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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20150529T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20150529T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T160405
CREATED:20231223T133106Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T001713Z
UID:63072-1432877400-1432877400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Strengthening Nuclear Security: Compliance to the Principal Legal Instruments of Nuclear Security
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Dr  Arvind KumarExternal  Discussants: Dr Sitakanta Mishra and Dr Manish DhabadeInternal  Discussants: Mr S Samuel C Rajiv and Ms Sourabhi  Mukherji  \nPresentation\n  Nuclear security concerns  during the Cold War era revolved around the concepts of nuclear deterrence and  nuclear proliferation. However\, in the 21st century\, due to  increased globalization\, political instability and terrorist activities around  the world\, there is a greater threat of theft\, sabotage\, unauthorized access\,  illegal transfer or other malicious acts involving nuclear or other radioactive  substance. In this context the author in this paper points to the urgency of  having an international consensus on building a more robust nuclear system with  legal instruments which would be put in place to prevent the misuse of  sensitive nuclear and radiological material by terrorists. Dr Kazi in her paper  highlights the gaps in the nuclear security system where there are no  substantial legal instruments that have been developed to control the transfer  of these sensitive materials to miscreants. A stronger nuclear security system  is also needed due the existence of nuclear weapons in domestically unstable  and politically volatile regions. In such places\, the nuclear facilities are  susceptible to vulnerabilities like accidents\, miscalculations\, sabotage and  pilferage. Therefore\, a nuclear security system with legal instruments would  allow more effective regulation and make individual states more accountable for  the safety of their nuclear capabilities. Hence\, the need for international  cooperation to control nuclear/radioactive sources around the world is of  paramount importance for the prevention of nuclear terrorism and ensuring  global security.\n Dr Kazi looks at three  existing critical instruments for strengthening nuclear security:  \n\nConvention  on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) of 1980\n\nIt is the only legally binding  international instrument in the area of physical protection of nuclear material\nIts primary objective is to facilitate the  safe transfer of nuclear materials.\n\nAmendment  to the CPPNM OF 2005\n\nSenior Expert Group for the Review of the  IAEA’s  Programme of Activities  recommended that a possible revision on the CPPNM should be done to address the  issues of prevention of unauthorized possession of nuclear material and access  to nuclear facilities\n2005 CPPNM amendment emphasised the  importance of sharing best practices that would be critical to developing a  stringent physical protection system. \n\nInternational  Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) of  2005  \n\nPrevention of the misuse of  nuclear/radiological materials.\nRequires State-parties to make every  effort to adopt appropriate measures to ensure the protection of radioactive  material\, taking into account relevant recommendations and functions of the  agency. \n\n\nThese three legal  instruments urge cooperation for the prevention\, repression and elimination of  terrorism in all forms and calls upon states to criminalize offences related to  the misuse of nuclear/radioactive materials. However\, Dr Kazi argues that  despite all these efforts\, the legal instruments mentioned above remain  ineffective and lack universality. One of the reasons for their ineffectiveness  is complacency. Since in reality no incident of this sort has taken place\,  there is no urgency in complying with a nuclear security system to protect  nuclear/radioactive material. Second\, is the lack of universality\, as countries  that do not have stockpiles of nuclear/radioactive material do not feel the  need to implement effective controls on nuclear material. Nevertheless\, the  author argues that State-parties and non-state parties have the prime  responsibility of generating the requisite political will for an effective  implementation of these legal instruments. If need be\, incremental transparency  in nuclear matters can be effected to generate confidence about its security concerns  which could in the future help to produce a necessary political will for making  these legal instruments universal. \n    Discussion  and Suggestions\n\nThe history and evolution of terrorism and  the way it has been tackled by states have to be mentioned in the context of  nuclear/radioactive materials falling into the wrong hands. \nHistorical debates surrounding the legal  instruments for nuclear security system should be elaborated.\nThe difference between nuclear security  and nuclear safety has to be mentioned and also how the former is evolving in  comparison to the latter. \nEvolution and reforms made in the various  Nuclear Security Summits have to be included to have a more comprehensive  understanding of the evolution of nuclear security. \nThe politics behind non-compliance should  be an integral part of the argument to highlight the lack of universality for  the nuclear security system at the international level.\nThe nature of the balancing act has to be  taken into consideration in the management of nuclear terrorism and nuclear  proliferation.\nThe human element or negligence of  security of nuclear facilities domestically has to be taken into consideration.\n\n(Report  prepared by Ms. Kuhoo Saxena\, Research Intern\, IDSA)
