decision-making rather than equipment alone\, with a call for the Navy to lead naval aviation design and create a dedicated cell for it. \nThe discussion then turned to whether the LCA Navy Mk-I has any meaningful operational role\, given its seventeen-minute endurance at thirty miles from the carrier. This was seen as potentially limiting for training and air defence. In response\, Cmde. Maolankar argued that the question hinges on defining the intended role of the N-LCA. He emphasised that during its final trials it exceeded expectations and therefore warranted continued evaluation to improve performance. He said the N-LCA could be used for data generation and training\, but if its primary purpose is data generation\, then holding it to full operational standards would be counterproductive. \nSupporting this view\, Gp. Capt. Narang said that what is needed now is test data generated in realistic conditions\, which can only be achieved if operational pilots—not test pilots—fly the aircraft. Requirements derived from operational scenarios\, rather than idealised environments\, are necessary for credible development. \nThe debate then moved to whether TEDBF and AMCA should be merged. One intervention argued that a naval fighter must be designed as such from the outset\, as modifying a land-based aircraft later results in long delays and obsolescence. If a merger must happen\, the suggestion was that it should produce an “AMCA Navy” variant\, noting that a carrier-borne aircraft can operate from land\, but a land-based aircraft cannot operate from a carrier. Responding to this\, Gp. Capt. Narang clarified that if a merger produces a naval AMCA that meets national requirements\, he would support it. He noted that the LCA Mk-II programme had benefited the Air Force\, demonstrating that cross-service adaptation is possible\, and that AMCA can also be adapted if required. Whatever platform India chooses now\, he stressed\, will serve the fleet for the next three to four decades\, making the decision strategically decisive. \nA question followed on whether march-in rights through bodies like the Anusandhan National Research Foundation could prevent technology loss. Prof. Shrivastava noted that\, while such rights exist and documentation is thorough\, the “art” of engineering judgment—held by the individuals who worked on the technology—is lost when they leave. While PhD papers and theses are available digitally under the “one nation\, one subscription” framework\, documentation alone cannot reproduce an aircraft. \nAnother participant argued that India is still “landlocked in thinking\,” despite the fact that aircraft are the longest-reach weapon available to a fleet. With a limited number of aircraft and rising threat levels\, platforms must be omni-role and uncompromised. While Rafale and TEDBF are described as outdated\, their avionics are comparable to AMCA except for stealth\, which is less relevant for naval strike roles\, where payload capacity matters more. India\, must be prepared for current contingencies rather than hypothetical future ones. \nTo this\, Gp. Capt. Narang agreed that India must seek the best capability available within its limited manpower\, resources and development capacity. He stated that India does not need a “land” or “naval” variant but an “India variant”—a platform designed to meet national rather than organisational demands\, even if it requires designing from scratch. At the same time\, he warned that China has already deployed the J-35 from carriers\, and India must consider whether TEDBF can credibly compete with aircraft such as the J-35 or J-20. He added that developing technology follows a different trajectory from buying technology\, and historically India has purchased the best available systems rather than developed them. He stressed that India must not fall behind technologically. \nIn closing\, Gp. Capt. Narang said that the art and science of naval fighter development must not be allowed to disappear\, or the larger vision of Viksit Bharat will suffer. Decisions must be taken in national interest\, and now is the appropriate moment for a unified approach. He warned that the naval fighter programme must not face a “Marut moment” due to indecision. On TEDBF\, Rafale and AMCA\, he said that India must field capability that can counter the J-35 and take the most optimal step for the next two decades. He emphasised the importance of giving indigenous aircraft the same leeway that foreign platforms receive\, cited past rotorcraft programmes to show how maturity results from accumulated experience\, and reiterated that technology loss through delays and indecision must be prevented through higher-level intervention. He added that aircraft and carrier design must proceed concurrently and echoed the earlier call for a higher-level scientific decision-making body for the national interest. \nThe Report has been prepared by Ms. Meghna Pradhan\, Research Analyst\, North America and Strategic Technologies Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/fellow-seminar-by-gp-capt-dr-r-k-narang-retd-senior-fellow-mp-idsa
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20250912T080000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20250912T170000
DTSTAMP:20261027T163656
CREATED:20260707T040903Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260707T054328Z
UID:98901-1757664000-1757696400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Fellow Seminar by Dr. MS Prathibha\, Associate Fellow\, MP-IDSA
DESCRIPTION:On 12 September 2025\, Dr. M.S. Prathibha\, Associate Fellow at the East Asia Centre\, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA)\, presented a paper on “Great Changes Unseen in a Century: China’s Conception of the Evolving World Order” for her Fellow Seminar. Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director-General\, MP-IDSA chaired the meeting. Two External Discussants (Professor Rajesh Rajagopalan\, Centre for International Politics\, Organisation and Disarmament\, School of International Studies\,  Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) and Professor T.G. Suresh\, Associate Professor\, Centre for Political Studies\, School of Social Sciences\, JNU) as well as two Internal Discussants (Dr. Saurabh Mishra\, Research Fellow\, Africa\, Latin America\, Caribbean and UN (ALACUN) Centre and Dr. Abhishek Kumar Darbey\, Associate Fellow\, East Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA) commented on the paper. Scholars from MP-IDSA actively participated in the Q&A. \nOpening Remarks by the Chair\nIn his Opening Remarks\, Ambassador Chinoy began by praising the Speaker’s paper as one that was both timely and apposite\, given the worldwide attention being paid to China’s rise. Amb. Chinoy related his experiences during recent trips to China\, where he heard Chinese narratives of confidence in the decline of the United States of America and the commensurate pre-eminence of China\, indicating that China itself believes that its time has come to play a dominant role on the world stage. He posited that China was now prepared to not only keep the US out of its perceived area of interest\, but to replace it as the power underwriting the global order. This is in large part due to General Secretary Xi Jinping\, whose role in the formation of this narrative has been decisive. \nAmb. Chinoy went on to state his fundamental doubt of the premises of this argument. He noted that while China as a nation-state may endure into the future\, it is not a historical given that the same can be said of the Communist Party of China (CPC). Further\, it is not inevitable that Xi’s ambitious ‘China Dream’ would be the means by which that country attains ‘greatness’\, as that inevitably requires that Beijing take some form of action on the self-ruled island of Taiwan. Though there have been some Chinese successes internationally\, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic\, Amb. Chinoy suggested that this may have as much to do with the fact that the US is now showing itself uninterested in playing its role in the current global order\, leading some to view China as a ‘noble equivalent’. \nNevertheless\, the international headwinds China’s economy has faced in recent years is a key reason why it has chosen now to focus internally on developing science and technology as well as innovation as two waves of the next phase of its development. Terming it a lesson in the might of the Scientific Revolution\, Amb. Chinoy called on the Speaker to elucidate further as to how these themes would come together in her presentation. \nPresentation by Dr. M.S. Prathibha\nThanking the Chair for his trenchant remarks\, Dr. Prathibha entered into her presentation with an outline of its structure. She then described the theoretical bases of her presentation\, noting that the future of the world order is indeed uncertain and that there is growing discussion of the role played by China. Pointing out that existing scholarship on China’s role within the international order largely attempted to compare China’s past to its present (for example\, by comparing Xi Jinping’s leadership to his predecessors’)\, which is a Eurocentric perspective\, she stated that her paper would focus only on the CPC’s vision of itself at the helm of China in years to come. \nDr. Prathibha expressed the view that the CPC compares China’s rise to the rise of the West as its operating paradigm. As such\, it does not wish to deconstruct the existing world order\, but to replace key elements of it. Thus\, a key question arises: is China a revisionist world power or an integrationist world power? She proposed that in order to answer this question\, it would be important to understand some of the concepts propounded by Xi Jinping and the CPC\, namely\, the ‘Great Changes Unseen in a Century’ and the ‘New Era’. \nDr. Prathibha highlighted certain definitional aspects of the concept of ‘Great Changes Unseen in a Century’. She noted that a key element of the concept is the role played by the CPC in forming historical judgments about world events\, which it views through its own lens. The CPC argues that the current period of time should be called a ‘New Era’\, where big changes are happening that are leading China to a ‘New Historic Starting Point’. \nThis latter idea sees China at a crossroads\, where export-driven consumption patterns are changing rapidly\, driven in part by falling economic momentum globally. At the same time\, China believes that the world is undergoing a historic power transition from the global West to the global East in tandem with the Fourth Industrial Revolution. Domestically\, this leads to an internal transition whereby the development of a science and technology base in line with ‘higher aspirations of the Chinese people’ is proceeding hand-in-hand with an orientation away from the export-led economic model. \nIn this scenario\, if China can exploit the opportunity accordingly\, the CPC holds that China can become a ‘modern socialist power’ leading the ‘next science and technology revolution’. For this\, the CPC needs to take certain major strategic decisions in the coming years\, which primarily involve encouraging innovation within society so as to provide strategic support to its comprehensive national power. The deadline for these objectives is 2049\, when the CPC reaches its centenary and the ‘China Dream’ is slated to be achieved. The end goal is the completion of the ‘Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation’\, which China after 2049 will notionally have achieved. If this project fails\, however\, Chinese thinkers see their country as falling victim to strategic passivity. \nDescribing the characteristics of the Great Changes\, Dr. Prathibha highlighted that the CPC\, as the entity in control of the ship of the state\, believes that it has a unique mission to seize the historical initiative and exercise strategic judgment in order to steer China through the uncertainty currently prevailing in the world order. At the same\, it is burdened with the responsibility of thinking about the bottom line\, that is\, to prepare for every eventuality\, welcome or unwelcome. She posited that China under Xi Jinping believes that wisdom itself is not enough\, and taking appropriate actions at the appropriate time is equally important. As such\, ‘Chinese-style modernisation’ and other revolutionary changes need to be taken if China is to avoid a second Century of Humiliation\, which it believes the West desires. \nAssessing these concepts in the final portion of her presentation\, the Speaker highlighted the fact that China’s actions have already invited a response and challenge from the global West\, which has resisted Chinese calls for more multipolarity in the global system. In the face of this resistance\, China has begun stressing on the need to reform global governance\, a message through which it seeks to appeal to the Global South. \nHowever\, she expressed scepticism about these moves\, which she proposed reflected an instrumental support for multipolarity as opposed to an earnest seeking of multipolarity. She contended that China at present is merely following global trends out of a desire to win supporters in its domestic quest for glory. She also contended that China at present was determined to partially reject the prevailing Western model\, especially as it impinged upon domestic affairs and internal economic governance. \nComments by External Discussants\nAmb. Chinoy called on Professor Rajesh Rajagopalan to deliver his Remarks on the paper. Prof. Rajagopalan in his review deliberated on some structural aspects of the paper and delivered a critique. He focused on the framing of certain subjects as well as the degree of accessibility for non-specialist readers. \nProf. Rajagopalan queried whether the CPC’s analysis of historical trends could be considered reliable\, as these could well be used as justification for its continued control of Chinese politics. He commented on the ‘pedestrian’ nature of the CPC’s analysis of the so-called ‘Great Changes’\, as it contains nothing ground-breaking or innovative at all. He argued that in fact\, the CPC’s reading of history may be to blame for the strategic ineptitude by which the administration of Xi Jinping has alienated broad swathes of the world. As such\, he doubted whether the reading of history espoused by Xi could significantly alter the world order in his favour. \nAnother salient point raised by Prof. Rajagopalan concerned the Speaker’s analysis of China’s emphasis on unleashing innovation through party fiat. Noting that while scientific innovation has always emerged out of a conducive environment provided by the State\, it is difficult to state that such innovation can be commanded from the top-down. As such\, while scientific progress has societal value as hypothesised by the CPC\, such value can also be used to maintain political control by the Party\, especially if it emerges out of a command economy. \nAmb. Chinoy\, praising Prof. Rajagopalan’s astute observations\, called on Professor T.G. Suresh to deliver his remarks. Prof. Suresh complimented the paper for being substantive and comprehensive\, before sharing his critique of the paper. He first discussed the necessity of characterising the Chinese Government and governance as seen in modern times. He proposed that externally-applied labels such as ‘post-socialist’ or ‘neo-Marxist’ were no longer relevant to describe China’s current rulers. \nSecondly\, he expressed his opinion that the concept of contention between China and the West may not be tenable. He cited the degree of comfort Chinese academics and officials display in talking and working with Western counterparts as proof of this. \nThirdly\, he questioned the basis of the CPC’s judgment on the factors that triggered China’s Century of Humiliation. He contended that unlike the isolationism cited by the Party as the primary cause of the decline of the Qing Empire in the mid-nineteenth century\, contact with the West\, particularly Imperialist Britain through the Opium Wars (1839-1842; 1856-1860)\, may have been the decisive factor for China’s decline. He suggested that the Party may be cherry-picking history to suit present circumstances. \nFinally\, he repeated Prof. Rajagopalan’s contention that a top-down command economy based on a ‘highly totalitarian state and culture’ may not be best placed to encourage the kind of innovation necessary to achieve dramatic advances in science and technology. He stated that China lacks the knowledge-based societal base that is necessary to produce the kind of innovation necessary to successfully navigate the Fourth Industrial Revolution. He also pointed out China currently does not possess the ‘vocabulary of hegemony’ that was a hallmark of both European and American narratives in the past. Thus\, Prof. Suresh contended that the emphasis on science and technology and innovation may be read as a way for the Party to secure a new ‘social contract’ that can justify the continued legitimacy of its rule. \nAmb. Chinoy thanked both External Discussants for their insightful comments and offered his own thoughts on the paper. Noting that China’s heavy reliance on science and technology could be traced back to the 1950s\, he recounted instances where India too played a prominent role as a supplier of advance scientific know-how to the Chinese. He informed the audience that the Sino-Soviet split of the late 1960s could partially be attributed to the Soviet Union’s denial of technology in the wake of Joseph Stalin’s demise in 1953\, which resulted in China and the US coming closer together. Terming current US policies towards China as an echo of the Soviet denial regime\, he noted that there is a continuum in Chinese worldviews. \nOffering his thoughts on various sections of Dr. Prathibha’s paper\, Amb. Chinoy pointed out the importance of distinguishing between decisions made by Xi himself and those made by the Party as an organisation in order to fix ‘responsibility’ for decisions. Addressing the point made by the two External Discussants on the relationship between political regimes and technology development\, Amb. Chinoy stated that technology\, not being as fungible as trade\, intrinsically admitted of a greater role for the sovereign to intervene. He pointed out the experience of several Western powers such as Britain\, France and Germany as illustrative in this regard. \nOn China’s interest in the world order\, he conveyed his impression that China is not interested in ‘reforming’ the current world order\, but to be at the head of it\, while creating parallel structures. He offered the examples of the New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) as analogues of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). \nFinally\, he stated that the extent of Western sanctions on China is a moot question\, as it is clear that the global West will generally follow the lead of the US despite the European Union’s purported claims of being separate from Washington. He then invited the Internal Discussants to deliver their comments on the paper. \nComments by Internal Discussants\nDr. Abhishek Darbey urged the Speaker to consider the Four Global Initiatives launched by Xi as linked to the Great Changes and its end-goal\, the Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation. He also invited the Speaker to consider the clarification of the Great Changes as offered by Yuen Fung\, a commentator with a military background\, who has referred to the concept as ‘a strong political expression of the Chinese people to achieve the Chinese Dream’. \nDr. Saurabh Mishra\, praised the innovative perspective taken by the Speaker’s paper\, but offered technical critique on certain aspects\, such as the use of certain terms in the title as well as the focus placed on statements made by the CPC hierarchy rather than China’s real-world behaviour. \nAmb. Chinoy also offered further thoughts on the Speaker’s paper. He highlighted that the Great Changes concept actually refers to two centuries. The first is the Century of Humiliation from the mid-nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century\, when China was the victim of predatory Western powers. The Party saw itself in this scheme as the political expression of Mao’s phrase\, ‘The Chinese people have stood up’. The end of the Maoist period with Deng Xiaoping’s Reform and Opening Up era from the late 1970s to 2008 would thus conclude\, according to the Party\, with the Century of Unprecedented Changes where China would become a strong socialist power on the world stage. \nAmb. Chinoy also commented on the similarities between Chinese thinking on interstate relations and the US’ thinking\, especially under President Trump. He noted that both China and the US seem now to be running mirror versions of each other’s foreign policy\, where both instinctively do not seek multipolarity in their relations\, preferring to deal with a lone strongman or a small oligarchic elite instead. With these thoughts he invited the Speaker to respond to the Discussants’ Remarks. \nDr. Prathibha responded to some of the comments offered. Firstly\, she answered Prof. Suresh’s statement regarding the CPC’s analysis of the failure of the Qing Empire vis-à-vis imperialist Western powers. She stated that the Party’s interpretation held China’s premodern rulers\, the Qing Empire\, responsible for the Century of Humiliation (instead of the West) because they believe that the Qing failed to adequately create economies of scale despite having a technological edge over Western countries\, instead choosing to retain that technological know-how with the elites. She conveyed that the Party’s understanding of its historical background revolves firmly around the premise that the need for the state to achieve military superiority drives its accommodation of and encouragement to industrial innovation and growth\, not property or common law as theorised by Western academics. \nNext\, the Speaker replied to the ‘social contract’ lens offered by Prof. Suresh. She averred that the Party actually has very little room for serious policy mistakes as these could negatively impact regime legitimacy\, so they are very conscious of ensuring that the correct narrative and policy is followed consistently. The Great Changes concept can also be seen in this light as an attempt to rhetorically justify the continuance of CPC control over China’s governmental machinery. \nQ&A\nAmb. Chinoy invited comments and questions from the floor. Dr. Prashant Kumar Singh\, Research Fellow\, offered an observation that China cannot be considered to be anti-hegemony\, only anti-Western hegemony. It is interested in propounding and propagating a ‘moral realist’ hegemony that it believes would be superior to the West. It has a strong tendency to see the world in its own view. \nThe Speaker added to this observation by noting that China believes the current world order to be rooted in Western ideas that create simplistic binaries between which conflict is unavoidable. As such\, the West is interested in maintaining the current world order in so far as it can help avoid the Thucydides Trap. China’s challenge to this world order draws on its rejection of global governance models based on such paradigms\, instead focusing on state capacity-based approaches as favoured by noted Western academics such as Samuel Huntington. \nProfessor Vijaylakshmi joined the meeting online to offer some comments on the Speaker’s paper as well. She cited the importance of analysing China’s internal debates in context\, and mentioned an internal report prepared by certain CPC-affiliated bodies working on historical issues which explicitly states that ‘liberal democracy is not the pinnacle of human evolution’\, thus drawing a clear demarcation line between the Western penchant for equating Westernisation with modernisation. \nFurther\, she proposed that area studies scholars studying China ought to focus on the formation of a knowledge-producing apparatus within the CPC as a promising field of study. She pointed out that Xi may be surrounded by a group of scholars and strategic thinkers to assist him in the formulation of concepts such as the Great Changes\, so studying these persons’ thought processes may be a fruitful way to develop Indian expertise on China’s strategic culture further. In conclusion\, she noted that the delineation of China’s behaviour alone would not suffice. An understanding of China’s\, and the CPC’s\, ideological underpinnings is necessary too. \nThe Seminar concluded with Amb. Chinoy thanking all present for their participation. \nThe Report was prepared by Dr. Arnab Dasgupta\, Research Analyst\, East Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/fellow-seminar-by-dr-ms-prathibha-associate-fellow-mp-idsa
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20250904T080000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20250904T170000
DTSTAMP:20261027T163656
CREATED:20260707T041159Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260707T054222Z
UID:98903-1756972800-1757005200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:MP-IDSA Fellow Seminar on “Faultlines in Pakistan: An Analysis”
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Ashish Shukla\, Associate Fellow\, South Asia Centre\, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA)\, presented his Fellow Paper on “Faultlines in Pakistan: An Analysis” on 4 September 2025 at 1500 hrs. The Seminar was chaired by Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General\, MP-IDSA. Ambassador TCA Raghavan\, Former Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan and Professor Ajay Darshan Behera\, Professor at the Academy of International Studies at Jamia Milia Islamia joined as External Discussants. Dr. Ashok Behuria\, Senior Fellow and Coordinator of the South Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA contributed as an Internal Discussant. Scholars of the Institute were in attendance. \nExecutive Summary\nPakistan’s internal landscape is shaped by a dense web of ideological\, ethnic\, sectarian\, economic\, and institutional fault lines that have accumulated over decades of post-colonial state-building and elite-driven governance. The country’s struggle to define a cohesive national identity\, sharpened by competing religious and civic narratives\, has fed intolerance and empowered radical groups. Ethnic grievances among Baloch\, Pashtuns\, Sindhis\, and Muhajirs stem from centralised power structures that privilege a narrow elite while side-lining regional aspirations\, producing cycles of insurgency\, protest\, and repression. Moreover\, long-standing economic fragilities\, repeated Internatiional Monetary Fund (IMF) dependence\, weak tax structures\, and a rent-seeking political culture have further eroded the state’s capacity to govern effectively. These tensions converge with institutional imbalances marked by political polarisation\, weak civilian authority\, and the military’s pervasive influence over policy and power. The discussion focussed thoroughly on these systemic crisis of identity\, governance\, and legitimacy that continues to shape Pakistan’s instability and its enduring significance for India’s foreign policy. \nDetailed Report\nIn his Opening Remarks\, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy welcomed the Discussants and audience to the Fellow’s Seminar featuring Dr. Ashish Shukla’s paper\, “Fault Lines in Pakistan: An Analysis.” He highlighted the paper’s relevance given Pakistan’s enduring significance in India’s foreign policy. Ambassador Chinoy noted that while Pakistan’s ideological\, ethnic\, economic\, and sectarian divisions merit close study\, equal focus should be placed on its institutional resilience. He emphasised that analyses of this nature must align with the principles of sovereignty\, good neighbourliness\, and non-interference\, which underpin India’s foreign policy approach. \nDr. Ashish Shukla began by expressing gratitude to the Chair and Discussants. He briefly outlined his approach\, noting that Pakistan’s political\, economic\, ideological\, and social divides stem from its post-colonial formation and remain deeply embedded in its national fabric. Instead of fostering inclusive governance or long-term institutional reform\, successive civil-military elites have pursued short-term political gains\, reinforcing instability and fragmentation. \nDr.. Shukla explained that Pakistan’s ideological divide has been central to its national trajectory. Founded on the Two-Nation Theory\, the State was projected as a homeland for the Muslims of South Asia. However\, right since the beginning\, it struggled to create a unifying identity. He referred to Jinnah’s contrasting speeches\, his March 1940 Lahore Address in which he emphasised on the differences between Hindus and Muslims and his August 1947 Constituent Assembly Speech in which he advocated for a presumably secular State. He highlighted that after 1971\, despite the loss of East Pakistan\, the military and political establishment continued to frame Pakistan’s identity around Islam and perceived hostility towards India. He said that this narrative persists today\, as reflected in General Asim Munir’s public remarks urging Pakistanis to view their State as founded on religious ideals. \nDr. Shukla highlighted how this ideological foundation has fostered radical and sectarian divisions. Successive political measures\, including the Objectives Resolution of 1949\, Bhutto’s declaration of Ahmadis as non-Muslims\, Zia-ul-Haq’s Islamisation\, and the blasphemy laws\, deepened intolerance and strengthened extremist forces in the country. Dr. Shukla noted that besides the Shia-Sunni tensions\, the intra-Sunni rivalries between Deobandi and Barelvi groups have further fractured society. He drew attention to increasing violence against minorities\, such as Ahmadis\, Hindus and Christians who face systemic persecution at the hands of radical forces. The State and its institutions often condone such violence which emboldens the radical outfits in the country. Quoting survey data\, he observed that nearly half of the Pakistanis disapprove of befriending people from different religions or sects\, illustrating the entrenched social divisions. \nDr. Shukla then discussed ethnic fault lines\, calling them among the most visible and enduring. Pakistan’s political and military elite\, dominated primarily by Punjabis\, have consistently failed to accommodate the country’s linguistic and regional diversity. This centralised control has provoked resentment and separatism among Baloch\, Sindhi\, Pashtun\, and Muhajir groups. While state coercion subdued Sindhi and Muhajir movements\, insurgency in Balochistan remains active. He referred to five distinct phases of Baloch resistance. The latest phase started around 2000 and continues to be alive. He also noted that the rise of the Baloch Liberation Army and its adoption of suicide tactics have rattled the security establishment in the country. What is surprising is the fact that BLA’s suicide squad includes significant number of women.  In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa\, he highlighted the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement’s peaceful campaign against human rights violations and the State’s repressive response\, including its ban in 2024. Both cases\, he noted\, show how Pakistan’s refusal to share power and resources continues to fuel alienation in its peripheries. \nTurning to the economy\, Dr. Shukla observed that Pakistan’s structural weaknesses have persisted since independence. The country has approached the IMF nearly 25 times\, reflecting chronic fiscal mismanagement and over-reliance on external aid. In 2023\, it narrowly avoided default due to an IMF bailout. This was followed by a 37-month Extended Fund Facility. He attributed Pakistan’s economic miseries to low tax compliance\, below normal tax to GDP ratio\, presence of exemptions\, and most importantly no serious attempt to introduce much needed structural reforms. Moreover\, Pakistan’s rentier mindset\, he argued\, allows its leaders to depend on international aid\, loans and strategic patronage. \nOn the political and institutional front\, he pointed to the 26th Constitutional Amendment\, which gave Parliament power to nominate the Chief Justice\, undermining judicial independence. Dr. Shukla underlined that the 2024 elections deepened political polarisation\, with Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) -backed independents emerging as the largest group but unable to form a government; Shehbaz Sharif\, strongly supported by the military establishment. In the wake of the security establishment’s micromanagement\, the PPP agreed to support PML-N Government from outside.  PTI’s attempts to mobilise public support\, seek judicial intervention\, and negotiate through backchannels failed to secure the release of Imran Khan and other senior leaders. Still\, the party retained its political relevance\, and Imran Khan remains the most popular politician in Pakistan. Dr. Shukla added that subsequent legal amendments extended the tenure of the three Service Chiefs from three to five years\, ensuring General Asim Munir’s continuation until 2027. Dr. Shukla concluded by stating that Pakistan’s multiple internal fractures\, including economic stagnation\, ethnic alienation\, ideological rigidity\, and institutional decay\, are not episodic but systemic. They represent an enduring crisis of governance and identity that continues to undermine state cohesion. \nAmbassador TCA Raghavan complimented Dr. Ashish Shukla’s paper for its analytical maturity and focus on Pakistan’s internal dynamics beyond the traditional military lens. He noted the challenge Indian scholars face in studying Pakistan due to limited access\, but observed that comparative insights from India’s own context often fill this gap. He welcomed Dr. Shukla’s structured framework for analysing Pakistan’s faultlines across ideological\, sectarian\, ethnic\, economic\, and institutional dimensions\, and suggested situating sectarian divisions within broader geopolitical shifts such as the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet-Afghan war. \nAmbassador Raghavan appreciated the nuanced discussion of Baloch and Pashtun issues but stressed the need to factor in tribal dynamics and the limited scale of insurgencies\, citing the loyalty of Pashtun soldiers as evidence of Pakistan’s enduring state cohesion. He cautioned against underestimating the consolidation of Pakistani nationalism alongside regional and sectarian identities. On the economy\, he agreed that recent stabilisation is superficial\, while institutional weaknesses\, particularly the military’s dominance\, remain central. He proposed looking beyond Indian democratic benchmarks\, suggesting comparisons with Thailand or Myanmar to grasp Pakistan’s national security state. \nProfessor Ajay Darshan Behera referring to Ambassador Raghavan’s comments\, acknowledged the challenges Indian scholars face due to limited access to Pakistan but pointed out that the extensive work of Pakistani academics already provides a solid empirical base. He suggested that Indian scholars should focus on developing new analytical frameworks rather than seeking new data\, and emphasised the value of understanding regional languages like Punjabi to grasp local realities better than Urdu-based sources allow. \nOn Dr. Ashish Shukla’s paper\, Professor Behera praised the categorisation of Pakistan’s ideological\, sectarian\, ethnic\, economic\, and political fault lines but noted that it needs greater focus on how Pakistan historically manages these divisions. He stressed on studying the intersections among fault lines and called for a theoretical framing. Highlighting elite capture as a stabilising mechanism\, he explained how bureaucratic and military elites\, rooted in land and class hierarchies\, have historically managed contradictions and maintained state stability through control over the economy and politics. He urged attention to the political fault lines\, especially the rise of Imran Khan’s educated middle-class base\, which challenges elite and military dominance. Concluding\, he suggested that Dr. Shukla’s rich data should drive analysis explaining how Pakistan navigates its internal contradictions\, offering interpretive depth beyond description. \nDr. Ashok Behuria began by appreciating the discussion and called for deeper research on Pakistan’s linguistic and ethnic dynamics. He noted the paradox of Punjabi dominance in governance alongside the marginalisation of the Punjabi language and traced historical shifts in language use among writers and newspapers. He highlighted the Saraiki community’s ongoing struggle for recognition and cultural rights as an area needing closer study. Discussing ethnic representation\, he examined the position of Hazaras\, and Pashtuns in the armed forces\, pointing to their limited inclusion and long-standing grievances. He explained how recruitment patterns in the Baloch regiment and tribal affiliations influence both loyalty and dissent\, linking the rise of movements like the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement to historical exclusion and marginalisation in former FATA areas\, with broader regional implications tied to pan-Pashtun nationalism and Taliban networks. \nDr. Behuria also underlined the need to study inter-ethnic dynamics in urban centres\, especially among Mohajirs\, Sindhis\, and Baloch\, to understand their impact on Pakistan’s social and political cohesion. While some groups hold sway in higher administrative positions\, representation at lower levels remains uneven\, perpetuating structural inequalities. Dr. Behuria stressed that Pakistan’s management of these divisions through policy\, elite negotiation\, and historical contingencies must be examined to grasp its internal governance mechanisms. He concluded that incorporating linguistic and ethnic dimensions into research is essential for a fuller\, more nuanced understanding of Pakistan’s state and society. \nQuestion and Comments\nThe discussion focused on Pakistan’s fault lines\, including ethnic\, sectarian\, and political divisions\, and how these interact with state structures and elite capture. Key themes included the criteria for prioritising fault lines\, the role of sectarian groups like Tehreek – e – Taliban Pakistan in deepening existing divides\, and the state’s use of religion as a political tool\, creating overlapping conflicts. Questions addressed why large-scale revolts among Pashtuns and Baloch have not materialised\, with insights pointing to disciplined military and tribal structures\, early training\, and regimented socialisation as containment factors. The discussion also highlighted the impact of social media on political awareness\, the significance of elite management in controlling insurgency and ethnic tensions\, and the importance of evaluating which fault lines have interstate relevance. \nReport prepared by Ms. Sneha M\, Research Analyst\, South Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA.  \n 
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/mp-idsa-fellow-seminar-on-faultlines-in-pakistan-an-analysis
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20250822T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20250822T053000
DTSTAMP:20261027T163656
CREATED:20250901T012234Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260707T054046Z
UID:93563-1755840600-1755840600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:MP-IDSA Fellows Seminar: Messianism – Concept\, Features and Geopolitical Manifestations
DESCRIPTION:The Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) organised a Fellows Seminar on 22 August 2025\, where Dr. Adil Rasheed\, Research Fellow\, presented his paper titled “Messianism: Concept\, Features and Geopolitical Manifestations.” The session was chaired by Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General\, MP-IDSA. Ambassador Talmiz Ahmad\, former Ambassador to Oman\, Saudi Arabia and the UAE\, and presently Distinguished Professor at Symbiosis International University\, Pune\, joined as the External Discussant. The Internal Discussant was Dr. Ashok Behuria\, Senior Fellow and Coordinator of the South Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA. \nExecutive Summary\nThe Seminar explored how the belief in a Messiah or a saviour figure at the end of times continues to shape politics\, societies\, and state behaviour. Dr. Rasheed argued that messianic ideas\, which include apocalyptic and utopian mythologies\, are not limited to religious beliefs but even influence modern nationalist\, ideological\, and secular movements. Drawing on examples from Iran\, Israel\, ISIS\, Pakistan\, US-based dispensationalists\, Russia\, and China\, he stressed that these narratives mobilise followers and leave a global geopolitical impact. The discussion highlighted the dangers of messianic myths when tied to power\, violence\, and geopolitics\, while also emphasising the need for careful analysis to distinguish between genuine theological traditions and opportunistic uses of such rhetoric. \nDetailed Report\nInitial Comments by the Chairperson \nAmbassador Sujan R.Chinoy \nIn his opening remarks\, Ambassador Chinoy explained that messianism is both a spiritual and a political force. While it inspires devotion\, history shows that it has also provoked wars and upheavals. He pointed out that the Abrahamic religions\, Judaism\, Christianity and Islam\, have been most associated with messianic traditions\, but these ideas have also influenced secular ideologies like Fascism\, Marxism\, and Neo-conservatism. He stated that Dr. Rasheed’s paper might help provide a framework to better understand how messianic themes might influence international geopolitics. \nPresentation by Dr. Adil Rasheed\nDr. Rasheed began by defining messianism as the belief in the arrival of a Messiah\, a redeemer who establishes justice and peace at the end of times. Though strongly present in the Abrahamic faiths\, he stressed that similar ideas have emerged across societies\, including secular thought. Movements such as Fascism and Marxism\, he argued\, drew on utopian and redemptive impulses that resemble religious salvation. \nDr. Rasheed explained how contemporary religious and political movements have woven messianic themes into their agendas. Examples include Salafi Jihadism\, Shia Mahdism\, Evangelical Dispensationalism\, Revisionist Zionism\, Neo-Conservatism and even Slavic nationalism. Once politicised\, these narratives do not remain abstract but influence state policy\, militant strategies\, and interstate relations. \nWest Asia\, he noted\, is one of the main theatres where such politics is visible. Iran’s former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad invoked the Hidden Imam during his UN speech in 2005\, and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei declared that Israel would not survive beyond 25 years. Tehran even installed a countdown clock in the capital to reinforce this message. While Iranian leaders claim to separate anti-Zionism from anti-Semitism\, the rhetoric still fuels fears of an eventual religious conflict. \nSunni groups also make use of such themes. ISIS portrayed itself as the beginning of a prophesied caliphate\, citing the Syrian town of Dabiq as the site of an end-time battle. By linking itself with apocalyptic prophecies\, the group tried to legitimise violence and attract recruits. \nDr. Rasheed then discussed how Jews\, despite being the originators of the messianic idea\, often became its greatest victims. He traced centuries of persecution\, from massacres in Alexandria in 38 CE\, to the Crusades\, expulsions from England\, France and Spain\, the Black Death pogroms\, the Spanish Inquisition\, Russian pogroms\, and ultimately the Holocaust. Even in modern Israel\, political leaders still draw on messianic themes. He mentioned Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s ties with Rabbi Menachem Schneerson\, who was revered as a messianic figure and had once predicted Netanyahu’s rise. Biblical references in Netanyahu’s speeches\, he said\, also illustrate how such narratives enter modern politics. \nDr. Rasheed further highlighted the role of Christian Zionism. In the United States\, many evangelicals believe support for Israel is essential for the fulfilment of prophecy and the Second Coming of Christ. This theological conviction has become politically influential\, shaping US foreign policy. Statements from leaders like US Senator Ted Cruz\, Dr. Rasheed argued\, reveal how messianic worldviews can translate into real political commitments. \nSouth Asia too is not free of these currents. In Pakistan\, both military and political elites have used religious prophecies such as Ghazwa-e-Hind to justify policies and rhetoric. General Asim Munir’s speech in April 2025\, shortly before the Pahalgam attack\, described Pakistan as a divinely ordained state\, which Dr. Rasheed said was evidence of messianic framing within its national identity. \nBeyond the region\, he also drew attention to Russia’s “Third Rome” idea\, neo-Nazi movements in Europe\, and aspects of Chinese strategic thought that sometimes present themselves in civilisational\, quasi-messianic terms. \nDr. Rasheed then explained the theological foundations of messianism in Judaism\, Christianity and Islam. For Jews\, the Messiah is a descendant of King David who will rebuild the Temple and restore Israel. For Christians\, Jesus Christ is already the Messiah\, whose Second Coming will bring the Kingdom of God. For Muslims\, Jesus is also the Messiah\, but his return will be preceded by the Mahdi. He briefly touched upon non-Abrahamic traditions too\, like the Hindu belief in the Kalki Avatar and the Buddhist expectation of Maitreya\, though he noted that these ideas have not yet taken militarised forms. \nHe drew on Anson Rabinbach’s typology of messianism\, restorative\, utopian\, apocalyptic and expectative. He contrasted quietist forms\, which wait for divine will\, with activist forms that seek to hasten the Messiah’s arrival through deliberate action\, even conflict. He concluded by noting that India must take these ideological undercurrents into account when dealing with states where such ideas shape political culture. \nComments by the External Discussant\nAmbassador Talmiz Ahmad \nAmbassador Ahmad began by recalling how his own study of messianism had grown out of research for his book Children of Abraham at War. He explained that he first turned to the subject while trying to understand why Judaism\, Christianity and Islam had been repeatedly caught in violent conflict. Through this\, he found the deep traditions of messianic expectation across all three. \nHe explained how Jewish messianic hopes were shaped by centuries of exile and persecution\, while European anti-Semitism\, from the Crusades to the Black Death\, fuelled repeated invocations of redemption. He then traced how Protestant premillennialism in the 19th Century laid the basis for Christian Zionism. For American evangelicals\, support for Israel became tied to their eschatological vision\, creating political alliances that were convenient for both sides. \nOn Islam\, he argued that messianism was historically less central but grew in importance after the Arab defeat in 1967. In times of despair\, he observed\, societies often turned to prophecy for hope. Still\, he stressed that groups like al-Qaeda were pragmatic and strategic rather than deeply messianic. Shia traditions around the Hidden Imam carried more weight\, but he warned against equating faith with politics. \nHe then offered a frank critique of the paper. He suggested that too many themes need not be grouped under messianism. Nationalism and racism\, he argued\, could not meaningfully be seen as messianic. He also felt that references to non-Abrahamic religions or leaders like Putin stretched the argument.  Instead\, he suggested\, the focus should remain on the Abrahamic core. \nHe further argued that messianism should not be overstated as the main driver of conflict. Geopolitics\, nationalism and identity are stronger forces\, with messianic rhetoric often serving as a tool rather than the cause. He gave examples such as George W. Bush’s religious imagery during the “War on Terror” and the selective use of scripture by Jewish extremists. \nIn conclusion\, he urged Dr. Rasheed to sharpen the framework\, distinguish clearly between theology and politics\, and avoid placing too many movements under one label. \nComments by the Internal Discussant\nDr. Ashok Behuria\nDr. Behuria\, began by emphasising that research in social sciences thrives on diverse perspectives rather than absolute truths. He praised Dr. Rasheed’s effort and argued that messianism should not be restricted to the Abrahamic religions alone. Non-Semitic traditions\, he noted\, also contain messianic themes. He pointed to the Bhagavad Gita\, where Lord Krishna promises to return in different eras to restore balance in favour of ‘Dharma’\, as an example. \nHe welcomed Dr. Rasheed’s reference to thinkers such as Carl Jung and Giorgio Agamben. Jung’s ideas of archetypes and the collective unconscious\, he noted\, offer a useful way to explain how symbols and myths continue to shape culture and politics. On Agamben\, he highlighted the distinction between “messianism” and “messianicity\,” as well as the notion of “inoperativity\,” which describes how existing structures can be suspended to allow new possibilities. \nAt the same time\, he advised that if the paper intends to go beyond Abrahamic cases\, then examples from Hinduism and Buddhism should be developed more fully\, rather than dealing with them briefly. He also noted that certain movements\, such as American Israel Public Affairs Committee (IPAC)\, were cited but not explained in detail. Expanding these\, he suggested\, would give the work a more balanced scope. \nHe concluded by describing the paper as a valuable primer on the subject and encouraged Dr. Rasheed to refine it further. \nQ & A Session\nDr. Rajiv Nayan praised the choice of topic but said the definition of messianism needed greater clarity. Was Dr. Rasheed restricting it to the Abrahamic faiths\, or taking it in a broader sense? He also urged that claims about its influence should be backed by data\, and asked whether messianic politics truly mobilises large groups today\, given declining religiosity in some societies. \nDr. Saurabh Mishra recommended a stronger methodology\, suggesting historical as well as contemporary analysis to show how messianic beliefs affect politics. He said exploring figures like Sri Krishnadevaraya could provide useful insights. \nDr. Arnab Dasgupta asked how a messianic leader or state might be identified in practice\, and how societies could move on after such leaders—a process he termed “demessianisation.” He also raised a question related to Pakistan\, pointing to General Asim Munir’s speeches after the Jaffar Express attack in March 2025\, where he used religious references.  He asked how such rhetoric should be situated within the broader framework of messianism. \nComments by the Chairperson \nThe Chairperson\, Ambassador Chinoy\, offered his reflections\, noting that while the paper should not become overextended\, parallels from history and ideology could be useful. He cited Donald Trump’s survival after an assassination attempt\, which he framed in religious language\, and the Spanish conquest of the Americas\, which carried strong messianic zeal. He contrasted this with the British Empire\, which avoided such religious fervour. He also referred to Marxism and Maoism as movements with utopian\, quasi-messianic claims. \nSharing further thoughts on the subject\, Ambassador Ahmad\, reminded the participants that religion has often been a tool of political mobilisation. He gave examples from the Crusades\, Nazi Germany\, Ahmadinejad’s presidency\, and Israel after 1967. He also drew parallels between Pakistan’s idea of itself as a “second Madina” and the Zionist project. He concluded that while messianic zeal persists\, it does not single-handedly drive global politics. \nDr. Rasheed responded to the questions and thanked the participants. \nReport was prepared by Mr. Harsh Yadav\, Intern\, West Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/mp-idsa-fellows-seminar-messianism-concept-features-and-geopolitical-manifestations