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/strengthening-nuclear-security-compliance-to-the-principal-legal-instruments-of-nuclear-security
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20150529T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20150529T053000
DTSTAMP:20261104T160405
CREATED:20231223T133106Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T001607Z
UID:63073-1432877400-1432877400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:India’s Decision Making on Cross Border Natural Gas Pipelines (1989-2012)
DESCRIPTION:Chair: Dr. Gulshan Dietl\nExternal Discussants: Ms. Lidya Powell and Mr. Ragunatha Mishra\nInternal Discussants: Dr. Smriti Pattnaik and Dr. Uttam Kumar Sinha \nIn the 21st century a nation’s economy thrives on its efficient and boundless use of energy. In this context\, India holds one of the largest markets of energy consumption in the world. Therefore\, energy security has become the paramount focus of Indian Foreign policy. To achieve this goal\, India is pursuing a broad range of options to diversify its energy sources. It ranges from LNG deals\, buying oil and gas spot markets\, acquisition of oil and gas fields abroad\, etc. One of the options is sourcing of energy supplies from neighbours (immediate and distant) through pipelines because of India’s comparative advantages in transportation costs as compared to other modes such as LNG. In this frame of reference\, Government of India identified three natural gas pipeline options: IPI (Iran-Pakistan-India)\, TAPI (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India) and MBI (Myanmar-Bangladesh-India). Kulkarni’s paper focuses on the decision making process involved on these natural gas pipeline projects from 1989 to 2012 and the factors that have influenced India’s decision making on cross border natural gas pipelines. \nThe paper examines the decision making process in this regard by using “Rational Actor Model Theory”\, which is based on cost benefit analysis and Masuda’s condition for Cross Border Pipelines. Kulkarni investigates the rationale behind India’s joining these projects which are costly and geopolitically controversial. The paper also attempts to understand India’s reasons for pursuing TAPI over IPI and MBI. \nKulkarni acknowledges that there is a clash between India’s need for energy security and its strategic interest. Hence\, taking this into account\, he recommends evolving a balance between the two. \nKey Points from discussion:\n\nThe paper discuss appropriate financial regime and commercial viability through cost benefit analysis. At the centre of any such decision making exercise should be the evolution of a balance between the management of geopolitical risk and commercial viability.\nThe energy demand in India is huge. However\, the demand is unmet because it cannot be transformed into purchasing power. Absence of stakeholders for using LNG to generate power is one example.\nWhy is the government reluctant to pursue gas projects as it has simultaneously pursued projects for LNG ports?\nAny analysis of decision making must include the agencies\, organisational structure and authorities involved in decision making. A critical examination of the decision making process is required.\nWhether any inter-ministerial conflict existed in the government during the course of decision making and implementation of the projects has to be taken into consideration.\nThe decision on applying the Rational Actor Theory and ‘Masuda’s’ model in the context of South Asia must be taken into consideration. A special focus is needed to understand the TAPI gas pipeline given the internal dynamics of India and Pakistan. One of the decision making models that is well suited for the conditions prevailing in South Asia is Richard Snyder’s.\nThe reasons for the government to opt for IPI\, TAPI and MBI rather that Oman–India pipeline or SAGE Pipeline should be carefully analysed. The analysis should also include the costs involved.\nAny decision making process on energy projects must include the following:\n\nProvision of providing excess to energy to every one\nSecuring energy supply\nTrying to limit carbon emissions\nImplementation of choices and alternatives of decision-making process must be in compliance with India’s fiscal and environment policies.\nGas pipeline construction must be looked at from the perspective of strategic investment. The presence of Iran and Unites States in this region should be taken into consideration.\n\n\n\n(Report prepared by Satyam Malaviya\, Research Intern\, IDSA)
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/indias-decision-making-on-cross-border-natural-gas-pipelines-1989-2012
CATEGORIES:FELLOW'S SEMINAR,EVENT REPORT
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