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20250725T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20250725T053000
DTSTAMP:20261027T163656
CREATED:20250829T065046Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260707T053739Z
UID:93546-1753421400-1753421400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:MP-IDSA Fellows Seminar: ‘Maritime Capacity Building in the Western Indian Ocean: Analysing the Role of International Maritime Organisation\, The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the European Union’
DESCRIPTION:The MP-IDSA Fellows Seminar by Dr. Abhishek Mishra Associate Fellow\, on ‘Maritime Capacity Building in the Western Indian Ocean: Analysing the Role of International Maritime Organisation\, The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the European Union’ was held on 25 July 2025. It was chaired by Vice Admiral Shekhar Sinha\, PVSM\, AVSM\, NM & Bar (Retd.)\, Chairman\, Board of Trustees\, India Foundation\, New Delhi. The External Discussant was Rear Adm. Monty Khanna\, AVSM\, NM (Retd.)\, Member\, National Security Advisory Board (Online from Goa) and the Internal Discussants were Cmde. Abhay K. Singh (Retd.)\, Research Fellow\, Southeast Asia and Oceania Centre\, MP-IDSA; Dr. R. Vignesh\, Associate Fellow\, Military Affairs Centre\, MP-IDSA \nExecutive Summary\nThe presentation examined the Western Indian Ocean (WIO) as a vital maritime region where international organisations and external actors have tested varied models of capacity building over the last two decades. Initially driven by counter-piracy imperatives\, efforts have since broadened to encompass maritime security and blue economy priorities. Case studies of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO)\, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)\, and the European Union (EU) illustrate distinct approaches: institutional capacity development (Djibouti Code of Conduct)\, criminal justice reform (Maritime Crime Programme)\, and integrated security–development frameworks (Operation Atalanta and CRIMARIO).  \nDetailed Report\nPresentation by Dr. Abhisek Mishra\nDr. Mishra began by outlining the rationale of his study\, observing that the Western Indian Ocean (WIO) is a coherent geographic region stretching from Somalia to South Africa and including island nations such as Seychelles\, Mauritius\, Madagascar\, and Comoros. With a coastline of nearly 15\,000 kilometres\, a continental shelf of 450\,000 square kilometres\, and natural assets worth an estimated USD 333.8 billion\, the WIO is a region of immense strategic and economic significance. Historically\, it served as a vital trade corridor between the Persian Gulf\, the Indian subcontinent\, and beyond. Yet\, after the wave of decolonisation\, the region fell into relative neglect\, as global attention shifted to other theatres. \nThe early 2000s\, however\, marked a turning point. Rising incidents of piracy off Somalia\, the 2000 attack on USS Cole\, and the 2002 Limburg bombing in Yemen underscored the vulnerability of maritime traffic and catapulted the WIO into the international security agenda. Dr. Mishra emphasised that piracy was not just a law enforcement problem but a systemic threat to global commerce. By 2008\, the situation had escalated to such an extent that the international community began to mobilise a broad array of responses\, turning the WIO into a testing ground for capacity-building initiatives designed to address maritime insecurity. \nFrom a conceptual standpoint\, Dr. Mishra explained that capacity building has its roots in post-World War II development assistance\, which initially involved technical training\, financial aid\, and institution-building in newly independent states. By the 1990s\, with the rise of discourse on “failed states” and security sector reform\, capacity building assumed a prominent place in international security practice. In the maritime domain\, this took the form of both capacity building assistance—providing hardware such as vessels\, radars\, or coastal surveillance systems—and capability enhancement through training\, legal reform\, and skill development. The WIO\, he argued\, became an “international laboratory” for experimenting with such capacity building approaches. \nIn this context\, the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) played a central role through the 2009 Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC)\, signed by 21 countries. Loosely modelled on the earlier ReCAAP agreement in Asia\, the DCoC sought to build regional capacity against piracy by establishing information-sharing centres in Mombasa\, Dar es Salaam\, and Sanaa\, although the latter has been defunct since 2019 due to conflict. It also created training facilities such as the Djibouti Regional Training Centre\, supported by Japan and European donors. Over time\, amendments broadened its scope to include wider maritime crime and even blue economy issues. Nevertheless\, Dr. Mishra noted that these initiatives faced limitations: they focused too narrowly on piracy without integrating multi-agency approaches\, while littoral states such as Seychelles and Kenya often prioritised tangible assets like patrol vessels over workshops and training measures. Moreover\, coordination problems and lack of sustainable funding hampered the effectiveness of such training programs\, thereby underscoring that no single agency could monopolise the maritime domain and that inter-agency cooperation and local ownership were indispensable. \nA complementary but distinct effort was made by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) through its Maritime Crime Programme (MCP)\, launched in 2009 to address the absence of robust criminal justice mechanisms to prosecute pirates. The programme facilitated prisoner transfer agreements\, developed prosecution models\, and strengthened judicial capacity in countries like Seychelles and Kenya. By reforming criminal justice frameworks and mentoring police and coastguard agencies\, the UNODC sought to move beyond narrow counter-piracy responses toward more holistic maritime security governance. Combined with bureaucratic inefficiencies and under-resourcing\, this meant that the MCP achieved only partial success. Nonetheless\, its emphasis on legal and judicial capacity represented a valuable innovation in the WIO region’s maritime governance landscape. \nParallel to these developments\, the European Union emerged as a particularly active actor through its Common Security and Defence Policy. Operation Atalanta\, launched in 2008\, deployed naval forces to protect World Food Programme vessels and deter piracy. This military mission was complemented by civilian-led initiatives such as the MASE program and CRIMARIO\, which emphasised information sharing and maritime domain awareness. The EU even expanded its focus geographically\, extending CRIMARIO’s scope from the WIO to the broader Indo-Pacific. Despite these ambitious efforts\, EU programmes often suffered from excessive bureaucracy\, overlapping mandates\, and donor-driven priorities. African stakeholders frequently complained that these initiatives were designed with little consultation\, privileging European energy routes over African community concerns such as illegal\, unreported\, and unregulated fishing. While the EU succeeded in building some regional information networks\, its fragmented approach raised questions about sustainability and local ownership. \nBringing these threads together\, Dr. Mishra argued that India must draw lessons from these experiences as it recalibrates its maritime strategy. Under SAGAR— “Security and Growth for All in the Region”—India positioned itself as a net security provider in the Indian Ocean. With the recent articulation of India’s MAHASAGAR framework\, this vision has expanded to include East African littorals and the wider Indo-Pacific. India must back its declaratory visions with delivery\, consistency\, and trust-building. This requires balancing naval deployments with capacity building\, integrating African priorities such as combating IUU fishing\, and ensuring sustained cooperation in maritime domain awareness. Only by doing so can India consolidate its credibility and strengthen its role as a responsible stakeholder in the evolving maritime order of the Western Indian Ocean. \nDiscussants’ Comments\nRear Adm. Monty Khanna (External Discussant)\nRear Adm. Khanna commended the paper’s comprehensive scope and its timely focus on the WIO\, a region of increasing importance for India. He nevertheless pointed to critical gaps. First\, he noted the absence of a clear India angle in the written paper\, even though the presentation included some references. He urged Dr. Mishra to integrate India’s interests and contributions more explicitly. Second\, he suggested including China as a major external actor\, given its expanding naval and economic presence in the region. \nOn the case studies\, Rear Adm. Khanna highlighted that the IMO’s DCoC had achieved significant progress in training and information sharing\, but fell short in translating skills into assets and surveillance systems. He criticised the UN for allowing fragmented coalitions to dominate counter-piracy operations rather than establishing a centralised UN maritime framework. The EU\, he argued\, was hampered by excessive acronyms\, institutions\, and bureaucratic overlap. Khanna also stressed that India’s MAHASAGAR initiative must not remain a slogan like SAGAR. It needs policy depth\, institutional mechanisms\, and branding\, similar to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. He proposed a “comparative analysis” in the paper to identify which of the three models was most successful and why\, as this would make the research more policy-relevant. \nCmde. Abhay K. Singh (Internal Discussant)\nCmde. Singh focused on the theoretical underpinnings of capacity building. He drew a distinction between capacity building assistance (providing physical assets such as radars\, vessels\, or platforms) and capability enhancement (skills\, training\, and knowledge). Using this prism\, he argued\, one can better evaluate whether initiatives truly addressed African needs. For example\, the UNODC focused primarily on capability enhancement through legal reforms\, while the IMO attempted a mix of both hardware and training. He cautioned that much of the international approach has been elitist\, prioritising piracy  which threatened global shipping over issues like IUU fishing that affect African communities more directly. He cited critiques that EU programs were overly military-centric\, donor-driven\, and insufficiently consultative. For India\,  Cmde. Abhay K. Singh argued\, the lesson is to avoid top-down approaches and instead build cooperative frameworks that resonate with African priorities. \nDr. R. Vignesh (Internal Discussant)\nDr. Vignesh praised the paper’s information-rich narrative but suggested strengthening its analytical depth. He recommended including a dedicated comparative case study section that identified common successes and limitations of the three initiatives. Such a section\, he argued\, would provide a useful template for future multi-actor capacity building projects. He also urged incorporating African perspectives\, particularly criticisms that donor-driven programs often undermined African autonomy. Dr. Vignesh highlighted the importance of law enforcement challenges: for example\, during the height of piracy\, captured suspects were often released because of jurisdictional gaps. The UNODC’s prisoner transfer program partially addressed this\, but similar models could be extended to other maritime crimes such as IUU fishing. Finally\, he recommended elaborating on the role of external powers. While the paper mentioned militarisation and competition\, it could examine more closely how actors like China\, France\, and the US shape maritime security dynamics in the WIO. \nChair’s Comments: Vice Admiral Shekhar Sinha\nVice Admiral Sinha congratulated Dr. Mishra for producing a timely and well-researched paper. He echoed the discussants’ view that India’s role must be central to the analysis. Specifically\, he pointed out that the paper overlooked the role of the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) and India’s recent membership in Combined Task Forces (CTFs)\, which are crucial to maritime security in the Arabian Sea and Gulf of Oman. On MAHASAGAR\, Sinha cautioned against confining its scope to the Indo-Pacific. Since it is increasingly linked to the Global South\, its definition should remain flexible enough to encompass Africa\, Latin America\, and beyond. Drawing a parallel with China’s BRI\, he emphasised the need for institutionalisation. Slogans and vision statements must be backed by policies\, resources\, implementation\, and monitoring mechanisms. Without this\, India risks repeating the limitations of SAGAR. \nHe further highlighted Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) as India’s most impactful contribution. By integrating African states into India’s Information Fusion Centre for the Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR) and regional MDA networks\, India can provide tangible value. He cited the importance of combating IUU fishing\, which affects African livelihoods but often receives less attention than piracy. For India\, MDA offers a credible entry point to align with African priorities while reinforcing its security provider image. \nDirector General’s Comments: Amb. Sujan R. Chinoy\nAmbassador Chinoy offered strategic perspectives. He suggested that the paper should incorporate Indo-US cooperation on critical and emerging technologies. India’s designation as a “Major Defence Partner” (2016) and STA-1 status (2018) has opened avenues for technology transfers such as the GE-414 jet engine deal. These developments have implications not only for India’s defence industrial base but also for its maritime exports and capacity building. \nAmbassador Chinoy underscored that MAHASAGAR must not be confined to the Indo-Pacific alone. Rather\, it should be conceptualised as a flexible and inclusive framework that positions India as a maritime partner for the entire Global South. He argued that India’s engagement with Africa\, Latin America\, and other regions should fall under its ambit\, ensuring that Mahasagar becomes a global rather than a regional initiative. Drawing parallels with China’s Belt and Road Initiative\, he stressed that Mahasagar must evolve beyond a declaratory slogan into a robust framework supported by branding\, secretarial support\, institutional backing\, and monitoring mechanisms. Only through such institutionalisation\, he noted\, could India’s maritime vision achieve sustained visibility and strategic impact. \nQuestion & Answer \nThe Q&A session touched on several practical issues. Participants asked about the difference between capacity building and capability enhancement\, to which Rear Adm. Khanna clarified: capacity building involves hardware (radars\, coastal stations\, platforms)\, while capability enhancement is software (training\, legal frameworks\, skill sets). Both are essential\, but without training\, hardware investments yield little value. \nAnother question addressed India’s coordination with EU and US programs. Dr. Mishra explained that India cooperates mainly through information sharing under the Djibouti Code of Conduct and regional centres\, though structured joint programs are still limited. Recent green shoots of India-EU naval cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea were noted as promising. Other interventions raised the issue of African ownership. \nParticipants also highlighted law enforcement challenges. During peak piracy years\, navies often had to release captured suspects due to lack of jurisdiction. The UNODC’s prosecution models helped\, but further reforms are needed. Questions were also raised about regional organisations such as ECOWAS and the Indian Ocean Commission\, which could play stronger roles in setting African priorities. Finally\, participants urged India to strengthen its presence in Maritime Domain Awareness initiatives and integrate African states more fully into platforms such as the IFC-IOR and the Colombo Security Conclave. \nDr. Abhishek Mishra thanked all discussants and participants for their constructive feedback. He acknowledged that this was a working paper and committed to incorporating suggestions on India’s role\, comparative analysis\, and African perspectives in the final version. The Seminar underscored the strategic importance of the Western Indian Ocean and the need for sustainable maritime capacity building. International initiatives led by the IMO\, UNODC\, and EU have made valuable contributions but also revealed structural weaknesses\, ranging from donor-driven priorities to limited African ownership. For India\, the key lesson is to design cooperative frameworks that balance hard capacity building with skill enhancement\, align with African priorities such as IUU fishing and MDA\, and back declaratory visions like Mahasagar with institutional depth. Only then can India consolidate its role as a credible maritime partner for Africa and the wider Global South. \nThe report has been prepared by Mr. Mohanasakthivel J.\, Research Analyst\, Africa\, Latin America\, Caribbean and UN (ALACUN) Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/fellow-seminar-report
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20250620T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20250620T053000
DTSTAMP:20261027T163656
CREATED:20250730T224709Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260707T061144Z
UID:93153-1750397400-1750397400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:MP-IDSA Fellows Seminar “Private Sector Defence Joint Ventures: Exports and Role of Offsets”
DESCRIPTION:An MP-IDSA Fellows Seminar conducted by Dr. S. Samuel C. Rajiv\, Research Fellow\, on ‘Private Sector Defence Joint Ventures: Exports and Role of Offsets’ took place on 20 June 2025. It was chaired by Col. (Dr.) Rajneesh Singh (Retd.)\, Research Fellow and Coordinator of the Defence Economics and Industry Centre at MP-IDSA. The External Discussants for the paper were Shri Amit Cowshish\, former Financial Advisor (Acquisition)\, Additional Secretary and Member of the Defence Procurement Board at the Ministry of Defence (MoD)\, and Shri Puneet Sharma\, Indian Defence Accounts Service\, Additional CDA (Air Force)\, PCDA Air Force\, New Delhi. The Internal Discussant was Cmde. Abhay K. Singh (Retd.)\, Research Fellow and Coordinator of the Southeast Asia and Oceania Centre at MP-IDSA. \nExecutive Summary\nThe presentation focused on the private sector defence industry’s role and contribution to India’s defence exports. It examined the exports of private sector defence joint ventures with US\, French\, and Israeli original equipment manufacturers (OEMs). Dr. Rajiv highlighted that the private sector has contributed to India’s defence exports through policies such as offsets. Dr. Rajiv added that changes to offset policies will impact the private sector’s share of exports. With India targeting INR 50\,000 crore in defence exports by 2028–29\, the private sector will be crucial in reaching this target. \nDetailed Report\nCol. (Dr.) Rajneesh Singh (Retd.) began the proceedings by highlighting the growing role of India’s private sector in defence exports\, driven by policy reforms and strategic imperatives. In FY 2024–25\, India’s defence exports reached a record ₹23\,622 crore\, with the private sector contributing ₹15\,233 crore—about 64.5 per cent. Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs) also saw a sharp 42.85 per cent rise in exports. As the government aims for ₹50\,000 crore in defence exports and ₹3 lakh crore in total defence production by 2029\, the private sector—now contributing 21 per cent of defence production—is expected to play a crucial role through innovation\, efficiency\, and global competitiveness. Col.(Dr.)Singh (Retd.) noted that while the defence offsets policy may have contributed to exports by private sector defence companies\, it has not effectively enabled meaningful technology transfers and access to advanced technologies. \nDr. Rajiv began his presentation with an empirical overview of India’s defence export performance over the last decade. Between 2015 and 2025\, India achieved cumulative defence exports worth ₹109\,997.6 crore. A striking feature of this growth trajectory has been the pivotal role played by the private sector\, which accounted for ₹71\,328.97 crore\, representing 65 per cent of total exports. Even as the public sector dominates India’s defence industrial base\, the private sector has played an essential role in contributing a larger share of India’s defence exports in recent years. \nDr. Rajiv gave the historical background of the policy framework relating to offsets\, from the 2006 Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) to the 2020 Defence Acquisition Procedure (DAP)\, highlighting their respective stipulations for offset obligations. The 2006 DPP mandated 30 per cent offsets for defence procurements above ₹300 crore under ‘Buy (Global)’ or ‘Buy and Make with Transfer of Technology’ (ToT) categories. Over the years\, the framework became more nuanced with multipliers for Micro\, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs)\, DRDO-oriented ToTs\, and investments in Defence Industrial Corridors (DICs). By 2020\, offset applicability was limited to contracts above ₹2\,000 crore and excluded intergovernmental agreements (IGAs) and single-vendor cases. The cumulative offset contracts reached US$13.2 billion by March 2025\, with verified claims worth US$6 billion. \nDr. Rajiv then highlighted Indian private sector joint ventures with foreign OEMs. India has procured defence equipment from the US under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) programmes. India was designated a Major Defence Partner in June 2016. Dr. Rajiv highlighted that Tata Advanced Systems Limited (TASL) is a prime example of a successful offset-driven private sector company. TASL subsidiaries such as Tata Boeing Aerospace Limited (TBAL) have become the global sole supplier of Apache AH-64 fuselages\, having delivered nearly 200 units. TASL also collaborates with Raytheon to produce Stinger missile control assemblies. \nThe 2016 Rafale fighter aircraft deal marked a significant advancement in Indo-French defence cooperation\, with an offset requirement of 50 per cent\, significantly above the typical 30 per cent. Three joint ventures—Dassault Reliance Aerospace Ltd. (DRAL)\, Thales Reliance Defence Systems Ltd. (TRDSL)\, and L&T MBDA Missile Systems Ltd.—have been formed to fulfil these commitments. DRAL\, a partnership between Reliance Infrastructure and Dassault Aviation\, commenced operations in 2018\, producing fuselage components for the Falcon 2000 and Rafale aircraft. TRDSL\, on the other hand\, became the first Indian company to assemble and test the AESA radar for export to France. L&T MBDA Missile Systems\, established in 2017\, constructed a missile integration facility in Coimbatore\, investing heavily in infrastructure and Technology Transfer (ToT). \nIndo-Israeli defence collaborations have mainly concentrated on missile systems and unmanned platforms. The Kalyani Rafael Advanced Systems (KRAS) joint venture\, founded in 2015\, was India’s first private missile subsystem manufacturer. KRAS showcases successful high-technology exports from India\, with 95 per cent of its revenues derived from exports. The Adani Group\, another major player\, has partnered with Elbit Systems through several entities\, including Adani Elbit Advanced Systems and Atharva Advanced Systems. These joint ventures produce Sky Striker loitering munitions and Drishti-10 (Hermes 900) UAVs in Hyderabad for international markets. Linked to the Adani group\, Alpha Design Technologies also has significant export sales. \nDr. Rajiv concluded the presentation by noting that while the offset policy has historically catalysed private sector participation and exports\, its evolving scope—especially under DAP 2020—raises both opportunities and challenges. However\, these challenges are offset by promising trends. Private defence firms like Kalyani Strategic Systems Limited (KSSL)\, Solar Industries\, and Zen Technologies have secured substantial export orders independent of offset obligations. Moreover\, global defence spending—particularly by European countries—offers vast opportunities for Indian firms to integrate into global supply chains. \nShri Amit Cowshish\nShri Cowshish began by commending the speaker for a well-structured presentation. He highlighted the limitations of the Defence Offsets Policy in enhancing domestic defence capabilities\, noting that only one offset contract was signed between 2021 and 2025. Shri Cowshish pointed out that the 2020 reforms raised the contract value threshold to ₹2\,000 crore and excluded intergovernmental and single-vendor deals. Although contracts worth US$13.52 billion were signed\, only US$6.85 billion in claims were processed by 2024\, with limited success in integrating Indian firms into global supply chains and minimal gains in technology transfer or innovation capability. \nDesign flaws\, such as permitting vendors to opt for easier offset routes like direct purchases and burdensome bureaucratic procedures\, further weakened the policy’s impact\, leaving it disconnected from broader self-reliance goals under Atmanirbhar Bharat. While acknowledging that the offsets have indeed contributed to India’s defence exports\, as succinctly brought out by the presenter\, Shri Cowshish stressed the need for India to move beyond offsets and develop a cohesive defence industrial strategy focused on targeted R&D\, greater private sector participation\, long-term partnerships with OEMs\, and co-development models built on trust and innovation. \nShri Puneet Sharma\nShri Sharma commended the presentation and stressed the importance of assessing whether current measures effectively enhance indigenous technological capacity. He highlighted the need for focused training in core manufacturing skills to strengthen domestic capabilities. Shri  Sharma highlighted some key changes in the policy framework relating to Atmanirbharta\, including revisions to the Offset Policy with an emphasis on attracting investment and facilitating technology transfer through the provision of higher multipliers\, the establishment of two Defence Industrial Corridors in Uttar Pradesh and Tamil Nadu\, the opening of defence research and development (R&D) to industry\, start-ups\, and academia\, with 25 percent of the defence R&D budget earmarked for this purpose\, and the gradual increase in the defence budget allocation for military modernisation through procurement from domestic sources. \nShri Sharma emphasised the importance of monitoring offset obligation compliance through audits and progress reviews\, to use capital acquisitions to strengthen India’s defence industry by promoting globally competitive enterprises\, boosting R&D capacity in defence\, and supporting related sectors like civil aerospace and internal security. \nCommodore Abhay K. Singh (Retd.)\nCommodore Singh appreciated the presentation for effectively highlighting India’s offset policy’s evolution\, outlining its strengths and weaknesses and its contributions to India’s defence exports. He noted the significant rise in defence exports\, especially by the private sector\, which reached a record ₹21\,083 crore in FY 2023-24\, marking a 32.5 per cent increase over the previous year and a 31-fold jump since 2013-14. With exports now reaching over 100 countries\, India’s defence sector appears to be at a turning point. India’s defence industrial ecosystem is also buttressed by the government’s large defence order pipeline and increasing private sector participation. \nQ&A Session\nThe Q&A session mainly focused on technology transfer\, defence exports\, foreign vendor involvement\, research and development\, joint ventures\, and high-value technological collaborations. Col. (Dr) Singh (Retd.) observed that India has adopted an offset policy to leverage large arms imports to build a strong indigenous defence industry. Despite numerous offset contracts signed since 2005\, Col. (Dr.) Singh (Retd.) reinforced Shri Cowshish’s point that only one offset contract has been signed in recent years. Moreover\, reports by the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) and various analysts have highlighted the policy’s limited success in ToT\, among other factors. \nIt was also pointed out that the offset policy has not been able to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) or bring high-end manufacturing and technology into India. However\, the policy has benefited civilian aerospace component exports. Dr. Rajiv stated that the paper was limited to investigating whether offsets have supported defence exports by enabling domestic sourcing of parts for imported platforms and facilitating joint ventures and component exports by Indian offset partners. The Chair\, Col. (Dr.) Singh (Retd.) mentioned that the Defence Acquisition Procedure (DAP) 2020 is being revised and stated that it will be interesting to see if there will be changes to the offsets policy as well. Dr. Rajiv expressed gratitude for the constructive comments and suggestions for future research. \nReport prepared by Dr. Shayesta Nishat Ahmed\, Research Analyst\, Defence Economics and Industry Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/mp-idsa-fellows-seminar-private-sector-defence-joint-ventures-exports-and-role-of-offsets
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20250530T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20250530T053000
DTSTAMP:20261027T163656
CREATED:20250721T035836Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260707T051111Z
UID:93026-1748583000-1748583000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Visiting Fellow Presentation: Mr. Abyssinia Abay Mengistu on “India’s Bilateral vs. Multilateral Defence Cooperation: Meeting Ethiopia’s Security Needs” 
DESCRIPTION:Mr. Abyssinia Abay Mengistu\, Visiting Fellow\, India-Africa Security Fellowship Programme\, spoke on; “India’s Bilateral vs. Multilateral Defence Cooperation: Meeting Ethiopia’s Security Needs”  at MP-IDSA on 30 May 2025\, Dr. Rajeesh Kumar\, Centre Coordinator\,  Africa\, Latin America\, Caribbean & UN (ALACUN) Centre\, chaired the session. Centre members participated in the discussion. \nExecutive Summary:\nMr. Abyssinia Abay Mengistu’s presentation examined the evolving dynamics of India–Ethiopia defence cooperation\, comparing bilateral mechanisms with multilateral frameworks such as AFINDEX. He highlighted Ethiopia’s critical security challenges\, including escalating cyberattacks and border incursions\, and assessed India’s strategic responses. The presentation outlined how India’s bilateral engagement marked by the 2025 MoU offers tailored solutions in cybersecurity\, surveillance\, and capacity-building\, unlike the more generalized multilateral approaches. Mr. Mengistu stressed the operational and strategic value of bilateralism while acknowledging the complementary role of multilateral platforms. Overall\, the presentation affirmed that India’s bilateral defence partnership with Ethiopia aligns closely with Ethiopia’s evolving security imperatives and enhances India’s credibility as a responsive and trusted partner.  \nDetailed Report:\nThe session commenced with opening remarks by Dr. Rajeesh Kumar\, who welcomed the speaker and emphasised the growing importance of India’s security partnerships in Africa\, particularly in the Horn of Africa. He noted Ethiopia’s strategic location\, historical ties with India\, and its pivotal role in regional security architecture. Dr. Kumar introduced the speaker and underscored the significance of examining defence cooperation frameworks that reflect Ethiopia’s evolving security needs. \nMr. Abyssinia Abay Mengistu began his presentation by expressing gratitude to MP-IDSA for the opportunity to conduct this research under the India–Africa Security Fellowship programme. He then outlined a comprehensive investigation into the comparative efficacy of India’s bilateral and multilateral defence engagements\, with particular focus on the India–Ethiopia defence MoU and the Africa-India Field Training Exercise (AFINDEX). \nThe presentation provided an in-depth overview of Ethiopia’s changing security landscape. Mr. Mengistu highlighted that Ethiopia is among the most cyber-attacked countries globally\, citing a dramatic rise in cyber incidents\, including the geopolitical “Black Pyramid War” that targeted critical national infrastructure. He noted that only 25% of Ethiopia’s cyber workforce meets international standards\, underscoring a critical capacity gap. \nIndia’s bilateral value was particularly emphasised. Mr. Mengistu discussed how India’s tri-service Defence Cyber Agency\, cyber emergency response teams\, and specialized institutions such as Defence Information Assurance and Research Agency (DIARA) and the Defence Communication Network serve as strategic assets. He noted that the bilateral MoU signed in February 2025 grants Ethiopia access to these capabilities\, enabling knowledge transfer and institutional collaboration that far outpace what multilateral exercises like AFINDEX currently offer. \nShifting focus to physical security threats\, Mr. Mengistu analysed Ethiopia’s border insecurity\, particularly in its western and southern regions. He referenced repeated cross-border incursions by armed militias using drones and light weapons\, pointing to the Ethiopian state’s limited surveillance and response capacity. In this context\, India’s experience with the Comprehensive Integrated Border Management System (CIBMS) and its operational knowledge from managing borders with Pakistan and China were presented as crucial advantages for Ethiopia under the bilateral agreement. \nAFINDEX\, while valuable for promoting multilateral interoperability\, was critiqued for its narrow scope. Mr. Mengistu noted that its focus on peacekeeping and mine clearance does not adequately address Ethiopia’s contemporary threats\, particularly in the cyber and drone warfare domains. As such\, he argued that bilateralism offers a more responsive and tailored solution. \nThe presentation introduced a layered theoretical framework\, juxtaposing realism and liberal institutionalism.  Mr. Mengistu argued that Ethiopia’s pursuit of cyber sovereignty and strategic autonomy aligns with realist imperatives\, and India’s approach grounded in non-interference and mutual respect makes bilateralism more desirable. \nIn his concluding remarks\, Mr. Mengistu laid out three key takeaways. First\, India’s bilateral cooperation with Ethiopia offers higher operational value\, especially in cyber defence and border management. Second\, multilateral engagements like AFINDEX must evolve in scope to remain strategically relevant. Third\, bilateralism and multilateralism are not mutually exclusive; rather\, they must be balanced intelligently based on the security context. \nQ&A Session\nFollowing the presentation\, a comprehensive round of feedback was given by the scholars of the ALACUN Centre\, MP-IDSA. One of the central points raised was the need to articulate more clearly the rationale behind selecting Ethiopia as the case study. Mr. Mohan underlined that Ethiopia’s strategic relevance must be explicitly anchored in its geopolitical and security significance. \nMr. Mohan also recommended expanding the theoretical framework beyond the realist–liberal dichotomy\, which he noted was insufficient to capture the complexities of India–Ethiopia security cooperation. He suggested to incorporate\, relational security perspective and the concept of security assemblages. These frameworks provide a more nuanced understanding of defence cooperation\, not merely as intergovernmental exchanges but as dynamic networks involving institutions\, technologies\, policy norms\, and training ecosystems. Within this context\, India’s engagement with Ethiopia will be seen as a co-constructed process that evolves through shared learning and capacity-building\, rather than a top-down transfer of expertise. \nDr. Abhishek Mishra commended the depth and timeliness of the study and called for a stronger historical contextualisation of India’s defence engagement with Africa. He suggested tracing the evolution from India’s early military training initiatives and UN peacekeeping contributions to its more recent emphasis on bilateral partnerships. Dr. Mishra proposed a dedicated section titled “Why 2025?” to explain the timing of the India–Ethiopia defence MoU\, situating it within Ethiopia’s post-Tigray recalibration and India’s shifting strategic posture. He also advised that India’s multilateral engagements\, particularly AFINDEX\, be situated within a broader timeline of India–Africa security cooperation\, incorporating reference points such as FOCAC and AU–EU partnerships. \nTo enhance the empirical grounding of the paper\, Dr. Mishra urged the inclusion of official communications\, diplomatic exchanges\, and press releases between India and Ethiopia especially those involving the Joint Commission and recent defence dialogues. In addition\, he recommended a comparative analysis of India’s engagement vis-à-vis other actors\, especially China\, whose presence in Ethiopia spans critical sectors like cybersecurity\, surveillance\, and defence industrial development. \nDr. Saurabh Mishra offered detailed structural and analytical recommendations. He proposed reorganising the paper around Ethiopia’s three primary security concerns: cybersecurity and digital resilience\, border security and drone threats\, and gaps in defence industrial development. These themes\, he noted\, would allow for a more focused comparison of the effectiveness of bilateral and multilateral approaches specifically India’s bilateral MoU and the AFINDEX framework. \nDr. Mishra emphasised the need to explore Ethiopia’s strategic intent in seeking defence partnerships\, including the expected outcomes and long-term goals. He advised reframing the research question to focus on the conditions under which bilateralism provides better alignment with Ethiopia’s needs\, moving beyond a simplistic binary of bilateral versus multilateral engagement. Finally\, he called for the addition of a comparative sub-section analysing China’s evolving security role in Ethiopia especially through its work with Huawei\, China Electronics Technology Group Corporation and AI-driven surveillance and drone technologies to contextualise India’s position within a broader geopolitical competition. \nDr. Rajeesh Kumar offered macro-level guidance on situating the paper within the broader framework of India’s Africa strategy. He recommended anchoring the discussion in key developments such as the India–Africa Forum Summits (2008\, 2015\, 2023)\, the SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) initiative\, and India’s defence diplomacy through its ITEC (Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation Programme)\, naval deployments\, and training missions. He suggested that the India–Ethiopia partnership be portrayed not as an isolated bilateral engagement but as part of a coherent\, values-driven strategy that emphasises non-interference\, inclusivity\, and capacity-building. \nAdditionally\, Dr. Kumar encouraged a brief\, but critical overview of other international actors involved in Ethiopia’s security landscape including China (via Belt and Road Initiative and People’s Liberation Army partnerships)\, Turkey (notably in Unmanned Aerial Vehicle sales and policing support)\, the United Arab Emirates and the United States (via cyber training and military presence in Djibouti). Within this crowded strategic field\, India’s approach should be presented as a sovereign-friendly\, development-oriented alternative that complements rather than competes with existing partnerships. \nFollowing the detailed feedback session\, Mr. Abyssinia Abay Mengistu expressed his heartfelt gratitude to all the discussants for their thoughtful comments\, constructive suggestions\, and critical insights. He acknowledged the value of the discussion in enriching his ongoing research and affirmed his commitment to revising the paper in line with the recommendations received. Mr. Mengistu noted that the perspectives shared would significantly enhance the analytical depth\, empirical grounding\, and policy relevance of his work. \nAs the session concluded\, members of the Africa\, Latin America\, Caribbean & UN (ALACUN) Centre at MP-IDSA extended their best wishes to Mr. Mengistu on the successful completion of his fellowship tenure. The team warmly bid him farewell\, commending his contributions during his time at the Institute and wishing him continued success in his future academic and professional pursuits. \nThe report has been prepared by Mr. Mohanasakthivel J.\, Research Analyst\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/visiting-fellow-presentation-mr-abyssinia-abay-mengistu
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240827T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240827T053000
DTSTAMP:20261027T163656
CREATED:20240926T230335Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250828T053301Z
UID:82713-1724736600-1724736600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Report of Fellows Seminar on "The Necessity of Military - Civil Technology Fusion (MCTF) for Making India a Global Drone Hub@2030"
DESCRIPTION:The MP-IDSA Fellow’s Seminar presentation by Gp. Capt. (Dr.) R.K. Narang (Retd.)\, Senior Fellow\, MP-IDSA\, on “The Necessity of Military – Civil Technology Fusion (MCTF) for Making India a Global Drone Hub@2030” was held on 27 August 2024. It was chaired by Dr. V.K. Saraswat\, former Secretary\, Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO)\, currently Member NITI Aayog. The External Discussants for the paper were Professor Hari Babu Srivastava\, former DG DRDO\, currently Professor of Practice at IIT Delhi\, and Cmde. Jaideep Maolankar (Retd.) from Newspace Research & Technologies Pvt. Ltd. The Director General\, MP-IDSA\, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, the Deputy Director General\, Gp.Capt. (Dr.) Ajey Lele (Retd.) and scholars of the Institute participated in the Seminar. \nExecutive Summary\nThe session deliberated on making India an atmanirbhar (self-reliance) drone hub @2030\, emphasising military-civil drone technology development initiatives\, challenges and the way forward. Key challenges include reliance on imports\, lack of civil drone R&D ecosystem\, gaps in defence UAV development programs and reducing import dependence of critical systems. Recommendations by the speaker included military-civil technology fusion (MCTF)\, designating an existing ministry as a nodal ministry for drone technology\, launching civil drone R&D initiatives\, fostering design capabilities\, building testing infrastructure\, creating indigenous content certification mechanism and formulating Indian standards among others\, on which further discussion took place. \nDetailed Report\nAmb. Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General\, MP-IDSA opened the session by introducing Dr. V.K. Saraswat\, Member of NITI Aayog\, as the Chairperson. He highlighted India’s progress towards greater self-reliance\, emphasising that this does not equate to self-sufficiency. Self-reliance\, he explained\, allows ample room for international collaboration. India has actively engaged with countries such as the United States\, the United Kingdom\, France and others. It is negotiating with global partners on the development of aero engines and other technologies. \nDr. V.K. Saraswat noted thatIndian industry’s efforts toward aatmanirbharta (self-reliance) in the field of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) have been limited\, particularly in the development of those with strategic value. However\, he acknowledged significant progress in civilian drone technology\, with applications ranging from entertainment and agriculture to logistics. The core technology behind drones remains consistent\, with variations primarily in payloads and command and control systems. In the civilian sector\, however\, the understanding of drone technology in India is limited\, with only a few companies excelling in this area. \nFurthermore\, Dr. Saraswat underlined that due to lack of focus\, the civilian sector has largely depended on import of critical components. There are also distinct differences in the requirements for civilian versus military applications. As future warfare is likely to involve large-scale deployment of unmanned systems\, achieving self-reliance in UAV technology requires a mission-driven approach to develop all critical components. \nGp. Capt. (Dr.) R.K. Narang (Retd.) began his presentation by highlighting the critical role of the Semi-Conductor Laboratory (SCL) in Chandigarh in hand-holding of the drone startups\, aimed at exploring the feasibility of developing chips to enhance security. He noted that his presentation addresses four key areas: military-civil drone policies\, technology development\, ecosystems and military-civil technology fusion (MCTF). He emphasised the need for significant reforms in the civilian drone sector\, as well as some improvements in the defence sector. \nAccording to Gp. Capt. Narang\, while India has set the ambitious goal of becoming a global drone hub\, the definition of what this entails remains unclear. He defines it as a “technology and innovation-driven\, high-tech\, high-value civil-military drone industry\, where India is self-reliant in critical technologies\, while also being a global leader in certain niche technologies.” \nThe growth of the Indian drone industry\, he explained\, will depend on proactive R&D\, innovation and the creation of drone technologies. Additionally\, the formulation of Indian standards\, standardisation and trial-based certifications of emerging and enabling drone technologies will play a crucial role in achieving this vision. With standards for drones still evolving\, India must adopt a proactive approach to formulate Indian standards to remain competitive in this sector. \nGp. Capt. Narang further elaborated on the contribution of civil drone policy initiatives\, beginning with the Drone Rules 2021\, which significantly transformed India’s drone sector by addressing operations\, certification\, training\, and Production-Linked Incentives (PLI). He also highlighted certain gaps and limitations in the drone policies. He observed India does not have a policy on certification by a drone technician. The PLI scheme supported drone manufacturing by domestic industry while simultaneously easing the import of drone components\, which\, in turn\, made the industry reliant on imports. Although India has an airworthiness certification mechanism\, there is no indication of whether products or components are indigenous. He also called for reforms in certification of drone batteries by citing an example where an Indian company developed innovative batteries\, but the Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) found it difficult to deviate from predefined standards to give them certification. \nGp. Capt. Narang pointed out that policy initiatives were focused on facilitating drone operation and not on development or the validation of indigenous drone technologies. Notably\, the Ministry of Civil Aviation lacks policies\, structures and mechanisms for atmanirbharta in civil drone technologies. Discussing development challenges\, he emphasised the lack of focus of innovation hubs on addressing the technology gaps. Furthermore\, civil drone development initiatives by the Department of Science and Technology\, MeitY and others are not focused on developing specific drone technologies. Globally\, civil aviation entities are leading development of enabling technologies and integration of drones into their national airspace; however\, similar initiatives by Ministry of Civil Aviation/Directorate General of Civil Aviation are lacking. \nGp. Capt. Narang explained that a major limitation in India is the absence of an R&D vertical within the Ministry of Civil Aviation. In the private sector\, investment in R&D is alarmingly low—that generally varies between 1 to 5 percent in most companies as compared to 10-20 % by global leaders—indicating a lack of focus on technological innovation. He stressed the need for greater demands on industry bodies and the private sector to drive meaningful technological progress. \nGp. Capt. Narang explained that India must also prioritise building an ecosystem for civilian drone test sites\, as some Indian companies are currently forced to test their drones abroad. Accreditation remains a challenge for the Indian drone industry\, and there is a pressing need to archive civil drone test data to facilitate the validation of technologies. Currently\, drone education in India is limited\, with only a few courses like the M.Tech program at IIT Kanpur and a handful of other universities offering specialised education. Strengthening higher education in the drone sector is essential to foster deep research in critical drone technologies within the country. \nFocusing on the defence UAV sector\, Gp. Capt. Narang mentioned that significant policy measures have been implemented\, such as the MAKE-1\, MAKE-2\, and Indigenously Designed\, Developed\, and Manufactured (IDDM) categories in the Defence Acquisition Procedure (DAP). Initiatives like iDEX and the Mehar Baba Competition have also played a key role in advancing technological development in the drone sector. Additionally\, he recommended induction of test pilots and test engineers by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO)\, National Aerospace Laboratories (NAL) and industry to help them in bridging the gap between drone designs and user expectations in UAV programs and the broader development of aviation technologies. \nOn the issue of indigenous content (IC)\, Gp. Capt. Narang emphasised the need for an expert body dedicated to IC certification\, which is currently lacking. India does not have a mechanism to identify indigenous content\, and he stressed the importance of creating one. He drew attention towards the need for archiving indigenous designs and content within Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs) and the DRDO. He recommended reforming the Development Cum Production Partner (DcPP) model to a Development Production and User (DPU) model\, where the user becomes a partner in the process rather than merely a reviewer of technology. \nGp. Capt. Narang also suggested that platforms like GeM should include verticals for iDEX\, Mehar Baba\, or IDDM to promote indigenous technologies. Also\, there is a need to standardise trial methodologies that are universally accepted\, which would help reduce challenges faced by startups in the drone industry. \nGp. Capt. Narang further highlighted the long-standing lack of interest in developing drone engines\, emphasising the urgent need to address this gap. According to him\, internal combustion (IC) engines\, in particular\, remain a weak area for India\, with challenges in commercialisation\, as well as competing with global Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) in terms of quality and efficiency. Another issue is the increasing acquisition of promising Indian startups and talent by foreign companies and VCs\, which calls for concerted efforts to prevent the loss of domestic talent and innovation. \nGp. Capt. Narang proposed the development of a mechanism to test the indigenous content (IC) of materials and software components for greater transparency and clarity. Moreover\, he advocated for the creation of a National MCTF initiative\, alongside a policy for aatmanirbharta in civil drone technology. He also called for designation of an existing ministry as a nodal ministry for civil UAV technology\, a National UAV Technology Mission\, and a National UAV Technology Fund to focus efforts in this critical domain. Additionally\, there is a need for a Positive Indigenisation List across all ministries and the creation of civil drone testing corridors and sites. \nLastly\, he proposed introducing an “IC 1” rating\, in addition to L1 and T1 criteria\, to recognise the highest levels of Indigenous Content in drone technology. \nProf. Hari Babu Shrivastava made several observations and recommendations\, raising key questions such as what defines a “hub” and how the MCTF initiative would benefit society\, industry\, and the economy as a whole. He referenced a report by Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry\, expressing concern that India’s indigenisation process may not keep pace with the country’s projected capabilities by 2030. He also noted that countries like Turkey and Iran have made significant advances in drone exports\, emphasising the need for India to accelerate its efforts in this sector to remain competitive on the global stage. \nCmde. Jaideep Maolankar (Retd.) expressed concern that specific recommendations may not be effective if the mechanisms and processes for implementation remain unchanged. He also raised concerns on the draft of the Military Airworthiness Bill\, pointing out that many issues stem from deep-rooted cultural challenges\, such as a risk-averse mindset and siloed working practices. He noted that many countries are already ahead of India in drone technology\, and instead of following the same path\, India should think ahead and adopt a different approach. \nFor instance\, he suggested that India should focus on collaborative robotics rather than UAVs. He emphasised the importance of understanding business models and advised companies to prioritise customer needs over their own preferences\, highlighting the necessity of focusing on requirements engineering to align with real market demands. \nQuestions and Comments\nAmbassador Chinoy\, in his remarks\, posed the question of how drone technologies can be developed to meet the specific needs of infantry\, particularly in terms of supply delivery and stock management. He also said that regarding engine testing\, the Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE) already has robust facilities\, such as those used for the Kaveri engine. If India’s private sector develops its own engines\, these testing facilities can be made available to support the testing and validation of their designs\, encouraging collaboration between public and private sectors. \nIn his concluding remarks\, Dr. Saraswat said that in India\, the technological lag often leads organisations to import new technologies for commercial use\, rather than focusing on developing their own innovations. This approach creates challenges in increasing indigenous content\, especially in critical technologies. Indigenous content should be measured in terms of critical technology development\, not merely by the percentage of cost of local components in a product. \nAnother issue is India’s reliance on foreign designs\, which are re-engineered and manufactured locally\, highlighting the need to strengthen domestic design capabilities. Additionally\, India should aim to leapfrog technological advancements rather than merely trying to catch up with advanced technologies. \nReport prepared by Mr. Rohit Kumar Sharma\, Research Analyst\, North America & Strategic Technologies Centre.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/report-of-fellows-seminar-on-the-necessity-of-military-civil-fusion-mcf-for-making-india-a-global-drone-hub2030
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240506T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240506T053000
DTSTAMP:20261027T163656
CREATED:20240506T222936Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250828T053313Z
UID:81015-1714973400-1714973400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:MP-IDSA Fellow’s Seminar on Evolution of African Maritime Security: Imperatives\, Governance and Challenges
DESCRIPTION:The MP-IDSA Fellow’s Seminar presentation by Dr. Abhishek Mishra\, Associate Fellow\, MP-IDSA\, on “Evolution of African Maritime Security: Imperatives\, Governance and Challenges” was held on 29 February 2024. It was chaired by Vice Admiral Satish Kumar Namdeo Ghormade\, PVSM\, AVSM\, NM (Retd.)\, former Vice Chief of Naval Staff. The External Discussants for the paper were Commander Abhijit Singh\, Head\, Maritime Policy Initiative\, Observer Research Foundation (ORF)\, and Dr. Pooja Bhatt\, Consultant\, Ministry of External Affairs and Researcher on Maritime Security and Governance. The Internal Discussants were Ms. Ruchita Beri\, Consultant\, Africa\, Latin America\, Caribbean\, & UN (ALACUN) Centre\, MP-IDSA\, and Cmde. Abhay K. Singh\, Research Fellow & Coordinator\, Southeast Asia and Oceania Centre\, MP-IDSA. \nExecutive Summary\nThe development of a maritime security agenda for African countries has been relatively new\, despite the continent being completely surrounded by water. Following the emergence of the scourge of piracy off the coast of Somalia\, African countries and international actors started to pay due attention to ensuring maritime security. Although armed robbery at sea has sensitised the countries of Africa and the international community to the threats in the African maritime domain (AMD)\, an overemphasis on piracy and armed robbery has skewed perceptions about the African maritime landscape. The challenges today are much broader\, and the resultant strategies employed by African countries go beyond tackling piracy. Thus\, in the present time\, African maritime strategies tend to focus on the common interests of wealth creation and sustainable governance. \nDetailed Report\nDr. Mishra’s research explored the potential of the “blue economy” or “blue growth” approach in mitigating maritime crime in African waters. He also examined the evolution of maritime security within the African context over the past two decades. \nPreviously neglected\, Dr. Mishra argued that Africa’s colonial past fostered a “sea blindness\,” hindering a focus on maritime security. He emphasised the ambiguity of the term “maritime security\,” highlighting the varying interpretations by Till (2018) with hard and soft security distinctions\, Bueger’s (2015) constructivist approach with the Maritime Security Matrix\, and Siebels’ (2020) “Tale of Two Regions” incorporating positive and negative definitions. \nHe further underscored the criticality of Africa’s maritime sector. Firstly\, 38 out of 54 African territories are island nations or coastal states. Secondly\, Africa boasts a vast coastline exceeding 26\,000 nautical miles. Finally\, the number and capabilities of actors threatening the African Maritime Domain (AMD) are continuously rising. These factors necessitate a commensurate response at national\, regional\, and continental levels. \nMoreover\, while explaining the threats and vulnerabilities of the African Maritime Domain (AMD)\, he categorised them into three main areas. Governance issues encompass illicit fishing\, marine pollution\, illegal oil bunkering\, and crude oil theft. Security concerns include armed robbery\, piracy\, and trafficking in weapons\, drugs\, and wildlife. Finally\, humanitarian assistance needs encompass Search and Rescue (SAR)\, Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR)\, and out-of-area emergencies. \nHe then highlighted the Stable Seas Maritime Security Index\, which ranks nations based on nine criteria relevant to Africa\, including global cooperation\, legality\, maritime safety\, coastal well-being\, the blue economy\, fishing practices\, piracy\, illegal trade\, and mixed migration via sea. \nHowever\, Dr. Mishra acknowledged the ongoing debate surrounding maritime security (MS) in Africa. He said that scholars grapple with a unified definition within the African context. Since 2005\, the African Union (AU)\, Regional Economic Communities (RECs)\, and the African Union Commission (AUC) have actively discussed the African Maritime Domain (AMD) primarily in relation to piracy. The initial discourse revealed diverse interests and a complex web of African-international relationships. Notably\, African RECs have collaborated with the United Nations\, International Maritime Organization\, and other nations. \nHe further emphasised Africa’s pre-existing engagement in maritime governance. By 2000\, 37 African nations were already members of the International Maritime Organization (IMO)\, and the continent had a maritime transit charter established in 1993. Additionally\, African countries ratified key agreements like the 1974 SOLAS Convention (safety of life at sea) and the 2004 ISPS Code (security of ships and port facilities). \nThe 2000 International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR) provided the foundation for the first pan-African initiatives to bolster SAR capabilities. Between 2007 and 2011\, five Maritime Rescue Coordination Centers (MRCCs) and twenty-six sub-centers were established in strategic locations like Mombasa\, Cape Town\, Lagos\, Monrovia\, and Rabat. \nDr. Mishra also highlighted the significance of informal gatherings and conferences fostering maritime cooperation since 2005. These include the IMO-sponsored Sea Power for Africa Symposium (SPAS)\, the U.S. Naval Command’s East Africa and Southwest Indian Ocean Maritime Security Conference (EASWIO)\, and the Indian Navy’s Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS)\, alongside regional meetings in Sana’a\, Muscat\, and Dar es Salaam. The establishment of the Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC) in January 2009 marked a further step towards regional cooperation. \nMoreover\, Dr. Mishra made a distinction between the Yaoundé Code of Conduct (YCoC) and the Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC). Adopted in January 2009\, the DCoC focuses on piracy and armed robbery suppression in the Western Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden. Its core objective is to facilitate international cooperation through information sharing\, training nitiatives\, national legislation updates\, and counter-piracy measures. The DCoC+\, established through the 2017 Jeddah Amendment\, addresses additional threats like illegal\, unreported\, and unregulated (IUU) fishing and human trafficking. \nOn the other hand\, the YCoC\, ratified in 2013 by 25 West and Central African nations\, targets a broader range of illicit maritime activities in the Gulf of Guinea\, including piracy\, armed robbery\, and IUU fishing. Information sharing is a central pillar\, achieved through two regional centers: (i) Regional Centre for Maritime Security in Central Africa (CRESMAC) under the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and (ii) the West Africa Regional Maritime Security Centre (CRESMAO) under the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). \nDr. Mishra highlighted key differences. The DCoC\, designed from the outset to combat piracy on the high seas\, actively seeks international assistance. Conversely\, the YCoC prioritizes preserving signatory sovereignty. Additionally\, the YCoC incorporates measures absent from the DCoC\, such as seizing assets linked to illicit activities\, mitigating IUU fishing\, and addressing pollution prevention (a broader maritime concern beyond traditional security). Finally\, the YCoC uses the term “signatories\,” while the DCoC uses “participants.” \nHe moved on to explain Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy (AIM 2050) as a unified effort to revitalize the maritime sector for the continent’s development. AIM 2050 aims to leverage Africa’s waterways and oceans for the benefit of its maritime industries. Additionally\, the African Union (AU) is fostering a maritime security community tailored to Africa’s unique needs\, experiences\, and practices. \nHe discussed the Lomé Charter\, formally known as the African Charter on Maritime Security\, Safety\, and Development in Africa\, signed in October 2016. It builds upon the AIM 2050 Strategy by transitioning maritime security in Africa from a “soft law” approach (non-binding guidelines) to a “hard law” approach with a legally binding treaty. This shift is in contrast to earlier instruments like the DCoC or AIM 2050. Notably\, while 25 nations signed the Lomé Charter\, only Benin\, Senegal\, and Togo have ratified it thus far. \nIn addition to that\, he emphasised the AU’s focus on promoting sustainable utilization of Africa’s ocean resources. He terms the Blue Economy (BE) as the “new frontier for Africa’s renaissance\,” highlighting its significance. The 2018 Sustainable Blue Economy Conference in Nairobi\, Kenya\, served as a key platform to discuss the applicability of the Blue Economy concept in Africa. \nIn conclusion\, Dr. Abhishek acknowledged the mixed success of various community-based and government-led Blue Economy initiatives in Africa. He argued that social equity and ecological sustainability haven’t received the same level of attention as economic benefits. He emphasized that people are the foundation of any successful Blue Economy endeavour. For Africa’s Blue Economy development to thrive\, it must prioritise social fairness\, environmental preservation\, and a robust institutional governance framework. \nThis was followed by Comments from the External Discussants. \nComments and Questions\nFollowing Dr. Mishra’s presentation\, the discussion shifted\, with Cdr. Abhijit Singh emphasizing the value of the “sea blindness” concept in academic and policy circles. He linked national security postures to global commons management\, highlighting how a state’s sea blindness or sea consciousness can impact its ability to address global maritime challenges. He argued that fragmented perspectives and challenges to coordination among African nations hinder effective action. He identified poverty and poor governance (extending to maritime domains) as key issues. He also mentioned CRESMAC and CRESMAO as maritime information centers focused on West and Central Africa. He made the case that we have to identify the challenges facing Africa’s marine sector and provide a targeted set of solutions. He stated that the lack of an Indian policy perspective in the study is the sole area of concern. Lastly\, he said it is essential to assess each of the instruments mentioned above closely. \nDr. Pooja Bhatt then offered insights on Africa’s evolving maritime approach. She noted a shift from the basic needs (food\, security\, and resources) to complex issues like trade\, the security of traditional and non-traditional rights\, and the intricate legal and technical aspects of addressing these challenges. Moreover\, she emphasised the importance of definitions in maritime security. Clear definitions help identify stakeholders and goals\, facilitating collaboration. However\, excessive focus on definitions can hinder progress. She commended the AU’s approach as a valuable model for regional cooperation on maritime security. Dr. Bhatt concluded by urging India to take a leadership role in establishing a dedicated maritime security office within the United Nations\, advocating a collective vision from the Global South on maritime security. \nThis was followed by Comments from the Internal Discussants. \nMs. Ruchita Beri highlighted the historical perception of land as a place to reside and the sea as a passage. This perspective shapes how power and security are traditionally viewed\, often neglecting the maritime domain. She pointed to the Berlin Conference’s impact on Africa\, where colonial powers focused on land wealth and used the seas for resource extraction\, neglecting maritime security concerns. She went on to point out the various narratives developed in maritime security\, shaped by African think tanks and academics. She urged Dr. Mishra to delve into questions pertaining to the root causes of the conduct of the African nations and the persistence of the problems in the region. \nCmde. Abhay Kumar Singh cautioned against a singular view of African maritime security. He identified two key schools of thought within Africa and argued that security is not solely about laws and standards. Power\, strategy\, and wealth are crucial elements for effective maritime security\, and Africa’s challenges in these areas contribute to its maritime insecurity. He asked Dr. Mishra to elaborate on a postmodernist viewpoint\, focusing on the rationale for the existence of this information and the reasons behind the state of affairs. \nThis was followed by Comments from the Floor. \nDirector General\, Amb. Sujan R. Chinoy stated that the whole issue is being explored without delving into the essential question of what it is about Africa’s economic growth that genuinely shapes its marine environment. There is undoubtedly substantial economic hardship that exists in the littoral regions\, which extends to the marine environment and vice versa. Furthermore\, as an Indian researcher studying the topic\, he asked Dr. Mishra to consider the Marine Biodiversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ) and expand on what specific aspect of the G20 proclamation seems to have been tailored specifically for today’s theme. \nWhen the house was opened for questions\, a question regarding Africa’s opposition to Western-led security formations was raised. The panelists responded by highlighting China’s growing role in African security\, noting the 2023 China-Africa Security Forum as a point of geopolitical interest to India. \nVice Admiral Satishkumar Namdeo Ghormade concluded the discussion by emphasising the strategic significance of Africa’s resources and location. He attributed the continent’s vulnerability to a lack of technology\, defensive forces\, and the multitude of challenges it faces. \nThe Report was prepared by Ms. Anusha Khurana\, Intern\, ALACUN Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/mp-idsa-fellows-seminar-on-evolution-of-african-maritime-security-imperatives-governance-and-challenges
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20231026T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20231026T053000
DTSTAMP:20261027T163656
CREATED:20240514T030756Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250828T053327Z
UID:81218-1698298200-1698298200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Report of MP-IDSA Fellows Seminar: “Iran in the Emerging (Eur)Asian Order: Mapping the Rise of a Regional Middle Power”
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Deepika Saraswat\, Associate Fellow\, West Asia Centre\, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA)\, presented her Fellow Paper on “Iran in the Emerging (Eur)Asian Order: Mapping the Rise of a Regional Middle Power” at the MP-IDSA Fellows Seminar held on 26 October 2023. The Seminar was chaired by Professor Gulshan Dietl\, former Professor\, School of International Studies (SIS)\, Jawaharlal Nehru University. The External Discussants were Professor A.K. Ramakrishnan\, Centre for West Asian Studies\, SIS\, Jawaharlal Nehru University and Dr. Meena Singh Roy\, Senior Fellow (West and Central Asia)\, Tillotama Foundation. Dr. Rajorshi Roy\, Associate Fellow\, Europe and Eurasia Centre and Dr. Jason Wahlang\, Research Analyst\, Europe and Eurasia Centre\, MP-IDSA\, were Internal Discussants. Director General of MP-IDSA\, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy and scholars of the Institute attended the Seminar.  \nExecutive Summary\nThree noteworthy trends delineate Iran’s emerging middle power behaviour. Firstly\, there is a proactive involvement in Asian multilateralism\, exemplified by active participation in regional institutions like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Secondly\, Iran employs an ideational strategy that leverages its civilisational identity and values as a foundation for nurturing an Asian regional security community. Thirdly\, Iran strategically positions itself as a geographic-civilisational “bridge\,” actively facilitating connections in transcontinental connectivity initiatives spearheaded by major powers\, including China\, Russia\, and India. These trends collectively signify Iran’s role in shaping the geoeconomic landscape of (Eur)Asia. \nDetailed Report\nIn his opening remarks\, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy welcomed the Chair and the External and Internal Discussants. He emphasised the importance of Iran being a part of India’s close neighbourhood and how India’s Act West policy encapsulates geopolitical and civilisational relations. He stated that Iran has special significance in West Asian politics. Amb. Chinoy highlighted that Iran frequently remains in the news for one or other issues like being part of a long-drawn imbroglio in Yemen with the Houthi problem\, Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)\, nuclear postures\, bilateral relations with the US\, and peace and security in the Persian Gulf. He outlined the role of Iran in the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC). \nIt was also noted that Iran has been a general outlier in the international system but gains a significant constituency when required. Its bilateral relations with India are mostly on a reciprocal basis. Amb. Chinoy recalled his tenure at the UN from 1992-1995 and specified that\, particularly in 1994-95\, Iran was instrumental in helping India counter Pakistan-backed human rights resolutions in Geneva. \nIntroducing the topic\, Dr. Deepika Saraswat highlighted the context of Iran’s return to a ‘Look East’ strategy and emerging middle power behaviour. She stated that Iran preferred Eastern partnerships over the West\, advocating closer ties with neighbouring nations and collaboration with countries sharing common goals. As a Persian country\, Iran desired to find a home in Asia to overcome identity isolation. Iran’s preference for the term “West Asia” over “Middle East” indicates this transformative paradigm. Dr. Saraswat further pointed out that Iran strategically channels its investments in Asia\, forging alliances with rising powers such as China\, India\, and Russia. Iran is seeing growing convergence between East\, Central\, West and South Asian regional systems. Dr. Saraswat highlighted the significance of Iran’s outlook in the evolving geopolitical landscape where mega connectivity projects are seen cooperatively\, considering it an opportunity. Iran has placed development-security connections and regional connectivity at the forefront of its regional cooperation initiatives. \nThe Speaker outlined multiple definitions of middle powers to contextualise Iran’s position. Middle powers possess the military and strategic strength requisite to elicit support from great powers during peacetime. Although they may not emerge victorious against great powers in times of conflict\, these middle powers can inflict disproportionate costs upon them. She articulated that being categorised as a middle power involves possessing specific capabilities\, adopting a particular attitude\, and asserting a distinct national identity. \nTo analyse Iran’s behaviour\, Dr. Saraswat used the concept of emerging middle powers\, especially in the post-Cold War era context. Emerging middle powers possess substantial relative power advantages over their smaller neighbours. These nations manifest dissatisfaction with their current standing and aspire to carve an independent trajectory guided by their interests\, values\, and ambitions for regional and global influence. Notably\, many of these middle powers have historical and cultural backgrounds that align with the concept of civilisational states. She highlighted that revisionist emerging middle powers actively seek to reshape the prevailing international order\, often aligning themselves with revisionist great powers in pursuit of their objectives. \nIran has positioned the “Look East” policy or “Asia orientation” as a central focus within incumbent Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi’s led foreign policy framework. The formalisation of Iran’s deepening engagement with Eur(Asia) was marked by its full membership approval in the SCO during the 21st summit\, a development Dr. Saraswat identified as a significant milestone in Iran’s evolving regional strategy. \nPositioned as a middle power\, Iran has demonstrated several key behaviours\, as outlined by the speaker: \nFirstly\, Iran has actively embraced “Asian multilateralism” by participating in regional institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). Initially joining as an Observer in 2004\, Iran applied for full membership in 2008\, ultimately achieving it in 2023. Dr. Saraswat contextualised this Iranian initiative within the institutional balancing framework\, replacing conventional military means with a focus on leveraging multilateral institutions to gain power and influence in world politics. Ebrahim Raisi’s address at the UNGA in 2023\, envisioning a novel and equitable world order rooted in regional cooperation\, was cited as evidence of Iran’s commitment to this approach. The Speaker noted that the withdrawal of the United States from Afghanistan\, coupled with the subsequent takeover by the Taliban\, has not only highlighted the diminishing influence of the US in shaping the regional order but has also triggered a realignment in the regional geopolitical landscape. Iran’s involvement in the 3+3 regional cooperation format to resolve problems of the South Caucasus without the interference of extra-regional and Western countries is a part of its regional diplomacy. \nSecondly\, Iran has employed its civilisational identity and values to construct an ideational strategy to foster an Asian regional security community. Dr. Saraswat highlighted Iran’s practice of framing bilateral ties with Asian powers\, including India and China\, in civilisational terms. Iran’s leaders have offered a conception of Asia as comprising diverse civilisations and cultures\, emphasising regional cultural and ideational autonomy and rejection of the Western normative universalism based on liberal democracy. The call for endogenous security and Asian unity by Iran was noted to align with the Chinese President’s ‘new Asian security concept\,’ emphasising the leadership of Asians in Asian affairs. The Speaker also mentioned  Iran’s effort toward displacing Turkiye’s ethnic-linguistic narrative of pan-Turkism. \nThirdly\, drawing from its notion of geographical centrality\, Iran strategically positions itself as a geographic-civilisational “bridge\,” actively connecting transcontinental connectivity initiatives spearheaded by China\, Russia\, and India. Iran considers itself a civilisational crossroad in the Silk Road narrative. The Speaker argued that Iran looks at the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) with both optimism and fear as BRI proposes to address the development deficit but can have adverse geopolitical implications. BRI may lead to Russia-China’s ‘Great Game’ and can have implications for Iran’s transit potential and bargaining power in Central Asian energy markets. This role underscores Iran’s significance in facilitating broader regional cooperation and integration. Dr. Saraswat also emphasised Iran’s declared foreign-policy priority of developing friendly cooperative relations with Central Asian countries and its pivotal role as a ‘gateway’ in the INSTC. Furthermore\, Iran’s ‘bridge’ role in projects such as BRI\, the Eurasian Economic Union\, and INSTC was underscored\, emphasising the Iranian focus on the complementary nature of these initiatives rather than their competitive dynamics. \nDr. Saraswat noted that Iran is actively articulating a conspicuous regional role in (Eur)Asia by promoting regional autonomy\, aligning with the shared objectives of Russia and China. Notably\, Iran’s observable effort is to enhance its geoeconomic ties with the three principal actors in the region\, namely China\, Russia\, and India. This strategic engagement aims to mitigate the potential challenges of multipolar rivalry and the prospect of Chinese-led hegemonic regionalism. \nProf. A. K. Ramakrishnan offered positive feedback on the paper\, commending its logical argumentation and contribution to comprehending Iran’s (Eur)Asia policy. He suggested additional nuances to enhance the analysis\, emphasising the need to highlight Iran’s quest for both strategic and regional autonomy. Encouraging the inclusion of major trends characterising emerging middle powers\, he underscored the importance of considering major powers entering the geopolitical space as Iran navigates through it. \nThe impact of sanctions and isolation on Iran’s economy\, along with resulting constraints in foreign relations\, particularly with the West\, was noted. Prof. Ramakrishnan stressed the significance of contextualising Iran’s power positioning as an Emerging Middle Power within the context of its historical isolation. He also highlighted the guiding principles of Iran’s foreign policy\, focusing on its revolutionary nature and the pursuit of a dignified existence. \nFurther suggestions included exploring East-West dimensions\, considering Iran’s call for unity and its role in the non-aligned movement within the paper. The importance of recognising Iran as an ideological state\, with domestic politics playing a role in its ideological revivalism\, was emphasised. The recommendation to include immediate neighbouring countries\, including Afghanistan\, aimed at providing a more comprehensive understanding of Iran’s foreign relations. Prof. Ramakrishnan concluded by stating the paper connects conceptual aspects with empirical descriptions and acknowledged the paper’s strength lies in capturing the intricate dynamics of Iran’s foreign policy. \nDr. Meena Singh Roy suggested that the author include a brief abstract and mention that the paper is part of a larger project. The need to clarify the theoretical focus in the title and introduce the hypothesis early on was emphasised. Dr. Roy commended the analytical rigour of the paper but recommended a reconsideration of subtitles for reader comprehension. Acknowledging the paper’s extensive use of primary references\, she suggested supplementary readings for a practical understanding of Iran’s foreign policy. Dr. Roy highlighted Iran’s strategic adaptability and sophistication\, emphasising the importance of understanding its use of strategic assets. \nShe proposed exploring how the international system perceives Iran\, particularly its acceptability in regional groupings like the SCO. Additionally\, Dr. Roy called for a precise analysis to determine whether Iran has attained emerging middle power status. It was suggested that concepts like emerging middle power should be explained early in the paper\, along with clarifying Iran’s narrative regarding (Eur)Asia due to the region’s vastness. Addressing Iran’s regional interests\, she recommended specifying its focus on the INSTC over the Silk Route and assessing its aspirations for regional power status. \nDr. Rajorshi Roy noted that the author has adeptly navigated the complexities of evolving issues\, intricate power dynamics\, and contestations within the paper. The incorporation of International Relations theories was noted as a strength\, rendering the analysis more credible and nuanced in deciphering Iran’s role in (Eur)Asia. Dr. Rajorshi suggested expanding the section on emerging (Eur)Asian politics to include issues related to Central Asian countries\, given their significant relevance. Additionally\, he recommended examining whether Iran possesses the capacity to actualise its identity as a revisionist power and raised questions about whether Russia and China would relinquish space for Iran. Furthermore\, Dr. Rajorshi underscored the importance of exploring the role of the SCO in the context of Eur(Asian) governance\, considering it as a potential backbone in this regard. \nDr. Jason Wahlang raised the issue of the possibility of China overtaking Russia in the region due to Russia’s preoccupation with Ukraine\, citing the Chinese base in Tajikistan as an illustrative example. Dr. Wahlang emphasised the importance of assessing whether Iran could capitalise on these shifting dynamics in the long term. Additionally\, he recommended delving into Iran-Turkiye relations\, particularly in terms of civilisational connections and cultural aspects. Dr. Wahlang highlighted Iran’s role as a Caspian nation alongside Kazakhstan and Russia\, suggesting that further exploration of this aspect would enhance the paper’s value. He also proposed addressing Iran’s focus on non-traditional security issues\, specifically related to water\, considering the Aral Sea and Amu Darya. \nProf. Gulshan Dietl commenced her remarks with the poignant quote\, “today is the best of times\, and today is the worst of times\,” emphasising Iran’s vulnerable position in its immediate neighbourhood. She recommended a clear definition of ‘(Eur)Asia\,’ as it is integral to the paper’s title\, and encouraged the author to provide her own interpretation of an emerging regional middle power. \nProf. Dietl highlighted the relevance of using ‘West Asia’ based on its geographical placement\, referencing Jawaharlal Nehru’s critique of ‘Middle East’ as a colonial term. Considering Iran’s global impact\, Prof. Dietl acknowledged its significant energy resources in proximity to Central Asia but underscored the challenges arising from linguistic and religious differences with neighbouring countries. This isolation\, she noted\, sheds light on Iran’s support for entities like Hezbollah\, Houthis\, and the Palestinians. \nProf. Dietl succinctly outlined challenges faced by Iran\, including sanctions\, which limit its foreign relations\, domestic concerns over election outcomes\, and controversies surrounding issues such as Hijab. She highlighted slogans reflecting domestic sentiments\, such as “Not Gaza\, Not Lebanon; I will die for Iran\,” and observed Iran’s outreach to revisionist major powers like China and Russia. In the broader context of changing world order\, Prof. Dietl emphasised the constraints faced by Iran\, particularly domestic challenges\, during a time when even the United Nations is under scrutiny. \nQ&A Session\nThe Q&A session delved into various themes\, encompassing Iran’s identity as a theological revolutionary state\, the reliability of information about Iran on social media platforms\, definitional and conceptual aspects of emerging middle power\, the nuanced relationship between (Eur)Asia and the security order\, the historical context of the Iranian revolution\, Iran’s ideological positions in relation to other countries\, and the constraints impeding Iran’s realisation of emerging middle power status. Dr. Saraswat addressed and responded to the comments and questions raised during this comprehensive discussion. \nThis report was prepared by Mr. Abhishek Yadav\, Research Analyst\, West Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/report-of-mp-idsa-fellows-seminar-iran-in-the-emerging-eurasian-order-mapping-the-rise-of-a-regional-middle-power
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20230720T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20230720T053000
DTSTAMP:20261027T163656
CREATED:20231223T130901Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130235Z
UID:62920-1689831000-1689831000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:MP-IDSA Fellows Seminar : Influence Operations: Winning Without Waging Wars in the 21st Century
DESCRIPTION:An MP-IDSA Fellows  Seminar presentation by Dr. Adil Rasheed\, Research Fellow\, on “Influence  Operations: Winning Without Waging Wars in the 21st Century” was  held on 20 July 2023. It was chaired by Lt. Gen. (Dr.) Rakesh Sharma (Retd.)\,  Member\, Executive Council\, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and  Analyses (MP-IDSA). The External Discussants were Maj. Gen. Roopesh Mehta\, ADG  CD (B) IHQ\, and Mr. Vinit Goenka\, Secretary\, Centre for Knowledge Sovereignty  (CKS). Maj. Gen. (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi (Retd.)\, Deputy Director General\, MP-IDSA; Lt.  Gen. Akshat Upadhyay\, Research Fellow\, MP-IDSA; and Ms. Shruti Pandalai\,  Associate Fellow\, MP-IDSA were Internal Discussants.  \nExecutive Summary \nInfluence Operations  (IO)\, a battle of narratives\, is considered a new and rapidly-evolving field of  study. Russia\, China\, the US\, and Pakistan have been at the forefront of using  their strategy. It pertains to clandestine operations that can manipulate and  influence individuals’ and governments’ perceptions\, decisions\, and cognition  of individuals and governments. IO includes active measures carried out by the erstwhile  Soviet Union and is a non-kinetic form of warfare. It also gives each country  relying on this strategy plausible deniability while conducting its activities.  Social media\, big tech\, and artificial intelligence are crucial in this regard.  \nDetailed Report \nIn his opening  remarks\, the Chair\, Lt. Gen. (Dr.) Rakesh Sharma (Retd.) stated that  Information Warfare (IW) is the future warfare strategy. He further stated that  besides India’s victory in 1971\, no wars have genuinely been won in the 21st  century.  \nDr. Adil Rasheed began  by introducing the topic of his paper\, Influence Operations (IO)\, a form of  high-tech and hybrid warfare. One of the key definitions provided by the  speaker was borrowed from Facebook\, according to which IO refers to coordinated  efforts to manipulate or corrupt public debate for a strategic goal. It was initially  defined by RAND Corporation in 2009. IO could also be divided into three  categories\, i.e.\, political and economic\, information\, and psychological.  \nDr. Rasheed clarified  that his study encompasses the assessment of IO carried out by Russia\, China\,  the United States (US)\, and Pakistan. He added that wars are now fought in the  virtual space and cognitive domain. These operations include offline and online  measures to infiltrate political institutions and processes of other countries\,  making them incapable of going to war. He elaborated on IO benefits\, such as being  highly adaptive and effective\, low-cost\, and sustainable in peacetime. Today\,  it is associated with a foreign and maligned sharp power technique\, including  subversive public diplomacy\, crowd manipulations\, engineering colour  revolutions and agitations\, and election meddling. In addition\, social media  has amplified IO’s impact through trolling\, flaming\, doxing\, posting dark  advertisements\, presenting Potemkin villages of evidence\, and participating in  cognitive hacking.  \nHe said that countries  like China have relied on their diaspora based in foreign countries\, such as the  US\, to act as spies and carry out industrial espionage. As per the Mueller  Report\, Russia was involved in elected meddling in the US in 2016\, resulting in  President Trump’s victory.   \nAt the same time\, the US\,  despite referring to IO as a threat to democracy\, has intervened in  approximately 81 foreign elections\, often accused by Russia and China of  instigating colour revolutions and the Arab Spring. The speaker delved into ISI  and ISPR’s (PR wing of ISI) role in spearheading and sustaining Pakistan’s IO\,  articulating that ISI engages in Soviet-styled active measures. Simultaneously\,  the role of diaspora and radicalisation through madrassas based in Jammu and  Kashmir\, Bangladesh\, and Nepal have been essential to Pakistan’s IO strategy.  \nThe speaker suggested  that therefore\, some key counter-measures India can adopt to address such  threats include censorship of programmes aired on online streaming platforms\, formulating  a coherent and regulated social media policy and guidelines for protests and  agitations\, and reforming madrassas.   \nDr. Rasheed stated  that digital and online tactics and techniques are associated with IO strategy\,  and some of the counter-measures involve capacity building\, implementing  effective and regulatory legal frameworks\, and deterrence. \nMaj. Gen. Roopesh Mehta spoke about the need  to simplify IO as a term to counter these operations effectively. He also  explained that Information Warfare (IW)/IO timeline is immaterial\, regardless  of whether it occurs in peacetime or war.  \nIO is a long-term  strategy involving a battle of narratives. IO has two fundamental aims: turning  a rival power into a modern vassal state or weakening it sufficiently to ensure  it is neutralised as a threat. There are multiple layers of intervention  concerning IO\, which is not amenable to positive control. He also underscored how  high-quality and appealing content must be disseminated swiftly in the IO/IW  space as an antidote to misinformation and disinformation.  \nFurthermore\, he  presented his perspective on the Indian Army’s role in Kashmir and how ISI has  been exploiting social media since 2014. Between 2015 and 2017\, i.e.\, when  Burhan Wani was active\, there was immense synergy between the local media in  the Kashmir Valley and developments in Pakistan. Therefore\, India must draw  lessons from this example. As far as China is concerned\, its IO has proven more  effective internally\, while its impact externally remains debatable. Nevertheless\,  Indian leaders cannot rely on examples of authoritarian states such as Pakistan  and China to establish IO-related institutions in the country. The US\, however\,  has struggled to be effective in this domain and is a soft target since it has  mainly relied on brute force to implement its agendas.  \nHe talked about some  key issues to be considered while discussing IO/OW. Firstly\, ISIS successfully  exploited social media to convince people worldwide to join its caliphate since  2014. Secondly\, social media is an unfair terrain. Thirdly\, India’s geography  and diversity make the establishment of centralised control a challenging task.  Fourthly\, developments in IO are multiplying faster than legislative actions  can be introduced to address them. Fifthly\, information space is a reality. He  said that therefore\, these trends require a robust Indian response\, an improved  fact check and tech ban eco-system\, collaboration with agencies such as Tech  Against Terror\, and sensitising the citizens towards challenges such as fake  news and propaganda.  \nMr. Vinit Goenka explained how colonisation  by might in the erstwhile times has transformed into colonisation by big data  today. Additionally\, IO\, a non-kinetic form of warfare\, is not a time-bound  strategy. He further presented three cases about IO potency. As per one of them\,  India’s western neighbour had used the local Marathi dialect online to stir up  agitation against the development of a metro station near the Aarey colony in  Mumbai. One of the other examples was a BBC documentary (1998) aired over 83  times in one year about AIDS-afflicted Indian truck drivers as a form of  psychological warfare.  \nHe recommended that  the speaker examine the role of lone wolves who seek to gain notoriety through  IO and are not beholden to an ideology or a country.  \nMaj. Gen (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi (Retd.) expounded on the multiple terminologies being used  in this context\, which he felt\, need to be simplified\, to make the paper more  comprehensible. He went on to trace the terminology’s evolution over the past  decades. \nIn the World War era\, he explained that the  only terms in use were psychological warfare and deception. With the advent of electronic  and digital media\, he mentioned the evolving terminologies of perception  management\, cyber warfare\, information operations\, and strategic communication.  He further delved into the linkages between Arthashastra and IW and how the  latter has always been a part of Chinese military strategy in Sun Tzu’s  writings\, therefore the concepts are actually age-old. Moreover\, he explained  that information operations had been broadly segregated by the US military into  two components\, i.e.\, information technical operations and information and  influence operations\, an error according to him\, given the Russian and Chinese  integrated approach in this domain.  \nThe discussant also spoke about how\, in recent  times\, unverified bulk transmissions have been occurring with no editorial  oversight\, while assessing the differing components of perception management  (PM) and the correlation between IW and PM. Additionally\, the US Military Cyber  Command Team’s role in training Ukrainians since 2014 against Russian IO\, the  inauguration of Singapore’s fourth military branch – Digital and Intelligence  Service –\, Chinese and Russian IO\, the need to secure information space\,  India’s 2010 IW doctrine\, and the November 2020 regulation about monitoring  online streaming platforms was also discussed. In addition\, he underlined the  need for states to flood the information space with timely\, credible data to  avoid conjecture by uncontrolled media in an information vacuum.   \nRegarding the disclaimer in the the paper  wherein Non- State actors and terrorist organisations were not being covered\,  he suggested a greater focus on state response to this challenge\, with particular  reference to India. He outlined the various organisations working in this space  in India and recommended the establishment of an HR vertical in IO/ IW  domain.  He also underlined the need to synergise organisations working separately in Cyber\,  Cognitive and Physical dimensions\, with a nominated lead agency to better  coordinate the state response in the Information domain. He further recommended that we must generate an All  of Nation response to this challenge\, and integrate at two levels; Firstly the  physical\, cyber\, and technical dimensions\, and Secondly\, Government\, Military\,  Industry\, Academia\, and Civil Society. \nFinally he suggested that the speaker may  review if IO is actually a new constituent of hybrid warfare\, and whether the  cognitive domain is the sixth domain of warfare\, as mentioned in the paper\, or  actually a part of the fifth domain- Information Domain\, the first four being  land\, sea\, air and space.  \nLt. Col. Akshat Upadhyay stated that the  speaker must introduce more clarity into his paper\, modify its title and scope\,  and provide contextualisation for various terminologies mentioned. He also emphasised  the need to expand the IO ambit as part of his research and expound on relevant  statistical and anecdotal examples. There is also a need to examine the  relationship between IO and truth\, list sharp techniques associated with IO\,  and provide a more nuanced understanding of cognitive warfare.  \nAt the same time\, the  speaker must account for how IO is not inherently malicious or positive and is  merely a tool that state and non-state actors can use. It is also a battle of  narratives. The discussant presented examples from the Gulf of Tonkin incident  (Vietnam War) and humane treatment meted out by Indian officers to dead  Pakistani soldiers during the Kargil War to support his argument. Lt. Col.  Upadhyay delved into how the paper presented must re-orient from a West-centric  approach and assess how Western countries have carried out IO elsewhere. Moreover\,  concrete examples are required to support assertions regarding US’ involvement  in IO abroad.  \nHe also suggested that  Dr. Rasheed analyse how the Soviet Union (now Russia) earlier used active  measures to weaken NATO and establish continuity between its cold war strategies  and contemporary tactics in Ukraine. Furthermore\, India must institutionalise  IO instead of relying on reactive counter-measures since the recommendations  suggested in the paper will increase countries’ vulnerabilities instead of  reducing them.  \nMs. Shruti Pandalai lauded that Dr.  Rasheed has attempted to simplify a complex and evolving field\, and it is  improbable that one can distinguish between IW and IO. She said that there are  divergences\, convergences\, and collaboration between Russian and Chinese IO\, as  visible in Hong Kong\, Taiwan\, and Ukraine. An assertive China has increasingly  adopted Russian tactics\, which have ranged from controlling the diaspora and external  and internal narratives in China’s favour.  \nAccording to her\, the  events in Ukraine demonstrate big tech and the West’s role in controlling and  strengthening the narrative in Ukraine’s favour. She also pointed out that US’s  Global Engagement Council\, run by the US State Department\, a grouping focused  on combating disinformation\, is inward-looking in its outlook.   \nShe pointed out that Dr.  Rasheed needs to examine contemporary debates about IO\, including artificial  intelligence and big data\, while being more cognisant of Western IO. At the  same time\, she emphasised that censorship of online streaming platforms\, as  suggested by the speaker\, will be an ineffective deterrent in India. Finally\, she  believes it is necessary to focus on lessons learned.  \nLt. Gen. Rakesh Sharma  (Retd.) suggested modifications to the paper’s title to adequately capture the core  arguments and for Dr. Rasheed to account for how states use non-state actors in  the IO/IW domain and refrain from using disclaimers. At the same time\, he urged  caution in using terms such as hybrid warfare while he elaborated on Chinese IO  in the US\, the United Nations Human Rights Council and India\, and Russia’s IO  in the United Kingdom during the Brexit vote and differing interpretations  about war. Furthermore\, he emphasised the need to establish a national  cognitive agency in India.  \nHe also recommended  that the speaker provide clarification about actors in India empowered to  conduct cognitive warfare\, India’s endgame regarding IO against China\, and  simplify terminologies used in the paper.  \nQ/A Session\nDirector General\, Ambassador  Sujan R. Chinoy affirmed  the need to examine all narratives concerning IO\, including the insidious  attempts by the West or current adversaries like Pakistan and China to prepare  for the future adequately. He suggested that the paper look deeper into the  role of IO/IW within India and the transboundary civil society actors’  involvement in these domains since their potency rivals big tech. At the same  time\, there is a requirement to assess if proposed Indian narratives are based  on consensus and where challenges lie. Finally\, an agnostic approach to values  in IO/IW domain must be practiced.  \nSome of the other  themes discussed in the Q/A session included strategic relevance behind IO/IW in  fields of health and disease\, for example\, the anti-vaccine campaign in the  West\, the scope of visibility of Indian IO\, the need to analyse vulnerabilities  in each segment of the population for antidotes to be forged\, lack of domestic consensus  on responding to IO threats against India\, the synergy between state and  non-state actors\, and quantification of influence.  \nDr. Rasheed responded  to the comments and questions raised.  \nThis report was  prepared by Ms. Saman Ayesha Kidwai\, Research Analyst\, Counter-Terrorism  Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/mp-idsa-fellows-seminar-influence-operations-winning-without-waging-wars-in-the-21st-century
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20230531T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20230531T053000
DTSTAMP:20261027T163656
CREATED:20231223T130948Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130235Z
UID:62930-1685511000-1685511000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:MP-IDSA Fellows Seminar: Defence Public Sector Units and Exports
DESCRIPTION:MP-IDSA  Fellows Seminar by Dr. S. Samuel C. Rajiv\, Associate Fellow\, on ‘Defence Public  Sector Units and Exports’ was held on 31 May 2023. It was chaired by Mr. Amit  Cowshish\, Former Financial Advisor (Acquisition) Ministry of Defence\, and  Former Distinguished Fellow\, MP-IDSA. The external discussants for the paper were  Dr. Manisha Mathur\, Sr. Dy. GM\, International Marketing\, Bharat Electronics  Limited (BEL) and Dr. Sameer Patil\, Senior Fellow\, ORF\, Mumbai. Gp. Capt. (Dr.)  Rajiv Kumar Narang (Retd.)\, Senior Fellow\, MP-IDSA\, and Col. (Dr.) Rajneesh  Singh\, Research Fellow & Centre Coordinator\, Defence Industry and Economics  Centre\, MP-IDSA\, were the internal discussants. \nExecutive Summary\nIn  recent years\, India has experienced a significant surge in defence exports. The  paper explored the primary issues faced by DPSU’s in research and development\, marketing\,  and competition from international aerospace businesses. The DPSUs’ future  success in the fiercely competitive defence export market would be essential  for India’s military manufacturing and indigenisation aims. \nDetailed Report\nThe Chair\, Mr. Amit Cowshish  opened the session by highlighting the 23 per cent growth in India’s defence  exports from Rs. 686 Crore in Financial Year (FY) 2013-2014 to Rs. 16\,000 Crore  in FY 2022-2023. This denotes the advancement in the design and development of  the Indian defence industry in the global defence manufacturing sector. \nDr. Rajiv in his paper ‘Defence  Public Sector Units and Exports’ noted that during the ten-year period 2012-23\,  India exported defence equipment worth about Rs. 67\,500 cr. Exports surged from  Rs. 446.77 crores in 2012-13 to Rs. 15\,918.16 cr in 2022-23. The paper examined  issues related to exports by DPSUs and the Ordnance Factory Board (OFB). \nDr. Rajiv stated that ships  overwhelmingly comprise the quantity of defence exports from India\, followed by  helicopters/aircraft and sensors (radars etc). This is as against major global  defence exporters\, like the US\, Russia\, France\, China and the UK\, for whom  aircrafts constitute the major chunk of exports. The share of DPSU defence  exports was over 56 per cent during 2013-14 and was about 9 per cent in  2021-22. The OFB share in the defence exports pie has reduced from nearly 3 per  cent in 2013-14 to less than 1 per cent in 2021-22. \nDuring the ten-year period from  2012-22\, around Rs. 9600 crores is the value of exports (both defence and  civil) executed by eight DPSUs. Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) has  accounted for more than 37 per cent of all exports by DPSUs\, followed by Bharat  Electronics Limited (BEL) at over 30 per cent and Goa Shipyard Limited (GSL) at  nearly 13 per cent. As for exports by the OFB during 2012-22\, about Rs. 688  crore worth of items/equipment have been exported. The OFB has exported various  items like brake parachutes and ammunition to many countries over the  years. \nDr. Rajiv gave certain examples  of some significant export items by DPSUs. These included Offshore Patrol Vessels  (OPVs) and helicopters to countries like Mauritius\, Sri Lanka\, Nepal\,  Afghanistan\, Seychelles\, Namibia\, Ecuador and Suriname. Some of the significant  contracts that the DPSUs did not succeed in securing have included the $300 mn  contract for Frigates by Philippines in 2016 (which went to a South Korean  firm) and $900 mn contract for Trainer Aircraft by Malaysia (which was again  bagged by a South Korean competitor in 2023). \nDr. Rajiv then highlighted  issues relating to DPSUs and R&D\, their marketing and strategic partnership  efforts and use of Lines of Credit. He noted that most DPSUs have tie-ups with  academic and research institutions like IITs. BEL has more than 300  collaborative R&D partners\, including with more than 150 MSMEs.  BEL has also been granted a total of 24  patents\, Mishra Dhatu Nigam Limited (MIDHANI) – five and Bharat Earth Movers  Limited (BEML) – 12 patents respectively\, while shipyards like Garden Reach  Shipbuilders and Engineers (GRSE) have filed over 100 IPRs out of which more  than 60 have been granted. BEL has the highest R&D spending among DPSUs  while average R&D spending of Bharat Dynamics Limited (BDL) over the five-year  period from 2017-22 has been less than 2 per cent. DPSUs have also been making  efforts to increase their marketing footprint overseas\, with BEL\, HAL and GRSE  at the forefront of such efforts. Dr. Rajiv noted that countries like  Bangladesh\, Sri Lanka\, Mauritius\, and Surinam have used LoCs to source Indian  defence equipment. \nDPSUs are actively  participating in Request for Information (RFIs) and Request for Proposal  (RFPs)\, to enhance their export profiles. Mazagon Dock Limited (MDL)\, for  instance\, as of December 2021\, had responded to over 30 RFIs and RFPs\,  involving nearly 200 vessels. The last vessel that was exported by MDL though  was way back in 2014. DPSU shipyards point out that highly competitive markets  and low pricing of the products from North–East Asian countries were some of  the challenges. DPSU’s like HAL will continue to have stiff competition from  global aerospace majors with their T-50 (Korea Aerospace Industries and  Lockheed Martin)\, T-7A (Boeing and SAAB)\, or M 346 (Leonardo) Trainer Aircrafts.  HAL though unveiled a new Hindustan Lead in Fighter (HLFT-42) Trainer Aircraft  at the Aero India 2023. \n  Goa Shipyard Limited (GSL)  expects export order book of Rs. 1200 crore during 2021-25\, including OPVs and Corvettes  to the Philippines Navy\, Fast Interceptor Boats (FIBs) to Comoros and Floating Docks  to Sri Lanka. New DPSU corporate entities like Munitions India Limited (MIL)  hope to increase exports from the existing 2 per cent of annual Value of Issue  to 8 per cent by next year. \nGoing forward\, Dr. Rajiv noted  that DPSU’s face a highly competitive export market for defence products. DPSUs  are some of the biggest defence companies in the world in terms of sales. With  the government’s stress on Atmanirbhar Bharat and ambitious targets  relating to defence production\, defence exports and defence indigenisation\, the  ability of the DPSUs to contribute to the exports pie will continue to be in  focus. \nDr. Manisha Mathur\nDr.  Mathur began by complimenting the author for the meticulous presentation of  data and stated the need to analyse the challenges and various initiatives to  increase India’s defence exports. She spoke about the various initiatives which  Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) has been making in the expanding global  defence market. \nDr.  Mathur delved into the challenges in dealing with developing countries in the  South Asian region\, particularly on the limited flexibility in the operations  of the DPSUs compared to Chinese counterparts. In comparison\, the private  sector might have greater flexibility. She delved into the various initiatives  and efforts by the Indian Government\, High Commissions\, and Embassies to provide  support through brand promotion\, participation in exhibitions\, and financial  assistance such as Lines of Credit (LoC) from the Export-Import Bank of India  to facilitate exports to these developing countries. Secondly\, she flagged that  India is not part of the NATO supply chain\, which could have added to the  exports pie. Thirdly\, Dr. Mathur stressed the need to focus on R&D\, customised  solutions\, product support\, and leveraging licensed production of Russian  platforms. However\, she also expressed caution in sharing sensitive defence  information and maintaining the confidentiality of partner countries in the  public. She was optimistic about the future course of defence exports and spoke  on the upward trend in collaboration with foreign and private sectors; she was optimistic  about swift clearance regarding defence exports and obtaining NOCs (No  Objection Certificates). She added that there is growing interest in India’s  defence sector\, pushed forward actively by the Raksha Mantri in his visits to  countries in India’s extended neighbourhood as well as by a few countries appointing  Defence Attaches to explore collaborative partnerships with the Indian defence  industry.  \nDr. Sameer Patil\nDr.  Sameer Patil appreciated the comprehensive research and use of statistics. He  stated that the declining share of Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs) might  be attributed to factors such as the absence of critical technologies\, poor  design capacities\, long gestation periods\, weak industry-academia interface\,  and limited success in the commercial arena. He remarked that the paper would  benefit from providing background information on the role of DPSUs and the Ordnance  Factory Board (OFB) in defence manufacturing and the government’s initiatives  to boost defence exports. Dr. Patil further suggested that the author may  include an explanation for concepts like legacy liabilities and strategic  partnerships and the link between capturing new markets and leveraging  partnerships. He indicated that the paper may include a uniform usage of units and currency (USD or INR) throughout  for clarity and comparison.  \nGp. Capt. (Dr.) Rajeev Narang\nGroup Captain (Dr) Rajeev Narang emphasised the importance of understanding the factors that contribute to  successful defence exports and identifying obstacles that hinder them. The  Indian Government has implemented initiatives like Make in India\, Strategic  Partnerships\, Joint Venture\, Transfer of Technology (TOT)\, and Aatmanirbhar  Bharat to achieve self-reliance in technology and become a defence export  hub. He commented that as the percentage of defence exports has increased\, the  private sector has shown more significant growth than DPSUs. He stated that it  is essential to differentiate between DPSUs to assess their value addition and  export potential. Gp. Capt. Narang stated that collaboration  with global manufacturers\, civil product exports\, and adherence to  international standards are crucial to improve technology and export quality.  Each institution has strengths\, challenges\, and associated areas influencing  their export goals. \nGp.  Capt. Narang stated the importance of user feedback from friendly countries\, which  is crucial to evaluate the perception and quality of Indian defence products. He  stressed that understanding limitations\, hurdles\, and reasons for missed  projects helps assess export potential. He discussed the significance of factors  like testing facilities\, standardisation\, accreditation\, and quality assurance that  contribute to the growth of the export ecosystem. Gp. Capt. Narang elaborated  on the challenges in global market entry\, user satisfaction\, supply lines\, and  regional variations. Comparison with other countries\, such as China\, highlights  the importance of assessing technology transfer and understanding their  approach. Collaboration with global manufacturers\, civil product exports\, and  understanding international standards and testing procedures play a role in  improving technology and export quality. \nCol. (Dr.) Rajneesh Singh\nCol.  (Dr.) Rajneesh Singh highlighted the decline in the share of defence exports by  DPSUs in recent years from over 56 per cent in 2013-14 to approximately 9 per  cent in 2021-22. In contrast\, the private sector’s share has surged to over 90  per cent during the same period. He stressed the need to study the reasons  behind this substantial shift to understand the underlying factors. The Ordnance  Factories turned DPSUs have witnessed a decline in their share of defence  exports. He expanded on the potential reasons for this decline\, including  unattractive product lists\, lack of competitive production quality/prices\, and  marketing issues that should be  analysed.  Col. Singh recommended that Ordnance Factories turned DPSUs should focus on  establishing joint ventures with foreign Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs)\,  producing critical items through technology transfer\, and engaging in  collaborative innovation for defence research and development in niche  technology areas. This strategic approach would optimise capacity utilisation\,  enhance efficiency\, and facilitate modernisation with capability development.  Moreover\, the assessment of defence export volume should carefully consider aspects  like After-Sales Maintenance and Support\, overhaul\, and training and clarify  whether these services are accounted for when receiving/executing the export  order or at the time of payment realisation. \nCol.  Singh suggested that a collaborative approach between various government  ministries\, including the Ministry of Defence\, Ministry of External Affairs\,  Department of Economic Affairs\, and Ministry of Corporate Affairs\, is vital to  provide diplomatic support for achieving export orders\, facilitating technology  transfer deals\, implementing offsets effectively\, producing dual-use technology  items\, establishing joint ventures with foreign OEMs\, and forming strategic  market partnerships. Furthermore\, DPSUs can be crucial in supporting defence  Micro\, Small\, and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) by providing a suitable  forum/platform for exports\, extending market support\, offering technological  guidance\, and enhancing capability. Lastly\, to obtain a realistic assessment of  the defence industry\, he suggested that a time period longer than a 10 years be  considered. Such a timeframe would account for any spikes or irregularities in  orders\, ensuring that accurate conclusions are drawn. \nMr. Amit Cowshish\nThe  Chair appreciated the suggestions and recommended certain changes to be  incorporated into the paper. \nFirstly\,  he suggested including a list of policy measures the government has taken as it  pertained to defence exports\, including issues like the Open General Export  License (OGEL) and other procedural changes.  \n  Secondly\,  he mentioned that\, while the paper focuses on R&D\, marketing efforts\, and  LOCs as facilitators\, there is a need for more coverage of the limiting  factors. \nThirdly\,  Mr. Cowshish flagged data points on exports and value of authorisations and  noted that countries like France consider both physical exports and authorisation  values\, to get a better picture of the country’s defence exports. \nFourthly\,  he clarified that DPSUs also manufacture civilian products and make efforts to  segregate defence export figures from civilian products. \nFinally\,  he also highlighted the role of the private sector in defence exports\, along  with changes in acquisition procedures and offsets. He commented on the  limitations of obtaining user inputs and mentioned the limited market in the  neighbourhood but expressed hope for success in Southeast Asia\, Central Asia\,  and South America. Finally\, the significance of Micro\, Small\, and Medium  Enterprises (MSMEs) in the defence export story and their collaboration with  DPSUs was flagged. \nDr  .Rajiv expressed gratitude for the constructive comments and suggestions and stated  that he intended to incorporate them to the extent possible while revising the  paper and also use the suggestions for future research. \nQuestions and Comments\nThe Director General Amb. Sujan R. Chinoy began his comments on the paper by suggesting the inclusion of the initiatives for critical and emerging  technologies between India and the US\, as India was recognised as a major defence  partner in 2016 and was given the STA-1 status in 2018 by the US. These steps aim  to boost India’s technology and R&D capabilities\, which can potentially  impact the country’s defence as well as high-technology exports. He cited the  example of the GE 414 afterburning turbofan engine\, on which India and the US  are expected to sign a major deal during the visit of Prime Minister Modi to  the US. Amb. Chinoy enquired as to how best we can utlisise such opportunities  to enhance the domestic manufacturing base. Secondly\, he advised the author to include  the contribution of positive indigenisation lists for Atmanirbhar Bharat\,  on Indian manufacturing capabilities and its effect on exports. Thirdly\, he  enquired whether we can categorise long-term  lease arrangements as defence exports\, like the transfer of the Kilo-class  submarine\, INS Sindhuvir to Myanmar. Amb. Chinoy also flagged the Chinese example  of using a European engine in the C919 commercial aircraft\, which they are  aggressively marketing for exports. He also asked the author to explore the  connection between Indian Armed Forces’ procurement decisions and exports. If  the Indian Armed Forces purchase in large quantities significant equipment like  the LCA Tejas\, given the  Rs 48\,000 crore  deal\, it should naturally translate\, sooner or later\, into possible export  opportunities for the indigenous fighter aircraft powered by the US engine. Lastly\,  Amb. Chinoy flagged the need for appropriate decision-making vis-à-vis R&D  investments\, including on aspects relating to when to enter the technology  lifecycle and which specific technologies to focus on. \nDeputy  Director General Maj. Gen. (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi commented  on Dr. Mathur’s statement where she mentioned the importance of entering the NATO  supply chain and highlighted the substantial defence budget of the US. Gen.  Bakshi flagged the possibility of Indian companies benefiting if and when India  and the US sign the Reciprocal Defence Procurement (RDP) Agreement\, which seems  to be in the works. He flagged business opportunities in terms of Maintenance\,  Repair and Operations (MRO) of Russian equipment in the inventories of other  countries\, given the current geo-political scenario. Gen Bakshi suggested that testing  and accreditation facilities in the public sector need to be made more  accessible to the private sector defence companies as well. The limitations in  critical technologies such as chips\, engines\, and precision guided munitions  was flagged.  \nThe  Q/A session broadly revolved around the themes of indigenisation\, defence  exports\, joint ventures arrangements\, as well as public and private defence  industries.  \nThe  speaker responded to the comments and questions. \n(Report  prepared by Ms. Shayesta Nishat Ahmed\, Research Analyst\, Defence Economics and  Industry Centre\, MP-IDSA).  
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/mp-idsa-fellows-seminar-defence-public-sector-units-and-exports
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20230207T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20230207T053000
DTSTAMP:20261027T163656
CREATED:20231223T131248Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130235Z
UID:62953-1675747800-1675747800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Report of  Fellows Seminar  on The Geopolitics of Europe's Quest for Energy Security: Significant Achievements amid Myriad Challenges
DESCRIPTION:A MP-IDSA Fellows Seminar by Dr. Swasti Rao\, Associate  Fellow\, on “The Geopolitics of Europe’s Quest for Energy Security:  Significant Achievements amid Myriad Challenges” was held on 7 February 2023.  It was chaired by Prof. Gulshan Sachdeva\, Professor\, Jawaharlal Nehru  University\, New Delhi. The external discussants were Dr. Lydia Powell\,  Distinguished Fellow\, Observer Research Foundation (ORF)\, and Mr. Rajeev Lala\,  Associate Director\, S&P Global. Ms. Anandita Bhada\, Research Analyst at MP-IDSA\,  was the internal discussant. \nExecutive  Summary \nAlmost a year into the war in Ukraine\, European nations have  fast-tracked their energy diversification in order to reduce their dependency  on Russia. The main issues are policies adopted by Europe to diversify\, the available  options\, and prognosis for the future. \nDetailed Report\nThe Chair\, Prof. Gulshan Sachdeva\, in his opening  remarks\, stated that diversification of energy supplies would likely have a major  geopolitical implication. For example\, Europe moving towards the US for oil and  Russia diversifying its energy exports away from Europe\, towards Asia would  significantly impact the international arena. \nDr. Swasti Rao began her presentation with a question – “Does  Europe want to diversify its energy requirements from Russia?” She replied in  the affirmative but pointed out that the main issue is implementing this  vision. The speaker then highlighted the structure of her paper before briefly delving  into the ongoing developments in Russia-Ukraine war.  \nDr. Rao stressed that Europe is seeking to completely  wean itself away from Russian crude oil\, natural gas and coal. She highlighted  Europe’s dependency on Russian energy amidst the differentiation in patterns  and volume of such trade. She elaborated on the internal and external  differences in Europe regarding the diversification process. She pointed out Europe’s  plans to focus on alternative fuels in the form of hydrogen and nuclear\, apart  from creating new energy maps and import corridors. The fact is that today Europe  is looking into both short-term and long-term energy measures\, anchored to  avoiding any potential dependency. For Europe\, the supply chains should not  only be cost-effective but also more resilient.  \nDr. Rao highlighted the diversification measures  undertaken by Europe. These include import diversification\, short-term energy  imports\, protection of the most venerable cohorts\, and acceleration to new  renewables.  \nThe speaker elaborated on the macro and micro energy trends  in Europe – both before and since the conflict started. At the macro level\, there  has been a systemic and sustainable shift away from Russian energy. At the  micro-level\, Europe has sought to cut down domestic demand apart from  transition to renewables. These steps are\, however\, hampered by limitations that  include pipeline disruption\, oil re-routing\, global liquefaction capacity\, and  failure to meet market goals. \nMoving to the issue of transition to renewables such as  green hydrogen\, blue hydrogen\, and bio-methane\, Dr. Rao highlighted the sense  of urgency in the form of new European pathways to develop these alternatives.  She also referred to Europe’s attempts at developing new import corridors. She  emphasised that one of the reasons for Europe’s ongoing support to Ukraine is  anchored to Ukraine emerging as a promising option for green hydrogen.  \nOn the issue of expanding avenues of energy cooperation  between India and Europe\, Dr. Rao referred to the Trade Technology Council and  ongoing bilateral discussions in the field of hydrogen.  \nDr. Rao concluded by stating that Europe appears to have  shown a strong political will to diversify yet it would need strong political  leadership in what would likely be a very painful period ahead.  \nDr. Lydia Powell:\nDr. Powell\, while complimenting the author for her  presentation\, felt that there is scope for enhancing the analytical rigour of  the paper by moving beyond the summarizing and descriptive aspects. This  includes a more rigorous analysis of the post-Ukraine energy situation in  Europe and its future. She observed that the speaker could qualitatively  improve the section on “geopolitics of Europe’s quest for energy security”.  \nDr. Powell gave a few more suggestions to improve the  paper. First\, she suggested revising the opening section\, particularly the  framing of whether the European Union (EU) can replace Russia in the context of  energy. Second\, one needs to dwell on who the winners and losers of the current  geopolitical scenario are – this includes Russia\, EU and the US. Also\, whether Russia’s  calculations are long-term vis-à-vis short term? Third\, the speaker could address  the question of whether the fossil fuel and nuclear industries are the winners  in this climate. Fourth\, the speaker should address whether Asia has become the  winner given the renewed focus on the continent amidst Russia’s growing energy  exports to India and China. Similarly\, has the developing world lost out in the  short term on account of their energy crisis? Fifth\, the paper must address its  policy relevance\, particularly for India.  \nMr. Rajeev  Lala:\nMr. Rajeev Lala highlighted the need to add a caveat  around hydrogen – “hope”\, especially on green hydrogen. Meanwhile\, there exists  two proponents around hydrogen; one is the blue hydrogen proponent (led by  Saudi Arabia) and the other being the green hydrogen proponents (led by Japan\,  Korea\, Switzerland\, and South Korea). The key issue is financing\, as both  technologies are expensive; hence it is still most policymakers’ hope. \nThere also exists a significant variation in European  countries dependency on Russia. This has a direct bearing on each country’s  national position on Russia with the most critical stand being taken by  countries which have the least dependency. Mr. Lala suggested the need for a chart  to show this correlation by providing the examples of energy dependencies of Germany  and the United Kingdom on Russia.  \nThe discussant called upon Dr. Rao to focus on the interconnectivity  issue and the status of interconnectors across Europe. Meanwhile\, a section  could be added on the risks for 2023 and what could go wrong.  \nMr. Lala elaborated on ongoing discussions on “winter  approaching” and its potential impact on Ukraine\, and stressed that winter has in  fact already arrived in South Asia in the June-August period since all the gas  markets are interconnected. He referred to its impact on Pakistan which is  undergoing a prolonged energy crisis. In the same vein\, Europe’s energy  diversification could impact the Indian gas market\, which the author should  also focus on. \nMs. Anandita  Bhada:\nThe discussant stressed on the need to highlight the  winners and losers of the ongoing crisis. She referred to the eastern European  countries\, who being less economically developed\, have found cheaper Russian  energy more attractive. Ms. Bhada felt that the importance of interconnectors  must be emphasized since several eastern European countries are landlocked or  have a small coastline. In this\, the significance of Poland-Lithuania interconnector  should be emphasised. She also referred to the concept of projects of common  interests which help secure energy across the continent. This includes the  Baltic Gas Pipeline connecting Norway via Denmark to Poland.  \nApart from raising the question of financing\, Ms. Bhada highlighted  the use of rare earth elements sourced from China for energy transition to  renewables. She wondered whether a significant focus on renewables would mean  Europe would have an increased dependence on China for rare-earth elements? Ms.  Bhada also observed that the Brexit deal must be resolved for any substantial  gains between Europe and the United Kingdom. Finally\, regarding the reduction  of demand\, she pondered that by the time there is a reduction in the market for  Russian energy sources\, the need for the substitute would increase; thus\, how  would Europe balance it out?  \nProf. Gulshan  Sachdeva:\nThe Chair complimented the author for her work. He also  highlighted some of the areas of the paper which could be further improved.  \nFirst\, the title could be formulated for a more precise  understanding. Too many aspects within the title may create problems. There is  also a need for more in-depth analysis of the geopolitical factors at play.  \nSecond\, there is a need to have a discussion on the  concept of energy security and what is the European understanding of energy security.  There is also need to discuss the history of the European understanding of  energy security from the past to the current era.  \n  Third\, Prof Sachdeva opined that the Literature Review  might not be needed but gave the researcher the discretion to keep or remove  it.  \nFourth\, he highlighted the need to re-arrange the paper.  In the introduction\, the researcher could highlight the European concept of  energy security\, and then delve into the current geopolitical situation as a  result of which Europe has chosen to adjust its energy security policies.  \nFifth\, concerning the figures\, there is a need for  primary data\, and the use of multiple graphics is confusing for the readers.  For example\, a graph could be there for the situation before the Ukraine war  and the current situation.  \nSixth\, there is a need to refer to more primary documents  from the European Union; for instance\, the Repower EU Plan needs to be added.  \nSeventh\, Prof. Sachdeva observed that on India-EU  collaboration\, the researcher could avoid the over-emphasis on hydrogen since it  may divert from the crux of the paper. In this\, the paper needs to focus more  on the impact of energy diversification on India. A country like India is  significantly dependent on Russian arms and energy\, and there could be severe  implications for the geopolitics of the Eurasian region.  \nEighth\, the author must expand the conclusion. \nQuestions and  Comments \nDeputy Director General\, Maj. Gen. (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi  (Retd.)  agreed with the Chair  on specific aspects of the paper which need to be reviewed. He observed that multilateralism  is weakening\, maybe to a certain extent even fracturing\, which has led to  multipolarity and emergence of regional groupings. In the past\, regional  groupings were linked to geography but several of those links are now fractured.  In the same vein\, he observed that geopolitics and ideology are fracturing  existing trade agreements\, for example\, the EU- Russian energy mix and the  US-China trade war. New alignments are shaping up\, and old friends and  alliances are finding themselves on opposite sides of the energy alignment;  simultaneously\, they are adapting and harmonizing with the current geopolitical  situation. \nOn green hydrogen\, he emphasised that Indian researchers  have been active. Nevertheless\, cost is a factor and the focus has also been  more on blue hydrogen. The questions of economics trumping geopolitics and the  success of the shift to hydrogen could be addressed. \nThe Q/A session broadly revolved around the themes of  transition to greener energy\, energy security\, energy politics within Europe\,  nuclear energy option\, North-South divide\, India’s ability to deal with global  risks and the need to focus on West Asia.  \nThe speaker responded to the comments and questions.  \n(Report prepared by Dr. Jason Wahlang\, Research Analyst\, Europe  and Eurasia Centre\, MP-IDSA)
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/report-of-fellows-seminar-on-the-geopolitics-of-europes-quest-for-energy-security-significant-achievements-amid-myriad-challenges
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20210409T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20210409T053000
DTSTAMP:20261027T163656
CREATED:20231224T101857Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130235Z
UID:64013-1617946200-1617946200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:India’s Response to the China Threat Since 1949
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General\, MP-IDSA  \nPresenter: Dr. S. Kalyanaraman\, Research Fellow\, MP-IDSA \nExternal Discussants: Lt Gen J.S. Bajwa\,  UYSM\, SM (Retd) and Prof Srikanth Kondapalli
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/indias-response-to-the-china-threat-since-1949
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20190822T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20190822T053000
DTSTAMP:20261027T163656
CREATED:20231224T101857Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130236Z
UID:64014-1566451800-1566451800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Structural Reforms in PLA and Future Assessed Capabilities
DESCRIPTION:Venue: Room No. 005 (Ground Floor) \nTopic: Structural Reforms in PLA and Future Assessed Capabilities
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/structural-reforms-in-pla-and-future-assessed-capabilities
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20180914T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20180914T053000
DTSTAMP:20261027T163656
CREATED:20231224T101859Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130236Z
UID:64015-1536903000-1536903000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Is there an Indian Way of Multilateralism? A Conceptual Inquiry
DESCRIPTION:Venue:  Room No. 005 (Ground Floor)
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/is-there-an-indian-way-of-multilateralism-a-conceptual-inquiry
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20180831T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20180831T053000
DTSTAMP:20261027T163656
CREATED:20231224T101859Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130236Z
UID:64016-1535693400-1535693400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:India - Japan Security Cooperation: Dynamics and Prospects
DESCRIPTION:Venue: Seminar Hall I (Second Floor)
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/india-japan-security-cooperation-dynamics-and-prospects
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20180816T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20180816T053000
DTSTAMP:20261027T163656
CREATED:20231224T101859Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130236Z
UID:64017-1534397400-1534397400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Response to Quest for NAGALIM by Ethnic Groups/Tribes outside Nagaland
DESCRIPTION:Venue:  Seminar Hall I (Second Floor).
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/response-to-quest-for-nagalim-by-ethnic-groups-tribes-outside-nagaland
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20180601T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20180601T053000
DTSTAMP:20261027T163656
CREATED:20231224T101859Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130236Z
UID:64018-1527831000-1527831000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Manifestation of ISIS in India
DESCRIPTION:Venue: Room No. 005 (Ground Floor)
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/manifestation-of-isis-in-india
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20180525T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20180525T053000
DTSTAMP:20261027T163656
CREATED:20231224T101900Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130236Z
UID:64019-1527226200-1527226200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Synthesis of Eurasian Trade Corridors: India‘s Strategic Centrality in the Emerging System
DESCRIPTION:Venue: Room No. 005 (Ground Floor).
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/synthesis-of-eurasian-trade-corridors-indias-strategic-centrality-in-the-emerging-system
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20180413T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20180413T053000
DTSTAMP:20261027T163656
CREATED:20231224T101914Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250227T233638Z
UID:64020-1523597400-1523597400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:India-Africa Cooperation in Human Resource Development:  Education\, Training and Skills
DESCRIPTION:Participation in the Fellow Seminars is by invitation only.\nMedia person accredited with foreign media and foreign diplomats may seek prior permission from DDG\, IDSA @ telephone no. 26146832.\n\n\n\n\n1030 to 1300 hrs
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/india-africa-cooperation-in-human-resource-development-education-training-and-skills
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20180405T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20180405T053000
DTSTAMP:20261027T163656
CREATED:20231224T101914Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250227T233825Z
UID:64021-1522906200-1522906200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:India - Kenya Maritime Security Cooperation: An Appraisal
DESCRIPTION:Participation in the Fellow Seminars is by invitation only.\nMedia person accredited with foreign media and foreign diplomats may seek prior permission from DDG\, IDSA @ telephone no. 26146832.\n\n\n\n\n1030 hrs\nVenue: Seminar Hall I (Second Floor)
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/india-kenya-maritime-security-cooperation-an-appraisal
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20180119T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20180119T053000
DTSTAMP:20261027T163656
CREATED:20231223T132907Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231224T130236Z
UID:63061-1516339800-1516339800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:The Nitisara or the Elements of Polity by Kamandaka: Continuity and Change from Kautilya’s Arthashastra
DESCRIPTION:Chairperson: Amb A. N. D. Haksar (Retd)External Discussants: Prof. Jayati Srivastava\, Dr. Medha Bisht\, Dr. Saurabh MishraInternal Discussants: Gp. Capt. K. K. Khera\, Col. Vikrant Deshpande \nMajor Arguments of the Paper\nSince India is one of the longest surviving civilisations\, there is likelihood that principles of statecraft are continuing through ages. This paper probes this possibility and argues that many concepts and principles of statecraft in India have not changed and that continuity is embedded in the vocabulary and concepts in the Indian tradition. They have survived due to their own enduring logic. This paper compares Arthasastra and Nitisara and analyses the enduring continuities in statecraft\, diplomacy and aspects of warfare. It seeks answers to the following questions: (a) What are the continuities and changes in the vocabulary and concepts from Kautilya’s Arthasastra to Nitisara?; (b) What is the vocabulary of Kamandaka in a stand-alone mode?; and\, (c) What is the contemporary relevance of the answers to these findings?  \nThe author found both texts are ahistorical\, dealing with the acquisition of wealth and its distribution and emphasising on war as the last resort. Some common aspects adhered to in both the texts are: mastering of control over the senses including non-violence; the need to ensure that the state of matsyanyaya does not prevail; anvikshiki; maintaining balance among dharma\, artha and kama; importance of intelligence; the seven prakrits and twelve vijigisus in a circle of kings or mandala theory; six measures of foreign policy; the upayas in which there is no war mongering and use of force is the last resort; issues of disasters (vysanas) that may afflict the constituent elements (prakrits) and how to overcome them prior to the execution of a policy; duties of diplomats and intelligence gathering; and\, aspects of war and use of power by sticking to the priorities of mantra-shakti (counsel or diplomacy)\, prabhav-shakti (economic and military power)\, and utsah-shakti (leadership).  \nThe paper also points out the dissimilarities in concepts employed by the two texts. To begin with\, while Kautilya’s work is inspired by statesmanship and is of a complex nature often questioning earlier scholars\, Kamandaka’s is a lucid and academic work and an abridged version of the Arthasastra. In terms of uniqueness\, Kamandaka stands out for deliberating at length not only on the four upayas (as mentioned in the Arthasastra) of sama \, dana\,  bheda and danda but also the powerful concept of Upeksha (a combination of neglect or diplomatic indifference and the supreme virtue of patience) which was the strategy adopted by the Indian freedom movement. The impact of Kamandaka can be further seen on the Hitopadesa by Narayana\, which has 90 verses of Kamandaka including sixteen types of alliances. \nIn the end\, the paper argues that India’s geo-cultural space extends beyond the Himalayas up to Central Asia. This has also been highlighted by the History Division of the Ministry of External Affairs in the second White Paper published in 1959 “Historical Background of the Himalayan Frontier of India\,” in which the Raghuvamsha of Kalidas is mentioned. In both this White Paper and in the text of Kamandaka\, there is mention of the Kushan empire and Kanishka.       \nMajor points of discussion and suggestions to the author\n\nThe time frame of both the Arthasastra and Nitisara as well as the context in which they were written forms a significant background for the comparison process. Further\, the Buddhist influence on Kamandaka and Kautilya can enrich the paper by providing another dimension. \nThematic structuring of the paper can be done on the basis of Kamandaka’s notions on war\, tactics\, ethics\, dharma\, etc.\, and an overall idea can be given about what is distinctive about Indian texts as compared to western texts. \nWhen one approaches a non-western text\, the method adopted should be devoid of an interpretative orientation and frames of comparison. Further\, the techniques of communication should be picked carefully focusing on the inclusive macro tradition over multiple micro traditions.\nMethodology adopted by these texts can be discussed in the paper along with historical similarities and dissimilarities as well as political situation of that time while explaining the central themes of both\, mentioning their categorization along with the reason for dissimilarities and commonalities. \nThe difference between Nitisara and Arthasastra lies in the idea of legitimacy which changed over time. While Arthasastra was dependent on deliverance of kingly duties\, Nitisara focuses on valour and the military qualities of the ruler.\nAuthor’s personal opinion should come out more strongly amongst the commendable literature survey and referencing. And\, to extend its reach to the masses\, the paper can be made more lucid.\n\nReport prepared by Ms. Lakshmi Priya\, Research Assistant\, IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/the-nitisara-or-the-elements-of-polity-by-kamandaka-continuity-and-change-from-kautilyas-arthashastra
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20180105T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20180105T053000
DTSTAMP:20261027T163656
CREATED:20231224T101914Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250227T234011Z
UID:64022-1515130200-1515130200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Debating Security in Japan
DESCRIPTION:Participation in the Fellow Seminars is by invitation only.\nMedia person accredited with foreign media and foreign diplomats may seek prior permission from DDG\, IDSA @ telephone no. 26146832.\n\n\n\n\n1030 to 1300 hrs\n\n\nVenue: Seminar Hall I (Second Floor)\, IDSA
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/debating-security-in-japan
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20171213T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20171213T053000
DTSTAMP:20261027T163656
CREATED:20231224T101915Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250227T234229Z
UID:64023-1513143000-1513143000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:India-Taiwan Ties: Can They Move Beyond China’s Shadow?
DESCRIPTION:Participation in the Fellow Seminars is by invitation only.\nMedia person accredited with foreign media and foreign diplomats may seek prior permission from DDG\, IDSA @ telephone no. 26146832.\n\n\n\n\n1030 to 1300 hrs\n\n\nVenue: Room No 005 (Ground Floor)\, IDSA
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/india-taiwan-ties-can-they-move-beyond-chinas-shadow
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20171027T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20171027T053000
DTSTAMP:20261027T163656
CREATED:20231224T102014Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250227T233134Z
UID:64024-1509082200-1509082200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:India’s Military Modernisation and its Impact on Conventional Defence Strategies
DESCRIPTION:Participation in the Fellow Seminars is by invitation only.\nMedia person accredited with foreign media and foreign diplomats may seek prior permission from DDG\, IDSA @ telephone no. 26146832.\n\n\n\n\n1030 to 1300 hrs\n\n\nVenue: Seminar Hall I (Second Floor)\, IDSA
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/indias-military-modernisation-and-its-impact-on-conventional-defence-strategies
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20170825T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20170825T053000
DTSTAMP:20261027T163656
CREATED:20231224T102014Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250227T234411Z
UID:64025-1503639000-1503639000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Partial Accommodation without Conflict: India as a Rising Link Power
DESCRIPTION:Participation in the Fellow Seminars is by invitation only.\nMedia person accredited with foreign media and foreign diplomats may seek prior permission from DDG\, IDSA @ telephone no. 26146832.\n\n\n\n\n1030 to 1300 hrs\n\n\nVenue: Seminar Hall I \, IDSA
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/partial-accommodation-without-conflict-india-as-a-rising-link-power
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20170818T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20170818T053000
DTSTAMP:20261027T163656
CREATED:20231224T102014Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250227T234635Z
UID:64026-1503034200-1503034200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Turkey as a 'Model' for Arab World: Myth or Reality?
DESCRIPTION:Participation in the Fellow Seminars is by invitation only.\nMedia person accredited with foreign media and foreign diplomats may seek prior permission from DDG\, IDSA @ telephone no. 26146832.\n\n\n\n\n1030 to 1300 hrs\n\n\nVenue: Seminar Hall I (Second Floor) \nChairperson: Shri Talmiz Ahmad\nExternal Discussants: Shri Sanjay Singh and Prof A K Mohapatra\nInternal Discussants: Dr Smruti S Pattanaik and Dr Adil Rasheed
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/turkey-as-a-model-for-arab-world-myth-or-reality
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20170713T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20170713T053000
DTSTAMP:20261027T163656
CREATED:20231224T102015Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250227T234801Z
UID:64027-1499923800-1499923800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:India’s Strategic Security Cooperation with Israel: Scope and Analysis
DESCRIPTION:Participation in the Fellow Seminars is by invitation only.\nMedia person accredited with foreign media and foreign diplomats may seek prior permission from DDG\, IDSA @ telephone no. 26146832.\n\n\n\n\n1100 hrs
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/indias-strategic-security-cooperation-with-israel-scope-and-analysis
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20170623T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20170623T053000
DTSTAMP:20261027T163656
CREATED:20231224T102015Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250227T234940Z
UID:64028-1498195800-1498195800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Why China Supports Pakistan on Terrorism?
DESCRIPTION:Participation in the Fellow Seminars is by invitation only.\nMedia person accredited with foreign media and foreign diplomats may seek prior permission from DDG\, IDSA @ telephone no. 26146832.\n\n\n\n\n1030 to 1300 hrs\n\n\nVenue: Seminar Hall I\, IDSA
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/why-china-supports-pakistan-on-terrorism
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR